“True Empiricism”: - 麻省理工学院人工智能研究专业

“True Empiricism”:
The Stakes of the
Cousin-Schelling
Controversy

Daniel Whistler
Royal Holloway, 伦敦大学

之间 1833 和 1835, Victor Cousin and F.W.J. Schelling engaged in an
“amical but serious critique” of each other’s philosophies. 我认为, 尽管
perceptions to the contrary, key to this exchange is a common vision of an
atypical, speculative empiricism. 那是, against the grain of most commen-
taries, I contend that there are signiﬁcant similarities between Cousin’s and
Schelling’s philosophies of the early 1830s—similarities that converge on the
possibility of a post-Kantian speculative empiricism, which they respectively
dub metaphysical psychology or a priori empiricism.

介绍

True empiricism does not necessarily deny everything
supernatural… From Kant onwards, it has become customary to
explain everything supersensible as super-empirical. After Kant, 上帝
has taken refuge in pure thinking, posited in a way that excludes all
经验. 然而, such an empiricism that denies everything
supersensible was not the empiricism of a Bacon, of a Pascal or of a
牛顿. (Schelling [1832/33] 1972, p. 271)1

之间 1833 和 1835, Victor Cousin (1792–1867) and F.W.J.
Schelling (1775–1854) engaged in an “amical but serious critique” of each
other’s philosophies (Cousin and Schelling 1991, p. 229). 下列
essay argues that, despite perceptions to the contrary, key to this exchange
is a shared vision of what Schelling above calls “true empiricism.” While
there are many differences between their philosophies, endlessly recorded

1. Unless otherwise speciﬁed, all translations are my own. Many thanks to Delphine
Antoine-Mahut, Silvia Manzo and Tyler Tritten for their extraordinarily helpful comments
on an earlier draft.

科学观点 2019, 卷. 27, 不. 5
© 2019 由麻省理工学院

https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00323

739

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740

The Cousin-Schelling Controversy

by subsequent commentators, such scholarly focus on discrepancies has
tended to obscure the similarities that motivated their interest in each
other’s work. Both Cousin and Schelling think through the possibility
of a post-Kantian speculative empiricism—what they respectively dub,
metaphysical psychology or a priori empiricism—namely, an empiricism
that “does not necessarily deny” some kind of experience of the supersen-
兄弟姐妹, that refuses to ultimately limit the empirical to data immediately
perceived by the ﬁve senses, but that interrogates critical limits on expe-
rience experientially. Both attempt to revive the tradition of “true empir-
icism” that Schelling describes above.

To make the case for the above, in the ﬁrst section of the essay I brieﬂy
sketch the intellectual context for this revival of “true empiricism”, 前
turning to the controversy itself, considering in turn Cousin’s empiricist
critique of Schelling and Schelling’s empiricist critique of Cousin. In so
doing, I gradually specify the visions of a “true empiricism” manifest in
their writings.

Experience after Kant

Sophyle: 哦, philosophy is such a beautiful thing!
Euthyphron: 为什么?
Sop.: 为什么? Because it makes known the truth, it delivers us from
prejudices, and it makes clear the precise limits of our knowledge.
Euth.: I avow it; but it is still more beautiful, because it makes the
universe and ourselves richer: it allows us to see unknown lands from
an immense distance.
Sop.: My friend, your unknown lands are imaginary spaces, believe
我. Philosophy is beautiful and good precisely only because it
destroys these fables. Its unshakeable basis is experience, and there is
no truth beyond it.
Euth.: We are agreed. A philosophy founded on experience is
evidently the only good one; but how many types of experience
有!
Sop.: I know of only one sole type; it is the experience of our
ﬁve senses. Do you know of others?
Euth.: To tell you the truth, there was a time when I was of exactly
the same opinion; but I have changed since. I am so changed that
when I think of my former meanness, I am ashamed. (Hemsterhuis
[1778] 2015, PP. 334–6)

So opens a 1778 dialogue, Sophyle, ou de la philosophie by François Hemsterhuis’
(1721–1790)—“the ABC of all orthodox philosophy,” as he was later to call
它 (2012, 10: p. 15). Taking the part of Euthyphron, the Dutch writer argues

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科学观点

741

against what he considers the prevailing eighteenth-century reduction of
experience to sensible properties of matter (represented by Sophyle).
Hemsterhuis’ point is a basic one: there is more to experience than is dreamt
of in any sensualist philosophy. But to make his case, he does not pit some
variant of rationalism, natural theology or ﬁdeism against empiricism; 在-
代替, the dialogue enacts a contest between two empiricisms. Both sides
agree that philosophy’s “unshakeable basis is experience, and there is no truth
beyond it,” that a “philosophy founded on experience is evidently the only
good one;” rather, what distinguishes these empiricisms is their speculative
intent. Sophyle, faithful to the Lockean tradition, insists that philosophy’s
primary purpose is critical: empiricism “delivers us from prejudices, and it
makes clear the precise limits of our knowledge.” However, Euthyphron
(IE。, Hemsterhuis) reﬁgures empiricism as ampliative, taking the philosopher
beyond the present state of knowledge into “unknown lands.” Hemsterhuis
attempts to expand the range of possible knowledge through new experiences.
Hemsterhuis’ avocation of a speculative form of empiricism—an empir-
icism that refuses merely to delimit the “precise limits of our knowledge,”
but instead progressively transcends them—found numerous adherents
among Idealists and Romantics at the turn of the nineteenth century,
它是, I am going to implicitly suggest in what follows, no surprise that
two of his most avid readers were Victor Cousin and F.W.J. Schelling.2 For
this Hemsterhuisian tradition centred on the possibility of an ampliative
empiricism, 的, crudely put, becoming sensible of the supersensible. It is a
tradition that runs through Herder’s revalorisation of aesthesis, Jacobi’s
early fascination with enthusiasm and Novalis’ magic idealism into—I will
contend—Schelling’s late a priori empiricism and Cousin’s metaphysical
心理学.

尽管如此, there are a number of ways in which later speculative em-
piricists could not merely imitate Hemsterhuis’ example. 对于一个, 那里
was the problem of mysticism that manifested itself in the Hemsterhuis-
inspired anti-philosophies of J.G. Schlosser, L. Stolberg and other members
of the Münster Circle (see Brachin 1951; Vieillard-Baron 1988). Becoming
sensible of the supersensible easily degenerates into a form of vision in
哪个, according to Kant’s polemics, “one does not have to work but need
only hearken and attend to the oracle within, in order to gain complete
possession of all the wisdom to which philosophy aspires” ([1796] 2002,
PP. 431–2). In the 1830s, Schelling is similarly critical of mystics as “phi-
losophers of not-knowing,” who employ “ecstatic intuition and immediate

2. On Schelling’s use of Hemsterhuis, see Schelling 1856–61, 4: PP. 490–1, 和
Franz 1996, PP. 81–2; on Cousin’s familiarity with Hemsterhuis, see Cousin 1841,
p. 274, Boulan 1924, PP. 58–9, and Schüppen 1995, p. 593.

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742

The Cousin-Schelling Controversy

revelation” as epistemic tools, 这样, while they may possess the truth,
“all communication of knowledge [becomes] impossible” ([1833] 1856–
61, 10: PP. 193–5; 1994, PP. 179–81). In the face of the anti-philosophical
use of mystic empiricisms, it became increasingly necessary to avoid
any claim to immediate certainty of the beyond, prior to all concepts, 全部
discourse and all rational scrutiny.

然而, the biggest challenge facing later speculative empiricists was
Kant’s critical philosophy. There are many ways in which the publication
of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, three years after Hemsterhuis’ Sophyle, 亲-
blematised any simple adherence to empiricism: to name but three, 有
Kant’s insistence on the activity of the understanding in the constitution
of objects, his re-description of experience in general as always already sat-
urated by categorial judgment,3 and his positing of limits to possible ex-
经历. The last obstacle is particularly pertinent to what follows: 远的
more than the Lockeans, Kant made clear “the precise limits of our knowl-
边缘,” in Sophyle’s words, by demarcating a speciﬁc set of experiences that
were possible. 那是, while it may well be possible to interpret Kant’s
doctrine of the limit in a way that does make room for ampliative empir-
icisms (IE。, such that the set of experiences that are possible could include
anything to which a non-mystic speculative empiricist would wish to lay
宣称),4 it was predominantly interpreted in the early nineteenth century
as robustly restricting the domain of the empirical with his “startling” con-
clusion that “we can never transcend the limits of possible experience”
([1787] 1929, Bxix). And central to such an interpretation is the idea that
“the formal conditions of experience” that circumscribe the possible
([1787] 1929, A218/B265; 看 [1790] 2002, p. 284) are deﬁned, 部分地,
by the present capacity of the senses: nothing that is beyond the capabil-
ities of human sensibility as it is currently constituted can count as an empir-
ical object. 因此, the reach of empiricism cannot be inﬁnitely ampliﬁed.
换句话说, Kant seems to presuppose that the human faculty of
sensibility is always going to be the same, that radical amelioration is
impossible and that, 最后, the limits to what is experienceable
remain static.5 Evidently, Kant does recognise a possible ampliﬁcation of
experience within limits “in accordance with the laws of the empirical

3. The meaning of ‘experience’ in Kant remains a highly contested topic. On its am-
biguity in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 看, 例如, Guyer 1987, PP. 79–81; Ginsborg
2006, PP. 59–65.

4. Even in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft itself, Kant hints that the range of possible
experience could be very broad; see his remarks, 例如, on magnetic matter ([1787]
1929, A226/B273). 下文中, I am concerned merely with the way Kant was inter-
preted among his immediate successors.

See Whistler 2014 for a fuller version of this argument.

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科学观点

743

progression” ([1787] 1929, A493/B521); 尽管如此, the set determin-
ing which experiences are possible and which are not does not appear to
改变. Kant’s static limits block the post-Hemsterhuisian ideal of an
ever-expanding empirical domain.

Interpreted thus, Kant’s limits provoked much opposition, even among
Kantians—opposition which often centred on re-theorizing experience so
that it could become speculative. 例如, Friedrich Schiller and
Salomon Maimon smuggle the resources of pre-Kantian traditions of nor-
mative epistemology into the critical framework, and with it a demand for
the radical amelioration of the faculties and thus experience itself (看
Whistler 2014). The job of the philosopher, on this alternative, 不是
to describe experience and its transcendental conditions as they are, 但
to improve the former in the name of the perfection of human knowledge.
G.W.F. Hegel provides another famous example. There are numerous ways
in which he contests Kantian limits, but what is of passing signiﬁcance
here is his return to a “Science of the Experience of Consciousness” (作为
early subtitle for the Phänomenologie des Geistes [1807] 把它).6 Crudely ar-
ticulated, Hegel rethinks experience by putting it in motion, such that its
own dialectical dynamics take it beyond any limits posited in advance by a
critical philosopher. Experience becomes a “series of conﬁgurations”
through which consciousness passes, continually transcending limits—
和, 最后, the philosopher’s job is not to insist on such limits
but merely to watch “the necessary progression and interconnection of
the forms” in their march towards “completed experience” (Hegel
[1807] 1977, §77–9). This dynamic course of experience is one way in
which Hegel rethinks Kant.

What is of interest in the rest of this essay is another set of responses to
limits on experience—the responses given by Cousin and Schelling in their
closely-related, if ultimately competing revivals of the tradition of
speculative empiricism. Both responses are oriented around a common
commitment to the idea that, in Schelling’s words, “empiricism [是个]
philosophical principle, insofar as it claims that the highest object of phi-
losophy is experiential… not to be determined through mere thinking nor
posited in mere thinking” ([1832/33] 1972, p. 239). Both Schelling and
Cousin renew the empiricist tradition in the face of what they see as prob-
lems in the very set-up of German Idealist philosophies from Kant to
Hegel. 它是, I am going to argue, in the series of writings published
之间 1833 到 1835 in which they provide “serious but amical critique”
of each other’s work that this shared heritage is, notwithstanding their

6. On the fate of this subtitle and its implications for Hegelian “experience,” see

海德格尔 [1950] 1970, PP. 139–45.

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744

The Cousin-Schelling Controversy

many differences, most explicit. To return to the epigraph that began this
散文: what is here made manifest, among much else, is their common ad-
herence to a “true empiricism” that refuses to hastily conﬂate the empirical
with the sensible, 那, 最后, makes use of experience to speculate
on the supersensible and that, ﬁnally, ﬁnds its forebears in “the empiricism
of a Bacon, of a Pascal or of a Newton.” Both Cousin and Schelling follow
Hemsterhuis’ Euthyphron in exclaiming, “But how many types of experi-
ence there are!”

The Cousin-Schelling Controversy: Cousinian Perspectives
2.
In Summer 1833, Schelling received Cousin’s new Preface for the second
edition of his Fragments philosophiques, and replied as follows, “I received
with great pleasure and read with great interest the second edition of your
Fragments philosophiques, evident proof of the fact that your political career
has not taken you from science.” (Cousin and Schelling 1991, p. 222)
Schelling went on to provide a critical notice of Cousin’s piece in the
Bayer’schen Annalen, subsequently reworked into a Preface to the 1834
German translation of Cousin’s second-edition Preface—“your preface to
my preface”, as Cousin dubbed it (Cousin and Schelling 1991, p. 229).
在 1835, it was itself translated into French, twice, and gave rise to a large
number of responses from both French and German philosophers (I.G.
Fichte, H.F. Hinrichs, F. Ravaisson, C.H. 韦斯, A. Wendt, J. Willm,
ETC。). 在 1838, Cousin himself responded to Schelling’s critique in the
Preface to the third edition of Fragments philosophiques. 此外, 这些
writings were merely the culmination of a correspondence that had begun
the day Cousin met Schelling in Munich, 2 八月 1818, 和, amongst
much else, this correspondence provides evidence of Schelling’s familiarity
with many of Cousin’s other writings from the period, 包括 1826
edition of the Fragments philosophiques and the 1828 lecture course on the
history of philosophy.7

7. With the addition of the preface Cousin wrote to the 1834 publication of Biran’s
Nouvelles considérations sur les rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, this seems the extent
of Schelling’s familiarity with Cousin’s works. It is much harder to gauge Cousin’s knowl-
edge of any speciﬁc work by Schelling. As Cousin himself writes to Schelling, “I have stud-
ied Kant and I believe that I understand him. I scarcely dare say that about Fichte. As for
你, I have studied you less, I understand you less; you are too far above me for me to be
able to measure you. 所以, I have proﬁted from what agreed with me here and there in your
ideas, but without judging the whole, without either adopting or rejecting your system”
(Cousin and Schelling 1991, p. 213). 的确, as with the other German inﬂuences on
Cousin, it is legitimate to wonder how much his knowledge of Schelling was second-hand
(via Tennemann, ETC). (下文中, I limit my analysis, with one or two exceptions, 到
those works Cousin and Schelling knew of each other or that were written around the time
of the controversy.)

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科学观点

745

Almost as soon as Schelling’s Preface appeared, the controversy was cast
into a battle between French and German philosophy: on the one side
stood the leader of the “new German school” of speculative metaphysics
who disdained the empirical world in the name of lofty abstractions and
on the other side stood the leading light of “establishment” French spiri-
tualism, ﬁghting abstractions with trusty empirical observation. 约瑟夫
Willm (1790–1853), 例如, observes in 1835:

What characterises [Schelling’s Preface] and gives it a quite
particular value is not Schelling judging Cousin, but French
philosophy examined according to the views of German
philosophy… Schelling judges Cousin’s doctrine less from the point
of view of his own system than from the German point of view; 这是
less Schelling’s system opposed to Cousin’s system as German
method compared to French method; it is the state of thought in
France faced with the thought of Germany… It is, ﬁnally, 这
successor of Kant and Fichte wishing to come to an understanding
with the successor of Descartes and Condillac. (1835, PP. vi–vii)8
Willm goes on to specify that it is specifically Cousin’s “psychological
方法, grounded in analysis of facts of consciousness”—the method
“which has predominated in France for many years… the method of
Descartes as of Condillac”—that is here “put on trial… by the most
powerful organ of German method” (1835, p. X).

Signiﬁcant is the extent to which this interpretation of the controversy
continues to inform contemporary scholarship. 一次又一次, the stakes
of the Cousin-Schelling controversy are held to consist in a sterile confron-
tation between two philosophical traditions that have little in common:
analysis vs synthesis, psychology vs speculation, empiricism vs rational-
ism—France vs. 德国. Cousin’s grounding of the philosophical enter-
prise in the data of psychological experience is, it is claimed, to be neatly
opposed to the German Idealist ﬂight from the empirical. One can list
commentators on the controversy who, while often sympathetic to many
German and particularly Hegelian inﬂuences on Cousin, still diametrically
oppose Cousin and Schelling as representatives of rival traditions: Cotten
(1994, p. 88), Janet (1887, PP. 370–6), Janicaud (1984, p. 460), Manns
(1994, p. 76), Rey (2013, p. 147), Tilliette (1970, 2: 126–8; 1999,
PP. 290–7), Vermeren (1991, p. 9).9

8. On Willm and his role in the controversy, see Rowe 2000.
9.

Such a list also makes clear how little—Tilliette excepted—Schelling scholars have

engaged with this controversy.

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746

The Cousin-Schelling Controversy

All these readings transform Cousin and Schelling into opponents.
And bound up with this transformation is a refusal to take seriously
the occasions on which the two philosophers admit to their similarities,
instead relegating them to polite, yet ultimately insincere gestures by
philosopher-politicians. In the face of Janicaud’s puzzled exclamation
that “it is certainly surprising that the great Schelling made the effort
to write more than thirty pages on Victor Cousin’s philosophy” (1984,
p. 460), the obvious response is surely that Schelling saw in Cousin an
ally in the struggle against the vices of the German Idealist tradition.
Rather than a neat opposition, Cousin and Schelling enter into an uneasy
alliance in the early 1830s, one deﬁned by their shared commitment to
atypical, speculative empiricisms.

The source of the problem is ultimately Cousin himself. He fails, 作为
much as anyone, to discern some of the more signiﬁcant similarities
between his philosophy and the later Schelling’s. 当然, Cousin does
acknowledge some dependence on Schellingian philosophy; 例如, 在
这 1833 Preface, he is adamant that “the ﬁrst years of the nineteenth
century saw appear this great system. Europe owes it to Germany and
Germany to Schelling. This system is the true one; for it is the most com-
plete expression of the entirety of reality, of universal existence.” And he
continues, “Hegel borrowed from Schelling; and me, weaker than both, 我
borrowed from both of them” (1833, PP. xl–xli). 尽管如此, Rey is
surely right to insist—in regard to Cousin’s own view of the matter—that “it
is more a general spirit than precise arguments that Cousin retained from
Schelling” (2013, p. 145).10 为了, when it comes to many of these precise
论据, Cousin contends that he differs radically from Schelling.
因此, he makes claims about the distance separating him from
Schelling that are often hyperbolic and occasionally downright false
with respect to the Schelling of the 1830s. This is most evident in the
following—plainly inadequate—claim that is propagated in later com-
mentaries from Willm onwards: Hegel and Schelling “place themselves
straightaway at the pinnacle of speculation; 我, I begin from experience”
(1833, p. xlii). What follows aims at recovering the resemblances, com-
plexities and ambivalences that such a binary covers over.

Cousin’s antipathy towards some of Schellingian philosophy turns on
方法. Cousin favours psychological introspection over all other method-
ologies: “Here as elsewhere, as everywhere, as always, I pronounce myself
for that method which places the point of departure of all healthy philos-
ophy in the study of human nature and therefore in observation” (1833,

10. Elsewhere, I have argued that one major exception concerns the idea of systema-

ticity that Cousin and Schelling share. See Whistler 2017.

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PP. vi–vii). It is on this methodological ground that Cousin’s opposition to
the “new German school” rests: “I must also in truth confess that some
fundamental differences separate me from [Hegel and Schelling]… I blush
to insist on them, but I cannot but recall the ﬁrst and most fruitful of all—
that of method.” He continues, “Here is manifest the general difference
which separates me from the new German school—that is, the psycholog-
ical character fully imprinted on all my views” (1833, PP. xlii–xliii).

The Preface to the third edition of Fragments philosophiques articulates
this methodological critique of German philosophy most clearly. With ref-
erence to Schelling’s early concept of intellectual intuition, Cousin asks,
“Either intellectual intuition falls under the eye of consciousness or it does
不是. If it does not, from where do you [IE。, Schelling] know of it? 什么
reveals to us its marvellous existence? With what right, what justiﬁcation
do you speak of it? If it does fall under the eye of consciousness, we are thus
reduced to psychology and I send you back to your own objections” (1838,
PP. x–xi). According to Cousin, Schelling has a choice: either to posit the
beginning of philosophy outside of consciousness or within it. The latter
position is ultimately reducible to Cousin’s psychological introspection,
whereas the former position is absurd, for a philosopher can only make
knowledge claims about what appears to consciousness. Cousin assumes
that the philosophical enterprise is a science of discovery, moving from
the known to the unknown, 和, since what does the knowing is con-
sciousness, the starting point—the initial known from which philosophy
begins—must fall under “the eye of consciousness.”

There are a number of problems with this argument, but I will only
mention three. 第一的, however one describes Schellingian intellectual intu-
ition—and it has a convoluted history in Schelling’s early works—it
always arises as the point of indifference between the subjective and the
objective.11 For the early Schelling, intellectual intuition is neither merely
inside consciousness nor merely outside; it is meant to be both, at the point
of identity between subject and object. Cousin’s alternative (either inside
or outside consciousness) is a false dichotomy—what is more, it is a false
dichotomy that Cousin himself repeatedly rejects: his own concept of
reason is almost identical to that of the early Schelling’s in laying claim
to both subjectivity and objectivity.12 Even in the 1833 Preface, Cousin
writes of reason as “a faculty that is both psychological and ontological

11. Evidence for the above can be found in many of Schelling’s works from 1794
through to 1804, but Schelling is clearest in the Fernere Darstellungen ([1802] 1856–61,
4: PP. 348–68).

12. On the similarity (although not dependence) 两者之间, see Cotten 1995,

p. 43; Janet 1887, PP. 76–9.

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The Cousin-Schelling Controversy

一起, subjective and objective at the same time, which appears in us
without properly belonging to us… which from the heart of consciousness
extends into the inﬁnite and attains the being of beings” (1833, p. xxv).
Cousin and the early Schelling share—in broad brushstrokes, at any rate—
a conception of the starting point of philosophy as a rational act occurring
at the point of indifference between the subjective and objective.

第二, Cousin’s argument implies that any starting point for philos-
ophy that “falls under the eye of consciousness” is ineluctably reducible to
a Cousinian form of psychological introspection. This seems odd, and it
stems from a particularly telling reduction of the ﬁeld of empiricism at
the heart of Cousin’s project. 为了, one might object, consciousness is typ-
ically aware of more than its own psychological composition; the eye of
consciousness ranges wider than introspection. But Cousin reduces the do-
main of empiricism from the empirical world as a whole to just one ele-
ment of it: 心理学. He is explicit on this point in the 1833 Preface:

[Philosophy] is distinguished from physics only by the nature of the
phenomena it observes. The phenomena proper to physics are those
of external nature, that vast world of which man is such a small part.
The phenomena proper to philosophy are those of that other world
that each man carries within himself, and that he perceives thanks to
that internal light called consciousness, just as he perceives the other
world through his senses. (1833, p. viii)

Consciousness observes something philosophically significant only when it
observes itself. This is the huge restriction Cousin places on the capacities
of empiricism. 它是, 而且, a restriction that Schelling pointedly
derided as Cousin’s “insistence on a sterile psychology that appears to us
merely as a sad limitation on the vast domain of experience” ([1834]
1856–61, 10: p. 217).

Thirdly, Cousin’s attempt to cast Schelling and himself as opponents
ultimately fails for the basic reason that—intentionally or unintention-
ally13—his presentation of Schelling’s position no longer bears any resem-
blance to the latter’s philosophy of the time. In the 1830s, Schelling no

13. 那是, 在 1838, it is difﬁcult to discern whether Cousin has just failed to
understand developments in Schelling’s philosophy (也许可以理解, 给定
Schelling’s publication record after 1809) or “Schelling” has merely become a symbolic
label for certain representative positions in German philosophy that it is expedient for
Cousin to attack. 换句话说, 经过 1838, the politics of “Germanism,” i.e., Cousin’s
attempts to increasingly distance himself from alleged German inﬂuences, raises the
question of the extent to which Cousin intended to read Schelling accurately. 对于在-
姿态, the claim that Schelling’s “system is the true one” is deleted from the 1838
edition of Fragments philosophiques, as well as from all subsequent ones.

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longer explicitly subscribes to a concept of intellectual intuition. 和
even if Cousin’s critique may well accidentally have some pertinence to
Schelling’s late notion of ecstatic reason (in which philosophy begins with
“a being that is absolutely external to thought… beyond all experience as
it is before all thought” ([1842/43] 1856–61, II/3: 127; 2007, p. 179]),
the fact is that, 在 1833, Schelling “advocates empiricism” ([1832/33]
1972, p. 272) and sets forth a methodology of philosophical empiricism
in opposition to much of the speculative rationalism that Cousin still as-
sociates with him. Cousin ignores these developments and so, 到底,
his critique—whether cogent or not—entirely misses the point: it attacks
a philosophy that no longer exists.

3.
The Cousin-Schelling Controversy: A Schellingian Perspective
所以, what most interpreters of the controversy—particularly Cousin
himself—miss is Schelling’s own recovery of a notion of experience during
the 1830s. Only once this is sufﬁciently taken into account can one cor-
rectly discern that what is at stake in the controversy is less the opposition
between empiricist and speculative forms of philosophy than an uneasy al-
liance between two similar, if distinct understandings of philosophy as spec-
ulative empiricism.14 Indeed, in his Preface to Cousin’s Preface, Schelling is
clear that—whatever differences do divide them—there is no question but
that he is beginning from the same empiricist starting point as Cousin:

It is not that we [Germans] fail in any sense to presuppose
经验, or that we refuse to admit that all philosophy rests
individually on experience. The very ﬁrst line of Kant’s Critique
declares that all knowledge proceeds from experience; and if one had
asked this philosopher—or any other defender of a priori concepts
independent of experience—how he had learnt of the existence of
这些概念, he would have responded, 毫无疑问: only from
experience… Thus the assertion that it is impossible to philosophise
without experience is superﬂuous for German philosophy. It is not at
all what is at issue. ([1834] 1856–61, 10: PP. 210–11)

Both Cousin and Schelling begin with experience—indeed, 甚至
观察, since Schelling goes on to avow a further specification of

14.

It needs to be kept in mind throughout, 然而, that both Cousin and Schelling
use the term “empiricism” in positive and negative registers. 那是, while they do occa-
sionally describe their projects as transformed or mutated empiricisms, they also critique
traditional empiricisms, particularly Lockean variants. On Cousin’s critique of past empir-
icisms, see Antoine-Mahut’s contribution to this issue.

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The Cousin-Schelling Controversy

this principle: “All healthy philosophy must begin from observation and
experience” ([1834] 1856–61, 10: p. 214).

Schelling draws attention so ﬂagrantly to this shared empiricist point of
departure, 因为, 部分地, he sees Cousin as an ally against the worst ex-
cesses of the German Idealist tradition he had been trying to escape. 尽管
这, as I will show at length in the next section, will ultimately be com-
plicated by Schelling’s perception of a residue of Hegelianism in Cousin’s
哲学, nevertheless initially in the 1834 Preface, Schelling is “pleased
to note on the side of the French and other no less gifted nations, WHO
differentiate themselves completely from the Germans by means of the em-
pirical standpoint of their philosophy, that this commitment to empiricism
has for a long time been a stark, if sometimes blind protest—not against
哲学, but against one-sided rationalism… and it is precisely in this
rejection of [rationalism] that we have seen, even if far off, a means of
coming to some future agreement with them” ([1834] 1856–61, 10:
PP. 216–7). 的确, for Schelling, Cousin’s empiricism exhibits a refresh-
ingly rebellious streak in its opposition to rationalist orthodoxies:

From time immemorial, noble and free spirits, peering out from
under the compulsion of desert-like rationalism, have ﬂed to the
domain of empiricism… This opposition, this uprising of
empiricism against the yoke of exclusive rationalism has been ever
beneﬁcial and breathed new life into science. After the restrictions of
all-smothering rationalism, it is again beneﬁcial to be able to view
the world in general as a fact once more. ([1832/33] 1972, p. 248)

而且, Schelling also goes further than just approving of Cousin’s
anti-rationalism. 那是, he insists, 此外, on the dream they
共享, in the early 1830s, for revived empiricisms built on non-standard
foundations—mutated variants of empiricism that would be metaphysically
ampliative. An early letter from Schelling to Cousin makes clear just how
much Schelling saw their works as complementary. Having opposed both
Cousin and himself to the “pitiable pusillanimity” of eighteenth-century
sensualism, 一方面, and ungrounded speculation, 在另一,
he continues,

It is for us, other Germans, who—since the advent of natural
philosophy—have left behind that sad alternative between hollow
ideas drawn from a metaphysics without basis, which everyone is
right to mock, and narrow, arid observations from a fruitless
psychology—it is for us, I say, and for those who understand us, 到
push towards the universal system, beginning from a ﬁrst principle
哪个, because of its absolute objectivity or positivity, can be known

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only a posteriori, to the point that it ends up merging with
empiricism, rightfully recognized, and uniting with it, until it is
irresistible and unshakeable. I speak to you of Germans, but to tell
真相, in Germany most are far from understanding what, 为了
例子, you have divined in your wisdom. (Cousin and Schelling
1991, p. 204)

Schelling makes Cousin an ally not only in rejecting the above false
dichotomy between heady rationalism, 一方面, and mere psychol-
ogism, 在另一; but also in the more constructive and speciﬁc project—
which Schelling was beginning to dub “positive philosophy”—of postulat-
ing a ﬁrst principle “known only a posteriori,“ 那是, empirically. Schelling
sees them both as renegades from the philosophical mainstream in their re-
fusal to conform to French and German intellectual stereotypes, 反而
seeking common ground in a revitalised empiricism. Schelling thus con-
tinues in the letter, “Keep going! You have followed entirely the idea of
the true system” (Cousin and Schelling 1991, p. 204). 更, 什么时候
Schelling describes Cousin’s project in his 1834 critique, it is remarkable
how close it sounds to his own: Cousin recognises “the necessity of raising
up the empiricism he found before him, which remains his point of depar-
真实, into a rational philosophy grounded on universal principles” ([1834]
1856–61, 10: p. 205). In Cousin’s own words, he was using empiricism
against itself “to reawaken among us the taste for high speculation” (Cousin
and Schelling 1991, p. 202).

更具体地说, what is most distinctively atypical about both
Cousin’s and Schelling’s empiricisms is their assimilation of rationalist
元素. Both rationalise their empiricism to the extent that Schelling
can describe his project as “a priori empiricism” and Cousin can similarly
exhort, “Reunite the two methods, like the great physician who, 在他的
laboratory, conceives and experiments, experiments and conceives, and uses
both his senses and his reason. Begin with the a priori method and as a
counterweight add the a posteriori method” ([1828] 1991, p. 102). 在
the same vein, Schelling repeatedly praises Cousin for refusing empiricism
“as it is now understood in France and a great part of Germany, as sen-
sualism and a system denying to human knowledge all universality and
necessity” ([1834] 1856–61, 10: p. 216). Cousin’s empiricism is simul-
taneously rational philosophy, just as Schelling’s own aim is to reconcile
“empiricism and rationalism together in a much higher sense than possible
until now” ([1834] 1856–61, 10: p. 216).

In the context of these avowed resemblances, it is evident that at least
some of what is at stake in the Cousin-Schelling controversy is a testing of
the closeness of their visions, an interrogation of each other’s philosophies

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The Cousin-Schelling Controversy

for the sake of a continued alliance of atypical empiricisms. Signiﬁcant dif-
ferences do emerge from this testing—and I will trace them in detail in
the next section—but so too does a common core.

Schelling’s Critique: Cousin as Rationalist

4.
When it comes to overturning the critical consensus—originating from
Cousin himself—that Schelling and Cousin represent rival traditions of
German abstraction and French analysis, what is even more striking than
Schelling’s recognition of their similarities is the way he goes about criti-
cising Cousin. For what emerges is precisely not the standard picture of
Schelling as a priori metaphysician and Cousin as careful observer of em-
pirical facts; 反而, Schelling criticises Cousin for being too much of a ra-
tionalist. According to Schelling, despite the initial hope he had for a
shared empiricist project (as described above), Cousin ultimately takes
refuge in concepts and is not empiricist enough, such that Schelling can
position himself as the genuine heir to the tradition of “true empiricism.”
Much of the controversy centres on the question of “the transition from
psychology to ontology”—that is, the legitimacy of Cousin’s claim that the
psychological facts he discovers through empirical introspection have
implications that bear on the existence of the external world and God.
Schelling describes Cousin’s philosophy as two-step:

第一个 [部分] remains completely within the sphere of psychology
and therefore subjectivity, and ﬁnds in consciousness only the faculty
of universal principles, thanks to which then a second part, A
dogmatic and objective part, claims to prove the existence of the
exterior world, that of our own personality and that of God. ([1834]
1856–61, 10: p. 209)

换句话说, Cousin begins with “the complete enumeration of the
essential elements or ideas of reason” (Cousin [1828] 1991, p. 105)—
purporting to complete the task of tabulating the categories begun by
Aristotle and Kant—and it is on this basis that he moves on to the second
step and undertakes a “higher induction” ([1828] 1991, p. 133) 那
results in a “demonstration of the independence of truths perceived by rea-
son” ([1828] 1991, p. 157). 那是, through this transition from enumer-
ation to demonstration, “the absolute principles obtained by observation
can legitimately lead us where observation itself no longer has an imme-
diate hold” (Cousin [1826] 1833, p. 23). Rational truths now have, 交流电-
cording to Cousin, objective value (i.e. whenever claims about nature
and God are rational, they are also mind-independently true). Cousin’s
philosophy “rests on observation; but has no limits other than reason itself,
just as physics begins from observation, but does not stop there and with

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753

the calculus raises itself to general laws of nature and to the system of the
world” (1833, p. 七).

The difﬁculty in Cousin’s account, 当然, is precisely what justiﬁes
the transition between the two parts. Schelling focuses on Cousin’s partic-
ular shift from the concept of cause that forms part of his inventory of the
mind to the objective principle of a cause functioning in the external
世界, and notes an unjustiﬁed assertion of the existence of causality
outside the mind to which Cousin seems committed: “It is thus through
reason—in virtue of the law of causality imposed on my consciousness—
that I am assured of the existence of an external cause and, by that, of an
external world” (Schelling [1834] 1856–61, 10: p. 219). 那是, Schelling
implicitly asks: what legitimates the mind-independent existence of the
principle of causality? What justiﬁes Cousin’s insistence that it is more
than just an expedient ﬁction imposed on an indifferent world by the rea-
soning subject? Schelling implies that Cousin’s inference from the subjec-
tive to the objective remains utterly unjustiﬁed—as Rey summarises it, “在
the ﬁrst as in the second preface to Fragments philosophiques, 的问题
the promised transition from psychology to ontology is left obscure. 乙酰胆碱-
cording to Schelling, this silence is explained by the impossibility that it
covers up.” (2013, p. 146)

As several commentators have noted in passing, behind Schelling’s cri-
tique of Cousin’s transition from psychology to ontology lies the spectre of
Hegelianism. Tilliette writes, 例如, “Schelling scented in Cousin’s
fragments the formidable presence of Hegel” (1970, 2: 128), and similarly
Janicaud claims, “For Schelling, Cousin’s abstract metaphysics is only an
Ersatz of Hegelian rationalism” (1984, p. 459).15 那是, 根据
Schelling and despite all appearances, Cousin turns out to be the rationalist
who stands ﬁrmly in the German philosophical tradition, 而不是
Schelling himself, and so Schelling—as a good empiricist—must offer a
critique on behalf of the value of experience. Schelling’s argument can
be summarised as follows: by beginning with an enumeration of rational
facts in consciousness, Cousin begins by thinking concepts, and he then at-
tempts to show that those concepts correspond to reality. 然而, 这样一个
transition from existence in intellectu to existence in re is the very paradigm
of rationalist argumentation, i.e. it mirrors the structure of Schelling’s
Hegel.16 Rationalists ﬁrst analyse a concept in pure thinking and, 仅有的

15. Rey helpfully pinpoints Schelling’s reading of the 1828 lecture course as the

source of this critique of Cousin as Hegelian (2013, p. 146).

16. As Schelling writes more generally in his lectures of the period, “If we consider
the termini around which everything revolves, i.e. the concept and existence of something,
then philosophy is fundamentally a question of whether one goes from concept to being or
from being to concept. Rationalism proves being a priori, immediately from the concept,

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随后, ﬁt reality into that conceptual template. 因此, Schelling
reads Cousin’s psychologism as disguised rationalism; there is nothing
empiricist, Schelling is suggesting, about using reason to explain the
world.17

This is precisely why Schelling spends so much of his 1834 Preface in a
critique of Hegel without once naming him: he discerns the structure of
Hegelian rationalism in Cousin’s argumentation. Just as for Hegel, so too
for Cousin: the “ﬁrst presupposition of this philosophy, which apparently
presupposes nothing, was to attribute to the purely logical concept as such
the property or nature of transforming itself into its opposite [IE。, 进入
objective reality]” (Schelling [1834] 1856–61, 10: p. 213). Both Hegel
and Cousin—as rationalists—mould philosophy into a science of the tran-
sition from concept to reality. 而且, as rationalistic, Cousin’s philoso-
phy falls prey to the very critique Schelling repeatedly makes of Hegelian
philosophy during the 1830s and 1840s—and this critique, unsurpris-
ingly enough, is focused on the necessary failure of any attempt to pass
from thinking to reality or, in Cousin’s terms, from psychology to ontol-
奥吉. 因此, what Schelling writes of Hegel also applies to Cousin: “这
system develops within what is purely logical; but at the instant it must
step outside this limit into reality, the thread of dialectical movement is
snapped” ([1834] 1856–61, 10: p. 212). The transition fails; any purported
progression from mind to world is only “an apparent progression” ([1832/
33] 1972, p. 461); both systems are “still far from being a real philosophy”
([1834] 1856–61, 10: p. 209). Schelling concludes,

[Hegel attempted] to begin metaphysics with a purely rational
concept exclusive of everything empirical—a vain attempt simply
because the empirical element, rejected at the beginning, 是
subsequently reintroduced through the backdoor… Even if this
episode in the history of modern philosophy has not served progress,
it has at least shown once more that it is impossible to arrive at
reality with what is purely rational. ([1834] 1856–61, 10: p. 213)

while empiricism, on the contrary, tries to prove the concept from experience a posteriori”
([1832/33] 1972, p. 402).

17. Note the implicit, idiosyncratic concept of “rationalism” to equally describe pre-
Kantian dogmatism and post-Kantian speculation; as will become clear below, 大部分
Schelling’s critique of types of “negative philosophy,” particularly Hegel’s, rests on a retool-
ing of the traditional dichotomy between empiricism and rationalism. For further analysis
of the formation of traditional and not-so-traditional distinctions between empiricism and
rationalism in the early nineteenth century, Manzo’s contribution to this issue is an essential
reference point.

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Cousin’s failure, according to Schelling, is to have learnt nothing from the
recent example of Hegelianism, to have repeated its mistakes and held
philosophy back from progress towards “true empiricism.” On the contrary,
Schelling remains faithful to “true empiricism,” on his own account, 经过
turning to “what is opposed to pure thinking” (经验), for “in experi-
恩斯, there is found that supplement which was lacking in the concept of
the pure subject [of rationalism]” ([1832/33] 1972, p. 239). 因此, Schelling
insists throughout the 1830s and 1840s: “There is an unbridgeable chasm
between logical necessity and reality” ([1842/43] 1856–61, II/3: p. 101;
2007, p. 160).18 Thought is stuck on one side of this abyss; it can deal
merely and exclusively with logically possible structures: “With pure
原因, I cannot even realize the existence of some plant… Under given
状况, 原因, of itself, can know quite well the nature of this plant,
but not its actual, present existence” ([1842/43] 1856–61, II/3: p. 172;
2007, p. 210). On Schelling’s interpretation, Hegel’s and Cousin’s negative
philosophies fail to take this limitation seriously: they erroneously suppose
reality can be reached from pure reason and consequently produce “negative
[哲学] driven beyond its limits” ([1842/43] 1856–61, II/3: p. 80;
2007, p. 145).

反而, Schelling’s positive philosophy delves directly into the empir-
ical to identify those experiences that form the material of an abductive
proof.19 The paradigm of this type of demonstration (and this is of course
not an arbitrary example considering that positive philosophy is ultimately
a philosophy of revelation) is that of knowing the character of a person
from their actions. 在这种情况下, it is not that the actions of a person, 作为
experienced, are to be derived from their character, as conceptually con-
ceived (as on the rationalist model), nor is it merely that, given the actions,
one is to infer the character of the freely-acting person behind them (as for
traditional forms of empiricism); 相当, in Schelling’s positive philosophy,
as Tritten summarises, “A person is only known by means of their conse-
quent words and deeds; 然而, that to be known, that toward which thinking
strives, is the supersensible will precedent to these deeds, their prius or
anterior” (2016, p. 62). Schelling applies this model to God:

If that which necessarily exists is God, then this and that consequence—
we want to say, then a, 乙, C, and so on—become possible; 但如果

18.

下文中, I occasionally make use of Schelling’s later 1842/43 Berlin lec-
tures to clarify some aspects of his positive project. 然而, I hope thereby not to commit
myself to any broader claims about the continuities and changes in Schelling’s philosophy
between the early 1830s and his return to Berlin.

19. On abduction in Schelling’s positive philosophy, see Matthews in Schelling 2007,

PP. 68–81; Tritten 2012, PP. 40–64.

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The Cousin-Schelling Controversy

according to our experience a, 乙, C, 等等, really exist, 那么
necessary conclusion is that that which necessarily exists is really God.
([1842/43] 1856–61, p. 169; 2007, p. 208)

The point, 然后, is to prove the essence (divinity) of that which exists by
means of the consequences of this existence made manifest in experience,
IE。, revelation—“to transform precisely that which is incomprehensible a
priori into what is a posteriori comprehensible” ([1842/43] 1856–61, II/3:
p. 165; 2007, p. 205). Positive philosophy consists of a proof of what is
known a priori (the unprethinkable existence of God) through what is
known a posteriori (experiences of revelation), and Schelling dubs this a
proof “per posterius,” or “a priori empiricism,” for “the prius is grounded
empirically,” and—as such—positive philosophy “has in it both elements of
rationalism and empiricism, but stands at the same time above both”
([1832/33] 1972, p. 402). Schelling’s rationalist transﬁguration of empir-
icism thus pinpoints those experiences indelibly marked by the non-
empirical—that is, aspects of the empirical world “where thought and
experience interpenetrate each other totally and together constitute one
and the same indissoluble whole” ([1842/43] 1856–61, II/3: p. 111;
2007, p. 1669).20 It follows that the task for the philosopher is to search
出去, and draw attention to, those marks of revelation, for “the true prin-
ciple of empiricism, genuine empiricism, is what infers the existence of
God… from experiential marks” ([1832/33] 1972, p. 271). This is what
Schelling announces in his 1834 Preface on Cousin: “It is in this sense that
philosophy will soon undergo a great reform which, in its essentials, 将要
be its last. 它会, 一方面, impart the positive explanation of
现实, 没有, 在另一, taking away from reason the right to be in
possession of the absolute prius, even that of divinity” ([1834] 1856–61, 10:
p. 216).

A full exposition of Schelling’s positive philosophy goes far beyond the
scope of this essay. My point here is merely to show how much more com-
plicated the Cousin-Schelling controversy is than a mere opposition be-
tween German speculation and French empiricism. This is a debate
between two empiricists over the best way to speculate with experience:
Cousin accuses Schelling of not taking the materials of human conscious-
ness seriously enough to undertake such a speculative empiricist project;
Schelling blames Cousin for beginning with concepts and thus not sufﬁ-
ciently escaping the orbit of rationalism. Both consider themselves as heir
to a “true empiricism” that makes use of experience to go beyond the
sensible, that employs observation to transcend the observable.

20. Translation modiﬁed.

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Cousin as Empiricist

5.
Cousin emerges from Schelling’s critique as a rationalist in empiricist’s
衣服, as far from the ideal of “true empiricism” as any traditional
German Idealist. It is worth pausing, 然后, to assess the cogency of
Schelling’s criticisms and, 尤其, to discern whether there might
be a way to save Cousin from rationalism and thereby bring him back into
the empiricist fold. 问题, 然而, is that many of the texts by
Cousin that Schelling read do seem to operate in the manner Schelling
is so critical of: beginning with facts of reason, which function as concepts,
and inferring from them, without prior ground, ontological conclusions
about the existence of the external world and God. 这 1833 Preface to
Fragments philosophiques and the 1828 lecture course on the history of phi-
losophy both exhibit such a structure.21 As is often the case, it is Cousin’s
earlier work that provides a clearer picture of his empiricist commit-
ments22 and, 因此, I turn in what follows to scattered passages in
这 1826 Preface to Fragments philosophiques, of which Schelling was also
aware, that suggest a different way of transitioning from psychology to
ontology.

最终, everything revolves around the status of rational facts in
Cousin’s psychology, for Schelling is very quick to identify them with con-
油炸. Throughout the late 1820s and early 1830s, Cousin repeats the same
story about his discovery of these rational facts; here is the 1826 version:

Immediately when one delves into consciousness, without any
systematic prejudice, one observes such varied phenomena manifest
there that one is struck, ﬁrst of all, by the presence of a crowd of
phenomena impossible to confuse with those of sensibility. Sensation—
as well as the notions that it gives rise to or with which it mixes—
constitutes a real order of phenomena in consciousness; but one
encounters there other equally incontestable facts which can be

21.

实际上, 在 1833, Cousin presents a mutilated form of Cartesian argumentation,
based loosely on Meditations 3. Since reason possesses a concept of a ﬁnite cause (both as will
and as nature), it must necessarily possess the concept of an inﬁnite cause (since ﬁnitude is
logically derivative of inﬁnity): “It is a fact that once the notion of ﬁnite and limited causes
is grasped, we cannot but conceive a superior, absolute and inﬁnite cause, which is itself the
ﬁrst and last cause of all others” (1833, p. xxii). 然而, there is no real attempt to show
why it follows that this idea of an inﬁnite cause necessarily exists or why the idea must
originate in an inﬁnite substance.

22.

换句话说, what follows is implicitly consonant with a traditional reading of
Cousin’s development during the late 1820s from spiritualist empiricism to metaphysical
speculation: 而 1826 Preface still retains traces of Cousin’s early empiricist model,
this is all but effaced in the 1830s. On Cousin’s development between the two Prefaces,
Antoine-Mahut’s contribution to this issue is impeccable.

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758

The Cousin-Schelling Controversy

grouped into two large classes: volitional facts and rational facts. 这
will is not sensation, for the former often struggles against the latter,
and it is in this very opposition that it manifests itself pre-eminently.
Equally, reason is not identical to sensation, 为了, among the notions
with which reason supplies us, there are some whose characteristics
are irreconcilable with those of sensible phenomena, for example the
notions of cause, substance, 时间, 空间, unity, ETC. ([1826] 1833,
PP. 13–14)

The contents of consciousness, Cousin attests, consist of three classes of
facts: sensible facts, volitional facts and rational facts. According to Cousin,
the Lockean empiricist tradition that culminated in eighteenth-century
French sensualism recognised only the first class, sensible facts; Maine de
Biran was, Cousin’s story continues, the first to really take seriously the
radical independence of volitional facts from sensible facts and, to this
extent, Cousin acknowledges him as his teacher (“This admirable observer
taught me to untangle in all our knowledge, and even in the most simple
facts of consciousness, the part that pertains to voluntary activity” [1833,
p. xxxv]). 然而, Cousin considers his own most innovative philosoph-
ical discovery to have been that of the irreducibility of rational facts to
either sensible or volitional facts. Rational facts are radically different,
and Cousin considers himself the ﬁrst empiricist to have properly observed
这.

的确, this is very much a matter of observation for Cousin: he considers
the discovery of the third order of mental phenomena to have resulted from
his highly-trained and nuanced powers of introspection. He perceived some-
thing no one else had—namely, he perceived the unique properties of ra-
tional facts that distinguish them from all other mental phenomena. His is
“a psychology to which only profound reﬂection can attain” (1833, p. xx),
and it is for this reason that he continues to exhort his readers to practice
observing, for “a deepened analysis of reason is one of the most delicate
enterprises of psychology” ([1826] 1833, p. 18). And through such deli-
cate empiricism three unique properties of rational facts are to be ascer-
泰内德: their necessity, universality and impersonality. The ascription of
the ﬁrst two properties is evidently dependent on Kant and suggest that
Schelling is right in considering Cousin to be merely describing a priori
concepts under another name (so too does his list of rational facts in the
above as “notions” of substance and cause, ETC).

It is with the third property of rational facts—impersonality—that
Cousin lays claim to something new, and it is on this property that the
transition from psychology to ontology depends. 的确, it is precisely
here that Cousin claims to have overcome what he considers to be Kantian

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subjectivism, for the unexamined, but faulty principle at the heart of
Kant’s system, according to Cousin, is the “principle [的] the subjectivity
and personality of reason” (1833, p. xvii). Cousin’s argument against
Kantian subjectivity goes something like this: if rational facts are observed
by a sufﬁciently trained psychologist to pertain not merely to the I, 但为了
reality in general, i.e. if they are impersonal, then psychological claims
about rational facts are simultaneously ontological claims about mind-
independent reality, i.e. they are objectively valid. What such an argument
fails to establish, 当然, is whether rational facts can be observed
through psychological introspection to pertain to reality in general or even
what it might look like for this to be the case.

It is at this point that a passage from the 1826 Preface to Fragments

philosophiques becomes pertinent:

The ﬁrst task of psychological method is to withdraw into the ﬁeld of
consciousness where there are only phenomena, all perceivable and
appreciable by observation. 而且, as no substantial existence falls
under the eye of consciousness, it follows that the ﬁrst effect of such a
rigorous application of method is to adjourn ontology. 这是
adjourned, I say, not destroyed. 的确, it is a fact attested by
observation that in this same consciousness, where there are only
现象, there are also notions whose regular development
transcends the limits of consciousness and which thereby attain
存在. Do you stop the development of these notions? 如果是这样, 你
arbitrarily limit the tendency of a fact, you attack this fact itself and
thus you destroy the authority of all other facts. One must either
revoke the authority of consciousness or admit this authority as a
whole for all the facts it attests. Reason is neither more nor less real
and certain than will and sensibility; its certainty, once admitted,
must be followed everywhere it rigorously leads, even across to
ontology. ([1826] 1833, PP. 14–15)

The central idea here is of “notions whose regular development transcends
the limits of consciousness and attain existence”—that is, the dynamic
“tendency” inherent in certain rational facts. Taking Cousin seriously on
this point requires interpreting these rational facts as more than just
traditional concepts, but as mental phenomena that possess their own
entelechy, that are in motion, transcending themselves and the limits of
the I. Rational facts move, and Cousin is clear that the philosopher, 作为
observer, must follow this movement through to the end, 并不是
arbitrarily stop at the limits of subjectivity. Rational
facts pursue a
dynamic path from consciousness to reality, and consequently—as a good
empiricist—the vigilant philosopher must mark out the same path from

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760

The Cousin-Schelling Controversy

psychology to ontology. To do otherwise is to impose prejudices, unjustified
limits and distorting restrictions on the phenomena themselves.23 It is in
this way that Cousin sees himself as the heir to “true empiricism”: 在他的
rigorous ﬁdelity to the phenomena, in his strict observation of mental facts
in their dynamic, self-transcending process.24 A certain set of experiences—
rational facts—are already in motion, and the philosopher must describe
this motion even as it exceeds consciousness.

The point is that Schelling’s description of Cousin’s philosophy as a
two-step process—ﬁrst, psychological description, then inference to
ontology—is false on the present account. Cousin is undertaking one
and the same task throughout: observing mental phenomena in their dy-
namic diversity. His only innovation is to have recognised through intro-
spection a sui generis fact which is derived neither from the will nor from
sensation and which turns out to move beyond consciousness, such that the
philosopher too must move beyond psychology and begin to do ontology
merely for the sake of doing justice to the full range of mental phenomena.
This is no longer the rationalist inference from concepts to reality that
Schelling criticises. 换句话说, rational facts are observed to have
the property of impersonality, and so to describe them accurately requires
a non-personal, non-subjective perspective—the perspective of ontology.25
As Cousin writes in the 1826 Preface, “Here is [客观的] 存在, 但
existence revealed by a principle attested by consciousness. Here is a ﬁrst
step into ontology, but by the route of psychology—that is, by observa-
化” ([1826] 1833, p. 16).

再次, a full exposition of Cousin’s thesis on the dynamic tendency
of rational facts—including a complete account of the how and why of
their entelechy—far exceeds the scope of this essay, taking us, as it would,
to texts much earlier than the period under discussion; 尽管如此, 这是
evident from the above that, pace Schelling, Cousin’s philosophy can be
interpreted as both empirical and metaphysical, as both introspective all
the way down, but also “extending into the beyond” (1833, p. xix). 这
above reading provides one possible way to justify Cousin as an atypical,

23. To any objection that this is not the case or that rational facts lack such a
tendency, Cousin’s response must therefore be that the objector’s powers of observation
are less developed or less sensitive than his own, IE。, that any objection is ultimately a
question of misperception, to be rectiﬁed through exercises in introspection.

From here one might develop a defence of Cousin against Schelling’s criticism

24.

that French philosophy does not think process ([1834] 1856–61, 10: p. 221).

25. Cousin writes, “Consciousness is a pure witness… Reason knows itself and knows
everything else, and goes beyond the sphere of the I, because it does not belong to the I”
(1833, PP. xxvi–xxvii).

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speculative empiricist, for whom “psychology, by illuminating the nature
of reason, itself leads us to ontology” (1833, p. xix). Just like other spec-
ulative empiricists, Cousin uses experience—in this case, the introspective
experience of a certain class of mental phenomena—to go beyond the sen-
sible and make metaphysical claims.

6. Mediated Experiences of the Impossible
On the above interpretation, Cousin’s and Schelling’s projects begin to re-
semble each other once again—two distinct forms of speculative empiri-
cism that make use of experiences to go beyond the sensible. Both identify
a kind of experience that does something seemingly impossible and takes
the philosopher beyond the range of possible experiences. Theirs is self-
transcending empiricism. Where they differ is in the speciﬁc experience
they identify as making such transcendence possible, 在, 那是, 特殊目的-
ciﬁc material they make use of to speculate.

因此, Cousin speciﬁes one class of mental phenomena as pertinent to
his project. He is thus relatively uninterested in experiences of the external
世界 (which he leaves to the natural sciences), introspective experiences of
perceptual states (as already catalogued by eighteenth-century sensualists)
and introspective experiences of volitional states (de Biran’s domain).
What remains are rational facts, the philosophical pertinence of which con-
sists in their inherent “tendency” to move outside the limits of conscious-
内斯. Cousin’s project ends up, 的确, broadly resembling Hegel’s
“science of the experience of consciousness” and its contestation of the
Kantian limits of possible experience: 在这两种情况下, the philosopher as
pure observer watches experiences in motion, pursuing a path that contin-
ually transgresses any pre-established limits. One fundamental difference,
然而, is that Hegel makes experience as such dynamic, whereas Cousin
restricts this dynamic tendency to the class of rational facts alone.

Schelling is interested in a certain type of experience which is marked
by divine free activity and which therefore makes a per posterius proof of
God possible—demonstrating what is a priori through a posteriori means.
那是, he attempts to locate traces of divine revelation. And ultimately it
turns out that all experience manifests such traces—that is, traces of either
the process of creation or salvation. Schelling makes this abundantly clear
在他的 1842/43 lectures on the philosophy of revelation: “The experience
towards which positive philosophy proceeds is not just of a particular kind,
but is the entirety of all experience from beginning to end. What contrib-
utes to the proof is not a part of experience, but all of experience” ([1842/
43] 1856–61, II/3: PP. 130–1; 2007, p. 181). In Schelling’s terminology
of the early 1830s, it is not just any particular fact that should be em-
ployed for speculation, but “the fact of the world” ([1832/33] 1972,

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762

The Cousin-Schelling Controversy

p. 272): experience as a whole provides the per posterius proof of God.26 And
it is precisely this determination of the material of empiricism that motivates
Schelling’s critique of Cousin’s restrictions on philosophically-pertinent expe-
riences; he writes, “Should [哲学] begin with the facts of conscious-
内斯? It would thereby, from the very beginning, exclude the whole
external world from its consideration. It must not ﬁnd its staging post in
any old fact, but only in the fact of the world” ([1832/33] 1972, p. 272).
Cousin and Schelling choose very different materials, 然后, but their goal
is the same: to identify properties in those experiences that “tend” towards a
supersensible domain. 因此, when it comes to the dual challenge set
out at the beginning of this essay facing any post-Hemsterhuisian specula-
tive empiricism—namely, Kantian critique and mystic enthusiasm—
Cousin’s and Schelling’s approach is as follows. In regard to Kant, Cousin
and Schelling both attempt to theorise an experience that helps determine
the supersensible, and yet such experience does so in a thoroughly mediated
manner—that is, the experience itself remains fully within the limits of
possible experience (experience of the workings of one’s own mind for
Cousin; the complete set of possible experiences for Schelling), but tends
to something outside that limit, such that tracing the dynamics of such a
possible experience reveals what is experientially impossible.27 Similarly, 在
regard to mysticism, Cousin and Schelling both specify experiences that tell
us something about God, about supersensible structures and metaphysical
流程, 然而, once more, these experiences do so in a mediated way,
from within the limits of possible experience. Such brief remarks evidently
do justice to neither Cousin’s nor Schelling’s intricate relations with Kant
and mysticism during the early 1830s; 尽管如此, what is evident from
the foregoing is the importance of the mediating movement that allows
them to contest the critical empiricism of Hemsterhuis’ Sophyle in the
name of an ampliative empiricism of the sort advocated by Hemsterhuis’
Euthyphron.

Such then, in conclusion, is the similar manner in which Cousin and
Schelling represent themselves as heirs of “true empiricism”—through
the description of possible experiences of the impossible. It is this resem-
blance that made the 1833–5 controversy possible, even if the writings
from the controversy itself often focus on disagreements. I have argued that
such differences are, 大部分情况下, reducible to a disagreement within

26. For a full discussion of this point, see Martin 2013, PP. 6, 18–20.
27.

I have spoken elsewhere of the “art of indirection” in Schelling’s late “strategic”
approach to the transcendent (see Whistler 2013). 当然, one might legitimately won-
der how far we have actually progressed from sensible experiences acting as analogues of the
supersensible in §59 of Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790).

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科学观点

763

empiricism over what experiences best serve ampliative ends. On my inter-
预谋, it is not the case, pace Schelling, that Cousin is some kind of
rationalist in empiricist’s clothing, nor is it the case, pace Cousin and most
later commentators, that the two are to be opposed as leading representa-
tives of the German tradition of speculative abstraction on the one hand
and the French tradition of analytic introspection on the other. 相当, 这
stakes of this controversy are to be located in their shared aim of reviving
“true empiricism.”

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