Elizabeth Hausler
Building Earthquake-Resistant
Houses in Haiti
The Homeowner-Driven Model
Earthquakes are deadly. Every year, thousands of people in developing coun-
tries die when buildings collapse on them, and hundreds of thousands more are
left homeless. It’s not the earthquake that kills people, it’s the collapse of build-
ings that were poorly designed and built. The potential for tragedy only
increases as more people move to cities and more buildings are constructed
using concrete, which can be dangerous without good design and building
标准. The recent disaster in Haiti is a tragic reminder of these facts. 但
these are man-made problems, and they have man-made solutions.
People in Haiti who have lost their homes are ideal candidates for home-
owner-driven reconstruction, a low-cost, high-impact rebuilding model used
successfully by governments in India, 印度尼西亚, 和中国, and implemented
on the ground by Build Change. 迄今为止, 超过 70,000 people in Indonesia and
China live in safer homes because of Build Change’s work. In Indonesia, 房子-
es we helped construct were tested in an earthquake that struck on September
30, 2009. None of the houses that met our minimum standard for earthquake
safety was damaged in the earthquake.
In addition to designing earthquake-resistant houses in developing countries,
we train builders, homeowners, engineers, and government officials to build them.
Working directly with homeowners to choose a design and hire and oversee
builders is a rewarding process that results in safer houses and satisfied homeown-
Elizabeth Hausler is the Founder and CEO of Build Change. She is a skilled brick,
block, and stone mason with an MS and a PhD in civil engineering from the
University of California, 伯克利, and an MS in environmental science from the
University of Colorado. Before graduate school, she spent five years providing engi-
neering consulting services at Peterson Consulting in Chicago and Dames & Moore in
丹佛. Elizabeth is a 2004 Echoing Green Fellow, A 2006 Draper Richards Fellow, A
2009 Ashoka-Lemelson Fellow, and was a Fulbright scholar to India in 2002-2003.
© 2010 Elizabeth Hausler
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Elizabeth Hausler
呃. Empowering homeowners, builders, construction professionals, and local gov-
ernments to drive change is a more cost-effective and lasting solution than build-
ing houses for people.
But people will not build an earthquake-resistant house unless they can afford
到, and they need access to technology, 材料, and skilled construction profes-
西纳尔斯. They also need incentives,
and someone must enforce the
building standards. By addressing all
three barriers—technology, 钱,
and people—Build Change encour-
ages the growth of an environment
in which earthquake-resistant con-
struction becomes common.
Earthquakes are deadly.
Every year, thousands of
people in developing
countries die when
buildings collapse on them,
and hundreds of thousands
more are left homeless. 它是
not the earthquake that kills
人们, it’s the collapse of
buildings that were poorly
designed and built.
Why is this work important?
Earthquakes are deadly. 他们
consistently rank among the top
three deadliest natural phenomena
在世界上, battling for top posi-
tion with floods and windstorms,
根据
the IFRC World
Disasters Reports. 在 2004, UNDP
estimated that over 130 million peo-
ple live with the constant threat of
being killed by an earthquake.1
到
Earthquakes are expensive. 在里面
1990s, global losses from earth-
quakes topped US$215 billion. Over US$8 billion has been requested for recon-
struction in Haiti since the 2010 earthquake.
Earthquakes have lasting consequences. People become permanently disabled;
women and orphaned children in particular suffer from the effects of trauma,
homelessness, and lack of security.
Earthquakes disproportionately affect poor people in developing countries who
have no safety net, no savings or insurance, no well-off relatives to take them in. 和,
because their homes are often their places of business, they often lose all of their
assets and their ability to earn an income.
Why do buildings collapse after earthquakes? The answer is those same three
intertwined factors: 技术, 钱, 和人. 在发展中国家, 这
poorest people build simple, traditional houses with their own labor and local low-
or no-cost materials, usually mud, thatch, or other lightweight (less deadly) mate-
rials. The trouble begins when they upgrade to more formal houses of mud bricks,
fired bricks, or stone with heavy slate or concrete roofs. These unreinforced
masonry or poorly built concrete houses can kill thousands in an earthquake.
Many factors are driving this shift. 第一的, people want to be modern, and brick
and concrete structures represent a step up the socioeconomic ladder. These struc-
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Building Earthquake-Resistant Houses in Haiti
tures also need less maintenance and are believed to be warmer, dryer, 和更多
secure. 第二, timber can be hard to get: many developing countries, trying to
rein in illegal logging and preserve forests, have restricted access to timber, driving
up the price, and making bricks and concrete cheaper and more accessible. 第三,
cement is easier to get, even in rural areas, thanks to large-scale development proj-
ects (dams, power plants, bridges, and roads), government-driven mass produc-
tion of schools and government buildings, and aggressive advertising by cement
公司. 第四, traditional building skills are being lost as the skilled stonecut-
ters and carpenters who could build traditional, earthquake-resistant houses have
grown old and passed on.
But this shift to modernity is deadly. How can we reverse these trends and help
people build safer, cheaper, and yet still desirable, 房屋? Tragic as it was, Haiti’s
earthquake presents a tremendous opportunity for change. We now have the
opportunity to put in place programs and strategies we have developed through
years of experience in Indonesia and China. We have urged the Haitian govern-
ment to encourage homeowner-driven reconstruction and have offered to share
the expertise we have acquired working throughout the world. The models we have
developed reflect a clear commitment to building safe houses, and we have already
started to create permanent change in Haiti so that when the next earthquake hits,
more buildings will stay standing.
In this case narrative, I describe how the Build Change model will work in
Haiti and why it is crucial to use a homeowner-driven model rather than a donor-
driven one. I describe examples of the work we have done so far in three earth-
quake-prone countries, and from it draw lessons for building a better Haiti.
THE HISTORY OF BUILD CHANGE
I grew up in a small town outside of Chicago, where I spent summers working as
a bricklayer for my father’s masonry construction company. After graduating from
the University of Illinois with a degree in general engineering, I worked in techni-
cal litigation support and environmental engineering. I was halfway through my
PhD in earthquake engineering at the University of California, 伯克利, 什么时候
three things happened in the same year.
第一的, an earthquake in Gujarat, 印度, killed over 20,000 人们, 大多
because unreinforced masonry buildings collapsed on them. This made me ques-
tion why earthquakes kill so many people in developing countries. 第二, 这
events of September 11, 2001, compelled me to use my engineering skills to make
the world a better place. 第三, I met Martin Fisher, cofounder and CEO of
KickStart.2 Meeting Martin opened my eyes to a world of opportunity for technol-
ogy—and the right business model—to impact people’s lives. So I finished my
doctorate and, 在 2002, went to India on a Fulbright fellowship to study and assist
with the post-earthquake reconstruction.
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Elizabeth Hausler
印度: Observing Reconstruction After Earlier Earthquakes
I landed in India at the end of 2002, with two questions:
1. Were people and organizations building safe houses in the wake of this earth-
quake?
2. Were construction practices changing permanently, so that people would con-
tinue to build safe houses in the future?
Over the next two years, 在 80 villages in three Indian states, I talked with
homeowners, builders, relief and development workers, and government officials
about the effects of several earthquakes. Back in 1993, an earthquake in eastern
Maharashtra state (Killari) had killed over 7,900 people and knocked down thou-
sands of houses. The reconstruction was largely driven by contractors and donors
who did not consider the homeowners’ needs and perspectives. Although commu-
nity members were involved in land-use planning and selecting beneficiaries, 这
homeowners did not get to choose their floor plans or types of structures or hire
a local builder to build the house.
Visiting Maharashtra in 2004, ten years after the earthquake, I found that some
homeowners were still sleeping outside their houses because they were not
involved in the construction process and did not trust that contractors had built
the houses properly. Few of the houses could be extended or added to in a struc-
turally integrated way. Because homeowners did not control the construction, 他们
could not use their own resources to build a larger house or a different floor plan
more appropriate to their family size, home business, or lifestyle. Some of the alter-
native technologies—like geodesic dome houses—were more earthquake resistant
but not appropriate to the culture and lifestyle. They provided little natural light
and ventilation, had poor interior acoustics, and the small interior space could not
be divided to provide privacy. Some people had abandoned homes—and entire
housing developments—that lacked the infrastructure they needed to live there.
Donor-driven approaches were also used after the 1999 earthquake in
Chamoli, 印度. In a few locations, the government introduced a prefabricated
plank-and-joist roofing system. Stimulating small business development and gen-
erating local income while meeting the need for building materials is a sensible
approach often applied after disasters. But the design and quality of construction
were less than ideal; homeowners reported that their roofs leaked during heavy
rainstorms. 在 2004, only one production facility was still active, and it `was work-
ing mostly for the government, not the general population. Most homeowners
who had the choice built a reinforced concrete cast-in-place roof, which can per-
form well in an earthquake—if built correctly. 所以, by focusing on the prefabricat-
ed technology, the reconstruction effort missed out on the opportunity to train
builders and homeowners to design and build properly with a common, locally
appropriate technology that people would continue to use.
On January 26, 2001, in the Kachchh district of Gujarat, 印度, the Bhuj earth-
quake caused over 20,000 deaths and destroyed over 215,000 houses.3
Unreinforced masonry buildings with heavy roofs and poorly designed reinforced
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Building Earthquake-Resistant Houses in Haiti
concrete frame buildings caused the most damage. 而且, before the earth-
quake, the government had used pre-cast concrete panel systems to build 6,000
primary schools; many of them collapsed. Owners of destroyed houses could
either rebuild their own homes with cash assistance (the homeowner-driven
方法) or move into a house built by a nonprofit or government organization
(the donor-driven approach). Approximately 77 percent of homeowners chose to
build the house themselves; they later reported being the most satisfied with their
new homes. Those whose
homes were rebuilt by donors
were the least satisfied.
Ten years after the earthquake,
some homeowners were still
sleeping outside their houses
because they were not involved
in the construction process
and did not trust that
contractors had built the
houses properly.
In the homeowner-driven
方法, the new houses were
built on the original sites, 和
the owners chose the floor plan
and building materials that fit
their lifestyle and budget. 他们
could build whatever type of
房子
they wanted: stone,
bricks, or blocks were common
for the walls, and reinforced
concrete or timber with clay
tiles for the roofs. They could
also build a larger house if they
could afford it, provided they
reinforced it properly and fol-
lowed government-issued guidelines. Most homeowners didn’t actually build a
house themselves; 反而, they hired local masons or teams of builders and took
advantage of technical assistance provided by government-trained engineers. 这
government provided funds in installments; homeowners had to comply with the
guidelines to receive the next installment. 和, 最后, because they hired the
builder and oversaw the construction themselves, the homeowners were more con-
fident that their house could keep their family safe.
In the donor-driven approach, houses were built en masse by contractors
working for the government or nonprofit organizations, usually at relocation sites.
The homeowners had little, if any, role in the design and construction, 和
houses were built primarily with donor funds, and thus not subject to inspections
like the other houses. 仍然, many of the nonprofits followed or exceeded the recon-
struction guidelines in order to maintain their reputation and gain the homeown-
ers’ trust, and houses built by the government of Gujarat complied with all earth-
quake-resistant building norms.
But many people in the donor-driven houses were not satisfied with them.
Some houses were never occupied. Many had architectural features that were not
appropriate for the climate or the culture. Toilets were built inside houses although
homeowners preferred them outside, so the toilets weren’t used. Doors led to the
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Elizabeth Hausler
street rather than to an enclosed courtyard. Many had very low ceilings, 制作
them unbearably hot during the day. These problems demoralized and frustrated
the homeowners; some abandoned their new homes or modified them in ways that
were no longer earthquake resistant. 在 2003, I saw donor-built relocation villages
that were still uninhabited. People gave various reasons why: some were waiting for
water and power, or for a formal ceremony. 在其他情况下, people had not been
chosen to live in the houses or had refused to move in until they had seen the hous-
es survive a year of aftershocks.
These were valuable lessons that would later apply to Haiti: when given the
选择, 几乎 80 percent of the families with destroyed houses elected to rebuild
by themselves, using local builders and the government’s financial and technical
协助. These people were the most satisfied because they could choose the
材料, 建筑学, and layout that were appropriate to their lifestyle and
预算. They could be actively involved in checking the quality of the construc-
的, which made them more confident that their house would keep their family
safe in an earthquake. They could hire local masons and builders, just as they had
before the earthquake. 和, depending on the technical competence of the govern-
ment engineers, the houses built using this approach were disaster resistant.
The lessons from Gujarat fall into our three key categories of technology,
钱, 和人.
技术
Standards: The government issued clear guidelines for common structures.
Capacity: Training programs and third-party technical assistance were avail-
有能力的.
钱
Access to capital: The government released enough funds to build a complete
basic house.
Incentives: The release of funds was contingent on meeting standards.
Subsidies: These were available on some materials, such as cement.
人们
动机: Homeowners, the government, and relief agencies were all moti-
vated to rebuild safely.
After India: Creating a Model
I left India intent on improving the process of constructing housing after earth-
quakes in developing countries. It started with what I called the three S’s: safety,
satisfaction, 和可持续性. Any house built after an earthquake should be safe,
the homeowner should be satisfied, and the process should be sustainable: 人们
should be able to build safe houses in the future.
From that I developed a theory of change. At that point, I assumed that gov-
ernments would not be in a position to enforce building standards and that the
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Building Earthquake-Resistant Houses in Haiti
Design Criteria for Permanent Housing Reconstruction
技术
• Disaster resistant design—compliant with standards and guidelines
• Disaster resistant construction—built with quality workmanship
• Durable and permanent
• Built with locally available materials and skills
• Easily expanded and maintained using locally available materials and skills
钱
• Competitive in cost with common local (but vulnerable) building methods
人们
• Environmentally neutral, using no illegal materials
• Suitable to the climate
• Culturally appropriate in architecture, 空间, and features
• Secure from break-ins and pests
• Designed and built with the participation of the people
• Trusted by inhabitants, who must believe their house will survive a disaster
only way earthquake-resistant houses would be built was if the right technology
became locally available, widely known, and culturally accepted. Such technology
also had to be cost competitive with existing but vulnerable building methods.
再次: 技术, 钱, 人们.
To make this something we could implement, and drawing on my observations
about what not to do, I developed and published a list of design criteria for per-
manent housing reconstruction.4 New houses should meet 12 criteria in those
three key categories, as spelled out in the text box above.
最后, I set up our implementation model: we would promote and implement
homeowner-driven reconstruction by providing technical assistance and training
仅有的; we would not build houses for people. We would work in environments
where funding was available from some other source, such as a government grant
program or relief agency. This would reduce our need to raise funds, and thus
enable us leverage our niche expertise.
在 2004, with a fellowship from Echoing Green, I started the Center for
Earthquake Resistant Houses. 在 2005, seeking a name that was less academic, 一个
Echoing Green staff member asked, “出色地, what do you do?” and I answered, Build
earthquake-resistant houses and change construction practice permanently.” Build
改变. That has been our name ever since. We had plans to work in Bam, 伊朗,
and Uttaranchal, 印度, near the Himalayas. But in December of 2004, the first
tsunami hit Aceh, 印度尼西亚, which changed everything.
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Post-Tsunami Aceh: The Donor-Driven Model Trumps the Homeowner-
Driven
On December 26, 2004, an earthquake on the Sunda trench caused the Indian
Ocean tsunami. Seismologists said this made it more likely that another strong
earthquake would occur on Sumatra’s other major fault, which runs right along
the edge of the most populated area of Aceh province. Given this huge seismic haz-
ard, I went to Aceh in March 2005.
In Indonesia I met members of Mercy Corps, who ran successful cash-for-
work programs to clean up tsunami debris. People had started to ask for housing,
and Mercy Corps needed a partner to provide it; they decided to fund a pilot proj-
ect in three villages. There we proposed to homeowners that they would choose the
structural system and layout for their home, and we would create the architectur-
al drawings and estimate the quantities and costs of the materials. Homeowners
would then receive a cash grant in installments, which they could use to hire
builders and buy materials, just like the homeowner-driven approach I had first
seen in Gujarat. We would be with them every step of the way, checking construc-
tion quality. But the homeowners thought this sounded like a lot of work—people
in other villages were getting complete houses built for them by other agencies—
so they said no.
I appealed to some of the other agencies involved in housing, sharing the les-
sons I had learned in India about homeowner-driven reconstruction and the pit-
falls of donor-driven approaches. But the second tsunami arrived—that of donor-
driven development models. The massive funding that poured into Aceh blinded
everyone to lessons of the past. Many agencies used top-down models, settling on
one floor plan and hiring contractors to build similar houses for everyone, with no
homeowner involvement. Most agencies applied community-based approaches for
land-use planning and beneficiary selection, but usually a small group made the
decisions for everyone—not how homeowners normally make decisions.
所以, we set out to make our donor-driven program as homeowner-driven as
可能的. Since we were using donor funds, we had to work carefully to determine
who was a legitimate beneficiary. Using lists from village chiefs of eligible home-
拥有者, we inspected each plot, looking for signs of a house, and compared satel-
lite images taken before and after the tsunami. Some plots clearly had had no
house on them before the tsunami, and one village chief wanted us to build some
houses he could rent out to generate income. While we were involved in this due
diligence process, another agency came in and snapped up one of the villages
where we had hoped to work.
But we persevered. We identified four typical structural types common or
viable in Aceh: confined brick masonry, reinforced concrete block masonry, stilt-
type traditional timber building, and timber frame with a masonry skirt wall.
Confined masonry is one of the most common ways of building a house in Asia,
拉美, and Hispaniola. It consists of a brick, concrete block, or stone
masonry wall that is tied together by reinforced concrete tie columns and bond
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Building Earthquake-Resistant Houses in Haiti
beams.5 The walls resist the earthquake forces and support the roof, so it is essen-
tial to build a strong, good-quality wall. The tie columns and bond beams provide
extra capacity so that if the wall cracks, the entire building does not collapse. It’s a
bit like putting an enormous rubber band around the building. The wall is built
before the concrete for the tie columns is cast: this ensures a good connection
between the wall and the confining elements. Confined masonry buildings can
withstand earthquakes if they are designed and built properly. They also can fail if
designed and built poorly, as we have seen repeatedly in Haiti.6
We organized a volunteer group of structural engineers from San Francisco-
based engineering firms to do the seismic design. We then sat down with each
homeowner and asked which type of
house they preferred. They could
choose the structural system and
roof type, the layout (within govern-
ment guidelines), and the paint
颜色. All homeowners wanted to
choose for themselves. They could
build the house themselves, 推荐-
mend a builder, or leave it up to us to
hire a builder. They all chose the
third option.
But the second tsunami
arrived—that of donor-
driven development
型号. The massive
funding that poured into
Aceh blinded everyone to
lessons of the past.
We completed the engineering
designs, developed a construction
inspection
recruited
checklist,
builders, and worked with Mercy
Corps to procure building materials. Our Indonesian technical supervisors were
on site every day, checking quality and providing hands-on training. Some builders
thrived in this environment, vastly improving their skills under our mentorship
and guidance. Others quit; they could work for another agency with less stringent
quality standards and the same, or sometimes higher, 工资. Our supervisors dili-
gently checked the quality of materials, often rejecting bricks that had not been
fully fired, steel that was smaller than the specified diameter, and sand with too
much mud in it. But the demand for building materials was so high and the over-
sight of quality was so low that the truck drivers would just drive down the road
with the materials we rejected, and dump them off at the project of another agency
that wasn’t checking quality so closely. Some agencies had to tear down or retrofit
entire villages because of problems with construction quality, and some home-
owners felt so alienated from the process—unable to control the quality of their
own house or get a job on a construction team—that they protested. These are
some of the pitfalls of donor-driven reconstruction programs and an important
lesson for Haiti: donors should allocate a significant portion of their funds for
quality control oversight and use the homeowner as an asset to help check the con-
struction.
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Our confined masonry design won an award from the Structural Engineers
Association of Northern California. Indonesian academics and reputable practic-
ing engineers visited our project and called it the best in Aceh. But we had only
建成 11 房屋.
Buoyed by our success, we decided to build seven more houses ourselves, 火车
more builders, and provide engineering design and inspection services to other
机构. We won another grant from Mercy Corps, along with income-earning
contracts for services from other agencies. We produced a design and construction
guideline, reviewed the designs of other agencies, inspected their houses, 和亲-
vided mentorship and training to over 100 builders in a four-month-long appren-
ticeship program rebuilding 15 房屋. In about 18 月, our work improved
the design and/or construction of another 4,200 房屋, and earned income on all
contracts except the one for building houses. We knew we were on to something
when our technical resources and ideas started to appear in others’ publications.
到年底 2007, there were more new houses built in Banda Aceh and Aceh
Besar than people who needed them. It was time to move to an environment
where we could go back to a homeowner-driven model. The Aceh post-tsunami
reconstruction illustrated some of the challenges and shortcomings with donor-
driven models:
技术
Standards: Guideline was incomplete and applied to a more expensive, 较少的
common structural system
Capacity: Some organizations did provide training
钱
Access to capital: Agencies and government had significant funds
Incentives: None existed to ensure safe construction
Subsidies: None existed
人们
动机: Homeowner involvement was minimal, government provided no
enforcement, and third parties provided only limited supervision
West Sumatra: The Homeowner-Driven Model Works
In January 2008, we relocated to Padang, West Sumatra, and set up a field office in
Padang Panjang, near the area affected by the March 2007 earthquakes along the
Sumatra Fault. We later expanded to areas affected by the September 2007 earth-
quakes near Bengkulu. These earthquakes had not captured the attention of the
international relief and donor community, so here we could return to the home-
owner-driven model of providing technical assistance to homeowners and train-
ing builders. We gave no funding or materials to the homeowners; they rebuilt with
the cash grant of 15 million rupiah (about US$1,700) from the Indonesian govern- 蒙特, and their own resources. 100 创新 / fall 2010 从http下载的://direct.mit.edu/itgg/article-pdf/5/4/91/704665/inov_a_00047.pdf by guest on 08 九月 2023 Building Earthquake-Resistant Houses in Haiti Before we started the program, we surveyed 76 homeowners in three of the most affected regencies (similar to counties) to be sure they wanted our assistance. Of the 91 percent who did, a large majority wanted hands-on practical training and on-site supervision; a lower percentage wanted classroom-type seminars. We did not need to select beneficiaries or document land tenure, which simplified things. We worked with any homeowner who was building a house, regardless of their income level and whether or not they had lost their house in the earthquake. It was up to the government to decide who was eligible for the cash grant—so our rela- tionships with the home- owners were only about the technical aspects of housing reconstruction. Now Build Change could be a trusted advisor, not a patron. We stopped call- ing the people we worked with beneficiaries. They were homeowners, builders, technical high school students, and gov- ernment officials. When the homeowner is the owner, they will spend only what they have, use recycled materials, and conserve their resources. They will take pride and ownership of their home; they will not steal from themselves. When the donor is the owner, they are perceived to have deep pockets. If the donor does not have robust internal controls—which are expensive to implement—they will no doubt lose resources. We sent our trained Indonesian technical supervisors to the villages to provide hands-on tech- nical assistance. We helped each homeowner select the structural system, draw layouts, estimate costs, check the quality of materials, and monitor the construction. We also trained and mentored builders. We held single-day homeowner training courses, on-the-job training for builders in masonry, barbending, and carpentry, and offered multi-day training courses for government officials and technical high school students and their teachers. We are now holding similar training programs in Haiti. Using this model meant more diverse engineering and design challenges than we had faced in Aceh. 那里, we were essentially reproducing the same blueprint several times, but in West Sumatra, each homeowner decided on the layout of their house. 所以, we developed a series of layout rules. 例如, how long could a wall be without bracing? Where could windows and doors be placed? Allowing homeowners to choose the type of structure they wanted led to a dif- ferent outcome from the one in Aceh: almost half chose to build a simple timber- 创新 / fall 2010 101 从http下载的://direct.mit.edu/itgg/article-pdf/5/4/91/704665/inov_a_00047.pdf by guest on 08 九月 2023 Elizabeth Hausler frame house with a masonry skirt—a structure that had been rejected in Aceh when well-funded relief agencies built larger, fancier houses from masonry and reinforced concrete. The timber-frame house can be finished to resemble a mod- ern masonry house and it is also easier to build safely, especially with limited finan- cial resources. We then developed technical resources to build timber houses, which was not difficult, as the building technology is well known in Indonesia and several of our Indonesian staff had ample skill and experience. We identified rea- sons why these structures sustained damage in earthquakes and developed a sim- ple checklist to ensure that the main structural features were done right. Some organizations that worked in West Sumatra after the 2009 earthquake are already promoting this type of construction in Haiti; our website has examples of draw- ings and checklists. But confined masonry was still popular, and we had gathered a wealth of data on how these houses performed during earthquakes in Indonesia. Many such buildings, though built to a lesser standard than the one we applied in Aceh, had performed well in earthquakes, and the houses we designed in Aceh now appeared to be too conservative and too expensive. It clearly was possible to build a simpler, less expensive house and still ensure that it would not collapse. We called the stan- dard we used in Aceh the “Build Change Standard” and shelved it for the time being. We developed the “Minimum Standard” for safe confined masonry con- struction, which established a set of minimum interventions to prevent part or all of a house from collapsing in an earthquake. In West Sumatra, we started mass marketing safe construction practices, producing a simple construction booklet and other tools. A shortcoming to the homeowner-driven model emerged. If people did not complete their homes or meet minimum standards, the reason usually was lack of funds. At that time the government was providing only 30 百分比到 50 percent of the funds that people needed to build a safe home. 超过 93 percent of the home- owners rebuilding with the timber frame could meet our minimum standard, 但仅 52 percent of homes built from confined masonry did so. Inspired by Hernando De Soto’s6 point that land rights provide access to capi- 的, we conducted a survey of homeowners’ land rights and willingness to use land certificates as collateral. We found that 95 percent had no land certificate, 57 每- cent wanted one, 和 68 percent would use such a certificate as collateral if they had one. Based on these results, we went searching for banks or microfinance insti- tutions that would provide loans to our clients. Commercial banks would only give loans to homeowners with formal sector jobs and significant collateral. Rural finance institutions were also risk averse, providing loans only for small business creation and to people with collateral. At the same time, we explored what level of financial incentive or bonus it would take for more people to comply with our minimum standard. An addition- 阿尔 $10 到 $200, which could be given in the form of materials like steel reinforce- 蒙特, would have likely resulted in substantially higher compliance and comple- 102 创新 / fall 2010 从http下载的://direct.mit.edu/itgg/article-pdf/5/4/91/704665/inov_a_00047.pdf by guest on 08 九月 2023 Building Earthquake-Resistant Houses in Haiti tion rates. But we didn’t have this kind of money, and the program was nearing completion. By the fall of 2009, most homeowners had either stopped or finished rebuild- 英. We had demonstrated that homeowner-driven reconstruction can produce low-cost earthquake-resistant houses. An earthquake-resistant house in West Sumatra, including the government grant, the homeowner’s contribution, and our technical assistance, cost between $3,000 和 $8,000. In Aceh, the same product cost $12,000 到 $20,000 and more. Using a homeowner-driven approach is an excellent way to stretch donor dollars. When the homeowner is the owner, they will spend only what they have, use recycled materials, and conserve their resources. They will take pride and owner- ship of their home; they will not steal from themselves. When the donor is the owner, they are perceived to have deep pockets. If the donor does not have robust internal controls—which are expensive to implement—they will no doubt lose resources. West Sumatra: Homeowner-Driven Reconstruction After the 2009 Earthquakes On September 1, 2009, we gave notice to all but four of our Indonesian staff that their last day of work would be September 30. On September 30, an earthquake off the coast just north of Padang killed 1,115 people and destroyed or severely dam- aged over 135,000 homes.7 Luckily, none of our staff or their families was injured, and they all came back to work. This new quake hit an area where we had provided technical assistance, and when we surveyed the houses in that area, we found no damage on those that had met our minimum standard. A few that did not meet the standard were dam- aged. Going back to some of these villages six months to a year after we had left them, we found new homebuilders using the same techniques we had promoted on houses built with their own resources. This kind of long-term change is our ultimate goal. Unlike the situation in 2007, this time the central government in Indonesia and the relief community paid attention. A major international donor, Indonesian gov- ernment officials, and experts from outside West Sumatra heavily promoted the building of reinforced concrete frame buildings, with masonry infill and masonry gable walls. This structural system, uncommon in rural areas, is expensive and dif- ficult to build properly without highly skilled builders and sufficient construction supervision. Unlike our experience in Aceh, 尽管, this time we were ready to answer the challenge. At this point we had four years of experience in Indonesia and were armed with data and experience from 20 months of work in West Sumatra. In partnership with government officials and academics from West Sumatra, we lobbied the central government to allow confined masonry and tim- ber frame with a masonry skirt wall, and they eventually agreed. Because the gov- ernment has limited expertise working with timber frame, they asked us to devel- 创新 / fall 2010 103 从http下载的://direct.mit.edu/itgg/article-pdf/5/4/91/704665/inov_a_00047.pdf by guest on 08 九月 2023 Elizabeth Hausler op resources and train technical supervisors in this method. Although the release of funds has just started, 85 percent of homeowners currently are building walls of timber frame with a masonry skirt. If the numbers remain at this level, we will have an impact on 57,000 houses.8 At the same time, other donors and agencies were promoting the short-term solution of transitional shelter. The government discouraged this, believing its people could cope with this disaster by staying with extended family, finding alter- native accommodations, or building a transitional shelter with their own resources. The government also recognized that it could not provide enough fund- ing for permanent houses, so it encouraged agencies to save their resources for the permanent housing phase. Few could do this, given the short grant periods their donors imposed on them. The government also discouraged them from using donor-driven models and building houses outright, as some did in Aceh, arguing that providing permanent houses in one community but not another would result in conflict and social ten- 锡安. 反而, it asked agencies to provide the government with financial resources that it could distribute to homeowners to build permanent housing, and to pro- vide technical assistance. Agencies had stepped away from permanent housing after the Aceh experience but were now returning, looking for ways to add value through capacity-building programs. In partnership with other agencies, we trained the homeowners, technical supervisors, and builders. In Haiti, we see the same opportunity to work in partnership with other agencies to build the capaci- ty of homeowners, builders, and engineers to rebuild safe houses. But once the transitional shelter period was over, most agencies left West Sumatra. Reconstruction is only just starting, and now our biggest challenge is raising funds to support our technical assistance programs, which are less attrac- tive to donors because of their long turnaround time. This points to an important lesson for both West Sumatra and Haiti: agencies should spend less on short-term (emergency) building and save more for the permanent reconstruction phase. Homeowner-driven reconstruction was effective in West Sumatra but would have been moreso with government enforcement of building standards and greater access to capital: Technology Standards: Build Change developed minimum standards (minimum to pre- vent collapse) Capacity: Build Change did hands-on training Money Access to capital: The government provided maximum US$1,700 per house,
not enough to rebuild safely
Incentives: None to ensure safe construction
Subsidies: 没有任何
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Building Earthquake-Resistant Houses in Haiti
人们
动机: Many homeowners were motivated, but government enforcement
was very limited
中国: Succeeding with the Homeowner-Driven Model
The quake that hit Sichuan, 中国, on May 12, 2008, killed over 80,000 people and
leveled buildings over an unprecedentedly wide area. My former colleagues at the
加州大学, Berkeley arranged for me to visit Sichuan through the 10
+ 10 Strategic Partnership between the University of California system and 10 大学-
versities in China.
There I found some compelling examples of confined masonry buildings con-
structed according to more recent codes; they survived unscathed in this earth-
quake. 但, they were surrounded by piles of rubble from older buildings made of
unreinforced masonry and pre-cast plank roofs. 清楚地, the Chinese already had
the expertise to design and build safer houses. The challenge would be getting that
expertise out to the rural areas and the people who needed it most.
We hired local engineers and graduates of construction trade schools, identi-
fied local partners, and sat down with each homeowner to draw an earthquake-
resistant layout, estimate costs, and provide supervision of the construction. 我们
applied the same homeowner-driven reconstruction model we had applied in West
Sumatra and plan to use in Haiti. The Chinese government provided funds direct-
ly to small groups of homeowners to pay for the building materials. The home-
owners hired local contractors to rebuild their houses. We provided only technical
assistance and training.
Xing Dayan lost her mother when her house collapsed on May 12. 什么时候我们
met her, she had already started building her new confined masonry house. 一
wall was going up out of plumb, and another wall had very large openings. 我们
talked her through what she needed to do—tear down the tilting wall and add a
reinforced concrete lintel beam over the window and door, tied into the tie
columns—and she convinced her contractor to make these changes. We didn’t
provide any money or materials, just information. She told us that after her neigh-
bors saw her lintel beam, they all wanted them too.
We started work in Tumen township, in partnership with a Chinese NGO. 我们
found that homeowners were signing incomplete, confusing, contracts with
builders. We developed simple contract templates that explained the technical
details—translating the concrete strength requirement into number of bags of
cement, number of wheelbarrows of sand, and number of wheelbarrows of gravel,
which enables the homeowners to check the construction. These templates are
available on our website. We are revising them for use in Haiti.
The township party secretary came to one of our homeowner trainings. 他
then invited us to work in partnership with the government to supervise construc-
的. The first barrier we had to overcome was the perception that our standards
were higher because I am a foreigner, even though our engineering design work
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Elizabeth Hausler
and standard development were based largely on Chinese standards and practices.
We reached consensus on a minimum standard that was simple enough to imple-
ment but would prevent houses from collapsing. We monitored construction, 亲-
viding hands-on training when needed, and reported back to the government
every week. The gov-
ernment called in con-
tractors who were
doing a bad job and
provided incentives to
those who complied
the standards.
和
Having the govern-
ment behind us cer-
tainly made our job
更轻松. In the end, 76
percent of the homes
we worked on com-
plied with our mini-
mum standard.
Xing Dayan lost her mother when
her house collapsed on May 12.
When we met her, she had already
started building her new confined
masonry house. One wall was going
up out of plumb, and another wall
had very large openings. We talked
her through what she needed to
do—tear down the tilting wall and
add a reinforced concrete lintel
beam over the window and door,
tied into the tie columns—and she
convinced her contractor to make
这些变化. We didn’t provide
any money or materials, 只是
信息. She told us that after
her neighbors saw her lintel beam,
they all wanted them too.
In rural areas in
中国, as elsewhere,
the lack of resources is
a significant obstacle
to implementing safe
住房
reconstruc-
tion programs and cre-
我们的
long-term
changes in construc-
tion practices. 不是
enough personnel have
技术的
足够的
背景;
不是
enough vehicles and
基础设施
是
available to facilitate
inspections, 和
list continues. Build Change is now working with construction trade schools in
China to develop a prestigious internship program in which technical high school
students will be placed in rural areas for one year to work with governments to
mentor local builders and enforce building standards.
Homeowner-driven reconstruction worked very well in China, as all of the
components—technology, 钱, and people—were in place.
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Building Earthquake-Resistant Houses in Haiti
技术
Standards: Government issued the guideline, and Build Change partnered with
local government to develop minimum standards (minimum to prevent col-
lapse)
Capacity: Build Change did hands-on training
钱
Access to capital: The government provided sufficient grant and loan access in
most areas
Incentives: Some existed for contractors
Subsidies: Prices of some materials were controlled
人们
动机: Many homeowners were motivated, and the government enforced
standards in Build Change work areas
We believe a homeowner-driven implementation model will work in Haiti, 和
now we describe why and how.
LESSONS FOR HAITI
The six-step Build Change model will work in Haiti. We understand why buildings
collapsed on January 12, 2010 (Step 1: 学习) and we have already identified low-
or no-cost improvements to existing ways of building (Step 2: 设计). We are hir-
ing local professionals, partnering with local and international agencies, 和
rolling out large-scale training and technical assistance programs for builders,
homeowners, and construction professionals. We are working in partnership with
buildings materials producers to produce better, locally available materials (Step 3:
Build Capacity)
We have met homeowners who are already taking steps to improve their homes
and asking plenty of questions about how to build a better building. Using mass
marketing and social media, we are kicking off a strategic communications pro-
gram designed to bring simple messages about house repair and safe reconstruc-
tion to the masses (Step 4: Stimulate Demand). We are promoting financing mod-
els that conserve resources while using incentives, such as grant funding in install-
ments or lower interest rates on loans, to improve construction quality. We are
working to convince agencies and governments that a homeowner-driven recon-
struction approach is the lowest cost, most efficient method of producing safe
房屋, satisfied homeowners, and a sustainable change in construction practice
(Step 5: Facilitate Capital). Step 6: Measure, will follow as we do the work.
Our work in other countries holds many lessons for Haiti, which I’ve organ-
ized using our six steps.
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The Build Change Implementation Model
Step 1: Learn First. Why did houses collapse in this earthquake? Why did some
不是?
Build Change begins with forensic engineering studies after earthquakes to
understand why buildings collapse and how to build them better. We have stud-
ied housing performance after 12 earthquakes in six developing countries. Please
visit our website to download these reports.
For any type of structure, safe construction depends on the three C’s: 骗局-
figuration, 连接, and construction quality. Configuration: 简单的,
square, symmetric building layouts are best. 连接: tie upper structure to
基础, roof to walls, and walls to the frame or confining elements, and tie
them to each other. Construction quality: concrete blocks need good raw mate-
rials, and enough cement, and proper curing. Masons must completely fill the
joints between blocks.
Step 2: Research and Design for Earthquake-Resistant Houses. What types of
houses do people want to build here now? With what materials, 技能, and tools?
How can we design them to resist multiple hazards?
It’s easier to make minor, low-, or no-cost improvements to existing ways of
building than to introduce a completely new technology or reintroduce a tradi-
tional building method that has gone out of style. Build Change completes
detailed housing sub-sector studies to design and build safe houses that are cul-
turally appropriate, preferred by homeowners, low cost, locally sustainable, 和
disaster resistant.
We also develop building manuals that are specific to the practices in the
developing countries where we work and distribute them to local builders and
homeowners. A set of resources for Haiti is already available at www.build-
change.org.
Step 3: Build Local Capacity. How can we disseminate this knowledge to
masses of engineers and builders?
The best designs in the world will not save lives unless they are built proper-
莱, local engineers know how to design them, and local producers can produce
enough quality building materials.
Step 1: Learn First
On my first trip to Haiti in March 2010, I spent most of my time learning, observ-
ing why houses collapsed and why they didn’t, and understanding how people
build houses here and now. Many houses built in Haiti were an incomplete or
imperfect version of confined masonry. Confined masonry buildings in Haiti vio-
lated some of the three C’s, described below.
First is configurations. The best configurations for surviving earthquakes are
简单的, square, symmetric building layouts that are the same from the first story to
第二. In Haiti, some buildings had second and third stories larger than the
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Building Earthquake-Resistant Houses in Haiti
We train local masons, carpenters, engineers, and homeowners to use earth-
quake-resistant building techniques that are culturally accepted and easy to
adopt with limited training and education. We target workers involved in con-
struction before the disaster, who are committed to staying in it for the long
学期, and partner with local agencies to train such people. On-the-job training
courses are led by Build Change’s local engineers and master masons or carpen-
特尔斯.
Build Change also works with local building materials suppliers to produce
better building materials, and meanwhile increase profits.
Step 4: Stimulate Local Demand. Someone has to want the house to be earth-
quake resistant. Homeowners, government officials, and relief agencies are in a
position to demand safe construction. But how can we convince a rural home-
owner with limited resources to invest more in building a safe house? Make it
affordable and easy to implement, and leverage the window of opportunity right
after a disaster.
How can we make it easy for local government officials to enforce building
标准, without letting corruption—and limits on their resources and time—
get in the way? Create simple building codes and guidelines, training seminars,
and inspection systems that work in areas with little infrastructure, 预算, 时间,
and personnel.
Step 5: Facilitate Access to Capital. Build Change does not build houses for
people and does not pay for materials and labor. Usually funding comes as
grants from governments or relief agencies. But if that funding is inadequate,
Build Change partners with financial institutions so homeowners have the fund-
ing they need to build safely.
Step 6: Measure the Change. Our ultimate test will be an earthquake in an
area where we have worked. 同时, we build in intensive monitoring and
评估. Every day, using paper and digital cameras, field staff documents the
recommendations made and the changes implemented on each house. 这
detailed tracking lets us tally the number of changes each homeowner makes
and how well the house meets—or exceeds—standards. For training programs,
we give pre- and post-tests to measure how people’s skills have changed.
第一的. A lightweight roof can make be crucial in reducing earthquake damage. 在
Haiti, many buildings have a weak concrete block masonry wall and a heavy roof
to reduce hurricane damage. During the earthquake, that combination proved
deadly.
Second is connections. For a building to survive an earthquake (or a hurri-
cane), all of its structural elements must be connected. That means the upper
structure is tied to the foundation, the walls to the frame or confining elements,
the frame or confining elements are tied to each other, and the roof is tied to the
墙壁. In Haiti, walls were not tied and they separated easily from the confining ele-
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Two common house types suitable for Haiti
Top: Timber frame with masonry skirt wall
Bottom: Confined masonry, done well
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Building Earthquake-Resistant Houses in Haiti
评论. 此外, steel reinforcements must be tied together at every corner.
Every earthquake-related building disaster seems to involve insufficient steel con-
nections—and Haiti is no exception.
The third C is construction quality. Poor construction quality and materials
played a very large role in the damage in Haiti. Sand had too much mud, gravel was
smooth rather than angular, and concrete blocks were of poor quality, made with
poor quality raw materials or insufficient cement or improperly cured.
All these are lessons for Haiti: everyone involved must check designs and
质量.
Step 2: Research and Design for Earthquake-Resistant Houses
For Haiti, we are developing several kinds of guidelines. 第一的, in partnership with
我们. and Haitian engineers, we have compiled a list of design criteria for Haiti,
available on our website. It includes a list of applicable codes and guidelines,
sources of materials, unit costs and strengths, and architectural criteria, 例如
ways to ensure that a covered porch will resist both wind and earthquakes.
第二, we are working in partnership with the Ministry of Public Works,
Transportation, and Communications to improve the guidelines for repairing
damaged houses and to develop new guidelines for the five specific building types
that are most common in Haiti:
1. Confined masonry (单身的- and two-story houses with timber, lightweight steel
and reinforced concrete cast-in-place roof options)
2. Reinforced masonry (单身的- and two-story houses with timber, lightweight steel
and reinforced concrete cast-in-place roof options)
3. Timber frame with various wall options (单身的- and two-story houses made of
masonry, earth, plastered wire mesh, plastered bamboo mat)
4. 二- and three-story mixed-use buildings, with ground floor for shops and
upper floors for residential use (structural system to be suggested in the analy-
姐姐)
5. Retrofitting (strengthening) of damaged one- and two-story confined concrete
block masonry.
第三, we are developing two sets of resources for different audiences. 为了
donor-driven reconstruction, the detailed engineering plans include a set of gener-
ic floor plans, with complete bills of quantity, construction quality checklists, 和
technical specifications, in case donors want to mass produce similar houses for
everyone. For homeowner-driven reconstruction, the set of design rules and com-
ponent drawings can be applied to a variety of floor plans, plot sizes, cultural and
architectural preferences, and budgets, and they include simple ways to estimate
costs and quantities in the field.
Step 3: Build Local Capacity
Haiti presents an enormous opportunity—and need—to build capacity while pro-
viding job opportunities. Build Change is working in partnership with local insti-
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tutions such as the Institute of Professional Training and IDEJEN to improve exist-
ing training courses by adding modules on earthquake-resistant design and con-
struction. 此外, we are partnering with relief and development organiza-
tions to train construction personnel and place them in apprenticeships and
income-earning reconstruction jobs.
Like a house and the implementation model, a successful builders’ training
program that produces permanent skills improvement and lasting change in con-
struction practice is a matter of technology, 钱, 和人.
技术: The best training courses for builders keep it simple and follow up
with on-the-job training.
人们: For the trainers, we are using local professionals to train local builders.
This is the best way to develop local capacity, and to ensure that only locally sus-
tainable materials, 技能, and tools are used. Build Change is hiring Haitian tech-
nical professionals, who will deliver the training courses.
For the trainees, we target workers who were already in the construction sec-
tor before the disaster and are committed to staying in it for the long term. We find
those folks simply by asking in the neighborhoods and by recruiting trainees who
have already invested their time and money in a training course by another agency.
It is crucial to target the right group. There is always a push to train engineers,
but the key is to train the builders and trade school graduates, as they will be the
ones involved in housing construction. Engineers see no money in it, they like to
build commercial buildings, and they often have a hard time designing a simple
house without a building code or standard to follow.
钱: We will attract the most dedicated trainees by charging people to come
to the training, consistent with training programs in place in Haiti prior to the
earthquake.
Step 3 also involves building the capacity of building materials producers to
produce better quality materials. Concrete blocks are widely used for construction
in Haiti; but their quality is inconsistent. We are working in partnership with the
national lab to check materials strengths and develop simple methods for assessing
materials quality in the field.
Step 4: Stimulate Local Demand
The earthquake itself increased the demand for safe housing; before it happened,
few homeowners, builders, engineers, or government officials in Haiti were aware
of the seismic risk. But now, people know. In March we met a group of residents
on the edge of Leogane who were building a new single-story building for a water-
treatment facility. They were using the same materials used to build so many of the
collapsed buildings—concrete blocks, steel, concrete—but they had made some
significant improvements, such as using reinforced concrete confinement around
the walls, windows, and doors. It wasn’t perfect, but it was a start. They opted for
a lighter timber-truss roof, which is a positive step toward earthquake safety but
will present a challenge during hurricanes unless the roof is properly connected to
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Building Earthquake-Resistant Houses in Haiti
the walls. As we were looking at this building, the builders and local residents gath-
ered around us with questions about construction details and quality. These resi-
dents had seen what the earthquake had done to poorly constructed buildings and
were already taking steps to build back better with their own funds and their own
技能. They just needed a little more information and technical expertise in order
to do so. These residents are ideal candidates for the homeowner-driven recon-
struction model: hiring and training local professionals to work with the home-
owners to design and build better buildings.
A key to stimulating demand is mass marketing—getting the word out—and
one key piece is a poster, mentioned earlier and available on our website, that lists
six ways to build a stronger house for Indonesia. These points also apply to Haiti.
1. Build from timber instead of masonry. If you build a masonry house, build con-
fined masonry (don’t build unreinforced masonry). At least put a ring beam on
top of your walls. Haitians may find it hard to build from timber because so lit-
tle is available, and people prefer masonry. But it still has to be confined, and it
still needs a ring beam.
2. Don’t build your gable wall from masonry, build it from timber or use a hipped
roof. In Haiti, use a lightweight roof and connect it to the walls. If you build a
reinforced concrete roof, make sure to follow rules for steel detailing and con-
struction quality.
3. Build a good, strong masonry wall by filling the joints between bricks (or blocks)
completely with mortar, using enough cement in the mortar and soaking the
bricks (or blocks) before building the wall.
4. If you prefer to have many large windows and doors at the front of your house,
put reinforcement over them.
5. Connect the confining elements together properly.
6. Connect the wall to the confining elements.
Stimulating demand through working with donor agencies and government
officials, as we have shown in China, is also a powerful way of building back bet-
特尔.
Step 5: Facilitate Access to Capital
Without sufficient funding, a trained builder and an empowered homeowner will
still not be able to build a safe house. Estimates of the cost to rebuild a disaster-
resistant house in Haiti range widely, 从 $3,500 to over $20,000. Build Change
is working in partnership with donors and other implementing agencies to prove
that the homeowner-driven model will work, and to identify the price point at
which a homeowner can combine their own resources with donor funding to
achieve a house that is safe, satisfactory, and sustainable.
Step 6: Measure the Change
Checking construction quality as the house is being built is one of the easiest ways
to confirm that building standards are met. Build Change’s simple inspection
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Elizabeth Hausler
checklists are available on our website and are being revised for use in Haiti. 我们是
working in partnership with other organizations to streamline this system by col-
lecting and transmitting data on a handheld device.
Based on all these experiences, we have a list of recommendations about the
homeowner-driven approach that we hope will be helpful in Haiti for donors,
relief agencies, and the government.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HAITI’S RECONSTRUCTION
Lessons from Step 2: Research and Design for Earthquake-Resistant Houses
• Release clear, 完全的, consensus-based guideline(s) for each common struc-
tural system.
• Give people, and agencies, 选项. Be flexible about the structural system. 做
not dictate the type of structure or layout; instead empower homeowners to
choose and establish a set of criteria that each structure should meet.
Lessons from Step 3: Build Local Capacity
• Train everyone on the construction value chain—builders, engineers, site
supervisors.
• Work with materials suppliers in the private sector to facilitate access to com-
mon materials.
• Provide hands-on technical assistance and/or building inspectors. 考虑
finding a third party to check construction quality. Distributing flyers and
holding classroom-type seminars can help but is not enough.
Lessons from Step 4: Stimulate Local Demand
• Require homeowners to meet minimum standards in order to receive financial
协助.
• Require agencies that intend to build houses to meet some minimum qualifica-
tion for technical competency and internal controls.
• Require all building projects to have at least three independent parties: owner,
contractor, and designer/inspector.
Lessons from Step 5: Facilitate Access to Capital
• Be clear about when funds will be released. Stick to the commitment, but do
not overcommit. There are several options:
− Provide grants in installments, contingent on construction quality.
− Provide access to loans, with some incentives for good quality reconstruc-
的.
− Provide an incentive bonus. 例如, if building to the top of the wall
meets a minimum standard for safe construction, then the homeowner
receives an extra small cash grant and/or a specified but limited amount of
材料.
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Building Earthquake-Resistant Houses in Haiti
• Don’t rush it. Give people time to get back on their feet economically. 一次
they have a stable income and job, they can contribute more to building a per-
manent home.
Lessons from Step 6: Measure the Change
• Make it easy for agencies to monitor and report on their work.
• Consider using handheld or automated systems.
1. United Nations Development Program, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, “Reducing
Disaster Risk: A Challenge for Development.” http://www.undp.org/cpr/whats_new/rdr_eng-
lish.pdf; 九月访问 20, 2010.
2. Martin Fisher, “Income is Development: KickStart’s Pumps Help Kenyan Farmers Transition to a
Cash Economy,” 创新 1, 不. 1 (2006): 9–30.
3. For more information see E. A. Hausler, “Housing Reconstruction and Retrofitting after the 2001
Kachchh, Gujarat, Earthquake,” 13th World Conference on Earthquake Engineering, Vancouver,
加拿大, 2004. Available on Build Change website, www.buildchange.org.
4. 乙. A. Hausler, “Long-Term Change in Construction Practice through Post-Earthquake
Reconstructions,” 1st International Conference on Urban Disaster Reduction, Kobe, 日本,
一月 17-20, 2005. Available on Build Change website, www.buildchange.org.
5. Engineering design work and a technical case history is available in a draft publication, “设计
and Construction of Confined Masonry Houses in Indonesia: 挑战, Performance in
Earthquakes, and Need for Future Research.” Available at www.buildchange.org.
6. 参见http://www.time.com/time/subscriber/2004/time100/scientists/100desoto.html; 访问过
九月 20, 2010.
7. See www.antaranews.com/en/news/1255472809/number-of-fatalities-in-w-sumatra-quake-now-
1-115.
8. We assume that 50 的百分比 135,000 homes will be rebuilt, and of those, 85 percent will be
built with walls of timber frame and a masonry skirt.
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