Why Arms Control?

Jon Brook Wolfsthal

America survived the nuclear age through a complex combination of diplomatic
and military decisions, and a good deal of luck. One of the tools that proved its val-
ue in both reducing the risks of nuclear use and setting rules for the ongoing nuclear
competition were negotiated, legally binding, and verified arms control agreements.
Such pacts between the United States and the Soviet Union arguably prevented the
nuclear arms racing from getting worse and helped both sides climb off the Cold
War nuclear precipice. Several important agreements remain in place between the
United States and Russia, to the benefit of both states. Arms control is under threat,
然而, from domestic forces in the United States and from Russian actions that
range from treaty violations to the broader weaponization of risk. But arms con-
trol can and should play a useful role in reducing the risk of nuclear war and forg-
ing a new agreement between Moscow and Washington on the new rules of the nu-
clear road.

N uclear arms control agreements that effectively constrain an opponent’s

capabilities in exchange for some form of American constraint can ben-
efit American security and the security of its allies. 具体来说, bilateral
nuclear arms control agreements between the United States and the Russian Fed-
eration and between the United States and other nuclear-weapon states, 乃至-
tually broader multilateral arrangements, have the potential to enhance American
security and global stability by reducing the risks of nuclear use and avoiding the
dangers associated with arms racing and arms race instability. Such agreements
have in the past reduced the risks of nuclear conflict, shaped and limited areas of
nuclear competition, and tailored the global landscape in ways that benefitted
global and American security.

Reaching such agreements, and making them effectively verifiable, takes time,
领导, political commitment, clear goals, and political compromise: com-
modities currently in short supply in the United States. 然而, this state of af-
fairs is far from permanent and it remains likely that a future president may pur-
sue such negotiated agreements.

Arms control agreements are far from perfect, but the same is true of de-
terrence, reassurance, military planning, 和, 当然, armed conflict. All of
these elements of American nuclear statecraft entail risks. Some arms control

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agreements have produced major security wins for the United States, 而其他人
never entered into force or collapsed due to neglect or outright violations. 甚至
in the wake of an imperfect record, arms control can be used in the future to im-
prove U.S.-Russian nuclear stability and global security. Rejecting the idea of arms
control out of hand due to past failures or ideological opposition is dangerous: 它
risks depriving security officials of a proven method for addressing both emerging
and uncontrolled areas of military competition. Just as it would be folly to support
arms control blindly without a clear strategy and well-crafted agreements, 这是
folly to reject arms control when it can produce real benefits.

Assessing how critical arms control agreements were in building and preserv-
ing a stable U.S.-Soviet nuclear relationship and providing a mechanism to end
decades of nuclear competition is a complex challenge.1 During the main period
of strategic arms control between Moscow and Washington–1969 until 2010–
nuclear arms control agreements helped reduce the scale and impact of the Cold
War arms race, created confidence between the United States and the Soviet
Union that neither sought to initiate a wholesale nuclear conflict, codified an end
of efforts by both states to gain nuclear superiority, and created norms of behav-
ior and methods for communication that helped avoid conflicts that could esca-
late to nuclear war.2 In some cases, these agreements shaped the landscape, 并在
其他的, deals were used to lock in a certain dynamic.

Perhaps the main feature of Cold War arms control was that the United States
and the Soviet Union were able, over the course of their negotiations, to devel-
op confidence that they had a shared goal: to create a strategically stable condi-
tion in which neither had an incentive to use nuclear weapons first or to initiate a
nuclear conflict. Each was able to gain confidence that it could retain a critical el-
ement of deterrence, a survivable second-strike retaliatory nuclear force capable
of inflicting unacceptable damage on an attacking state.3 This shared definition
of strategic stability was an essential element for why agreements from 1972 直到
the mid-2000s were sustainable. The breakdown of confidence that this remains
a shared U.S.-Russian goal, as much as any other single factor, has undermined the
role that arms control can play and has increased the risk of nuclear use through
either deliberate acts, via escalation, or through accident or miscalculation.

今天, nuclear arms control is a polarizing term in the United States, 还有一些
analysts believe that legally binding, Senate-approved arms control deals have no
viable future due to perceived costs and objectionable Russian behavior.4 While
some experts and officials see nuclear treaties as commonsense enhancements to
national security and defense policy that should be pursued despite partisan op-
位置, critics see nuclear deals as dangerous and an unnecessary constraint on
American freedom of action in the face of growing Russian and Chinese dangers.5
To be sure, there are risks associated with arms control agreements. 这是
true of most features of the nuclear debate including deterrence and, 最终,

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesWhy Arms Control?

war-fighting. Arms control deals require the United States to accept constraints
on areas of possible military procurement and deployment, some of which could
be militarily useful both for deterrence and in a conflict, should deterrence fail.
And in such deals, there remains the ever-present risk that the partner may not
fully live up to its commitments. It is this history of noncompliance that current-
ly dominates the debate over the future of arms control with Russia. These risks,
然而, are acceptable if they are needed to gain a commitment from a treaty
partner to in turn constrain their capabilities (symmetrically or asymmetrically).
这是, 当然, of concern that Russia has violated past arms control agreements.
Even when the option for legal withdrawal is available, Russia has consistently ei-
ther skirted or materially violated some arms control agreements. This lack of legal
compliance has a direct bearing on both American security and the viability of ne-
gotiating future agreements with Moscow. 然而, the United States’ consistent
efforts to verify the terms of agreements and its ability to respond in a timely man-
ner to potential Russian breaches has helped prevent Russia from gaining a clear
military advantage through its violations. It also is true that Russia remains in full
compliance with important agreements, 包括 2010 New Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (New START). That pact provides the United States with irre-
placeable information on Russian nuclear activities and developments and remains
squarely in the interest of America and its allies. 然而, in the face of Russian
violations of multiple agreements, experts and politicians wonder why any new
deals should be negotiated. Such behavior raises the bar on negotiating such agree-
ments and suggests that the United States needs to consider new steps to improve
the durability of negotiated deals, including considerably extending the timelines
for withdrawal and the mechanisms for addressing issues of noncompliance.

While America should expect a treaty partner to abide by its commitments,
good agreements have verification provisions built on the assumption that this
will not be the case. Past arms control agreements were negotiated to enable the
United States to take steps to protect its interests even in the face of violations.6
因此, even when Russia has proven to be less than 100 percent reliable, 那个单位-
ed States has been able to pursue and implement other agreements. When Russia
has violated its commitments, verification has made timely detection possible, 阿尔-
lowing the United States to take steps either to bring Russia back into compliance
or to secure its objectives through other means.7 Despite the bleak current out-
look for the future of nuclear arms control, negotiated, verified, and legally bind-
ing treaties and other understandings continue to hold great promise in manag-
ing the new competition between Russia and the United States, who together hold
多于 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons.8

Reviewing the role that arms control has played in the past and can play in the
future with the appropriate investment in political and strategic capital is also crit-
ical in thinking about the long-term effort to address the risks posed by nuclear

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149 (2) Spring 2020Jon Brook Wolfsthal

武器. Nuclear-weapon states–the United States, 俄罗斯, 英国,
法国, and China–and indeed all states under the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-
tion of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remain committed to ending the arms race and to
general and complete disarmament. The global discord over the extent to which
the United States and Russia (and other NPT nuclear states) are fulfilling this com-
mitment is real, even if its effects are uncertain. Negotiated, verified agreements
will clearly have to be part of that broader effort as envisioned by the originators
of the NPT. 因此, questions about the future of U.S.-Russian arms control, 如何
and at what point to expand the process (quantitatively or qualitatively) to include
countries with smaller nuclear arsenals (中国, 法国, and the United Kingdom),
and how finally to expand an effective nuclear constraint system to include the
countries outside of the NPT that possess nuclear capabilities remain undefined
and daunting. These hurdles become much higher even to contemplate if the pos-
sessors of the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals, with a history of engagement
and cooperation to prevent nuclear risks, can no longer muster the political will or
commitment to continue the arms limitation and reduction process.

A rms control is not done as a favor to any one or group of countries. Agree-

ments and constraints, both legal and political–if part of broader strate-
gy for stability and security–can make America and its allies safer and re-
duce the risk of conflicts (intentional or accidental) from escalating to the nuclear
等级. Agreements can also close off or manage the growth of new areas of military
competition through transparency and constraints, saving money and enabling
investment in other military or domestic areas.

Crafting effective nuclear agreements requires a common understanding
among the parties of the nature of stability and the elements that need to be con-
trolled to maintain or enhance that state. This crucial element of the Cold War
discourse between Russia and the United States is missing today, and arguably is
absent even in the United States.9 It is no longer a given that differing parts of the
American national security establishment remain committed to the concept of
mutual vulnerability or to the idea that the goal of U.S. strategic nuclear doctrine
should be to create conditions in which neither the United States nor Russia (也不
any other state) has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first or early in a crisis or
冲突. Until America knows what it wants, arms control may only play a limit-
ed role in American security.

Given today’s global security picture, 然而, the United States would do
well to recommit itself and gain Russian commitment to a set of strategic princi-
ples and seek to develop new, broader agreements that stabilize the bilateral nu-
clear relationship and manage new and dangerous areas of technical competition.
Steps that would reduce the risk of nuclear use would be a good starting point, 但
others can and should be considered as well.

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesWhy Arms Control?

Sadly, the consensus for negotiated constraints on nuclear forces has been
weakened by the broader domestic polarization in the United States and a lack of
strategic consensus on how to deal with the geopolitical challenges posed by Rus-
sia and China. Ideological commitment to certain programs–primarily national
missile defense–at the expense of preserving global nuclear stability and the in-
ability of the American political system to sustain support for negotiated treaties
from one administration to the next have increased instability and reduced the
perceived viability of arms control.10 Building support for new agreements in the
United States will take time, patience, and an investment of political capital, 但
in the end should be pursued if they enhance American security.

幸运的是, circumstances can change quickly and negotiated agreements
have proven to be flexible and valuable tools, able to adapt to new circumstanc-
es and requirements. Just as the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and Interme-
diate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty looked different and covered different
territory than START and New START, so too can future agreements address new
and even more complex areas that undermine U.S. or mutual security. The tech-
nical means for addressing certain systems, whether substrategic nuclear weap-
昂斯, hyperglide missiles, or a new generation of INF range missiles, either exist
or can be brought to bear quickly if an appropriate level of political support can
be achieved. More exotic and complicated challenges, including those associated
with doctrine, cyber capabilities, or AI-related challenges will take more time and
technical advancements, but can be the focus of joint efforts by the United States
and Russia that can also generate trust and mutual cooperation.

The prospect for new agreements remains viable because there is little pub-
lic support for a new arms race, and concern about the risks of nuclear use are
growing.11 Moreover, there is little evidence that arms control issues have much if
any impact on electoral politics either way, creating space for political leaders to
champion arms control as a component of a new strategy for improving American
security if they choose to do so. It remains true, even in the face of vocal but lim-
ited opposition from certain parts of the national security community, that arms
control agreements have provided multiple advantages for the United States in
the past, including direct military and national security benefits, and can provide
them in the future if properly configured and implemented.

A rms control agreements have effectively managed or limited the introduc-

tion of new technologies that could have negatively affected strategic sta-
能力. There is no stronger case than the early agreement between the So-
viet Union and the United States recognizing a relationship between offensive and
defensive forces and that controls on one were impossible without controls on the
其他. This understanding, based on the embraced logic of deterrence and mutu-
al vulnerability, led to the negotiation and implementation of the ABM Treaty in

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149 (2) Spring 2020Jon Brook Wolfsthal

1972. This agreement limited both sides to no more than two missile defense fa-
城市 (later reduced to one) with no more than one hundred interceptors.12 This
meant that both sides could retain a large enough nuclear force to hold the other
at risk without having to overwhelm more than one hundred interceptors, 减少-
ing the incentives to massively increase the number of nuclear weapons and of-
fensive launchers both possessed. This agreement was based on the counterintui-
tive concept that, to be secure, one had to leave oneself vulnerable to attack, 一些-
thing that created broader political challenges that eventually led to its undoing
at the hands of more conservative voices in the United States.13 It should also be
noted that the immature state of technology at the time, which precluded the de-
velopment and deployment of effective missile defense, led the United States to
eliminate its only ABM site (Safeguard) and the existence of the ABM Treaty like-
ly saved the United States from investing billions of dollars in an attempt to build
a working ABM system.14

The ABM Treaty, and the decision to acknowledge mutual vulnerability with the
苏联, was controversial from the start. Its long-term future was questioned
as early as Ronald Reagan’s 1983 Star Wars speech that called for the development of
global missile defenses capable of shielding the United States from nuclear attack.15
俄罗斯, which had come to rely on the deterrent model that left both countries vul-
nerable to retaliatory attack–thereby reducing the risk of first nuclear strike or nu-
clear escalation–immediately began to question whether the offense-defense rela-
tionship both states had embraced in 1972 was going to remain valid.16

The United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty during the George W. 衬套
行政, eliminating a major pillar that underpinned the nuclear arms re-
duction process.17 When the ABM Treaty was in force, Washington and Moscow
were able to agree on multiple nuclear control agreements including SALT (Stra-
tegic Arms Limitation Talks) I and II, which limited the growth of nuclear forces,
and START I and II, which significantly reduced the number of strategic weapons
and missiles capable of striking the other country. 此外, the two negotiat-
ed the 1987 INF Treaty that helped enhance crisis stability and lengthen command
decision time in both NATO states and Russia, to their mutual benefit. 下列的
the death of the ABM Treaty, the United States and Russia were able to negotiate
the New START agreement that sustained a viable verification and monitoring ap-
普罗奇, but the process of both deep reductions and mutual steps to enhance stra-
tegic stability has broken down since 2003. 当然, the current prospect for a
renewed arms race is not driven entirely by America’s pursuit of missile defenses:
Russia’s need to rely on nuclear systems to compensate for its conventional infe-
riority, violation of other agreements, and domestic political concerns have also
played a role. Yet the breakdown in the shared model for strategic stability, 嗯-
bodied by the ABM Treaty as much as any other element of the bilateral relation-
船, has clearly contributed to the poor state of U.S.-Russian nuclear relations.

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesWhy Arms Control?

第二, and while not the preferred outcome, the decision by the United States
to withdraw from the ABM Treaty by using its legal provisions and providing no-
tice gave Russia advance warning of the move and reduced the potential shock val-
ue of what could have happened in the absence of any agreement on defenses. 它
remains unfortunate and dangerous that Russia has failed to exercise withdrawal
provisions of multiple agreements, including the INF Treaty, and instead has vio-
lated them covertly or without explanation. While Americans would likely prefer
Russia to comply with and stay in agreements that serve a common goal, 大部分
the distrust that has grown in the United States is based on Russia’s apparent will-
ingness to violate agreements instead of exercising legal withdrawal provisions.
If one accepts the ABM Treaty model as beneficial, then there are multiple ar-
eas in which U.S.-Russian agreements could play a role in managing areas of desta-
bilizing competition in the future. The development of national missile defenses
and their ability to undermine deterrence remain a critical issue, and it is possible
to see how numerical constraints on missile defense on both countries–setting
strict limits on the number of interceptors with constraints on rapid growth–
could restore some stability and enable further nuclear reductions. While such
constraints would be highly controversial politically, such opposition could be
overcome if the benefits provided by such an agreement were clear and if opposi-
tion to it were confronted directly.

当然, arms control did not solve all problems and, in some areas, failed to
adequately anticipate or address emerging dangers. One of the most glaring his-
torical lapses was the SALT I agreement’s failure to constrain the development and
deployment of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles. This meant that
the treaty limits on launchers did little to constraint a massive growth in the num-
ber of nuclear weapons that could be delivered against either country. START and
New START, 然而, constrained these systems by assigning a specific number
of weapons to specific launchers and enabled deep reductions in the level of stra-
tegic nuclear weapons deployed by both states. It is possible that the New START
failure to include hyperglide systems will be seen historically in the same context.

A rms control agreements, including both treaties that limited the number

and types of weapons systems each side would have and bilateral arrange-
ments that helped the two states determine in advance how their militar-
ies would operate in the face of incidents and potential conflicts, have also had
the important benefit of preventing conflicts or accidents from becoming nucle-
ar flash points.

Some of these agreements, 包括 1987 INF Treaty, had multiple bene-
ficial effects on the U.S.-Russian relationship.18 The INF Treaty eliminated an en-
tire class of launchers–ground-based missiles with ranges from 500 到 5,500 ki-
lometers–and treated all such missiles as potential nuclear-delivery vehicles. 在

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149 (2) Spring 2020Jon Brook Wolfsthal

adopting the agreement, the two sides made clear their desire to reduce the pres-
sures on leaders of both sides to make nuclear launch decisions too quickly, 哪个
could lead to the early and possibly accidental use of nuclear weapons.19 With
missiles in Europe having very short flight times to Moscow and Russian missiles
having very short flight times to NATO capitals, INF systems posed a unique chal-
lenge to stability in Europe. If a small number of nuclear weapons could be deliv-
ered against key targets in Moscow with little or no warning, Russian command-
ers would have to be ready to launch nuclear responses with little or no warning.
This raised the risk that Russian leaders–possibly through a misinterpretation, 作为
was the case in 1983 with the Able Archer event–might seek to preempt a decapi-
tating first strike by launching its own nuclear weapons first.

The INF Treaty was also an important harbinger of more effective arms control
agreements in that it was the first to allow for on-site inspections.20 By accepting the
presence of U.S. inspectors on Russian territory and vice versa, the two states were
intentionally moving away from the idea that opacity and hiding capabilities were
sources of strength and stability, and embraced the idea–with obvious limits–that
transparency and access provided a more stable basis for deterrence and a steady
bilateral relationship. The broadening of these transparency measures, 包括
steps that enabled U.S. monitoring at key Russian missile production facilities and
military bases, would form the basis for the intricate and advanced inspection pro-
cedures implemented in the 1991 START and the 2010 New START agreements.

While not formal arms control agreements per se, there are other negotiat-
ed commitments that set norms and expectations of behavior that have served
to enhance crisis stability in certain regions. Such arrangements have reinforced
the view that both Washington and Moscow wanted to set limits on the extent of
their military and geostrategic competition to avoid or at least reduce the risk that
lower-level incidents or interactions might quickly escalate and go nuclear. 这
1972 U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement and the 1963 Memorandum of Un-
derstanding Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Line, 为了
例子, have proven their value.21 While direct communication is now an after-
想法, in a crisis, secure communication links may prove critical, and in the face
of stepped-up military exercises by both NATO and Russia, the Sea Agreement has
proved its worth and helped to manage interactions. There appears to be room to
expand such deals to include interactions between aircraft and naval forces, 空气-
to-air interactions, and even land-based incidents. Russia has recently negotiated
deals with Baltic states on civilian air traffic and discussed conflict resolution and
avoidance agreements with other NATO states.

O ne of the most important benefits of arms control agreements, and a pre-

eminent one today, is the transparency and predictability they can pro-
vide for defense and security planners. It is one thing to guess at how

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesWhy Arms Control?

many missiles and nuclear weapons your adversary might have that are capable of
striking you or your allies, and it is another to have high confidence that the num-
bers fit within a specific range as supported by direct evidence and inspections
that can both detect and deter violations.22 The Cold War’s early years and even
some during the early days of arms control agreements are replete with examples
in which the lack of insight into Moscow’s nuclear capabilities led to worst-case
planning that, 反过来, led the United States to build more capabilities than were
需要的, driving Moscow to do the same in a cycle of arms racing and technical
escalation.23 The bomber gap, the missile gap, and the famous Team B exercise
that overestimated Russia’s nuclear capabilities and led the United States to di-
rect resources into areas that did not enhance deterrence or stability are clear ex-
amples of this dynamic.24 Having confidence in the size of an enemy’s possible
forces allows you to more effectively and sustainably plan for your own nuclear
军队, balancing investments in nuclear and other competing defense and non-
defense priorities.

The risk that the last remaining strategic arms control agreement–New
START–could soon expire illustrates this concern. As less information is avail-
able on Russia’s nuclear capabilities, it is easy to imagine how more militaristic or
fearful strategists in Washington could pressure for expanding America’s arsenal.
Allegations of secret or undocumented programs and unverified numbers of
weapons could become the basis for force planning in the United States. 我们. 交流电-
tions could again be seen in Moscow as cause for new actions of their own, fueled
by their own lack of insight into U.S. force structure, as the arms race between
Moscow and Washington quickens its pace.

现在, New START provides a remarkable level of transparency and data
exchanges, including through on-site verification in both Russia and the United
States.25 This feature, in the face of growing tension and instability in the U.S.-
Russian relationship, is a critical element in U.S. national security decision-making.
New START’s possible expiration or demise would leave the two largest nuclear
powers with no active and intrusive inspection or information exchange provi-
sions to cover their strategic nuclear weapons, and could result in a large-scale
expansion of the number of nuclear weapons each might determine it needs to
maintain deterrence. As other areas of military competition expand, it seems es-
sential that American intelligence and military officials have some confidence in
their ability to determine the size and scope of Russia’s strategic nuclear capabili-
ties and to maintain some access to those systems through treaty inspections.

There are multiple areas of technological development that may likely have
significant impacts on nuclear deterrence and stability.26 It is worth considering
how the lack of agreements covering such weapons and capabilities, 在那里-
fore the lack of transparency and predictability, are already affecting the strategic
景观. There has been some consideration over the past decade of whether

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149 (2) Spring 2020Jon Brook Wolfsthal

hyperglide missiles are ripe for limits or constraints, and it is interesting in retro-
spect how the tacit decision by Russia and the United States not to include hy-
perglide missiles in the New START agreement opened up an area of competition
now cited by voices concerned about Russian military actions as a growing threat
to the United States and its allies. This is one future area in which numerical lim-
its on such systems could, if analyzed in the broader context of nuclear and relat-
ed systems, be subject to future political or legal agreement bilaterally or more
宽广地.

A clear case for sustaining New START could be made on this basis alone. 这
United States is only at the starting point in modernizing its strategic nuclear forc-
英语, whereas Russia is nearing completion of its modernization cycle (something
we know in detail because of the transparency provided by New START verifica-
的). Given the cost and schedule uncertainties that come with America’s nucle-
ar efforts, it makes great sense to maintain constraints and insight into Russia’s
nuclear systems while the U.S. modernization program advances. Lack of such
controls combined with significant cost increases or schedule delays could put the
United States in a major numerical mismatch with Russia, leading it to have to
take other steps–such as uploading its forces–in a way that could increase uncer-
tainty and instability with Russia.

P erhaps few images inspire as much derision as the idea of large U.S. 和

Soviet negotiating teams in Geneva or Vienna spending weeks at a time
reading and responding to long, laborious, and frankly boring plenary and
working-group statements. Decades of sitting across tables in ornate rooms hard-
ly seems the setting for negotiating dramatic agreements that could decide the fate
of hundreds of millions of people. And yet the hard, slow, and detailed work of ne-
gotiating and implementing arms control agreements provides one of the more
important elements of the benefits that come from arms control treaties. Engage-
蒙特, 沟通, and the willingness to work seriously toward a common
solution have salutatory benefits that must not be overlooked.

It has quickly become apparent over the past half-century of engagement
when both sides are serious about reaching agreements, and when they are not.
The composition of delegations, the willingness to discuss real, pressing, and sub-
stantive issues as opposed to airing grievances, and seeking unrealistic solutions
or compensation versus actually engaging on issues of mutual concern have all
been indicators as to whether American and Russian officials and leaders are seri-
ous about using arms control to manage the strategic competition.

This motivated good faith is sometimes the case, and sometimes not. Recent

negotiations provide examples of each.

Among the discouraging cases, it was clear from 2013 on that Russia was not treat-
ing U.S. concerns about Russia’s development and testing of the 9M729 land-based

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesWhy Arms Control?

cruise missile in a way that enhanced confidence about Russia’s intention to honor
the INF agreement. The 9M729 was, according to U.S. 来源, tested in a way that
violated the INF Treaty, and Russia has now deployed several battalions of 9M729
land-based cruise missiles that Washington and NATO believe have a range beyond
the INF limit of 500 kilometers. Russia’s refusal to acknowledge the existence of the
missile and later to deny and refuse steps to not deploy and even eliminate the of-
fending system fed into concern within both the Obama and Trump administra-
tions that Russia had no desire to preserve the INF Treaty. 当然, Russia likely
has similar views about Washington’s refusal to engage constructively on issues of
concern raised by Russia, including the ability of the Mk-41 missile defense launch-
ers to possibly hold and launch offensive cruise missiles. These cases strengthen the
view in both countries that neither side remained fully committed to the benefits
derived from the INF Treaty’s ban on land-based medium-range missiles.

T here are multiple examples, 然而, in which the implementation bod-

ies set up to aid in fully implementing agreements or resolving disputes
have proven their worth and reinforced the perceived value of and com-
mitment to arms control treaties. The ABM dispute over the Krasnoyarsk radar is
one example, and ongoing discussion between the United States and Russia over
the method by which the United States is converting nuclear-associated launchers
to a non-nuclear role is another. The extent to which Washington seriously engag-
es with Russia’s concerns and how visible this engagement is to Russia will be im-
portant factors in preserving what is left of the partnership on basic predictability
and transparency associated with New START.

There are several major areas that need to be addressed for arms control to as-
sume a more central role in addressing and improving American security. 第一的,
the United States needs to have a clear concept of what situation it would consider
stable and what mix of nuclear and non-nuclear systems it would need in the face
of Russian activities to maintain deterrence and stability. That will require a clear-
eyed assessment about what systems Russia has and is developing, and what spe-
cific capabilities pose new and unmanageable threats to the United States and its
盟国. For too long this conversation has been left to civilian and military officials
to determine. It needs to include not only strategic thinkers from other parts of the
我们. 政府, but also from Congress, foreign policy experts, and the broad-
er informed public. Developing and maintaining a new consensus on the princi-
ples of strategic and crisis stability is required to pursue them either through mil-
itary or diplomatic means.

第二, the United States and Russia need to pursue sustained, high-level, 和
interagency engagement on a broad set of issues related to both nuclear and broad-
er strategic stability. The lack of engagement at the presidential and leadership
levels of the Department of State, 国防部, and the intelligence

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149 (2) Spring 2020Jon Brook Wolfsthal

communities has both created a major gap in our understanding of and confi-
dence in Russia’s strategic perspective and left us to guess at Russia’s plans and in-
tentions. 实际上, the United States and Russia are now in the midst of the longest
gap in either arms control negotiations or strategic stability discussions since be-
fore the Cuban Missile Crisis. This dangerous state of affairs cannot be allowed to
continue. Talks do not in and of themselves offer the promise of new agreements,
or even agreement on the current problems. But lack of engagement does guaran-
tee that the state of affairs will maintain, if not worsen.

第三, the United States and Russia need to broaden the scope of possible nego-
tiations beyond strategic nuclear weapons. While extending New START or find-
ing a viable replacement that can replicate the level of confidence we have in the
overall size and nature of Russia’s strategic nuclear capabilities seems both com-
monsense and essential, it will likely prove impossible to pursue deeper reduc-
tions and more qualitative constraints through arms control unless the thorny is-
sues of the offense-defense relationship and the impacts of advanced convention-
阿尔, new intermediate-range, and other new military technologies are addressed in
some way. Not all of these issues need to be included in one agreement, 并不是
all need to be subject to binding, verified arms control. Some features could be
pursued via political commitments and restraints, and other as unilateral declara-
系统蒸发散. It is hard to see how the United States and Russia can find common ground
for anything other than sustaining the limited scope of strategic arms control
agreements unless they begin to address sources of instability being pursued by
both states. If so engaged, a wider range of agreements, understandings, 和骗局-
straints could become viable.

最后的, even if some semblance of a consensus can be developed in the United
状态, and if that domestic platform can be used to negotiate new broader deals
with Russia, it appears that new norms within arms control agreements need to
be considered and addressed to make them more durable. As evidenced by Pres-
ident Trump’s readiness to withdraw from agreements, even those approved by
the Senate and ratified by successors, as well as by multiple examples of Russia’s
violation of agreements, both Russia and the United States need to consider ways
their commitments to treaties can be made more durable and their reversal less
rapidly achieved. One idea would be to increase the declared withdrawal time to
more than the three to six months included in current treaties to one year or even
multiple years. The length of time it takes to design, 建造, and deploy new mis-
sile and delivery systems would not seem to preclude this as a starting point for
negotiations. 此外, while the Trump administration has talked about want-
ing to make treaties more “enforceable” but has yet to propose any substance be-
hind this idea, it behooves those who support the pursuit of new agreements to
consider whether there can be certain terms of punishment built into an agree-
蒙特, including a priori determination of economic or political sanctions or other

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesWhy Arms Control?

consequences for proven violations. 当然, this might require submitting is-
sues of treaty compliance to outside arbiters, but that may also have some positive
implications in certain cases that should be openly discussed by the parties.

Yogi Berra once said that “predictions are always hard, especially about the fu-
ture.” This has always been the case with nuclear weapons. By possessing the means
of our own and the world’s destruction, the future is always uncertain and the best
we can accomplish is to reduce the scope of uncertainty and increase our ability
to manage crises when they inevitably occur. Using arms control agreements–in
their many forces and for the many potential benefits they bring–to our advantage
must remain a viable part of our nuclear strategy. Without effective agreements,
the costs of our nuclear complex as well as risks of conflict and the global danger
of nuclear destruction only rise. That sobering thought should inform decisions by
current and future leaders about how best to position the United States and Russia
to enable arms control to play a continued role in our joint survival.

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关于作者

Jon Brook Wolfsthal is the Senior Advisor to Global Zero and Director of the Nuclear
Crisis Group. He served from 2014 到 2017 as the Senior Director on the National
Security Council for Arms Control and Nonproliferation and as Special Assistant
to the President of the United States. He has served in the U.S. government in a va-
riety of positions, including as a Foreign Affairs Officer at the U.S. Department of
Energy and as Special Advisor to Vice President Joseph Biden for Nuclear Security.
He is the author of Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (with Joseph
Cirincione and Miriam Rajkumar, 2002).

尾注

1 Thomas Graham Jr. and Damien J. LaVera, Cornerstones of Security: Arms Control Treaties in

the Nuclear Era (Seattle: 华盛顿大学出版社, 2002).

2 Coit Blacker and Gloria Duffy, 编辑。, International Arms Control: Issues and Agreements, 2ND版.

(帕洛阿尔托, 加利福尼亚州。: 斯坦福大学出版社, 1984).

3 Henry D. Sokolski, 编辑。, Getting MAD, Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Prac-

泰斯 (卡莱尔, 帕。: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004).

4 See Linton F. 布鲁克斯, “The End of Arms Control?代达罗斯 149 (2) (春天 2020).

5 迈克尔·A. Levi and Michael E. O’Hanlon, 编辑。, The Future of Nuclear Arms Control (Wash-
因顿, 华盛顿特区: 布鲁金斯学会出版社, 2005); and John R. Bolton, Surrender Is Not an
Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad (纽约: Threshold Editions,
2008).

113

149 (2) Spring 2020Jon Brook Wolfsthal

6 See the annual Arms Control Compliance Reports at U.S. Department of State, Adherence
to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commit-
评论 (Compliance Report) (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: 我们. Department of State, various years),
https://www.state.gov/adherence-to-and-compliance-with-arms-control-nonproliferation
-and-disarmament-agreements-and-commitments-compliance-report/.

7 “Russian Violations of the INF Treaty: After Detection,” Hearing before the Subcommit-
tee on Strategic Forces of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives,
113th Cong., 2nd sess., H.A.S.C. 不. 113-120, 七月 17, 2014.

8 See the “Nuclear Notebook” section of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://fas.org/

issues/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-notebook/.

9 See Anya Loukianova Fink and Olga Oliker, “Russia’s Nuclear Weapons in a Multipo-
lar World: Guarantors of Sovereignty, Great Power Status & 更多的,代达罗斯 149 (2)
(春天 2020).

10 Thomas Karako and Ian Williams, Missile Defense 2020: Next Steps for Defending the Homeland

(华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2017).

11 Steven Erlanger, “Are We Headed for Another Expensive Nuclear Arms Race? Could Be,”
The New York Times, 八月 8, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/08/world/
europe/arms-race-russia-china.html.

12 美国国家科学院, Nuclear Arms Control: Background and Issues (华盛顿,

华盛顿特区: The National Academies Press, 1985), 136–149.

13 McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (新的
约克: Vintage Books, 1990); and Alexander T. J. Lennon, 编辑。, Contemporary Nuclear De-
bates: Missile Defense, Arms Control, and Arms Races in the Twenty-First Century (剑桥,
大量的。: 麻省理工学院出版社, 2002).

14 Mark Berhow, 我们. Strategic and Defensive Missile Systems 1950–2004 (牛津: Osprey Pub-

lishing, 2005).

15 Frances FitzGerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War

(纽约: 西蒙和舒斯特, 2000).

16 Bilyana Lilly, Russian Foreign Policy toward Missile Defense: 演员, Motivations, and Influence

(华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: 列克星敦图书, 2014).

17 Terence Neilan, “Bush Pulls Out of ABM Treaty; Putin Calls Move a Mistake,“ 新的
约克时报, 十二月 13, 2001, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/13/international/
bush-pulls-out-of-abm-treaty-putin-calls-move-a-mistake.html.

18 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles
(INF Treaty), 十二月 8, 1987, available at https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/
102360.htm.

19 Maynard W. Glitman, The Last Battle of the Cold War: An Inside Account of Negotiating the Inter-

mediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (伦敦: 帕尔格雷夫·麦克米伦, 2006).

20 Lewis A. Dunn and Amy E. Gordon, Arms Control Verification and the New Role of On-Site

Inspection (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: 列克星敦图书, 1990).

21 Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “Paper 11. Applying and Extending the USA-USSR Incidents at Sea
协议,” in Security at Sea: Naval Forces and Arms Control, 编辑. Richard Fieldhouse

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesWhy Arms Control?

(Stockholm and Oxford: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and Ox-
福特大学出版社, 1990); and Graham and LaVera, Cornerstones of Security.

22 美国国家科学院, Nuclear Arms Control.
23 看到我们. Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Military Power, 4特德. (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区:
我们. Government Printing Office, 1985), https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/
docs/CIA-RDP88B00745R000100140025-7.pdf.

24 The Cold War Museum, “Bomber Gap,” http://www.coldwar.org/articles/50s/bomber
_gap.asp; Peter Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap (伊萨卡岛, 纽约: 康奈尔大学
按, 1995); and Joshua Rovner, Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelli-
根杰斯 (伊萨卡岛, 纽约: 康奈尔大学出版社, 2015), 113.

25 Amy Woolf, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区:

Congressional Research Service, 2019).

26 看, 例如, Christopher F. Chyba, “New Technologies & Strategic Stability,”
代达罗斯 149 (2) (春天 2020); 詹姆斯·M. Acton, “Cyber Warfare & Inadvertent Escala-
的,代达罗斯 149 (2) (春天 2020); and James Timbie, “A Way Forward,代达罗斯 149
(2) (春天 2020).

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