Tactical Opposition: Obstructing Loss - 麻省理工学院人工智能研究专业

Tactical Opposition: Obstructing Loss
and Damage Finance in the United
Nations Climate Negotiations

(西德:129)
Danielle Falzon*, Fred Shaia, J. Timmons Roberts,
Md. Fahad Hossain, Stacy-ann Robinson,
Mizan R. 汗, and David Ciplet

抽象的

在 1991, in meetings constructing the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change, the small island state of Vanuatu introduced a proposal requiring wealthy
countries to pay for damages related to sea level rise. More than thirty years later, 县-
tries ﬁnally agreed to establish a ﬁnancing mechanism for loss and damage associated
with climate change. Scholars have observed the slow progress on loss and damage
ﬁnance, but what tactics did countries use to obstruct negotiations? We answer this ques-
tion using data from primary and secondary sources, observations at negotiations, 和
key informant interviews. Our analysis details four periods of obstruction and outlines a
typology of fourteen tactics countries have used to delay progress. These tactics limited
the issue’s scope, reduced transparency, manipulated language, and advanced nontrans-
formative solutions. These ﬁndings contribute to the study of obstructionism in climate
governance and can help loss and damage advocates better anticipate and respond to
obstruction.

关键词: obstruction, climate ﬁnance, climate justice, global governance, loss and
damage, negotiation, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC)

When asked at the 2015 climate negotiations in Paris whether the United States
would pay for climate-related damages, lead US negotiator Todd Stern said
bluntly, “We are in favor of support, technical and ﬁnancial support, going to
countries with loss and damage. … There’s one thing that we don’t accept …
which is the notion that there should be liability and compensation for loss
and damage. Virtually all developed countries [agree]” (quoted in Adler 2015,
9). Six years later, at the Glasgow Dialogue in 2021, where parties discussed
funding arrangements for loss and damage, Global North countries like the

* 通讯作者: danielle.falzon@rutgers.edu

Global Environmental Politics 23:3, 八月 2023, https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00722
© 2023 麻省理工学院. 根据知识共享署名发布 4.0 国际的
(抄送 4.0) 执照.

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96 (西德:129) Tactical Opposition

United States doubled down on their opposition to establishing a dedicated
fund to address the issue (Weise and Mathiesen 2021).

Tensions regarding loss and damage1 ﬁnance in the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) can be traced to the very begin-
ning of the multilateral negotiations. 在 1991, during the Intergovernmental
Negotiating Committee (INC) meetings that drafted the foundational text for
the convention, Vanuatu submitted a signiﬁcant proposal on behalf of the Alli-
ance of Small Island States (AOSIS) (Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee
[INC] 1991). The proposal outlined an insurance mechanism that wealthy Global
North countries would ﬁnance to protect against observed and future climate
影响, particularly sea level rise. 然而, countries excluded this proposal from
the ﬁnal text adopted the following year in Rio in 1992. Only Article 4 的
UNFCCC mentions “insurance” as one of several actions that parties “shall give
full consideration to” (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
改变 [UNFCCC] 1992, 8). A ﬁnancial mechanism was not formalized until
2022, when parties agreed at the twenty-seventh meeting of the Conference
of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP27) to set up a fund for loss and damage.
Over the more than thirty years between 1991 和 2022, 南方国家
countries and civil society advocates have consistently and increasingly argued
that Global North countries should fund losses and damages associated with
climate change. These countries are disproportionately responsible for and are
far more capable of addressing these impacts. Because ﬁnance is fundamental to
vulnerable countries’ ability to manage climate impacts independently, 你的OPPO-
tion to loss and damage ﬁnance is “the ultimate manifestation of climate injus-
tice” (Galvão Ferreira 2021, 127). The ﬁnancial dimension of loss and damage
made it more difﬁcult to negotiate. Studies show that ﬁnance-related agenda
items are more contentious (less “integrative”) than other issues (Odell 2013;
Walton and McKersie 1965; Winham 1986). This reﬂects a broader pattern in
global governance, whereby demands for compensation often result in contes-
tation and inaction.

We use the case of loss and damage ﬁnance to explore obstructionism in
the United Nations (和) climate negotiations. Speciﬁcally, we ask, what tactics
have countries used to obstruct loss and damage ﬁnance in the UNFCCC?
Drawing on data from primary and secondary sources, such as submissions by
派对, observations at UN negotiations, and interviews with twelve key infor-
mants, we trace the emergence and evolution of loss and damage ﬁnance in the
UNFCCC from the early 1990s to the 2020s. Based on our analysis, we develop a
typology of obstructionist tactics that countries have used to delay action on loss
and damage over the last thirty years. We deﬁne obstruction as any intentional
slowing or blocking of policy or action on loss and damage ﬁnance. This includes
efforts to prevent the adoption of UNFCCC text that acknowledges loss and

1. The capitalization of the phrase loss and damage is a subject of political debate (see Hartz
2023). We use lowercase spelling to ease reading and follow the capitalization norms on sim-
ilar terms, such as adaptation and mitigation.

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D. Falzon, F. Shaia, J. 时间. 罗伯茨, 中号. F. Hossain, S. 罗宾逊, 中号. 右. 汗, 和D. Ciplet

(西德:129) 97

damage as a concern and speciﬁes that countries should provide funds to address
the issue. This conception builds on the normative stance that ﬁnance for loss
and damage is an essential mechanism for climate justice, which vulnerable
countries have advocated for decades. We interpret obstructionist tactics along
a continuum of “hard” and “soft” bargaining to explain how countries kept loss
and damage ﬁnance out of UNFCCC texts for three decades.

The article comprises four parts. 第一的, we review international negotiation
scholarship and use a hard–soft bargaining continuum to assess obstructionist
tactics in the UNFCCC. 第二, we provide a brief history of loss and damage in
the UNFCCC, including how obstruction to ﬁnancial obligations emerged and
how it has evolved. The ﬁrst period centers on the 1991 Vanuatu proposal and
the lack of progress over the subsequent sixteen years. The second period covers
这 2007 Bali Action Plan to the establishment of the Warsaw International
Mechanism ( WIM) for Loss and Damage in 2013. The third and fourth periods
trace the 2013 WIM to the 2015 Paris Agreement and the Paris Agreement to the
2022 decision in Sharm el-Sheikh to establish a fund for loss and damage. 我们
then present a typology of obstructionist tactics used by Global North countries
that comprises four tactical categories: limiting the scope of the issue, 减少
transparency, manipulating concepts, and pushing nontransformative solutions.
This typology could help improve our understanding of negotiating tactics in
other areas of environmental governance and global governance more generally.
It could also help loss and damage advocates better anticipate and respond to
climate obstructionism in the negotiations. We conclude by explaining how
scholars and practitioners can use our typology to hold countries accountable
for obstructionist positions. We anticipate that work to obstruct the ﬂow of
ﬁnance to loss and damage will continue, regardless of the recent decision to
establish a funding mechanism. Identifying and countering obstructionist prac-
tices are crucial for delivering just climate action.

Obstruction in International Negotiations: The Case of
Loss and Damage

For decades, countries in the Global South, particularly small islands, 有
advocated for action on loss and damage (Adelman 2016; Calliari 2018; Mace
and Verheyen 2016; Robinson and Carlson 2021). 相比之下, countries in the
Global North2 have historically opposed, 首先, a formal distinction between cli-
mate adaptation and loss and damage and, 第二, liability and compensation
to address the issue (Burkett 2016; Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2019; Page and
Heyward 2017; Roberts and Huq 2015; Roberts and Parks 2007; Vanhala and
Hestbaek 2016). The highly contentious nature of loss and damage in the
UNFCCC (see Boyd et al. 2017; Calliari et al. 2020; McNamara and Jackson

2. We refer to “Global North” countries broadly to indicate wealthy countries, often referred to as
“developed” countries or “Annex I” countries in the UNFCCC arena. Many of these countries
are also included in the “Umbrella Group” coordinating group.

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98 (西德:129) Tactical Opposition

2019; see also other articles in this issue) makes it an informative case for asses-
sing obstructionist behavior in international negotiations.

Despite growing attention to climate obstruction at the domestic level
世界各地,3 obstruction at the international level is relatively underex-
plored (绿色的 2020). The most extensive thread of scholarship explores how
private actors and coalitions thwart climate action (例如, Ciplet et al. 2015; 征收
and Egan 1998; Meckling 2011; Mildenberger 2020; Newell and Paterson 2010;
Stokes 2020). A much smaller body of work explores the tactics countries use to
impede progress at the international level. 例如, Depledge (2008) traces
Saudi Arabia’s efforts to obstruct mitigation policy in the UNFCCC. 虽然
this case uncovers valuable insights about the speciﬁc tactics Saudi Arabia
employs, this country represents an extreme case (Depledge 2008, 10). 我们的
analysis builds on these initial studies by examining obstruction carried out
in international negotiations by a range of actors over many years and identiﬁes
the speciﬁc tactics that they have used.

We deﬁne international negotiation as “a process in which actors take steps
to agree on an outcome, and all the actors seek to make that outcome as good as
possible from their own perspectives” (Odell and Tingley 2016, 231). All parties
engage in UNFCCC negotiations to advance their interests. Although scholars
have categorized negotiating behavior in many ways—value-claiming and
value-creating strategies (Odell 2018), (convergent) bargaining and problem-
solving bargaining strategies (瓦格纳 1999), and bargaining and arguing (Dür
and Mateo 2010; Risse 2000)—we adopt a distinction between “hard” and “soft”
bargaining (Bailer 2012; Dür and Mateo 2010; Weiler 2012). Relative to other
classiﬁcations, this typology avoids some of the analytical challenges to studying
international negotiations. Hard–soft approaches to bargaining are easier to
observe empirically; they also omit assumptions about the intentionality under-
pinning strategies (Dür and Mateo 2010). On one end of the continuum, 难的
bargaining is an ideal type that encompasses “conﬂictual or aggressive tactics”
that maximize the distribution of resources among some parties relative to others
(Dür and Mateo 2010, 561). A hard bargaining tactic might include refusing to
accept a priority of another party or misrepresenting one’s minimal needs. 在
the other end of the continuum, soft bargaining comprises “cooperative or
friendly” negotiating tactics (Dür and Mateo 2010, 561). Soft bargaining tactics
might include emphasizing the collective interests of an issue and advancing new
or ﬂexible proposals for compromise.

We use this hard–soft continuum to assess obstructionist behavior in
international negotiations. Speciﬁcally, we trace how countries have used hard
and soft tactics to obstruct loss and damage in the UNFCCC from the 1990s to
the 2020s. By obstruction, we refer to the intentional slowing or blocking of policy
or action on climate change that is commensurate with the current scientiﬁc con-
sensus of what is necessary to avoid dangerous human-caused interference with

参见https://cssn.org/, last accessed May 30, 2023.

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D. Falzon, F. Shaia, J. 时间. 罗伯茨, 中号. F. Hossain, S. 罗宾逊, 中号. 右. 汗, 和D. Ciplet

(西德:129) 99

the climate system (see Ekberg et al. 2023). Loss and damage ﬁnance obstruction
is a negotiating strategy: a long-term guiding plan or objective. And the strategy is
composed of negotiating tactics: individual actions and steps to get there.

In their initial elaboration of this hard–soft continuum in the context of Euro-
pean Union negotiations, Dür and Mateo (2010) found that parties with more
“bargaining power,” directly related to material wealth, were more likely to employ
hard bargaining tactics. In the UNFCCC, this would suggest that wealthy countries
like the United States would be hard bargainers. In studies of the UNFCCC, 一些
scholars have suggested that Global South countries have actually been those with a
难的, uncompromising approach to negotiation, while Global North countries
(apart from the United States) have worked to ﬁnd constructive solutions (古普塔
2012). Others have argued that the structure of international negotiations can
override parties’ material power in bargaining (McKibben 2013) and that cultural
factors can inﬂuence whether a country will employ hard or soft bargaining tactics
(Martill and Staiger 2021). The consensus-based bargaining structure of the
UNFCCC may then lead parties to take whatever approach is necessary to get others
to concede, given the need for a collective agreement. Weiler (2012) ﬁnds that the
use of soft bargaining in climate negotiations can be more effective in negotiating
success when they aim to beneﬁt all concerned parties mutually.

We contribute to this small set of studies by elaborating on the use of hard
and soft bargaining in the UNFCCC on an issue of particular importance to
parties that are materially weak (Betzold 2010; Ciplet et al. 2015; Águeda
Corneloup and Mol 2014; Rasheed 2019). The very fact that wealthy countries
use obstructionist tactics suggests that power in international climate politics is
more than a function of materiality.4 Though we do not trace hard–soft bargain-
ing tactics among all actors in the UNFCCC around loss and damage ﬁnance, 我们的
case provides an opportunity to understand how these countries approach bar-
gaining on such a key issue. Finance is ultimately a linchpin for loss and damage
negotiations, but scholars have yet to examine the deliberate efforts to obstruct
loss and damage ﬁnance over time. The analysis that follows addresses this gap.

Four Periods of Obstruction to Loss and Damage Finance

To determine the tactics countries have used to obstruct loss and damage
ﬁnance in the UNFCCC, we divide more than thirty years of negotiations into
four periods based on signiﬁcant texts that advanced the issue of loss and dam-
年龄 (桌子 1) (for the history on which we base this periodization, see Falzon
等人. 2022; see also Galvão Ferreira 2021; Siegele 2021a, 2021乙; Vanhala and
Hestbaek 2016). In each period, we identify the demands advanced by loss and
damage advocates and the obstructionist tactics opponents used to thwart the
realization of these demands (见表 2). To construct this history, we trian-
gulated data gathered from interviews with key informants, observations at

4. We thank the anonymous reviewer who drew our attention to this point.

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桌子 1

Four Periods of Contention over Loss and Damage Finance in the UNFCCC and Positions Taken by Advocates and Opponents

Period

Years

Milestones

L&D Finance Advocates

L&D Finance Obstructionists

1991–2007

1991: AOSIS proposal

(西德:129) Vanuatu/AOSIS worked to include

(西德:129) Global North countries excluded

2007: Bali Action Plan

2008–2013

2008: AOSIS proposal

2010: L&D work program

2012: L&D institutional
安排

2013: WIM established

L&D in the 1992 text of the
UNFCCC Convention, including by
proposing an insurance mechanism
for the impacts of sea level rise
(西德:129) L&D discussed through language of
“adverse effects” and “risk transfer”
(西德:129) Meetings were held on the possibility

of an insurance mechanism

(西德:129) The phrase “loss and damage” was
included in UNFCCC texts in Bali
在 2007

Vanuatu’s proposal for L&D
insurance from UNFCCC drafting
negotiations

(西德:129) Parties agreed to include insurance
as an instrument under Article 4.8 的
the UNFCCC, but without a funding
机制

(西德:129) Parties reached consensus to explore

new issues through workshops
outside of ofﬁcial UNFCCC
negotiations

(西德:129) AOSIS again introduced a proposal
for a compensation mechanism for
L&D

(西德:129) Global North countries agreed to
address L&D only through discussion-
based work programs

(西德:129) AOSIS, the Least Developed

(西德:129) Global North countries, 尤其是

国家 (LDC) 团体, 和
African Group of Negotiators
formed a coalition on L&D, 哪个
the broader Group of 77 和中国
(G77 + 中国) bloc later supported
(西德:129) L&D coalition came prepared with
robust proposals for texts at the
2013 Warsaw Conference

美国, removed and
weakened proposed texts for the WIM

(西德:129) The United Kingdom pulled

funding for organizations advancing
L&D efforts

(西德:129) Global North countries regularly

connected and conﬂated L&D with
adaptation

1
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(西德:129)

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2014–2015

2014: L&D two-year
work plan

(西德:129) Strategically broadened the framing

of L&D appeals

2015: Paris Agreement

(西德:129) Increased media and

nongovernmental organization
attention to L&D

(西德:129) Succeeded in including a stand-

alone article on L&D in the 2015
Paris Agreement (文章 8)

(西德:129) The nondifferentiation of the Paris
Agreement broadened the scope of
L&D to apply to all parties

(西德:129) The United States and Australia,
除其他外, worked to prevent
L&D from appearing in the Paris
Agreement entirely

(西德:129) 美国, 除其他外,

foreclosed the possibility of linking
L&D to liability and compensation
in the Paris Agreement

2016 到
展示

2016: WIM review
2017: L&D ﬁve-year
work plan

2018: expert dialogue
2022: L&D ﬁnance on
议程, parties agree
to a L&D Fund

(西德:129) G77 + China repeatedly requested
an agenda item on L&D at the
Subsidiary Body meetings

(西德:129) Global North countries opposed
adding L&D as a stand-alone
agenda item apart from the WIM

(西德:129) Worked to consider L&D in the

global stocktake

(西德:129) Worked to keep the WIM under the

(西德:129) Global North countries stayed
silent in L&D dialogues and
discussions

jurisdiction of the COP
(西德:129) Advocated for a ﬁnancing

mechanism and L&D Fund

(西德:129) G77 + China demanded a dedicated
agenda item on L&D ﬁnancing,
which was accepted for discussion at
COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh

(西德:129) Global North countries refused
additional ﬁnancing for L&D,
including establishing a new fund

(西德:129) Global North countries focused
their suggestions on weak and
partial alternatives for ﬁnance
(例如, insurance)

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(西德:129)

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桌子 1

(Continued )

Period

Years

Milestones

L&D Finance Advocates

L&D Finance Obstructionists

(西德:129) G77 + China succeeded in

establishing a UNFCCC L&D
ﬁnance facility at COP27

(西德:129) Global North countries attempted
to move the WIM to be exclusively
under the Paris Agreement agenda
to preclude claims of liability and
赔偿

(西德:129) The United States and Australia,

除其他外, delayed deciding on
ﬁnancial arrangements for L&D
until COP29 in 2024

L&D = loss and damage.

1
0
2

(西德:129)

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D. Falzon, F. Shaia, J. 时间. 罗伯茨, 中号. F. Hossain, S. 罗宾逊, 中号. 右. 汗, 和D. Ciplet

(西德:129) 103

UNFCCC meetings between 2013 和 2022, primary documents from the
UNFCCC (例如, country submissions, 报告, decision texts), and secondary
documentation of events from researchers, reporters, and advocacy groups,
including the Climate Action Network and the Third World Network. 我们
selected informants based on their close involvement in key loss and damage
negotiations and related committees and groups (例如, country negotiators, 合法的
advisors, leading climate advocates, and academics from countries in the Global
South and North). The interview protocol for each interviewee began with ques-
tions to elicit their perspective on the history of loss and damage ﬁnance in the
negotiations, from the beginning of their involvement. We asked follow-up
questions for details regarding speciﬁc events in the negotiations identiﬁed
through our document analysis (例如, the establishment of the WIM) 和
moments that they identiﬁed as signiﬁcant. All informants were granted ano-
nymity as the basis for their contribution to this study. 因此, the informa-
tion presented herein is never attributed to speciﬁc individuals.

As Table 1 节目, the ﬁrst period began in 1991, when Vanuatu advanced
a landmark proposal on behalf of AOSIS to establish an insurance mechanism
funded by the most climate-culpable countries. The submission speciﬁed that
the mechanism’s revenue should be “new, additional, and adequate,” with
mandatory contributions from the Global North. Speciﬁcally, AOSIS suggested
那 50 percent of the revenue should be based on a developed country’s gross
national product (GNP) relative to the total GNP of all developed country
派对, representing a country’s capacity. The remaining 50 percent of revenue
would be based on a developed country’s carbon emissions, representing the
country’s level of responsibility for climate change (INC 1991).

然而, 在 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro that followed the
INCs, countries agreed to a convention text that contained a provision on
insurance (文章 4.8) but excluded Vanuatu’s proposal. In the latter half of
the 1990s, when COP meetings began, AOSIS continued advancing proposals
for an insurance mechanism. 仍然, none were incorporated into ofﬁcial
UNFCCC texts (Burkett 2015). 在 2001, the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report
revealed new evidence about the projected impacts of climate change in the
南方国家. In response to scientiﬁc ﬁndings and sustained advocacy from
AOSIS, the phrase “loss and damage” appeared in the 2007 Bali Action Plan.
In this text, parties agreed to explore “means to address loss and damage
associated with climate change impacts in developing countries that are partic-
ularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change” (UNFCCC 2012,
Decision 1/CP.13, 为了. 1[C][三、]).

The second period began at COP14 in Poznań, 波兰, 在 2008, 什么时候
AOSIS proposed a “multi-window facility” to address loss and damage. 他们的
proposal called for a new fund that would compensate for all risks, 包括
sea level rise, temperature increases, loss of land, damage to coral reefs, loss of
ﬁsheries, and salinization of aquifers (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2008).
Although parties did not include this proposal in the COP14 decisions, 他们

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104 (西德:129) Tactical Opposition

agreed to discuss the facility at COP16 in Cancún in 2010 via a “work pro-
gramme” (Ladislaw 2010). Parties delayed discussing speciﬁc elements of the
work program until COP17 in Durban in 2011, where they ultimately called
for a series of expert meetings. The following year, AOSIS established a coalition
with the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) Group to increase the authority of
their demands for loss and damage action. 玻利维亚, along with China, 厄瓜多尔,
El Salvador, 危地马拉, Nicaragua, the Philippines, and Thailand, also issued a
statement calling for a “solidarity fund” to compensate vulnerable countries for
“permanent” and “irreversible” loss and damage associated with climate change
(Subsidiary Body for Implementation 2012, 6, 4). Despite the growing interest
in establishing a loss and damage fund among G77 + China members, 这
United States and other countries in the Global North claimed it would inhibit
adaptation efforts and place a monetary value on lives and livelihoods in
vulnerable countries (McNamara 2014). Combative negotiations at COP18 in
Doha in 2012 repeatedly stalled, especially on ﬁnancial arrangements, as US
representatives sought to remove the paragraph that would establish a funding
mechanism for loss and damage. After thirty-six hours of nonstop deliberations
in Doha, representatives agreed to further concretize the work program
(McNamara 2014).

After COP18, representatives from the G77 + 中国, including AOSIS, 这
LDCs, and other loss and damage advocates, convened to develop a draft text
for what would become the WIM. Civil society organizations and the media also
generally supported Global South countries’ demands going into COP19 in
Warsaw in 2013 (Allan and Hadden 2017). Just as the negotiations began,
Super Typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines. Haiyan’s devastation prompted
Yeb Saño, a negotiator for the Philippines, to engage in a hunger strike that drew
signiﬁcant attention to the realities of climate impacts and created, 根据
one of our informants, a “public relations nightmare” for Global North coun-
tries that opposed a loss and damage mechanism. G77 + China negotiators
walked out of one negotiation when they perceived that Australia’s delegation
was not taking the talks seriously (Vidal 2013). Civil society observers noisily
walked out the next day. Although parties eventually agreed to the text for the
WIM, parties from the Global North succeeded in ensuring that the ﬁnal text
included only a work plan, without mention of a ﬁnancial mechanism.

The establishment of the WIM in 2013 kicked off the third period, culmi-
nating in a stand-alone article on loss and damage in the 2015 Paris Agreement
(UNFCCC 2015). The G77 + China arrived at the Paris talks with a draft text for
文章 8 that avoided language on liability and compensation. Given Global
North countries’ long-standing resistance to this language, this text constituted
a signiﬁcant political compromise from the bloc ( Vanhala and Hestbaek 2016).
相比之下, with support from other Global North countries, 美国
presented a text that did not mention loss and damage. To address the North–
South standoff on loss and damage, US climate envoy John Kerry held closed-
door meetings with leaders from small island states to reach an agreement.

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D. Falzon, F. Shaia, J. 时间. 罗伯茨, 中号. F. Hossain, S. 罗宾逊, 中号. 右. 汗, 和D. Ciplet

(西德:129) 105

文章 8 was included in the Paris decision document, but it was accompanied
by the text of paragraph 51, which read, “Article 8 的 [巴黎] Agreement does
not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation” (UNFCCC
2016, Decision 1/CP.21). Paragraph 49 of the decision text also arguably
weakens the WIM’s mandate from “avoid and reduce” loss and damage to
“avert, minimize, and address” loss and damage (UNFCCC 2016, 决定
1/CP.21). 此外, parties did not formally connect Article 8 to the articles
on ﬁnance and transparency, meaning that there is no mechanism under the
Paris Agreement to raise or administer funding for loss and damage or to mon-
itor progress on the issue in the regular global stocktaking of country actions.
In the fourth period, after Paris, the United States and its Global North
allies worked to prevent loss and damage from progressing via the WIM and
文章 8, including by avoiding discussing ﬁnance in the WIM’s rolling ﬁve-year
work plan. The same countries also refused to consider loss and damage in
ﬁnance negotiations, removed language on transparency for tracking loss and
damage, and narrowed the frequency and scope of loss and damage discussions.
They then attempted to bring the WIM under the exclusive authority of the Paris
Agreement to make it beholden to paragraph 51. During the Suva Expert
Dialogue at the forty-eighth session of the Subsidiary Bodies (SB48) 在 2018,
discussions around insurance dominated, 虽然, by that time, insurance
was only a slice of the funding sought by the G77 + China for loss and damage.
During the dialogue, Global North countries were uncharacteristically silent and
largely abstained from the discussion. Later that year, 日本, 美国,
and Australia failed to include loss and damage in their reporting under the
enhanced ﬁnance transparency framework. When the G77 + China called for
a “Glasgow Loss and Damage Facility” at COP26 in 2021, 美国,
澳大利亚, and the European Union (欧洲联盟) agreed only to a dialogue on “arrange-
ments for the funding of activities to avert, minimize and address loss and dam-
age” to take place at midyear meetings from 2022 到 2024 (Rowling 2021).

After the ﬁrst Glasgow Dialogue at SB56 in 2022, the G77 + China’s per-
sistence for an agenda item on loss and damage ﬁnally paid off. The provisional
agenda for COP27 included an item titled “matters related to funding arrange-
ments to address loss and damage” under “matters relating to ﬁnance.” How-
曾经, the United States and other Global North countries attempted to remove it
in the days leading up to COP27. After overnight deliberations, parties changed
the agenda item to “matters relating to funding arrangements responding to loss
and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including a
focus on addressing loss and damage.” COP27 president Sameh Shoukry intro-
duced the item with the caveat that “the outcomes of this agenda item are based
on cooperation and facilitation, and do not involve liability or compensation,”
echoing paragraph 51. Although Global North parties worked to codify
President Shoukry’s verbal caveat in the decision text, they were unsuccessful.
最终, by the end of COP27, parties agreed to “establish new funding
arrangements for assisting developing countries that are particularly vulnerable

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106 (西德:129) Tactical Opposition

to the adverse effects of climate change” and to “establish a fund for responding
to loss and damage whose mandate includes a focus on addressing loss and
damage.”5 While the funding mechanism(s) (actual sources of money) 有
yet to be established, the decision to create them is the closest the UNFCCC
has come in its thirty-year history to ﬁnancing loss and damage.

Tactics of Obstruction

A picture of obstruction emerges by tracing the negotiation processes and out-
comes across four historical periods. Global North countries have actively and
passively sought to avoid ﬁnancial obligations for loss and damage via hard and
soft negotiation tactics. Drawing on Lamb et al.’s (2020) typology of discourses
of climate delay, we identify fourteen tactics countries have used to delay or pre-
vent progress on loss and damage in the UNFCCC (见表 2). These fall into
four broad and interrelated categories: 首先, limiting the scope of the agenda
项目; 第二, reducing transparency by failing to monitor the problem; 第三,
manipulating the meaning of the language; and fourth, pushing for nontrans-
formative solutions.

Limiting the scope of loss and damage includes rejecting and excluding the
issue from the agenda, passing it between negotiating tracks, and denying its
合法性. 第二, reducing transparency prevents parties from collecting infor-
mation on the issue and making signiﬁcant decisions in closed-door meetings.
第三, countries manipulate loss and damage ﬁnance concepts. These tactics
include replacing clear language with ambiguous text and narrowing, diluting,
and swapping concepts. 最后, countries push nontransformative solutions,
which include parties agreeing only to further discussions, calling for more
scientiﬁc input, waiting on more “perfect” policy proposals, and diverting
attention to progress on other issues. Countries often use these tactics simulta-
neously, which increases the difﬁculty of countering them.

The tactics used to obstruct loss and damage ﬁnance exist along a concep-
tual continuum of two ideal types, “hard” and “soft” bargaining (Dür and
Mateo 2010). The “limiting the scope” and “reducing transparency” tactics fall
toward the hard bargaining end of the spectrum. 相比之下, the “manipulating
language” and “pushing nontransformative solutions” tactics better align with
soft bargaining. We categorized tactics into hard and soft ideal types based on
whether they push uncooperative, hard-line answers to contentious proposals
or promote seemingly cooperative solutions that offer a way to progress on
the issues, even if those solutions effectively work to delay addressing the issue.
Rather than placing the tactics along a continuum (例如, we might iden-
tify “open rejection” as “very hard” and “concept dilution” as “somewhat soft”),

5. 截至撰写本文时, ﬁnal decision texts have not been released. The draft text for Decision
-/CP.27 -/CMA.4, “Funding Arrangements for Responding to Loss and Damage Associated with
the Adverse Effects of Climate Change, Including a Focus on Addressing Loss and Damage,”
can be found at https://unfccc.int/documents/624440, last accessed May 30, 2023.

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桌子 2

Tactics Obstructing Loss and Damage Finance in the UNFCCC

Tactic

描述

Hard Versus
Soft

Example from L&D negotiations

Open rejection

Refusing to agree to include proposed
elements in draft texts

Hard

Limiting the Scope

Agenda exclusion

Rejecting proposed elements in negotiations Hard

Venue shifting

Manipulating institutional infrastructure to
restrict the scope of new and existing
mechanisms

Hard

Denying credibility

Reducing the legitimacy of an issue

Hard

Keeping ﬁnancial mechanisms like insurance
out of the convention and denying any
language that would imply compensation for
climate impacts

Excluding L&D from the agenda of
Subsidiary Body meetings post-Paris

Working to shift L&D to sole jurisdiction
under the Paris Agreement rather than the
convention; passing ﬁnance discussions
between negotiating tracks

日本, 美国, and Australia failing
to report on L&D in the enhanced ﬁnance
transparency framework

Omission of
监控

Impeding the collection of information on
an issue to limit future consideration

Hard

Keeping L&D out of reporting requirements
under the Paris Agreement and global
stocktake

Reducing Transparency

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(西德:129)

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桌子 2

(Continued )

Tactic

描述

Fortress building

Excluding actors to limit the number of
participants who make decisions, 减少
transparency

Hard Versus
Soft

Hard

Example from L&D negotiations

Holding L&D negotiations in closed
meetings

Issue narrowing

Reducing the scope and framing of a concept

Soft

Manipulating Language

Concept dilution

Weakening the language of a proposed area
of action

Soft

Concept swapping

Replacing broad issues with singular,
acceptable components

Strategic ambiguity

Agreeing on text that allows parties to
interpret the language according to their
兴趣

Soft

Discussing only discrete dimensions of L&D,
例如, insurance mechanisms
Diluting the language, 例如, “averting,
最小化, and addressing loss and
damage” to expand the scope of the issue to
include mitigation and adaptation actions
Redeﬁning L&D to mean disaster risk
reduction and response, especially with
insurance

The WIM and various documents relating to
L&D discuss “support” for L&D without
specifying what it involves or its nature, 等级,
or sources

1
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(西德:129)

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All talk, no action

Agreeing to discussions on topics to forestall
行动

Soft

Keeping L&D in workshops and work
programs as long as possible

Pushing Nontransformative Solutions

12 Waiting on
the science

政策
perfectionism

Redirecting
注意力

Delaying action via calls for more research

Soft

Delaying action via the pursuit of an
unobjectionable policy solution, 尤其
which avoids “fault”
Deﬂecting attention from nonaction in
governance spaces to action elsewhere

Soft

Calling for more research on the science of
attribution of extreme events to climate
改变

Failing to establish a L&D fund with a
funding mechanism based on responsibility,
and a system to allocate funds in practice

The United States and other Global North
countries highlighting places where they are
already doing related work, 例如
contributing to regional risk-pooling
计划

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(西德:129)

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110 (西德:129) Tactical Opposition

we maintain the broad categories of “hard” and “soft” to acknowledge that each
tactic may vary in its “hardness” or “softness,” depending on that particular con-
文本. 简而言之, this hard–soft characterization helps us assess when and how coun-
tries have been (和)cooperative on the issue of loss and damage ﬁnance over
时间. We argue that the United States’ red line on liability and compensation
drove an “all hands on deck” strategy, where countries with vested interests in
keeping loss and damage ﬁnance out of the UNFCCC did whatever they could
to obstruct it. What follows is an elaboration on some of these tactics.

In each of the four periods, Global North countries endeavored to limit the
scope of discussions on loss and damage ﬁnance. The hard tactics of agenda ex-
clusion and open rejection, which countries often paired together, 是
both noncooperative and aggressive. The ﬁrst instance of openly rejecting loss
and damage ﬁnance (though this was not the operative language at the time)
was when parties excluded Vanuatu’s 1991 proposal for an insurance mechanism
from the convention text. 最近, countries openly rejected responsibility-
based loss and damage ﬁnance via paragraph 51 of the Paris Agreement decision,
which precluded the possibility of compensation for loss and damage. 这些
actions kept loss and damage ﬁnance off the agenda, despite calls from develop-
ing country parties and activists (Climate Action Network 2022; McGrath 2022).
Shifting the issue between negotiating tracks and denying its credibility only fur-
ther limited the scope of the issue by shutting down discussions on it.

Countries have primarily resorted to hard tactics comprising “reducing
transparency” in the fourth period in response to the incorporation of loss
and damage in ofﬁcial texts via the WIM and the Paris Agreement. 尤其,
the structure of the Paris Agreement may have spurred these tactics since the
primary accountability mechanisms for implementing the agreement are regular
reviews of countries’ progress on climate action through “global stocktakes”
(GSTs), along with reviews of national communications and biennial reviews.
Because there is no connection between the articles on transparency and loss
and damage in the Paris Agreement, Global North countries have repeatedly
refused the Global South’s calls to include loss and damage in national reviews
and the ﬁrst GST in 2023, even as a sub-issue area under adaptation.

Global North countries have also used softer tactics to obstruct action on
loss and damage. Soft tactics like “policy perfectionism” and “redirecting atten-
tion” give the appearance of advancing effective solutions that support the
common good. 例如, the United States agreed to participate in loss
and damage discussions as they arose but often advocated for nontransforma-
tive solutions that did not include ﬁnance. One of the most signiﬁcant and
common soft tactics of loss and damage obstruction is relegating the issue to
dialogues and work programs. This tactic exempliﬁes “all talk, no action,” where
countries stymie concrete outcomes by delaying policy making without entirely
rejecting the issue.

Key parties in the Global North consistently justify continuing work pro-
grams and dialogues by claiming that we need more scientiﬁc evidence and

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D. Falzon, F. Shaia, J. 时间. 罗伯茨, 中号. F. Hossain, S. 罗宾逊, 中号. 右. 汗, 和D. Ciplet

(西德:129) 111

输入 (IE。, “waiting on the science”). 美国, 例如, used this
tactic to obstruct AOSIS’s 2008 proposal for insurance and other loss and dam-
age ﬁnance mechanisms (McNamara 2014; Siegele 2021a). Developed country
parties also rejected Vanuatu’s 1991 proposal based on the need for more sci-
entiﬁc evidence, according to an informant who participated in the INCs. 这
work program preceding the establishment of the WIM in 2013 was a rare
exception that led to a concrete outcome, albeit without a ﬁnancial mechanism.
最近, the Glasgow Dialogue, which began after COP26 in 2021, 曾是
initiated with no mandated outcome for loss and damage ﬁnance. This lack of
mandate became a chief complaint of the G77 + 中国, animating its successful
campaign to establish a new ﬁnancing mechanism at COP27 by 2024.

The United States and other Global North countries also manipulated the
core concepts of the issue. 例如, developed country parties strongly sup-
ported the language of “averting, 最小化, and addressing” loss and damage.
This language incorporates mitigation and adaptation actions that “avert” and
“minimize” into loss and damage discussions. This move increases the risk of
double-counting funding and minimizes the need for a new ﬁnancial mecha-
nism for loss and damage. Though undermining the phrasing preferred by
the G77 + 中国, we characterize this tactic as soft because it is more concilia-
tory than outright rejection. 美国, 除其他外, has also consis-
tently swapped the concept of loss and damage with more narrow dimensions
of the issue, such as disaster risk reduction or disaster insurance. This tactic
avoids a broader discussion on loss and damage by focusing on a speciﬁc, 较少的
contentious aspect. 相似地, wealthy country parties have worked to narrow
the ﬁnance issue to include only insurance mechanisms. We classify this tactic
as soft because, at face value, it appears to be an attempt at cooperation.

最终, these results demonstrate that the United States and other
materially powerful countries in the Global North have employed both hard
and soft bargaining tactics to obstruct loss and damage in the UNFCCC over
时间. While these materially powerful countries often use hard bargaining tac-
抽动症 (Dür and Mateo 2010), our ﬁndings support McKibben’s (2013) contention
that the bargaining structure can minimize the effects of material power. 在里面
consensus-based UNFCCC context, wealthy countries appear to use whatever
bargaining tactic(s) might be most concession promoting at a given moment.
The salience of climate justice as a moral imperative in climate negotiations
may enhance the bargaining power of the G77 + China and its constituent
groups when they employ injustice as a frame, making the relations of power
between countries more complex than other international negotiations (Betzold
2010; Ciplet et al. 2015; Águeda Corneloup and Mol 2014; Rasheed 2019).

结论
Our case study of obstruction to loss and damage ﬁnance spotlights the hard
and soft bargaining tactics that Global North countries have used to forestall

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112 (西德:129) Tactical Opposition

opportunities for climate justice in the UNFCCC. Although they caused the loss
and damage occurring in the Global South, these countries refused for decades
the creation of funding mechanisms to address it. We have demonstrated that
the United States and other Global North countries have outright rejected and
repeatedly stalled progress on loss and damage ﬁnance over more than thirty
years of climate negotiations. While the requirement of consensus among
parties in the UNFCCC negotiations allows countries to easily obstruct an issue
by withdrawing their support, our analysis shows that it also gives countries
with less geopolitical power leverage to assert their priorities. The diversity of
tactics we have identiﬁed supports the idea that materially powerful countries
是, 所以, forced to take nuanced approaches in the face of contestation
from subordinate actors in climate negotiations (McKibben 2013).

Our study contributes to a growing literature on climate obstruction. 这
obstruction tactics we identify expand on, 例如, Lamb et al.’s (2020)
typology of delaying mitigation action. Rather than contradicting existing
frameworks for understanding obstruction, we believe that each new case study
of an arena of climate decision-making will reveal the particularities of obstruc-
tion in different contexts, building a nuanced landscape of climate obstruction
that is both far reaching and speciﬁc. 例如, tactics of “climate doomism”
that Global North countries use for mitigation (Lamb et al. 2020) might actu-
ally work to bolster Global South countries’ arguments for a loss and damage
基金, making them inappropriate for this context.

For loss and damage, greater awareness of the tactics used to block or
delay action on ﬁnance may serve actors who are seeking to advance equitable
climate solutions in the UNFCCC. Spotlighting obstructionism helps reduce the
effectiveness of these tactics. This typology could also serve as the basis for sim-
ilar typologies tailored to other global governance contexts beyond the
UNFCCC. 例如, ﬁnancial compensation for damages is also a matter
of concern for countries in the Global South under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade and World Trade Organization agreements; nuclear arms
accords; 和, 当然, development ﬁnance expectations and systems at the
世界银行集团, the International Monetary Fund, regional development
银行, 等等. Proposals of developing nations in those venues advance
or stall, depending in part on tactics taken by both sides.

Scholars can build on this study in several ways. 第一的, we need more anal-
ysis of the domestic determinants of the strategies countries use in international
negotiations, particularly in powerful countries like the United States (Bailer
2012; Dür and Mateo 2010; Falkner 2012; 瓦格纳 1999; Weiler 2012). 为了
例子, it would be helpful to account for how industrial interests shaped
the United States’ early opposition to responsibility-based mechanisms in the
UNFCCC in the 1990s. 第二, we do not understand the conditions under
which speciﬁc obstructionist tactics are used or are more likely to succeed.
Understanding how negotiation tactics emerge among negotiators, 国家,
and coalitions, or what happens when various tactics come into conﬂict in

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D. Falzon, F. Shaia, J. 时间. 罗伯茨, 中号. F. Hossain, S. 罗宾逊, 中号. 右. 汗, 和D. Ciplet

(西德:129) 113

settings like the UNFCCC, could shed light on how and why international nego-
tiations progress the way they do.

最后的, the parties’ recent decision to establish loss and damage ﬁnancial
安排, including a fund, under the UNFCCC raises a critical question:
what form will obstruction take moving forward? Fundamental equity issues
related to the yet-to-be-named loss and damage fund remain unresolved, 包括-
ing who will pay, how much, and using what sources of funding. 在那个时间
写作, parties have yet to make pledges aside from very modest external insti-
tutional funds promised by the leaders of Scotland, 比利时, 丹麦, and a
few other countries. 最终, obstruction will likely continue in the UNFCCC
on this and other climate justice–related issues. Identifying and overcoming
these tactics will only become more urgent as climate disasters proliferate.

Danielle Falzon is an assistant professor of sociology at Rutgers University, 新的
Brunswick, New Jersey. Her work examines power in climate change decision-
制作, 尤其, how inequalities are institutionalized into decision-
making organizations. Her recent work on the UN climate negotiations includes
her article “The Ideal Delegation: How Institutional Privilege Silences ‘Develop-
ing’ Nations in the UN Climate Negotiations,” published in Social Problems. 在
添加, she has completed work examining the multiscalar ﬁeld of actors
inﬂuencing climate adaptation planning and implementation in Bangladesh.

Fred Shaia is a PhD candidate and presidential fellow in the Department of
Political Science at Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island. His work
focuses on international organizations, diplomacy, and the politics of climate
改变. His current research explores how small states overcome structural dis-
advantages to achieve their political goals in UN negotiations.

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J. Timmons Roberts is the Ittleson Professor of Environment and Society and
Sociology at Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island. His current work
focuses on obstruction of climate action at the subnational level and of adap-
tation and loss and damage ﬁnance at the international level. He has published
多于 100 articles and thirteen monographs on environmental and climate
social science. He is director of the Climate Social Science Network (CSSN.org),
supporting more than 450 scholars around the world.

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Md. Fahad Hossain coordinates the Least Developed Countries (LDC) 大学-
sities Consortium on Climate Change, a capacity-building initiative endorsed by
the LDC governments and hosted at the International Centre for Climate
Change and Development in Bangladesh, where he also leads the LDC Pro-
gramme on Loss and Damage. His research interests lie in the area of climate.

Stacy-ann Robinson is an associate professor of environmental studies at Colby
College in Waterville, Maine. Her scholarship investigates the human, 社会的,

114 (西德:129) Tactical Opposition

and policy dimensions of climate change adaptation in small island developing
状态, with a special focus on international adaptation ﬁnance and climate jus-
泰斯. She was a contributing author to chapter 15 (“Small Islands”) of Working
Group II’s contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, which was released in February 2022. 她是
2022–2023 Lightning Scholar at Perry World House, the University of Pennsyl-
vania’s hub for global policy engagement.

Mizan R. Khan has a PhD in environmental policy and management from the
School of Public Policy, University of Maryland, 学院公园. He has also been
a visiting professor and fellow at Brown University, the University de Poitiers,
the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland College Park, 和
University of Manitoba. He was a lead author of the IPCC. 博士. Khan has been
serving as lead negotiator of climate ﬁnance with the Bangladesh delegation
自从 2001. He has to his credit a wide range of publications, including three
books on climate change economics and politics, published by Routledge and
与新闻界.

David Ciplet is an assistant professor of environmental studies at the University
of Colorado Boulder. His research focuses on justice, 不等式, 和社会的
change in climate governance. He is lead author of Power in a Warming World:
The New Global Politics of Climate Change and the Remaking of Environmental
不等式 (与新闻界, 2015). He has coauthored articles in journals like Global
Environmental Change, Nature Climate Change, and Global Environmental Politics.

致谢

We thank the Climate Social Science Network for supporting this research
and Perry World House for covering the cost of open access publication. 我们也
thank the special issue editors—Lisa Vanhala, Elisa Calliari, and Adelle
Thomas—for bringing together this great group of articles and for their early
comments on this project, along with the rest of the participants at the June
2022 special issue workshop at University College London. Thanks to the GEP
editors and anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback on this manuscript.

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