The Bipartisan Origins of - 麻省理工学院人工智能研究专业

The Bipartisan Origins of
White Nationalism

Douglas S. 梅西

Dysfunctional immigration and border policies implemented in recent decades have
accelerated growth of the Latino population and racialized its members around the
trope of illegality. Since the 1960s, Republicans have cultivated White fears and re-
sentments toward African Americans, and over time these efforts broadened to tar-
get Hispanics as well. Until 2016, this cultivation relied on a dog whistle politics of
racially coded symbolic language, but with the election of Donald Trump as presi-
凹痕, White nationalist sentiments became explicit and White nationalism emerged
as an ideological pillar of the Republican Party. This volume confirms this political
转型, describing its features and documenting its consequences. 在这个
散文, I describe the unwise U.S. immigration and border policies that were steadily
promulgated and expanded over the decades by Democrats as well as Republicans,
inevitably leading to the current racist and nativist moment. I close by offering a
way forward by granting legal status to those who currently lack it, while simulta-
neously dismantling the nation’s formidable machinery of immigration and border
enforcement.

在 2016, Donald Trump was elected president of the United States on a wave

of White nationalist sentiment that he deliberately fomented and would
relentlessly cultivate during his time in office. As the essays in this issue of
Dædalus make clear, America’s current racist and xenophobic moment was a long
time coming. It did not begin with Trump. It followed decades in which one of
the nation’s two major political parties deliberately incited White racial fears
and resentments for purposes of political gain. Beginning with Richard Nixon’s
“Southern strategy” in 1968 and continuing through Ronald Reagan’s evocation
of the “welfare queen” stereotype in 1980, George H. 瓦. Bush’s airing of the Wil-
lie Horton ad in 1988, and George W. Bush’s 2001 appointment of a neo-Confed-
erate as Attorney General, Republicans developed and deployed a “dog whistle”
politics of symbolic appeals to racial fears and biases.1 Trump simply threw away
the whistle.

Although Republican fearmongering and race-baiting initially focused on Af-
rican Americans, over time it broadened to include the nation’s growing Hispanic

我

D
哦
w
n
哦
A
d
e
d

F
r
哦
米
H

t
t

:
/
/

d
我
r
e
C
t
.

米

我
t
.

e
d
你
d
A
e
d
A
r
t
我
C
e
–
p
d

我

F
/

1
5
0
2
5
2
0
6
0
4
2
9
d
A
e
d
_
A
_
0
1
8
4
3
p
d

乙
y
G
你
e
s
t

哦
n
0
8
S
e
p
e
米
乙
e
r
2
0
2
3

人口. In the process, the Mexican-U.S. border was militarized and trans-
formed into a potent symbol of ethnoracial exclusion.2 The framing of the border
as a line of defense against alien invaders dates to 1976, when the commissioner of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (a former Marine Corps general and
Nixon appointee) published an article in Reader’s Digest alleging that a “silent in-
vasion of illegal aliens” was threatening the nation and that a budget increase for
his agency was “desperately needed to help us bring the illegal alien threat under
control.”3 With the election of Jimmy Carter later that year, 然而, Chapman’s
plea remained unfulfilled until 1986, when Ronald Reagan signed the Immigration
Reform and Control Act.

The great irony is that the resulting militarization of the border did not curtail
the unauthorized entry of Mexicans. Instead it ended circular migration, 减少
the rate of return migration back to Mexico while leaving in-migration unaffect-
编辑, thereby increasing the net volume of unauthorized migration and accelerating
rather than reducing undocumented population growth to hasten the “brown-
ing” of the nation so feared by nativists.4 From 1988 到 2008, the estimated size
of the undocumented population rose from two million to twelve million persons
and the nation’s Hispanic population rose from 13.1 百分比到 15.4 的百分比
全部的. The Hispanic share today stands at 18.3 百分, 和 34.4 percent being for-
eign born and 36.5 percent of those born abroad being undocumented.5

The net inflow of undocumented migrants was greatest during the 1990s. 它
began to slow after 2000 and came to an abrupt halt with the onset of the Great
Recession in late 2007.6 Although the recession may have been the proximate
cause of the sudden end of undocumented migration from Mexico, the under-
lying cause was a sharp decline in Mexican fertility after 1970, which brought
about the rapid aging of the Mexican population. Labor migration is highly age
dependent. Rates of departure rise in the late teens, peak around age twenty-two
or twenty-three, and then decline rapidly to low levels by age thirty and above.
之间 1975 和 2020, the median age in Mexico rose from seventeen to twenty-
nine and the rate of undocumented out-migration consequently fell to record low
levels.7 While 1.6 million Mexicans were apprehended along the border in 2000,
经过 2017, the number had fallen to just 128,000, despite the fact that the number of
Border Patrol agents trying to catch them had risen from 9,000 到 19,000.8

Since the Great Recession, undocumented migration from Mexico has been
net negative, and the estimated number of undocumented Mexicans living in
the United States declined by 23 之间的百分比 2010 和 2018.9 的确, 什么时候
Trump declared his candidacy in 2016 and promised to build his two-thousand-
mile border wall, undocumented Mexican migration had been effectively over
for nearly a decade. With few Mexicans arriving at the border, once in office, 他
focused his fearmongering on Central Americans. Although migrants had been
exiting El Salvador, 危地马拉, and Honduras since the U.S. interventions of

我

D
哦
w
n
哦
A
d
e
d

F
r
哦
米
H

t
t

:
/
/

d
我
r
e
C
t
.

米

我
t
.

e
d
你
d
A
e
d
A
r
t
我
C
e
–
p
d

我

F
/

1
5
0
2
5
2
0
6
0
4
2
9
d
A
e
d
_
A
_
0
1
8
4
3
p
d

乙
y
G
你
e
s
t

哦
n
0
8
S
e
p
e
米
乙
e
r
2
0
2
3

代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesThe Bipartisan Origins of White Nationalism

20世纪80年代, their modest numbers historically were obscured by the much larger
number of Mexicans arriving at the border. 经过 2019, 然而, the Mexicans were
largely gone and Central Americans accounted for 71 percent of all those appre-
hended at the border.10

Despite the continued arrival of migrants from Central America, unauthorized
border crossings are no longer the principal source of undocumented population
生长. Whereas the undocumented Central American population did grow by
大约 19 之间的百分比 2010 和 2018, the corresponding rate was 22 百分
for undocumented Chinese, 69 percent for undocumented Indians, 和 164 每-
cent for undocumented Venezuelans. Migrants from these countries enter the
United States by overstaying visas rather than surreptitiously crossing the border.
一起, their arrival, along with Central Americans, partially offset the loss of
Mexicans from the undocumented population; but the total number of unautho-
rized U.S. residents nonetheless fell by 10 之间的百分比 2010 和 2018.11

Although undocumented migration from Central America continues and le-
gal immigration from Latin America has by no means ended, Hispanic population
growth is now driven primarily by an excess of births over deaths rather than net
in-migration. The total fertility rate for Hispanic Americans today is 2.01 (孩子们
per woman) compared with 1.67 for White Americans and 1.82 for Black Ameri-
cans.12 Even though all three rates are below replacement level fertility (大致
2.1), Hispanics are nonetheless increasing their share of the population because
they are a much younger population with a larger share of women of childbearing
年龄, thus amplifying the effect of the small fertility differential.

W hereas Hispanics constituted just 4.7 占美国的百分比. 人口

在 1970, 经过 2019, their share had reached 18.3 百分, 和 12.7 每-
cent for Blacks and 5.7 percent for Asians. The share of non-Hispanic
Whites, 同时, had fallen to around 60 percent.13 The rising share of Hispan-
ics in the electorate helped to provide Barack Obama with winning margins in two
选举, 和 67 percent voting for him in 2008 和 71 百分比在 2012.14 Togeth-
是, the rapid growth of the Hispanic population and the election of Barack Obama
as president of the United States were critical in sparking the White nationalist
reaction that elected Donald Trump in 2016.15 But as already noted, Trump was
building on a long Republican history of exploiting race as a wedge issue.

In his contribution to this volume, “Immigration & the Origins of White Back-
lash,” Zoltan Hajnal marshals abundant evidence to demonstrate that Trump’s
mobilization of reactionary sentiment in 2016 was simply an extension of a long-
term Republican project of fomenting White racial fears and resentments. He ex-
plains how Republicans steadily increased their share of the White vote by scape-
goating immigrants and promising to curtail undocumented migration. 自从
1990, votes in Congress have increasingly displayed a stark division between Re-

我

D
哦
w
n
哦
A
d
e
d

F
r
哦
米
H

t
t

:
/
/

d
我
r
e
C
t
.

米

我
t
.

e
d
你
d
A
e
d
A
r
t
我
C
e
–
p
d

我

F
/

1
5
0
2
5
2
0
6
0
4
2
9
d
A
e
d
_
A
_
0
1
8
4
3
p
d

乙
y
G
你
e
s
t

哦
n
0
8
S
e
p
e
米
乙
e
r
2
0
2
3

150 (2) Spring 2021Douglas S. 梅西

publicans who favor restrictive laws and punitive measures against immigrants,
and Democrats who favor more open immigration policies and defend immi-
grant rights. Hajnal concludes that “a backlash to immigration is helping drive
this most significant development in American party politics in the twenty-first
century.”

Hajnal’s view is supported by Michael Hout and Christopher Maggio’s analy-
sis in their essay, “Immigration, 种族 & Political Polarization,” of data collected
from White likely voters by the General Social Survey. Whereas, 在 1994, 物质-
tial majorities of Whites in both political parties favored restrictions on immi-
gration, 经过 2018, the share supporting restriction had fallen to 21 percent among
Democrats but remained at 62 percent among Republicans. The partisan division
in White attitudes toward immigrants is paralleled by a similar division in atti-
tudes toward African Americans. Using an index of anti-Black resentment they
发达, Hout and Maggio show that between 1994 和 2018, White resentment
toward Blacks fell sharply among Democrats while it barely budged among Re-
publicans, opening up a huge 46 percent gap between the two parties. 绘画
on data from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey, they show that
Whites who favored restricting immigration and expressed racial resentment to-
ward Blacks were far more likely to vote for Trump than Whites who did not hold
these views.

The foregoing analyses suggest that anti-Black resentments and anti-immigrant
attitudes have increasingly become intertwined over time, a conclusion sustained
by Christopher Parker in his contribution “Status Threat: Moving the Right Fur-
ther to the Right?” He argues that the election of Barack Obama against the back-
drop of a browning America created a powerful threat to White status, fueling a
bitter politics that is not just conservative, but reactionary. The Republican base
today seeks not simply to preserve the social structures and practices that histori-
cally ensured White privilege; they wish to restore an imagined past in which Black
and brown people knew and accepted their subordinate place in the social or-
这. In a well-controlled analysis, Parker’s index of status threat strongly predicts
White support not only for immigration restriction, but opposition to Trump’s
impeachment and support for his reelection, holding constant the effects of rac-
主义, 威权主义, social dominance, ideological conservatism, and exposure
to Fox News.

The emergence of reactionary racial resentment against Blacks and Hispanics
as a fundamental pillar of support for the Republican Party is perhaps unsurprising
given the long history of skin color stratification in the United States. As President
Lyndon Johnson once observed, “If you can convince the lowest White man he’s
better than the best colored man, he won’t notice you’re picking his pocket. Hell,
give him somebody to look down on, and he’ll empty his pockets for you.”16 As
Ellis Monk argues in his contribution “The Unceasing Significance of Colorism:

我

D
哦
w
n
哦
A
d
e
d

F
r
哦
米
H

t
t

:
/
/

d
我
r
e
C
t
.

米

我
t
.

e
d
你
d
A
e
d
A
r
t
我
C
e
–
p
d

我

F
/

1
5
0
2
5
2
0
6
0
4
2
9
d
A
e
d
_
A
_
0
1
8
4
3
p
d

乙
y
G
你
e
s
t

哦
n
0
8
S
e
p
e
米
乙
e
r
2
0
2
3

代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesThe Bipartisan Origins of White Nationalism

Skin Tone Stratification in the United States,” immigration has changed the ra-
cial complexion of American society in recent decades and processes of skin color
stratification have broadened to incorporate dark-skinned Hispanics and Asians
as well as Blacks, leading him to conclude “that the integration of new members
of American society is also hampered and stratified by skin tone . . . so much so that
it seems quite fair to label it a pigmentocracy.”

A distinctive feature of the racialization of Hispanics is the conflation of skin
color with illegality. As Cecilia Menjívar points out in “The Racialization of ‘Ille-
gality,’” it is the close association between suspected illegality and perceived Lat-
in American origins that fuels the treatment of Latinos as racialized “others” in
我们. 社会. Laws passed in 1996 和 2001 increasingly focused the weight of anti-
immigrant enforcement efforts not just along the border, but throughout the na-
tion’s interior. In the wake of this legislation, deportations from the U.S. 内部的
surged and Hispanics were disproportionately swept into the maw of a “formi-
dable machinery” of apprehension, detention, and removal.17 Although the 1996
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the USA PATRIOT Act were
enacted in the name of the war on terror, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) has overwhelmingly targeted brown-skinned people who “look Hispanic,”
thereby contributing to their racialization. 的 3.7 million persons deported be-
补间 2008 和 2018, 96 percent were Latin American.18

For most of U.S. 历史, unauthorized entry, residence, and labor in the Unit-
ed States were violations of civil rather than criminal law. Until quite recent-
莱, even immigrants convicted of crimes were not routinely deported once they
had completed their sentences. In his essay “Criminalizing Migration,” César
Cuauhtémoc García Hernández documents the steady criminalization of immi-
gration in the United States, a process known as “crimmigration.” Whereas in
1986 Congress enacted legislation to request that local law enforcement officers re-
port immigrants arrested for drug crimes to immigration authorities, 在 1988, 它
created a new legal category of “aggravated felony” and required immigration au-
thorities to take custody of any noncitizen convicted of such an offense, 包括
legal resident aliens.

Although aggravated felonies originally included only homicide, arms deal-
英, and drug trafficking, over the years the category expanded to encompass
twenty-one separate offenses, including nonviolent acts common among undoc-
umented migrants such as the use of false documents and entering without au-
thorization after an earlier removal. Whereas criminal deportations averaged just
605 每年从 1960 通过 1985, 从 1986 到 2018, the yearly average rose to
83,418.19

Although crimmigration has consequences for all immigrants to the United
状态, the burden falls most heavily on Latinos, creating powerful barriers to im-
migrant integration along the lines of race and legal status. In their contribution

我

D
哦
w
n
哦
A
d
e
d

F
r
哦
米
H

t
t

:
/
/

d
我
r
e
C
t
.

米

我
t
.

e
d
你
d
A
e
d
A
r
t
我
C
e
–
p
d

我

F
/

1
5
0
2
5
2
0
6
0
4
2
9
d
A
e
d
_
A
_
0
1
8
4
3
p
d

乙
y
G
你
e
s
t

哦
n
0
8
S
e
p
e
米
乙
e
r
2
0
2
3

150 (2) Spring 2021Douglas S. 梅西

“Race, Legal Status & Social Mobility,” Mary Waters and Philip Kasinitz note that
although a lack of legal status hinders the economic integration of immigrants,
it does not stop them from integrating socially. Immigrants and their children are
learning English and converging with U.S. natives on most social outcomes, 甚至
as they struggle economically. According to Waters and Kasinitz, “when consider-
ing blocked mobility among immigrants and their descendants, 种族, while heav-
ily correlated to legal status in the largest current immigrant groups, does not ap-
pear to be the most important factor.”

In their essay “The Legal Status Divide among the Children of Immigrants,”
Roberto Gonzales and Stephen Ruszczyk depict what life is like for unauthorized
migrants brought into the country as children who grew up in the United States
speaking English, attending public schools, and not realizing they were undocu-
mented. Upon entering adolescence, they gradually came to realize that their life
chances were narrowly circumscribed by a legal status they did not choose and
could not control. The authors argue that a lack of documentation has become
what sociologists call a “master status” that overrides the influence of a person’s
individual traits and characteristics in determining key life outcomes. Adoles-
cence among undocumented teens is thus dominated by the fraught “process of
learning to be illegal,” compelling them to scale back their dreams and ambitions
for success in the only country they know.

Always difficult, life without documents became even more challenging un-
der President Trump. In their contribution “Latinos & Racism in the Trump Era,”
Stephanie Canizales and Jody Agius Vallejo argue that “Trump’s racist and dehu-
manizing rhetoric and policy actions have increased Latinos’ experiences of dis-
crimination and institutionalized legal violence . . . while fomenting racial terror-
ism directed at Latinos and other groups.” They report that counties hosting ral-
lies for Trump in 2016 experienced a 226 percent surge in hate crimes and that the
number of anti-Latino hate crimes rose by 21 百分比在 2018 独自的.

In addition to experiencing a surge of private acts of prejudice and discrimi-
国家, Hispanics have increasingly been brutalized by President Trump’s public
政策, which have accelerated the arrest, detention, and removal of immigrants
from the U.S. 内部的. The burden of deportation falls hardest on long-term un-
documented residents, most of whom now have U.S.-born citizen children. Based
在 111 interviews with adult immigrants who had experienced the deportation or
detention of a family member, Yajaira Ceciliano-Navarro and Tanya Golash-Boza
document the devastation inflicted upon families by mass deportation in their es-
say “‘Trauma Makes You Grow Up Quicker’: The Financial & Emotional Burdens
of Deportation & Incarceration.” All too often, the family member detained is the
principal breadwinner, which causes a cascading financial crisis of lost income,
rising debt, and housing instability among already poor families. Accompanying
these financial challenges are profound psychological traumas, with respondents

我

D
哦
w
n
哦
A
d
e
d

F
r
哦
米
H

t
t

:
/
/

d
我
r
e
C
t
.

米

我
t
.

e
d
你
d
A
e
d
A
r
t
我
C
e
–
p
d

我

F
/

1
5
0
2
5
2
0
6
0
4
2
9
d
A
e
d
_
A
_
0
1
8
4
3
p
d

乙
y
G
你
e
s
t

哦
n
0
8
S
e
p
e
米
乙
e
r
2
0
2
3

代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesThe Bipartisan Origins of White Nationalism

reporting intense feelings of emptiness, loss, shame, embarrassment, 愤怒, 和
frustration.

Although Asians are commonly seen as America’s “model minority,” in her
contribution “Asian Americans, Affirmative Action & the Rise in Anti-Asian
Hate,” Jennifer Lee points out that their elevated socioeconomic standing does
not shield them from racism and xenophobia. In the current political climate, 这
model minority stereotype of high competence but low warmth places them awk-
wardly between disadvantaged minorities who stand to gain from affirmative ac-
tion and non-Hispanic Whites who see it as a threat. In this position, they are po-
tentially exposed to resentment from both sides. A surge in anti-Asian incidents in
the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic only serves to underscore the precariousness
of their position. Even before the pandemic, anti-Asian hate crimes under Trump
rose 31 之间的百分比 2016 和 2018.

T he essays in this volume clearly show that Republicans led the way in

framing Latino immigrants as a grave threat to the nation while simulta-
neously fueling the fires of anti-Black resentment. 尽管如此, 电流-
rent moment of open racism and xenophobia could not have happened without
Democratic acquiescence. Although Democrats have long stated their support for
immigrant rights and endorsed immigration reform in principle, in practice they
served as handmaids in launching and funding the U.S. government’s war on im-
migrants.20 Anti-immigrant enforcement first accelerated under Ronald Reagan,
but it was continued and expanded by every subsequent president, Democratic
and Republican, each of whom found it politically convenient to portray Latino
immigrants as a grave threat to the nation.

Ronald Reagan framed unauthorized immigration as a question of “nation-
al security” and explicitly linked it to his prosecution of the Cold War in Central
美国, telling Americans that “terrorists and subversives are just two days driv-
ing time from [the border crossing at] Harlingen, 德克萨斯州,”21 and they could be ex-
pected to yield “a tidal wave of refugees–and this time they’ll be ‘feet people’ and
not boat people–swarming into our country seeking safe haven from commu-
nist repression to the south.”22 Communist provocateurs, he alleged, would then
“feed on the anger and frustration of recent Central and South American immi-
grants who will not realize their own version of the American dream.”23

Reagan went on to push for and sign the 1986 Immigration Reform and Con-
trol Act, which increased the number of Border Patrol agents by 50 百分比和
created new penalties for smuggling, harboring, and transporting unauthorized
migrants. Republican control of the White House continued with the election of
George H. 瓦. 衬套, 并在 1990, he signed into law the last major change in U.S.
immigration law. Its provisions were manifold, but in signing the bill, Bush stated
that “immigration reform began in 1986 with an effort to close the ‘back door’ on

我

D
哦
w
n
哦
A
d
e
d

F
r
哦
米
H

t
t

:
/
/

d
我
r
e
C
t
.

米

我
t
.

e
d
你
d
A
e
d
A
r
t
我
C
e
–
p
d

我

F
/

1
5
0
2
5
2
0
6
0
4
2
9
d
A
e
d
_
A
_
0
1
8
4
3
p
d

乙
y
G
你
e
s
t

哦
n
0
8
S
e
p
e
米
乙
e
r
2
0
2
3

150 (2) Spring 2021Douglas S. 梅西

immigration. 现在, as we open the ‘front door’ to increased legal immigration, 我
am pleased that this Act also provides needed enforcement authority.”

The “front door” to which Bush referred was an increase in the global cap on
numerically limited visas from 270,000 到 675,000, an expansionary provision
that enabled Democrats to support the bill, even though closing the “back door”
entailed the hiring of one thousand additional Border Patrol agents. The legisla-
tion also increased the penalties for immigration violations and authorized new
measures to expedite removals from the United States. As in 1986, Democrats
were willing to accept harsher police actions against immigrants in return for lib-
eralization in other areas of immigration policy.

The new enforcement measures failed to stop the inflow of unauthorized mi-
grants across the Mexican-U.S. 边界, 当然, 并在 1993, El Paso became the
second-busiest sector after San Diego. 它是 286,000 apprehensions amounted to
forty-eight arrests for every one hundred residents, who had begun to complain
bitterly about the migrants traipsing through their yards and neighborhoods.
Sensing an opportunity, the local Border Patrol Chief Silvestre Reyes on his own
initiative launched Operation Blockade, an all-out mobilization of enforcement
resources along the city’s border with Juarez, 墨西哥. The operation reduced ap-
prehensions by 72 percent over the next year and Reyes became a very popular
figure locally.24 In 1996, he parlayed his popularity into election to Congress as a
Democrat.

Fellow Democrat Bill Clinton took note of the apparent success of Operation
Blockade and used it as a blueprint for enhancing enforcement operations along
the entire border. The new policy, described in the Border Patrol report Border Pa-
trol Strategic Plan: 1994 and Beyond, articulated a national strategy that “builds on
El Paso’s success through an infusion of permanent resources designed to stabi-
lize their enforcement initiative and extend it.” The new strategy was christened
“prevention through deterrence” and its goal was to bring “a decisive number of
enforcement resources to bear in each major entry corridor,” “increase the num-
ber of agents on the line, and make effective use of technology, [从而] 提高
the risk of apprehension high enough to be an effective deterrent.”25

To publicize the new strategy, Attorney General Janet Reno organized a news
conference along the border in San Diego, where she was joined by California
Senators Barbara Boxer and Dianne Feinstein to announce the debut of Opera-
tion Gatekeeper, another all-out militarization effort designed to “restore the rule
of law to the California/Baja California Border.”26 Running for reelection in 1996,
Bill Clinton boasted that “our comprehensive strategy to restore the rule of law to
illegal immigration enforcement has done more in three years than was done in
thirty years before.”27

As in El Paso, apprehensions fell precipitously in San Diego over the ensuing
年. 尽管如此, total border apprehensions continued to rise, peaking at 1.6

我

D
哦
w
n
哦
A
d
e
d

F
r
哦
米
H

t
t

:
/
/

d
我
r
e
C
t
.

米

我
t
.

e
d
你
d
A
e
d
A
r
t
我
C
e
–
p
d

我

F
/

1
5
0
2
5
2
0
6
0
4
2
9
d
A
e
d
_
A
_
0
1
8
4
3
p
d

乙
y
G
你
e
s
t

哦
n
0
8
S
e
p
e
米
乙
e
r
2
0
2
3

代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesThe Bipartisan Origins of White Nationalism

百万 2000. Undocumented migrants did not stop attempting to cross the
边界; they just staged their attempts at different locations, using routes through
the Sonoran Desert into Arizona. The new routes entailed traversing a rugged,
sparsely settled terrain characterized by extreme environmental conditions that
threatened life and limb.

Elevating the risks of unauthorized border crossing was an explicit goal of the
new policy. In the words of the Strategic Plan, “the prediction is that with tradition-
al entry and smuggling routes disrupted, illegal traffic will be deterred, or forced
over more hostile terrain, less suited for crossing and more suited for enforce-
ment.”28 But the migrants were not deterred and, tragically, bodies piled up along
the border. Prior to Operation Gatekeeper, the death toll among undocumented
border crossers averaged ninety-nine per year. In the ensuing years, the toll rose to
an average of 330 每年, yielding a body count of 8,239 通过 2019.29

In the ensuing years, Clinton’s policy of prevention through deterrence was
taken up and expanded by each successive U.S. president, whatever their par-
ty affiliation. 在 2006, 乔治·W. Bush declared “we’re a nation of laws, 和我们
must enforce our laws” and called for doubling the Border Patrol and deploying
six thousand National Guard troops to the border.30 In his 2013 State of the Union
地址, Barack Obama asserted that “real reform means strong border security,
and we can build on the progress my administration has already made–putting
more boots on the southern border than at any time in our history.”31

T he bipartisan nature of support for the militarization of the Mexican-U.S.

border is clearly evident in official statistics documenting the nation’s ris-
ing enforcement effort. 数字 1 shows the number of Border Patrol offi-
cers by presidential administration. Through the Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Car-
ter administrations, the number drifted slowly upward to level off at just below
2,500 agents during the early Reagan years. 然而, 之间 1984 和 1986, 这
number rose by 50 percent and remained stable until the last year of George H. 瓦.
Bush’s presidency, when it rose by a modest 12 百分. The trend line then moves
sharply upward with President Bill Clinton. Upon his taking office in 2003, 这
Border Patrol had slightly fewer than 4,000 officers. When he left office, the force
stood at 9,200 officers, an increase of 132 百分.

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, border enforcement was further
intensified in the name of the war on terror. During George W. Bush’s presiden-
赛, the Border Patrol grew from 9,200 到 17,500 officers, with the curve becom-
ing almost vertical between 2005 和 2008. Upon assuming office in 2009, Barack
Obama announced another surge in border enforcement in an effort to placate
Republicans in hopes of pushing them toward comprehensive immigration re-
形式. The resulting augmentation brought the Border Patrol to an all-time high
of around 21,400 agents in 2011. Apparently realizing the futility of trying to lead

我

D
哦
w
n
哦
A
d
e
d

F
r
哦
米
H

t
t

:
/
/

d
我
r
e
C
t
.

米

我
t
.

e
d
你
d
A
e
d
A
r
t
我
C
e
–
p
d

我

F
/

1
5
0
2
5
2
0
6
0
4
2
9
d
A
e
d
_
A
_
0
1
8
4
3
p
d

乙
y
G
你
e
s
t

哦
n
0
8
S
e
p
e
米
乙
e
r
2
0
2
3

150 (2) Spring 2021Douglas S. 梅西

数字 1
Number of Border Patrol Agents by Presidential Administration

25,000

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

s
t
n
e
G
A

我
哦
r
t
A
磷
r
e
d
r
哦
乙
F
哦
r
e
乙
米
你
氮

LBJ

奥巴马

Trump

G. 瓦. 衬套

克林顿

G. H. 瓦. 衬套

Reagan

Carter

Nixon-Ford

1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020

来源: Mexican Migration Project database, Supplementary Files, “NATLYEAR” File.

Republicans toward a compromise on immigration reform, Obama later scaled
back the corps to just under twenty thousand officers in 2016, where it has roughly
remained ever since.

Rather than adding more personnel to border enforcement, President Trump
chose to divert resources to build a “big, beautiful wall” along the border. 作为一个
结果, although staffing of the Border Patrol leveled off, the agency’s budget did
不是. 数字 2 shows the trend in the size of the Border Patrol’s budget by presi-
dential administration. As can be seen, through the second Bush administration,
the trend parallels that shown in Figure 1. 此后, 然而, the budget shoots
rapidly upward through both the Obama and Trump administrations, reaching a
record $4.7 十亿 2019. In addition to militarizing the border, beginning in the mid-1990s, successive administrations dramatically increased the budget for immigrant detention and removal from the nation’s interior, again in the name of the war on terror. 在重新- sponse to the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, 在 1996, a bipartisan ma- jority in Congress passed and President Clinton signed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which authorized the expedited removal of non- 14 l 从http下载 : / / 直接的 . 米特 . / 教育论文 – 压力 / 的f / / / / / 1 5 0 2 5 2 0 6 0 4 2 9 d a e d _ a _ 0 1 8 4 3 压力 . 来宾来访 0 8 九月 2 0 2 3 代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesThe Bipartisan Origins of White Nationalism Figure 2 Border Patrol Budget by Presidential Administration 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0 s r a l l o D l a n i m o N f o s n o i l l i B G. 瓦. Bush Clinton LBJ Nixon-Ford Carter Reagan G. H. 瓦. Bush Trump Obama l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / 直接的 . 米特 . 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 来源: Mexican Migration Project database, Supplementary Files, “NATLYEAR” File. 公民. In the same year, Congress also passed and Clinton signed the Illegal Im- migration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, which increased the budget for deportation and narrowed the criteria for claiming asylum. After September 11, 2001, Congress overwhelmingly and virtually without debate passed and Pres- ident Bush signed the USA PATRIOT Act, creating the Department of Homeland Security and further increasing funds for the surveillance and deportation of for- eigners and authorizing the deportation of noncitizens without due process. As shown in Figure 3, these legislative acts dramatically increased the bud- get for interior enforcement and removal. 从 1965 通过 2002, this budget is proxied by the annual budget of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for nonborder operations. 从 2003 向前, the budget for interior en- forcement is more precisely indicated by funding for Immigration and Customs Enforcement, a new agency created by the PATRIOT Act. As can be seen, the trend line rises slowly during the Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations, but toward the end of the Reagan administration, the budget experiences a nota- ble bump upward and continues to rise at an elevated pace through the first Bush administration. 15 / 教育论文 – 压力 / 的f / / / / / 1 5 0 2 5 2 0 6 0 4 2 9 d a e d _ a _ 0 1 8 4 3 压力 . 来宾来访 0 8 九月 2 0 2 3 150 (2) Spring 2021Douglas S. Massey Figure 3 Interior Enforcement Budget by Presidential Administration 9.0 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0 s r a l l o D l a n i m o N f o s n o i l l i B Clinton LBJ Nixon-Ford Carter Reagan G. H. 瓦. Bush Trump Obama G. 瓦. Bush l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / 直接的 . 米特 . 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 来源: Mexican Migration Project database, Supplementary Files, “NATLYEAR” File. After sagging during the first two years of the Clinton administration, the curve rises dramatically for the next six years and then accelerates further during the first two years of the second Bush administration, pushing the budget upwards from $1.2 十亿 1994 到 $4.8 十亿 2002. The abrupt drop in the curve be- 补间 2002 和 2003 is an artifact of the shift in indicators. 此后, 然而, the upward trajectory resumes at an even faster pace, with the ICE budget rising from $3.3 十亿 2003 到 $5.1 十亿 2008. During the first year of the Obama administration, the ICE budget momentary tops out at nearly $6 billion before
dropping slightly and then rising unevenly to $6.2 billion in Obama’s final year. During the first year under President Trump, the budget shot up to $6.8 亿和
then continued to rise almost vertically to $8.8 十亿 2019.

Obama’s scaling back of the budget between 2008 和 2015 is not reflected in
the number of migrants removed from the country, which is depicted in Figure 4.
Prior to 1996, annual deportations from within the United States were in the tens
of thousands with no strong trend upward. 从 1995 到 2000, the annual number
removed rose from 51,000 到 288,500 under Clinton and then jumped to 360,000
under President George W. Bush before reaching its all-time high of 432,000 在

e
d
你
d
A
e
d
A
r
t
我
C
e
–
p
d

我

F
/

1
5
0
2
5
2
0
6
0
4
2
9
d
A
e
d
_
A
_
0
1
8
4
3
p
d

乙
y
G
你
e
s
t

哦
n
0
8
S
e
p
e
米
乙
e
r
2
0
2
3

代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesThe Bipartisan Origins of White Nationalism

数字 4
Number of Deportations by Presidential Administration

d
e
t
r
哦
p
e
D
r
e
乙
米
你
氮

450,000

400,000

350,000

300,000

250,000

200,000

150,000

100,000

50,000

Nixon-Ford

LBJ

Carter

奥巴马

G. 瓦. 衬套

Trump

克林顿

Reagan

G. H. 瓦. 衬套

我

D
哦
w
n
哦
A
d
e
d

F
r
哦
米
H

t
t

:
/
/

d
我
r
e
C
t
.

米

我
t
.

e
d
你
d
A
e
d
A
r
t
我
C
e
–
p
d

我

F
/

1
5
0
2
5
2
0
6
0
4
2
9
d
A
e
d
_
A
_
0
1
8
4
3
p
d

乙
y
G
你
e
s
t

哦
n
0
8
S
e
p
e
米
乙
e
r
2
0
2
3

1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020

来源: Office of Immigration Statistics, 2019 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (华盛顿,
华盛顿特区: 我们. Department of Homeland Security, 2020).

2013 under Obama. Across three administrations, the total deported rose from
870,000 under Clinton, 到 2 million under Bush, 到 3.1 million under Obama, earn-
ing him the sardonic moniker “Deporter in Chief.”

Although deportations fell sharply during Obama’s second term, removals in-
creased once again under Trump. What set Trump apart from his predecessors,
然而, was not his detention of settled migrants captured within the United
状态, but his use of the immigrant detention system to house migrants appre-
hended along the border. As the huge inflow of undocumented Mexican migrant
workers was replaced by a much smaller inflow of Central American families
seeking asylum, Trump refused to hear their claims for asylum at ports of en-
try along the border and turned them back, compelling them to cross the border
without authorization and then to lodge a claim for defensive asylum upon being
captured.

The number of persons annually funneled through the immigrant detention
system is shown in Figure 5. As deportations accelerated under Clinton, 衬套,
and Obama, logically so did the annual number of detentions until Obama elect-
ed to scale back deportations in his second term. From just 23,000 detentions in

150 (2) Spring 2021Douglas S. 梅西

数字 5
Annual Detentions by Presidential Administration

600,000

500,000

400,000

300,000

200,000

100,000

d
e
n
我
A
t
e
D
r
e
乙
米
你
氮

G. 瓦. 衬套

克林顿

Trump

奥巴马

我

D
哦
w
n
哦
A
d
e
d

F
r
哦
米
H

t
t

:
/
/

d
我
r
e
C
t
.

米

我
t
.

0
1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

来源: J. Rachel Reyes, “Immigration Detention: Recent Trends and Scholarship” (新的
约克: Center for Migration Studies, 2019), http://cmsny.org/publications/virtualbrief
-detention/.

e
d
你
d
A
e
d
A
r
t
我
C
e
–
p
d

我

F
/

1
5
0
2
5
2
0
6
0
4
2
9
d
A
e
d
_
A
_
0
1
8
4
3
p
d

乙
y
G
你
e
s
t

哦
n
0
8
S
e
p
e
米
乙
e
r
2
0
2
3

1993, the number rose to 210,000 at the end of the Clinton administration and
379,000 at the end of the Bush administration. Under Obama, detentions peaked
在 464,000 在 2012 and then declined sharply as he scaled back deportation efforts.
Although Figure 4 shows that the number of deportations under Trump in 2018
was roughly equal to that prevailing at the end of the Obama administration, 全部的
detentions under Trump skyrocketed to almost 600,000 as the detention system
filled up with Central American women and children seeking refuge rather than
Mexicans moving to jobs in the United States.

T he essays in this issue of Dædalus make it clear that White racial resent-

ment lies at the core of support for the Republican Party today, 然后
the party’s animus toward Black Americans, actively cultivated since the
1960s, has now broadened to include Hispanics. The rising political agency of Af-
rican Americans and a changing racial demography together created a powerful
status threat to conservative White Americans. As Democratic attitudes moved

代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesThe Bipartisan Origins of White Nationalism

decisively away from racist, nativist sentiments, the Republican base doubled
down to embrace a reactionary politics of White identity grounded in fear.

Both the racialization of Latinos around the trope of illegality and the extra-
ordinary growth of the Hispanic population were made possible by dysfunction-
al immigration and border policies implemented in equal measure under both
Democratic and Republican administrations. Rather than challenging the narra-
tive of a cross-border alien invasion, Democrats in Congress and the White House
co-opted it in the futile hope of pushing Republicans toward support for immi-
gration reform. It was Bill Clinton who promulgated the strategy of “prevention
through deterrence” that militarized the Mexican-U.S. 边界; and it was Clin-
ton who unleashed the formidable regime of mass deportation upon the nation.
Barack Obama subsequently increased the number of deportations and Border
Patrol officers to all-time record highs.

At this writing, Joe Biden is days away from being inaugurated as the 46th
President of the United States. His victory was not accompanied by the hoped-
for “blue wave,” however. 一些 48 percent of the electorate still voted for Trump
despite his calamitous performance in managing the COVID-19 pandemic. 自从
the election, the president has assiduously worked to discredit the election as sto-
len and Biden’s presidency as illegitimate. The Republican Party has become in-
creasingly undemocratic and authoritarian, deploying a cynical hardball politics
of misinformation, court packing, and voter suppression in order to perpetuate
White minority rule in a rapidly diversifying nation.

Upset victories in the Georgia runoff elections have just ensured Democrat-
ic control of both chambers of Congress, offering the party a chance to make
amends for its part in propagating the nation’s war on immigrants. Democrats
need to abandon the fiction that a militarized Southern border somehow contrib-
utes to the nation’s security and that the mass deportation of Hispanics in some
way protects Americans from harm. The truth is that America’s over-the-top im-
migration enforcement machine is a costly symbolic charade that wastes taxpayer
美元, needlessly takes lives, and rips gaping holes in the nation’s social fabric.

Two reports prepared by the National Academy of Sciences conclude that im-
migrants are a net benefit to the U.S. economy and that they are integrating well
and rapidly into U.S. society–if they are unhindered by a lack of legal status.32 To
realize the full social and economic potential of immigrants who are already in our
中间, the legal barriers to full participation must be removed. To achieve this end,
the United States must 1) grant immediate legal permanent residence to the young
people who registered under the program of Deferred Action for Childhood Ar-
rivals (DACA) and others who entered the country as minors; 2) bestow legal per-
manent residence upon those currently in Temporary Protected Status, who often
have been living and working legally in the United States for decades; 3) create a
path to legal residence for undocumented residents who entered as adults but have

我

D
哦
w
n
哦
A
d
e
d

F
r
哦
米
H

t
t

:
/
/

d
我
r
e
C
t
.

米

我
t
.

e
d
你
d
A
e
d
A
r
t
我
C
e
–
p
d

我

F
/

1
5
0
2
5
2
0
6
0
4
2
9
d
A
e
d
_
A
_
0
1
8
4
3
p
d

乙
y
G
你
e
s
t

哦
n
0
8
S
e
p
e
米
乙
e
r
2
0
2
3

150 (2) Spring 2021Douglas S. 梅西

no criminal record aside from immigration violations and misdemeanor infrac-
系统蒸发散; 和 4) recognize our moral obligation to Central Americans fleeing delete-
rious circumstances that stem directly from U.S. intervention in the region during
the 1980s by processing their asylum claims rather than detaining them.

Although most of the essays in this volume are rather bleak in their assessment
of policies and practices leading up to the 2016 election of a White nationalist ad-
事奉, the collection’s final contribution by Richard Alba, “The Surge of
Young Americans from Minority-White Mixed Families & Its Significance for
the Future,” paints a far more optimistic future. Rather than seeing a tension-
ridden “majority-minority” society of non-Hispanic Whites competing with a
majority of racially distinct others, his careful assessment of the demographic ev-
idence suggests a future of integration, adaptation, and peaceful accommodation
in which intergroup boundaries blur rather than harden. What is necessary for
the full realization of this vision is the full legalization of the roughly eleven mil-
lion people who now peacefully live among us without legal permanent residence.

关于作者

Douglas S. 梅西, 自此成为美国科学院院士 1995, is the Henry
G. Bryant Professor of Sociology and Public Affairs at Princeton University. His re-
cent publications include Understanding International Migration: 理论, 实践, 政策
(2017), Spheres of Influence: The Social Ecology of Racial and Class Inequality (2014), 和
Climbing Mount Laurel: The Struggle for Affordable Housing and Social Mobility in an Ameri-
can Suburb (with Len Albright, Rebecca Casciano, Elizabeth Derickson, and David
金赛, 2013).

尾注

1 Ian Haney López, Dog Whistle Politics: How Coded Racial Appeals Have Reinvented Racism and

Wrecked the Middle Class (纽约: 牛津大学出版社, 2014).

2 Douglas S. 梅西, “The Mexico-U.S. Border in the American Imagination,” Proceedings

of the American Philosophical Society 160 (2016): 160–177.

3 Leonard F. Chapman, “Illegal Aliens: Time to Call a Halt,” Reader’s Digest, 十月 1976,

188–189.

4 Douglas S. 梅西, Jorge Durand, and Karen A. Pren, “Why Border Enforcement Back-

fired,” 美国社会学杂志 121 (5) (2016): 1557–1600.

5 Ruth Ellen Wasem, Unauthorized Aliens Residing in the United States: Estimates Since 1986

(华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: Congressional Research Service, 2011).

我

D
哦
w
n
哦
A
d
e
d

F
r
哦
米
H

t
t

:
/
/

d
我
r
e
C
t
.

米

我
t
.

e
d
你
d
A
e
d
A
r
t
我
C
e
–
p
d

我

F
/

1
5
0
2
5
2
0
6
0
4
2
9
d
A
e
d
_
A
_
0
1
8
4
3
p
d

乙
y
G
你
e
s
t

哦
n
0
8
S
e
p
e
米
乙
e
r
2
0
2
3

代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesThe Bipartisan Origins of White Nationalism

6 Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, Mexicans Decline to Less Than Half the U.S. Unauthorized
Immigrant Population for the First Time (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: 皮尤研究中心, 2019).
7 “Mexico: Median Age of the Population from 1950 to 2050,” Statista, 七月 2019, https:
//www.statista.com/statistics/275555/median-age-of-the-population-in-mexico/
(accessed October 10, 2020).

8 Mexican Migration Project Database, Supplementary Files, https://mmp.opr.princeton

.edu/databases/instructions-en.aspx (accessed October 10, 2020).

9 Robert Warren, “Reverse Migration to Mexico Led to U.S. Undocumented Population

衰退: 2010 to 2018,” Journal on Migration and Human Security 8 (1) (2020): 32–41.

10 Office of Immigration Statistics, 2018 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区:

我们. Department of Homeland Security, 2019).

11 Warren, “Reverse Migration to Mexico Led to U.S. Undocumented Population Decline.”
12 时间. J. Mathews and Brady E. 汉密尔顿, “Total Fertility Rates by State and Race and His-

panic Origin: 美国,” National Vital Statistics Reports 68 (2019): 1–10.

13 Steven Ruggles, Sarah Flood, Ronald Goeken, 等人。, IPUMS USA: Version 10.0 [dataset]

(明尼阿波利斯: IPUMS, 2020), https://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V10.0.

14 Mark Hugo Lopez, The Hispanic Vote in the 2008 选举 (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: Pew Research
中心, 2008); and Mark Hugo Lopez, Latino Voters in the 2012 选举 (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区:
皮尤研究中心, 2012).

15 Christopher S. Parker and Matt A. Barreto, Change They Can’t Believe In: The Tea Party and
Reactionary Politics in America (普林斯顿大学, 新泽西州: Princeton University Press, 2013); 和
Marisa Abrajano and Zoltan L. Hajnal, White Backlash: Immigration, 种族, and American
政治 (纽约: 牛津大学出版社, 2015).

16 Quoted in Bill Moyers, “What a Real President Was Like,” 华盛顿邮报, 诺维姆-
误码率 13, 1988, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1988/11/13/what-a
-real-president-was-like/d483c1be-d0da-43b7-bde6-04e10106ff6c/.

17 Doris Meissner, Donald M. Kerwin, Muzaffar Chishti, and Claire Bergeron, Immigration
Enforcement in the United States: The Rise of a Formidable Machinery (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: Migra-
tion Policy Institute, 2013), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigration
-enforcement-united-states-rise-formidable-machinery.

18 Office of Immigration Statistics, 2018 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics.
19 我们. Department of Justice, Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: 我们. 司法部, 1970–1977); 我们. 法律系-
泰斯, Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区:
我们. 司法部, 1978–2001); 和美国. Department of Homeland Security,
Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: 我们. Department of Homeland Se-
安全性, 2002–2018).

20 Douglas S. 梅西, “Creating the Exclusionist Society: From the War on Poverty to the

War on Immigrants,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 43 (1) (2020): 18–37.

21 Quoted in Al Kamen, “Central America is No Longer the Central Issue for Americans,”

Austin American Statesman, 十月 21, 1990.

我

D
哦
w
n
哦
A
d
e
d

F
r
哦
米
H

t
t

:
/
/

d
我
r
e
C
t
.

米

我
t
.

e
d
你
d
A
e
d
A
r
t
我
C
e
–
p
d

我

F
/

1
5
0
2
5
2
0
6
0
4
2
9
d
A
e
d
_
A
_
0
1
8
4
3
p
d

乙
y
G
你
e
s
t

哦
n
0
8
S
e
p
e
米
乙
e
r
2
0
2
3

150 (2) Spring 2021Douglas S. 梅西

22 Quoted in Lou Cannon, “Warns of Wave of Refugees,” 华盛顿邮报, 六月 21, 1983,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/06/21/warns-of-wave-of
-refugees/f934b3b9-558f-42da-9e5e-a4c92ef53fcc/.

23 Quoted in Timothy J. Dunn, The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1978–1992: 低的

Intensity Conflict Doctrine Comes Home (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996).

24 我们. Border Patrol, “Fiscal Year Southwest Border Sector Apprehensions (FY 1960–FY
2019),” January 28, 2020, https://www.cbp.gov/document/stats/us-border-patrol-fiscal
-year-southwest-border-sector-apprehensions-fy-1960-fy-2019 (accessed October 10,
2020).

25 我们. Border Patrol, Border Patrol Strategic Plan: 1994 and Beyond Homeland Security (Wash-
因顿, 华盛顿特区: 我们. Border Patrol, 1994), 6, https://www.hsdl.org/?看法&did=721845
(accessed October 10, 2020).

26 Joseph Nevins, Operation Gatekeeper: The Rise of the “Illegal Alien” and the Remaking of the

U.S.-Mexico Boundary (纽约: 劳特利奇, 2001), 3.

27 同上。, 1.
28 我们. Border Patrol, Border Patrol Strategic Plan, 7.
29 Karl Eschbach, Jacqueline Hagan, and Nestor Rodriguez, “Causes and Trends in Migrant
Deaths along the U.S.-Mexican Border, 1985–1998,” Working Paper Series 01-4 (豪斯-
吨: Center for Immigration Research, University of Houston, 2001); 和美国. Border
Patrol, “Southwest Border Sector Deaths (FY 1998–FY 2019),” January 28, 2020, https://
www.cbp.gov/document/stats/us-border-patrol-fiscal-year-southwest-border-sector
-deaths-fy-1998-fy-2019 (accessed October 18, 2020).

30 乔治·W. 衬套, “Address to the Nation on Immigration Reform, May 15,” The American
Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation
-immigration-reform (accessed October 10, 2020).

31 巴拉克奥巴马, “Obama’s 2013 State of the Union Speech: Full Text,“ 大西洋组织, Feb-
鲁阿里 12, 2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/02/obamas-2013
-state-of-the-union-speech-full-text/273089/.

32 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The Economic and Fiscal
Consequences of Immigration (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: The National Academies Press, 2016),
https://doi.org/10.17226/23550; and National Academies of Sciences, Engineering,
and Medicine, The Integration of Immigrants into American Society (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: 这
美国国家科学院出版社, 2015), https://doi.org/10.17226/21746.

我

D
哦
w
n
哦
A
d
e
d

F
r
哦
米
H

t
t

:
/
/

d
我
r
e
C
t
.

米

我
t
.

e
d
你
d
A
e
d
A
r
t
我
C
e
–
p
d

我

F
/

1
5
0
2
5
2
0
6
0
4
2
9
d
A
e
d
_
A
_
0
1
8
4
3
p
d

乙
y
G
你
e
s
t

哦
n
0
8
S
e
p
e
米
乙
e
r
2
0
2
3

代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesThe Bipartisan Origins of White Nationalism
下载pdf