What Allies Want
What Allies Want Iain D. 亨利
Reconsidering Loyalty, Reliability, 和
Alliance Interdependence
Do states judge their
ally’s behavior toward its other allies? If yes, 如何? 历史上, 决定-
makers have instinctively adopted deterrence theory’s logic that a state’s char-
acter is judged through displays of innate loyalty: if a state is disloyal to one
盟友, then this will create a reputation for disloyalty, which will cause other al-
lies to doubt the state’s reliability. 因此, disloyalty can have calamitous conse-
序列: the aggrieved ally will punish the betrayal; other allies will suffer
crises of faith; and adversaries will conclude that the state’s alliances are cheap
talk. The logic is that discrete alliance commitments are interdependent—that
what happens in one alliance affects the expectations of other allies—and
那
this interdependence is underpinned by demonstrations of loyalty.
President Lyndon Johnson said that if the United States were “driven from the
ªeld in Viet-nam, then no nation can ever again have the same conªdence in
American promise or in American protection.”1
These convictions
regularly animate contemporary debates: 南希
Bernkopf Tucker and Bonnie Glaser argue that if the United States were to
Iain D. Henry is a Lecturer at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University.
The author thanks the anonymous reviewers, 大卫·卡皮, Timothy Crawford, Evelyn Goh, 米-
chael Green, Yasuhiro Izumikawa, Yuen Foong Khong, Tongª Kim, Amy King, Ronald Krebs,
Gregory Miller, Evan Resnick, Jennifer Spindel, and Hugh White for their comments and sugges-
系统蒸发散. The author also thanks the staff at the National Archives and Records Administration,
Princeton University’s Seeley G. Mudd Library, and the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Li-
brary. The author gratefully acknowledges the ªnancial support provided through grants and
scholarships from the Australian Government, the Australian National University, and the Austra-
lian-American Fulbright Commission.
1. Vietnam Task Force, Ofªce of the Secretary of Defense, United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–
1967, V.A., Justiªcation of the War, Public Statements, 卷. 2: D—The Johnson Administration, p. D-50,
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/205536-pentagon-papers-part-v-a-volume-ii-d.html.
On deterrence theory and the interdependence of commitments, see Thomas C. Schelling, Arms
and Inºuence (新天堂, 康涅狄格州: 耶鲁大学出版社, 1966); Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of
Conºict (剑桥, 大量的。: 哈佛大学出版社, 1960); Robert Jervis, Perception and
Misperception in International Politics (普林斯顿大学, 新泽西州: 普林斯顿大学出版社, 1976); Glenn H.
斯奈德, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (普林斯顿大学, 新泽西州: 普林斯顿大学-
大学出版社, 1961); Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conºict among Nations: Bargaining, 决定
制作, and System Structure in International Crises (普林斯顿大学, 新泽西州: 普林斯顿大学出版社,
1977); and Robert Jervis and Jack L. 斯奈德, 编辑。, Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and
Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland (牛津: 牛津大学出版社, 1991).
国际安全, 卷. 44, 不. 4 (春天 2020), PP. 45–83, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00375
© 2020 由哈佛大学和麻省理工学院的校长和研究员撰写.
根据知识共享署名发布 4.0 国际的 (抄送 4.0) 执照.
45
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国际安全 44:4 46
abandon Taiwan in a conºict with China, this could deal “a fatal blow to the
U.S.-Japan alliance” and might lead to South Korea “renouncing its security al-
liance with Washington and aligning with Beijing.”2 Aaron Friedberg writes
that expecting a U.S. “back down . . . [和] a Chinese victory over Taiwan . . .
to leave America’s Asian alliances unscathed, is to indulge in wishful thinking
of the most dangerous kind.”3 Others suggest cross-regional effects, claiming
that by “retreating from the Middle East and abandoning Ukraine to Russian
aggression,” President Barack Obama left “America’s Asian allies . . . bewil-
dered and alienated.”4 If alliance interdependence exists, and is governed by
innate loyalty, then ªghting for reputation is crucial, because any single alli-
ance rift could quickly tear asunder other alliance relationships.
Some scholars, described as “reputation skeptics,” dispute this common
智慧. Skeptics argue that because “reputation is in the eye of the beholder,”
the United States should never regard demonstrating loyalty as sufªcient
grounds for military action.5 Jonathan Mercer argues that when allies observe
the United States demonstrating loyalty, they will attribute this desired behav-
ior to situational causes and thus will not conclude that it will be loyal in fu-
ture crises. 相比之下, he concludes that when the United States is disloyal,
this undesired behavior will be attributed to national character, but will not al-
ways cause allies to expect similar behavior in the future.6 Reputation skeptics
believe that “leaders are tragically mistaken when they commit to the use of
force in the expectation of long-term beneªts beyond any gains in the immedi-
ate dispute.”7
2. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker and Bonnie Glaser, “Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?”
Washington Quarterly, 卷. 34, 不. 4 (落下 2011), PP. 32–33, doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2011.609128.
See also Richard C. 衬套, Uncharted Strait: The Future of China-Taiwan Relations (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区:
布鲁金斯学会出版社, 2013); and Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is
Conºict Inevitable?” 国际安全, 卷. 30, 不. 2 (落下 2005), PP. 7–45, doi.org/10.1162/
016228805775124589.
3. Aaron L. Friedberg, “Will We Abandon Taiwan?” Commentary, 可能 1, 2000, https://万维网
.commentarymagazine.com/articles/will-we-abandon-taiwan/. See also Charles L. Glaser, “A
U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommoda-
的,” 国际安全, 卷. 39, 不. 4 (春天 2015), PP. 49–90, doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00199.
4. Arthur Herman and Lewis Libby, “America’s Crisis of Credibility in Asia” (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区:
Hudson Institute, 一月 31, 2017), https://www.hudson.org/research/13296-america-s-crisis-of-
credibility-in-asia.
5. Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (伊萨卡岛, 纽约: 康奈尔大学出版社,
1996), p. 227. Other reputation-skeptic works include Daryl G. 按, Calculating Credibility: 如何
Leaders Assess Military Threats (伊萨卡岛, 纽约: 康奈尔大学出版社, 2005); 和特德·霍普夫, Periph-
eral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965–1990 (安娜堡:
University of Michigan Press, 1994). The best review of the debate is Frank P. Harvey and John
Mitton, Fighting for Credibility: 我们. Reputation and International Politics (多伦多, 加拿大: 大学-
sity of Toronto Press, 2016).
6. 美世, Reputation and International Politics, PP. 227–228.
7. Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in Inter-
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What Allies Want 47
This interdependence debate has usually focused on adversarial interactions
and reputations for resolve, deªned as “the extent to which a state will risk
war to keep its promises and uphold its threats.” Loyalty is usually assumed
to be the obvious “ºip side” of resolve, and is not often studied in its own
right.8 Some studies of reputation and alliances exist, but are predominantly
focused on alliance formation rather than management.9 Because loyalty has
not received the signiªcant scholarly attention centered on resolve, alliance in-
terdependence is undertheorized.10 But as the contemporary debate about
Taiwan highlights, beliefs about loyalty and alliance interdependence could
be a decisive inºuence on policy today. If alliance interdependence exists,
scholars and policymakers urgently need to know how it works.
I argue that both the deterrence theorists and the reputation skeptics are
wrong. Alliance interdependence exists—what happens in one alliance can af-
fect others—but this is not determined by a national moral character of innate
loyalty. When a state observes its ally’s behavior in another alliance, 它不是
hope to see loyalty per se. 反而, it hopes to see proof that the ally’s interests
align with its own. 在某些情况下, it will be in the observer state’s interest for
its ally to fulªll a separate alliance commitment—that is, the state will want its
ally to be loyal to the other ally. But in other cases, where loyalty would not be
in the observer state’s interest, it will want its ally to be disloyal to the other
盟友. This reasoning contrasts starkly with other theories, which expect that a
state will always want its ally to demonstrate inherent, pure loyalty. 我认为
that the state is unconcerned about whether its ally’s behavior is loyal or dis-
loyal in any objective or moral sense. 相当, when the state is conªdent that
its ally’s interests align with its own, and therefore the alliance poses no risk
of either abandonment or entrapment, then the ally is reliable.11 Observed
reliability—not innate loyalty—is what states want from allies. If an ally poses
risks of entrapment, abandonment, 或两者, then it is unreliable, 和
state will act to mitigate these risks. Responses could include hedging, diplo-
national Politics,” 国际组织, 卷. 69, 不. 2 (春天 2015), p. 476, doi.org/10.1017/
S0020818314000393. 笔记, 尽管, that these authors are not reputation skeptics.
8. 美世, Reputation and International Politics, p. 15.
9. Examples include Douglas M. Gibler, “The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Forma-
的,” 冲突解决杂志, 卷. 52, 不. 3 (六月 2008), PP. 426–454, doi.org/10.1177
%2F0022002707310003; and Mark J.C. Crescenzi et al., “Reliability, Reputation, and Alliance For-
运动,” International Studies Quarterly, 卷. 56, 不. 2 (六月 2012), PP. 259–274, doi.org/10.1111/
j.1468-2478.2011.00711.x.
10. Other scholars have noted the need to consider reputations for loyalty or reliability separately
from considerations of resolve and adversaries. See Press, Calculating Credibility, p. 160; 和
Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo, “Revisiting Reputation,” p. 492.
11. On entrapment, see Tongª Kim, “Why Alliances Entangle but Seldom Entrap States,“ 安全
学习, 卷. 20, 不. 3 (2011), PP. 350–377, doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2011.599201.
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国际安全 44:4 48
matic restraint initiatives, intra-alliance bargaining, threats of defection, 在-
tempts to entrap the ally, 或者, in extremis, alliance abrogation, bandwagoning, 或者
nuclear proliferation.12
Deterrence theory recommends that states ªght for reputation, and skeptics
urge policymakers not to worry about reputation costs. I argue that adroit alli-
ance management requires understanding how developments in one alliance
can affect the reliability perceptions and behavior of other allies. 联合
States may need to ªght—or not ªght—to ensure that allies still perceive it
as reliable. If the true nature of interdependence is recognized, 联合
States can manage alliance interdependence without being captive to a “cult
of reputation.”13
In the ªrst section of this article, I examine existing theories of reputation,
loyalty, and alliance interdependence, and critique the belief that states want
their allies to be indiscriminately loyal. In the second section, I explain why the
concept of alliance reliability has greater explanatory power than the idea of
loyalty. I propose hypotheses on reliability and alliance interdependence and
contrast these with deterrence theory and Mercer’s reputation-skeptic argu-
蒙特. In the third section, I use process tracing and archival research of the
First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954–55) to test my theory of alliance reliability. 我
show that although U.S. decisionmakers fretted about being perceived as dis-
loyal to the Republic of China (ROC, or Nationalist China), most allies actively
encouraged the United States to compel an ROC withdrawal from disputed
territories and thus reduce the risk of conºict. In the ªnal section, I summarize
my ªndings and explain their implications for theory and policy.
Ideas of Reputation, Loyalty, and Alliance Interdependence
Reputation, which Mercer states is “a judgement of . . . 特点 (or disposi-
的) that is then used to predict or explain future behavior,” is usually pre-
sented as a necessary condition for interdependence.14 Deterrence theorists
12. See Alexander Lanoszka, Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (伊萨卡岛,
纽约: 康奈尔大学出版社, 2018). On chain ganging, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack
斯奈德, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” Interna-
tional Organization, 卷. 44, 不. 2 (春天 1990), PP. 137–168, doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300035232.
On bandwagoning, see Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Proªt: Bringing the Revisionist
State Back In,” 国际安全, 卷. 19, 不. 1 (夏天 1994), PP. 72–107, doi.org/10.2307/
2539149.
13. Shiping Tang, “Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conºict,” 安全研究,
卷. 14, 不. 1 (January–March 2005), PP. 34–62, doi.org/10.1080/09636410591001474.
14. 美世, Reputation and International Politics, p. 6.
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What Allies Want 49
argue that issuing credible threats to adversaries requires a reputation for re-
solve. Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing replicated this logic by arguing that alli-
ance interdependence is determined by a reputation for loyalty:
just “as
‘resolve credit’ with adversaries can be earned and ‘banked’ by repeated in-
stances of ªrmness, so ‘loyalty credit’ with present or potential allies can be
generated and drawn upon in the future by repeated demonstrations of sup-
port.”15 Thus, an instance of disloyalty not only risks “the defection of an
alienated partner,” but contributes toward a wider reputation for disloyalty.16
Given its importance, the concept of loyalty receives insufªcient attention in
the literature on alliances.17 Does loyalty mean always supporting an ally, 或者
just complying with an alliance treaty? Is it disloyal to abandon a reckless and
provocative ally? When discussing interdependence, alliance theorists are
largely silent on these questions and instead transpose deterrence theory’s
logic onto alliance commitments: states observing an ally’s behavior make
a dispositional (特点) judgment based on a state’s loyal or disloyal con-
duct.18 According to this logic, because an ally’s conduct reveals its innate na-
tional character and suggests similar behavior in future scenarios, states will
never want to see their ally demonstrate disloyalty.
Mercer—the most prominent reputation skeptic—argues that when states
observe an ally’s behavior, they do not always attribute it to character.19 He
claims that an ally’s desired behavior will be attributed to situational factors,
but its undesired behavior will be blamed on national character. The result
is that “states get no credit when they behave properly, but do get blame when
they misbehave.”20 Thus, states should never ªght to demonstrate loyalty, 是-
cause this will not create a beneªcial reputation. Mercer extends this argument
to conclude that a state should be unconcerned about having a reputation
for disloyalty, because deliberate efforts to demonstrate loyalty will be dis-
15. Snyder and Diesing, Conºict among Nations, p. 432. As noted by other authors, various terms
are substituted, with “credibility” often taking the place of “loyalty.” See, 例如, 唐, “Rep-
utation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conºict,” p. 34 n. 2.
16. Glenn H. 斯奈德, Alliance Politics (伊萨卡岛, 纽约: 康奈尔大学出版社, 1997), p. 54.
17. For a more general discussion, see Albert O. 赫希曼, 出口, 嗓音, 和忠诚度: Responses to
Decline in Firms, 组织机构, and States (剑桥, 大量的。: 哈佛大学出版社, 1970).
18. 美世, Reputation and International Politics, p. 6. Like Mercer, I use “dispositional” as inter-
changeable with “character.” Harvey and Mitton argue that deterrence theorists expected reputa-
tion to be only one of four variables affecting predictions of adversary behavior. See Harvey and
Mitton, Fighting for Credibility, PP. 71–104. See also John Mitton, “Selling Schelling Short: Reputa-
tions and American Coercive Diplomacy after Syria,” 当代安全政策, 卷. 36, 不. 3
(十二月 2015), PP. 408–431, doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2015.1091573.
19. I use Mercer to represent the reputation-skeptic perspective. See also Press, Calculating Credi-
能力; 和霍普夫, Peripheral Visions.
20. 美世, Reputation and International Politics, p. 227.
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国际安全 44:4 50
counted by allies who will “assume that our capabilities and interests deter-
mine our resolve.”21 These different positions lead to diametrically opposed
policy recommendations: depending on who is asked, ªghting for reputation
is either essential or folly.
In this debate, alliance interdependence is usually considered analogous to
the interdependence of threats issued to adversaries.22 But as Gregory Miller
writes, “Scholars . . . often ignore . . . a state’s willingness to honor its [联盟]
promises.”23 This neglect has resulted in two contestable ideas being taken
as true.
The ªrst is that states always want to see their ally demonstrate loyalty: A
term often used, but rarely deªned. If Mercer’s deªnition of resolve was trun-
cated, loyalty could be deªned as “the extent to which a state will risk war to
keep its promises.”24 This is the most common meaning of the term, and it di-
rectly connects loyalty to the risk of abandonment: a disloyal state does not
keep its promise to ªght, and thus abandons its ally. This deªnition, 然而,
does not adequately encapsulate the cooperative efforts expected—and obliga-
tions felt—within alliances. 还, it suggests that judging a state’s loyalty is a
直截了当, unproblematic task. 相比之下, Snyder argues that alliances
create a norm that the states “ought to give each other mutual support on
lesser issues, most especially those that relate somehow to the ultimate mili-
tary contingency.” He calls this the “alliance halo,” which creates “an obliga-
tion to support, or at least to avoid damaging, the interests of the ally.” Snyder
concludes that “there appears to be a norm . . . that allies’ expectations of sup-
port must be satisªed, even when such expectations are not founded on any
formal obligation.” Thus, I borrow from Snyder and deªne loyalty as fulªlling
not only the obligation to support an ally in wartime, as usually required by an
alliance agreement, but also fulªlling the obligation to support the ally within
the expectations established by the alliance halo.25
显着, Snyder’s halo concept suggests that there are degrees of alli-
ance loyalty, a notion that confounds the description of a state as either
21. 同上。, p. 228. The emphasis on interests and capabilities is supported by Press, Calculating
信誉度.
22. 美世, Reputation and International Politics, p. 15. Alliances are “formal associations of states
for the use (or nonuse) of military force, in speciªed circumstances, against states outside their
own membership.” See Snyder, Alliance Politics, p. 4.
23. Gregory D. 磨坊主, The Shadow of the Past: Reputation and Military Alliances before the First World
战争 (伊萨卡岛, 纽约: 康奈尔大学出版社, 2012), p. 4.
24. 美世, Reputation and International Politics, p. 15.
25. 斯奈德, Alliance Politics, PP. 356–359. The author thanks Timothy Crawford for a reminder of
Snyder’s alliance halo concept.
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What Allies Want 51
categorically loyal or disloyal. Ambiguity in an alliance text, or differing inter-
预谋, can make assessments of loyalty difªcult: a state might be loyal
on the core issues clearly formalized by an alliance treaty, but disloyal on
some peripheral issue.26 Thus, it is more accurate to describe speciªc state
behavior—rather than the state itself—as loyal or disloyal.
Theorists and decisionmakers overlook these nuances and instead assume
that states want their ally to demonstrate a national character trait of unal-
loyed loyalty. On closer examination, 然而, this is a questionable belief of
fragile logic. 考虑, 例如, a state with two allies, that come under si-
multaneous attack. The state’s military resources are such that it can support
only one ally: this ally will survive, but the abandoned ally will be conquered.
Each ally will desperately desire the state’s loyalty and will be unconcerned
that this requires the state’s disloyalty to the other ally.27 A similar dynamic is
described by Thomas Christensen: European allies initially welcomed the
United States’ decision to defend South Korea, 但
later worried that
the Korean War would result in the Americans either “expending their power
in an unimportant area or . . . triggering World War III.”28
Other circumstances could also prompt demands for disloyalty. A state
might have two allies, and the ªrst ally’s territorial dispute risks escalating
into a major war. If the second ally fears escalation more than the risks of de-
escalation, it will worry that the state could be too loyal and will instead want
the state to be disloyal to the ªrst ally. These hypotheticals show that a state
will not always want its ally to loyally fulªll all alliance commitments.
26. 例如, A 1961 State Department memo, commenting on the U.S.-ROC alliance treaty,
noted “a wide discrepancy between the interpretation placed upon it by the United States” and
that of the ROC. This meant that the United States would have to “take actions involving a serious
risk of war or . . . back away from a real or implied commitment.” See George McGhee to
McGeorge Bundy, 可能 22, 1961, box 284a, Departments and Agencies, National Security Files,
Papers of President Kennedy, 约翰·F. Kennedy Presidential Library, 波士顿, 马萨诸塞州.
27. A similar point is made in Robert Jervis, “Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior,” in Jervis
and Snyder, Dominoes and Bandwagons, p. 36.
28. 托马斯·J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: 大战略, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-Amer-
ican Conºict, 1947–1958 (普林斯顿大学, 新泽西州: 普林斯顿大学出版社, 1996), p. 181. For a compelling
examination of how European allies reacted to the United States’ policy reversal, see also Jonathan
美世, “Emotion and Strategy in the Korean War,” 国际组织, 卷. 67, 不. 2 (四月
2013), PP. 221–252. 笔记, 尽管, that many Asian states strongly supported the U.S. decision to
defend Korea. For an excellent discussion of this dynamic, but in response to the Vietnam War, 看
Ronald R. Krebs and Jennifer Spindel, “Divided Priorities: Why and When Allies Differ over Mili-
tary Intervention,” 安全研究, 卷. 27, 不. 4 (2018), PP. 575–606, doi.org/10.1080/09636412
.2018.1483609. My work differs from that of Krebs and Spindel in several ways: I expect allies to
oppose intervention when it damages their ally’s reliability, and I argue that, 在某些情况下, 国际米兰-
ventions could improve alliance reliability. 还, I consider alliance interdependence, 而不是
the question of military intervention: my theory can operate in non-intervention scenarios.
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国际安全 44:4 52
Another questionable belief is that states observe behavior to assess national
特点, rather than interests and capability. This assumption is strongest in
deterrence theory, but even Mercer expects that reputations, based on a na-
tion’s character, might form as a result of undesired behavior. Although at one
point he argues that states “usually prefer . . . allies to stand ªrm,” Mercer goes
on to depict an ally’s loyal behavior as desired and disloyalty as undesired.29
But if states discourage or attempt to prevent loyal behavior, these actions sug-
gest that alliance interdependence is determined by something other than
judgments of national character.
A Theory of Alliance Reliability
If states do not want innately loyal allies, then what do they want? Gregory
Miller’s work suggests that states want allied reliability. Although he does not
explicitly deªne reliability, Miller notes that a state could be considered unreli-
able if it “fails to ªght when obligated to do so” (IE。, abandons its ally) 或者
“drags its ally into an unwanted conºict” (IE。, entraps its ally).30 He ªnds that
reliable states maximize their choice of allies and autonomy, whereas unreli-
able states have fewer alliance prospects and are more constrained by alliance
treaty texts. Miller’s work contributes signiªcantly to the scholarship on alli-
ance interdependence, but its contemporary relevance is limited by the
hypotheses tested and case studies examined: such ªndings may not be gen-
eralizable to contemporary conditions.31
Miller’s underlying logic suggests that in a perfect alliance, the two states
would always agree on goals, 资源, and methods. Because this agree-
ment would neutralize any risk of disloyalty, neither state would fear aban-
donment. Just as importantly, total agreement would neutralize any risk of
adventurism, so neither state would fear entrapment. This perfect alliance
29. 美世, Reputation and International Politics, p. 66. For an example of how Mercer treats allied
loyalty as desired behavior, see especially pp. 226–228.
30. 磨坊主, The Shadow of the Past, p. 44.
31. 看, 例如, Dale C. Copeland, “Do Reputations Matter?” 安全研究, 卷. 7, 不. 1
(秋天 1997), PP. 50–51, doi.org/10.1080/09636419708429333. For alliance scholarship examin-
ing more modern cases, see Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S. Sechser, “Signaling Alliance Com-
mitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence,” American Journal of
政治学, 卷. 58, 不. 4 (十月 2014), PP. 919–935, doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12082; Linton
Brooks and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Extended Deterrence, Assurance, and Reassurance in the Paciªc
during the Second Nuclear Age,” in Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. 丹麦, and Travis Tanner,
编辑。, Strategic Asia, 2013–14: Asia in the Second Nuclear Age (Seattle, Wash.: 国家统计局
Asian Research, 2013); and Alexander Lanoszka, “Tangled Up in Rose? Theories of Alliance En-
trapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War,” 当代安全政策, 卷. 39, 不. 2 (四月
2017), PP. 234–257, doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1392102.
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What Allies Want 53
would be all beneªt and no risk: because of their identical interests, each
state would be a completely reliable ally to the other. Although it is an abstrac-
的, this ideal of pure reliability is what allies want.
To be clear, this is not how all scholars have deªned reliability: others have
used the word to describe states that ªght alongside their allies in wartime.32
My deªnition includes this aspect but also builds on Miller’s earlier work:
I deªne reliability as the degree to which allies agree on the relative value of
particular interests and the manner in which the interests should be pursued.33
因此, the most obvious sign of a reliable ally is that it does not pose a risk of
abandonment or entrapment. 相比之下, an unreliable ally would be too
timid or too aggressive. This does not mean that two allies need agree on every
问题: allies might be reliable on one matter when their interests converge, 但
unreliable on another when interests diverge. 更远, my concept is not re-
stricted to wartime or moments of security crisis, but extends to peacetime
cases as well.
To assess reliability, states can monitor their ally’s behavior for actions that
demonstrate convergent interests and capabilities that can be used to achieve
those interests. This dynamic differs from the argument that observers are try-
ing to discern a state’s level of resolve, which is private information about its
preference ordering.34 A state’s preference ordering is actually not private in-
形成, but rather a “known unknown” about which the state, and its allies,
have certain beliefs.35 As Frank Harvey and John Mitton argue, “Interests are
not always obvious . . . willingness to use force is never unequivocally clear or
self-evident.”36 Leaders may genuinely believe that they will stand ªrm in
a crisis, but at the moment of truth, they may instead back down.37 This
uncertainty is why I expect even allies, which share secret information about
military capabilities and strategic interests, will closely monitor each other’s
32. For an excellent overview, see Brett Ashley Leeds, Andrew G. 长的, and Sara McLaughlin
米切尔, “Reevaluating Alliance Reliability: Speciªc Threats, Speciªc Promises,” Journal of Conºict
解决, 卷. 44, 不. 5 (十月 2000), PP. 686–699, doi.org/10.1177%2F0022002700044005006.
33. In some respects, my deªnition is an extension of Miller’s implicit deªnition of reliability. 作为
explained later, 然而, I operationalize it differently.
34. See Tang, “Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conºict,” p. 27; and Weisiger and
Yarhi-Milo, “Revisiting Reputation,” p. 474.
35. To use an analogy discussed by Mercer, 按, 和别的, once a bully has extorted money
from his victim, the bully now knows how the victim orders his preferences. Much of the reputa-
tion literature assumes that the victim knew, in advance, he would hand over the money. 这可能
not be true: the victim may, 实际上, have fully intended to ªght. See Mercer, Reputation and Interna-
tional Politics, p. 16; 并按, Calculating Credibility, p. 16.
36. Harvey and Mitton, Fighting for Credibility, p. 46.
37. See also ibid., p. 87.
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国际安全 44:4 54
行动. A state’s actions not only conªrm the existence of particular interests,
but also reveal how these are prioritized.
There are three reasons why this idea of reliability is superior to the concept
of loyalty. 第一的, reliability has twice as much explanatory power: states worry
not just about allied disloyalty (abandonment), but also about being dragged
into an unwanted conºict (entrapment). The idea of reliability incorporates
both risks: an ally can be unreliable because it is too timid or too aggressive.
第二, the reliability concept acknowledges that a state’s behavior may not
be perceived in a uniform manner by all its allies. The loyalty concept implies
that there is an objective standard against which national behavior is judged:
an ally can be loyal or disloyal. A state’s loyalty is not so easily judged, 如何-
曾经: its actions might be simultaneously loyal and disloyal. I argue that be-
cause states observe their ally’s behavior to discern interests and capabilities
—not to make character judgments—a state will not have a reputation for loy-
alty or disloyalty. And because different states have different interests, 这是
possible for two nations, each allied to the same state, to hold opposing views
about that state’s reliability. Reliability is thus a relative concept, contingent on
a state’s interests and its ally’s behavior. Loyalty and reliability are not syn-
onymous: because states have different interests, one state’s disloyal ally can
be another state’s reliable ally.38
举个例子: a state has three bilateral alliances, and its third ally initiates
a conºict. The ªrst ally might encourage the state to withhold military sup-
港口, because it does not desire war and believes that the third ally behaved
recklessly. The second ally, which feels especially threatened by the adversary,
might hope that the state is loyal and therefore helps the third ally destroy the
adversary’s military capabilities. If the state intervenes, the ªrst ally will view
it as unreliable, because it poses risks of entrapment. The second ally, 然而,
pleased by the decision, will view the state as reliable. All involved have
learned valuable information about the state’s preference ordering: 缺点-
sequences of defending the third ally were prioritized over the costs of the
conºict and the damage to the ªrst ally’s reliability perceptions.
This hypothetical situation illustrates the shortcomings of the loyalty con-
cept: if one believed that states always want their ally to demonstrate loyalty,
then one would incorrectly expect the ªrst ally to be pleased. 相比之下, 这
38. 这里, my conception of reliability also differs from Miller’s: my concept allows for a state’s
disloyalty toward one ally to improve another ally’s assessment of the state’s reliability. See Miller,
The Shadow of the Past, p. 43; and Gregory D. 磨坊主, “Hypotheses on Reputation: Alliance Choices
and the Shadow of the Past,” 安全研究, 卷. 12, 不. 3 (2003), p. 55, doi.org/10.1080/
09636410390443035.
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What Allies Want 55
idea of reliability can easily explain these varied reactions. Because assess-
ments of reliability are not judgments of character, and two states can reach
opposing conclusions about the same behavior, I argue that states do not have
reputations as deªned by either Mercer or Miller.39
第三, the reliability idea allows for alliance commitments to be interdepen-
凹痕, but in a broader sense than usually expected. Mercer deªnes interde-
pendence as “using past behavior to predict or explain future behavior,“ 和
interdependence is often examined in terms of iterative crises: the state backed
down in the ªrst crisis, so it is expected to back down in a second crisis.40 Inter-
dependence could also operate on a much quicker schedule, 然而, in non-
conºict situations, and with reference to revelations of interests rather than
特点. If a state observes something indicating allied unreliability, then it
should try to mitigate this risk. A state fearing abandonment could increase
its defense budget, seek new allies, peacefully settle old scores, or discuss
these fears with the ally. A state fearing entrapment could employ distancing
策略, threaten to withhold support, launch peace initiatives, 甚至
abrogate the alliance. 或者, because the state is not judging character,
interdependence could be weak: if a state has no real stake in an issue, 和
its ally’s actions will not affect reliability, then the state may not care how its
ally behaves.41
重要的, this concept of interdependence allows for the ally’s actions to
be important now, not just in future crises. Considering how interdependence
operates simultaneously across discrete alliance commitments allows for the
idea of reliability to be tested within a single crisis. 更远, it is more represen-
tative of the real world: a state might not need to worry signiªcantly about an
adversary’s resolve until the next crisis, but Brett Ashley Leeds ªnds that
when “conditions change, [联盟] violation becomes more likely.”42 Thus, 我
expect states to be sensitive to variations in their ally’s reliability.
然而, because reliability is contingent upon interests—not character
judgments—the effects of alliance interdependence might not be as severe as
those predicted by other theories. If states do not assess character, then an
39. Mercer’s deªnition appears in Reputation and International Politics, p. 5. Miller deªnes reputa-
tion as “a shared perception about one state’s prior behavior that is used to predict future behav-
ior.” See Miller, The Shadow of the Past, p. 37. I argue that it does not matter if the perception is
共享.
40. 美世, Reputation and International Politics, p. 66. I use Mercer’s deªnition in this article.
41. Krebs and Spindel reach a similar conclusion. See “Divided Priorities,” p. 29.
42. Brett Ashley Leeds, “Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate
Treaties,” 国际组织, 卷. 57, 不. 4 (落下 2003), p. 824, doi.org/10.1017/S0020818
303574057.
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国际安全 44:4 56
ally’s unreliability on one particular issue will not result in the ally being unre-
liable on all matters. 一个美国. backdown and withdrawal in one region may not
damage the United States’ reliability in another: it may, 反而, improve it. 铝-
ternatively, the United States’ unwillingness to support a reckless ally may
mean nothing for its determination to defend that same ally against an unpro-
voked attack.
hypotheses
The above analysis generates two hypotheses that can test whether alliance in-
terdependence exists and whether it is inºuenced by reliability.
H1: A state will observe its ally’s behavior in other alliances. If the behavior re-
veals divergent interests and thus raises entrapment or abandonment fears,
the state will assess the ally to be unreliable.
H1 posits that convergent or divergent interests, not judgments of character,
underpin alliance interdependence. If H1 is supported, then discrete alliance
commitments are interdependent: the state is “using past behavior to predict
or explain future behavior.”43 But because the observing state is not assessing
national character, not all observations will decisively revise reliability percep-
系统蒸发散. Depending on the importance of the issue or interest, interdependence
may be weak; but because the behavior still reveals new information about
the ally’s preference ordering, it will update the state’s assessment of its ally’s
reliability. Interdependence will be strong, 尽管, if the ally’s behavior con-
cerns an issue of signiªcant importance to the observing state.44
H2: If a state assesses its ally to be unreliable, it will act to mitigate the speciªc
risk posed.
H2, in specifying the impact of interdependence, makes the concept of reliabil-
ity satisfying. If the behavior observed in H1 is of signiªcant importance, 然后
interdependence will be strong, and as expected by H2, the state will attempt
to mitigate the risk of allied unreliability.
H2 does not specify exactly how a state will respond, as this will depend on
why the ally is unreliable. If the state fears abandonment, it might attempt to
43. 美世, Reputation and International Politics, p. 66.
44. 例如, during the Vietnam War, Asian allies reacted differently to European allies. 看
Krebs and Spindel, “Divided Priorities.”
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What Allies Want 57
convince the ally that a more aggressive approach is wise or seek new allies
that share its interests vis-à-vis the adversary. The state could boost its internal
balancing by purchasing new equipment, building advanced weapons, 库存-
piling munitions and provisions, or introducing conscription. In severe situa-
系统蒸发散, the fear of abandonment could prompt the development of nuclear
武器. If the state believes that its ally is growing more unreliable as time
passes, it might seek to initiate conºict before the ally’s reliability diminishes
更远. 或者, a weak state fearing abandonment may have no options
beyond complaining to its ally or conciliating the adversary.
If the ally is unreliable because it poses risks of entrapment, the state could
encourage the ally to adopt a more restrained policy by arguing that conºict is
unwise. It might privately or publicly distance itself from the ally, signaling
that it is unlikely to provide military support. If the allies share intelligence or
military facilities, the state might restrict access to reduce the ally’s likelihood
of success and thus dissuade it from engaging in violence. 最后, 国家
could work with other nations to restrain the ally, launch diplomatic peace ef-
forts, impose sanctions, 或者, in extremis, threaten to abrogate the alliance and
defect to the opposing side in any resultant conºict.
In either scenario, allies are likely to discuss, and bargain over, shared inter-
埃斯特. A state can attempt to convince its ally to order its preferences differently,
for the sake of alliance unity, and the prioritization of interests might change as
一个结果.
To test my theory against alternate explanations, I generate three hypotheses
for deterrence theory (DT).
DT H1: A state, wanting to see its ally demonstrate loyalty, will observe the
ally’s behavior in other alliances.
DT H2a: If the ally demonstrates loyalty, the observing state will expect
the ally to be loyal in the future.
DT H2b: If the ally demonstrates disloyalty, the observing state will expect the
ally to be disloyal in the future.
Mercer’s work, which is skeptical of reputation, is suitable for generating com-
peting hypotheses about the independence of alliance commitments:
JM H1: A state, wanting to see its ally “behave properly” and demonstrate loy-
alty, will observe its ally’s behavior in other alliances.45
45. 美世, Reputation and International Politics, p. 227.
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国际安全 44:4 58
桌子 1. Summary of Reliability, Deterrence Theory, and Reputation-Skeptic Expectations
Reliability
Deterrence Theory
Skeptic (美世)
Are alliances
interdependent?
是的
What do
observers want
to see?
behavior suggesting
reliability (convergent
兴趣)
是的
有时
loyal behavior
loyal behavior
What is the
result of loyal
行为?
varies: depends on
observer’s interests
(not on reputation)
reputation for loyalty,
which can strengthen
other alliances
no result: loyalty
attributed to situation
What is the
result of disloyal
行为?
varies: depends on
observer’s interests
(not on reputation)
reputation for
disloyalty, which can
damage other alliances
reputation for
disloyalty, which can
damage other alliances
JM H2a: If the ally demonstrates loyalty, the observing state will not expect
the ally to be loyal in the future.
JM H2b: If the ally demonstrates disloyalty, the observing state will expect the
ally to be disloyal in the future.46
Deterrence theorists encourage demonstrations of loyalty because disloyalty
risks damaging other alliances. Mercer warns against ªghting for reputation,
because allies “will tend to assume that our interests and capabilities deter-
mine our resolve” and thus the United States will never gain a reputation for
loyalty.47 My theory treads a middle path, recommending that although the
consequences of alliance interdependence should be considered, allies will not
always want to observe loyalty (见表 1). 在某些情况下, ªghting to preserve
allied assessments of reliability will be wise, as doing so will prevent unde-
sired allied behavior. 有时, 然而, it will be wisest to back down to re-
assure allies fearing entrapment. There is no one-size-ªts-all response.
testing the concept of alliance reliability
The First Taiwan Strait Crisis, which began in September 1954 and concluded
in April 1955, is a hard case for testing reliability, and should be an easy case
for loyalty, for three reasons. 第一的, the People’s Republic of China (the PRC, 或者
Communist China) was identiªed by the United States and its allies as an ad-
维萨里, as was the PRC’s ally, 苏联. The defender, the Republic of
中国, on the island of Formosa (now Taiwan), had enjoyed informal ally
46. See table 4 in ibid., p. 67.
47. 美世, Reputation and International Politics, p. 228.
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What Allies Want 59
status since the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, when President
Harry Truman ordered the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet to defend the island.48 If
the United States was unwilling to stand by the ROC, then ideas of loyalty and
interdependence should have prompted allied concern about future disloyalty.
第二, the crisis occurred when the United States was deeply worried
about its reputation: 在 1953 the National Security Council (NSC) requested an
analysis of the “reported decline in U.S. prestige abroad,” and in November
1954, an assessment warned that because of the communist bloc’s apparent
victory at the Geneva Conference, 我们. “prestige . . . has suffered greatly.”49
During the crisis, the “Never Again!” schema was a clear inºuence.50 Days be-
fore the crisis, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles insisted that it was “highly
important that we do not lose any more prestige in this area . . . [他是] 将要-
ing to take a strong line militarily which might involve de facto belligerency
for a certain period.”51 Accordingly, any behavior casting doubt on the impor-
tance of loyalty—either by allies or by U.S. decisionmakers—is a strong indica-
tion that other factors, such as reliability, have greater explanatory power.
第三, traditional arguments about loyalty and alliance interdependence
carried the day for the majority of the crisis. The object of the dispute was a
number of small offshore islands—predominantly Quemoy and Matsu—
which are contiguous with the Communist-held mainland, 多于 100 miles
from the island of Taiwan. Although held by Nationalist forces in well-
established defensive fortiªcations, the islands were easily within range of the
PRC’s artillery on the mainland. And despite never having been publicly guar-
anteed by the United States, they were regarded as sitting within the alliance
halo. The United States could have justiªed abandonment by citing a strict
deªnition of loyalty, but concern over the consequences of disloyalty domi-
nated ofªcial thinking for seven months. 因此, any U.S. decision to reject these
48. For the sake of consistency with archival sources, in my case study section, I use Chinese-
language place names as they appear in the United States documents cited.
49. Memorandum for the Vice-President, 十月 1, 1953, 盒子 2, Special Staff File Series, 国家的
Security Council Staff: 文件, 1953–61, White House Ofªce, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential
Library, Abilene, 堪萨斯州 (henceforth DDEPL); and National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 10-7-54,
Communist Courses of Action in Asia through 1957, 十一月 23, 1954, Foreign Relations of the
美国 (FRUS), 1952–1954年, 卷. 14: 中国和日本 (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: Government Printing
Ofªce [GPO], 1985), p. 933. On prestige, see Jonathan Mercer, “The Illusion of International
Prestige,” 国际安全, 卷. 41, 不. 4 (春天 2017), PP. 133–168, doi.org/10.1162/isec_a
_00276.
50. For analysis of the “Never Again!” concept, see Snyder, Alliance Politics, p. 184; Snyder and
Diesing, Conºict among Nations, PP. 189, 443; and Mercer, Reputation in International Politics, p. 40.
51. Memorandum for the Record, 九月 8, 1954, 盒子 48, Records of the Ofªce of Chinese
事务, Lot Files, General Records of the State Department, RG 59, National Archives and Records
Administration, 学院公园, Maryland (henceforth NARA).
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国际安全 44:4 60
ideas about loyalty and interdependence would be doubly powerful: 不仅
rejecting a general, preexisting belief that loyalty mattered, but also refuting
the arguments that had previously determined U.S. policy in the crisis.
Beyond being a hard case, this crisis is also an extremely useful case for the-
ory development. The United States was loyal to the ROC on the core issue of
Formosa’s security, but disloyal on the offshore island question, and this en-
ables an examination of how allies interpreted contrary signals. 决定-
makers had to regularly reevaluate their reasoning and defend their decisions
in the face of opposing arguments and new allied perspectives. 因为
U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty was signed during the crisis, this case study
also enables an exploration of how interdependence might vary across both in-
formal and formal alliances. Because alliance formalization did not alter these
alliance dynamics, this suggests that both informal and treaty alliances can be
interdependent. 最后, the crisis was—from its opening salvos—one in which
the real issues at stake were prestige and reputation.
以下, I use process tracing to test my idea of reliability against the alterna-
tive explanations. Using extensive archival evidence, I show how allies per-
ceived the United States’ actions and sought to mitigate the risks posed by its
unreliability.52 A single case study cannot generate generalizable ªndings, 但
it does strongly suggest that because alliance interdependence is not governed
by loyalty, the consequences of disloyalty are easily misunderstood. After pro-
viding relevant background, I explain the chronology of the case study with
reference to the views and reactions of Australia, 加拿大, 新西兰, 和
the United Kingdom.53 I conclude the case study by examining the reactions of
three other allies: 日本, the Philippines, 和韩国.
The First Taiwan Strait Crisis, September 1954–April 1955
在 1949, the Truman administration attempted to absolve itself of responsibil-
ity for the ROC: an August White Paper distanced the United States from the
Nationalists and their leader, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.54 In January
52. I conducted research at the National Archives and Records Administration; the Dwight D.
Eisenhower Presidential Library; Princeton University’s Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library
(housing the John Foster Dulles Papers); and the National Archives of Australia. For accessibility
and replication reasons, I have, wherever possible, quoted from documents available in the Foreign
Relations of the United States.
53. I have taken this approach because the documentary record focuses predominantly on these
four states, which had substantial and regular interactions with U.S. policymakers.
54. This article is not a comprehensive history of the crisis. The best treatment is Robert Accinelli,
Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy toward Taiwan, 1950–1955 (教堂山: 大学
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What Allies Want 61
1950, President Truman conªrmed that the United States would not use mili-
tary force to restore Nationalist rule over mainland China. When Secretary of
State Dean Acheson publicly described the United States’ defensive perimeter
that same month, the Chinese Nationalists—holding the island of Formosa
and the nearby Pescadore Islands—did not receive a security commitment. 但
when North Korea initiated the Korean War on June 25, 1950, this perimeter
was quickly revised. The Seventh Fleet was dispatched to the Taiwan Strait:
it was to deter communist attacks against Formosa, while also deterring any
Nationalist effort to attack the mainland and widen hostilities.
经过 1953, President Eisenhower had become frustrated by the lack of prog-
ress toward an armistice in Korea. On February 2, he announced that the
Seventh Fleet would no longer “shield Communist China,” as the United
States had no “obligation to protect a nation ªghting us in Korea.”55 U.S.
政策, as deªned in NSC 146/2, was to defend Formosa and the Pescadore
Islands “even at grave risk of general war.” This document did not commit the
United States to defending the offshore islands, but brought them within
the alliance halo by instructing U.S. agencies to “encourage and assist the
Chinese National Government to defend” them.56
Prior to the crisis, decisionmakers in Washington recognized that these
policies could damage other U.S. alliance relationships. 十一月 1953,
NSC 166/1 cautioned, “The Free World will not act as a unit toward Commu-
nist China . . . the United States can avoid the most dangerously divisive po-
tentials of the Chinese Communist issue, by refraining from excessive pressure
on its friends to follow American policies.”57 In 1954, the potential for allied
North Carolina Press, 1996). Other relevant works include Haruka Matsumoto, “The First Taiwan
Strait Crisis and China’s ‘Border’ Dispute around Taiwan,” Eurasia Border Review, 卷. 3 (夏天
2012), PP. 77–91; 约翰·W. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold
War Strategy in Asia (伦敦: M.E. 夏普, 1997); and Robert L. Suettinger, “我们. ‘Management’ of
Three Taiwan Strait ‘Crises,’” and Niu Jun, “Chinese Decision Making in Three Military Actions
across the Taiwan Strait,” both in Michael D. Swaine, Zhang Tuosheng, and Danielle F.S. 科恩,
编辑。, Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, 2006), PP. 251–292 and pp. 293–326, 分别. See also Deborah
瓦. 拉森, “Bandwagon Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality?” in Jervis and
斯奈德, Dominoes and Bandwagons, PP. 85–111.
55. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union,
二月 2, 1953, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/annual-message-the-congress-
the-state-the-union-16.
56. NSC 146/2, United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and the
Chinese Nationalist Government, Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, 十一月
6, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954年, 卷. 14, p. 308. See also Matsumoto, “The First Taiwan Strait Crisis and
China’s ‘Border’ Dispute around Taiwan.”
57. NSC 166/1, 我们. Policy towards Communist China, Statement of Policy by the National Secu-
rity Council, 十一月 6, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954年, 卷. 14, PP. 305–306.
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国际安全 44:4 62
disunity grew, as the United States proposed intervention in Indochina. A
State Department ofªcial warned that Western unity could be threatened by
“the fear that the U.S., in an excess of anti-communist zeal, may launch a mili-
tary crusade against Communism and bring on World War III . . . [和] a fear
认为美国. may wash its hands of other nations and leave them to their fate
. . . what other peoples are afraid of are the extremes of conduct to which we
might resort.”58 Dulles acknowledged that maintaining alliance unity would
be difªcult, and cautioned the NSC that it must “avoid getting the United
States into a war . . . where world public opinion would be wholly against the
美国, 因为那个 . . . was the kind of war you lose.”59 Against this
backdrop, on September 3, 1954, the PRC launched an artillery attack against
the offshore island of Quemoy.60
september–december 1954: the crisis begins
The purpose of the attack on Quemoy was not perfectly clear: 虽然
Communist China had earlier announced its intent to “liberate Formosa,“ 这
opening salvo targeted only Quemoy.61 In the United States, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) disagreed about the military value of this island: the “majority opin-
ion” argued it was “important but not essential to the defense of Formosa.”
The more vigorous debate concerned the symbolic value of the offshore is-
lands. The JCS worried about the psychological impact “on the Chinese
Nationalist troops and other Asiatic countries inclined to support U.S. policy”
if Quemoy were lost.62
Adopting a domino theory lens, Dulles wrote that the “loss of Quemoy
会 . . . lead to mounting Communist action against deteriorating anti-
Communist morale . . . this would be beginning of chain of events which could
gravely jeopardize entire off-shore position.”63 Dulles was especially reluctant
to back down given his belief that the West had just done so in Indochina.
According to Walter Robertson, the assistant secretary of state for East
58. 先生. Ogburn to Mr. Drumright, S/P Paper on United States Policy in Indochina, 七月 2, 1954,
盒子 46, Records of the Ofªce of Chinese Affairs, Lot Files, RG 59, 奈良.
59. Memorandum of Discussion at the 211th Meeting of the National Security Council, 八月 18,
1954, FRUS, 1952–1954年, 卷. 14, p. 536.
60. For an examination of the Chinese perspective, see Jun, “Chinese Decision Making in Three
Military Actions across the Taiwan Strait.”
61. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (罗伯逊) 到
Secretary of State, 八月 25, 1954, FRUS, 1952–1954年, 卷. 14, PP. 548–549.
62. The Acting Secretary of Defense (安德森) to the President, 九月 3, 1954, FRUS, 1952–
1954, 卷. 14, PP. 556–557.
63. The Secretary of State to the Department of State, 九月 4, 1954, FRUS, 1952–1954年, 卷. 14,
p. 560.
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What Allies Want 63
Asia and the Paciªc, Dulles “felt that if Quemoy can be held much of the
Communist prestige stemming from Dien Bien Phu will be canceled.” Thus,
the “U.S. should help hold Quemoy, even if its defense could not be substan-
tially related to [这] defense of Formosa.”64 In other words, Dulles advocated
defending Quemoy purely to demonstrate loyalty and resolve.
Eisenhower worried about U.S. prestige, but was skeptical about ªghting for
reputation. Defending Quemoy would mean “our prestige is at stake . . . 一次
we get tied up in any one of these things our prestige is so completely in-
volved.”65 The JCS and the State Department advocated defending the islands,
but Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson expressed doubts and noted that strikes
against the Chinese mainland would be an act of war, requiring congressional
authorization. Vice President Richard Nixon suggested that the United States
should help the Nationalists evacuate the islands, but Adm. Arthur Radford,
chairman of the JCS, thought this would cause a collapse of morale on Formosa
and its subsequent loss to Chinese Communist subversion.66
When the NSC met again on September 12, Eisenhower decided that
“Quemoy was not really important except psychologically.” He was “against
making too many promises to hold areas around the world and then having to
stay there to defend them . . . If we get our prestige involved anywhere then
we can’t get out.” By contrast, Dulles’s comments highlight the different policy
prescriptions the concepts of deterrence theory and alliance reliability might
recommend. The secretary of state argued that an ROC retreat “would have di-
sastrous consequences in Korea, 日本, Formosa and the Philippines,” but that
if the United States was loyal to the ROC and defended the offshore islands,
this “would involve us in war with Communist China. Outside of [南
Korean President] Rhee and Chiang, the rest of the world would condemn us.”
Equivocating, Dulles lamented that an “overwhelming case can be made on ei-
ther side,” and recommended that a cease-ªre be sought in the United Nations
(和) Security Council.67
The United Kingdom, as the United States’ closest ally, quickly requested
64. The Assistant Secretary of State (Walter Robertson) to the Acting Secretary, 九月 7, 1954,
Reel 27, C0014, Conªdential U.S. State Department Files, Special Files, Southeast Asia, 1944–1958,
RG 59, 奈良. The French defeat at Dien Bien Phu occurred immediately before the 1954 日内瓦
会议, which resulted in the partition of Vietnam.
65. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and the Acting Secretary of
状态, 九月 6, 1954, FRUS, 1952–1954年, 卷. 14, p. 573.
66. Memorandum of Discussion at the 213th Meeting of the National Security Council, 九月
9, 1954, in FRUS, 1952–1954年, 卷. 14, PP. 589–591.
67. Memorandum of Discussion at the 214th Meeting of the National Security Council, 九月
12, 1954, FRUS, 1952–1954年, 卷. 14, PP. 616–619.
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国际安全 44:4 64
consultations. Dulles explained to British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden
that an “all out” Communist assault might capture Quemoy “unless [这]
A-bomb [曾是] used tactically in [A] last resort.” The British echoed Nixon’s
suggestion that the Nationalists evacuate the islands. Although Dulles thought
that this outcome was desirable “eventually,” he considered it “not practi-
cal now.” Dulles explained to Eden a concern that would dominate U.S.
considerations throughout the crisis: disloyalty over Quemoy—such as a co-
erced evacuation—would cause Nationalist morale to plummet, the Chinese
Nationalist regime to collapse, and Formosa to pass to Communist control.68
Eisenhower had described Quemoy as “not really important except psych-
ologically,” but this importance was so severe that U.S. decisionmakers now
contemplated using nuclear weapons to defend the island.69 Alarmed by this
response, the United Kingdom encouraged Dulles’s suggestion of a cease-
ªre resolution. Working with New Zealand, which held a nonpermanent seat
on the UN Security Council, the three allies developed “Operation Oracle,” a
plan for New Zealand to propose a Security Council cease-ªre resolution. 这
allies expected this resolution to prompt a Soviet veto, but even this outcome
would have the positive effect of highlighting the true aggressor in the crisis.
As work commenced on Oracle, Dulles reconsidered the ROC’s long-
standing desire for a bilateral alliance. The United States had previously re-
fused this request, despite repeated efforts, given its fear of entrapment and
its desire for Nationalist China to occasionally conduct small-scale attacks
against the mainland. Dulles noted that the PRC’s attacks against Quemoy
meant that any alliance treaty would require careful drafting. 虽然
President Eisenhower “was not ready to use the armed forces of the United
States for the defense of these islands,” no treaty text could reveal this deci-
锡安, because it would “green-light” a PRC invasion.70
As part of Operation Oracle, 我们. ofªcials briefed both the United Kingdom
and New Zealand on the proposed alliance. When the British asked about the
treaty area, a State Department ofªcial said that the islands would not be ex-
plicitly included but that the United States was “working on language which
would cover that point.” Dulles privately emphasized that the ROC would
68. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to Roderic
L. O’Connor, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, 九月 19, 1954, FRUS, 1952–1954年, 卷.
14, PP. 650–651.
69. Memorandum of Discussion at the 214th Meeting of the National Security Council, 九月
12, 1954, FRUS, 1952–1954年, 卷. 14, PP. 619–620.
70. Memorandum of Discussion at the 216th Meeting of the National Security Council, 十月 6,
1954, FRUS, 1952–1954年, 卷. 14, p. 699.
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What Allies Want 65
have to promise not to initiate hostilities without U.S. approval, but the United
Kingdom and New Zealand remained concerned about escalation. These two
states decided that they were unwilling to advance Operation Oracle until
Beijing’s reaction to U.S.-ROC alliance negotiations could be observed.
Ofªcials in New Zealand were “anxious to know the terms of the proposed
我们. announcement concerning its treaty negotiations,” and encouraged U.S.
ofªcials to “emphasize as much as possible the defensive nature of the pro-
posed treaty.” Dulles assessed that the United Kingdom would not commit to
initiating Oracle “unless and until it felt that our [U.S.-ROC alliance] treaty un-
dertaking would be compatible” with the cease-ªre resolution plan.71
The State Department had earlier recognized the “desirability of keeping the
Communists guessing” about the offshore islands, and the mutual defense
treaty between the United States and the ROC, signed on December 2, 1954,
was carefully drafted with this in mind.72 The treaty area was limited to
Formosa and the Pescadores, but the activating clause referred to an attack
“directed against” the territories of either party. Although Dulles argued
that the status of the offshore islands was “neither promoted . . . 也不 . . .
demoted by the treaty,” this wording allowed the United States to interpret
an attack against an offshore island as the start of a military campaign di-
rected against Formosa.73 Assistant Secretary of State Robertson thought that
this phrasing would “keep the Communists guessing as to what U.S. 在-
tentions are.”74 While this commitment was made ambiguous, another was
kept secret: the ROC agreed that it would not attack Communist China with-
out Washington’s approval.75
The problem with the United States’ ambiguous stance was that it also kept
its allies guessing. Dulles, 罗伯逊, and Radford were all well-known China
hawks. Earlier in 1954, the British thought that the JCS chairman “wanted to
使用 [Indochina] as a means of launching what Eden said was ‘Radford’s war
against China.’”76 Robertson, described by one historian as “rabidly anti-
71. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Ofªce of United Nations Politi-
cal and Security Affairs (Bond), 十一月 9, 1954, FRUS, 1952–1954年, 卷. 14, p. 883.
72. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (罗伯逊) 到
Secretary of State, 八月 25, 1954, FRUS, 1952–1954年, 卷. 14, p. 549.
73. Department of State Bulletin (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: 我们. Department of State, 十二月 13, 1954),
p. 896.
74. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of
(McConaughy), 十一月 12, 1954, FRUS, 1952–1954年, 卷. 14, p. 890.
75. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of
(McConaughy), 十一月 6, 1954, FRUS, 1952–1954年, 卷. 14, PP. 870–880.
76. Carl McCardle to the Secretary, 四月 30, 1954, 盒子 2, General Correspondence and Memoran-
dums, John Foster Dulles Papers, DDEPL.
the Ofªce of Chinese Affairs
the Ofªce of Chinese Affairs
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国际安全 44:4 66
共产,” was regarded by the British as a “loathsome ªgure.”77 In August
1954, a State Department ofªcial wrote that “one of the chief reasons why so
many countries are concerned lest U.S. policy lead to general war is because
. . . [we support] the claim of the Chinese Nationalists to constitute the true
Government of China—a claim that cannot be made good except as the result
of all-out war between the U.S. and Communist China.” For allies, “the central
political issue . . . was the worry that Washington was ‘too quick on the trig-
ger.’”78 Although U.S. ofªcials insisted that they did not intend to defend the
offshore islands, Dulles had candidly admitted to Eden that the United States
was “keeping [the Communists] . . . guessing partly because we’re guessing
ourselves.”79 So even as hawkish U.S. ofªcials professed their desire for a
cease-ªre, allies had cause for concern.
Deterrence theory would expect allies to desire loyalty (DT H1), for loyal be-
havior to create expectations of future loyalty (DT H2a), and for disloyal
behavior to create expectations of future disloyalty (DT H2b). In contrast to DT
H1’s expectations, both the United Kingdom and New Zealand worried about
a surfeit of U.S. loyalty toward the ROC. Supporting DT H2a, they worried
那个美国. loyalty to Nationalist China would continue and result in conºict.
最后, if these countries believed that disloyal treatment of the ROC sug-
gested future U.S. disloyalty, they would not have encouraged the United
States to organize a Nationalist withdrawal. The intensiªcation of entrapment
concerns in London and Wellington, and their efforts to restrain the United
状态, falsify DT H1, support DT H2a, and cast doubt on the logic underpin-
ning DT H2b.
Mercer would expect allies to desire U.S. loyalty to the ROC (JM H1), 那
loyal behavior would not cause allies to expect future loyalty (JM H2a), 和
that disloyal behavior would cause allies to expect future disloyalty (JM H2b).
Contrary to JM H1, the United Kingdom and New Zealand were utterly un-
concerned about possible disloyalty to the ROC. 反而, they worried that
我们. loyalty to the ROC suggested that the United States would be similarly
loyal in the future, thus increasing the risk of war. This evidence falsiªes
JM H2a, which expects that a demonstration of loyalty will not cause observ-
77. See Fredrik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam
(纽约: 兰登书屋, 2012), PP. 486, 558.
78. 先生. Ogburn to Mr. Baldwin, Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East, 八月 2, 1954, Reel 27,
C00014, Conªdential U.S. State Department Files, Special Files, Southeast Asia, 1944–1958, RG 59,
奈良.
79. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to Roderic
L. O’Connor, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, 九月 19, 1954, PP. 650–651. Dulles’s
words support my earlier contention that a state’s preference ordering is actually a “known
unknown.”
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What Allies Want 67
ing states to expect similar loyalty in the future. 最后, allied ofªcials were
“anxious to restrain Washington” and so encouraged disloyalty to the ROC.80
If JM H2b were true, and these states believed present disloyal behavior to be
suggestive of future disloyalty, they would not have encouraged an evacua-
的. The events examined so far falsify JM H1 and JM H2a, but because the
United States had not demonstrated clear and unambiguous disloyalty toward
the ROC, I do not yet describe DT H2b and JM H2b as falsiªed.
相比之下, these events do support the alliance reliability concept: as ex-
pected by H1, allies observed the United States’ behavior toward the ROC and
updated their beliefs about U.S. reliability. Allies expressed concern about the
United States’ determination to assist the ROC and advocated a withdrawal
from the offshore islands. Because of this divergence in interests, allies worried
about escalation and believed that U.S. reliability had declined. In response—
and as expected by H2—these states worked to mitigate the risk of entrap-
蒙特. 目前, their efforts focused on private consultations with ofªcials in
华盛顿. Through these actions, they had commenced a monthslong effort
to restrain the United States and to persuade its leaders that alliance cohesion
required disloyalty to the ROC.
january–february 1955: the crisis escalates
On January 10, 1955, the PRC launched an air attack against Nationalist forces
on the Tachen Islands, located 200 miles north of Taiwan. Days later, it at-
tacked and occupied the Yikiangshan Islands, only eight miles from the
Tachens. Secretary of State Dulles worried that U.S. inaction was “having a
bad effect on our prestige in the area, since it was in many quarters assumed
that we would defend the islands, and our failure to do so indicated that we
were running away.” This remark is especially revealing: Dulles believed
that the United States would be judged by allied expectations of its loyalty to-
ward the ROC, rather than by whether the United States lived up to its formal
security commitment. Eisenhower decided that the United States should offer
to evacuate ROC forces from the Tachens, but then publicly commit to defend-
ing Quemoy.81 Dulles promptly briefed the ROC’s ambassador on this idea,
while also hoping that a cease-ªre resolution (Operation Oracle) 将会
moved in the UN Security Council.82
British ofªcials, 然而, criticized this plan, believing that it would
80. Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, p. 177.
81. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, 一月 19, 1955, FRUS, 1955–1957, 卷. 2:
中国, p. 42.
82. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, 一月 19, 1955, 3:45 p.m., FRUS,
1955–1957, 卷. 2: 中国, PP. 46–50.
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国际安全 44:4 68
“encourage the Nationalists to hang on to the islands.” Deftly, they re-
called Dulles’s earlier assessment—that holding Quemoy required nuclear
weapons—and asked “whether Quemoy was sufªciently vital to risk such
wide-reaching developments.” Dulles replied that Quemoy must be guaran-
teed, because “if the Tachens are evacuated and no other move or explanation
给定, the impression will be that of a collapse in position. The consequences
. . . in Japan, 韩国, the Philippines and very possibly throughout Southeast
Asia would be extremely serious. The interpretation which would gain cur-
rency was that the U.S. was vague until its interests were attacked and then
did nothing.” Robertson agreed, arguing that U.S. ofªcials were considering
“morale throughout all of free Asia.” Finally, Dulles attempted to allay British
担忧, promising that his earlier reference to nuclear weapons “related only
to the most extreme hypothesis of . . . a human wave” attack, which was a “re-
mote possibility.”83
Dulles failed to convince the allies, 然而, and returned to the NSC
empty-handed. The best possible compromise was that the United Kingdom
and New Zealand might support the U.S. plan if there were no public security
commitment to any offshore island. Concerned that the U.S.-ROC treaty text
might prove insufªcient from a domestic politics standpoint, the NSC agreed
to seek a congressional resolution empowering President Eisenhower to de-
fend “Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack,” and that this would
“include the securing and protection of such related positions now in friendly
hands.”84 As Robert Accinelli notes, a lack of allied support inºuenced U.S.
政策: the undertaking to defend Quemoy, regarded by allies as “ill advised
and dangerous,” was kept “secret as a concession to the British.”85
When Chiang Kai-shek learned that the United States was reneging on its
pledge to publicly guarantee Quemoy, he refused to evacuate the Tachens.
The United States’ response was that its promise to defend Quemoy and
Matsu—in exchange for the evacuation of the Tachens—must remain private
and might be disavowed if it was leaked.86 With this conªrmed, 联合
83. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, 一月 20, 1955, FRUS, 1955–1957,
卷. 2: 中国, PP. 86–87.
84. Memorandum of Discussion at the 233d [原文如此] Meeting of the National Security Council, Wash-
因顿, 一月 21, 1955, FRUS, 1955–1957, 卷. 2: 中国, p. 95.
85. Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, PP. 190–191. 澳大利亚, which had learned of Oracle through
the United Kingdom and New Zealand, also lobbied against a public commitment to Quemoy. 看
Memorandum of Conversation, 一月 21, 1955, 盒子 55, Records of the Ofªce of Chinese Affairs,
Lot Files, RG 59, 奈良.
86. Memorandum of a Conversation, 华盛顿, 一月 30, 1955, FRUS, 1955–1957, 卷. 2,
p. 171.
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What Allies Want 69
Kingdom and New Zealand initiated Operation Oracle, called for a cease-ªre,
and invited a PRC representative to attend the UN Security Council. 什么时候
Beijing denounced the resolution, these tensions prompted other allies to in-
crease their own efforts. In early February 1955, the Australian prime minister
stated that “opinion would be much opposed to accepting a risk of war over
the ‘off-shore’ islands.”87 A State Department ofªcial wrote to Dulles, assessing
that Commonwealth allies could support the United States “if we . . . 有
Chinese Nationals withdraw from all the off-shore islands and make our stand
on Formosa.”88 Signiªcantly, as the crisis persisted, allied criticism would shift
from private words of caution to more public discussion of the risks involved.
Reluctantly accepting the U.S. policy reversal, the Nationalists requested
assistance to evacuate the Tachens. The withdrawal was completed by mid-
二月, but the broader dilemma remained: What would the United States
do if the PRC attempted to capture Quemoy and Matsu? Eisenhower wrote
Prime Minister Winston Churchill, insisting that the psychological stakes
were critical: “Korea, 日本, the Philippines, 和, 当然, Formosa itself,
are watching nervously to see what we do next. I fear that, 如果我们 . . . compel
Chiang to make further retreats, the conclusion of these Asian peoples will
be that they had better plan to make the best terms they can with the
Communists.”89 Dulles tried a similar approach with Foreign Secretary Eden,
telling him that “we are in a battle for Taiwan,” Dulles invoked the need to
demonstrate loyalty: “Further retreat would have grave effect on Taiwan and
in Asia . . . Further retreat could swing Asia. Trends in Japan are already
disturbing. Further retreat or loss of Formosa would convince Japan commu-
nism wave of future. Consequent effect on . . . other parts of Asia obvious.”90
The British leaders, 然而, were unconvinced and again recommended
withdrawal from the islands.
Allied reactions now cast serious doubt on the validity of deterrence theory,
which expects allies to desire loyal behavior (DT H1), for loyal behavior to cre-
ate expectations of future loyalty (DT H2a), and for disloyal behavior to create
87. Telegram from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (奥尔德里奇) to the Department of State,
二月 4, 1955, FRUS, 1955–1957, 卷. 2, p. 212. See also Cablegram from Canberra to London,
二月 8, 1955, 部分 3, 852/21/2, A1838, 澳大利亚国家档案馆 (henceforth NAA),
PP. 179–180.
88. Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) 到
Secretary of State, 二月 4, 1955, FRUS, 1955–1957, 卷. 2, PP. 213–214.
89. Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 二月 18,
1955, FRUS, 1955–1957, 卷. 2, PP. 293–295.
90. Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Department of State, 二月 25, 1955, FRUS,
1955–1957, 卷. 2, PP. 308–309.
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国际安全 44:4 70
expectations of future disloyalty (DT H2b). Events examined so far support
DT H2a, but falsify DT H1 and DT H2b. When the United States displayed loy-
alty to the ROC through public signals such as the Formosa Resolution, 和它的
promise to publicly guarantee the security of Quemoy, other allies worried
that this increased the likelihood of future loyalty and thus raised the risk of
conºict: this supports DT H2a. These allies were pleased, 然而, 当。。。的时候
United States was disloyal and refused to publicly commit to a defense of
Quemoy. If DT H2b were true, then allies would not have welcomed this, 是-
cause it would have suggested a character trait of disloyalty. 最后, allied en-
couragement of disloyalty not only falsiªes DT H1, but also suggests that allies
were not judging character. If allies believed that disloyalty to the ROC was
proof of the United States’ disloyal character, they would not have encouraged
such behavior.
Mercer would expect allies to desire U.S. loyalty to the ROC (JM H1), 那
loyal behavior would not generate allied expectations of future loyalty
(JM H2a), and that disloyal behavior would generate allied expectations of fu-
ture disloyalty (JM H2b). The reactions of the United Kingdom, 新西兰,
and Australia clearly falsify JM H1: these states encouraged U.S. disloyalty to
the ROC. They observed instances of the United States’ loyalty to Nationalist
China and, 因此, worried about the likelihood of future loyalty, thus falsi-
fying JM H2a. In contrast to the expectations of JM H2b, there is no indication
that these states expected U.S. disloyalty toward the ROC to be suggestive of
future disloyalty, and thus JM H2b is also falsiªed.
相比之下, allied responses clearly support the idea of reliability. As ex-
pected by H1, 我们. behavior revealed divergent interests and caused allies to
grow more concerned about the possibility of escalation and entrapment. 在
response, these countries encouraged U.S. disloyalty toward the ROC. Like-
minded allies presented a united message: a Nationalist withdrawal from the
offshore islands would increase their support for U.S. 政策. As a result of this
allied lobbying, the United States reneged on its promise to the ROC and did
not make an explicit public commitment regarding Quemoy. Through such
intra-alliance bargaining, states worked to mitigate U.S. unreliability and the
risk of entrapment, and this evidence supports H2.
march–april 1955: the crisis peaks, then unexpectedly subsides
In a bold display of brinkmanship, on March 8, 1955, Secretary of State Dulles
stated that the United States regarded nuclear weapons as “interchangeable
和 . . . conventional weapons.” Within days, similar sentiments were ex-
这些
pressed by President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon, 但
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What Allies Want 71
threats found no allied support.91 Australia suggested that the ROC might
be persuaded to withdraw from the offshore islands if, in exchange, 这
U.S.-ROC alliance were expanded to include other nations such as Australia,
新西兰, and the United Kingdom.92 On March 8, in the House of
Commons, Foreign Secretary Eden “openly advocated a Nationalist with-
drawal from Quemoy and Matsu.”93 He later privately explained that “not
one percent of British people” would support a conºict over the offshore
islands, and he could not “increase that percentage no matter how hard
I tried.”94 The Canadians cautioned Dulles that if nuclear weapons were
used against the PRC, then the Americans “would be [ªghting] on their own
as far as Canada was concerned.”95 Fearing entrapment, allies dramatically
warned—both in private and in public—that they would not ªght for the off-
shore islands.
In late March, Eisenhower was still standing ªrm. He wrote a friend, “If you
became convinced that the capture of [Quemoy and Matsu] . . . would inevita-
bly result in the later loss of Formosa to the free world, what would you do?”96
Even though some of the domino states were, in their willingness to cede
the offshore islands, rejecting the domino theory, 我们. ofªcials continued
to fret.97 But in late March, a new survey of Nationalist morale challenged
Eisenhower’s position with the conclusion that “subversion [on Formosa] 是
well under control . . . Chinese-American cooperation continues to be satisfac-
tory.”98 If Nationalist morale could withstand the loss of Quemoy and Matsu,
then the ROC government would not collapse, 和美国. disloyalty on this is-
sue would not damage other important alliances.
In early April, Eisenhower’s views evolved and he took a more skeptical
91. Gordon H. 张, “To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis,”
国际安全, 卷. 12, 不. 4 (春天 1988), PP. 107–108, doi.org/10.2307/2538996.
92. Memorandum of a Conversation, 行进 14, 1955, FRUS, 1955–1957, 卷. 2, p. 370. 也可以看看
Memorandum from the Undersecretary of State (Hoover) to the Secretary of State, 四月 1, 1955,
FRUS, 1955–1957, 卷. 2, PP. 440–441.
93. Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, p. 208.
94. Letter from General Alfred Gruenther to President Eisenhower, 四月 3, 1955, 盒子 4, MC172,
Ann Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, John Foster Dulles Files, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Li-
brary, 普林斯顿大学, 普林斯顿大学, New Jersey.
95. The Australian Embassy in Tokyo to the Department of External Affairs, 行进 12, 1955, 1957/
5035, A1209, NAA.
96. Letter from President Eisenhower to Lewis W. Douglas, 行进 29, 1955, FRUS, 1955–1957,
卷. 2, PP. 423–424.
97. The author thanks Evelyn Goh for suggesting this language on states, depicted as dominos, 关于-
jecting the domino theory.
98. Memorandum from the Director of the Executive Secretariat (斯科特) to the Secretary of State,
行进 31, 1955, FRUS, 1955–1957, 卷. 2, p. 434.
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国际安全 44:4 72
.
tone.99 After noting the alliance damage that would ºow from a defense of the
offshore islands, Eisenhower wrote that withdrawal “might have equally dis-
advantageous results” and that “further retreat .
. could result, it is al-
摔角, in the disintegration of all Asian opposition” to communism. 在这个
letter, Eisenhower describes falling dominoes as a possibility, rather than a cer-
tainty.100 This judgment enabled a policy shift: Eisenhower decided the
United States would not defend the offshore islands, and so he encouraged a
Nationalist withdrawal. 作为回报, the United States would station a Marine di-
vision on Formosa, try to expand the U.S.-ROC alliance to include other states,
and blockade a portion of Communist China’s coastline. 这里, Eisenhower de-
cided that maintaining reliable alliances was more important than preserving a
reputation for loyalty.
Robertson and Radford were dispatched to Taipei to convince Chiang
Kai-shek to accept this arrangement, but he was immovable. He insisted that
“soldiers must choose proper places to die. Chinese soldiers consider
Quemoy—Matsu are proper places for them.”101 Ultimately, 美国
escaped its dilemma “not through the ill-conceived evacuation-blockade
scheme but an unexpected offer from the Chinese Communists.”102 On
四月 24, PRC Premier Zhou Enlai stated that he was willing to discuss secu-
rity tensions directly with the United States. Although Dulles was initially
skeptical, allies quickly encouraged direct negotiations, and when the United
States agreed to direct talks with the PRC, “Washington’s openhanded re-
响应 . . . brought an end to the Taiwan Strait crisis.”103
how did other allies react?
To explain the main dynamics of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, I have focused
so far on the perceptions and actions of the most inºuential allies. 虽然
less prominent, other allies also reacted as the alliance reliability concept
would expect.
Japan was petriªed about a possible war with Communist China. Secretary
of State Dulles repeatedly claimed that Japan worried about retreat, 但是
我们. embassy in Tokyo reported Japan’s “desire for peace at almost any price,”
noting that “such lesser matters as . . . which side loses ‘face’ are relatively un-
99. Letter from President Eisenhower to Lewis W. Douglas, 行进 29, 1955, FRUS, 1955–1957,
卷. 2, PP. 423–424.
100. Memorandum from the President to the Secretary of State, 四月 5, 1955, FRUS, 1955–1957,
卷. 2, PP. 445–447.
101. Message from the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (罗伯逊) to the Secre-
tary of State, 四月 25, 1955, FRUS, 1955–1957, 卷. 2, p. 512.
102. Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, p. 228.
103. 同上。, p. 230. See also Editorial Note, FRUS, 1955–1957, 卷. 2, p. 678.
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What Allies Want 73
important.”104 The U.S. ambassador to Japan, John Allison, wrote that if the
United States defended the offshore islands, most Japanese would view
“the U.S., rather than Communist China . . . [作为] the principal ‘war monger.’”
Japan would approve a defense of Formosa itself, 如果需要的话, but was espe-
cially worried about the entrapment risks posed by the offshore islands.105
Under the bilateral alliance signed in 1951, the United States had the legal
right to use bases in Japan—even without permission from the Japanese
government—for any purpose the United States deemed relevant to Far
Eastern security. 因此, Japan’s entrapment risks were far more severe than
those faced by other countries. Ambassador Allison assessed that if the United
States used these bases, then Japan would “take more positive steps to ensure
Japanese non-involvement,” such as “failure to act ofªcially against . . . [劳动]
strikes at US bases or . . . [A] request not to use Japanese bases for the staging of
attacks on the China mainland.” Ominously, Allison warned that if the United
States used nuclear weapons, this could cause a “sharp swing of Japan into the
ranks of the neutral nations [和] . . . might well jeopardize our whole posi-
tion” in Japan, as Tokyo would request the withdrawal of all U.S. forces.106 By
对比, Allison’s remarkable assessment was that if the offshore islands fell
because the United States stood aside, this disloyalty was “likely to be greeted
with relief, even praised,” in Japan.107
Given its unique and unequal postwar position, Japan could not quickly
mitigate the entrapment risks posed by the United States’ excessive loyalty to
the ROC. It did, 然而, use public messaging, as well as private diplo-
macy, to make its position clear. Shortly after the crisis ended, Japan quickly
moved to renegotiate its alliance with the United States. The ªnal result—the
1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States
and Japan—sharply reduced U.S. military freedoms and mitigated the risk
of Japan’s main islands being dragged into a Taiwan Strait conºict. 虽然
domestic politics was a signiªcant motivation for treaty revision, recent re-
search has also noted the inºuence of Japan’s entrapment fears.108
The Philippines’ reaction was affected by geographical proximity to
104. Comments on Reactions Overseas Chinese and Japanese People to Certain Contingencies in
Connection with Off Shore Islands, 四月 1, 1955, 盒子 13, Classiªed General Records, 1953–1955,
日本, Tokyo Embassy, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, RG 84,
奈良.
105. Tokyo’s 2202 to Washington, 行进 9, 1955, 793.5/3-955, 盒子 3939, Central Decimal File
(CDF), 1955–1959, RG 59, 奈良.
106. 同上.
107. Tokyo’s 2508 to Washington, 四月 4, 1955, Secret, 793.00/4-455, 盒子 3917, CDF, 1955–1959,
RG 59, 奈良.
108. See Yukinori Komine, Negotiating the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Japan Conªdential (纽约:
劳特利奇, 2017), p. 30.
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国际安全 44:4 74
Formosa, misunderstanding, and excessive conªdence in U.S. military capabil-
实体. Foreign Secretary Carlos Garcia, reacting to the PRC’s attack against the
Tachen Islands, “expressed alarm for [这] safety [的] Philippines as [A] 关于-
苏尔特 [的] Tachen incidents.” He briefed the press that Manila was “‘closely
watching’ Tachen development,” and that the “entire free world’s faith in
America will hinge on your ability to cope with [这] situation.”109
Despite this apprehension,
there were no “serious reactions” to the
Tachens withdrawal.110 In early April 1955, Felino Neri, a foreign affairs ad-
viser to Philippines President Ramon Magsaysay, implored U.S. diplomats to
provide a clearer explanation of United States policy and encouraged them
to “understand [这] Asian mind. To us a retreat on Quemoy and Matsu means
a retreat in all of Asia.”111 The State Department assessed that “sentiment in
the Philippines is very strongly against . . . abandonment of Quemoy and
Matsu. The islands are generally thought to be important to the defense of
台湾. Loss of the islands . . . would cause serious concern . . . 认为联合国
States was unwilling, unable, 或两者, to fulªll its Paciªc commitments.”112
Later in April, Neri complained that “many Filipinos fear U.S. 决心
is wavering, especially under pressure [从] 英国人, Canadian allies, 然后
failure [到] defend Quemoy, Matsu would lead inevitably to withdrawal from
Formosa and Philippines.” The U.S. embassy in Manila assessed that these
fears, though genuine, rested on a misunderstanding: beyond overestimating
the importance of Quemoy and Matsu, “most Filipinos . . . do not include seri-
ous considerations of world war possibilities, but rather take for granted that
. . . Formosan issue can be limited to local action.”113 Given these beliefs, 它
is unsurprising that Manila desired a defense of the offshore islands. 其他
allies—with different understandings of the military situation and risks—were
more worried about escalation.
Despite these fears, the Philippines was “highly elated” when the PRC
hinted at a cease-ªre.114 The available evidence suggests that the Philippines
109. Manila’s 1909 to Washington, 一月 23, 1955, Unclassiªed, 793.00/1-2355, 盒子 3915, CDF,
1955–1959, 奈良.
110. Manila’s 2606 to Washington, 四月 2, 1955, Secret, 793.00/4-255, 盒子 3917, CDF, 1955–1959,
RG 59, 奈良. See also State’s 13966, 行进 30, 1955, Secret, 793.00/3-3055, 盒子 3916, CDF, 1955–
1959, RG 59, 奈良.
111. Manila’s 2642 to Washington, 四月 6, 1955, Secret, 793.00/4-655, 盒子 3917, CDF, 1955–1959,
RG 59, 奈良.
112. Memorandum from Comiskey to McConaughy, 四月 12, 1955, Secret, 793.5/4-1255, 盒子 3939,
CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, 奈良.
113. Manila’s 2772 to Washington, 四月 22, 1955, Secret, 793.5/4-2255, 盒子 3939, CDF, 1955–1959,
RG 59, 奈良.
114. Manila’s 2799 to Washington, 四月 25, 1955, Ofªcial Use Only, 793.00/4-2555, 盒子 3917, CDF,
1955–1959, RG 59, 奈良.
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What Allies Want 75
carefully monitored the U.S.-ROC alliance, 然后
these observations
caused it to doubt U.S. reliability: the Philippines feared that abandonment of
Nationalist forces on Quemoy and Matsu might be replicated in the future.
Perhaps because of an excessive faith in U.S. military power and an expecta-
tion of only limited hostilities, Filipino leaders encouraged a defense of the off-
shore islands.
Among United States allies, the Republic of Korea was the unambiguous
outlier: Seoul wanted conºict, as this would provide an opportunity to restart
朝鲜战争. One U.S. diplomat thought that South Korea’s foreign minis-
特尔, Pyun Yong Tae, held the “basic premise that World War III is inevitable and
believes sooner the better.”115 At a press conference, the Korean ambassador to
the ROC said he was “sure” that in the event of an attack against Formosa, 这
United States would “allow [南] Korea to start its ‘long withheld military
drive into North’” Korea.116 Such data suggest that Seoul advocated U.S. loy-
alty to the ROC not because it would conªrm national character, but because it
could result in wider hostilities. In September 1954, Pyun sent a message to
Dulles: “In this part of world Quemoy can be symbol, loss of which . . . 会
have serious repercussions in Asia.”117 Although these words suggest that
South Korea viewed the crisis as a test of U.S. reliability, the United States was
ultimately unmoved by South Korea’s pleas. When Washington opened direct
talks with Beijing, the South Korean press claimed that Eisenhower was “risk-
ing alienation of America’s only real friends in the Far East.”118
assessing the three competing explanations
Deterrence theory would expect states to desire allied loyalty and observe
their ally’s behavior to make judgments about its loyalty (DT H1), for loyal be-
havior to create expectations of future loyalty (DT H2a), and for disloyal
behavior to create expectations of future disloyalty (DT H2b). For the ªve allies
fearing entrapment—Australia, 加拿大, 日本, 新西兰, 和联合国
Kingdom—DT H2a is supported, whereas DT H1 and DT H2b are falsiªed.
The two allies desiring a stronger U.S. response—South Korea and the
Philippines—partially fulªll the expectations of deterrence theory. As pre-
dicted by DT H1, these allies wanted to defend the offshore islands. Examples
115. Seoul’s 869 to Washington, 二月 4, 1955, Secret, 793.5/2-455, 盒子 3939, CDF, 1955–1959,
RG 59, 奈良.
116. Seoul’s 1078 to Washington, 行进 30, 1955, Ofªcial Use Only, 793.00/3-3055, 盒子 3916, CDF,
1955–1959, 奈良.
117. Seoul’s 283 to Washington, 九月 10, 1954, Secret, 793.00/9-1054, 盒子 4209, CDF, 1950–
1954, 奈良.
118. Seoul’s 1186 to Washington, 四月 30, 1955, Ofªcial Use Only, 793.00/4-3055, 盒子 3917, CDF,
1955–1959, 奈良.
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国际安全 44:4 76
of United States loyalty to the ROC, however—such as the formalization of the
U.S.-ROC alliance and the issuing of nuclear threats to the PRC—did not cre-
ate expectations of future loyalty, so this falsiªes DT H2a. Instead of being
reassured, these allies thought that U.S. disloyalty in the present—illustrated
by the United States’ refusal to actually defend the offshore islands—was sug-
gestive of future disloyalty as well, and these data support DT H2b.
Mercer’s reputation-skeptic approach expects that states want to observe al-
lied loyalty (JM H1). If the ally demonstrates loyal behavior, the observing
state will not expect the ally to be loyal in the future (JM H2a), but if the ally
demonstrates disloyal behavior, the observing state will expect the ally to be
disloyal in the future (JM H2b). As explained earlier, Mercer’s hypotheses are
falsiªed by the reactions of the ªve allies fearing entrapment. These allies en-
couraged U.S. disloyalty and showed no concern that this behavior might sug-
gest future disloyalty. 相比之下, the reactions of South Korea and the
Philippines strongly support Mercer’s theory. Both allies desired U.S. loyalty
to the ROC (JM H1), appeared to take no comfort in the loyal behavior that the
United States did demonstrate (JM H2a), and worried that Washington’s un-
willingness to defend the offshore islands was suggestive of future disloyalty
还有 (JM H2b).
The United States was neither perfectly loyal nor consistently disloyal to
台湾: it was loyal in formalizing the U.S.-ROC alliance, in signaling a ªrm
intent to defend Formosa, and in rattling the nuclear saber. But the United
States was also disloyal: it did not meet the ROC’s hope for counterattacks
against the mainland; it reneged on its promise to publicly announce a security
guarantee for Quemoy; and it ultimately attempted to cajole the Nationalists
into withdrawing from the offshore islands. It is difªcult, 然后, to simply de-
scribe the overall conduct of the United States as either loyal or disloyal: 它
曾是, 实际上, 两个都. Of greater interest is how U.S. allies interpreted this be-
行为, and what they did in response. The reactions of South Korea and
the Philippines suggest that if states do want their allies to display innate
and pure loyalty, then Mercer’s theory has greater explanatory power than de-
terrence theory. These allies took no comfort in displays of U.S. loyalty and, 在-
代替, lamented that the United States was not being loyal enough. 另一个
ªve allies, 相比之下, thought that the United States was being too loyal to
the ROC and worried about consequent risks of entrapment.
These differing reactions support the central claim of the alliance reliability
概念: allies did not want a display of unalloyed loyalty to the ROC because
it would reveal the national character of the United States. 相当, they wanted
我们. preferences to be identical to their own: they wanted reliability. Five allies
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What Allies Want 77
desired a reduction of tensions and a Nationalist withdrawal from the offshore
islands, but South Korea and the Philippines were disappointed by the United
States’ disloyal behavior toward the ROC. These reactions all support H1:
a state observes its ally’s behavior in other alliances, and this behavior affects
the state’s assessment of the ally’s reliability. If the United States behaved con-
trary to the ally’s desires, because it was either too timid or too belligerent, 它
was perceived as unreliable.
The varied preferences of these allies presented them with different dilem-
但. As expected by H2, all allies tried to mitigate the unique risk posed by
我们. unreliability. Both South Korea and the Philippines worried about U.S.
timidity, but as small allies extremely reliant on their alliances, they had little
capacity to inºuence the United States. As Miller notes, “If a state has only
one potential ally, that ally’s reputation will be a minor factor” in alliance poli-
tics.119 Their actions suggest, 然而, that when faced with similar indica-
tions of declining reliability, stronger allies could react in a different fashion.
Japan could not quickly mitigate U.S. unreliability, but once the crisis sub-
sided, it moved to renegotiate its alliance and reduce the risk of entrapment.
instrument to monitor
For other allies, Operation Oracle was “a useful
and moderate U.S. policymaking.”120 New Zealand’s high commissioner in
London assessed that for the United Kingdom, “a major reason” for participat-
ing in Operation Oracle “was to place some kind of restraint on the United
States.”121 New Zealand’s ambassador in Washington said that Eden “always
took the line that the Russians . . . would restrain the Chinese, and the British
. . . would restrain the Americans.”122 These diplomatic efforts escalated as the
United States grew more belligerent and unreliable: private discussions pro-
gressed to public warnings and, 最终, to distancing and outright disasso-
引文. These actions support H2: when confronted with an ally’s unreliability,
states move to mitigate this risk.
结论
Throughout the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, the belief that alliance interdepen-
dence was underpinned by loyalty proved remarkably resilient. Even after
119. 磨坊主, Shadow of the Past, p. 188.
120. Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, p. 171.
121. New Zealand High Commission (伦敦) to Minister for External Affairs (惠灵顿), Janu-
和 27, 1955, 部分 3, 952/21/2, A1838, NAA, p. 46.
122. Interview with Ambassador Leslie Munro, 九月 10, 1964, John Foster Dulles Oral His-
tory Project, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, 普林斯顿大学, p. 23.
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国际安全 44:4 78
diplomatic reporting conªrmed that several allies were opposed to a defense
of Quemoy and Matsu, 我们. leaders continued to talk and act as if abandon-
ment of the offshore islands would tear the Asian alliance system apart.
President Eisenhower’s eventual decision to back down was, to some degree,
prompted by new thinking about the relationship between Quemoy and
Matsu and the state of morale on Formosa. Eisenhower, 然而, also knew
那个美国. loyalty to the ROC was damaging other, more important alliance rela-
tionships. Alliance commitments were interdependent, but not in the way ex-
pected by deterrence theory: several allies urged the United States to be
disloyal toward the ROC and coerce the Nationalists into withdrawing from
the offshore islands, because this disloyalty would reduce the risk of an un-
wanted war. Although the perceived need to demonstrate loyalty was an im-
mense inºuence throughout the crisis, the need to demonstrate reliability was
ultimately of greater importance.
The prolonged duration of the crisis was key in enabling U.S. 决定-
makers to revise their assessments of what was at stake. It took months to cor-
rect the mistaken belief that U.S. national character was on trial in the court of
allied opinion. If the PRC had attempted an invasion of Quemoy or Matsu,
then President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles—believing that the al-
liance system would be destroyed by a display of disloyalty—would have
probably intervened. Several U.S. allies would likely have regarded such inter-
vention as proof that the United States was intent on a ªnal showdown with
the PRC. Some may have accepted their entrapment into this conºict, but oth-
ers might have ended their alliance with the United States.
The events of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis illustrate the need to delineate be-
tween innate loyalty and observed reliability. Reliability is a broader and more
useful concept that subsumes the idea of loyalty and reduces its unwarranted
突出. 我们. conduct was not judged against an objective standard of
loyalty: allies desiring a confrontational posture, such as South Korea and the
菲律宾, invoked Quemoy and Matsu as symbols that required defending,
and encouraged U.S. loyalty to the ROC. Most allies, 然而, were more
concerned about the possibility of war, and so discouraged a U.S. 防御
of strategically unimportant territory. These allies did not mind that this
would involve U.S. disloyalty to the ROC, but instead cared about whether
Washington’s policy goals were convergent with their own.
In this case study, several allies cooperated to restrain the United States and
mitigate the risk of entrapment, while weaker allies fearing abandonment had
little option but to complain about U.S. timidity. In other circumstances, 如何-
曾经, allies fearing abandonment could respond differently. 例如,
in May 1950 Japan dispatched a secret delegation to Washington. Citing
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What Allies Want 79
the concern prompted by the 1949 withdrawal of United States forces from the
Korean Peninsula, and vacillating U.S. policy toward Nationalist China, 日本
expressed its desire for U.S. forces to stay in Japan, even once the postwar
occupation ended.123 Similar fears of abandonment were sparked in the 1970s,
when President Jimmy Carter planned troop reductions in South Korea. 在重新-
响应, Tokyo initiated a new period of military and economic cooperation
with Seoul. As Victor Cha writes, “The most single decisive factor in this up-
swing in security contacts was anxiety over the Carter plan.”124
As explained, Mercer’s argument about reputation is contingent upon what
constitutes desired and undesired behavior. If states do not always desire al-
lied loyalty, then this leaves open the possibility of interdependence being gov-
erned by assessments of interests and capability, but raises the question of
when such interdependence might be observed. This article deployed a
within-case study approach, but interdependence was also operative across it-
erative crises: allies were unsurprised by the United States’ initial response to
the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, because they had just observed a similarly bellig-
erent approach toward the PRC during discussions on Indochina. 虽然
the United States ultimately backed down on Indochina in 1954, this did not
lead its allies to expect a similar back down over the Taiwan Strait. This logic
supports the argument made by Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo: by fo-
cusing on iterative security crises, previous research may have overlooked the
possibility that during such events, “information gleaned from past actions . . .
will have already been folded into the general assessment of interests.”125
Studying prolonged security crises, where assessments of interests are regu-
larly updated in response to new information, may provide fresh insight into
not only how states assess allied reliability, but when and why these assess-
ments change.
Although this article focuses on alliances, my ªndings raise new questions
about the possible interdependence of threats. One assumption contested
in this article—that allies always want to see their ally demonstrate innate
loyalty—has an equivalent in deterrence theory. It is assumed that states al-
ways want their adversary to back down, but are there circumstances in which
an adversary’s decision to ªght is welcomed?126 A state may desire this if it
123. See Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation (纽约:
牛津大学出版社, 1997), PP. 26–30.
124. Victor D. Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism: The U.S.-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (帕洛阿尔托,
加利福尼亚州。: 斯坦福大学出版社, 1999), p. 167.
125. Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo, “Revisiting Reputation,” p. 478.
126. Mercer brieºy mentions this possibility in Reputation and International Politics, PP. 218–219,
describing it as a “peculiar desire.”
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国际安全 44:4 80
saps public support, provides geography unfavorable to the adversary, or ties
down an adversary’s military force in an unimportant theater. China may not
object to a display of U.S. resolve in the Middle East or Europe if it believes
that this decreases the United States’ focus on Asia. This counterintuitive
possibility requires further consideration and, if supported, would be fur-
ther evidence to suggest that states assess national interests, 而不是
national character.
The policy implications of the alliance reliability concept are signiªcant, 英语-
pecially given President Donald Trump’s mercurial approach to alliance man-
代理. How should U.S. policymakers approach the possibility of alliance
interdependence? 第一的, they should realize that the national character of the
United States is not on trial: allies will be looking for evidence of reliability, 不是
loyalty. The idea of reliability is especially pertinent to current discussions
about a U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East: allies may not invariably de-
spair at withdrawal if it enables the United States to focus on other issues of
greater allied concern. 第二, 我们. policymakers should consider how speciªc
actions might inºuence each ally, as different allies are likely to react in differ-
ent ways. Ofªcials will not need a crystal ball: this First Taiwan Strait Crisis
case study suggests that allies will not hesitate to express their fears. Nor will
allies rush for the door at the ªrst sign of unreliability: 在这种情况下, their ªrst
instinct was to bargain with U.S. leaders and convince them that disloyalty to
the ROC was actually in the best interests of the United States. The reliability
concept shows that state interests are not totally exogenous to their alliance re-
lationships: alliance unity can require hard bargaining over how states order
their interests.127 This bargaining is made more difªcult if states in alliance are
reluctant to consider situations where their interests diverge, even privately,
for fear of upsetting alliance comity. Such discussions may be difªcult, 和
frustrating for the United States if it expects unqualiªed support, but they pro-
vide an opportunity to understand what, in alliance interdependence terms, 是
at stake in a crisis. 最后, the United States should consider the desirability of
likely allied reactions and factor these into decisionmaking. Fighting to pre-
serve allied beliefs about U.S. reliability may be worthwhile if doing so
prevents unwanted reactions such as dealignment, bandwagoning, or nuclear
增殖. 另一方面, it may be beneªcial for allies to fear unreli-
ability if this will almost certainly cause them to pursue policies—such as
increased defense spending—desired by the United States.
127. The author thanks an anonymous reviewer for making this point.
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What Allies Want 81
今天, several ºash points around the globe could create problems of alli-
ance interdependence. The closest parallel to the events of 1954–55 is found in
the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which are cov-
ered by the U.S.-Japan alliance. Another similar case is the recent reafªrma-
的, by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, that the U.S.-Philippines alliance
covers Filipino military assets in the South China Sea.128 The instinct of many
in the United States will be to regard any Chinese challenge in these areas as a
test of national character. 反而, policymakers should consider their options
and the likely allied reactions. Given the escalation risks present within the
U.S.-China relationship, will other allies want to risk conºict—perhaps even
nuclear war—over uninhabited territory of debatable strategic importance or
the sinking of a single naval vessel?129 当然, arguments advocating dis-
loyalty would have to be weighed against the likely effects in Japan, 或者
菲律宾. Would Japan abrogate the alliance, conciliate China, 也许
develop its own nuclear weapons? Or could it be reassured, thus avoiding un-
desired consequences? Would the Philippines react by bandwagoning with
中国? These questions will be even harder to answer during a security crisis,
but neither deterrence theory nor reputation-skeptic perspectives would
prompt decisionmakers to ask them. The concept of reliability and its effect on
alliance interdependence do not solve such dilemmas, but they help to raise
the right questions and more accurately identify the actual stakes involved.
A fourth Taiwan Strait crisis would probably be over territory of greater
strategic signiªcance: Taiwan itself. 我们. ofªcials would probably not have the
luxury of time to reconsider their beliefs about reputation, 和决定
could be strongly inºuenced by the unexamined conviction that allies will
desire a display of innate loyalty. 反而, decisionmakers should carefully
investigate—before any crisis erupts—the possibility that allies may actually
128. Michael R. Pompeo, “Remarks with Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin, Jr.,”
行进 1, 2019, https://www.state.gov/remarks-with-philippine-foreign-secretary-teodoro-locsin-
jr/. Scholars have already noted the potential for this commitment to invoke concerns about U.S.
可信度. 看, 例如, Jennifer Lind (@profLind): “出色地, folks, ready all of your tweets and
opeds about America’s credibility, because we have got ourselves a redline.” Twitter, 行进 4,
2019, 2:20 a.m., https://twitter.com/profLind/status/1102222733721591811. See also Yuen Foong
Khong, “Power as Prestige in World Politics,” International Affairs, 卷. 95, 不. 1 (一月 2019),
p. 136, doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy245.
129. See Avery Goldstein, “First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-
China Relations,” 国际安全, 卷. 37, 不. 4 (春天 2013), PP. 49–89, doi.org/10.1162/
ISEC_a_00114. On the questionable importance of the Senkaku Islands, see Josh Gerstein, “White
房子: 中国, Japan Squabble over ‘Bunch of Rocks,’” Politico, 一月 21, 2011, https://万维网
.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2011/01/white-house-china-japan-squabble-over-bunch-of-
岩石-032645.
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国际安全 44:4 82
want the United States to adopt a more measured policy. If loyalty to Taiwan
would create substantial risks of nuclear war, these allies may even prefer that
the United States simply stand aside and allow Taiwan to fall under PRC con-
控制. Policymakers should carefully identify the allied interests that would
be at stake, and such assessments should inform their considerations of
什么, in terms of alliance interdependence, would be at risk. They should
also be sensitive to the possibility that national positions could shift: 一些
states might initially encourage a ªrm stance, but if tensions escalate and nu-
clear risks emerge, then these states might change tack and belatedly encour-
age disloyalty.
This is not to blithely suggest that the circumstances of 1954–55 will repeat,
but it is possible that there would again be a range of views among allies.
日本, fearful of the strategic implications of a Chinese victory, might encour-
age a ªrm U.S. response. In extreme scenarios, if U.S. reliability could not be
assured and extreme forms of abandonment were regarded as likely, 然后
Japan might develop its own nuclear capabilities. As Alexandre Debs and
Nuno Monteiro have argued, if “the Trump administration question[s] 我们.
commitments to its East Asian allies, Tokyo may be pushed to change its
policy of nuclear forbearance.”130 The events of 1954 和 1955 show that not all
allies are of equal importance to the United States, and that the concerns of
some allies may be prioritized while others are disregarded. The protection
of the U.S.-Japan alliance may be so important that consequent damage to
other alliances would be acceptable.
那就是说, the likely effect on other U.S. allies should not be ignored. 在
1954–55, the concerns of South Korea and the Philippines could be safely dis-
数过的, because neither country had feasible realignment options. In any
fourth Taiwan Strait crisis, allies desiring U.S. restraint could again decline to
support the United States in a conºict. Given China’s economic inºuence, 和
the prospect of a clash over Taiwan escalating into a nuclear war, there could
be several such allies. The United States could easily ªnd itself ªghting alone,
除了 (possibly) for Japan. It might end up reassuring Japan, but at the cost of
dramatically damaging its other alliances in the region. Policymakers would
need to consider alliance reliability carefully, for it is a double-edged sword:
capable of cutting both ways against allies with different fears.
130. Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro, “Cascading Chaos in Nuclear Northeast Asia,” Wash-
灵顿季刊, 卷. 41, 不. 1 (春天 2018), p. 109, doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2018.1445902. 看
also Mike M. Mochizuki, “Japan Tests the Nuclear Taboo,” Nonproliferation Review, 卷. 14, 不. 2
(七月 2007), PP. 303–328, doi.org/10.1080/10736700701379393.
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What Allies Want 83
This article has advanced the debate about alliance interdependence by fur-
ther developing the idea of reliability. Deterrence theory counsels policy-
makers to ªght
for reputation, because doing so strengthens alliances.
Reputation skeptics such as Jonathan Mercer advise the United States to not
worry about the views of allies, because the United States “cannot manipulate
our allies’ image of us,” and “there probably will not be any future costs” re-
sulting from U.S. behavior.131 These theories do not recognize, 然而, 那
alliance interdependence is underpinned by beliefs about reliability.
在
the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, excessive loyalty to Nationalist China caused
other allies to regard the United States as unreliable. Had conºict broken
出去, then future costs would have been very likely: these other alliances may
have been severely damaged or—in the case of Japan—perhaps even abro-
gated. Reputation-skeptic arguments are correct that a reputation for innate
loyalty does not deserve the central importance afforded it by deterrence the-
奥里, but this does not mean that any prospect of alliance interdependence
should be dismissed. Skillful alliance management requires decisionmakers to
understand that the United States’ actions will not be perceived in a uniform
manner by a united audience of allies. Although deterrence theory encouraged
the conception of U.S. allies as a monolithic bloc—all desiring a display of
loyalty—President Eisenhower realized that a ªrm stand could severely dam-
年龄, or destroy, other important alliances. To manage future crises with similar
adroitness and wisdom, 我们. decisionmakers will again need to distinguish be-
tween loyalty and reliability.
131. 美世, Reputation and International Politics, p. 228.
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