Summaries

7–46

The Peril of Peaking Powers: Economic Slowdowns and Implications
for China's Next Decade
Michael Beckley, Tufts University

From ancient times to the present, rising powers have taken up arms to reorder
the world. Yet such violent revisionism poses a puzzle: If a rising power is
profiting from the existing order, why would it disrupt that progress with a
reckless fit of expansion? One reason is slowing economic growth. Over the
past 150 years, peaking powers, meaning rising powers whose economic
booms have slowed but not yet stopped, have been the most dangerous kind
of country. An extended period of rapid growth equipped them with the
means to shake up the world, and then a protracted growth slowdown moti-
vated them to move aggressively to try to rekindle their rise. Peaking power
dynamics help explain some of the most consequential geopolitical events in
modern history, including the surge of U.S. imperialism in the late nineteenth
century, the outbreak of World War II, and Russia's 2014 aggression against
Ukraine. These findings amend classic theories of great power conflict and
have ominous implications for contemporary Chinese foreign policy.

47–90

The Institutional Origins of Miscalculation in China's
International Crises
Tyler Jost, Brown University

When is China prone to miscalculate in international crises? National security
institutions—the rules shaping the flow of information between leaders and
their diplomatic, defense, and intelligence bureaucracies—offer one important
answer to this question. A theoretical framework differentiates between three
institutional types: integrated, fragmented, and siloed. Integrated institutions
reduce the risk of miscalculation both by building capacity to relay bureau-
cratic information to the leader, and by fostering a competitive dialogue be-
tween bureaucracies that improves the quality of information that they
provide. In contrast, miscalculation is more likely under two types of patho-
logical institutions. Fragmented institutions reduce capacity to relay bur-
eaucratic information to leaders and encourage bureaucrats to manipulate

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information to conform with the leader's prior beliefs. Siloed institutions restrict information sharing between bureaucracies, which degrades the evaluation of information and encourages bureaucracies to manipulate information to suit their organizational interests. A medium-N analysis of China's international security crises from 1949 to 2012 demonstrates that national security institutions help to explain the majority of its crisis miscalculations. Case studies on the 1962 Nationalist invasion scare, the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict, and the 2001 EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft incident illustrate the mechanisms by which national security institutions shape the risk of miscalculation in international crises.

91–124
Collective Resilience: Deterring China's Weaponization of
Economic Interdependence
Victor D. Cha, Georgetown University

Since the 2010s, China has used economic coercion against Western and Asian states to achieve territorial and political goals. China's leveraging of its market is a form of "predatory liberalism" that weaponizes the networks of interdependence created by globalization. The United States and other like-minded partners have mostly used piecemeal "de-risking" measures such as decoupling, supply chain resilience, reshoring, and trade diversion to reduce dependence on China and thereby minimize vulnerability to its economic coercion. But these practices do not stop the Chinese government's economic bullying. "Collective resilience" is a peer competition strategy designed to deter the Xi Jinping regime's economic predation. What informs this strategy is the understanding that interdependence, even asymmetric interdependence, is a two-way street. Original trade data show that the previous and current targets of economic coercion by the Xi Jinping regime export over $46.6 billion worth of goods to China on which it is more than 70 percent dependent as a proportion of its total imports of those goods. These target states could band together in a collective resilience alliance and practice economic deterrence by promising to retaliate against China's high-dependence trade should Beijing act against any one of the alliance members.

125–165
Words Matter: The Effect of Moral Language on
International Bargaining
Abigail S. Post, University of Pittsburgh

How does moral language affect international bargaining? When countries
rely on moral language to frame a disputed issue, they decrease the probability
of peaceful compromise and increase the probability of the dispute escalating
with military action. This language operates through two pathways. First,
moral language prejudices domestic audiences against compromise over the
disputed issue, thereby limiting the options available to negotiators during
bargaining. Second, moral language prompts the dispute opponent to also uti-
lize moral arguments to defend its position. The ensuing moral debate moral-
izes both sets of domestic audiences, consequently reducing opportunities for
compromise and narrowing the bargaining range. Negotiated concessions
then frustrate the bargaining opponent and elicit accusations of hypocrisy
from domestic audiences for compromising on the principle at stake. This
backlash triggers crises and pressures the government to stand firm on its pre-
viously principled (and uncompromising) position, increasing the probability
of military escalation. An examination of the effects of moral language on ne-
gotiation breakdown and dispute escalation in the Falkland Islands/Islas
Malvinas case probes the theory. The findings illustrate how moral language
can shape a government's behavior far into the future, constraining its ability
to broker a peaceful compromise.

166–207
Bargaining with the Military: How Presidents Manage the Political
Costs of Civilian Control
Andrew Payne, University of Oxford

In an era of increased politicization of the military, there are powerful disin-
centives for commanders-in-chief to challenge the preferences of the senior
military leadership. Even though presidents may have the constitutional
"right to be wrong," they require considerable political capital to test that
proposition. Dominant normative theories of civil-military relations focus on
ideal-type scenarios that do not reflect the messy, inherently political character
of elite decision-making. A case study of civil-military dynamics during the
Iraq War identifies four decision-making strategies that George W. Bush and
Barack Obama used to avoid incurring a domestic political penalty for being

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seen to go against the preferences of the uniformed military. Drawing on declassified documents and dozens of interviews with former administration officials and top-ranking military leaders, the findings indicate that both administrations used these strategies during key episodes of civil-military friction in the Iraq War (the 2007 surge and the troop drawdown that followed). Scholars and practitioners should focus on strengthening civilian and military leaders' capacity to navigate the politics of national security decision-making and reconsidering conventional understandings of the apolitical role of the military.

NOTE TO CONTRIBUTORS

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