Summaries
Summaries
7–46
这
为了
迈克尔
的
Peril
China’s
Peaking
下一个
十年
Beckley,
Tufts
大学
权力:
经济的
Slowdowns
和
Implications
taken
向上
A
如果
那
puzzle:
disrupt
经济的
权力
最多
这
equipped
生长
他们的
rise.
有
rising
been
生长
protracted
rekindle
展示,
到
这
暴力
existing
rising
revisionism
命令,
有
A
它
slowing
权力
姿势
会
是
意义
为什么
原因
ancient
次
世界.
从
这
proªting
reckless
过去的
150
booms
的
方法
vated
dynamics
modern
世纪,
Ukraine.
有
有
国家.
到
他们
然而
从
的
ªt
年,
这样的
这
expansion?
peaking
但
extended
向上
这
移动
解释
包括
slowed
一个
shake
到
帮助
历史,
这
这些
outbreak
的
ªndings
implications
ominous
一
权力,
然而
时期
不是
世界,
和
aggressively
stopped,
迅速的
A
到
的
然后
尝试
到
最多
的
这
的
涌
战争
二,
classic
一些
这
世界
amend
为了
后果性的
帝国主义
Russia’s
我们.
和
理论
geopolitical
在
2014
great
这
晚的
aggression
力量
conºict
的
Chinese
contemporary
foreign
政策.
武器
rising
进步
生长.
谁的
dangerous
和
他们
slowdown
Peaking
到
力量
和
reorder
是
A
超过
这
经济的
种类
这
moti-
力量
事件
在
nineteenth
反对
和
47–90
这
国际的
Jost,
Tyler
Crises
棕色的
大学
Institutional
Origins
的
Miscalculation
在
China’s
在
ºow
international
crises?
国家的
的
信息
之间
到
到
这
这
miscalculate
shaping
和
theoretical
prone
规则
防御,
中国
是
什么时候
institutions—the
他们的
外交,
回答
institutional
reduce
cratic
补间
provide.
逻辑的
eaucratic
问题.
类型:
的
信息
A
integrated,
miscalculation
到
bureaucracies
对比,
机构.
这
那
leader,
miscalculation
Fragmented
领导者
和
improves
是
信息
风险
这
在
到
智力
bureaucracies—offer
differentiates
框架
支离破碎的,
经过
两个都
Integrated
siloed.
和
容量
到
building
A
competitive
的
在下面
fostering
质量
likely
经过
这
更多的
信息
类型
二
到
容量
到
bureaucrats
机构
和
encourage
reduce
领导者
一
之间
安全
和
重要的
三
机构
bureau-
relay
是-
dialogue
他们
那
patho-
的
bur-
relay
操纵
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国际安全 48:1 4
information to conform with the leader’s prior beliefs. Siloed institutions re-
strict information sharing between bureaucracies, which degrades the evalu-
ation of information and encourages bureaucracies to manipulate information
to suit their organizational interests. A medium-N analysis of China’s interna-
tional security crises from 1949 到 2012 demonstrates that national security in-
stitutions help to explain the majority of its crisis miscalculations. Case studies
在 1962 Nationalist invasion scare, 这 1969 Sino-Soviet border conºict,
和 2001 EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft incident illustrate the mechanisms
by which national security institutions shape the risk of miscalculation in
international crises.
91–124
Collective Resilience: Deterring China’s Weaponization of
Economic Interdependence
Victor D. Cha, Georgetown University
Since the 2010s, China has used economic coercion against Western and Asian
states to achieve territorial and political goals. China’s leveraging of its market
is a form of “predatory liberalism” that weaponizes the networks of inter-
dependence created by globalization. The United States and other like-minded
partners have mostly used piecemeal “de-risking” measures such as decoup-
令, supply chain resilience, reshoring, and trade diversion to reduce depend-
ence on China and thereby minimize vulnerability to its economic coercion.
But these practices do not stop the Chinese government’s economic bullying.
“Collective resilience” is a peer competition strategy designed to deter the
Xi Jinping regime’s economic predation. What informs this strategy is the un-
derstanding that interdependence, even asymmetric interdependence, 是一个
two-way street. Original trade data show that the previous and current targets
of economic coercion by the Xi Jinping regime export over $46.6 十亿
worth of goods to China on which it is more than 70 percent dependent as a
proportion of its total imports of those goods. These target states could band
together in a collective resilience alliance and practice economic deterrence by
promising to retaliate against China’s high-dependence trade should Beijing
act against any one of the alliance members.
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Summaries 5
125–165
Words Matter: The Effect of Moral Language on
International Bargaining
Abigail S. 邮政, University of Pittsburgh
How does moral language affect international bargaining? When countries
rely on moral language to frame a disputed issue, they decrease the probability
of peaceful compromise and increase the probability of the dispute escalating
with military action. This language operates through two pathways. 第一的,
moral language prejudices domestic audiences against compromise over the
disputed issue, thereby limiting the options available to negotiators during
bargaining. 第二, moral language prompts the dispute opponent to also uti-
lize moral arguments to defend its position. The ensuing moral debate moral-
izes both sets of domestic audiences, consequently reducing opportunities for
compromise and narrowing the bargaining range. Negotiated concessions
then frustrate the bargaining opponent and elicit accusations of hypocrisy
from domestic audiences for compromising on the principle at stake. 这
backlash triggers crises and pressures the government to stand ªrm on its pre-
viously principled (and uncompromising) 位置, increasing the probability
of military escalation. An examination of the effects of moral language on ne-
gotiation breakdown and dispute escalation in the Falkland Islands/Islas
Malvinas case probes the theory. The ªndings illustrate how moral language
can shape a government’s behavior far into the future, constraining its ability
to broker a peaceful compromise.
166–207
Bargaining with the Military: How Presidents Manage the Political
Costs of Civilian Control
Andrew Payne, 牛津大学
In an era of increased politicization of the military, there are powerful disin-
centives for commanders-in-chief to challenge the preferences of the senior
military leadership. Even though presidents may have the constitutional
“right to be wrong,” they require considerable political capital to test that
主张. Dominant normative theories of civil-military relations focus on
ideal-type scenarios that do not reºect the messy, inherently political character
of elite decision-making. A case study of civil-military dynamics during the
Iraq War identiªes four decision-making strategies that George W. Bush and
Barack Obama used to avoid incurring a domestic political penalty for being
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国际安全 48:1 6
seen to go against the preferences of the uniformed military. Drawing on de-
classiªed documents and dozens of interviews with former administration
ofªcials and top-ranking military leaders, the ªndings indicate that both ad-
ministrations used these strategies during key episodes of civil-military fric-
tion in the Iraq War (这 2007 surge and the troop drawdown that followed).
Scholars and practitioners should focus on strengthening civilian and mili-
tary leaders’ capacity to navigate the politics of national security decision-
making and reconsidering conventional understandings of the apolitical role
of the military.
note to contributors
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