The New Competition in - 麻省理工学院人工智能研究专业

The New Competition in
Multilateral Norm-Setting:
Transnational Feminists
& the Illiberal Backlash

Anne Marie Goetz

Global norm-setting to advance women’s rights has historically been a fertile area
for feminist activism. These efforts in multilateral institutions have also, 然而,
attracted a transnationally coordinated backlash. Initially spearheaded by the Vat-
ican, the right-wing backlash has consolidated into a curious coalition that now in-
cludes authoritarian and right-wing populist regimes and bridges significant differ-
ences of religious belief, regime type, and ideology. Hostility to feminism has prov-
en to be a valuable point of connection between interests that otherwise have little in
常见的. Some tensions between feminist groups have been exploited by right-wing
兴趣, in particular over sex workers’ rights and the use of technology to alter the
interpretation and experience of sexuality, 再生产, 和性别 (transgender
问题, surrogacy, sex-selective abortion, and sexuality and disability). This essay
reviews a recent instance of right-wing coordination, seen in the nearly successful ef-
fort to derail the 2019 meeting of the UN Commission on the Status of Women. 它
examines the strategic responses of transnational feminist movements to this back-
lash in multilateral institutions, including their exploration of new transnational
policy issues and experimentation with hybrid transnational spaces.

G lobal governance–understood not just as the work of multilateral insti-

tutions tackling transborder problems (climate change, 移民, 武器-
ons of mass destruction) but as a regime of shared norms, such as uni-
versal human rights–has been a focus of feminist activism for at least a centu-
里. From the efforts of the International Congress of Women in 1915 to end World
War I and support what eventually became the League of Nations, to the creation
of the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) 在 1946, to the inclusion of
gender-based violence in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
在 2000, to the centrality of gender equality in the 2015 UN Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals, feminist activism has sought to make gender equality a core compo-

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nent of global governance. In spite of the marked male dominance of multilater-
al institutions and disciplines (diplomacy, peace- and war-making, 贸易), 全球的
institutions also constitute a valuable “transnational opportunity structure” for
feminist activism using normative and legal strategies to make gender equality
norms persuasive in global goal-setting.1 Global institutions, 反过来, have stimu-
lated transnational activism among feminists, providing opportunities for build-
ing common cause, providing a focus and location for advocacy (例如, 这
UN World Conferences on Women series between 1975 和 1995), providing fund-
英, and creating gender policy machinery that transnational feminists can hold
accountable (for instance, UN Women, created in 2010). It is precisely because
global institutions have provided a helpful normative and policy terrain for fem-
inist movements that forces hostile to gender equality are seeking to dislodge the
feminist foothold in global institutions, a process explored in this essay, 哪个
draws upon twenty-one interviews with transnational feminist activists conduct-
ed in March and April 2019 (see the methodological note at the end of the essay).
Examples of feminist normative triumphs in multilateral space include the 1979
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(and its increasingly progressive general recommendations to update provisions
on violence against women, 贩卖, reproductive rights, and rights with-
in families), inclusion of conflict-related gender-based violence as war crimes in
这 2000 Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, and the UN Security
Council’s ten resolutions on women, peace, and security that bring a gender per-
spective to global security work.2 The 1995 Beijing Platform for Action (从
UN’s Fourth World Conference on Women) is a progressive manifesto that makes
unusual reading for an agreement between UN Member States, proposing struc-
tural changes to enable women to participate fully in economic life, support for
women’s autonomy in sexual and reproductive decisions, elimination of gender
stereotypes in the media, and recognition of the need to overcome attitudinal bar-
riers to women in politics and to men in unpaid care work.

这 1995 Beijing conference was significant for another reason: it was a pro-
foundly productive moment for transnational feminist activism. Two years of
preparatory funding from donor governments in advance of the meeting support-
ed significant organizational development in a wide range of women’s groups and
网络, which accounted for over thirty thousand participants in the unprec-
edented NGO Forum (the companion event open to the public) beside the ten
thousand state delegates. This intergovernmental process, hard on the heels of the
1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo and the
1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, ended up being generative
for feminist civil society around the world by creating an incentive for feminist
organizations to professionalize, prioritize, and network transnationally to am-
plify impact. This effect, 然而, was strongest in the Global South. 根据

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149 (1) Winter 2020Anne Marie Goetz

to a Bangladesh-based interviewee from the Asian Network of Women’s Shelters:
“We got a lot of funding from OECD countries for Beijing and when we got there
we felt sorry for Northern feminists. We discovered they had not been funded that
whole time, and grassroots women of the West were left out. From the West it was
mainly professional bureaucrats who were represented.”3 This funding support-
ed intellectual work in the Global South to generate feminist critiques of neoliber-
alism and to insist upon attention to the race and class differences overlooked by
Western feminists. These conceptual changes challenged the North-South gap in
objectives and leadership that had made transnational feminism appear up to that
point as the internationalization of American second-wave feminism.4

Feminist engagement with international institutions is held up by constructiv-
ist international relations theorists as a paradigmatic example of how a relative-
ly power-deprived social group (women and feminists) can challenge the power
of sovereign states and recruit them to promote justice. Constructivists Marga-
ret Keck, Kathryn Sikkink, and Martha Finnemore have described how feminist
“norm entrepreneurs” have built alliances with friendly states and insider cham-
pions (“femocrats”), reaching a “tipping point” after which a “norm cascade”
triggers universal commitments to gender equality.5

This “cascade” has been interrupted. By the time the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SDGs) were agreed on in 2015, while gender parity had been reached
globally in some areas of health and education, progress remained stubborn-
ly slow on women’s political participation (still on average less than 25 百分
of legislatures) and had started to reverse on women’s labor force participation
(dropping in most contexts after 2005 from highs points above 50 百分).6 这
SDGs include a stand-alone goal on gender equality as well as gender-specific tar-
gets across many of the other goals. 但, signaling a shift in the international en-
vironment for women’s rights, states could not agree on targets for encouraging
men’s involvement in domestic care work (SDG target 5.4), or for state responsi-
bilities to use social policy to mitigate the costs borne by women for childbearing
and -rearing (such as displacement from career ladders and discontinued pension
contributions, SDG target 1.3). In both of these areas, feminist activism seems to
have hit a wall: states cannot agree on their responsibility to change social norms
and are therefore asked only to make efforts “as nationally appropriate.”7 In the
area of reproductive rights, 这 2015 SDGs were forced to retreat to decades-old
language that had been agreed on at the Cairo conference on population and de-
发展 (SDG target 5.6).8

T he cascade of global gender equality norms generated some cautious tri-

umph among feminist observers in the period between 1995 and the end
of the post–Cold War honeymoon around 2008. Feminist organizations
working with a growing number of feminist policy-makers (femocrats) inside

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesTransnational Feminists & the Illiberal Backlash

states and multilateral institutions were forming increasingly effective “trans-
national advocacy networks” or “velvet triangles” of insider-outsider policy
change champions.9 Writing in 2006, political scientist Aili Mari Tripp noted, “在
the past two decades we have witnessed the evolution of an international consen-
sus around particular norms regarding women’s rights” that has made a range of
international institutions “intent on changing women’s status and removing key
impediments to women’s advancement in almost every arena.”10 Reflecting on
the creation of UN Women in 2010, which merged four marginal UN entities and
elevated its new executive director to the same rank as leaders of other UN agen-
化学系, international relations and gender scholars Gulay Çağlar, Elisabeth Prugl,
and Susanne Zwingel wrote: “Together, the UN and feminist activists have formed
a unique apparatus of international governance that has made possible remark-
able changes in gender regimes.”11

This gender mainstreaming apparatus (of which UN Women is one expres-
锡安) is not without its critics. Legal scholar Janet Halley has derided it as estab-
lishment-based “governance feminism.”12 Her critique implies that not only does
institutionalized feminism legitimate some of the global systems that create op-
压力 (neoliberal growth strategies, militarization), but it risks reproducing
some patriarchal gender and cultural essentialisms. Legal scholar Ratna Kapur
has argued that this happens through the constant effort to make feminist objec-
tives intelligible to policy-makers either by instrumentalizing women as useful to
every policy objective, from poverty reduction to counterterrorism, or by focus-
ing on women as victims, in what she labels “subordination feminism.”13 Accord-
ing to Halley: “Merging into the mainstream can efface the feminist fingerprints
on important governance projects and preclude intrafeminist arguments about
他们. . . . It can respond to more general discursive or strategic demands making
victimization and identity the prerequisites for legal intelligibility.”14 This means
femocrats in international governance are either essentializing dupes or are cor-
rupted by the “seductions of power,” drawn in particular to narrowing the focus
of the gender equality project to those born anatomically female, and to what Hal-
ley has called the “siren call of victimization”: focusing on how women are ob-
jects of male venality. Some argue this depoliticizes the feminist project by con-
verting public policy into a rescue mission for abused women that constructs a
simplistic dichotomy between “progressive” Western liberal values and “barbar-
ic” cultures in the Global South, and that misperceives or ignores women’s agen-
cy and intentions in practices such as sex work or veiling. This reductive victim
focus is enormously productive for fundraising.15 However, it may contribute to
the sluggish progress on feminist policy objectives to build women’s rights and
participate in competitions for power, such as in the labor market and in politics.
The risks of co-optation and the impetus toward instrumental reduction inher-
ent to most efforts to institutionalize women’s rights have long been obvious to

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149 (1) Winter 2020Anne Marie Goetz

feminist activists who engage with international institutions, some of whom have
maintained a productive insider-outsider tension to keep gender equality policy
from deviating into paternalistic approaches. After the 1995 Beijing conference,
there was a drift in feminist transnational activism away from UN-related activ-
ism and toward independent arenas such as the World Social Forum or regional,
national, and local work.16 In part, this was because of frustration about the side-
lining of the Beijing Platform for Action in international policy-making, 哪个
shifted wholesale to the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) framework just a
few years later. Unlike the Beijing Platform for Action, the MDGs lack a critique of
neoliberal growth strategies and were designed without consultation with trans-
national feminist groups. From a women’s rights perspective, they were seen as
reductive. Girls’ participation in primary school was the only target to measure
the gender equality goal (MDG 3), and the only direct goal for adult women (MDG
5) was focused on maternal mortality. Nationally, competition to perform well on
the simple eight-point MDGs sidelined implementation of the complex and cul-
turally challenging Beijing Platform for Action.

The partial retreat from multilateralism also stemmed from difficulties in
connecting global developments to domestic challenges: as the U.S. 活动家
Charlotte Bunch has pointed out, in the United States during this period, “there
[曾是] a tendency not to see the international arena as adding anything to caus-
es at home,” unlike earlier suffrage movements and peace efforts that saw ad-
vances in other countries as likely to spur the same in the United States.17 The
United States is of course a special case, since its nonratification of the Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW) and the disdain of periodic Republican administrations for multilat-
eralism means that the “boomerang” effect described by Keck and Sikkink, 在
which transnational norms can be used to advance domestic equality agendas,
has not been deployed.18

部分, the retreat from multilateralism also stems from a significant drop in
financing for autonomous feminist mobilization by official bilateral and multi-
lateral aid donors after Beijing. A decade-long monitoring process conducted by
the Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID) shows that after the
Beijing moment, funding for autonomous feminist mobilization shrank dramati-
cally and remains a problem today. 尽管 2019 saw significant new gender equal-
ity commitments by governments and private foundations (such as the Gates
Foundation’s commitment of $1 billion over ten years), so far only 1 percent of these new funds are committed to organizational strengthening of feminist asso- ciations.19 In regular OECD bilateral aid, 关于 4 百分 ($4.5 十亿) has the pro-
motion of gender equality as its principal objective, of which less than 10 百分
supports women’s organizations, with only a fraction of that amount dedicated to
operational costs.20

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesTransnational Feminists & the Illiberal Backlash

T he Beijing high point for transnational feminism was also linked with the

debut of a visceral conservative countermovement, triggered in particular
by feminist theorizing about the distinctions between “sex” and “gender”
(and the implication that gender identity and sexual orientation are social construc-
系统蒸发散), as well as by advances in recognition of women’s sexual and reproductive
autonomy achieved in Cairo in 1994 and the decisive subjection of domestic gender-
based violence to the principles of criminal law and justice in Vienna in 1993.21

While the Holy See initiated the backlash effort to discredit feminist think-
ing in multilateral forums–using its observer status at the UN–what is striking is
the size and diversity of the antifeminist movement this fostered.22 As early as the
Cairo conference on population and development, the Vatican experimented with
unconventional alliances to support this agenda, courting Libya and Iran to ob-
ject to assertions of women’s autonomy in making reproductive decisions.23 The
antifeminist movement has since become a core component of a very broad reac-
tion against liberal norms that spans opposition to issues ranging from the toler-
ance of same-sex relationships, to prohibitions on torture, to affirmative action,
to gun control. This illiberalism, according to analysts of the global right wing,
unites normative and epistemic communities that are in fact usually antagonistic
to each other. They tend to enjoy an advocacy advantage since they defend what
are seen as familiar and accepted traditional social virtues.24 As an interviewee
from AWID noted: “The narrative strength is on the right. Even progressive states
won’t challenge the idea of family values.”25 Hostility to feminism, to feminist or-
ganizations, and to feminist women leaders seems to perform a useful bonding
function between right-wing and authoritarian interests with otherwise next to
nothing in common.

The antigender campaign has targeted the UN since the 1990s–particularly
the Commission on the Status of Women, which initiated all four World Confer-
ences on Women, and the Commission on Population and Development–but the
feminist leaders interviewed for this essay note an intensification of efforts, a di-
versification of conservative alliances, and an increasing impact since 2012. 那
year saw illiberal forces score a significant “spoil” when they prevented the pro-
duction of “agreed conclusions” at the fifty-ninth meeting of the CSW. A small
group of conservative (mainly North African and Middle Eastern) 状态, 三月-
shalled by the Russian delegation to the CSW, blocked consensus because of a re-
fusal to accept the notion of “comprehensive sexuality education,” caricatured as
promoting promiscuity and homosexuality in adolescents.

That same year, feminist activists, according to a member of the European
Women’s Lobby I interviewed, became aware that the Holy See had quietly been
sponsoring pre-CSW retreats in spas in Arizona for members of UN missions con-
sidered to be amenable to their position–smaller African countries in particu-
拉尔. Consistency in language and negotiating strategies is ensured through use of

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149 (1) Winter 2020Anne Marie Goetz

a ninety-page guide to recommended conservative positions on family-related
matters in UN negotiations. This manual, which covers more than eighty topics
from abortion to youth sexuality, is updated annually by the conservative NGO
Family Watch International.26 According to an interviewee from AWID, the Alli-
ance Defending Freedom, identified by the Southern Poverty Law Center as a hate
group because of its anti-LGBT positions, also provides documentation and train-
ing to support conservative positions on international law.27 It was also after this
观点 (在 2012), according to a European Women’s Lobby member from Turkey,
that important countries (Turkey, 埃及) started to eliminate feminist civil soci-
ety participants from their CSW delegations.28

Shortly after the impasse at the CSW in 2012, Ban Ki-moon, then UN secretary-
一般的, asked the General Assembly if it would like to see a Fifth World Confer-
ence in 2015. The rancor of the preceding CSW debates contributed to the convic-
tion of UN Women and feminist activists that a multilateral Fifth World Confer-
ence on women would trigger a catastrophic erosion of women’s rights. The pro-
posal to hold a Fifth World Conference quietly evaporated.

Capture of state power by conservative, often religious fundamentalist groups
has amplified their power enormously. The “illiberal drift”–democratic swings
in favor of right-wing populists–has caught many democracy analysts off-guard,
and its extent is significant, with most of the world’s most populous nations now
under right-wing and sometimes authoritarian government control, and Free-
dom House counting the erosion of civil and political rights for thirteen straight
years.29

The Trump administration in the United States has brought a surprising boost
to antifeminist voices in multilateral forums. Evangelical Christians have been
appointed to some pivotal roles relevant to gender equality in the State Depart-
蒙特, USAID, and Health and Human Services, where they have embarked on dis-
mantling women’s health and rights programs domestically and international-
ly as well, starting with the reinstatement and strengthening–on Trump’s first
day in office–of the global gag rule cutting funding for family planning services.30
While a revival of the global gag rule had been expected, more surprising have
been efforts to eliminate references to reproductive health services of any kind
for women (for instance in an April 2019 Security Council resolution on support
for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence), the promotion of abstinence in-
stead of contraception, and attempts to eliminate the use of the word “gender” in
UN documents.31

Antifeminists collaborate at the UN to oppose the use of feminist language in
official documents, in particular opposing abortion and the free expression of
nonheterosexual and nonbinary versions of sexual orientation and gender identi-
蒂. There has been an increase in pressure to insert terms like “natural” and “fun-
damental” to describe “the family,” and to celebrate women’s roles and respon-

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesTransnational Feminists & the Illiberal Backlash

sibilities as mothers. 自从 2015, a “Group of the Friends of the Family” (GoFF)
has cooperated on this agenda. Depending on who is counting, this is a group of
twenty-five countries (according to the GoFF website) 或者 112 (according to one
anti-abortion website).32 The group is a mix of countries with Muslim-dominant
人口 (埃及, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, 伊朗, 伊拉克), former Soviet countries
(Belarus and the Russian Federation itself ), several prominent African countries
(乌干达, Sudan, Zimbabwe), very populous democracies (尼日利亚, 印度尼西亚,
Bangladesh), and one Catholic-dominant country (Nicaragua). The Holy See is a
consistent if informal presence. These are the countries that successfully coordi-
指定的, in the process mentioned earlier, to obstruct progressive targets on men’s
engagement in unpaid care and on social protection in the SDG framework.33

In response to these well-coordinated multilateral norm-spoiling efforts,
transnational feminists are rebooting their UN advocacy. This has involved shifts
in focus and tactics. Lobbying formerly friendly states–the United States, 胸罩-
目标, the Philippines, even Turkey–is no longer an option in efforts to gain ground
on substantive issues in UN negotiating documents. The “usual suspects”–Aus-
tralia and New Zealand, the Nordic countries, 墨西哥, many of the EU states, 和
the EU bureaucracy itself–continue to be supportive, particularly those practic-
ing “feminist foreign policy.”34 But the credibility of feminist advocacy now re-
lies on emerging (but not very powerful) feminist champions: 利比里亚, Namib-
ia, 佛得角, Tunisia and Lebanon, Uruguay. These advocates are important be-
cause their support contradicts the frequent charge that feminist policy ambitions
are a Western women’s project.

T ransnational feminists are facing extremely effective tactics by well-fund-

ed opponents. These include forum-shopping to set up antifeminist po-
sitions in policy debates underpopulated by feminist activists (discussed
以下), closing down access for civil society in multilateral forums, exploiting
schisms in the feminist movement, parading “defectors” to demoralize oppo-
尼特, and social media attacks. Some of these tactics were deployed to generate
chaos and a near failure to reach agreement in the March 2019 CSW.

The forty-five members of the CSW produce an annual consensus outcome in-
tended to guide policy at the national level. Social protection–pensions, social se-
安全性, cash transfers–was the topic of the 2019 CSW.35 Social conservatives tend
to reject feminist demands on states to promote gender equality, which include ef-
forts to encourage men to do care work (such as through paternity leave) or giv-
ing women survival alternatives to dependence on individual men (social secu-
理性, 养老金). Market fundamentalists have other concerns, mainly about the
costs to taxpayers of universal pensions or universal basic income. They also pre-
fer to minimize state responsibilities to step in when private income support sys-
tems fail. 这 2019 CSW topic, 所以, invited a convergence between religious

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149 (1) Winter 2020Anne Marie Goetz

and market fundamentalisms to reject the gender and class redistributive poten-
tial of social protection.

The original concise negotiating draft of policy conclusions–the six-page
“zero draft”–was subject to so many textual inserts and nonnegotiable “red
lines” in the March 2019 negotiations that it expanded to one hundred pages. 这
textual bloating happens every year, but UN Women insiders said they had nev-
er seen such extended or aggressive edits, and observed a coordinated strategy of
creating chaos to make negotiating agreed text next to impossible in the two-week
time frame.36 Beyond objections to proposals for gender-equal social protection
系统, the United States joined Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Malaysia, and the Rus-
sian Federation to demand removal of fairly standard provisions such as the use
of the word “gender,” a reaffirmation of the Beijing Platform for Action, and refer-
ences to sexual health and reproductive rights, to comprehensive adolescent sexu-
ality education, and to portable social security benefits on migration.

The facilitator of the negotiations, Kenyan Ambassador Koki Muli Grignon,
generated a compromise document at the end of the negotiations that did not jet-
tison previously agreed commitments to sexual and reproductive health services
and to comprehensive sexuality education for adolescents. On the final night of
the CSW (行进 23), Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, members of the Commission, reg-
istered a refusal to join consensus. Their identically worded statements listed the
core elements of women’s rights to which they objected:

具体来说, multiple references to sexual and reproductive health and reproductive
权利. Promotion of sexual rights and related issues that had never garnered consen-
他们的. Refusal to recognize parental rights language. Refusal to recognize the family as
the natural and fundamental group unit of society. Failure to fully reflect the role of the
family in protecting women and girls. Promotion of sexuality education to children,
despite its irrelevance to the theme. Focus on ambiguous terms, such as multiple and
intersecting discrimination. Lack of language on national sovereignty. Lack of balance
on addressing the issues of violence. Overall issues of transparency and failure to give
sufficient time to controversial issues.37

然而, this repudiation of so many aspects of women’s rights was delivered
at the wrong point in the negotiations, not at the point when the chair called for
反对意见, which meant that Saudi Arabia and Bahrain failed to block the agree-
蒙特, and so the agreed conclusions document was adopted. This procedural
“save” meant that previously agreed normative language was preserved for an-
other year, but it was a close call and the mistake will not be repeated. At the meet-
英, the United States’ final statement included rejection of past agreements at
the UN on sexual and reproductive health and rights because of connotations of
abortion.38 When the U.S. representative reminded the assembly that the Unit-
ed States would be a member of the Commission in 2020, it sounded like a threat.

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesTransnational Feminists & the Illiberal Backlash

For transnational feminist activists, the CSW has now become a space in which
women’s rights are vulnerable to reversals. According to an activist in the transna-
tional gay rights organization ARC International, “The outcome of CSW is almost a
joke. It lags far behind other parts of the UN like the Human Rights Council (HRC)
and even the General Assembly, which have stronger language and go much further
than the CSW agreed conclusions.”39 An AWID activist noted the dilemma for fem-
inists: “CSW is important for AWID and other organizations. It is a huge space and
important annual forum for women’s rights groups to come and lobby. But we have
no scope for strategic asks.”40 An activist with OutRight International, a gay rights
组织, 解释了: “We keep our expectations realistic. We don’t try to push
the envelope–there has never been inclusion of language on sexual orientation and
gender identity in the agreed conclusions. We just try to encourage states to remove
rigid gender binary language where we can.”41 The conclusion reached by another
AWID activist shows that conservatives have de facto repurposed the Commission:
“The CSW is probably one of the most regressive spaces at the UN.”42

Outside the closed negotiations, conservative civil society groups were aggres-
sively visible. A large blacked-out bus painted with fetuses pleading for their lives,
funded by the Spain-based extremist group Citizen Go, patrolled the streets. 这
Holy See and conservative NGOs hosted side events with titles like: “Surrogacy:
A Fresh Look at Women’s Bodily Autonomy and the Rights of Children,” “Biolo-
gy Is Not Bigotry,” and “Protecting Femininity and Human Dignity in Women’s
Empowerment.” A number of panels boasted “defectors”–a former editor from
Cosmopolitan magazine regretting connections made years ago between the fem-
inist and sexual revolutions, a lesbian former staff member of a family planning
clinic, and a victim of gender-based violence–all emphatically opposed to recog-
nizing trans women as women. Menacingly, the chief facilitator was subject to a
cyber assault during negotiations, her email account bombarded with hundreds
of antichoice messages. Citizen Go eventually took responsibility for this.

These events demonstrated a capacity for creative adaptation of feminist dis-
课程: 例如, praising the value of women’s care work (but not seeking to
redistribute it to men), or condemning the harm created by overly rigid gender ste-
reotypes (but rejecting individuals who transition genders), or condemning the ex-
ploitation of poor women in surrogacy contracts (but not supporting their capac-
ity to shape such contracts). In several areas, conservative groups have exploited
important schisms between feminists. The Heritage Foundation, 例如, 有
exploited the unease expressed by some feminists about the transgender movement
and has built alliances with activists labeled TERFs (trans-exclusionary radical fem-
inists).43 They have also made inroads with feminists with reservations on abortion
问题, particularly where the pro-choice position has led to sex-selective abor-
的, or to abortion linked to potentially eugenic purposes, such as to eliminate fe-
tuses deemed imperfect. This is a matter of enormous concern to disabled people.

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149 (1) Winter 2020Anne Marie Goetz

T he tumult and the uncomfortable outcome in the 2019 CSW was not unex-

pected, but has spurred urgent discussion on whether and how to exploit
the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Beijing World Con-
ference on Women to renew global solidarities, refresh the membership of glob-
al women’s movements, address deep divisions, and challenge the conservative
backlash. A number of activists suggested that the sense of attacks on all fronts
has forced them into a reactive mode. As a leader of CREA, a South Asian femi-
nist organization, 把它: “Strategic conversations are not happening because we
are responding day to day to attacks. We don’t have the resources or the security
to do the same strategic thinking that the opposition is doing. We are being frac-
图尔德. . . . They can see we are a divided house.”44 Transnational feminist organi-
zations have been investing in strategic pushback. These efforts, discussed in turn
以下, include exploiting the full range of transnational spaces, inserting feminist
conversations into new human rights discussions, critical engagement with UN
Women to support resolution of differences between feminists, and monitoring
the membership and financing of conservative groups.

T ransnational feminists have successfully demanded space for gender equal-

ity issues in multilateral institutions that lack a gender mandate. An impor-
tant example is the pursuit of the Women Peace and Security agenda since
2000 in the UN Security Council. 45 Successful feminist interventions have also been
made at the International Criminal Court and the UN’s International Law Commis-
锡安. Feminist advocacy, 例如, influenced the new June 2019 draft Conven-
tion on Crimes against Humanity, which uses an updated definition of gender that
prohibits persecution on the basis of gender identity or sexual orientation, and iden-
tifies prohibitions on abortion as violating women’s rights to life, 健康, and free-
dom from torture.46 Like conservatives, feminists are exploiting every possible part
of transnational space to make advances when they are blocked elsewhere.

The Human Rights Council, 建立在 2005, has become a vital focus. 它
has more meaningful structured access for civil society groups than any other
part of the UN, with formal procedures for receiving civil society position papers.
It meets in at least three annual regular sessions, providing frequent opportuni-
ties for activists to counter conservative mobilization on a wide range of topics,
most notably the continuous efforts by Russia and allies to generate resolutions to
protect traditional families. Its “universal periodic review” mechanism has since
2006 provided a new opportunity for critical civil society commentary on nation-
al deficits in women’s rights. 最后, because the HRC takes decisions on the basis
of votes and not consensus, it has been able to support the creation of special man-
date positions even against conservative opposition, 例如, 在 2016, appointing
an independent expert on protection against violence and discrimination based
on sexual orientation and gender identity.

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesTransnational Feminists & the Illiberal Backlash

The twenty-three-member CEDAW committee has always been a focus for civ-
il society activism, and the multiplication of general recommendations that ex-
pand the remit of the original treaty have provided useful entry points for address-
ing significant differences between feminists. A general recommendation on traf-
ficking under negotiation in June 2019, 例如, provided for agreement about
the need to defend the human rights of sex workers, in spite of differences be-
tween abolitionists who seek to outlaw sex work and those who seek legal protec-
tions for sex work. According to interviewees, the Sex-Worker Inclusive Feminist
Alliance has found a more receptive environment in the CEDAW committee and
the HRC than in the CSW. On the issue of sex workers’ rights, an activist with the
Asia-Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development cautioned: “There is a risk
that we can intersect with the ultra-right when our thinking stresses protection,
victimhood, and minimizes women’s agency.”47 Awareness of this risk is growing
among abolitionists. A member of the European Women’s Lobby, which supports
the Swedish model (criminalization of sex workers’ clients), 著名的: “We are not
going to get anywhere if we cannot find a compromise [with sex workers’ rights
团体]. I wish they would drop the word ‘work.’ We cannot budge on our posi-
的, but we all know this is not working.”48

Feminist successes in all of these forums have been supported by formal access
opportunities for civil society input and the use of technical discourses (particu-
larly legal argumentation) to support goals. Feminist advocacy has also benefited
from the fact that these forums permit lobbying with a subset of member states
(such as the limited membership of the HRC and, 尤其, the Security Coun-
cil), which allows for fostering alliances among them, as well as shaming and iso-
lating resistors.

Both conservative groups and transnational feminists are adept at forum-

shopping to seize advantage, and transnational feminists have learned to
leave no vacuums in their monitoring of rights developments. A valuable
source of intelligence on the “globalization of anti-gender campaigns” is analy-
sis of funding patterns flowing from conservative Christian and Muslim interests
and individuals to support misogynist projects.49 The online liberal journal Open
Democracy has tracked the “dark money” flowing from individuals and organiza-
tions in the United States to support the campaigns of populists in Europe and to
support European initiatives to defend the traditional family.50 A number of the
transnational feminist organizations interviewed for this essay have joined forc-
es to track the backlash, contrasting the mounting funding for conservative anti-
abortion and pro-family groups with the cuts to funding for women’s rights–
based providers of family planning. AWID in particular has updated its important
ten-year study of funding for women’s organizations–“Where is the Money for
Women’s Rights?”–to collaborate with Open Democracy and the global abortion

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149 (1) Winter 2020Anne Marie Goetz

rights advocate Ipas to improve forensic accounting techniques to track funding
of antifeminist initiatives.51

Two new arenas in which feminists have engaged to combat conservative ac-
tivists are disability rights and indigenous rights. Both pose important challeng-
es for feminists. Feminists have faced troubling implications of their positions on
abortion rights when abortion has been used sex-selectively, or for aborting dis-
abled fetuses. CREA has engaged closely with the annual Conference of States Par-
ties to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. A CREA activist
笔记: “Prenatal testing, technologies that enable us to see the fetus as so present
and real . . . the right have used these to attack us. . . . The bulk of the disability move-
ment is antichoice.” Unlike the right, 然而, CREA has engaged with disabled
women on the question of their sexual and reproductive health and rights, 和
in October 2018 produced, in partnership with the International Campaign for
Women’s Right to Safe Abortion, the “Nairobi Principles” recognizing the agen-
cy of disabled women in making sexual and reproductive choices.52

Indigenous women’s rights are another area of conservative mobilization. 这
raises challenges for feminists because the emphasis on the rights of collectivities
over individuals undercuts a powerful feminist tactic of insisting on women’s equal
rights as individuals. Collective rights framings have been used by conservative
groups at the HRC to defend culture and traditional values in ways that can subor-
dinate women’s rights to the traditional family. 作为回应, connections between
transnational feminists and indigenous rights leaders have formed around global
campaigns to protect women human rights defenders, 包括那些, like indige-
nous activists, protesting the environmental damage caused by extractive industries.
Engagement on these issues is difficult but strategic because it denies conser-
vatives opportunities to gain ground on issues that are off many feminists’ radar.
Reflecting on her experience at the UN’s annual meeting on disability, the CREA
activist observed: “We were one of the only feminist organizations there. 那里
had been zero conversation up to then about disabled women’s sexuality. It was a
highly male-dominated space. That is solidarity-building. That is alliance-build-
ing in the face of the right-wing co-optation of the disability movement.”53

One of the biggest constraints on this type of strategic engagement on new
issues is a lack of funding for feminist organizations to address and even medi-
ate their differences. All the Global South–based transnational advocates I in-
terviewed mentioned the significance of specific funding initiatives such as the
Netherlands’ €77 million MDG 3 fund launched in 2008, at the time the largest sin-
gle fund available to support strategic planning and networking between feminist
组织. Subsequent initiatives such as the 2016–2020 Dialogue and Dis-
sent funding window and the related “Count Me In!” series of coalition-building
strategic encounters are intended to enable feminists to address their differences
on the issues used by conservatives to divide them.

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesTransnational Feminists & the Illiberal Backlash

UN Women is well-positioned as a transnational institutional mechanism

to advance women’s rights. Feminist civil society groups had advocated
for its creation for years, such as through the Gender Equality Architec-
ture Reform (GEAR) campaign, and upon their success, an advisory group com-
posed mainly of GEAR members was formed to support UN Women’s work. 这
不是, 然而, an independent observatory or monitoring group, nor is it a gov-
erning body. Like all UN entities, UN Women is accountable to an executive board
made up of member states: 的确, it has one of the largest executive boards of
any UN agency, with forty-one members, currently including Saudi Arabia. 乙酰胆碱-
cording to a member of AWID, “UN Women is very compromised. Antirights
groups are laser-focused, unrelenting, and their approach includes pushing states
to threaten, constrain or defund UN Women–above all, the states on UN Wom-
en’s executive board.”54

Civil society observers are concerned about UN Women’s caution on some
of the hot-button issues within feminism, a caution partly explained by the con-
straints of its executive board and the interests of its funders. The dilemmas are
clear on the issue of sex work. UN Women, 例如, has officially followed the
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, 世界卫生组织, 和
International Labour Organization position that all consensual adult sex must be
decriminalized as a means of combatting the marginalization of sex workers. 但
it suddenly declared itself neutral on the matter on receipt of a petition signed by
1,400 sex work abolitionists in mid-November 2019.55 The fact that Sweden pro-
vides significant financial and diplomatic support for UN Women, and that Swe-
den is also promoting an abolition of sex work through the criminalization of
clients of sex, 可能, critics worry, compromise the organization. While feminist
groups are divided on the issue, a global survey of activists conducted in 2016, 经过
the then head of policy at UN Women, Purna Sen, showed that a majority of re-
spondents supported the full decriminalization of sex work.56

A quarter-century has passed since the transformative Fourth World Con-

ference on Women in Beijing. UN Women announced in March 2019 它是
intention to convene a global meeting on women’s rights in 2020, but said
that this would center on women’s rights organizations, not states. This intention
is animated by the conviction that the only sustained driver of progress on wom-
en’s rights historically has been women’s autonomous organizing. UN Wom-
en’s intention is to provide feminist activists with a global platform. Mexico and
France will, with UN Women, cohost what they have labeled “Generation Equal-
ity” forums (in May and July 2020, 分别), but these will not be multilater-
al negotiations to build on the 1995 Platform for Action. Consensus holds that this
remains too precarious a moment for normative debate. What then could a glob-
al convening add that transnational feminists are not already accomplishing? 这

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149 (1) Winter 2020Anne Marie Goetz

六月 2019 Women Deliver conference in Vancouver attracted some nine thousand
attendees and spurred the commitment of $650 million CAD by the Canadian gov-
ernment and private donors to support gender equality. 十月 2020, AWID
will hold one of its huge triennial global meetings. Massive global feminist gather-
ings take place without multilateral engagement, raising questions about the value-
added of the “Generation Equality” events.

UN Women, 法国, and Mexico propose to use this global process to identify
serious remaining gaps in the achievement of women’s rights and to form “action
coalitions” with funding and five-year programs to close these gaps. These coa-
litions will build on the comparative advantage of specific private-sector actors,
civil society organizations, state and multilateral institutions, and even private in-
dividuals such as celebrities to mobilize funds to address stubborn gap areas such
as the gendered digital divide, or climate action, or the impact of corruption and
tax evasion on resources for gender equality.

Behind these proposals is an acknowledgment of the extent of polarization
globally on women’s rights. UN Women clearly feels it cannot rely on a liberal
consensus between nations to advance state responsibilities to promote gender
平等. The call for engagement of the private sector and even prominent in-
dividuals implies a shift in the understanding of the mechanics of policy change
and in the power and cultural roles of state authorities. Global corporations and
wealthy individuals command more resources than some states. Celebrities can
recommend actions to fan bases that are bigger than some countries’ populations.
The “action coalition” proposal is an alternative to the paralysis in multilateral
negotiations, but it has generated unease. According to an activist from Just Asso-
ciates, which supports women human rights defenders: “There is pressure to work
with companies, private foundations. These are nontransparent, nonaccountable
actors with objectives very different from ours. If we find member states to be fick-
le partners, what can we expect from private actors?” However, she acknowledged
that building alliances with unconventional partners is essential: “We’ve been cut
off at the knees because we have been preaching to the choir. . . . We need to forge
new relationships with actors that can push strategic issues.”57

In the face of a ferocious backlash and the rapid reinstatement and accep-
tance of patriarchal norms in some states and communities, transnational fem-
inists are confronting the issues that divide them more openly than ever before.
Whether a global convening in 2020 can hold back this reactionary tide depends
on the extent to which transnational feminists engage with it and the extent to
which systems are developed to ensure that “action coalitions” are held account-
able for meeting gender equality goals. As a representative of FEMNET (the Afri-
can Women’s Development and Communication Network) 争论: “Celebrat-
ing gains when space has shrunk for autonomous organizing is perverse and prob-
莱马蒂克. We cannot have bureaucratic elites in the UN or member states decide on

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesTransnational Feminists & the Illiberal Backlash

priorities. . . . We know the trends, we know what to fight for, what is strategic.
When so many other forces are limiting us, we cannot be limited by UN Women.”58

methodological note

This essay is based on twenty-one interviews I conducted in March–April 2019
with activists from transnational feminist organizations. Most are members of
even larger caucuses with a degree of institutional access to the deliberations of
multilateral institutions, such as the Women’s Major Group, first created at the Rio
Earth Summit of 1992 and currently monitoring implementation of the Sustainable
Development Goals (2012–2015); the Women’s Rights Caucus, a global coalition
of over 250 organizations with shared positions on the debates of the UN Commis-
sion on the Status of Women and the Human Rights Council; and the EU-focused
European Women’s Lobby, comprising seventeen European women’s rights coali-
tions.59 This was a purposive but not comprehensive selection, based on the avail-
ability of interviewees who were attending the March 2019 meeting of the UN Com-
mission on the Status of Women in New York. The interviews were conducted on
a nonattribution basis.

Interviewees were from the following organizations: Amnesty International; ARC
国际的; Asian Network of Women’s Shelters; Asia Pacific Forum on Women,
Law and Development; Association for Women’s Rights in Development; CREA;
CSW NGO Forum; Development Alternatives for Women in a New Era; Diverse
Voices and Action for Gender Equality; European Women’s Lobby; FEMNET; Just
Associates; International Women’s Health Coalition; Mesoamerican Initiative of
Human Rights Defenders; and OutRight Action International.

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关于作者

Anne Marie Goetz is Clinical Professor at the Center for Global Affairs at New
约克大学. She has also served as a Policy Director of Governance, Peace and
Security for UN Women and UN Development Fund for Women. She is the author
of Who Answers to Women? Gender and Accountability (2008), Reinventing Accountabil-
性: Making Democracy Work for Human Development (with Rob Jenkins, 2004), 和
Women Development Workers: Implementing Rural Credit Programs in Bangladesh (2001).

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尾注

1 Myra Marx Ferree, “Globalization and Feminism: Opportunities and Obstacles for Ac-
tivism in the Global Arena,” in Global Feminism: Transnational Women’s Activism, Orga-
nizing, and Human Rights, 编辑. Myra Marx Ferree and Aili Mari Tripp (纽约: 新的
约克大学出版社, 2006), 5.

175

149 (1) Winter 2020Anne Marie Goetz

2 The tenth resolution was presented by South Africa on October 29, 2019, resolution 2493,
aiming to strengthen the implementation of previous women, peace, and security
resolutions.

3 Interview with author, 纽约, 行进 22, 2019.

4 Aili Mari Tripp, “Challenges in Transnational Feminist Mobilization,” in Global Femi-

nism, 编辑. Ferree and Tripp, 296.

5 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,“ 国际的
事务 94 (2) (2018); Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Ad-
vocacy Networks in International Politics (伊萨卡岛, 纽约: 康奈尔大学出版社, 1998);
and Gulay Çağlar, “Constructivist Thought in Feminist IPE: Tracking Gender Norms,”
in Handbook on the International Political Economy of Gender, 编辑. Juanita Elias and Adri-
enne Roberts (Northampton, 大量的。: 爱德华·埃尔加, 2018).

6 世界经济论坛, The Global Gender Gap Report 2018 (日内瓦: World Economic

Forum, 2018), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf.

7 United Nations Development Programme, Sustainable Development Knowledge Plat-
形式, “Sustainable Development Goals 2019,” https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org
/sdgs.

8 Shahra Razavi, “这 2030 议程: Challenges of Implementation to Attain Gender Equal-

ity and Women’s Rights,” Gender and Development 24 (1) (2016): 24–41.

9 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders; Debra J. Liebowitz, “Gendering (反式)
National Advocacy,” International Feminist Journal of Politics 4 (2) (2002): 173–196; 和
Alison E. 伍德沃德, “Building Velvet Triangles: Gender and Informal Governance,”
in Informal Governance in the European Union, 编辑. Thomas Christiansen and Simona Piat-
toni (Northampton, 大量的。: 爱德华·埃尔加, 2003).

10 Aili Mari Tripp, “The Evolution of Transnational Feminisms: Consensus, Conflict, 和

New Dynamics,” in Global Feminism, 编辑. Ferree and Tripp, 51.

11 Gulay Çağlar, Elisabeth Prugl, and Susanne Zwingel, “Introducing Feminist Strategies in
International Governance,” in Feminist Strategies in International Governance, 编辑. Gulay
Çağlar, Elisabeth Prugl, and Susanne Zwingel (纽约: 劳特利奇, 2013), 2.

12 Janet Halley, “Preface,” in Governance Feminism: 一个介绍, 编辑. Janet Halley, Prabha
Kotiswaran, Rachel Rebouché, and Hila Shamir (明尼阿波利斯: University of Minneso-
ta Press, 2018).

13 Ratna Kapur, Erotic Justice: Law and the New Politics of Post-Colonialism (伦敦: Glass-

house Press, 2005), 106.

14 Halley, “Preface.”
15 Kate Cronin-Furman, Nimmi Gowrinathan, and Rafia Zakaria, Emissaries of Empower-
蒙特 (纽约: Colin Powell School for Civic and Global Leadership, City College
of New York, 2017), http://www.deviarchy.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/
EMISSSARIES-OF-EMPOWERMENT-2017.pdf.

16 Ara Wilson, “Feminism in the Space of the World Social Forum,” Journal of International

Women’s Studies 8 (3) (2007): 10–27.

17 Charlotte Bunch, “Whose Security?” The Nation, 九月 23, 2002.
18 同上; and Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders.

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesTransnational Feminists & the Illiberal Backlash

19 Lydia Alpízar Durán, “20 Years of Shamefully Scarce Funding for Feminist and Women’s
Rights Organizations,” AWID, 可能 14, 2015, https://www.awid.org/news-and-analysis
/20-years-shamefully-scarce-funding-feminists-and-womens-rights-movements.
20 Calculations of the amount of bilateral aid allocated to support the activities and operat-
ing costs of women’s organizations are complicated by the lack of consistent and ob-
jective ways of measuring aid agencies’ “gender spend.” The figure quoted here comes
from OECD.Stat, “Aid Projects Targeting Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment,
2017,” https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=DV_DCD_GENDER. 然而, A
2016 report suggests that only 0.5 percent of the funds targeting gender equality go to
women’s organizations. See OECD DAC Network on Gender Equality (GENDERNET),
Donor Support to Southern Women’s Rights Organizations (巴黎: Organisation for Econom-
ic Co-operation and Development, 2016), http://oecd.org/dac/gender-development/
OECD-report-on-womens-rights-organisations.pdf.

21 Sally Baden and Anne Marie Goetz, “Who Needs [性别] When You Can Have [性别]?

Conflicting Discourses on Gender at Beijing,” Feminist Review (56) (1997): 3–25.

22 Mary Anne Case, “The Role of the Popes in the Invention of Complementarity and the
Anathematization of Gender,” Religion and Gender 6 (2) (2016): 155–172, https://doi.org
/10.18352/rg.10124.

23 Rebecca Sanders, “Norm Spoiling: Undermining the International Women’s Rights Agen-
和,” International Affairs 94 (2) (2018): 271–291, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy023.

24 Clifford Bob, The Global Right Wing and the Clash of World Politics (剑桥: 剑桥

大学出版社, 2012).

25 Interview with author, 纽约, 四月 1, 2019.
26 Family Watch International, “Resource Guide to UN Consensus Language on the Family,”
http://familywatch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2017/05/Resource_Guide_2013.pdf.
27 Southern Poverty Law Center, “Roundup of Anti-LGBT Events and Activities 11/6/2018,”
Hatewatch, 十一月 6, 2018, https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2018/11/06/
roundup-anti-lgbt-events-and-activities-1162018.
28 Interview with author, 纽约, 行进 17, 2019.
29 巴里·R. 波森, “The Rise of Illiberal Hegemony,“ 外交事务 (March/April 2018),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-02-13/rise-illiberal-hegemony; and Free-
dom House, Freedom in the World 2018: Democracy in Crisis (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: Freedom
房子, 2018), https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_FITW_Report_2018_
Final_SinglePage.pdf.

30 Kelli Rogers, NGOs Scramble to Safeguard Programs in Wake of Trump’s Expanded
“Global Gag Rule,” Devex, 一月 25, 2017, https://www.devex.com/news/sponsored
/ngos-scramble-to-safeguard-programs-in-wake-of-trump-s-expanded-global-gag
-rule-89515.

31 Dulcie Leimbach, “At the UN, 美国. Darkens Women’s Right to Abortion,” Pass-
Blue, 四月 23, 2019, https://www.passblue.com/2019/04/23/at-the-un-the-us-darkens
-womens-right-to-abortion/.

32 Uniting Nations for a Family-Friendly World, “It Takes a Family,“ 可能 2019, https://
unitingnationsforthefamily.org/ (accessed June 5, 2019); and John Smeaton, “112
Nations Form ‘Friends of the Family’ Coalition to Fight Back against Pro-Abortion,

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149 (1) Winter 2020Anne Marie Goetz

Pro-Gay Push,” LifeSite, 行进 20, 2014, https://www.lifesitenews.com/blogs/112
-nations-at-un-form-friends-of-the-family-coalition-to-fight-back-on-pro.

33 看, 例如, the statement from Egypt in United Nations General Assembly, “Re-
port of the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals, Addendum: Ex-
planations of position and reservations on the report,” October 27, 2014, A/68/970/
Add.1, 6.

34 Alice Ridge, Caroline Lambert, Joanne Crawford, Rachel Clement, Lyric Thompson,
Sarah Gammage, and Anne Marie Goetz, Feminist Foreign Policy: Key Principles and Ac-
countability Mechanisms, A Discussion Summary (纽约: International Center for Re-
search on Women, International Women’s Development Agency, Center for Global
事务, 2019).

35 UN Women, Families in a Changing World (纽约: UN Women, 2019), http://万维网

.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/progress-of-the-worlds-women.

36 Interviews with author, 纽约, 行进 5, 2019.
37 Transcribed from UN WebTV, 14th Meeting of the 63rd Session of the Commission on the
Status of Women (CSW63 2019), http://webtv.un.org/watch/14th-plenary-meeting
-commission-on-the-status-of-women-csw63-2019-action-on-draft-proposals-action
-on-draft-agreed-conclusions-action-on-any-other-outstanding-issues/6017175833001.

38 同上.
39 Phone interview with author, 行进 26, 2019.
40 Interview with author, 纽约, 四月 1, 2019.
41 Interview with author, 纽约, 行进 5, 2019.
42 Interview with author, 纽约, 行进 21, 2019.
43 Emily Zanotti, “Self-Described ‘Radical Feminist’: Transgender Activism is a ‘Men’s
Rights’ Movement,” The Daily Wire, 一月 29, 2019, https://www.dailywire.com/
news/42804/self-described-radical-feminist-transgender-emily-zanotti.

44 Interview with author, 纽约, 行进 20, 2019.
45 Anne Marie Goetz and Rob Jenkins, “Agency and Accountability: Facilitating Women’s

Participation in Peacebuilding,” in Feminist Economics 22 (1) (2016).

46 Lisa Davis, “This is How We Won a Historic Victory for Women’s and LGBTIQ Rights
in International Law,” OpenDemocracy, 六月 26, 2019, https://www.opendemocracy
.net/en/5050/this-is-how-we-won-a-historic-victory-for-womens-and-lgbtiq-rights-in
-international-law/.

47 Interview with author, 纽约, 行进 8, 2019.
48 Interview with author, 纽约, 行进 15, 2019.
49 Sonia Correa, David Paternotte, and Roman Kuhar, “The Globalization of Anti-Gender
Campaigns,” International Politics and Society, 可能 21, 2018, https://www.ips-journal.eu/
topics/human-rights/article/show/the-globalisation-of-anti-gender-campaigns-2761/.
50 Claire Provost, editor of the 50.50 page for OpenDemocracy, has been tracking financial
contributions from Christian fundamentalists to nationalist populists in Europe since
2018; see “Claire Provost,” OpenDemocracy, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/
author/claire-provost/ (七月访问 8, 2019).

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesTransnational Feminists & the Illiberal Backlash

51 See Kamardip Singh, Sarah Rosenhek, and Angelika Arutyunova, “Democratizing
Knowledge on Funding Trends,” AWID, 四月 20, 2016, https://www.awid.org/news
-and-analysis/democratizing-knowledge-funding-trends; and Ipas, https://www.ipas
.组织/.

52 International Campaign for Women’s Right to Safe Abortion, “Abortion, Prenatal
Testing and Disability–The Nairobi Principles,” March 26, 2019, http://www.safe
abortionwomensright.org/abortion-prenatal-testing-disability-the-nairobi-principles/.

53 Interview with author, 纽约, 行进 20, 2019.
54 Interview with author, 纽约, 四月 1, 2019.
55 Barbara Crossette, “UN Women Declares Its Neutrality in the Sex Trade Debate,”
PassBlue, 十一月 11, 2019, https://www.passblue.com/2019/11/11/un-women
-declares-its-neutrality-in-the-sex-trade-debate/.

56 CREA, All India Network of Sex Workers, Centre for Advocacy and Research, 等人。, “Rec-
ommendation on UN Women’s Approach to Sex Work, Sex Trade, and Prostitution,”
十月 17, 2016, https://www.creaworld.org/sites/default/files/UN%20Women%20
Submission%20on%20Sex%20Work-16-10-16.pdf.
57 Interview with author, 纽约, 行进 22, 2019.
58 Interview with author, 纽约, 行进 22, 2019.
59 The Women’s Major Group is one of nine “major groups” formed of stakeholder “sec-
tors” recognized by the UN as having relevant group-based perspectives on UN treaties;
others include indigenous groups, NGOs, trade unions, 商业, children and youth,
等等. 见联合国, “Major Groups and Other Stakeholders,” Sustainable
Development Goals Knowledge Platform, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/
majorgroups/about (六月访问 13, 2019). See also AWID, “Women’s Rights Caucus:
Conclusion of CSW61,” March 27, 2017, https://www.awid.org/news-and-analysis/
womens-rights-caucus-conclusion-csw61; and European Women’s Lobby, “Herstory:
25 Years of European Women’s Lobby,” https://womenlobby.org/25-years-of-European
-Women-s-Lobby?lang=en (六月访问 2 , 2019).

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