Narda L. Sotomayor
Setting the Regulatory Landscape for the
Provision of Electronic Money in Peru
Fletcher School Leadership Program in Financial Inclusion:
Peru Policy Memo
Although there is much evidence that access to financial services correlates posi-
tively with economic development, basic convenient transfer and payment servic-
es are still unavailable for low-income segments of the Peruvian population. 这
experience of Kenya, the Philippines, and other countries has shown that electron-
ic money (e-money) products can be effective in extending payment services.
然而, in Peru, the absence of regulation for the provision of schemes based on
e-money prevents good investments and at the same time encourages fraudulent
活动.
This policy memo discusses the main elements of establishing a regulatory
framework for e-money. It recommends that policymakers first define e-money,
taking into account the laws and regulations of a particular country. If e-money is
not defined as a deposit, then it follows that financial institutions may provide e-
money products, along with telecommunications companies and similar opera-
托尔斯. This will provide contestability in the market and more efficiency in the pro-
vision of e-money-based products for the benefit of consumers, 特别是
贫穷的.
Narda L. Sotomayor is a Senior Economist at the Superintendency of Banks,
Insurance Companies and Pension Funds of Peru (SBS). She is currently the Head of
the Department of Microfinance Analysis and is leading the SBS effort to design an
appropriate regulatory framework for the development of mobile money services.
Sotomayor combines public service with academia, is a professor in the Economics
Department of the Catholic University of Peru, and also lectures in microfinance-
related training courses. The focus of her professional activity and her research inter-
ests are on financial inclusion related topics, rural finance, and microfinance, areas in
which she has published and worked as a consultant for diverse international organi-
zations, including USAID, IADB, 和世界银行.
This policy memo was initially written for the Fletcher School Leadership Program in
Financial Inclusion, where Narda Sotomayor was a Fellow in 2011.
© 2012 Narda L. Sotomayor
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THE PROBLEM
Although access to and usage of financial services in Peru has improved, 进步
has been insufficient. From June 2006 to June 2011, the level of access measured by
the total points of service, including branches, ATMs, and retail agents, 每 100,000
adults has increased from 23 到 103. 进一步来说, the share of the number of
transactions through retail agents has reached about 12 percent in six years of exis-
张力, and it is still increasing. Usage indicators in the same period, such as the
number of borrowers per 100 adults, went from 18.2 到 26.1, and the number of
individuals with saving accounts per 100 adults went from 61.6 到 83.9.1
然而, a large percentage of the population still remains underserved or
excluded, particularly in most rural areas, where financial institutions do not find
it profitable to offer services through the current channels and products available
in the market. Relatively low population densities in remote areas and the small
average size of transactions hamper the expansion of the financial system’s physi-
cal network. The population living in the districts with access to financial services
delivery channels now includes 82 percent of the adult population. 然而, 这
其余的 18 percent of the adult population lives in 66 percent of the isolated dis-
tricts without any access to the financial system.
The international experience sheds some light on this problem. It shows that
alternative access channels and products can be used to expand financial services.
尤其, the use of diverse electronic devices, including mobile phones, 能
significantly reduce operational and transaction costs for both consumers and the
financial service providers. 在秘鲁, the fact that penetration of the mobile indus-
try is above 95 percent and that 88 percent of the districts in Peru have mobile
phone coverage creates an opportunity for using these devices to increase the scope
and the depth of outreach.2
尽管如此, the lack of rules and supervision of e-money constrains the
development of mobile financial services (MFS) by generating uncertainty and
preventing investments in e-money-based products.3 On the other hand, this same
lack of rules and supervision leaves room for fraudulent activities.
所以, it is necessary to define a regulatory framework conducive to the
development of e-money-based services so that they can be offered in a secure,
可靠的, efficient, and transparent way. The proposal of such a regulatory frame-
work is the aim of this memo.
背景: DISTINGUISHING MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES
A regulatory framework may be conceived of as the rules of the game. It conditions
entrance into the market, and affects the decisions and hence the outcomes
achieved by market participants. 为此原因, regulators have a great responsi-
bility and they must be very clear about the vision of the market they want to
encourage.
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Setting the Regulatory Landscape for the Provision of Electronic Money in Peru
Electronic devices, including mobile phones, may be used in different ways to
access financial services. In order to clearly delineate the scope of this policy
memo, it is necessary to analyze at least two of these ways:
1. M-banking services. The most immediate way to use electronic devices is
simply as additional channels to access deposit accounts. 在这种情况下, a customer
may manage her account using an electronic instrument such as her mobile
电话, transferring money among her accounts or to others, or paying bills.4 This
is done by submitting orders to the financial institution (FI) holding her deposit
account without her making a trip to the FI’s branch. This approach is usually
called mobile banking, or m-banking. To sustain these operations, FIs will need to
hire the services of a telecommunications company (telecom). Some examples of
this approach are Wizzit in South Africa and Nipper in Mexico.
M-banking providers have to be FIs authorized to offer deposit accounts,
which are in most cases, as in Peru, prudentially regulated and supervised. From a
regulatory perspective, using this relatively new channel to access deposit accounts
does not present a particular challenge, other than managing operational risks. 在
事实, m-banking activities already exist in Peru, although they are oriented to medi-
um- and high-income segments of the population. The extension of m-banking
services for the unserved population should follow after deposit accounts become
available to them. To encourage this, regulatory changes have already been brought
up since February 2011 to reduce the average cost of opening small deposit
accounts by lessening the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing
(AML/CTF) rules for low-risk products.
2. E-money services. The supply of transfer and payment services using elec-
tronic devices does not require deposit accounts. These services can also be offered
using e-money, which may involve telecoms and other specialized operators, 这样的
as service providers. This is the case with Safaricom, a telecom that offers M-PESA
products in Kenya, or with GCash in the Philippines. In these cases, 顾客
buys electronic (虚拟的) money at the service provider’s agent, either with cash or
other means of payment, crediting the same value. The value stored is registered
by the service provider and can be used by the customer at her convenience by
使用, 例如, a plastic card or a mobile phone. In the latter case, the product
is commonly known as an “electronic wallet,” where the mobile phone is used to
send orders of transfers or payments to the provider’s platform by using an SMS
or a specially designed menu.
到目前为止, e-money activities have not been available in Peru. 然而, 一些
investors are interested in providing these services; investors vary from little-
known operators to telecoms with significant market share.
然而, there is a regulatory vacuum. No definition of e-money exists and
regulation does not specify who can provide services and under what conditions,
thus preventing investments or leaving the door open to any participant, 然而
credible, to enter the market. The current Law of the Payment System recognizes
the existence of possible providers of e-money schemes but does not regulate or
supervise them. It indicates that the central bank will supervise them only if
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providers pose a systemic risk. But if a systemic risk emerges, regulation may come
too late. We must fill the regulatory vacuum related to e-money-based services,
which is the focus of this policy memo.
THE OBJECTIVE OF THE REGULATOR
The main objective of the Peruvian financial regulator is to design an enabling reg-
ulatory framework for the development of a sustainable and inclusive financial
系统. From the regulator’s perspective, stability and sustainability are essential to
the provision of financial services. 然而, the regulatory framework should not
constrain innovation in order to meet the challenge of financial inclusion. 为此
purpose, in the arena of mobile financial services, the rules of the game should
induce the development of transfer and payment services based on e-money,
offered by solid and responsible institutions under conditions of safety, reliability,
efficiency, and transparency for the benefit of the population.
分析: Setting the basis for e-money regulation
There are two key elements that help define the rules of the game for e-money-
based services: a clear definition of e-money, and the decision about the allowed
issuers of e-money. 实际上, both elements are related, as I will show.
Electronic money is generally understood as a value stored electronically that
can be accessed by an electronic device. 然而, the consideration of e-money as
being a deposit or not varies across countries, depending on how deposits are
defined in their constitutions, 法律, and regulations. In the case of Peru, neither the
Political Constitution of Peru nor the General Law of the Financial System defines
a deposit. But the latter mandates that the financial regulator supervise depository
firms collecting deposits from the public.5 The Peruvian Civil Code sheds some
light on this concept. It indicates that a (常规的) voluntary deposit occurs when
the depository institution receives a good for custody and later return.6 On the
另一方面, an irregular deposit occurs when the depositor allows the depository
institution to use the good, acquiring the right to receive (或不) 赔偿,
according to the terms of the contractual agreement.7
None of these definitions of deposit tackles the way e-money-based products
work in the most successful cases. Those products do not involve just custody and
return of the cash handled by the customer, as stated in the general definition of a
voluntary deposit in the Peruvian Civil Code. They involve more. 例如, 在
e-wallet schemes, the customer uses the service of having her cash de-materialized
(converted to e-cash) to store value and to carry out transfers and payments in a
more convenient and cost-efficient way (Mas and Kumar, 2008). 此外, e-
money service providers are not allowed to use the value stored for lending or any
other purpose that the provider may deem convenient, which differs from the con-
cept of irregular deposits defined in the Peruvian Civil Code. The provider only
performs the operations that the customer requests. The cash exchanged for elec-
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Setting the Regulatory Landscape for the Provision of Electronic Money in Peru
tronic value remains in control of the customer at all times, much like it was inter-
preted when the Central Bank of Kenya analyzed the case of M-PESA (AFI, 2010).
因此, under current Peruvian laws and regulations, e-money cannot be con-
sidered a deposit. We can define e-money as being a monetary value stored in an
electronic device that is presented by a claim on the issuer and that has the follow-
ing characteristics:
• It is issued upon receipt of funds at an equal value of the monetary value
receipt
• It is widely accepted as a means of payment
• It can be converted back into cash
• It is not a deposit
Analyzing potential e-money service providers
Consistent with the proposed definition, the range of potential e-money service
providers and models increases. According to the Peruvian constitution, pruden-
tial regulation is required only for depository institutions. 因此, it is possible to
allow the entrance of other non-financial service providers without requiring
them to be regulated as full intermediaries.
然而, the decision of who enters the market should be made only after
careful analysis. All of the stakeholders’ concerns have to be taken into account—
those of the regulator, of the service providers, and of the unserved population. 我
consider only two general types of potential e-money issuers.
1. Financial intermediaries. From the point of view of FIs, the issuance of e-
money would just increase the array of products they can offer to consumers. Like
their m-banking activities, they would have to use the services of a telecommuni-
cations company.
From the point of view of the population, particularly of the poor, the gains
are not clear. If FIs were able to reach them through e-money-based products, 他们
could also offer them m-banking services, which would make more sense in that it
implies additional services beyond transfers and payment services. 然而,
despite the substantial increase of the retail agent of the financial system in Peru,
which reached 9,204 as of December 2010, the impact appears to be limited to the
low end of the market. Perhaps the advantage of offering e-money services in rela-
tion to m-banking will appear if FIs are able to increase the capillarity of their dis-
tribution networks by incorporating the mobile operator’s agent network into
their distribution networks. Under this option, since deposit-taking FIs are pru-
dentially regulated, the concerns of the regulator relate primarily to transparency
问题. The regulator should require FIs to make clear for the customers the char-
acteristics of the product that is being provided, m-banking or e-money (deposit
or non-deposit). 此外, FIs should be required to offer e-money-based serv-
ices using a trust-like scheme, for two basic reasons. 第一的, the regulation must keep
consistency with the nature of e-money, whereby the service provider receives the
money only to perform transfers and payments at the request of the customer. 这
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constitution of a fund for a specific purpose is the concept intrinsic in a trust.
第二, since the e-money issued is not a deposit, it is not protected by the Deposit
Insurance Fund. In the event of an FI’s bankruptcy, the trust assets will not be liq-
uidated; 因此, the customers’ money will be safe.
2. Mobile operators and other specialized service providers. 在这种情况下, 移动的
operators have the opportunity to go beyond the communication services they
provide and offer e-money services. This can be done with the relative advantage
of having scope economies, since the systems needed are mostly in place, 和他们
have experience running high-volume, real-time prepaid platforms (Alexandre et
等人。, 2010). From the population perspective, considering the high level of penetra-
tion that mobile phones have achieved in Peru even among the poor, the gains are
清除. Mobile phone users are already familiar with the mobile service and with
their providers, and they can benefit from the expanded functionality of their
mobiles. 而且, the large network of retail airtime resellers may serve them as
convenient cash-in/cash-out outlets.
The argument against allowing mobile operators to offer e-money services is
that they do not promote full entry into a suite of a financial institution options.
Without underscoring the value of providing access to credit and deposit services,
例如, we have to acknowledge that the most basic service that the financial
system should provide is transfer and payment facilities. This has not been hap-
pening in Peru as in other developing countries. 所以, poor migrants living in the
首都, Lima, often find themselves sending money to their dependents by infor-
mal means, such as using bus services to send cash hidden in packages or using
informal bus transportation remittance services, in order to avoid the high com-
missions that a regulated financial entity may charge. 因此, e-money services pro-
vided by mobile operators can make the unserved population better off by offer-
ing efficient payment and transfer services. 此外, alliances may take place
between mobile operators and full intermediaries to provide a wider set of finan-
cial services. 实际上, this entry route to financial services may be more effective for
消费者, since mobile networks may have a consumer track record in payment
and credit worthiness (Williams and Torma, 2007). 尤其, this type of infor-
mation about the poor may help to reduce the barriers to accessing a larger set of
financial services, getting closer to reaching full financial inclusion, which is the
final objective a country wants to achieve.
From the regulatory perspective, when mobile operators are allowed to offer a
financial service (IE。, e-money based) they have to be supervised by a financial reg-
ulator. 然而, since the service is not a deposit, only non-prudential regulation
is needed to ensure the safety of the value stored by the customers and to protect
consumers from possible mistreatment by the providers. To safeguard the cus-
tomers’ funds, diverse financial regulators from the Philippines, 肯尼亚, 和
印度尼西亚, 除其他外, have made the decision to require the e-money issuers to
maintain liquid assets equivalent to the total value of the funds collected in a trust
account of a prudentially regulated institution. As explained before, if a specialized
mobile operator goes bankrupt, customers’ funds are safe and they will be able to
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cash out a value equal to the one they have cashed in. 在这个意义上, there is no sol-
vency risk posed under this approach by the mobile operator (GSMA, 2010).
THE CHOICE
The most conservative approach would be to allow as e-money issuers only
those FIs that are prudentially regulated, which is more than what is needed to
monitor e-money services. But this would create a regulatory barrier for mar-
ket contestability and may hinder potential gains for financial inclusion. 上
other hand, the international experience has shown that the participation of
mobile operators has been the most effective way to incorporate the under-
served population into the payment systems. Their advantage lies in their expe-
rience to manage high-volume low-value transactions, which allows them to
safely offer e-money services with lower cost structures than banks (GSMA,
2010). 此外, mobile operators generally market themselves nationwide,
avoiding niche strategies that may be usual for FIs, driven by specific customer
and segment profitability within defined geographies (Ivatury and Mas, 2008).
最后, mobile operators have a larger agent network, which provides
more convenience to customers for cash-in and cash-out operations. 在里面
Peruvian case, it is estimated that the telecom with the largest share in the
mobile telecommunications market has a network of almost 90,000 airtime
resellers, which is about ten times the agent network of financial intermedi-
aries. 因此, mobile operators may be in a better position to achieve mass
adoption of their services.
From the regulator’s perspective, the concerns involved in allowing mobile
operators to offer payment services can be easily addressed. 实际上, there is not a
tradeoff between the participation of financial intermediaries and mobile opera-
托尔斯. Under the two possible scenarios competition between different types of
the population can be better off. 在
service providers or alliances among them
the end, by allowing all types of participants, the financial regulator leaves the mar-
ket to figure out what works best, and the customers will benefit from the result.
OTHER REGULATORY ISSUES
The fundamental principle that the financial regulator should follow when defin-
ing the regulation is to establish a level playing field for all types of service
提供者. For this purpose, a key approach is to focus the regulation on the serv-
ice rather than on the service providers (GSMA, 2010). 和, to guarantee that all
participants will follow the same rules, they should have a common supervisor; 在
this case, the financial supervisor. During the whole regulatory and supervisory
过程, the financial supervisor will need to maintain a continuing dialogue with
other supervisors including, in the Peruvian case, the Central Bank that oversees
the payment system and the regulator of the telecommunications sector. 因此,
mobile operators must obtain a special license from the financial supervisor to
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provide e-money services only, fulfilling the usual entry requirements to ensure the
viability of the project. The financial supervisor should evaluate the suitability of
the shareholders, and make sure that directors and management are qualified, fit,
and proper to manage the operations soundly and prudently. 还, minimum cap-
ital sufficient to support the startup of operations and deter investors who are not
serious may be considered.
Once the firms are incorporated into the regulated market, regulators should
make sure that e-money providers have adequate risk-management processes to
identify, assess, 控制, and monitor the potential risks arising from their activity,
so that the service is provided under conditions of security and reliability. In many
国家, including Peru, the existing risk-management principles are in general
适用的; 然而, regulators may need to tailor them to the activity of e-money
条款. The regulation of operational risk may need to be made more specific,
focusing on the information technology risk. In relation to other electronic chan-
nels to deliver financial services (Internet in personal computers, automatic teller
machines), the use of mobile phones and the mobile network in e-money-based
products are new sources of technological risk. It recognizes the existence of data
and network security risks, which may negatively affect the authenticity, confiden-
tiality, and integrity of the financial transaction, and also the availability of the
服务.
In response to these risks, uniform requirements and rigid levels of security
may be inconsistent with the objective of incorporating the unserved population
into the payment system. The level of security functionality of the mobile phone,
which is most likely basic among the poor, and the degree of dependence on a par-
ticular telecom directly affect the aforementioned risks.8 In view of that, 一些
国家, such as Pakistan and Mexico, have assumed a tiered approach, requiring
data-security levels that vary with the data channels used and transaction size
(AFI, 2010). 而且, the standards defined are technology neutral in order not
to constrain continuous innovation and efficiency gains observed in the telecom-
munications sector. 此外, regulators should be very careful in reviewing the
providers’ risk policies, 程序, and tools for managing the risk. 例如,
the high risk associated with lower levels of security in basic mobile phones may
be mitigated by effective business-process and product-design controls
(Bezuidenhoudt and Porteous, 2008). 这样, regulators can create a flexible,
proportionate regulation to allow continuous supervision that may eventually help
to fine-tune the regulation.
另一方面, liquidity risk is also viewed as relevant to mobile financial
服务, and in this context it is usually understood as the risk that retail agents
may not have enough cash to meet customers’ request of withdrawals. 然而,
this is not a risk specific to the provision of e-money-based products, but to the
use of retail agents to deliver financial services. In the case of Peru, where this
scheme is well developed, this risk does not seem to be critical and it may be a con-
sequence of the retail agent model. In order to keep retail agents as low sources of
风险, FIs are required to establish operational limits consistent with the business
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Setting the Regulatory Landscape for the Provision of Electronic Money in Peru
activity of the agent; they may also consider limits per type of transaction and per
人. 因此, a customer may be unable to transact with an agent if the limits
there are binding. 然而, she may find it easy, depending on the density of the
agent network, to go to another agent nearby to perform the transaction. 即使是这样,
the regulator may require the service provider to have a contingency plan in case
of sudden demand for cash outs, including information on agreements with liq-
uidity suppliers to cope with this eventuality.
Pertaining to money laundering risk concerns, all type of e-money services
providers must comply with existing regulations on AML/CFT, 监控, 和
reporting suspicious activity. 而且, the involvement of mobile operators may
facilitate the identification of suspicious behavior, given their more advanced com-
puting power and their ability to handle large amount of information. 此外,
fieldwork revealed that low amounts of money, traceability, and the monitoring
features of mobile money can make it far less risky than other means of payment,
especially cash (Chatain et al., 2011). 因此, it is possible to introduce some flexi-
bility to the usually rigorous “know your customer” requirements of AML/CTF
norms in order to ease the unbanked population’s access to financial services.
而且, if the regulations are too rigid, people will not move out of the informal
sector (但, 2010), which is another desirable objective to pursue.
Peru has taken this “proportionate to risk” approach by defining in the
AML/CFT regulation three regimes, recognizing the existence of varying risk lev-
els associated with customers and the services and products provided. 第一个
regime is a general one, where regular measures of know your customer and due
diligence apply. The others are special regimes. In the second regime, exemptions
from traditional customer due diligence rules aimed at preventing money launder-
ing apply to low-risk products. Under this regime, the regulation defines a gener-
al basic deposit account with balance and transaction limits, per month and per
天. This product can be contracted with the (widely available) Peruvian National
Identification, even at the financial intermediary’s retail agent network. For e-
money-based products, the same balance and transaction limits should apply.
最后, in the third regime, firms should apply reinforced measures of due dili-
gence for customers whose transactions are inconsistent with their business pro-
files and for those highly exposed to the risk of engaging in money laundering
活动.
Most of the previous risks trigger consumer protection concerns if the subse-
quent losses affect consumers, particularly the poor, who have less ability to com-
plain and obtain compensation for damages. The regulatory framework for con-
sumer protection is well developed in Peru, and the responsibility of compliance
rests with the service provider, independently of the channel used to deliver the
服务. 然而, some aspects may need to be tailored to e-money services,
addressing the consequences of the new risks derived from the use of the mobile
phone and the mobile network. The basic purpose of the consumer-protection
regulation in Peru is to induce service providers to adopt a conduct of respect with
消费者, creating a customer service system with clear policies of consumer
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protection and mechanisms for complaints and dispute resolution. Transparency
in the provision of the services is also a key element in the regulation of consumer
保护, since it allows consumers better decision-making, which also con-
tributes to the healthy development of service providers. 然而, some require-
ments may become cumbersome and costly when dealing with low-risk products.
因此, proportionality is also required. In this spirit, a simplified regime is also
defined for consumer protection rules as maintaining transparency on the most
important elements of information. This framework should also apply to the pro-
vision of e-money services with some fine-tuning. 在这种情况下, basic elements for
consumer protection include information on commission charges for each type of
交易, clear guidance to prevent frauds and identity theft, and information
about alternative channels in the event of system failures. As a part of their con-
sumer protection policies, service providers may be required to get involved in
programs to increase financial capability and customer awareness with regard to
the e-money service being provided. 9
In regard to factors that affect competition in the market, the role of interop-
erability is frequently discussed. Interoperability exists when the service is network
独立的, allowing consumers to transact beyond their service provider’s net-
工作. 否则, consumers would have to choose their providers by evaluating
whose offer is more suitable for them, taking into account, 除其他事项外,
prices and the possibility to transact with a larger group of individuals or with
those with whom they interact more. This incentivizes competition, and e-money
service providers will take action to add value to their networks and attract cus-
tomers, either by product differentiation or by cutting prices. 然而, 有一个
concern that the final outcome may be a reinforcement of the dominant position
of the operator with the largest network. The challenge for regulators is to decide
whether or not interoperability should be imposed by regulation and what is the
most appropriate timing for doing so. Considering the market dynamics men-
上面提到的, interoperability should not be imposed at an early stage of market
发展, when e-money services are not developed, to avoid the risk of ham-
pering market development and innovation, which is motivated by competition.
At the same time, regulators should make sure that technical interoperability
remains feasible at a low cost, while reserving a credible option for regulatory
intervention to secure interoperability in the future, in the light of market devel-
选项 (Houpis and Bellis, 2007). 实际上, even at an early stage of development
it is likely that interoperability will emerge spontaneously if the leader wants to
build up a large customer base, which is a necessary condition for the viability of
this low-cost, large-volume service. 一般来说, consumers are better off with as
much interoperability as possible, provided that they get value propositions at rea-
sonable prices.
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Setting the Regulatory Landscape for the Provision of Electronic Money in Peru
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
An enabling environment for the development of sustainable and inclusive mobile
financial services requires creating a clear regulatory framework, without prevent-
ing innovation and competition in the market. Key recommendations for crafting
such a regulatory framework for e-money-based services can be summarized as
如下:
• A clear definition of e-money must first exist, which takes into account the laws
and regulations of a particular country. A key element in that definition is to
establish whether or not e-money is a deposit. This defines the array of service
providers that may be allowed into the market.
• In order to induce market contestability, it is important to allow all types of e-
money issuers, 如果可能的话. 尤其, the participation of mobile operators
may have the potential to accelerate the incorporation of the poor into an effi-
cient payment service system by providing them convenient and affordable
产品.
• Risk-based approaches deal with money laundering concerns without jeopard-
izing the objective of financial inclusion. The literature has shown that e-
money-based schemes offer less risk than the use of cash, since they are trace-
able and easy to control.
1. Superintendencia de Banca (2011). Note that the number of depositors may be overestimated,
since the information available is the sum of depositors across institutions and one person may
have accounts in more than one institution. 仍然, the trend observed is increasing.
2. Penetration is measured by the number of lines over total population (OSIPTEL, 2010)
3. Bankable Frontiers and Afi (2009) argue that in civil law environments, like those in Latin
美国, “what is not expressly permitted, is usually not allowed unlike common law countries
(such as South Africa and Kenya) where the absence of express laws prohibiting new develop-
ments may actually create space for innovations to develop.” Thus, certainty is a relatively stronger
prerequisite in Latin America than in common law countries for the development of mobile
financial services.
4. From now on, the customer will be referred as “she.” This is to remind us that women typically
have less access to financial services than men.
5. Political Constitution of Peru 2003, 文章 87.
6. Peruvian Civil Code, 文章 1814.
7. Peruvian Civil Code, 文章 1829.
8. A complete description of the risks involved and strategies to mitigate them can be found in
Bezuidenhoudt and Porteous (2008).
9. A detail analysis of consumer protection issues in branchless banking can be found in Dias and
McKee (2010).
参考
AFI-Alliance for Inclusion. (2010). Enabling Mobile Money Transfer: The Central Bank of Kenya’s
Treatment of M-Pesa, case study.
AFI-Alliance for Inclusion. (2010). Mobile Financial Services. Regulatory Approaches to Enable
Access, policy note.
Alexandre, Claire, 伊格纳西奥·马斯, and Dan Radcliffe. (2010). Regulating New Banking Models That Can
创新 / 体积 6, 数字 4
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Narda L. Sotomayor
Bring Financial Services to All, Bill & 梅琳达·盖茨基金会.
Bezuidenhoudt, Johann, and David Porteous. (2008). Managing the Risk of Mobile Banking
Technologies, report commissioned by FinMark Trust to Bankable Frontier Associates.
Bankable Frontier Associates and Afi-Analistas Financieros Internacionales. (2009). How Enabling
Is the Latin American Environment for Mobile Money? briefing note 1.
Chatain, Pierre-Laurent, Andrew Zerzan, Wameek Noor, Najah Dannaoui, and Louis de Koker.
(2011). Protecting Mobile Money against Financial Crimes, World Bank.
Dias, Denise, and Khaterine McKee. (2010). Protecting Branchless Banking Consumers: 政策
Objectives and Regulatory Options, CGAP focus note no. 64.
GSMA. (2010). Mobile Money for the Unbanked, annual report, 2010.
Houpis, 乔治, and James Bellis. (2007). Competition Issues in the Development of M-
Transactions Systems. In Vodafone policy paper series no. 6, The Transformational Potential of M-
Transactions.
Ivatury, Gautam, and Ignacio Mas. (2008). The Early Experience with Branchless, CGAP focus note
不. 46.
但, Ignacio, and Kabir Kumar (2008). Banking on Mobiles: 为什么, 如何, for Whom? CGAP focus note
不. 48.
但, Ignacio. (2010, 十一月 23). Servicios Financieros en Todas las Comunidades, presentation
made to the SBS and other regulatory authorities and potential e-money market players in Peru.
Organismo Supervisor de Inversión Privada en Telecomunicaciones-OSIPTEL. (2010). Statistics of
National Coverage of Mobile Phone Services. 可在 http 上获取://www.osiptel.gob.pe
Superintendencia de Banca, Seguros y AFP –SBS. (2011). Reporte de Indicadores de Inclusión
Financiera, 六月 2011. 可在 http 上获取://www.sbs.gob.pe
威廉姆斯, 霍华德, and Maili Torma. (2007). Trust and Fidelity: From “under the mattress” to the
mobile phone. In Vodafone policy paper series, 不. 6, The Transformational Potential of M-
Transactions.
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