The Belligerent Bear
The Belligerent Bear Pål Røren
俄罗斯, Status Orders, and War
Do states get higher
social status from ªghting? The relationship between war and social status
in world politics has been widely explored in recent years by scholars of inter-
national relations.1 This topic is of crucial interest given the ªnding in cog-
nate literatures that actors are willing to bicker, quarrel, or even ªght to gain
higher status or adjust a perceived lack of status.2 Indeed, arguments on
status in international relations agree that participating in wars can be either a
viable status-seeking strategy, or a normal way of acting out because of per-
ceived status underperformance.3
Pål Røren is a Visiting Fellow and Researcher in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the
University of Cambridge.
For invaluable feedback, comments, and critique on various iterations of this article, the author
thanks Paul Beaumont, Chiara de Franco, Tanja Marie Hansen, Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Vincent
Keating, Erik Ringmar, Anastasia Kriachko Røren, 奥利维尔·施密特, Ole Jacob Sending, 迈克尔·J.
夏皮罗, Ayqe Zarakol, former colleagues at the Center for War Studies at the University of South-
ern Denmark, and the anonymous reviewers. The author also thanks the diplomats who agreed to
be interviewed for this article. The research for this article was supported by the Carlsberg Foun-
dation under the project Gatekeeping the Great Power Club (GREATKEEP).
1. For an overview of the literature, see Allan Dafoe, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth, “Reputa-
tion and Status as Motives for War,” Annual Review of Political Science 17, 不. 1 (2014): 371–393,
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-071112-213421; Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. 帕-
耳鼻喉科, “The Status of Status in World Politics,” 世界政治 73, 不. 2 (2021): 358–391, https://
doi.org/10.1017/S0043887120000301.
2. See Eric M. Anicich et al., “When the Bases of Social Hierarchy Collide: Power without Status
Drives Interpersonal Conºict,” Organization Science 27, 不. 1 (2016): 123–140, https://doi.org/
10.1287/orsc.2015.1019; Sheldon Stryker and Anne Statham Macke, “Status Inconsistency and
Role Conºict,” Annual Review of Sociology 4, 不. 1 (1978): 57–90; Joyce Thompson Heames, 迈克尔
G. 哈维, and Darren Treadway, “Status Inconsistency: An Antecedent to Bullying Behaviour in
Groups,” International Journal of Human Resource Management 17, 不. 2 (2006): 348–361, https://
doi.org/10.1080/09585190500404952; Yan Li et al., “Individualism, Collectivism, and Chinese Ad-
olescents’ Aggression: Intracultural Variations,” Aggressive Behavior 36, 不. 3 (2010): 187–194,
https://doi.org/10.1002/ab.20341.
3. See Jonathan Renshon, “Status Deªcits and War,” 国际组织 70, 不. 3 (2016): 513–
550, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818316000163; Jonathan Renshon, Fighting for Status: Hierarchy
and Conºict in World Politics (普林斯顿大学, 新泽西州: 普林斯顿大学出版社, 2017), https://doi.org/
10.23943/princeton/9780691174501.001.0001; or for a qualitative perspective see Rasmus Brun
Pedersen, “Bandwagon for Status: Changing Patterns in the Nordic States Status-Seeking Strat-
egies?,” International Peacekeeping 25, 不. 2 (2018): 217–241, https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2017
.1394792; Ann Hironaka, Tokens of Power: Rethinking War (纽约: 剑桥大学出版社,
2017), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316796290; Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Jens Ringsmose, and Håkon
Lunde Saxi, “Prestige-Seeking Small States: Danish and Norwegian Military Contributions to U.S.-
国际安全, 卷. 47, 不. 4 (春天 2023), 7–49, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00458
© 2023 由哈佛大学和麻省理工学院的校长和研究员撰写.
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国际安全 47:4 8
Existing research shows that states seek status by joining or initiating wars.
But it has yet to fully determine whether states get recognition from ªghting.4
This is puzzling given what is at stake. Wars kill people, destroy states, 和
cause irreversible damage to individuals and groups. 因此, if states believe
that war is a means to achieve status—however ethically alarming such a
stance might be—it is imperative to also understand whether other states
grant belligerent states status recognition.
To ªll this gap, I explore conditions under which war and aggression can
lead to higher social status in world politics. In line with previous research, 我
assume that wars can have different status effects. Most obviously, losing a
war can reduce a state’s social status and winning one can increase it. 但
an even more important factor in determining status effects is the context in
which the warªghting is interpreted. States rarely gain or seek recognition
from the international system as a whole. 反而, they both pursue and re-
ceive status from various substrata of world politics. I call these substrata
“social clubs,” which are social collectives of exclusion and inclusion that con-
fer status on their members.5 Each club contain a “status order.” These are so-
cial structures that condition and enable the pursuit and recognition of status.
Status orders determine the criteria that states need to enter social clubs or to
navigate their status hierarchies.6 I argue that the prestige of war depends on
Led Operations,” European Journal of International Security 3, 不. 2 (2018): 256–277, https://doi.org/
10.1017/eis.2017.20.
4. Notable exceptions include Renshon, Fighting for Status; Renshon, “Status Deªcits and War”;
Jonathan Mercer, “The Illusion of International Prestige,” 国际安全 41, 不. 4 (春天
2017): 133–168, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00276. But Renshon’s use of proxies and his
correlational approach offer limited and questionable insights about how status is distributed
among belligerents. I build on Mercer’s qualitative approach but ultimately refute his argument
that status is an illusion.
5. These clubs include but are not limited to collectives such as international organizations (例如,
欧盟, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or the United Nations) informal and
formal groupings (例如, the G-20, the G-8, the BRICS, or the Non-Aligned Movement), or categories
(例如, the Nordic states or middle powers). For similar usage of collectives, see Tristen Naylor, 所以-
cial Closure and International Society: Status Groups from the Family of Civilised Nations to the G20 (朗-
大学教师: 劳特利奇, 2018), https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351252423; Deborah Welch Larson, “Status
Competition among Russia, 印度, and China in Clubs: A Source of Stalemate or Innovation in
Global Governance,” Contemporary Politics 25, 不. 5 (2019): 549–566, https://doi.org/10.1080/
13569775.2019.1622183; William C. Wohlforth et al., “Moral Authority and Status in International
关系: Good States and the Social Dimension of Status Seeking,》 国际研究评论
44, 不. 3 (2017): 3–4, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210517000560; Renshon, Fighting for Status,
140–141; Joslyn Barnhart, “Humiliation and Third-Party Aggression,” 世界政治 69, 不. 3
(2017): 535, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887117000028.
6. For a similar conceptualization, see Lilach Gilady, The Price of Prestige: Conspicuous Consumption
in International Relations (芝加哥: 芝加哥大学出版社, 2018), 42–43, https://doi.org/
10.7208/chicago/9780226433349.001.0001; Catherine Jones, “Constructing Great Powers: China’s
Status in a Socially Constructed Plurality,” International Politics 51 (2014): 600–605, https://doi.org/
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The Belligerent Bear 9
whether the relevant social club, through its status order, assigns positive
value to war ªghting or not. A state might be criticized, sanctioned, 甚至
condemned for ªghting a war. But it might simultaneously experience an in-
crease in status within the relevant club and status order if that club recognizes
ªghting as esteemed behavior. 反过来, if a status order stigmatizes war,
the belligerent state will experience a drop in status—even if the state wins a
war and can demonstrate an effective use of force.
I build a qualitative research design to study the relationship between status
orders and war. I use discourse analysis as a method of analysis to explore
status orders and their components. Existing research relies on proxies to in-
fer status attribution. 相比之下, studying recognition via words means focus-
ing on the place where status claims and concessions are taking place.7 I
conduct a single case study of the great power club to understand how status
orders affect the relationship between social status and war.8 Next, to explore
the assumption that clubs in world politics have distinct status orders, I com-
pare the core case with two ancillary shadow case studies:9 the United Nations
(和) Security Council and the Group of 8 (G-8).10
10.1057/ip.2014.28; Pål Røren, “Status Seeking in the Friendly Nordic Neighborhood,” Cooperation
and Conºict 54, 不. 4 (2019): 564–567, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836719828410; Iver B. 新-
mann, “Status Is Cultural: Durkheimian Poles and Weberian Russians Seek Great-Power Status,”
in T. V. 保罗, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. 沃尔福斯, 编辑。, Status in World Politics (凸轮-
桥: 剑桥大学出版社, 2014), 85–114, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO978110 744440
9.006; Naylor, Social Closure and International Society, 4.
7. Erik Ringmar, 身份, Interest, and War: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden’s Intervention in the
Thirty Years War (剑桥: 剑桥大学出版社, 1996), 79–82, https://doi.org/10.1017/
CBO9780511557705; Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Alexei Tsinovoi, “International Misrecognition:
The Politics of Humour and National Identity in Israel’s Public Diplomacy,” European Journal of In-
ternational Relations 25, 不. 1 (2018): 7–9, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066117745365.
8. The membership composition of the great power club is not set. 反而, it is an empirical puz-
zle that should be solved inductively. When scholars attempt to make such a list, 然而, 这
states that are most frequently mentioned as great powers in contemporary world politics are:
中国, 法国, 德国, 印度, 日本, 俄罗斯, 英国 (英国), 和美国.
看, 例如, 斯蒂芬·G. 布鲁克斯和威廉·C. 沃尔福斯, “The Rise and Fall of the Great
Powers in the Twenty-First Century: China’s Rise and the Fate of America’s Global Position,”
国际安全 40, 不. 3 (冬天 2015/16): 7–53, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00225;
托马斯·J. Volgy et al., “Major Power Status in International Politics,” in Thomas J. Volgy et al., 编辑。,
Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics (纽约: 帕尔格雷夫·麦克米伦, 2011),
1–26, https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230119314_1; Correlates of War Project, State System Member-
ship List, V2016, https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/state-system-membership/.
9. I use the term “shadow cases” in this article to denote ancillary cases that do not qualify in
length, extent, and focus to make the study a comparative case study, but that still shed light on
the external validity of claims made in the core case. Hillel Soifer, “Shadow Cases in Comparative
研究,” Qualitative and Multi-Method Research 18, 不. 2 (落下 2020): 11, https://doi.org/10.5281/
zenodo.4046562; 约翰·杰林, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (剑桥: 剑桥
大学出版社, 2006), 20–22, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316848593.
10. The G-7, consisting of Canada, 法国, 意大利, 日本, 英国, 美国, and West
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国际安全 47:4 10
For the core case study, I assign the United States the role of chief gatekeeper
of the great power club. I then analyze the reception of the 2014 annexation of
Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine in the U.S. public discourse. I rely on
op-eds and editorials from 2010 到 2019 about the great powers. These opinion
pieces reºect what the public associates with great power status. 因此, 他们
offer a window into the status order of the great power club. They also provide
insight into what becomes accepted as obvious and commonsensical among
the public. Decision-makers with authority to bestow recognition upon other
states are socially constrained by these narratives.
Discursive recognition of Russia’s belligerence by the U.S. public and for-
eign policy elites is a least likely case for Russian inclusion in the club. 这是
least likely because the elites have little incentive to offer admission. Recog-
nizing Russia as a great power means attributing social status—and with that
potential power and inºuence—to a historical and contemporary adversary.
If the U.S. public conceives of Russia as a great power, it increases the likeli-
hood that foreign policy ofªcials will do the same. And if these U.S. foreign
policy ofªcials recognize Russian great power status, it increases the likelihood
that other established great powers would do the same.
I also explore the assumption that clubs of world politics have distinct status
orders. 这样做, I compare the ªndings in the core case with how discourse on
Russian belligerence was framed in the two shadow cases. If the type of status
recognition in the UN Security Council and the G-8 differs from that in the
great power club, it increases the conªdence that the esteem of war depends
on the status order in which it is framed.
The analysis shows that Russia, up until 2014, was represented in the U.S.
public discourse as a second-tier, fallen superpower. Russia was seen as a state
desperate to pursue—but ultimately destined to fall short of—great power
地位. Russia’s annexation of Crimea drastically shifted the U.S. public dis-
课程. 反而, it was seen as a revived empire. Russia became a state willing
to shun norms of the liberal international order to resurrect the Russian and
Soviet empires. These narratives laid groundwork for an account of Russia as
an equal rival great power. 经过 2019, the narrative of a rivaling group of great
powers—consisting of the United States, 中国, and Russia—dominated the
我们. public foreign policy discourse.
Russia’s social status in the UN Security Council and the G-8 took a dis-
德国, ªrst gathered in 1976. The name changed to the G-8 after Russia joined the club in 1997
and reverted to the G-7 name on March 24, 2014, after Russia’s membership in the group was sus-
pended following the annexation of Crimea.
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The Belligerent Bear 11
tinctly different turn than in the great power club. In the UN Security Council,
Russia’s status remained unchanged because of a combination of established
legal privileges and the council’s joint interest in cooperation on other issues.
相比之下, members of the G-8 threw Russia out of the club in 2014 因为它
violated the club’s shared rules, 价值观, and order.
The ªndings of this article have three implications for the study of status in
international relations. 第一的, the effective use of force is a central component of
the status order of the great power club. While Russia’s annexation of Crimea
and invasion of eastern Ukraine was condemned and criticized within the U.S.
public discourse, it was simultaneously recognized as a move that elevated its
standing vis-à-vis the great powers. 第二, some clubs may value war
(the great power club) while others condemn it (the G-8). 因此, the often-
mentioned statement that war either elevates or diminishes states’ status,
without referring to in which clubs the status change takes place, is logically
invalid. 第三, if status orders dictate whether states get status from ªghting,
they must also shape the type of recognition that states receive from other ac-
系统蒸发散. International behavior, of which war-making is one example, affects
multiple audiences who will respond differently. Incorporating analyses of so-
cial clubs’ status orders is thus crucial in any attempt to understand the recog-
nition that a state receives for its actions.
This article proceeds as follows. 第一的, I review the literature on status and war
in international relations and highlight the lack of focus on recognition. 第二,
I develop the theoretical concept of status orders and highlight their importance
in determining states’ social status. 第三, I present the research design of the ar-
ticle. 在第四节中, I analyze the change in Russia’s social status vis-à-vis
the great power club after it annexed Crimea and invaded eastern Ukraine.
第五, I compare the change in Russia’s social status in the great power club with
its change in the UN Security Council and the G-8. Sixth, in light of the ªndings,
I discuss the future of Russia’s status in world politics following Russia’s full-
scale war against Ukraine beginning in February 2022. In the ªnal section, I sum
up the article’s ªndings and limitations as well as outline its broader implica-
tions for the study of status in international relations.
Status and War in World Politics
In the last decade, research on status in international relations emerged from
the discipline’s background to become a productive ªeld of research.11 This
11. Canonical works in this wave include Renshon, Fighting for Status; Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth,
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国际安全 47:4 12
wave of research shows that states go to war because of status,12 that they
spend money to cultivate it,13 and that they behave in an irrational manner
when it is up for grabs.14 The allure of social status stems from two observa-
系统蒸发散. 第一的, status grants actors an intrinsic good. 第二, actors can reap the
positive byproducts of status—visibility, inºuence, and voluntary deference.15
A large part of the status literature in international relations explores
the relationship between war and status. This research agenda centers on three
问题. 第一的, scholars consider whether and to what extent perceived
lack of prestige increases the likelihood of war.16 The literature conceptualizes
these status gaps as status deªcits,17 status anxiety,18 status inconsistency,19
“Reputation and Status as Motives for War”; 保罗, 拉森, and Wohlforth, Status in World Politics;
Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses
to U.S. Primacy,” 国际安全 34, 不. 4 (春天 2010): 63–95, https://doi.org/10.1162/
isec.2010.34.4.63; William C. 沃尔福斯, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,”
World Politics 61, 不. 1 (2009): 28–57, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887109000021.
12. Renshon, Fighting for Status; Richard Ned Lebow, “The Past and Future of War,“ 国际的
关系 24, 不. 3 (九月 2010): 243–270, https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117810377277; Steven
Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers (剑桥: 剑桥大学出版社, 2017),
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316856444.
13. Matthew Crandall and Ingrid Varov, “Developing Status as a Small State: Estonia’s Foreign
Aid Strategy,” East European Politics 32, 不. 4 (2016): 405–425; Christina Stolte, Brazil’s Africa Strat-
egy: Role Conception and the Drive for International Status (纽约: 帕尔格雷夫·麦克米伦, 2015);
Deganit Paikowsky, The Power of the Space Club (剑桥: 剑桥大学出版社, 2017),
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108159883.
14. 美世, “The Illusion of International Prestige”; Paul Beaumont, “Brexit, Retrotopia, 和
Perils of Post-Colonial Delusions,” Global Affairs 3, nos. 4–5 (2018): 379–390, https://doi.org/
10.1080/23340460.2018.1478674.
15. Deborah Welch Larson, 时间. V. 保罗, and William C. 沃尔福斯, “Status and World Order,“ 在
保罗, 拉森, and Wohlforth, 编辑。, Status in World Politics, 18–19; Andrew Q. Greve and Jack S.
征收, “Power Transitions, Status Dissatisfaction, and War: The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895,”
安全研究 27, 不. 1 (2018): 8, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1360078; Renshon,
“Status Deªcits and War,” 521–522; Wohlforth et al., “Moral Authority and Status in International
关系,” 2–4; Janice Bially Mattern and Ayqe Zarakol, “Hierarchies in World Politics,” Interna-
tional Organization 70, 不. 3 (2016): 637–638, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818316000126.
16. I use prestige and status interchangeably in this article. Scholars disagree about whether status
and prestige should be treated as two distinct concepts or as synonyms. See the discussion in
Reinhard Wolf, “Taking Interaction Seriously: Asymmetrical Roles and the Behavioral Founda-
tions of Status,” European Journal of International Relations 25, 不. 4 (2019): 1186–1211, https://
doi.org/10.1177/1354066119837338; Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth, “Reputation and Status as Mo-
tives for War,” 376; 美世, “The Illusion of International Prestige,” 136; Yuen Foong Khong,
“Power as Prestige in World Politics,” International Affairs 95, 不. 1 (2019): 131, https://doi.org/
10.1093/ia/iiy245.
17. Renshon, “Status Deªcits and War.”
18. Tudor A. Onea, “Between Dominance and Decline: Status Anxiety and Great Power Rivalry,”
Review of International Studies 40, 不. 1 (2014): 125–152, https://doi.org/10.1017/S026021051
2000563.
19. Hanna Smith, “Russia as a Great Power: Status Inconsistency and the Two Chechen Wars,”
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47, 不. 3–4 (2014): 355–363, https://doi.org/10.1016/
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The Belligerent Bear 13
status dissatisfaction,20 status humiliation,21 misrecognition,22 and status un-
certainty.23 In short, this research shows that perceived status deªcits lead to
grievances. These grievances, 反过来, increase the likelihood of war.
第二, scholars examine how status may inºuence states’ decisions to go
to war. This strand of research focuses on whether participation in wars can be
explained by the prize of higher status. This research shows how the carrot of
potentially increasing or preserving status leads states to start conºicts,24 legit-
imize international interventions,25 participate in military coalitions,26 和恩-
gage in great power conºicts.27
A third question is how and to what extent military capabilities can act as
status symbols. Status symbols are things, 属性, privileges, or reputa-
tions that actors acquire, embody, or practice to signal their preferred social
地位. Within this strand of research, states acquire military objects such as
j.postcomstud.2014.09.005; Maria Raquel Freire, “USSR/Russian Federation’s Major Power Status
Inconsistencies,” in Volgy et al., Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, 55–75,
https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230119314_3.
20. Greve and Levy, “Power Transitions, Status Dissatisfaction, and War”; 沃尔福斯, “Uni-
polarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War.”
21. Barnhart, “Humiliation and Third-Party Aggression.”
22. Michelle Murray, The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations: Status, Revisionism, 和
Rising Powers (纽约: 牛津大学出版社, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/97801908
78900.001.0001.
23. William C. 沃尔福斯, “Status Dilemmas and Interstate Conºict,” in Paul, 拉森, 和
沃尔福斯, 编辑。, Status in World Politics, 113–141.
24. Jonathan Renshon, “Losing Face and Sinking Costs: Experimental Evidence on the Judgment
of Political and Military Leaders,” 国际组织 69, 不. 3 (2015): 659–695, https://
doi.org/10.1017/S0020818315000107; Nicholas Sambanis, Stergios Skaperdas, and William C.
沃尔福斯, “Nation-Building through War,” American Political Science Review 109, 不. 2 (2015): 279–
296, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055415000088; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Alexander H.
蒙哥马利, “Power Positions: International Organizations, Social Networks, and Conºict,” Jour-
nal of Conºict Resolution 50, 不. 1 (2006): 3–27, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002705281669.
25. Courtney J. Fung, China and Intervention at the UN Security Council: Reconciling Status (牛津:
牛津大学出版社, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198842743.001.0001; Matthieu
Grandpierron, “Preserving ‘Great Power Status’: The Complex Case of the British Intervention in
the Falklands (1982),” Croatian International Relations Review 23, 不. 79 (2017): 127–156, https://
doi.org/10.1515/cirr-2017-0017.
26. Pedersen, “Bandwagon for Status”; Rasmus Brun Pedersen and Yf Reykers, “Show Them the
Flag: Status Ambitions and Recognition in Small State Coalition Warfare,” 欧洲安全 29,
Jakobsen, Ringsmose,
不. 1 (2020): 16–32, https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2019.1678147;
and Saxi, “Prestige-Seeking Small States”; Nina Græger, “From ‘Forces for Good’ to ‘Forces for Sta-
tus’? Small State Military Status Seeking,” in Benjamin de Carvalho and Iver B. 诺伊曼, 编辑。,
Small State Status Seeking: Norway’s Quest for International Standing (伦敦: 劳特利奇, 2015), 86–
107, https://doi.org/10.4324_9781315758817-6.
27. Hironaka, Tokens of Power; Richard Ned Lebow, Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives
for War (剑桥: 剑桥大学出版社, 2010), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511
761485.
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国际安全 47:4 14
核武器,28 aircraft carriers,29 combat aircrafts,30 and naval ºeets31 to
signal high social status in world politics.
为了确定, these questions have generated valuable insights into under-
standing how war works to adjust states’ status. 然而, the research on war
and status has yet to explore whether belligerents get status from ªghting. 这
major exception is Jonathan Renshon’s scholarship. Renshon uses the number
of hosted diplomatic missions as a proxy measure for status recognition to
show that states gain status from ªghting regardless of whether they win
or lose.32 But Steven Ward has identiªed key errors in Renshon’s research de-
sign.33 Ward labels Renshon’s ªnding that initiating and especially winning a
war improves a state’s status as a “modeling error.” When this error is cor-
rected, the positive status effect of initiating wars disappears, and the status
effect of winning a war is weakened.34
而且, the proxy measure is problematic.35 The network centrality meas-
28. Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,”
国际安全 21, 不. 3 (冬天 1996/97): 54–86, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.21.3.54; 苏珊
Turner Haynes, “The Power of Prestige: Explaining China’s Nuclear Weapons Decisions,” Asian
安全 16, 不. 1 (2020), 35–52, https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2018.1472581; Barry O’Neill,
“Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige,” Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper no. 1560, SSRN,
2006, https://ssrn.com/abstract(西德:2)887333; Andrew Prosser, “Much Ado about Nothing? Status
Ambitions and Iranian Nuclear Reversal,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 11, 不. 2 (夏天 2017): 26–
81.
29. Gilady, The Price of Prestige, 55–89.
30. Græger, “From ‘Forces for Good’ to ‘Forces for Status’?”
31. Michelle Murray, “Identity, Insecurity, and Great Power Politics: The Tragedy of German Na-
val Ambition before the First World War,” 安全研究 19, 不. 4 (2010): 656–688, https://
doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2010.524081; Xiaoyu Pu and Randall L. Schweller, “Status Signaling,
Multiple Audiences, and China’s Blue-Water Naval Ambition,” in Paul, 拉森, and Wohlforth,
编辑。, Status in World Politics, 141–162.
32. Renshon, “Status Deªcits and War”; Renshon, Fighting for Status. Another exception is Jona-
than Mercer’s analysis of British prestige. Building on a similar critique of the diplomatic ex-
change measure, Mercer conducts a historical case study of the 1899–1902 South African War to
test hypotheses of perceived increased British prestige. Mercer suggests that prestige is illusory in
international politics. He develops a hard case for his argument that prestige is not attributed by
adversaries by merit. If the British allies do not bestow prestige upon Britain in victory, Mercer ar-
猜测, then other states—including adversaries—are also unlikely to recognize it. See Mercer, “这
Illusion of International Prestige,” 144–145.
33. Steven Ward, “Status from Fighting? Reassessing the Relationship between Conºict Involve-
ment and Diplomatic Rank,” International Interactions 46, 不. 2 (2020): 274–290, https://doi.org/
10.1080/03050629.2020.1708350.
34. 同上。, 275.
35. For work that uses the diplomatic representation measure to investigate the relationship be-
tween war and status, see Thomas J. Volgy and Stacey Mayhall, “Status Inconsistency and Interna-
tional War: Exploring the Effects of Systemic Change,” International Studies Quarterly 39, 不. 1
(1995): 67–84, https://doi.org/10.2307/2600724; Greve and Levy, “Power Transitions, Status Dis-
satisfaction, and War”; Zeev Maoz et al., “Structural Equivalence and International Conºict: A So-
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The Belligerent Bear 15
ure assumes that if state A establishes an embassy in state B, it represents a
“vote” for state B’s importance in the world. This measure is noisy. Hosting in-
ternational organizations, receiving aid, colonial ties, and geographic proxim-
ity can raise the diplomatic rank of states. Yet these factors are not indicators
of high status.36 Moreover, high-status states should in theory count most in
determining the status of recipient states. Hosting a Chinese embassy is a
stronger signal of prestige than hosting a Norwegian embassy. But the wealth-
ier and more powerful states have the resources to establish embassies in vir-
tually every corner of the world. 因此, an embassy from a high-status state,
such as the United States or China, in practice carries little to no information
about the hosting state’s prestige. 反而, embassies from low-status states are
most informative in that measure and ultimately dictate most states’ positions
in the international status hierarchy.37
Scholars are right to critique the diplomatic representation proxy measure.
But the ªeld has yet to develop an equally sophisticated approach to capture
status recognition. Most scholars instead focus on showing that states and
leaders go to war because they want higher status. 反过来, some hint that par-
ticipation may increase a state’s status.38 To be sure, this line of research has
been useful for showing that status is an important factor in understanding
states’ motivations for war. 然而, it has not shown whether those aspirations
come to fruition.
Another strand of research explicitly focuses on the social consequences of
ªghting. Like status, reputations are formed by others’ beliefs that an actor has
cial Networks Analysis,” 冲突解决杂志 50, 不. 5 (2006): 664–689, https://doi.org/
10.1177/0022002706291053. For work that uses the diplomatic measure for other research pur-
姿势, see Marina G. Duque, “Recognizing International Status: A Relational Approach,” Interna-
tional Studies Quarterly 62, 不. 3 (2018): 577–592, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqy001; Pål Røren,
“On the Social Status of the European Union,” Journal of Common Market Studies 58, 不. 3 (2020):
706–722, https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12962.
36. 美世, “The Illusion of International Prestige,” 138; Pål Røren and Paul Beaumont, “Grading
Greatness: Evaluating the Status Performance of the BRICS,” Third World Quarterly 40, 不. 3 (2019):
433–434, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2018.1535892; Steven Ward, “How Not to Measure
Status” (unpublished manuscript, 2014).
37. Ward, “How Not to Measure Status.”
38. 例如, Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Jens Ringsmose, and Håkon Lunde Saxi explicitly suggest
that while it is “intensely debated in Denmark whether Denmark’s military support for the United
States in Afghanistan, 伊拉克, 利比亚, and Iraq/Syria has paid off or not,” their article is only “seeking
to determine whether Danish decision-makers measure success in a way that signals interest in
generating prestige and goodwill in NATO, 伦敦, 巴黎, and Washington.” See Jakobsen,
Ringsmose, and Saxi, “Prestige-Seeking Small States,” 267. See also Græger, “From ‘Forces for
Good’ to ‘Forces for Status’?,” 92; Reinhard Wolf, “Status Fixations, the Need for ‘Firmness,' 和
Decisions for War,” International Relations 28, 不. 2 (2014): 256, 259–260.
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国际安全 47:4 16
a certain trait.39 Although the conceptual distinction between status and repu-
tation is not that clear, these concepts should nonetheless remain analytically
separated for two reasons. 第一的, status is autotelic, reputation is not. 其他
字, it is meaningless to seek reputation as a goal in itself. 分析地, rep-
utation only comes into existence when it inºuences perceptions that an actor
is capable and willing to ªght.40 Social status could also be identiªed via its ef-
fects (for instance via voluntary deference). But this would eliminate those
cases in which actors have status, but its effects are equivocal. It would also
not pick up the social process of turning a feat, 质量, or behavior into recog-
nition and status.
第二, reputations are easier to manipulate than status.41 States can gain a
reputation for something without affecting others’ reputations. 相比之下,
status is positional and competitive. If everyone has high status, no one does.42
最后, peers have an incentive not to recognize actors for their status-
seeking if the status quo is preferable to them. This makes status stickier
than reputations.43 Thus, research on reputation can assume that a state
strengthens its reputation for resolve if it commits more than before. 相同
logic cannot be applied to status. But reputations still affect actors’ social
地位. Status is inºuenced by a host of factors, 行动, symbols, 特质, 和, 在-
契据, reputations.44 As the next sections illustrate, reputations for toughness
or ruthlessness can help actors join a prestigious club or navigate a particular
status hierarchy.
总结,
the lack of research exploring the recognitional side of
belligerence—with an eye for its spatial, 颞, and social contingencies—
is puzzling. To ªll this gap, I develop a theoretical framework and research de-
sign that underline the importance of different status orders in determining
how and whether war leads to higher status.
39. Renshon, “Status Deªcits and War,” 522.
40. See Robert Jervis, Keren Yarhi-Milo, and Don Casler, “Redeªning the Debate over Reputation
and Credibility in International Security: Promises and Limits of New Scholarship,” 世界政治
73, 不. 1 (2021): 182–189, https://doi.org 10.1017/S0043887120000246. An illustrative example of
this kind of operationalization can be found in Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “Revisiting
Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics,” 国际组织 69, 不. 2
(春天 2015): 482–483, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818314000393.
41. Jervis, Yarhi-Milo, and Casler, “Redeªning the Debate over Reputation and Credibility,” 187–
188; Renshon, “Status Deªcits and War,” 522.
42. 拉森, 保罗, and Wohlforth, “Status and World Order,” 9.
43. The size of the audience also affects this stickiness. It is easier to manipulate reputation than
status because fewer actors need to be convinced. Renshon, Fighting for Status, 118.
44. Ahsan I. Butt, “Why Did the United States Invade Iraq in 2003?,” 安全研究 28, 不. 2
(2019): 264–268, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2019.1551567; Renshon, Fighting for Status, 588.
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The Belligerent Bear 17
Status Orders and War
To study the effects of going to war on an actor’s social status, it is impor-
tant to understand whose opinion matters. 的确, if states ªght wars for
地位, they rarely seek recognition from the “international society.” In-
代替, states seek and receive status from different substrata of world politics,
which I call the “social clubs” of world politics.45 These clubs can be interna-
tional organizations or institutions, informal and formal groups, cliques, 美食-
gories, or communities. Each club has its own collective social boundaries of
exclusion and inclusion that confer status on its members, and each club con-
tains one or more status orders.46
Clubs’ status orders determine whether war—or indeed any other form of
行动, 实践, or item—merits recognition or not. I deªne these orders as sets
of shared, and often tacit, assumptions by the club members about what
事物, 实践, or reputations count as effective symbols for determining ac-
tors’ social status.47 Given that most states participate in a range of clubs in
world politics, they also adhere to an array of status orders.48 Thus, to answer
the main question of whether war increases a state’s status, it is necessary to
ªrst understand how the status orders of clubs in world politics are con-
structed and how they inºuence the distribution of prestige within them.
Status orders condition actors in two ways: they deªne what states need to
enter a club, and they dictate what club members think of as prestigious. 第一的,
to join a club, prospective members must show that they have the correct
地位. In the G-20, 例如, member states should be of “systemic sig-
niªcance” for the ªnancial system.49 Thus, wealth, 人口, regional im-
45. Naylor, Social Closure and International Society; 拉森, “Status Competition among Russia, 在-
dia, and China in Clubs”; Deborah Welch Larson, “New Perspectives on Rising Powers and Global
Governance: Status and Clubs,” International Studies Review 20, 不. 2 (2018): 247–254, https://
doi.org/10.1093/isr/viy039; Paikowsky, The Power of the Space Club; Gilady, The Price of Prestige;
Wohlforth et al., “Moral Authority and Status in International Relations.”
46. Naylor, Social Closure and International Society, 7; 拉森, “New Perspectives on Rising
权力,” 249–251; Røren, “On the Social Status of the European Union,” 710–711.
47. This deªnition of status orders builds on how “orders” in international relations normally are
conceptualized: as the continuous effort to develop and sustain “relatively stable expectations and
shared norms to govern relations among actors.” Michael N. Barnett, “Sovereignty, Nationalism,
and Regional Order in the Arab States System,” 国际组织 49, 不. 3 (夏天 1995):
486, https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081830003335X.
48. Gilady, The Price of Prestige, 42–43; Naylor, Social Closure and International Society, 4; 琼斯,
“Constructing Great Powers,” 600–605.
49. Lora Anne Viola, “‘Systemically Signiªcant States’: Tracing the G20’s Membership Category as
a New Logic of Stratiªcation in the International System,” Global Society 34, 不. 3 (2020): 1–18,
https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2020.1739630.
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国际安全 47:4 18
协议, and diplomatic maneuverability are the symbols of the club’s status
order deemed necessary to enter.50
第二, once in the club, the status order dictates how members may reach
the club’s status echelons. In the words of Max Weber, status orders are “strati-
ªcation in terms of ‘honor’ and of styles of life peculiar to status groups,”
meaning that they deªne the relevant components of conªned status hier-
archies.51 For example, diplomatic practices in the North Atlantic Treaty
组织 (北约) and the UN tend to “generate notions of competence or
mastery,” which in turn produce patterns of social stratiªcation among
diplomats.52 Thus, members need to develop competence, acquire symbols, 或者
behave in certain ways that ªt with the club’s status order to move up its
status hierarchy.53
The criteria for entry and ascent often overlap. 例如, to join the great
and superpower club during the Cold War, states needed to have nuclear
weapons.54 By the early 1950s, the United States and the Soviet Union had
enough warheads for nuclear deterrence.55 Nonetheless, both kept producing
more weapons. At their respective peaks, the two superpowers’ nuclear arse-
nals were 300 到 400 times bigger than what they needed to fend off any adver-
sary.56 Thus, the goal for these states was not to deter the other club member;
相当, it was to become recognized as number one in that club.57
50. Naylor, Social Closure and International Society, 38; Juha Jokela, “The High-Level Representation
of the EU in the G20,” Studia Diplomatica 65, 不. 4 (2012): 23. For the role of status symbols in en-
abling club entry, see Gilady, The Price of Prestige, 33–54.
51. Max Weber, Hans H. Gerth, 和C. 赖特·米尔斯, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (新的
约克: 牛津大学出版社, 1958), 192; Røren and Beaumont, “Grading Greatness,” 432–433.
52. Vincent Pouliot, International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy
(剑桥: 剑桥大学出版社, 2016), 258, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO97813165
34564.
53. Gilady, The Price of Prestige; Pouliot, International Pecking Orders.
54. Jo L. Husbands, “The Prestige States,” in William H. Kincade and Christoph Bertram, 编辑。,
Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s: Perspectives and Proposals (伦敦: 帕尔格雷夫·麦克米伦, 1982),
112–136, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-06163-1_5; Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear
武器?,” 78. 当然, nuclear weapons are not sufªcient for great power status. See Richard
Ned Lebow, National Identities and International Relations (剑桥: 剑桥大学出版社,
2016), 85–87, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316710982.
55. Joshua M. Pearce and David C. Denkenberger, “A National Pragmatic Safety Limit for Nuclear
Weapon Quantities,” Safety 4, 不. 2 (2018): 25, https://doi.org/10.3390/safety4020025.
56. The United States had over 30,000 warheads at its Cold War height in 1966, whereas the Soviet
arsenal reached a peak of about 45,000 warheads in 1986. The minimum number of warheads that
a state needs for deterrence purposes is 100. See Pearce and Denkenberger, “A National Pragmatic
Safety Limit.”
57. Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and Interna-
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The Belligerent Bear 19
Status orders are important to incorporate into analyses of status and war
because waging wars may not only raise or decrease a state’s social status.
Waging war might elevate a state’s positional status in club A. But it might si-
multaneously lead to no status changes in club B. And it might even decrease
the state’s status in club C.58 For instance, Canada’s status in NATO in-
creased when it used its aircraft to deploy U.S. nukes. But its standing in the
Non-Aligned Movement dropped for the same reasons.59 Similarly, 瑞典
abandoned its aspirations to join the nuclear weapons club in the 1960s in
order to remain in the middle power club.60
Status orders are social constructs. 为了确定, over time they become inter-
nalized, reiªed, and harder to “explain away.”61 But they remain social con-
structs. An analytical focus centered on status orders thus offers agency to
actors both inside and outside clubs. Actors have the agency to maintain or
change what is considered prestigious. Members can attempt to change the
status order if they see their competitors emulating them. 例如, 恩-
try criteria for the so-called “Family of Civilised States” shifted between mate-
law.62 States in the club’s status
rial power and positivist international
tional Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), 282. Also see Paul Beaumont,
“The Grammar of Status Competition: International Hierarchies as Domestic Practice” (博士论文。,
Norwegian University of Life Sciences, 2020); 拉森, 保罗, and Wohlforth, “Status and World Or-
这,” 7.
58. In this respect, status order overlaps with Alexander Wendt’s classic deªnition of “culture” as
being shared ideas that constitute the interactions among actors in an anarchic system. See Alexan-
der Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (剑桥: 剑桥大学出版社, 1999),
140–142, 249, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511612183. 的确, as I show below, war-waging
is a component of the status order of the great power club. 相比之下, the status order of the
Nordic club contains no such elements; 相当, friendship, 相信, and amity have become embed-
ded within the status dynamics of this club. See Røren, “Status Seeking in the Friendly Nordic
Neighborhood.”
59. 奥尼尔, “Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige,” 19.
60. Prosser, “Much Ado about Nothing?,” 35.
61. Iver B. 诺伊曼, “Discourse Analysis,” in Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, 编辑。, Qualitative
Methods in International Relations (伦敦: 帕尔格雷夫·麦克米伦, 2008), 74, https://doi.org/
10.1057/9780230584129_5; Iver B. 诺伊曼, Uses of the Other: “The East” in European Identity For-
运动 (明尼阿波利斯: 明尼苏达大学出版社, 1999), 148; 约翰·M. Hobson and J. C.
Sharman, “The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics: Tracing the Social Logics of Hierar-
chy and Political Change,” European Journal of International Relations 11, 不. 1 (2005): 87, https://
doi.org/10.1177/1354066105050137; Evelyn Goh, “Hierarchy and the Role of the United States in
the East Asian Security Order,” International Relations of the Asia-Paciªc 8, 不. 3 (2008): 353–377,
https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcn011.
62. Naylor, Social Closure and International Society, 9, 60–61.
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国际安全 47:4 20
echelons could “shift the goal posts” so that ascendant states remained ex-
cluded if they only fulªlled one of these sets of criteria.63
总共, the question of whether war leads to status cannot be answered with
a simple yes or no. War may be prestigious in one club and stigmatized in an-
其他. The meaning of war as a practice or symbol of status depends on the
status order in which it is interpreted. 因此, scholars and practitioners should
not ask whether war either increased or decreased a state’s social status. 在-
代替, they ought to ask: Where did the war lead to adjustments in status? 和
why did those shifts happen in those clubs? The next section builds a research
design to answer these questions.
Research Design
I ªrst show how discourse analysis offers a useful method to analyze the status
order in social clubs. 第二, I outline the article’s case selection strategy,
which consists of a least likely single case study of the great power club com-
plemented by two ancillary shadow case studies of the UN Security Council
and the G-8. 第三, I describe the process of operationalization in each case.
第四, I detail the empirical data used in the analysis and the procedure for
搜集, systematizing, and analyzing the collected data.
method of analysis
Discourse is a battle for truth.64 Hence, discourse analysis is a method to un-
derstand clashes between different versions of truth.65 Discourse analysts do
not deny the existence of an objective reality.66 But they suggest that objective
reality is never directly available. 相当, it needs to be interpreted. 和这个
constant interpretation of realities leads to changing the ways in which people
view the world. 因此, discourse can function as a tool to legitimize, 政治-
63. 同上。, 61; also see Tomoko T. Okagaki, The Logic of Conformity: Japan’s Entry into International
社会 (多伦多: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 37–41, https://doi.org/10.1177/00207020145
39239.
64. Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (剑桥: 剑桥大学出版社, 1995), 2,
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511586385; John Todd, The UK’s Relationship with Europe: Strug-
gling over Sovereignty (伦敦: 帕尔格雷夫·麦克米伦, 2016), 10, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-
33669-5.
65. Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty, 4.
66. Kevin C. Dunn, “Historical Representations,” in Klotz and Prakash, 编辑。, Qualitative Methods in
International Relations, 79, https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230584129_6.
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The Belligerent Bear 21
cize, or securitize certain phenomena over others.67 It turns migrants into secu-
rity threats,68 freedom ªghters into terrorists,69 and converts superior weapons
into symbols of stigma.70
These interpretive insights have consequences for this article. 至关重要的是,
whether war is considered prestigious in a given status order depends on the
sociocultural context in which it is interpreted. From a discursive point of
看法, the established truth that wars generate prestige rests on salient and
dominant discursive representations. 简而言之, ªghting wars only becomes
esteemed if this position is reºected in the dominant representations of the dis-
课程. The prestige of war depends on the rhetorical labor that goes into con-
structing it as such.71
I use discourse analysis to explore the components of status orders in three
clubs: the great power club, the UN Security Council, and the G-8. 每一个
case—and particularly in the great power club—I focus on identifying the key
representations of the discourse. Representations here refer to positions within
a particular discourse; 那是, a speciªc line of argument or a particular under-
standing of a given phenomenon.72 The task of the discourse analyst is to map
these truth claims, and to determine the dominant and alternative representa-
tions within a discourse. Investigating these representations offers a window
into the status orders of these social clubs. 例如, the section below
analyzes how high-status clubs discursively responded to Russian war-
making in Ukraine. The dominant representation of Russia’s social status after
67. Richard Price, “A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo,” 国际组织 49,
不. 1 (冬天 1995): 87, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300001582.
68. Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration,” Journal of Common
Market Studies 38, 不. 5 (2000): 751–777, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.00263.
69. Paul Beaumont, Performing Nuclear Weapons: How Britain Made Trident Make Sense (伦敦:
帕尔格雷夫·麦克米伦, 2021), 58–59, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67576-9.
70. Price, “A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo”; Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the
Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,” 国际安全 29, 不. 4 (春天 2005): 5–49, https://
doi.org/10.1162/isec.2005.29.4.5. For other examples from international relations on how dis-
course structures how people understand reality, see David Campbell, Writing Security: 团结的
States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (明尼阿波利斯: 明尼苏达大学出版社, 1992);
Anders Sundstøl Bjørkheim, “One Terrorism to Rule Them All: Turkey, the PKK and Global Ter-
rorism Discourse,” Journal of International Relations and Development 23 (2020): 487–510, https://
doi.org/10.1057/s41268-018-00167-z; Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, “Twisting
Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric,” European Journal of International Re-
lations 13, 不. 1 (2007): 35–66, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066107074284.
71. Kevin C. Dunn and Iver B. 诺伊曼, Undertaking Discourse Analysis for Social Research (安
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2016), https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.7106945.
72. 诺伊曼, “Discourse Analysis,” 61–62; Dunn, “Historical Representations,” 79.
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国际安全 47:4 22
the ªghting had started will indicate how war features in each status order.
Russia’s war against Ukraine could propel Moscow discursively up or down
the status hierarchy of a club. 如果是这样, it could be argued that war is either valued
or stigmatized in this club.
Discourse thus fulªlls two important functions in this article. 第一的, 话语
has productive power. The dominant representations of the discourse shape
status orders and thus what actors consider prestigious within them.73 For ex-
充足, whether a political activist is considered a freedom ªghter or a terrorist
is less about individuals’ behaviors and more about the discourse surrounding
them.74 Likewise, whether war is deemed prestigious is less about its inherent
destructive force and more about the discourse surrounding the ªghting. 秒-
另一, discourse offers an apt empirical window into status order and the status
recognition of states in world politics. In contrast to other methods, 例如
network analysis using diplomatic exchange data, discourse analysis does not
require proxies to trace the status recognition of states. 反而, discourse anal-
ysis focuses on where those status claims and concessions are actually tak-
ing place.
case selection
To understand whether ªghting leads to status in world politics, I ªrst explore
how status orders affect the relationship between social status and war. 要做的事
所以, the core case investigates how Russia’s status vis-à-vis the great power club
changed after it annexed Crimea and invaded eastern Ukraine. 第二, I use
two shadow cases to explore the assumption that clubs and world politics
have distinct status orders. I compare the ªndings from the core case with how
Russian war-making was received in the UN Security Council and in the G-8.
I ªrst analyze the kind of discursive recognition that Russia received in U.S.
public discourse. This approach warrants further explanation. 为了确定, 全部
members of a club act as gatekeepers for prospective candidates. 此外,
the great powers also depend on the recognition of non–great powers to sus-
tain their legitimacy and privileges in world politics.75 Yet, there are two rea-
73. 迈克尔·J. 夏皮罗, “Textualizing Global Politics,” in James Der Derian and Michael J. 夏皮罗,
International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics (列克星敦, 嘛: 列克星敦
图书, 1989), 14.
74. Beaumont, Performing Nuclear Weapons, 58–59.
75. Andrew Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism, and Global Order: What Space for Would-Be Great
权力?,” International Affairs 82, 不. 1 (2006): 6; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Or-
der in World Politics (纽约: 哥伦比亚大学出版社, 1977), 196, https://doi.org/10.1007/
978-1-349-24028-9; 琼斯, “Constructing Great Powers.”
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The Belligerent Bear 23
sons why focusing only on the United States’ discursive recognition is a sound
case selection strategy.
第一的, since the end of World War II, the United States has been the most
ideologically, 军事上, and economically dominant state in world politics.76
This dominance does not mean that the United States dictates whether an out-
sider should become a member. But given the United States’ position and its
overall recognition by the academic community as a peak great power, 我们.
recognition is a necessary condition for great power status in contemporary
world politics.77 Recognition from the United States thus serves as a litmus test
for great power status.
第二, discursive recognition of Russia’s belligerence by the U.S. 民众
and foreign policy elites represents a least likely case for Russian inclusion in
the club. It is a hard case because the elites have little incentive to recognize
Russia as a great power, given that doing so means ascribing social status—
and with that potential power and inºuence—to a historical and contempo-
rary adversary. 而且, status is a scarce good. Gatekeepers of the most
prestigious club in world politics—the great powers—have a strong incentive
to keep potential entrants outside.78 Thus, if Russia is conceived of in the U.S.
public discourse as a great power, it means foreign policy ofªcials will likely
do the same. If these U.S. foreign policy ofªcials recognize Russian great
power status, it increases the likelihood that other established great powers
would do the same.
In the second part of the analysis, I explore the assumption that clubs in
world politics have distinct status orders. I analyze the recognition attributed
to Russia in the UN Security Council and the G-8 after the annexation and in-
vasion. These clubs represent the functional expression of great power status.79
The focus of the analysis is on the status order of the great power club. The UN
76. 赋予生命. Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations (伊萨卡岛, 纽约: 康奈尔大学出版社, 2011),
82–92.
77. See Goh, “Hierarchy and the Role of the United States,” 360–361. I am unaware of any schol-
arly work that places the United States in any clubs below the great powers in the period analyzed
in this article.
78. See Larson, 保罗, and Wohlforth, “Status and World Order,” 9; Greve and Levy, “Power Transi-
系统蒸发散, Status Dissatisfaction, and War,” 8; Renshon, “Status Deªcits and War,” 520; 沃尔福斯,
“Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” 30.
79. Shogo Suzuki, “Seeking ‘Legitimate’ Great Power Status in Post–Cold War International Soci-
埃蒂: China’s and Japan’s Participation in UNPKO,” International Relations 22, 不. 1 (2008): 48,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117807087242; Ian Clark and Christian Reus-Smit, “Liberal Interna-
理性主义, the Practice of Special Responsibilities and Evolving Politics of the Security Council,”
International Politics 50 (2013): 45, https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2012.27; 拉森, “New Perspectives
on Rising Powers,” 250–251.
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国际安全 47:4 24
Security Council and the G-8 offer useful comparisons to the status order of
the great power club. 至关重要的是, if discursive recognition of Russia is similar in
both these clubs and the great power club, it weakens my argument that clubs
have distinct status orders. 反过来, if these clubs’ discursive recognition of
Russia differs from that of the great power club, it strengthens the argument
that clubs have distinct status orders.
The article’s research design is not intended to provide a sole explanation for
status change within these clubs. There are many paths to prestige, 毕竟,
and covering them all is beyond the scope of this article. 因此, while I make a
concerted effort to understand how Russia’s status changed, my analysis is not
an exhaustive explanation.
operationalization of indicators
The distinct organizational structures in the three clubs means that the type of
discourse differs in each case. Members of socially distant clubs, like the great
power club, rarely meet. They do not have a ªxed group of representatives,
and their duties and privileges are not inscribed in statutes enforced by a pro-
tocol department. 因此, the discourse produced on the club’s status order is
decentralized.80 Conversely, members of socially proximate clubs like the UN
Security Council have close and regular interaction with one other. 这里, 这
discourse is centralized and structured in and around representatives of
the council.81 In clubs that are on a spectrum between distant or proximate,
such as the G-8, the status order of the club is upheld by a mixture of central-
ized and decentralized discourse.
For the great power club, I rely on editorials and op-eds on great power
status in ªve major newspapers in the United States. This bottom-up approach
challenges some mainstream assumptions in the literature. Most approaches
assume that state leaders are vested with the authority to bestow recognition
upon other states. 而且, leaders base their decisions to recognize other
states on their ªrst-hand perceptions of such states.82 This conventional ap-
proach obscures the process leading up to whether leaders decide to recognize
80. Wohlforth et al., “Moral Authority and Status in International Relations,” 531; Naylor, Social
Closure and International Society, 64–67; Pål Røren and Anders Wivel, “King in the North: Evalu-
ating the Status Recognition and Performance of the Scandinavian Countries,” International Rela-
系统蒸发散, published ahead of print, 2022, 5–6, https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178221110135.
81. Pouliot, International Pecking Orders; Vincent Pouliot, “Diplomats as Permanent Representa-
特维斯: The Practical Logics of the Multilateral Pecking Order,” International Journal 66, 不. 3 (2011):
543–561, https://doi.org/10.1177/002070201106600302.
82. 拉森, 保罗, and Wohlforth, “Status and World Order,” 8. For a multifaceted, broader ap-
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The Belligerent Bear 25
or not to recognize another state. 至关重要的是, this decision—like any other for-
eign policy decision—is a complex process. It is the result of international pres-
sures and dynamics as well as domestic concerns and priorities.83 To be sure,
the president of the United States has considerable authority to bestow recog-
nition upon another state. 然而, the decision depends on the broader discourses
found within and outside the United States.
Opinion pieces offer a window into those discourses that reºect, 状况,
and enable what foreign policy practitioners can say and do. 当然, edito-
rials and op-eds are often written by political and cultural elites who are some-
times out of touch with the broader public opinion. 尽管如此, I rely on
newspaper opinions because they offer insights into the discourse that became
accepted as common sense. These editorials and op-eds reºect dominant nar-
ratives, and as such they “represent the boundaries of legitimate American
views of the global scene.”84 It is still true that foreign policy practitioners can
bestow recognition on other states. But the broader public discursive space
conditions what is socially possible to say or do.85
To be clear, this kind of discourse analysis cannot predict that foreign policy
leaders will or will not recognize Russia or any other nation as a great power.
实际上, most discourse analysts are inherently skeptical of predictions. 在-
契据, as Kenneth Waltz famously claims, structural theories cannot explain
“why state X made a certain move last Tuesday.”86 Structural approaches are
never deterministic. 然而, in both neorealism and discourse analysis, 结构
(whether material or discursive) can push or discourage certain behaviors.
Although I do not offer predictions, I do show that the public discourse is
likely to have a strong effect on how U.S. leaders and practitioners speak and
act in the world. Even though it is physically possible for practitioners of the
普罗奇, see Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers, 小伙子. 2; Beaumont, “Brexit, Retrotopia
and the Perils of Post-Colonial Delusions.”
83. Anne L. Clunan, “Historical Aspirations and the Domestic Politics of Russia’s Pursuit of Inter-
national Status,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47, nos. 3–4 (2014): 281–290, https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2014.09.002; Rebecca Adler-Nissen, “Are We ‘Lazy Greeks’ or
‘Nazi Germans’?” in Ayqe Zarakol, 编辑。, Hierarchies in World Politics (剑桥: Cambridge Uni-
大学出版社, 2017), 198–218, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108241588.011;
Joshua Freedman,
“Back of the Queue: 英国脱欧, Status Loss, and the Politics of Backlash,” British Journal of Politics and
International Relations 22, 不. 4 (2020): 635, https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148120949824.
84. Ronald R. Krebs, “How Dominant Narratives Rise and Fall: Military Conºict, 政治, 和
Cold War Consensus,” 国际组织 69, 不. 4 (2015): 816, https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0020818315000181.
85. 同上。; Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of
the West (安娜堡: University of Michigan Press, 2006), https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.155507.
86. Kenneth N. 华尔兹, Theory of International Politics (Reading, 嘛: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 171.
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国际安全 47:4 26
United States to utter “Malta is a great power,” such a statement has no root in
the rhetorical truism about what great powers are.87 Thus, someone who
claims that Malta is a great power will face ridicule. The claim is socially im-
可能的. 因此, it is unlikely that leaders or practitioners will ever label Malta
a great power. 换句话说, these commonsense discursive representations
found in the broader public discourse “set the boundaries of what actors can
legitimately articulate in public, what they can collectively (though not indi-
vidually) imagine, and what is politically possible.”88
Instead of covering all U.S. narratives about Russia in my analysis of the
great power club, I show how the U.S. public discourse makes sense of
Russian belligerence. 而且, I illustrate how this sense-making relates to
the status order of the great power club. This discourse in turn constrains and
reºects the possible ways in which foreign policy practitioners can interact
with Russia and the great power club and its status order.89
For the two shadow cases, I collected and analyzed a different type of dis-
课程. For the socially proximate UN Security Council, I collected and ana-
lyzed two types of data among the permanent representatives to showcase the
club’s status order. 第一的, I collected transcripts of ofªcial open council meet-
ings between ambassadors and looked for statements that indicated a rise or
decrease in Russian status because of its actions in Ukraine. 第二, I con-
ducted interviews with former and current ambassadors and diplomats to the
UN or the UN Security Council. The aim for the interviews was to understand
the informal discourse about Russia’s actions among permanent repre-
sentatives and how it aligned with the formal discourse. The second shadow
案件, the G-8, is neither a socially distant club nor a socially proximate one. 铝-
though the membership composition and rules of the club are not as ªrm as
in the UN Security Council, they are not as loose as in the great power club.
For this club, the leaders’ discourse and statements about the Russian an-
nexation and invasion were most unequivocal before, 期间, and after
planned summits.
87. Krebs and Jackson, “Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms,” 45.
88. Krebs, “How Dominant Narratives Rise and Fall,” 813; Jennifer Milliken, “The Study of Dis-
course in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods,” European Journal of Inter-
national Relations 5, 不. 2 (1999): 237, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066199005002003.
89. Iver B. 诺伊曼, “Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy,” Millen-
nium: Journal of International Studies 31, 不. 3 (2002): 630–631, https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829
8020310031201.
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The Belligerent Bear 27
data collection
To understand how U.S. public discourse framed Russian belligerence, I rely
on op-eds and editorials from 2010 到 2019 in ªve newspapers: the Chicago
Tribune, the Los Angeles Times, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, 和
the Washington Post. I used three criteria to select these newspapers. 第一的, 他们的
political inclinations are spread across the political spectrum.90 Second, 这些
newspapers are among the ten outlets with the largest circulations in the
美国. 第三, the sampled newspapers feature long-standing, reputa-
ble foreign policy opinion sections.
Drawing on the academic literature on great powers, I developed a list of
terms used to describe overlapping categories of the great power club.91 I
searched the ProQuest database of U.S. major dailies from January 1, 2010, 到
七月 15, 2019, to construct my corpus.92 This initial search yielded 11,158 edito-
rials and op-eds.93 I screened each piece and completely read those that were
relevant for the topic.94 The total study sample was 544 opinion pieces. I then
coded each piece using the following four criteria: (1) which club or group it
referred to; (2) the time reference;95 (3) whether Russia was positively or nega-
tively compared with the club; 和 (4) which other states were associated with
the club. I used this coded material to get an overview of the discourse and to
understand which representation was dominant at a given time. I then used
this overview to map and layer the discursive representation of Russia’s status
vis-à-vis the great power club.
For the ªrst shadow case, the UN Security Council, I gathered and analyzed
90. See Ceren Budak, Sharad Goel, and Justin M. 饶, “Fair and Balanced? Quantifying Media
Bias through Crowdsourced Content Analysis,” Public Opinion Quarterly 80, 不. S1 (2016): 250–271,
https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfw007.
91. These categories include the singular, plural, and other relevant conjugations of the root terms:
great power, superpower, major power, big country, big power, major country, major state, major
国家, large power, emerging power, emerging state, emerging nation, emerging country, hegem-
在, middle power, regional power, rising power, rising country, rising states, global power, empire,
world power, powerful nation, powerful country, powerful state, hyperpower, leading power,
leading country, and leading state.
92. 我们. Major Dailies, ProQuest, https://www.proquest.com/products-services/US-Major-Dailies
.html.
93. These articles are from the following newspapers: the Chicago Tribune (8 百分), the Los
Angeles Times (9 百分), the New York Times (25 百分), the Wall Street Journal (24 百分), 和
the Washington Post (34 百分).
94. 例如, hundreds of omitted opinion pieces cite “empire,” “superpowers,” or “major
state” but are actually referring to the Empire State Building, Wonder Woman, and Texas,
分别.
95. 例如, time reference indicates whether Russia was referred to as a “former great
power” (过去的), “a great power” (contemporary), or a “potential great power” (未来).
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国际安全 47:4 28
twenty-nine verbatim transcripts of the open council meetings on Ukraine and
Crimea from 2014 到 2019. I put special emphasis on the ªfteen meetings held
在 2014. 下一个, using snowball sampling, I conducted a total of six in-depth in-
terviews with current and former ambassadors and diplomats to the UN
Security Council or the UN. In the analysis I refer to all interviewees as “diplo-
mats” because they preferred to remain anonymous.
For the second shadow case, the G-8, I conducted a focused newspaper
search in LexisNexis on Russia and each of the G-8 members and their repre-
sentatives. The aim was to capture the reactions coming from leaders and top
foreign policy practitioners inside the club. I conducted the search from 2013 到
2020 to capture the immediate reaction to the Russian annexation and inva-
锡安, as well as President Donald Trump’s attempts to re-include Russia to the
G-7 summits.
In the rest of this article, I put this research design to work. 第一的, I analyze
the discursive representations of Russia’s standing vis-à-vis the great power
club according to U.S. newspaper opinion articles. 第二, I analyze the imme-
diate and long-term discursive reactions from the UN Security Council and the
G-8 following the Russian war-making in Ukraine.
The Belligerent Bear and the Club of Great Powers
On February 23, 2014, the Kremlin-supported Ukrainian President Viktor
Yanukovych was overthrown by the Ukrainian Parliament after weeks of pub-
lic protest in Kiev. In the midst of the Ukrainian crisis, Russian special forces
occupied Crimea, claiming that it protected Russia’s access to the Black Sea.
The Russian forces seized control of the Crimean legislature and installed a
pro-Russian prime minister. On March 11, the Supreme Council of Crimea and
the Sevastopol City Council declared independence from Ukraine. Five days
之后, the region held a referendum to join the Russian Federation.
Russia also stirred political protest movements in eastern Ukraine. 从
February to May of 2014, the movement became a violent conºict between
pro-Russian separatists backed by Moscow and the Ukrainian Army. 在一个
replay of the Crimean annexation, pro-Russian militia overtook government
buildings across eastern Ukraine. Separatists in Luhansk and Donetsk de-
clared their independence from Ukraine in May.
Two representations dominated the U.S. public discourse on Russia’s status
leading up to the Crimean annexation and invasion of eastern Ukraine. 这
ªrst representation centered on Russia’s lost superpower status. This represen-
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The Belligerent Bear 29
tation focused on the sharp temporal divide between the former communist
superpower and the current disgruntled Russian regional power. Commenta-
tors said that the loss of wealth, 人口, and power meant that President
Vladimir Putin’s wish to regain status would prove futile.96 “Stripped of its
possessions,” one commentator noted, “the Soviet Empire has been rolled back
and has morphed into a Russia with a wounded ego.”97 The representation de-
scribed a broken state spearheaded by a leader desperately clinging to the
hope of restoring Russia’s former glory. 例如, commentators said that
the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) served to boost
Russia’s vanity. Russia could use it “to bolster its withered status as a super-
力量,” said a Washington Post editorial.98 Likewise, columnist George Will ar-
gued that the treaty beneªted Russia’s need for “psychotherapy,” given that it
“longs to be treated as what it no longer is, a superpower.”99 Ilan Bernan called
the New START “an exercise in arms control as psychiatry” for a Russia that
“still suffers from an acute post-imperial hangover.”100 Russia was ridiculed as
a “pretend post-Soviet Superpower”101 and a state “in pursuit of a superpower
status that [它] has irretrievably lost.”102 Any engagement with the United
状态, be it via Russia’s support for Bashar al-Assad or meetings in the G-8,
was to “cultivate the domestic illusion that Russia remains a great power [嗯-
phasis added].”103
The second representation maintained that Russia was still a disruptive and
potentially dangerous second-tier power. This representation built on the
material realities of the mid-2000s. The Russian economy had stabilized,104
Putin had consolidated and centralized political power, and Russia was gradu-
96. See arguments made by Walter Russell Mead, “The Future Still Belongs to America,” Wall
Street Journal, 七月 2, 2011; Joel Kotkin, “The Kids Will Be Alright—the Coming U.S. Population
Boom Will Bring New Economic Vitality; the Resurgence of Fargo,” Wall Street Journal, 一月 23,
2010; Jackson Diehl, “The Good and the Bad of the Egg-Tossing in Ukraine’s Parliament,”
Washington Post, 四月 27, 2010.
97. Frank Schell, “What’s Wrong with Congress?,” Chicago Tribune, 八月 11, 2011.
98. Editorial, “On the Brink with Russia: Has President Obama Managed to Outwait Vladimir
Putin on Nuclear Arms Control?,” Washington Post, 行进 20, 2010.
99. George F. 将要, “Treaty in a Time Warp,” Washington Post, 十二月 2, 2010.
100. Ilan Bernan, “Obama Gives the Kremlin A Seal of Approval,” Wall Street Journal, Decem-
误码率 24, 2010.
101. Charles Krauthammer, “While Syria Burns,” Washington Post, 四月 27, 2012.
102. Diehl, “The Good and the Bad of the Egg-Tossing in Ukraine’s Parliament.”
103. Editorial, “A Welcome Rebuke to Putin,” Wall Street Journal, 八月 8, 2013; for the same
phrasing see also Editorial, “A Little Russian Help? Nyet,” Chicago Tribune, 六月 17, 2012.
104. S. Neil MacFarlane, “The ‘R’ in BRICs: Is Russia an Emerging Power?,” International Affairs
82, 不. 1 (2006): 43–44, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00514.x.
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国际安全 47:4 30
ally reemerging as a military power.105 For example, commentators portrayed
Russia as a pivotal “major power” or “world power” broker along with
中国, 欧盟 (欧洲联盟), 法国, 德国, 英国 (英国),
and the United States.106 Additionally, indebted to its BRICS (巴西, 俄罗斯,
印度, 和中国) membership, Russia was labeled an “emerging power”107 and
a “rising power” when grouped together with China.108 Furthermore, the repre-
sentation also depicted Russia as a “nuclear superpower.” Russia was seen as
capable of playing a distinctive role in world politics despite it not having any
other symbols associated with great or superpower status. 例如, Leon
Aron suggested that the United States must prepare for “any truculence” and
“any destabilizing developments in the world’s other nuclear superpower.”109
因此, the representation suggested that Russia was a force to be reckoned
和. But the narrative also made clear that the United States was the only
(fully ºedged) superpower in the world; 那是, China was a “rising” major
力量, Russia was in “decline,” and the United States was a stable hege-
mon.110 The emphasis on unipolarity in this discursive representation is also
notable. Other major powers existed. But none posed a symmetrical threat to
美国. In an op-ed for the New York Times, former U.S. diplomat
and president of the Council on Foreign Relations Richard Haas argued: “这
United States faces no great-power rival. And this is likely to remain so for
the foreseeable future. . . . None of the other major powers of this era—China,
俄罗斯, 欧洲, 日本, India—are tempted to challenge the United States for
105. Bettina Renz, “Russian Military Capabilities after 20 Years of Reform,” 生存 56, 不. 3
(2014): 61–84, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2014.920145.
106. For Syria talks, see Nicholas D. Kristof, “From Peace Prize to Paralysis,“ 纽约时报,
六月 10, 2012; Rajan Menon, “Syrian Standoff: Shared Interests Must Pull the United States, 中国
and Russia Together,” 洛杉矶时报, 七月 27, 2012. For Iran talks, see Editorial, “Sanctions
against Iran,“ 纽约时报, 六月 22, 2012; Editorial, “Another Try at Nuclear Talks,” New York
时代, 行进 2, 2013; Gerald F. Seib, “While Talking to Iran, Ducking Friendly Fire,” Wall Street
杂志, 十一月 5, 2013; Gerald F. Seib, “Moment of Truth Arrives for Iran Nuclear Talks,” Wall
Street Journal, 可能 15, 2012.
107. Paul Krugman, “On Economic Hooliganism,“ 纽约时报, 可能 11, 2011; Fouad Ajami,
“America and the Solitude of the Syrians,” Wall Street Journal, 一月 6, 2012.
108. Samuel Moyn, “Human Rights, Not So Pure Anymore,“ 纽约时报, 可能 13, 2012; A.
Wess Mitchell and Jakub J. Grygiel, “America Needs Its Frontline Allies Now More Than Ever,”
Wall Street Journal, 七月 5, 2013.
109. Leon Aron, “Dancing with Putin Again: The Last Thing Russia Needs Is More of the Same
Failed Economic Policies and Politics,” 洛杉矶时报, 十月 3, 2011; also see Leon Aron, “As
the Ice Cracks under Putin, What Will He Do?,” Wall Street Journal, 十二月 19, 2011; 劳伦斯
Krauss, “6 Minutes to . . . Doomsday: Can We Stop the Clock?,” 洛杉矶时报, 一月 22, 2010.
110. Joseph S. Nye, “Another Overhyped Challenge to U.S. 力量,” Wall Street Journal, 六月 20,
2011; Mead, “The Future Still Belongs to America.”
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The Belligerent Bear 31
primacy. America’s per-capita gross domestic product is at least six times that
of China, and the United States spends more on defense than the next 10 县-
tries combined [添加了强调].”111
合在一起, these two dominant representations painted a picture of a
Russia desperate to restore a lost empire in order to rejoin the great power
club. This narrative also had an underlying, ridiculing tone—a tone underlin-
ing how impossible, ludicrous, and farfetched such aspirations were. By mid-
2013, Russia was seen as a global player in world politics. But any prospect of
being seen as a member of the great power club seemed unrealistic.
the empire strikes back
During and after Russia annexed Crimea and invaded Ukraine, a new revived
empire representation replaced the lost superpower representation. Both rep-
resentations built on Russia’s history as a previous great power and super-
力量. 然而, the lost superpower representation drew a sharp line between
contemporary Russia and its historical imperial great power status. 在骗子-
特拉斯特, the new revived empire representation drew a direct parallel between
contemporary Russia and the Russian and Soviet empires. In December 2013,
two Wall Street Journal editorials, 例如, said Putin’s aim was “to
drag Kiev into his own trade and political bloc as he tries to reconstitute a
Russian empire.”112
The link between the Russian empire and the “new” empire was discur-
sively established by presenting Putin as a prospective czar. Former am-
bassador Robert J. Callahan said Putin was “an eager successor to the
czars and commissars [WHO] seeks to re-create the Russian empire, buffer
states and all.”113 Similarly, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman ar-
gued that Putin sought to “restore Russia’s czarist empire”114 and to establish
“the same ‘sphere-of-inºuence’ that Russia had in Central Europe in the days
of the czars.”115 Furthermore, in an op-ed on the tug-of-war between the EU
and Russia over Ukraine, Friedman rhetorically connected the Russian em-
pire and contemporary Russia:
111. Richard N. Haass, “America Can Take a Breather. And It Should,“ 纽约时报, 六月 23,
2013.
112. Editorial, “The Stakes in Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, 十二月 9, 2013; also see Editorial,
“The Putin Crony Rescue Fund,” Wall Street Journal, 十二月 18, 2013.
113. 罗伯特·J. Callahan, “Frustrations of U.S. Foreign Policy,” Chicago Tribune, 十二月 12, 2013.
114. 托马斯·L. 弗里德曼, “The Square People, Part 2,” New York Times, 可能 18, 2014.
115. 托马斯·L. 弗里德曼, “People of Inºuence,” July 2, 2014.
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国际安全 47:4 32
The ªrst uniªed “Rus” state was born in Kiev, when “St. Vladimir the
Great, the Grand Prince of Kiev,” uniªed all the tribes and territories in the re-
gion into an entity called by historians “Kievan Rus.” . . . Now fast-forward
1,000-plus years, and you have another “Vladimir the Great”—Mr. Putin—
massing troops on Ukraine’s border to re-establish Russia’s inºuence here.
Putin recently hinted that it might be time for him to reclaim “Novorossiya” or
New Russia, which is how a region of southeastern Ukraine was referred to by
the czars in the 19th century, when it was part of Russia. So when Putin
says New Russia, he really means Old Russia—a Russia that used to domi-
nate Ukraine.116
Friedman’s argument sets the tone for a sizable group of articles under
the revived empire representation. Commentators saw Russia’s actions as
moves that Russia believed would revive an empire. Conservative columnist
Charles Krauthammer wrote that Ukraine was “the linchpin for Vladimir
Putin’s dream of a renewed imperial Russia.”117 Other commentators and edi-
torials stated that Putin either “position[编辑] contemporary Russia as the heir to
the Russian empire”118 or was trying “to regain a lost empire,”119 “to construct
a 21st-century version of the Soviet empire,”120 or to cobble “together as much
of the old Soviet empire as he [可以].”121 The revived empire representation
ridiculed Russia’s new imperialism. New York Times columnist Ross Douthat
claimed that Putin’s dream of empire “seems far out of his reach, 和
what’s closer to his grasp is something more destructive—a wrecker’s legacy,
not Peter the Great’s, in which his own people gain little from his efforts, 但
the world grows more unstable with every move he makes.”122
Senator John McCain was even more critical. McCain characterized Putin as
“an unreconstructed Russian imperialist,” and further claimed that Putin’s
“regime may appear imposing, but it is rotting inside. His Russia is not a
great power on par with America. It is a gas station run by a corrupt, auto-
cratic regime.”123
Yet the revived empire discursive representation also contained concern that
116. 托马斯·L. 弗里德曼, “Who Will Inºuence Whom?,“ 纽约时报, 四月 27, 2014.
117. Charles Krauthammer, “Woe to U.S. Allies,” Washington Post, 十二月 6, 2013.
118. Masha Gessen, “After Carving Up Ukraine, Where Will Putin Turn Next?,” Washington Post,
可能 10, 2014.
119. David Garner, “The U.S. Needs to Be Resolute against Putin,” Washington Post, 十月 15,
2014.
120. Editorial, “Putin’s Big Mac Attack,” Chicago Tribune, 十月 23, 2014.
121. Editorial, “Merkel Pokes the Russian Bear,” Chicago Tribune, 十一月 20, 2014.
122. Ross Douthat, “Is Putin Winning?,“ 纽约时报, 十月 4, 2015. Also see Editorial, “Rus-
sian Paper Tiger?,” Chicago Tribune, 四月 29, 2014.
123. John McCain, “Obama Has Made America Look Weak,“ 纽约时报, 行进 15, 2014.
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The Belligerent Bear 33
the annexation might lead Putin closer to establishing a new empire and
achieving great power status. During the annexation of Crimea, some voiced
opinions that if Ukraine and Europe were to stop Russia, Putin would have to
give up on any dreams of a revived empire. “Without Ukraine,” a Wall Street
Journal editorial in December 2013 claimed, “Russia can’t become a new em-
pire.”124 Two months later, the same newspaper was gloomier about the pros-
pects of stopping Russia. Two successive editorials argued that without
Ukraine “a new Russian empire is impossible,”125 but a Ukraine under
Moscow’s control would represent “a revived Russian empire if Mr. Putin has
his way.”126 In the words of Walter Russell Mead, “With Ukraine, Russia can at
least aspire to great power status and can hope to build a power center be-
tween the EU and China that can stand on something approaching equal terms
with both. 如果, 另一方面, the verdict of 1989 and the Soviet collapse be-
comes ªnal, Russia must come to terms with the same kind of loss of empire
and stature that Britain, 法国, and Spain have faced. 先生. Putin’s standing at
home will be sharply, and perhaps decisively, diminished.”127
The faction expressing concern about the arrival of a new Russian empire
became stronger after the Russian annexation of Crimea. The narrative focused
less on the utopian idea of an empire and more on a plausible scenario that
Russia could become one. Some argued that the military response by the
West was lacking. A Wall Street Journal editorial in mid-March 2014 claimed
that Putin might “ªgure he’s better off seizing more territory now and forcing
the West to accept his facts on the ground. All the more so given that his domestic
popularity is soaring as he seeks to revive the 19th-century Russian empire
[添加了强调].”128 The combination of a successful annexation from
Moscow’s perspective and a United States–NATO standoff meant that the on-
set of a new Russian empire became more pressing in the discourse. A Chicago
Tribune editorial argued that “Crimea has been lost,” urging Europe to focus
on making “it a painful acquisition for Putin, and signal that his ambitions for
124. Editorial, “Global Disorder Scorecard,” Wall Street Journal, 十二月 31, 2013; also see Serhy
Yekelchyk, “Goodbye, Lenin—and Russia,” Washington Post, 行进 2, 2014; and Mikheil
Saakashvili, “Why the West Must Join the Ukraine Protesters,” Wall Street Journal, 一月 28, 2014,
for a similar line of argument.
125. Editorial, “Why Putin Wants Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, 二月 21, 2014.
126. Editorial, “Ukraine and America,” Wall Street Journal, 二月 20, 2014.
127. Walter Russell Mead, “Putin Knows History Hasn’t Ended,” Wall Street Journal, 二月 21,
2014.
128. Editorial, “Welcome to the 19th Century,” Wall Street Journal, 行进 17, 2014.
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国际安全 47:4 34
a greater Russian empire can go no further.”129 The representation thus shifted
toward a realization that “czarist Russia . . . is reemerging and has in Vladimir
Putin an ambitious warden.”130
From April to September 2014, the public narrative centered on limiting the
expansion of a Russian empire instead of ridiculing the idea. Mead said that
only “power keeps or can keep Russia from rebuilding its old empire
and pushing forward into the former Warsaw Pact states.”131 The narrative
urged the West to prevent Moscow from annexing another state. Doing so
would be “the next front in Russia’s efforts to rebuild its lost empire.”132 Anne
Applebaum even urged the United States to “begin to reinforce the local police
forces of the states that border the new Russian empire [添加了强调].”133
Applebaum’s remark signiªes a broader trend within the discourse. 经过
the end of 2014, what was once a ridiculed dystopian idea of a new Russian
empire had become reality. 而且, Russia’s imperial moves were also in-
creasingly seen as conducive for achieving great power status.
rivaling greats
Parallel to the revived empire narrative was the “rivaling greats” representa-
的. The latter established an even stronger link between belligerence
and great power status. Unlike the revived empire representation, the rivaling
greats narrative avoided ridiculing Russia’s dream of higher status. 反而,
the representation centered on the new security environment between the
United States and Russia. Because of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the repre-
sentation highlighted an antagonistic dyad between two great powers.
Throughout 2014, the rivaling greats representation focused on Russia’s bel-
ligerence in Ukraine. But it also scolded the Barack Obama administration
for not responding proportionally. According to a Washington Post editorial,
“President Obama has led a foreign policy based more on how he thinks the
world should operate than on reality.” In Obama’s vision, “invasions, brute
力量, great-power games and shifting alliances—these were things of
the past. . . . 很遗憾 . . . Russian President Vladimir Putin has not re-
129. Editorial, “Your Turn, 欧洲,” Chicago Tribune, 行进 21, 2014.
130. George F. 将要, “Keeping Russia Out,” Washington Post, 行进 27, 2014.
131. Walter Russell Mead, “Putin Did Americans a Favor,” Wall Street Journal, 六月 2, 2014.
Also see Matthew Kaminski, “Putin Has Exposed Europe’s Cracks,” Wall Street Journal, 六月 17,
2014.
132. Brenda Shaffer, “Russia’s Next Land Grab,“ 纽约时报, 九月 9, 2014.
133. Anne Applebaum, “A New Kind of War,” Washington Post, 四月 17, 2014.
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The Belligerent Bear 35
ceived the memo on 21st-century behavior.”134 Similarly, the Wall Street Journal
criticized Obama for dismantling the U.S. nuclear deterrent and suggested that
the Russian belligerence provided “daily reminders that the great-power rival-
ries of previous centuries are far from over.”135 A few days later, the Wall Street
Journal editorial again lashed out at Obama, suggesting that he “didn’t run
for President to engage in great power politics, but it is still part of the
job description.”136
Throughout 2014, the representation became more adamant about Russia’s
prospective entrance to the great power club. On March 9, 2014, 以前的
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warned of a great power confrontation be-
tween Russia and the United States in a Washington Post op-ed. Rice wrote that
while the United States and Europe have tried to convince Russia that Ukraine
“should not be a pawn in a great-power conºict . . . Putin has never seen it that
方式,” because he views Russia as in “a zero-sum game for the loyalty of for-
mer territories of the empire.” The invasion and possible annexation of
Crimea, Rice claimed, “is his answer to us.”137 Rice thus connected the onset
of a great power conºict with Russia to the revived empire representation and
the annexation of Crimea, arguing that war-making is a way for Russia to be-
come recognized as a great power. In the wake of Russia entering the Syrian
civil war, Rice—along with former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates—was
even more explicit about Russia’s ascent to the great power club:
Putin’s move into Syria is old-fashioned great-power politics. (是的, people do
that in the 21st century.) There is a domestic beneªt to him, but he is not
externalizing his problems at home. Russian domestic and international poli-
cies have always been inextricably linked. Russia feels strong at home when it
is strong abroad—this is Putin’s plea to his propagandized population—and
the Russian people buy it, at least for now. Russia is a great power and derives
its self-worth from that. What else is there? When is the last time you bought a
Russian product that wasn’t petroleum? Moscow matters again in international
政治, and Russian armed forces are on the move [添加了强调].138
The rivaling greats representation remained widespread in the U.S. 民众
foreign policy discourse in the years that followed. But it became the dominant
134. Editorial, “The Risks of Wishful Thinking,” Washington Post, 行进 3, 2014.
135. Editorial, “Putin Invades, Obama Dismantles,” Wall Street Journal, 四月 8, 2014.
136. Editorial, “Putin Acts, Obama Assesses,” Wall Street Journal, 四月 15, 2014.
137. Condoleezza Rice, “A Ukrainian Wake-Up Call,” Washington Post, 行进 9, 2014.
138. Condoleezza Rice and Robert M. Gates, “Countering Putin,” Washington Post, 十月 9,
2015.
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国际安全 47:4 36
discursive representation at the end of Trump’s ªrst year as president. 在
十二月 18, 2017, the Trump administration launched its National Security
Strategy.139 The document traditionally outlines the United States’ major na-
tional security concerns and how the executive branch intends to handle them.
The document sparked extensive debates about U.S. foreign policy, building
on the already established rivaling greats discursive representation: “After be-
ing dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition re-
turned. China and Russia began to reassert their inºuence regionally and
globally. 今天, they are ªelding military capabilities designed to deny
America access in times of crisis and to contest our ability to operate freely in
critical commercial zones during peacetime. 简而言之, they are contesting our
geopolitical advantages and trying to change the international order in their
favor [添加了强调].”140 The document further stated that “Russia seeks to
restore its great power status and establish spheres of inºuence near its bor-
ders” and that “with its invasions of Georgia and Ukraine, Russia demon-
strated its willingness to violate the sovereignty of states in the region.”141
In the wake of the publication of the National Security Strategy, 大部分的
major newspapers published editorials that addressed the renewed great
power competition.142 Commentators began using “great power competition”
to justify their opinions beyond Ukraine. Former Ambassador to NATO
Victoria Nuland wrote an op-ed ahead of the Helsinki meeting between Trump
and Putin, arguing that the U.S. president “can make American diplomacy
great again if he demonstrates to Mr. Putin that normal relations with us re-
quire civilized global behavior by Russia. The alternative—a NATO in tatters
and a re-energized Mr. Putin—would leave America weaker and Mr. Trump
139. The National Security Strategy was a follow-up to then defense secretary Jim Mattis’s National
Defense Strategy, launched in January in that same year. While the document remains conªdential,
Mattis claimed in presenting it that Russia and China were “revisionist powers” and that “great
power competition, not terrorism, is now the primary focus of the U.S. national security.”
See “U.S. Military Puts ‘Great Power Competition’ at Heart of Strategy: Mattis,” 路透社,
一月 19, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-china-russia/u-s-military-puts-
great-power-competition-at-heart-of-strategy-mattis-idUSKBN1F81TR.
140. White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 十二月 2017
(华盛顿, 直流: Historical Ofªce, Ofªce of the Secretary of Defense, 2017), https://历史
.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/NSS2017.pdf.
141. 同上。, 25, 47.
142. Editorial, “The Trump Doctrine, in Theory; Realism about Rising Threats but Some Policy
Disconnects,” Wall Street Journal, 十二月 19, 2017; Editorial, “Trump’s Steely Approach to a
Treacherous World,” Chicago Tribune, 十二月 18, 2017; Editorial, “Raising the Risk of Nuclear
战争,“ 纽约时报, 一月 14, 2018; Editorial, “On Russia, We Need More Reason and Less
Frenzy,” Washington Post, 二月 27, 2018.
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The Belligerent Bear 37
the loser in the great power competition he himself has initiated.”143 Senator
Jon Kyl and former CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell urged that “nuclear
weapons must continue to maintain their deterrent effect” when the govern-
ment mindset shifts “to a return of great power competition with Russia and
China.”144 Similarly, former CIA Director David Petraeus and Senator Sheldon
Whitehouse wrote in the Washington Post that because Russia had weaponized
“corruption as an instrument of foreign policy,” the ªght against it “has be-
come a strategic one—and a battle ground in a great power competition.”145
And New York Times columnists Thomas Friedman and David Brooks wrote
that the era of great power rivalry is coming back.146 The vocal involvement of
Russia and the United States in the 2019 Venezuelan presidential crisis led
Mead to label it the һrst major crisis of this new era of great-power competi-
tion.”147 It also prompted former NATO Ambassador Ivo Daalder to refer to it
as a “site of great power conºict between the United States on one side and
俄罗斯, China and Iran on the other.”148
China’s entry to the great power club boosted Russia’s status ascent.149 The
rivaling greats narrative focused on China and Russia as a collective antago-
nist “Other.” Three developments framed this discursive othering of Russia
和中国. 第一的, Russia and China share overlapping club memberships. 两个都
were nuclear weapons states150 and members of the G-20, P5 (永恒的
members of the UN Security Council),151 and the BRICS,152 and they were
143. Victoria Nuland, “A Moment of Truth for Trump,“ 纽约时报, 七月 7, 2018.
144. Jon Kyl and Michael Morell, “Why America Needs Low-Yield Nuclear Warheads Now,”
Washington Post, 十一月 30, 2018.
145. David Petraeus and Sheldon Whitehouse, “Authoritarians’ Corruption Is a Weapon—and a
Weakness,” Washington Post, 行进 11, 2019.
146. David Brooks, “Voters, Your Foreign Policy Views Stink!,“ 纽约时报, 六月 14, 2019;
托马斯·L. 弗里德曼, “Who to Elect for a Crisis at 3 a.m.?,“ 纽约时报, 行进 13, 2019.
147. Walter Russell Mead, “Maduro Is Putin’s Man in Caracas,” Wall Street Journal, 一月 29,
2019.
148. Ivo Daalder, “In Venezuela, 我们. Military Intervention Is Not the Answer,” Chicago Tribune,
可能 9, 2019; also see Drew Holland Kinney, “What the History of Coups in the Middle East Tells
Us about Venezuela,” Washington Post, 可能 2, 2019.
149. Commentators already saw China as an established great power by 2010. See Harold
迈耶森, “How We Help China; the Shining City on a Hill Needs Repair,” Washington Post,
行进 31, 2010; Fareed Zakaria, “China’s Case of Nerves,” Washington Post, 六月 7, 2010; 罗伯特·J.
Samuelson, “China’s ‘Me First’ Doctrine,” Washington Post, 二月 15, 2010; John Bolton, “骗局-
fronting China’s Snarl,” Wall Street Journal, 八月 10, 2010.
150. Kyl and Morell, “Why America Needs Low-Yield Nuclear Warheads Now.”
151. David Gordon and Ash Jain, “Forget the G-8; It’s Time for the D-10,” Wall Street Journal,
六月 17, 2013.
152. Mead, “Putin Did Americans a Favor.”
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国际安全 47:4 38
grouped in the rising power club.153 Second, the narrative focused on Russia
and China’s combative illiberalism and authoritarianism. 例如, Fareed
Zakaria asked how the order that the United States built could be ensured to
“continue, even as new powers—such as China—rise and old ones—such as
Russia—ºex their muscles?”154 Third, the discursive othering of Russia and
China as a deªant duo was also helped by the increasing cooperation between
the two states. As Ali Wyne argued, “Russia is a declining power with re-
gional, perhaps continental, ambitions. China is a rising power with global
ambitions. Russia’s quest for great-power status rides partly on the perception
that it enjoys a privileged alliance with Beijing. 中国, 同时, regards
Russia as one of an ever-growing array of countries eager to furnish it with vi-
tal commodities. Russia is important but not indispensable.”155
The stronger relationship between Russia and China fed into the rivaling
greats narrative. Under this representation, any mistrust that Russia and China
shared was superseded by common opposition to the United States. The “bud-
ding partnership between these two great powers—who were riven for de-
cades by high levels of mistrust—is a natural response to the adversity and
confrontation in the U.S.-Russian relationship,” Alexander Gabuev wrote in a
Wall Street Journal op-ed.156
经过 2019, the rivaling greats representation had become normalized in the
public discourse on U.S. foreign policy. The depiction of the contemporary se-
curity climate dominated by great power antagonism produced symmetry
between Russia and the United States. The idea of a poor, weak, and resentful
post-Soviet regional power—prominent in the early 2010s lost superpower
representation—was replaced by an idea of Russia that competed on equal
terms with the great power United States and the new great power China.157 In
writing about the demise of the liberal international order, Mead argued:
“Great powers like Russia and China never liked this approach, seeing it as a
thinly disguised form of U.S. hegemony and a threat to their illiberal political
153. Gerald F. Seib, “In Syria and Beyond, a Dangerous New Era Dawns; 美国. 同时地
Confronts an Aggrieved Russia and an Aggressive Rising Power in China, a Situation that Calls
for Dexterous Diplomacy,” Wall Street Journal, 四月 16, 2018.
154. Fareed Zakaria, “The Perils of Leaning Forward,” Wall Street Journal, 六月 6, 2014. Also see
Walter Russell Mead, “2018’s Biggest Loser Was the Liberal International Order,” Wall Street Jour-
纳尔, 十二月 31, 2018; Vance Serchuk, “Russia and China Are Outwitting America,” Washington
邮政, 四月 10, 2019.
155. Ali Wyne, “The Limits of China-Russia Cooperation,” Wall Street Journal, 可能 23, 2014.
156. Alexander Gabuev, “China and Russia’s Dangerous Entente,” Wall Street Journal, 十月 4,
2017.
157. For a similar academic conclusion, see John J. 米尔斯海默, “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall
of the Liberal International Order,” 国际安全 43, 不. 4 (春天 2019): 42, https://
doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342.
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The Belligerent Bear 39
systems.”158 Other op-eds referred to China and Russia as “great powers,”159
“great power rivals,”160 “authoritarian great powers,”161 or “rising great pow-
ers.”162 By the end of the 2010s, the consensus among commentators was that
Russia had arrived in the great power club.163
rival explanations of russia’s great power attribution
Before I analyze the status effects of Russia’s war against Ukraine in other
clubs in world politics, I consider two rival explanations for Russia’s entry into
the great power club. 第一的, Russia’s rise to great power standing could be a
function of its increase in power during the 1990s and 2000s. 桌子 1 presents
three measures of capabilities as a share (percentage) of major power capabili-
领带: 国内生产总值, military expenditures, and national power capa-
能力. Three factors facilitated the representation of Russia as a second-tier
major power with considerable inºuence in world politics: (1) Russia’s mili-
tary expenditures rose during the period; (2) Putin centralized and consoli-
dated power; 和 (3) Russia maintained its large nuclear arsenal.164 But the
change in overall distribution of capabilities is too small to exhaustively ex-
plain the increasing recognition of Russia’s great power status during the per-
iod. As table 1 节目, the size of Russia’s economy and overall national power
158. Mead, “2018’s Biggest Loser Was the Liberal International Order.”
159. Mary Anastasia O’Grady, “The Case for Force in Venezuela,” Wall Street Journal, 六月 3, 2019.
160. Katrina vanden Heuvel, “Progressives Are Starting to Deªne a New Realism for Our Na-
tional Security Strategy,” Washington Post, 行进 5, 2019.
161. Robert Kagan, “The Strongmen Strike Back,” Washington Post, 行进 14, 2019.
162. Dan Sullivan, “Trump Has Not Been Soft on Russia. He’s Been Tougher Than Obama,”
Washington Post, 行进 28, 2019.
163. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss how the rivaling greats representation within
the public discourse spilled over into the beliefs and practices of foreign policy leaders and practi-
系统蒸发散. 然而, evidence suggests that it did. 例如, John McCain, who in March of 2014 说
explicitly that Russia was “not a great power,“ 在 2016 和 2017 embraced the notion of an era of
“great power competition with Russia and China.” Compare McCain, “Obama Made America
Look Weak” with U.S. House of Representatives, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017, Conference Report, 114th Cong., 2nd sess. (十二月 23, 2016), Congressional Record S.2943,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/2943/text; and National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Motion to Proceed, 115th Cong., 1st sess. (七月 10, 2017), 骗局-
gressional Record S.1519, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1519/text.
相似地, President Joseph Biden still referred to the “growing rivalry with China and Russia” in
his Interim National Security Strategic Guidance. President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Interim Na-
tional Security Strategic Guidance (华盛顿, 直流: White House, 行进 2021), 6, https://万维网
.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf. 而且, he broke with Presi-
dent Barack Obama’s policy to not refer to Russia as a great power when, before his meeting with
President Putin in Geneva in 2021, he referred to Russia and the United States as “two great pow-
in Geneva,” C-SPAN,
ers.” “President Biden and Russian President Putin Hold Summit
六月 16, 2021, https://www.c-span.org/video/?512681-1/president-biden-russian-president-putin-
hold-summit-geneva.
164. Renz, “Russian Military Capabilities”; MacFarlane, “The ‘R’ in BRICs,” 43–44.
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国际安全 47:4 40
桌子 1. Comparing Concentrations of Power: Share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
Military Expenditures, and National Power Capabilities among Major Powers
(percentage of aggregate major power capabilities), 1992–2016
Share of GDP among major powers (in percent)
年
中国
法国
德国
印度
日本
俄罗斯
团结的
王国
团结的
状态
1992
2000
2010
2016
6
9
19
25
8
7
6
5
11
10
8
7
2
3
4
5
16
14
11
9
4
3
3
3
8
8
7
6
45
47
42
39
Share of military expenditures among major powers (in percent)
年
中国
法国
德国
印度
日本
俄罗斯
团结的
王国
团结的
状态
1992
2000
2010
2016
3
6
10
17
6
6
4
4
6
6
3
4
2
4
4
5
5
6
4
4
5
3
4
6
6
6
5
4
67
63
67
56
Share of national power capabilities (CINC) among major powers (in percent)
年
中国
法国
德国
印度
日本
俄罗斯
团结的
王国
团结的
状态
1992
2000
2010
2016
23
30
37
41
4
3
3
2
6
5
3
3
12
13
14
15
10
9
7
6
13
9
7
6
5
4
3
2
28
26
26
24
SOURCES: GDP (持续的 2015 美元$), World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GDP.MKTP.KD; SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所, https://milex.sipri.org/sipri; David J. 歌手, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965. National Material Capabilities v.6.0,” in Bruce Russett, 编辑。, 和平, 战争, and Numbers (Beverly Hills, CA: 智者, 1972), 19–48, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. 笔记: The table shows the share of power capabilities relative to the total power capabilities of the eight major powers in the study. Distribution of GDP among major powers is based on constant 2015 $我们. Distribution of military expenditures among major powers is
based on constant 2020 $我们. The Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) is an aggregate measure consisting of six variables (military expenditures, armed forces, steel production, energy consumption, urban population, and total population) across three di- mensions of national power. capabilities remained only a fraction of those of the United States and China during the measured period. The timing of Russia’s entry into the great power club suggests that the war against Ukraine—and not material capabilities— was the immediate cause of increased status recognition as a great power. The second rival explanation for Russia’s entry into the great power club is l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / 直接的 . 米特 . 呃呃 / 我是c / 文章 – p d l f / / / / 4 7 4 7 2 0 9 0 9 7 9 / 我是 c _ a _ 0 0 4 5 8 压力 . 来宾来访 0 7 九月 2 0 2 3 The Belligerent Bear 41 that Russia was involved in multiple wars when it gained this status, not just when it annexed Crimea and invaded eastern Ukraine. 实际上, Russia has not stopped ªghting since it ªrst became a state in 1991. 尤其, its interven- tion in the Syrian civil war boosted the perception in the public discourse of an emerging great power.165 Even though Russia’s participation in the Syrian civil war helped construct an antagonistic “Other” to the United States, the Ukrainian war had an even stronger effect. It was the annexation of Crimea and subsequent invasion of eastern Ukraine that engendered associations with Russian imperial behavior.166 This imperial behavior was in turn the narrative foundation for the discursive recognition of Russia as a great power. 总共, the annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine are not a monocausal explanation for the increased recognition of Russia as a great power during the 2014–2019 period. Russia would not be considered as a potential entrant to the club had it not possessed sufªcient material capa- 能力. And Russia’s overall belligerence contributed to the idea of a resur- gent and antagonistic great power rival. 尽管如此, I contend that Russia’s actions in Ukraine were the immediate cause of the increasing rhetorical recog- nition in U.S. foreign policy discourse of Russia as a member of the great power club. Russia’s Status in the UN Security Council and the G-8 Annexing Crimea and invading eastern Ukraine meant that Russia was increasingly conceived of as a great power in the U.S. public discourse. 因此, the status order of the great power club values belligerence. A key theoretical argument of this article is that status orders differ from club to club. War might be positively received in one club but stigmatized in another. What conse- quences did the war have for Russia’s standing in other clubs of world poli- 抽动症? To answer the question, I analyze the discourse on Russian status within the UN Security Council and the G-8. I show that Russia’s status remained sta- ble in the UN Security Council because of established legal privileges and the 165. For examples of opinion articles that connected great power status and the Syrian civil war, see Rice and Gates, “Countering Putin”; Michael Ignatieff and Leon Wieseltier, “Enough Is Enough—U.S. Abdication on Syria Must Come to an End,” Washington Post, 二月 9, 2016; Charles Krauthammer, “While Obama Fiddles,” Washington Post, 二月 25, 2016; Doyle McManus, “Why the Cease-Fire in Syria Won’t Work,” 洛杉矶时报, 九月 14, 2016; Jochen Bittner, “Who Will Win the New Great Game?,“ 纽约时报, 四月 26, 2018. 166. See Walter Russell Mead, “Russia and Europe Vie to Win the Prize of Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, 十一月 15, 2013; Mead, “Putin Knows History Hasn’t Ended”; Editorial, “Why Putin Wants Ukraine”; Stein Ringen, “Putin Fights for His Empire,” 洛杉矶时报, 可能 18, 2016. l 从http下载 : / / 直接的 . 米特 . 呃呃 / 我是c / 文章 – p d l f / / / / 4 7 4 7 2 0 9 0 9 7 9 / 我是 c _ a _ 0 0 4 5 8 压力 . 来宾来访 0 7 九月 2 0 2 3 国际安全 47:4 42 UN Security Council’s interest in cooperating with Russia on other issues. In the G-8, there were no such established legal privileges or interest in working on other issues. 因此, Russia was thrown out of the club because it violated the club’s shared rules, 价值观, and order. 总共, the status outcomes for Russia in these three clubs diverged. This ªnding strengthens the theoretical claim that clubs in world politics have distinct and sometimes diverging status orders. the un security council In 2014, Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that reafªrmed Ukraine’s territorial integrity.167 But the veto did not deter the UK, 美国, and France (the P3, 集体地) from condemning Russia’s actions.168 In 2014, the council met ªfteen times to discuss the developments in eastern Ukraine and Crimea. According to one diplomat, the P3 strategy for these meetings was to “expose Russian lies and hypocrisy.”169 Throughout the ses- 西翁, the P3 ambassadors stigmatized Russia within the UN Security Council. Ahead of the annexation, the French ambassador said, “Russia will gain Crimea and lose its credibility.”170 And when Russia tries to return to its foun- dations and restore the credibility of Russian diplomacy, the French ambassa- dor continued, “it will be met with nothing but sarcasm and a shrug.”171 The British ambassador argued that in the “twenty-ªrst century, no country should be acting with such blatant disregard for international law,” suggesting that Russia’s “political and economic reputation have already suffered” following the annexation.172 The P3 viewed the annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine as disrupting the international order, which warranted conse- quences for Russia’s standing within the UN Security Council. Despite the P3’s efforts, 然而, Russia’s status within the council at large remained stable. The main reason for this stability is that Russia’s social 167. Emily Crawford, “United Nations General Assembly Resolution on the Territorial Integrity of Ukraine,” International Legal Materials 53, 不. 5 (2014): 927, https://doi.org/ 10.5305/intelegamate .53.5.0927. 168. Alisher Faizullaev and Jérémie Cornut, “Narrative Practice in International Politics and Di- plomacy: The Case of the Crimean Crisis,” Journal of International Relations and Development 20, 不. 3 (2017): 578–604, https://doi.org/10.1057/jird.2016.6; Juliet J. 落下, “Territory, 主权, and Entitlement: Diplomatic Discourses in the United Nations Security Council,” Political Geography 81 (2020): 102208, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2020.102208. 169. Author interview with diplomat, by Zoom, 十二月 15, 2020. 170. United Nations Security Council, 7134th Meeting, 行进 13, 2014, S/PV.7134, 9. 171. 同上. 172. United Nations Security Council, 7125th Meeting, 行进 3, 2014, S/PV.7125, 7. l 从http下载 : / / 直接的 . 米特 . 呃呃 / 我是c / 文章 – p d l f / / / / 4 7 4 7 2 0 9 0 9 7 9 / 我是 c _ a _ 0 0 4 5 8 压力 . 来宾来访 0 7 九月 2 0 2 3 The Belligerent Bear 43 status within the council is closely connected to its legal status privileges as a P5 country with veto rights.173 In the words of one diplomat, “the P5 are at the top of the pecking order in any way you cut it. . . . The system is set up in a way . . . [那] if you want the system to work you have to engage with the P5.”174 This tiered status system makes it necessary for the UN Security Council members to compartmentalize their tasks. 一方面, Russia needs the council to work to preserve the esteem associated with being a per- manent member.175 As one diplomat noted, given that Russia’s “permanent membership is at the absolute heart of their big power status,” it would simply not “be in the interest of Russia to freeze the rest of business or whatever was happening outside Ukraine.”176 On the other hand, the other members of the council need to include Russia to get other things done. As the diplomat re- 被称为, “even though we were hammering Russia on Ukraine in the morning, the Security Council was still conducting other business in the afternoon.”177 While Russia’s status inside the council did not increase, Russia’s ªxed privi- leges and the members’ joint interest in cooperation meant that its status within the council remained relatively stable. the group of eight (g-8) The Russian occupation and March 2014 referendum on the status of Crimea drew immediate criticism from the members of the G-8. But unlike the UN Security Council, the G-8 sanctioned Russia. On March 2, 2014, the leaders of the seven other members issued a joint communiqué condemning Russia’s “clear violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine,” which also contravened “the principles and values on which the G7 and the G8 oper- ate.”178 Consequently, the other seven members suspended their participation in the scheduled G-8 summit in Sochi, 俄罗斯, in June.179 “You just don’t in the 21st Century behave in 19th Century fashion by invading another country,” 173. Pouliot, International Pecking Orders, 40–41, 167; Roy Allison, 俄罗斯, the West, and Military In- tervention (牛津: 牛津大学出版社, 2013), 176, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/ 9780199590636.001.0001. 174. Author interview with diplomat, by Zoom, 十二月 15, 2020. 175. Author interview with diplomat, by Zoom, 十二月 14, 2020; author interview with diplo- 垫, by telephone, 十二月 17, 2020. 176. Author interview with diplomat, by Zoom, 十二月 15, 2020. 177. 同上. 178. “Statement by G7 Nations,” G7 Research Group, 行进 2, 2014, http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/ summit/2014sochi/ukraine_140302.html. 179. 同上. l 从http下载 : / / 直接的 . 米特 . 呃呃 / 我是c / 文章 – p d l f / / / / 4 7 4 7 2 0 9 0 9 7 9 / 我是 c _ a _ 0 0 4 5 8 压力 . 来宾来访 0 7 九月 2 0 2 3 国际安全 47:4 44 said U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry. “If Russia wants to be a G8 country, it needs to behave like a G8 country,” he continued.180 After the annexation, the leaders of Canada, 法国, 德国, 英国, 和美国, threatened Russia with permanent exclusion from the club. Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper said that the exclusion was a way to harm Russia’s status: “A regime does not spend $50-billion on the Olympics if
it does not care about its international reputation.”181 On March 24, the seven
states issued a joint statement announcing that “Russia’s actions in recent
weeks are not consistent” with the rest of the group’s “shared belief and
shared responsibilities,” which led them to suspend their “participation in the
G-8 until Russia changes course.”182
During the summit in Quebec in June 2018, Trump launched a bid to let
Russia back in, suggesting that the G-8 was “a more meaningful group than
the G7.”183 But Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said that readmittance
was “not something we are even remotely looking at.”184 German Chancellor
Angela Merkel said that readmitting Russia could not happen unless “substan-
tial progress in regard to the problems with Ukraine” was made.185 Two years
之后, President Trump again invited President Putin to the G-7 summit at
Camp David.186 And again the G-7 members pushed back. Trudeau said that
Russia was excluded because it invaded Crimea, and its disrespect of interna-
tional rules and norms was why it “will continue to remain out.”187 Unlike
with the UN Security Council, the G-8 had a clear mechanism to cause harm to
Russia’s status within the club: exclusion. The violation of Ukraine’s sover-
eignty was not in line with the club’s “values,” “principles,” “shared re-
180. Rebecca Kaplan, “John Kerry Warns of Consequences for Russia after Ukraine Invasion,” Face
the Nation, 行进 2, 2014, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/john-kerry-warns-of-consequences-
for-russia-after-ukraine-invasion/.
181. Steven Chase and Mark Mackinnon, “Leaders Cancel G8 Summit, Excluding Russia from
团体,” Globe and Mail, 行进 24, 2014, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/
leaders-cancel-g8-summit-excluding-russia-from-group/article17644834/.
182. “G7: The Hague Declaration,” European Council, 行进 24, 2014, http://www.g8.utoronto
.ca/summit/2014brussels/hague-declaration.pdf.
183. Jennªer Hansler, “Trump Again Calls for Readmitting Russia to G7, Blames Obama for Cri-
mea’s Annexation,” 美国有线电视新闻网, 六月 9, 2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/09/politics/trump-
russia-g8-press-conference/index.html.
184. 同上.
185. 同上.
186. Julian Borger, “Donald Trump Offers to Invite Vladimir Putin to Expanded G7 Sum-
mit,“ 监护人, 六月 1, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/01/donald-trump-
vladimir-putin-g7-call.
187. 同上. Also see Charlie Cooper, “UK Would Veto Russia’s Return to G7,” Politico, 六月 1, 2020,
https://politico.eu/article/uk-boris-johnson-would-veto-russia-vladimir-putin-g7-return/.
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The Belligerent Bear 45
sponsibilities,” and “like-minded” members who were dedicated “to the rule
of law.”188
总共, the core case and the two shadow cases show three variations in out-
come. Despite all being high-status clubs, the analysis supports my theory that
status orders govern what is considered prestigious in a club. Russian war-
making in Ukraine propelled Russia toward becoming a member of the great
power club. 相比之下, it had no effect on Russia’s standing within the UN
Security Council, and it diminished Russia’s club status within the G-8. 这些
three cases show that the status orders in clubs of world politics vary enough
to potentially cause diverging individual status effects for the same kind
of action.
The Future of Russia’s Social Status
In February 2022, Russia launched a new stage in the war against Ukraine. A
full-scale invasion replaced the hybrid war that Russian-supported militias
had been ªghting in eastern Ukraine since 2014. Leaders and experts, 包括-
ing Putin himself, expected Kiev to fall within a matter of days.189 It did not.
After Russia’s successive defeats in Ukraine, experts have argued that its im-
moral actions, combined with its poor military performance, mean that
its standing in world politics would drop.190 On the basis of the ªndings in this
文章, I would advocate for more tentative predictions. 第一的, Russia’s status
has not uniformly decreased across the international system. Wars do not
either increase or decrease a state’s social status because there is no all-
encompassing status hierarchy in world politics. The invasion of Ukraine
and annexation of Crimea caused different status effects in the great power
188. Tristen Naylor suggests that it was the club’s core “value of the inviolability of sovereign ter-
ritory and the violation of international law that served as the impetus for Russia’s expulsion.”
Naylor, Social Closure and International Society, 47.
189. Jake Epstein and Charles R. 戴维斯, “Putin Thought Russia’s Military Could Capture Kyiv in 2
Days, but It Still Hasn’t in 20,” Business Insider, 行进 15, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/
vladimir-putin-russian-forces-could-take-kyiv-ukraine-two-days-2022-3?r(西德:2)我们&和(西德:2)时间.
190. 看, 例如, Lynne Hartnett, “The Long History of Russian Imperialism Shaping Putin’s
战争,” Washington Post, 行进 2, 2022; Daniel R. Depetris, “Is Russia Still a Great Power?,”
Newsweek, 九月 30, 2022, https://www.newsweek.com/russia-still-great-power-opinion-
1747602; Taras Kuzio, “Putin’s Failing Ukraine Invasion Proves Russia Is No Superpower,” Atlan-
tic Council, 十一月 1, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-
failing-ukraine-invasion-proves-russia-is-no-superpower/; Phillips P. O’Brien, “Ukraine Has Ex-
posed Russia as a Not-So-Great Power,” Atlantic, 七月 1, 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/
ideas/archive/2022/07/rethinking-russia-ukraine-international-political-power-military-strength/
661452/.
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国际安全 47:4 46
club, in the G-8, and in the UN Security Council. Clubs containing different
status orders are thus likely to respond differently to the current stage of the
Ukraine war.
第二, military blunders do not necessitate status loss. One of my core ar-
guments in this article is that—contrary to popular belief and amid the noise of
condemnation—successful wars can generate recognition in certain clubs.
反过来, the ineffective use of force could harm Russia’s status as a great
力量. 例如, the Soviet Union’s failed war in Afghanistan and subse-
昆特 1989 withdrawal contributed to its loss of superpower status.191 In con-
特拉斯特, the United States retained its superpower status following its loss in the
Vietnam War.192 And while the Suez crisis caused reputational damage to
英国, it is still considered a great power.193 Moreover, even if Russia were
to lose its great power status given its poor military performance in Ukraine, 它
is likely to be represented as a second-tier power within the foreign policy dis-
课程. Key status symbols, such as nuclear weapons, ensure a position not too
far below the great power club.
第三, initial reactions are a poor indication of a state’s long-term status rec-
ognition as a great power. 这 2014 annexation of Crimea and invasion of east-
ern Ukraine were immediately met with ridicule, moral upheaval, and strong
criticism in the U.S. foreign policy discourse. The rivaling greats representa-
tion only became dominant years after the initial annexation of Crimea. 因此,
while Russia’s military may have suffered a reputational loss after it launched
its full-scale war against Ukraine in 2022, it is too soon to conclude that it is no
longer a great power because of its actions.
结论
在本文中, I have explored under which conditions war can lead to higher
social status in world politics. 这样做, I developed a theory of status orders,
191. A. Z. Hilali, “Afghanistan: The Decline of Soviet Military Strategy and Political Status,” Jour-
nal of Slavic Military Studies 12, 不. 1 (行进 1999): 114–115, https://doi.org/10.1080/13518049
908430380; Daria Fane, “After Afghanistan: The Decline of Soviet Military Prestige,” Washington
季刊 13, 不. 2 (六月 1990): 5–16, https://doi.org/10.1080/01636609009477632.
192. John Glaser, “Status, Prestige, Activism and the Illusion of American Decline,” Washington
季刊 41, 不. 1 (2018): 173–197, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2018.1445903.
193. Renshon, Fighting for Status, 233–244; David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and
World Power in the Twentieth Century (伦敦: 朗文, 1991), 205; 大卫·M. McCourt, “Has Brit-
ain Found Its Role?,” 生存: Global Politics and Strategy 56, 不. 2 (2014): 159–178, https://doi.org/
10.1080/00396338.2014.901746; Volgy et al., “Major Power Status in International Politics.”
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The Belligerent Bear 47
which are shared assumptions about what counts as prestigious in a given so-
cial club of world politics. I argued that different clubs in world politics have
distinct status orders, and that war and aggression might be ways for states to
gain higher status if the relevant status order values belligerence.
I used discourse analysis as a method of analysis to explore status orders
and their components. Using the U.S. public discourse as an analytical win-
dow, I conducted a single case study of the great power club to understand
how status orders affect the relationship between social status and war. To ex-
plore the assumption that clubs in world politics have distinct status orders, 我
analyzed the discourse in the core case with two ancillary shadow case stud-
是的: the UN Security Council and the G-8. I argued that if the type of status rec-
ognition in the UN Security Council and the G-8 differs from that in the great
power club, it increases the conªdence that the esteem of war depends on the
status order in which it is interpreted.
这 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine
shifted the U.S. public discourse. 随着时间的推移, this discourse labeled Russia as a
disgruntled and disillusioned regional power, then as a resurgent imperial
力量, and then increasingly as a great power rival. Whether a planned status
move or not, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine
was viewed by the U.S. public as in line with the status order of the great
power club. 相比之下, Russia’s status remained stable in the UN Security
Council because of established legal privileges and the council’s joint interest
in cooperating with Russia on other issues. But these two factors were not
relevant to the status order of the G-8, and thus that club ejected Russia for vio-
lating its shared rules, 价值观, and order.
These ªndings are consequential for the future study of status in interna-
关系. 第一的, the effective use of force is a central component of the
status order of the great power club. Although public elites in the United
States condemned and criticized Russia’s annexation of Crimea and invasion
of eastern Ukraine, they simultaneously recognized that such moves elevated
Russian’s standing vis-à-vis the great powers. 第二, an act of war can
have divergent status effects depending on the audiences. Waging war
against Ukraine raised Russia’s status in the great power club, demolished it in
the G-8, and caused little change within the UN Security Council. 因此, 这
often-mentioned statement that war either elevates or diminishes states’
地位, without specifying in which clubs the status change occurred, is logi-
cally invalid. 第三, if the type of status order decides whether states get status
from ªghting, the consequence is that status orders also determine the type of
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国际安全 47:4 48
recognition that states receive from other actions. Any type of foreign policy
action or behavior, of which war-making is one example, affect multiple audi-
ences that are likely to respond to the act in different ways. Incorporating anal-
yses of social clubs’ status orders is thus crucial for understanding the
recognition that a state receives for its actions.
There are ªve key caveats for these ªndings. 第一的, war should not be seen as
an exhaustive explanation for Russia’s changed status in the three clubs that I
analyze in this article. I have shown that Russia’s standing vis-à-vis the great
power club improved because of ªghting. But other political, 经济的, 和
military factors might have facilitated or indirectly inºuenced this change.
而且, China has already arrived in the great power club without having
to ªght. This juxtaposition reinforces the point that there are many paths to
prestige. This article has sought to illuminate one of those paths.
第二, not all wars may represent a path to prestige. UN-led peacekeeping
missions are fundamentally different than hybrid warfare and annexations.
因此, these forms of war and the ways that they are conducted should pro-
duce different status effects in different clubs. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in
2014 was effective and precise, resulting in few battle deaths and symbolizing
the military superiority of the state. This outcome, 反过来, strengthened the
idea that Russia belonged in the great power club. 相比之下, Russia’s ineffec-
主动的, full-scale invasion of Ukraine beginning in 2022 is not likely to beneªt
Russia’s status as a great power.
第三, the annexation and hybrid warfare proved successful for Russia’s bid
for great power status. But other states may not achieve the same result for
similar actions. The discourse on Russia’s actions in Crimea and eastern
Ukraine was rhetorically connected to Russia’s past; 那是, the Russian em-
皮雷, 苏联, and the state’s former great power and superpower
status.194 Countries that do not share the same great power history as Russia,
such as Brazil or India, would arguably not achieve the same results if they
were to take similar military actions.
第四, acquiring great power status is not the same as receiving higher
地位. The two shadow cases in this article have illustrated this dynamic well.
Emulating Russian belligerence runs the risk of a state being barred or ejected
from or having its standing decrease in other clubs of world politics.
第五, 也许最重要的是, even though the status order of the great
194. Naylor refers to this dynamic as “ostensibly achievable criteria” for inclusion into clubs.
Naylor, Social Closure and International Society, 64–67.
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The Belligerent Bear 49
power club seems to positively recognize war, this is not set in stone. If my the-
oretical assumptions of status orders and discourse are correct, then a wide
range of actors may have agency to change the status order of the club. 到
change dominant representations of the discourse is no easy feat. But it is pos-
兄弟姐妹. Highlighting the conducive and perhaps problematic relationship be-
tween the great power club and war may enable doing something about it. 这是
my opinion that leaders and practitioners, along with public and political
elites and even academics, have agency to shift this discourse.195
Beyond the empirical ªndings, I believe that the analytical framework de-
veloped and applied in this article applies to cases not covered here. The most
logical step forward would be to explore the status recognition of new or es-
tablished great powers. It would be particularly intriguing to trace Chinese
discursive recognition of other major powers. This would make it possible to
gauge whether these rhetorical moves of inclusion and exclusion correspond
to those of the United States. The study cases could also be expanded beyond
Russia and belligerence. According to U.S. public discourse, China has already
arrived as a great power. Future research might trace the exact timing for this
认出. It could also determine what that discursive recognition was
基于. 最后, a comparative analysis of members and potential entrants to
the club (例如, 巴西, 中国, 德国, 印度, 日本, and Russia) or potential
declining great powers (例如, France and the UK) would determine the mem-
bership composition of the club and could shed light on the different aspects of
the status order beyond that of a single case study.
The analytical framework in this article is also applicable to other informal
and formal clubs of world politics, ranging from the BRICS to the middle pow-
ers to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to the African Union. The ex-
act technique for analyzing these clubs’ respective status orders might differ
from the approach applied here. I have argued that discourse offers a useful
analytical window to explore status orders. But other interpretive meth-
odologies such as ethnography or practice theory offer equally well-suited al-
ternatives to study the situated status dynamics unfolding in various clubs of
world politics.196
195. Iver B. 诺伊曼, Concepts of International Relations, for Students and Other Smarties (安
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2019), 104–105, https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.9709659.
196. Røren, “Status Seeking in the Friendly Nordic Neighborhood”; Pouliot, International Pecking
Orders; Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Vincent Pouliot, “Power in Practice: Negotiating the Interna-
tional Intervention in Libya,” European Journal of International Relations 20, 不. 4 (2014): 889–911,
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066113512702.
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