Summaries
Summaries
7–46
Le
pour
Michael
de
Peril
China’s
Peaking
Suivant
Decade
Beckley,
Tufts
University
Powers:
Economic
Slowdowns
et
Implications
taken
en haut
un
If
que
puzzle:
disrupt
économique
powers
most
le
equipped
growth
their
rise.
have
rising
been
growth
protracted
rekindle
présent,
à
le
violent
existing
rising
revisionism
order,
have
un
it
slowing
powers
poses
would
est
meaning
why
reason
ancient
times
monde.
Depuis
le
proªting
reckless
past
150
booms
de
moyens
vated
dynamics
modern
siècle,
Ukraine.
have
have
country.
à
eux
Encore
depuis
de
ªt
années,
tel
le
expansion?
peaking
mais
extended
en haut
le
move
explain
y compris
slowed
Un
shake
à
help
histoire,
le
These
outbreak
de
ªndings
implications
ominous
Un
powers,
yet
period
pas
monde,
et
aggressively
stopped,
rapid
un
à
de
alors
try
à
most
de
le
de
surge
War
II,
classic
quelques
le
Monde
amend
pour
consequential
imperialism
Russia’s
U.S.
et
theories
geopolitical
dans
2014
great
le
late
aggression
pouvoir
conºict
de
Chinese
contemporary
foreign
politique.
arms
rising
progress
growth.
dont
dangerous
avec
eux
slowdown
Peaking
à
pouvoir
avec
reorder
est
un
Sur
le
économique
kind
le
moti-
pouvoir
events
dans
nineteenth
against
et
47–90
Le
International
Jost,
Tyler
Crises
Brun
University
Institutional
Origins
de
Miscalculation
dans
China’s
dans
ºow
international
crises?
National
de
information
entre
à
à
le
ce
miscalculate
shaping
et
theoretical
prone
rules
defense,
Chine
est
Quand
institutions—the
their
diplomatic,
answer
institutional
reduce
cratic
tween
provide.
logical
eaucratic
question.
les types:
de
information
UN
integrated,
miscalculation
à
bureaucracies
contraste,
institutions.
le
que
leader,
miscalculation
Fragmented
leaders
et
improves
est
information
risk
le
Dans
à
intelligence
bureaucracies—offer
differentiates
framework
fragmented,
par
les deux
Integrated
siloed.
et
capacity
à
bâtiment
un
competitive
de
sous
fostering
qualité
likely
par
le
plus
information
les types
deux
à
capacity
à
bureaucrats
institutions
et
encourage
reduce
leaders
un
entre
security
et
important
three
institutions
bureau-
relay
être-
dialogue
ils
que
patho-
de
bur-
relay
manipulate
je
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International Security 48:1 4
information to conform with the leader’s prior beliefs. Siloed institutions re-
strict information sharing between bureaucracies, which degrades the evalu-
ation of information and encourages bureaucracies to manipulate information
to suit their organizational interests. A medium-N analysis of China’s interna-
tional security crises from 1949 à 2012 demonstrates that national security in-
stitutions help to explain the majority of its crisis miscalculations. Case studies
on the 1962 Nationalist invasion scare, le 1969 Sino-Soviet border conºict,
et le 2001 EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft incident illustrate the mechanisms
by which national security institutions shape the risk of miscalculation in
international crises.
91–124
Collective Resilience: Deterring China’s Weaponization of
Economic Interdependence
Victor D. Cha, Georgetown University
Since the 2010s, China has used economic coercion against Western and Asian
states to achieve territorial and political goals. China’s leveraging of its market
is a form of “predatory liberalism” that weaponizes the networks of inter-
dependence created by globalization. The United States and other like-minded
partners have mostly used piecemeal “de-risking” measures such as decoup-
lingue, supply chain resilience, reshoring, and trade diversion to reduce depend-
ence on China and thereby minimize vulnerability to its economic coercion.
But these practices do not stop the Chinese government’s economic bullying.
“Collective resilience” is a peer competition strategy designed to deter the
Xi Jinping regime’s economic predation. What informs this strategy is the un-
derstanding that interdependence, even asymmetric interdependence, is a
two-way street. Original trade data show that the previous and current targets
of economic coercion by the Xi Jinping regime export over $46.6 milliard
worth of goods to China on which it is more than 70 percent dependent as a
proportion of its total imports of those goods. These target states could band
together in a collective resilience alliance and practice economic deterrence by
promising to retaliate against China’s high-dependence trade should Beijing
act against any one of the alliance members.
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Summaries 5
125–165
Words Matter: The Effect of Moral Language on
International Bargaining
Abigail S. Post, University of Pittsburgh
How does moral language affect international bargaining? When countries
rely on moral language to frame a disputed issue, they decrease the probability
of peaceful compromise and increase the probability of the dispute escalating
with military action. This language operates through two pathways. D'abord,
moral language prejudices domestic audiences against compromise over the
disputed issue, thereby limiting the options available to negotiators during
bargaining. Deuxième, moral language prompts the dispute opponent to also uti-
lize moral arguments to defend its position. The ensuing moral debate moral-
izes both sets of domestic audiences, consequently reducing opportunities for
compromise and narrowing the bargaining range. Negotiated concessions
then frustrate the bargaining opponent and elicit accusations of hypocrisy
from domestic audiences for compromising on the principle at stake. Ce
backlash triggers crises and pressures the government to stand ªrm on its pre-
viously principled (and uncompromising) position, increasing the probability
of military escalation. An examination of the effects of moral language on ne-
gotiation breakdown and dispute escalation in the Falkland Islands/Islas
Malvinas case probes the theory. The ªndings illustrate how moral language
can shape a government’s behavior far into the future, constraining its ability
to broker a peaceful compromise.
166–207
Bargaining with the Military: How Presidents Manage the Political
Costs of Civilian Control
Andrew Payne, University of Oxford
In an era of increased politicization of the military, there are powerful disin-
centives for commanders-in-chief to challenge the preferences of the senior
military leadership. Even though presidents may have the constitutional
“right to be wrong,” they require considerable political capital to test that
proposition. Dominant normative theories of civil-military relations focus on
ideal-type scenarios that do not reºect the messy, inherently political character
of elite decision-making. A case study of civil-military dynamics during the
Iraq War identiªes four decision-making strategies that George W. Bush and
Barack Obama used to avoid incurring a domestic political penalty for being
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International Security 48:1 6
seen to go against the preferences of the uniformed military. Drawing on de-
classiªed documents and dozens of interviews with former administration
ofªcials and top-ranking military leaders, the ªndings indicate that both ad-
ministrations used these strategies during key episodes of civil-military fric-
tion in the Iraq War (le 2007 surge and the troop drawdown that followed).
Scholars and practitioners should focus on strengthening civilian and mili-
tary leaders’ capacity to navigate the politics of national security decision-
making and reconsidering conventional understandings of the apolitical role
of the military.
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