Strategies of Inhibition
Strategies of Inhibition Francis J. Gavin
我们. 大战略, the Nuclear
革命, and Nonproliferation
What roles have nu-
clear nonproliferation and counterproliferation played in U.S. grand strat-
egy since 1945?1 And what insights does this history provide into the sharp,
contemporary debates over the past, 展示, and future trajectory of U.S.
grand strategy?
Most accounts of postwar U.S. grand strategy focus on two broad but dis-
tinct missions: (1) to contain great power rivals and (2) to open the world’s
economy and political systems to encourage the ºow of trade, 资源, 和
capital.2 There has been considerable debate over the origins, continuity,
and effectiveness of both the containment and openness missions, and over
identifying when these strategies have been at odds and where they have
overlapped.3 U.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts, 另一方面,
Francis J. Gavin is the ªrst Frank Stanton Chair in Nuclear Security Policy Studies and Professor of Politi-
cal Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
The author is grateful for the feedback he received during presentations of earlier versions of this
article to the Managing the Atom Program at Harvard University, the Program on International
Conºict and Cooperation at Texas A&M University,
the Christopher Browne Center for
International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania, and the Center for International Security
Studies at Princeton University. He would also like to express his gratitude to the graduate stu-
dents in a nuclear proliferation course he co-taught with Vipin Narang. 最后, he is especially
thankful for comments and suggestions from Mark Bell, Hal Brands, Peter Feaver, Eliza Gheorghe,
Celeste Ward Gventer, 亚历山大·拉诺斯卡, Austin Long, Julia Macdonald, Walter McDougall,
Nicholas Miller, Andrew Moravcsik, Vipin Narang, Reid Pauley, Mira Rapp-Hooper, Elisabeth
Röhrlich, Joshua Rovner, Joshua Itzkowitz Shifrinson, Marc Trachtenberg, Stephen Van Evera, 和
匿名审稿人. Lena Andrews, Jessica Mahoney, and Timothy McDonnell provided su-
perb research assistance.
1. Inhibition includes both nonproliferation and counterproliferation policies.
2. For the history of and logic behind the United States’ strategies of containment during the Cold
战争, see John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Secu-
rity Policy during the Cold War (纽约: 牛津大学出版社, 2005). The openness mission is
also often referred to as “liberal internationalism.” For the best summary of its origins and motiva-
系统蒸发散, see G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American
World Order (普林斯顿大学, 新泽西州: 普林斯顿大学出版社, 2011).
3. For a sense of these debates, see Michael E. Brown et al., 编辑。, America’s Strategic Choices, 转速. 编辑.
(剑桥, 大量的。: 与新闻界, 2000); and Elbridge Colby, 大战略: Contending Contemporary
Analyst Views and Implications for the U.S. 海军 (Arlington, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses,
十一月 2011), http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?动词(西德:2)getRecord&metadataPreªx(西德:2)html&identiªer(西德:2)
ADA553735]; Michèle Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, 编辑。, Finding Our Way: Debating American
大战略 (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: Center for a New American Security, 六月 2008), http://万维网
.cnas.org/ªles/documents/publications/FlournoyBrimley_Finding%20Our%20Way_June08.pdf.
For the best version of the restraint case, see in Barry R. 波森, 克制: 美国的新基金会.
大战略 (伊萨卡岛, 纽约: 康奈尔大学出版社, 2014). For the best critiques, see G. 约翰
Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan; and Stephen G. 布鲁克斯, Ikenberry, and William C. 沃尔福斯, “不
国际安全, 卷. 40, 不. 1 (夏天 2015), PP. 9–46, 土井:10.1162/ISEC_a_00205
© 2015 由哈佛大学和麻省理工学院的校长和研究员撰写.
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国际安全 40:1 10
have been largely subsumed under other strategies and missions, 在下面-
played, or even ignored. When it is discussed, nuclear nonproliferation is often
portrayed as a post–Cold War priority, applied inconsistently and selectively,
motivated more by idealistic and normative considerations than by strategic
因素, and taking second billing to more important U.S. 目标. Even when it
has been recognized as a signiªcant policy interest, nuclear nonprolifera-
tion has rarely been understood as a core, long-standing, and driving goal of
我们. grand strategy.4
这是不幸的. What Scott Sagan has labeled the “renaissance” in
nuclear studies—much of it based on declassiªed government documents—
reveals the extraordinary lengths the United States has gone to since the begin-
ning of the nuclear age to inhibit (IE。, slow, halt, and reverse) the spread
of nuclear weapons and, when unsuccessful, to mitigate the consequences of
their spread.5 To accomplish this end, the United States has developed and im-
plemented a wide range of tools, applied in a variety of combinations, 哪个
might be thought of as the “strategies of inhibition.”
Come Home, 美国: The Case against Retrenchment,” 国际安全, 卷. 37, 不. 3 (Win-
特尔 2012/13), PP. 7–51.
4. Nuclear nonproliferation is not discussed in Gaddis’s Strategies of Containment and only in pass-
ing in Ikenberry’s Liberal Leviathan. U.S nonproliferation policy is overlooked in the most recent
works on American grand strategy, including Hal Brands, What Good Is Grand Strategy? 电源和
Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. 衬套 (伊萨卡岛, 纽约: 康奈尔大学-
城市出版社, 2015); Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: 力量, Culture, and Change in American Grand
战略 (普林斯顿大学, 新泽西州: 普林斯顿大学出版社, 2008); and William C. Martel, 大战略
in Theory and Practice: The Need for an Effective American Foreign Policy (纽约: Cambridge Uni-
大学出版社, 2015). 罗伯特·J. Art identiªes preventing the spread of nuclear, 生物, and chem-
ical weapons to rogue states and terrorists as a priority after September 11, 2001, but does not
believe that the United States should be overly concerned by what he calls “normal states” with
核武器. See Art, A Grand Strategy for America (纽约: Century Foundation, 2003).
Barry Posen also sees nuclear nonproliferation as a post–Cold War priority, arguing that U.S.
“grand strategy today is ªxated on preventing nuclear proliferation.” Posen thinks this unwise:
美国. nonproliferation effort, which “assumes the risks and responsibilities of defending other
capable states around the world, and ªghts and threatens preventive wars to deny potential ad-
versaries nuclear capabilities, is costly and risky, and ultimately futile.” See Posen, 克制,
PP. 72–73. 斯蒂芬·M. Walt recognizes that the United States pursued nuclear nonproliferation for
strategic reasons that preceded the end of the Cold War, 但, other than with regard to preventing
nuclear terrorism, also believes that recent U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policies have been costly
and ineffective: “Earlier efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons were only partly successful,
and they required the United States to offer considerable inducements to would-be proliferators
(including security guarantees, access to nuclear technology, and a U.S. pledge . . . eventually to re-
duce its own nuclear arsenal).” See Walt, The Taming of American Power: The Global Response to U.S.
Primacy (纽约: W.W. 诺顿, 2005), PP. 139–140.
5. Scott D. Sagan, “Two Renaissances in Nuclear Security Studies,” introduction to H-Diplo/ISSF
Forum, 不. 2, “What We Talk About When We Talk about Nuclear Weapons,” Issforum.org, 六月
15, 2014, http://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-Forum-2.pdf. For the increased availability of pre-
viously classiªed documents on nuclear dynamics from capitals around the world, see Francis J.
Gavin, “What We Talk about When We Talk about Nuclear Weapons: A Review Essay,” in the same
roundtable.
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Strategies of Inhibition 11
信息, and technology controls;
These strategies to inhibit nuclear proliferation employ different policies
rarely seen as connected to one another. They include treaties; 规范; dip-
lomacy; 援助; conventional arms sales; alliances and security guarantees;
export,
智力; preemptive
counterforce nuclear postures; missile defense; sanctions; 强迫; interdic-
的; sabotage; and even the threat of preventive military action. 联合
States has applied these measures to friend and foe alike, often regardless of
political orientation, economic system, or alliance status. Although the strate-
gies of inhibition sometimes have complemented the United States’ openness
and containment missions, many times they have been unrelated to or even in
tension with these other strategies; in all cases, they have been motivated
in large measure by inhibition’s distinctive strategic logic. Collectively, 这些
linked strategies of inhibition have been an independent and driving feature of
我们. national security policy for more than seven decades, to an extent rarely
documented or fully understood in debates over grand strategy. For better or
更差, absent the United States’ strategies of inhibition, we might live in a
world with many more nuclear weapons states.
Demonstrating the persistent and long-standing centrality of nuclear non-
proliferation and counterproliferation to U.S. grand strategy is important for at
least four reasons. 第一的, the history of inhibition provides a more accurate,
复杂的, and continuous picture of post–World War II international history
than offered by standard, stylized accounts of the Cold War and post–Cold
War eras. 例如, inhibition often demanded that the United States coop-
erate with its Cold War adversary, 苏联, and work against Cold
War allies such as West Germany and South Korea. 第二, inhibition inserts a
critical and often missing variable into debates over the causes of nuclear pro-
liferation. Scholarly treatments that focus on factors such as political leader-
船, regime type, norms and treaties, and the regional security environment
of the potential proliferator often overlook the powerful inºuence of U.S. inhi-
bition strategies on when and why states make their decisions about nuclear
武器. 第三, the strategies of inhibition challenge some of the most popu-
lar international relations theories that seek to explain or predict how the
United States should assess and react to nuclear proliferation. Defensive real-
主义, 例如, cannot explain and did not predict the long-standing, ag-
gressive U.S. efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons. 第四, and most
重要的, a better understanding of the strategies of inhibition requires schol-
ars to recast ongoing debates over whether the United States should continue
to be deeply engaged in world affairs or to retrench. Inhibition helps explain
many otherwise puzzling policies, such as the persistence of Cold War security
联盟, that analysts often ascribe to hegemonic hubris, bureaucratic politics,
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国际安全 40:1 12
或意识形态. The inhibition mission also sheds light on the motivation behind
我们. efforts to ensure that Iran does not develop a nuclear weapons capability.
This article proceeds as follows. The ªrst section deªnes grand strategy, lays
out the basic contours of the well-known containment and openness missions,
and highlights several important U.S. policies in the nuclear age that neither
mission can fully explain.6 The second section outlines the history of the
United States’ strategies of inhibition by answering ªve questions. 第一的, 什么
is the inhibition mission? 第二, why has the United States pursued it? 第三,
what tools—what strategies of inhibition—has the United States employed to
achieve as ambitious a goal as nonproliferation? 第四, how should scholars
and policymakers understand historical variations in the strategies of inhibi-
tion and explain when inhibition fails? 第五, why have the strategies of inhi-
bition often been overlooked or misunderstood in the scholarly literature on
Cold War history, grand strategy, and international relations theory? The ªnal
section explores the importance and implications of the strategies of inhibition,
both for understanding the past and better assessing contemporary choices for
我们. grand strategy.
Postwar U.S. 大战略: Contain, Open, and Inhibit
There are two immediate challenges to anyone trying to understand U.S.
grand strategy after World War II. 第一的, the whole concept of grand strategy,
unless properly deªned, can be nebulous. As Hal Brands points out, it is “one
of the most slippery and widely abused terms in the foreign policy lexicon.”7
第二, the history of postwar U.S. grand strategy can be particularly difªcult
to explain; it is a complex and messy subject, inºuenced by structural consid-
erations, domestic and international politics, and the personality and prefer-
ences of individual presidents and their administrations. Barry Posen deªnes
grand strategy as a “nation-state’s theory about how to produce security for it-
self.” It is “not a rule book,” but a “set of concepts and arguments that need to
be revisited regularly.”8 Brands explains grand strategy “as the intellectual ar-
6. This effort began against Germany even before the United States had used atomic bombs
against Japan. As the war in Europe ended, the “U.S. and U.K. forces moved aggressively to pre-
vent the proliferation of this nucleus of nuclear capability. They promptly seized the scientists and
materials in their own zones of occupation and snatched some from the agreed zones of France
and the USSR ahead of their advancing armies. They even destroyed by air attack the Auer Com-
pany plant, in the prospective Soviet zone, that had produced the uranium metal for the German
程序. They interned near London the ten ranking scientists . . . and only after Hiroshima did
they release them under such conditions that they would not want to go to the USSR.” See Henry
S. Lowenhaupt, “On the Soviet Nuclear Scent,” Studies in Intelligence, 卷. 11, 不. 4 (落下 1969),
p. 13.
7. Brands, What Good Is Grand Strategy? p. 七.
8. 波森, 克制, p. 1.
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Strategies of Inhibition 13
chitecture that gives form and structure to foreign policy.” Decisionmakers
undertaking grand strategy “are not simply reacting to events or handling
them on a case-by-case basis. 相当, a grand strategy is a purposeful and co-
herent set of ideas about what a nation seeks to accomplish in the world, 和
how it should go about doing so.”9
While the history of U.S. foreign, foreign economic, 和国家安全
policy since 1945 contains many twists and turns, discontinuities, and anoma-
谎言, scholars have identiªed two broad goals that have united American grand
strategists and meet Brands’s deªnition: (1) to contain (和, 如果可能的话, defeat)
great power rivals, particularly the Soviet Union, 和 (2) to open the interna-
tional economic and political system. Analysts have vigorously debated the re-
lationship between, the wisdom of, and the best ways to achieve and balance
these goals, but both the containment and openness missions are recognized as
pillars of postwar U.S. grand strategy.
The strategy of containment is most closely associated with U.S. diplomat
and historian George Kennan and emerged to counter what were seen as the
Soviet Union’s aggressive geopolitical designs on the crucial Eurasian land-
mass and beyond, without sparking a third world war.10 As John Lewis
Gaddis and others have highlighted, how the United States implemented
the containment mission has varied over time, depending on changes in the
international environment and who was in the White House.11 In the early
1950s and arguably the late 1970s/early 1980s, containment was more aggres-
sive and reliant on military tools, and included policies to pressure the Soviets
and their client states. In other periods, containment was strictly defensive and
even at times accommodating; the emergence of détente, which ºourished
from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, witnessed occasional superpower re-
spect and cooperation. The overall goal of containment, 然而, was to check
and over time reduce the Soviet Union’s military power and geopolitical reach.
Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, 我们. 盛大
strategists have debated whether the containment mission is relevant in a
9. See Brands, What Good Is Grand Strategy? p. 3.
10. Kennan laid out his view in “X” (George Kennan), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign
事务, 卷. 25, 不. 4 (七月 1947), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/
1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct. Kennan ultimately distanced himself from how U.S. 政策-
makers came to understand and implement containment. See John Lewis Gaddis, George F.
Kennan: An American Life (纽约: 企鹅, 2011).
11. The containment strategy had a wide spectrum of supporters, from Kennan, who emphasized
economic tools and lamented the militarization of the Cold War, to more hawkish advocates who
believed in employing aggressive military postures. All shared the same goal—to contain and if
possible eventually reverse the Soviet Union’s power without a war. For an argument that efforts
to undermine the Soviet Union’s control in Eastern Europe went beyond containment in the early
冷战, see Gregory Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin: America’s Strategy to Subvert the Soviet
Bloc, 1947–1956 (伊萨卡岛, 纽约: 康奈尔大学出版社, 2000).
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国际安全 40:1 14
world lacking peer competitors, and whether it should be applied to other
emerging threats, such as Iraq, 伊朗, and the People’s Republic of China.12
The openness mission in U.S. grand strategy emerged from the vigorous ef-
forts of the United States and its allies to rebuild the world economy and en-
courage political liberalization after the disasters of the Great Depression and
World War II. Economically, American policymakers believed that the United
States had a vital interest in encouraging open trade, access to natural re-
来源, and the easy movement of capital across borders.13 The United States
and its allies created international and regional organizations, regimes, 和
rules to encourage multilateral trade and investment. The founding of the
International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and
发展, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade reºects this
desire, as do more recent initiatives such as the North American Free Trade
协议, the World Trade Organization, and various regional and global
trade negotiations.14 These efforts have often required U.S. presidential ad-
ministrations to resist powerful domestic political pressures encouraging
protectionism. The United States often (though not always) has encouraged
regimes to embrace liberal values including the rule of law, political toler-
安斯, independence for colonial territories, and free elections. Promoting self-
determination and democracy as core elements of U.S. grand strategy has its
roots in the legacy of President Woodrow Wilson, but accelerated and intensi-
ªed after World War II.15
合在一起, the openness and containment missions explain much about
我们. grand strategy since the end of World War II. Neither mission, 然而,
12. For a sample of discussions over the pros and cons of attempting to contain Iran, see Kenneth
中号. 波拉克, “Containing Iran,” in Robin Wright, 编辑。, The Iran Primer: 力量, 政治, 和美国. 政策
(华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010), PP. 209–211. For a discussion of
containment in the context of Iraq, see Eric K. Graben, “Policy Brief: The Case for Containing
伊拉克,” Middle East Quarterly, 卷. 1, 不. 2 (六月 1994), http://www.meforum.org/223/policy-brief-
the-case-for-containing-iraq. For the debate over containing China, see David Shambaugh, “骗局-
tainment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing’s Responses,” 国际安全, 卷. 21,
不. 2 (落下 1996), PP. 180–209.
13. The openness mission, similar to containment and inhibition, also evolved over time, as the in-
ternational economy shifted to market-determined exchange rates and freer ºows of capital and
trade after the 1971 ending of the Bretton Woods System of ªxed exchange rates, managed trade,
and limitations on capital ºows.
14. 我们. support for European integration was driven by both the openness and containment mis-
西翁. On the security considerations behind U.S. 支持, see Sebastian Rosato, Europe United:
Power Politics and the Making of the European Community (伊萨卡岛, 纽约: 康奈尔大学出版社,
2011).
15. The best source is Tony Smith, America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle
for Democracy in the 20th Century (普林斯顿大学, 新泽西州: 普林斯顿大学出版社, 1994). See also Frank
Ninkovich, The Wilsonian Century: 我们. Foreign Policy since 1900 (芝加哥: 芝加哥大学
按, 1999).
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Strategies of Inhibition 15
can fully account for the high priority the United States has placed on slowing,
reversing, and mitigating the spread of nuclear weapons. Consider ªve
puzzles about the history of U.S. grand strategy since 1945 that neither the
containment nor openness mission can entirely explain.
puzzle one
Why has the United States considered preventive military action against na-
scent nuclear weapons states from the start of the nuclear age, even when most
of these countries were far too weak to be otherwise threatening to the United
状态?16 Containment, a largely defensive doctrine, is not adequate to fully il-
luminate debates over targeting the nuclear facilities of the Soviet Union in the
late 1940s and early 1950s, the People’s Republic of China in the 1960s, 北
Korea in the 1990s, and Iraq and potentially Iran more recently.17 Arguments
that identify hegemony or imperial ambitions as the driver fail to explain why
only the adversary’s nuclear programs, and not its land, 市场, or economic
资源, were ever the focus of the United States.
puzzle two
Neither the openness nor the containment strategy can fully explain why the
United States time and again pressured even its closest allies to eschew inde-
pendent nuclear forces.18 In some cases, the United States even threatened co-
ercive actions, including sanctions or abandonment, against ostensible Cold
War allies such as West Germany, 台湾, 韩国, and Pakistan to pre-
vent them from developing nuclear weapons.19 If containment was the sole
driver of U.S. grand strategy during the Cold War, then one might imagine that
the United States would have wanted its friends to possess these powerful
weapons to help balance against the Soviet Union or, 至少, would try
to avoid alienating its allies with its vigorous nonproliferation policies. 这
16. Marc Trachtenberg, “Preventive War and U.S. Foreign Policy,” 安全研究, 卷. 16, 不. 1
(January/March 2007), PP. 1–31; and Francis J. Gavin and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “The Copenhagen
Temptation: Rethinking Prevention and Proliferation in the Age of Deterrence Dominance,”
Working Paper (剑桥, 大量的。: Tobin Project, 2011), http://www.tobinproject.org/sites/
tobinproject.org/ªles/assets/Gavin%26Rapp-Hooper_US_Preventive_War_Thinking.pdf.
17. Such attacks might generate economic instability and uncertainty, which would not be good
for the goals of the openness mission.
18. Nicholas L. 磨坊主, “The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions,” 国际组织-
的, 卷. 68, 不. 4 (落下 2014), PP. 913–944.
19. Gene Gerzhoy, “Coercive Nonproliferation: 安全, Leverage, and Nuclear Reversals,” 博士.
dissertation, 芝加哥大学, 2014; Gene Gerzhoy, “Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Re-
菌株: How the United States Thwarted West Germany’s Nuclear Ambitions,” International Secu-
理性, 卷. 39, 不. 4 (春天 2015), PP. 91–129; and Alexander Lanoszka, “Protection States Trust:
Major Power Patronage, Nuclear Behavior, and Alliance Dynamics,” 博士. dissertation, 普林斯顿大学
大学, 2014.
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国际安全 40:1 16
United States regularly made economic concessions to its allies—including
agreements permitting trade and monetary discrimination against the United
States—to achieve inhibition, in ways often at odds with the openness mission.20
puzzle three
Why did the United States create a vast set of alliances and security guarantees
backed by implicit or explicit protection under its nuclear umbrella?21 和
为什么, after the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union disappeared, did it
not only maintain but expand its nuclear umbrella? The containment mission
vis-à-vis the Soviet Union had been completed successfully by 1989–91. 许多
efforts to explain continuing and expanding alliances in the post–Cold War pe-
riod are unconvincing.22
puzzle four
Why has the United States aggressively sought strategic nuclear primacy since
1945? One of the core assumptions of the scholarly literature on the nuclear
revolution is that once mutual vulnerability between rivals emerges, it makes
little sense to try to escape this condition by building more or better nuclear
weapons systems. According to Kenneth Waltz, “[氮]uclear weapons elimi-
nate strategy. . . . [氮]uclear weapons make strategy obsolete.”23 Yet the United
States has poured enormous sums of money into strategic systems geared to-
ward counterforce (IE。, damage limitation strategies to establish nuclear pri-
macy against any potential adversary), often with little regard for the potential
effects on stability.24 Over the next decade, the United States plans to spend
20. 例如, the United States made economic concessions to West Germany while privileg-
ing inhibition over containment and openness because of “the explosive set of issues surrounding
the German and nuclear question.” See Francis J. Gavin, 金子, 美元, and Power: The Politics of In-
ternational Monetary Relations, 1958–1971 (教堂山: University of North Carolina Press, 2004),
p. 12; 另见. 89–116, 135–164. Similar logic infused U.S. calculations on trade and interna-
tional monetary relations with Japan.
21. Jeffrey W. 克诺夫, 编辑。, Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation (斯坦福大学, 加利福尼亚州。: 斯坦福大学
大学出版社, 2012); and Makreeta Lahti, “Security Cooperation as a Way to Stop the Spread of
Nuclear Weapons? Nuclear Nonproliferation Policies of the United States towards the Federal Re-
public of Germany and Israel, 1945–1968,” Ph.D. dissertation, 波茨坦大学, 2008.
22. One might argue that these are not, 实际上, 联盟. 历史上, alliances have been tempo-
rary, threat speciªc, and additive. These relationships appear to be permanent, to persist regard-
less of threat, and are suppressive.
23. Kenneth N. 华尔兹, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American Political Science Review,
卷. 84, 不. 5 (九月 1990), p. 738.
24. Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, “Stalking the Secure Second Strike: 智力,
Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy,》 战略研究杂志, 卷. 38, Nos. 1–2 (2015), PP. 38–73;
and Keir A. Lieber and Daryl Press, “The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy,”
国际安全, 卷. 30, 不. 4 (春天 2006), PP. 7–44.
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Strategies of Inhibition 17
$350 billion upgrading its nuclear forces, despite possessing vast quantitative and qualitative advantages over every other current nuclear weapons state.25 puzzle ªve Why did the United States cooperate during the Cold War with its sworn en- emy and the target of its alliances and strategic nuclear forces, 苏联, to stanch nuclear proliferation? The most famous example of the super- power rivals working to inhibit proliferation is the negotiations that led to the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).26 It turns out, 然而, that this was not an isolated example. Even during the bitterest periods of the Cold War, the United States was willing to work with the Soviet Union to achieve its inhibition goals.27 These and other puzzles, which at ªrst blush seem unrelated, can only be fully explained by understanding the crucial role the inhibition mission has played in U.S. grand strategy since 1945. The United States has been willing to 25. The sums of $160 billion will be spent on strategic nuclear delivery systems and weapons
和 $52 billion on nuclear-related command, 控制, 通讯, and early-warning
系统. See Congressional Budget Ofªce (CBO), “Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2015
to 2024,” (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区, CBO, 一月 2015). https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/ªles/
cboªles/attachments/49870-NuclearForces.pdf.
26. Hal Brands, “Non-Proliferation and the Dynamics of the Middle Cold War: The Superpowers,
the MLF, and the NPT,” Cold War History, 卷. 7, 不. 3 (八月 2007), PP. 389–423; 安德鲁·J.
Coe and Jane Vaynman, “Collusion and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” Journal of Politics
(即将推出); Vladimir Orlov, Roland Timerbaev, and Anton Khlopkov, Nuclear Nonproliferation in
U.S.-Russian Relations: Challenges and Opportunities Report, Center for Policy Studies in Russia (Mos-
cow: Raduga, 2002); William C. Potter, “The Soviet Union and Nuclear Proliferation,” Slavic Re-
看法, 卷. 44, 不. 3 (落下 1985), PP. 468–488; Dane Swango, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty:
Constrainer, Screener, or Enabler?” University of California, 天使们, 2009; Joseph S. Nye Jr.,
“U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in a Nonproliferation Regime,” in Alexander L. 乔治, 菲利普·J. Farley,
and Alexander Dallin, 编辑。, U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, 教训 (新的
约克: 牛津大学出版社, 1988), PP. 336–352; and Peter R. Lavoy, “Learning and the Evolu-
tion of Cooperation in U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Nonproliferation Activities,” in George W.
Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock, 编辑。, Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy (博尔德, 科罗拉多州。:
西景, 1991), PP. 735–783. Elisabeth Röhrlich demonstrates that the two superpowers acknowl-
edged a shared interest in nuclear nonproliferation at the time of the negotiations to create the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency during the Eisenhower administration. See Röhrlich, “Cold
War Dynamics and North-South Divisions in the Creation of the IAEA, 1953–1957,” paper pre-
sented at the Nuclear Studies Research Initiative, University of Texas, Austin, 十月 16, 2013.
27. The Test Ban Treaty—discussed by the superpower rivals both before and immediately after
the Cuban missile crisis—was understood as an inhibition tool: “A test ban, the Soviets would be
told, would mean that ‘there would be no additional nuclear powers in our camp.’ The Russians,
for their part, would prevent their allies from building nuclear forces. And these commitments
would be linked: the United States would ‘take responsibility in respect to nondissemination with
relation to those powers associated with it, if the Soviet Union is willing to take a corresponding
obligation for the powers with which it is associated.’” See Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace:
The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (普林斯顿大学, 新泽西州: 普林斯顿大学出版社, 1999),
p. 385.
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国际安全 40:1 18
pressure, coerce, and threaten nascent nuclear states, including friends, to keep
them nonnuclear. It has also been willing to provide assurances of protection
and make them more credible with potentially destabilizing counterforce/
damage-limitation nuclear strategies and missile defense. To inhibit nuclear
增殖, the United States was even willing to work with its most threat-
ening adversary, 苏联.
The literature on U.S. grand strategy has not ignored the question of nuclear
proliferation altogether.28 When it has discussed proliferation, 然而, it has
generally made three problematic assumptions.29 First, some analysts claim
that nuclear nonproliferation emerged as an important U.S. goal only after the
Cold War ended and that it focuses only on weak or so-called rogue states.30
第二, the primary driver of U.S. nuclear proliferation policies is often
identiªed as norms and ideals, not strategic considerations.31 Third, 核
nonproliferation is frequently subsumed under other strategic goals, 这样的
as multilateralism, or is considered only one among many new global chal-
lenges.32 These assumptions fail to acknowledge the deep historical roots, 这
28. No scholar has identiªed nuclear nonproliferation as an independent driver of U.S. 盛大
strategy with its own strategic logic.
29. For a sample of writings on grand strategy that share one or more of these assumptions, 看
罗伯特·J. Art, “Defensible Defense: America’s Grand Strategy after the Cold War,“ 国际的
安全, 卷. 15, 不. 4 (春天 1991), PP. 5–53; Shawn Brimley, “Finding Our Way,” in Flournoy
and Brimley, Finding Our Way, PP. 9–22; Ashton B. Carter, 威廉·J. Perry, and John D.
施泰因布鲁纳, A New Concept of Cooperative Security (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: 布鲁金斯学会出版社,
1992); G. John Ikenberry, “An Agenda for Liberal International Renewal,” in Flournoy and
Brimley, Finding Our Way, PP. 43–60; G. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Final Paper of
the Princeton Project on National Security” (普林斯顿大学, 新泽西州: Princeton Project on National Security,
2006); Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,“ 外交事务, 卷. 70, 不. 1 (1991),
PP. 23–33; and Sarah Sewall, “A Strategy of Conservation: American Power in the International
系统,” in Flournoy and Brimley, Finding Our Way, PP. 103–122.
30. Sarah Sewall writes, “The end of the Cold War offered an opportunity to reduce the incentives
for acquiring nuclear weapons. 反而, a new class of weak and insecure states that are either
seeking or expanding their nascent nuclear capability has emerged. . . . These states’ internal
weakness, 然而, poses a new problem because of the uncertainties associated with the state
implosion of a nuclear power.” See Sewall, “A Strategy of Conservation,” p. 109.
31. According to Ashton Carter, William Perry, and John Steinbruner, “Proliferation of destructive
technology casts a shadow over future U.S. security in a way that cannot be directly addressed
through superior force readiness. . . . And even when U.S. interests are not directly at risk, 这
United States bears an unavoidable responsibility for the world order.” See Carter, Perry, 和
施泰因布鲁纳, A New Concept of Cooperative Security, p. 4. Walter Russell Mead makes the interesting
argument that “Jeffersonian logic on disarmament was widely accepted; every president from
Kennedy through Reagan engaged in serious efforts to limit the development and spread of nu-
clear weapons.” See Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World
(纽约: 劳特利奇, 2002), p. 212.
32. John Ikenberry notes, “What is most striking [in the post–Cold War era] is not the preeminence
of one threat but the scope and variety of threats. Global warming, health pandemics, nuclear pro-
liferation, jihadist terrorism, energy scarcity. . . . The point is that none of these threats is, in itself,
so singularly preeminent that it deserves to be the centerpiece of American grand strategy in the
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Strategies of Inhibition 19
prevalence, the wide array of tools, or the driving strategic logic of the United
States’ strategies of inhibition.
明显地, inhibition is not the only explanation for these and other impor-
tant U.S. 政策; 经常, the inhibition mission has intertwined with the open-
ness and especially the containment mission. 此外, given the profound
and unprecedented challenge presented to U.S. grand strategy by nuclear
武器, the strategy of inhibition took time to coalesce into a coherent, 骗局-
sistent, and effective set of strategies. Policies that were originally motivated
by inhibition instincts—such as President Dwight Eisenhower’s “Atoms for
Peace” program or the controversial Multilateral Force proposal—were ulti-
mately seen as counterproductive and abandoned. The historical record makes
清除, 然而, that inhibition has been one of the driving motivations behind
我们. grand strategy since the start of the nuclear age, pursued across presiden-
tial administrations despite important changes in the international system.
The Strategies of Inhibition
What is the goal of the strategies of inhibition and why have they been a core
feature of U.S. grand strategy since 1945? What tools does the United States
use to implement these strategies? How should the variations in these strate-
gies over time be understood? And why have scholars underemphasized or
even ignored them?
the strategic logic of inhibition
The objective of the United States’ strategies of inhibition was and remains
简单的: to prevent other states—regardless of their political afªliation or
orientation—from developing or acquiring independent nuclear forces, 和
when this effort fails, to reverse or mitigate the consequences of prolifera-
的. Across different administrations and changing international circum-
立场, the United States has shown itself willing to pay a very high price to
achieve these ends. When it is unable to stop proliferation, it works hard to
prevent the proliferator from undertaking policies—weaponization, pursuit of
a missile capability, and especially nuclear testing—that would increase the
pressure on other states to acquire nuclear weapons. The United States is
also more willing to countenance nuclear weapons programs, such as Great
way that anti-fascism and anti-communism did in an earlier era.” See Ikenberry, “An Agenda for
Liberal International Renewal,” p. 49.
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国际安全 40:1 20
Britain’s, that become dependent on and are coordinated with U.S. nu-
clear systems.33
Why has the United States been so interested in preventing states from pos-
sessing independent nuclear forces? Many international relations scholars
argue that the spread of nuclear weapons can stabilize world politics.34 Nu-
clear weapons, they contend, have little effectiveness for anything but deter-
rence.35 These analysts are often perplexed by or critical of U.S. efforts to halt
nuclear proliferation, and wonder if policymakers understand how nuclear
deterrence works. Even those analysts who do not support nuclear prolifera-
tion are puzzled by the high price of strategies the United States has employed
to prevent it.
These scholars miss a fundamental point: 历史地, 我们. policymakers
have demonstrated less enthusiasm than the conventional wisdom suggests
for the supposedly stabilizing aspects of nuclear weapons for international re-
lations. Of far greater concern has been the worry over how other countries
might use nuclear weapons against the United States. The strategies of inhibi-
tion were developed to stem the power-equalizing effects of nuclear weapons
and have been motivated by the desire of the United States to safeguard its se-
curity and preserve its dominant power. 华硕. Secretary of State Dean Rusk
pointed out, “It was almost in the nature of nuclear weapons that if someone
had them, he did not want others to have them.”36
There are seven interrelated elements driving the United States’ strategies of
inhibition. They are motivated by the goal to protect the United States from
nuclear attack and/or the desire to maintain U.S. freedom of action to pursue
other strategic goals.
第一的, the United States has feared nuclear weapons being used against it,
either through a deliberate nuclear attack or an accidental launch. The higher
the number of states that possess nuclear weapons, the greater the risk the
United States might be hit. Given the horriªc consequences of an attack,
American decisionmakers have considered it their responsibility to decrease
this danger by limiting proliferation and its consequences. 华硕. Secretary of
33. One of the reasons that the United States viewed collective nuclear-sharing arrangements such
as the Multilateral Force as nonproliferation tools was that they were far preferable to independent
nuclear programs.
34. Kenneth N. 华尔兹, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better,” Adelphi Papers,
不. 171 (伦敦: 国际战略研究所, 1981).
35. Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (伊萨卡岛, 新泽西州: 康奈尔大学出版社,
1984).
36. Rusk to State Department, 八月 7, 1963, 约翰·F. Kennedy Presidential Library (JFKL), 普雷西-
dential Papers (PP), National Security Files, 盒子 187, folder “USSR—Gromyko Talks—Rusk.”
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Strategies of Inhibition 21
State John Foster Dulles told his Soviet counterpart, Andrei Gromyko, 它是
“frightening to think of a world where anybody could have a bomb.”37
第二, given the difªculty of identifying where a nuclear attack may have
originated, 我们. policymakers worry about the catalytic or “detonator” conse-
quences of proliferation; 换句话说, they fear that an independent nuclear
state might threaten to use or actually employ a nuclear weapon to draw the
United States into a conºict in which it did not want to become involved.38
There is evidence that Pakistan, 南非, 以色列, and possibly France pur-
sued nuclear strategies aimed at pulling an otherwise unwilling United States
into crises on their behalf.39 A 1962 top-secret study explained this fear: 这
“Nth country problem” might generate “the danger of major war being ‘cata-
lyzed,’ deliberately or inadvertently, by the possessors of nuclear weapons
outside the control of the major alliances.”40
第三, the United States has worried about the emergence of nuclear tipping
points or nuclear dominoes, whereby one key state acquiring a nuclear capa-
bility might lead four or ªve other states to do the same.41 After the People’s
Republic of China tested a nuclear device in 1964, 例如, 总统
Lyndon Johnson’s Committee on Nuclear Proliferation (also known as the
Gilpatric Committee) 警告: “The world is fast approaching a point of no re-
turn in the prospects of controlling the spread of nuclear weapons.”42 Not only
would “proliferation cascades” increase the number of nuclear states in the
世界, with all the dangers that this could bring; it could also increase tensions
37. Memorandum of Conversation, “Subject: Disarmament,” October 5, 1957, Foreign Relations of
美国 (FRUS), 1955–1957, 卷. 20: Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy (华盛顿,
华盛顿特区: Government Printing Ofªce [GPO], 1990), PP. 731–734.
38. For an excellent treatment of catalytic strategies, see Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Mod-
ern Era: Regional Powers and International Conºict (普林斯顿大学, 新泽西州: 普林斯顿大学出版社, 2014).
39. On Israel, 巴基斯坦, and South Africa, see ibid. On France, see Trachtenberg, A Constructed
和平, p. 338, n 192. 他写, “One measure of how bad relations had become is that Rusk at one
point even threatened the French with an American nuclear attack if they dared to act independ-
ently in a crisis.”
40. “Report on Strategic Developments over the Next Decade for the Interagency Panel,” October
12, 1962, JFKL, PP, National Security Files, 盒子 376, item no. 27, p. 52.
41. For a compelling argument that the United States was very worried about nuclear tipping
点, see Nicholas L. 磨坊主, “Hegemony and Nuclear Proliferation,” 博士. dissertation, Massa-
楚塞茨理工学院, 2014.
42. Report by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, 一月 21, 1965, FRUS, 1964–1968, 卷. 11:
Arms Control and Disarmament (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: GPO, 1997), PP. 173–182. For an early National
Intelligence Estimate dealing with the likelihood and consequences of new nuclear states, 看
National Intelligence Estimate 100-6-57, “Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries—
Likelihood and Consequences,“ 六月 18, 1957, in William Burr, 编辑。, National Intelligence Estimates of
the Nuclear Proliferation Problem: The First Ten Years, 1957–1967, National Security Archive Elec-
tronic Brief Book (NSA EBB) 155, 文档. 2, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/prolif-
2.pdf.
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国际安全 40:1 22
and dangers in parts of the world the United States has considered important.
此外, it could drive U.S. allies—for example, Japan and South Korea—
to target each other in ways inimical to the United States’ interests.43
第四, 我们. policymakers have fully appreciated the power of nuclear de-
terrence, but have feared that nuclear weapons could be used to deter the
United States and limit its freedom of action, both regionally and in the world
at large.44 From the beginning of the nuclear age, the United States recognized
the potential for nuclear weapons to become the great equalizer, “weapons
of the weak,” allowing states with far inferior conventional, 经济的, 和
other forms of power to prevent it from doing what it wants. In the words of
the Gilpatric Committee report, “As additional nations obtained nuclear
武器, our diplomatic and military inºuence would wane, and strong pres-
sures would arise to retreat to isolation to avoid the risk of involvement in nu-
clear war.”45 And as Michael Horowitz explains, a feeble state “possessing
even a single nuclear weapon inºuences America’s strategic calculations and
seems to make coercive success harder.”46
第五, it is easier to control allies that do not have their own nuclear weapons
and that depend on the United States for their security. 美国有
bristled at the independent policies that nuclear-armed allies such as France
and Israel have pursued, often against its wishes. A Germany, 台湾, 日本,
or South Korea with nuclear weapons might be more likely to challenge the re-
gional or international status quo with threats or the use of force in ways inim-
ical to U.S. 兴趣. President John F. 肯尼迪, 例如, warned that if
43. “Mr. Gilpatric stated his preference for a world with a limited number of nuclear powers,
ªnding it implausible that additional proliferation could be compartmentalized, quarantined, 或者
regionalized and comparing the consequences for the world of the Sarajevo incident. He found it
all the more unlikely that a nuclear conºict involving 1.5 billion Chinese, Indians and Japanese
could not affect our own security.” See “Minutes of Discussion,” January 7–8, 1965, Lyndon B.
Johnson Presidential Library (LBJL), National Security ªle, Committee ªle, Committee on Nuclear
增殖, Minutes of Meetings, 盒子 9.
44. Matthew Kroenig notes, “Power-projecting states, states with the ability to project conven-
tional military power over a particular target, have a lot to lose when that target state acquires nu-
clear weapons,” which is why “power-projecting states fear nuclear proliferation to both allied
and enemy states.” See Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear
武器 (伊萨卡岛, 纽约: 康奈尔大学出版社, 2010), p. 3.
45. Report by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, 一月 21, 1965, FRUS, 1964–1968, 卷. 11.
46. Michael C. Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International
政治 (普林斯顿大学, 新泽西州: 普林斯顿大学出版社), p. 106. As Richard K. Betts has pointed out,
what may be good for the “system”—stability—may not be what the United States prefers: “If nu-
clear spread enhances stability, this is not entirely good news for the United States, since it has
been accustomed to attacking small countries with impunity when it felt justiªed and provoked.”
See Betts, “Universal Deterrence or Conceptual Collapse? Liberal Pessimism and Utopian Real-
主义,” in Victor A. Utgoff, 编辑。, The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, 我们. Interests, and World Order
(剑桥, 大量的。: 与新闻界, 2000), p. 65
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Strategies of Inhibition 23
我们. allies acquired nuclear weapons, “they would be in a position to be en-
tirely independent and we might be on the outside looking in.”47
Sixth, 我们. policymakers have feared that otherwise weak adversaries
might become emboldened to act aggressively if they acquired nuclear weap-
ons.48 And given the nature of nuclear weapons—where the absolute number
a state possesses may be less important than its willingness to use them—
small nuclear-armed states might even try to coerce the United States during a
crisis.49 As Secretary of State Dulles lamented to his Soviet counterpart, “A dic-
tator could use the bombs to blackmail the rest of the world.”50 And in 1962,
a government report suggested that “[C]oping with the possessors of a small,
extortionate deterrent force will require the mastery of some new political-
military techniques.”51 Finally, containing nuclear states is far more expensive
than containing nonnuclear states.52
Seventh, although dozens of states could potentially build a nuclear
weapon, 我们. policymakers remain concerned that only great powers possess
the economic, 技术性的, and bureaucratic capacities to build robust com-
要求, 控制, 通讯, and intelligence capabilities and to keep their
weapons safe and secure.53 This concern matters for two reasons. 第一的, 小的
47. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, p. 321.
48. For the argument that nuclear weapons embolden states, see Mark S. 钟, “Beyond Em-
boldenment: How Acquiring Nuclear Weapons Can Change Foreign Policy,” 国际安全,
卷. 40, 不. 1 (夏天 2015), PP. 87–119; S. Paul Kapur, “India and Pakistan’s Unstable Peace:
Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like Cold War Europe,” 国际安全, 卷. 30, 不. 2 (落下
2005), PP. 127–152; S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conºict in
南亚 (斯坦福大学, 加利福尼亚州。: 斯坦福大学出版社, 2007); 和S. Paul Kapur, “Ten Years of In-
stability in a Nuclear South Asia,” 国际安全, 卷. 33, 不. 2 (落下 2008), PP. 71–94. 新的
nuclear states may act more aggressively in the immediate aftermath of acquiring nuclear weap-
昂斯. See Michael Horowitz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conºict: Does Ex-
perience Matter?” 冲突解决杂志, 卷. 53, 不. 2 (四月 2009), PP. 234–257.
49. For the argument that nuclear weapons place a great premium on resolve, on risk-taking, 和
perhaps ultimately on recklessness, see Marc Trachtenberg, “Walzing to Armageddon,” National
Interest, 落下 2002, http://nationalinterest.org/article/waltzing-to-armageddon-281.
50. Memcon, 十月 5, 1957, in FRUS, 1955–1957, 卷. 20, p. 732. For fears of how the People’s
Republic of China would be emboldened by acquiring nuclear weapons, see Francis J. Gavin,
“Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s,” 国际安全, 卷. 29, 不. 3
(冬天 2004/05), PP. 100–135.
51. “Report on Strategic Developments over the Next Decade for the Interagency Panel,” October
12, 1962, JFKL, p. 54.
52. For suggestions regarding expensive measures to contain a nuclear Iran, see Colin H. Kahl, Raj
Pattani, and Jacob Stokes, “If All Else Fails: The Challenges of Containing a Nuclear-Armed Iran”
(华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: Center for a New American Security, 可能 2013), http://www.cnas.org/sites/
default/ªles/publications-pdf/CNAS_IfAllElseFails.pdf.
53. For an excellent assessment of this concern, see Peter D. Feaver, “Command and Control in
Emerging Nuclear Nations,” 国际安全, 卷. 17, 不. 3 (冬天 1992/93), PP. 160–187.
美国, which spent far more than any other nuclear state on nuclear safety and com-
命令与控制, was plagued by accidents and near misses. The classic work on this is Scott D.
Sagan, The Limits of Safety: 组织机构, Accidents, and Nuclear Safety (普林斯顿大学, 新泽西州: 普林斯顿大学
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国际安全 40:1 24
and weak nuclear states could disintegrate and lose control of their weapons,
including to substate actors and terrorists.54 As Chairman of the U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen revealed about Pakistan’s nuclear pro-
公克, “I worry a great deal about those weapons falling into the hands of ter-
rorists and either being proliferated or potentially used. 所以, control of
那些, 稳定, stable control of those weapons is a key concern.”55 Second,
the United States might be forced to politically support—against its other
interests—otherwise problematic, weak nuclear states to forestall the dangers
their instability might bring. 当冷战结束时, 例如, 这
United States decided not to encourage the breakup of the Soviet Union—
the preferred geostrategic choice of the George H.W. Bush administration
—because of fears over nuclear security, safety, and proliferation. As President
Bush and his national security adviser, 布伦特·斯考克罗夫特, lamented, 管理-
tion ofªcials “decided they would prefer to see weapons in the hands of just
one entity, which had the stability and experience to secure them.”56
As the greatest power in the international system seeking to maintain its se-
curity and pursue its freedom of action in the world, the United States found
如果
these challenges intolerable. The strategies of inhibition were natural,
difªcult, 昂贵, and often destabilizing, responses. For all of these reasons, 这
purportedly peace-inducing qualities of nuclear weapons typically took a back
seat to American policymakers’ fears about the effect of nuclear proliferation
关于美国. 国家利益. The United States worked hard to inhibit the spread
of independent nuclear weapons programs and mitigate the consequences of
proliferation when it could not be stopped.
大学出版社, 1993). See also Eric Schlosser, 命令与控制: Nuclear Weapons, the Damas-
cus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety (纽约: 企鹅, 2013).
54. Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, “Managing the Collapse of a Nuclear State: Problems and
Prospects,” paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, Wash-
因顿, 华盛顿特区, 八月 2014; and Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, “The Second Face of Existential De-
terrence: Nuclear Collapse and Regime Survival,” Texas A&M University, 2014.
55. Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security
问题,” Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: CRS,
行进 19, 2013), p. 1, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf.
56. George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (纽约: 阿尔弗雷德·A. 克诺夫,
1998), PP. 543–544. 美国. intelligence community worried that South African Prime Minister
John Vorster pursued nuclear weapons to induce the United States to provide more political sup-
port to the apartheid regime: “[瓦]e believe his price for formally agreeing to relinquish the nu-
clear option would come high. . . . [H]e is aware that the US government attaches great importance
to halting the spread of nuclear weapons. . . . What he wants most is a general softening of US
policy towards South Africa. His position may well be put something like this: if you want us to
renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons, you must make it easier for us (white South Afri-
罐头) to survive as a nation.” See Director of Central Intelligence, Interagency Intelligence Memo-
randum, South Africa’s Nuclear Options and Decisionmaking Structures, (circa July 1978), 在
William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, 编辑。, Proliferation Watch: 我们. Intelligence Assessments of Po-
tential Nuclear Powers, 1977–2001, NSA EBB 451, 文档. 2, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/
ebb451/docs/2.pdf.
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Strategies of Inhibition 25
the spectrum of inhibition
How would such an ambitious and historically unheard of strategy—
preventing sovereign states from having independent control of the most pow-
erful weapons the world has ever seen—be carried out? Since the birth of
the nuclear age, the United States has employed different strategic tools in var-
ious ways and mixes to achieve the inhibition mission. An array of factors
have driven these variations, particularly shifting international circumstances,
trade-offs with the openness and containment missions, and the changing
preferences of new presidential administrations.
Looked at broadly, the strategies of inhibition fall into three categories along
a broad spectrum: legal/normative, coercive, and assurance.57 At one end,
legal/normative policies involve U.S. policymakers pursuing arms control
treaties, establishing norms, and using rhetoric to dissuade states from acquir-
ing independent nuclear capabilities. Coercive polices are at the other end of
the spectrum and include technology and export controls, interdiction, 阿班-
donment, sabotage, sanctions, and even the threat of preventive strikes against
nascent nuclear states. Assurance policies have been the most prevalent and
arguably the most successful tools in achieving inhibition: especially conse-
quential has been the use of security guarantees and alliances, often backed
by aggressive strategic nuclear postures, military deployments, and conven-
tional arms sales, to extend the United States’ nuclear umbrella to limit the nu-
clear ambitions of potential proliferants. 合在一起, these policies, 哪个
are often seen as unrelated, reºect a powerful and consistent U.S. desire to
limit the number of independent nuclear weapons states in the world, a mis-
sion that began in the earliest days of the nuclear age and continues today.
legal/normative strategies. 自从 1945 the United States has often em-
ployed legal/normative measures—lofty rhetoric, treaties, and regimes—to
highlight the dangers of nuclear weapons and to encourage a norm against
their possession and a taboo against their use.58 Every U.S. president since
1945 has spoken eloquently about the horrors of nuclear war, lamented the nu-
clear arms race, and called for international efforts to limit the spread of
nuclear weapons.59 Despite controversy, the United States demonstrated a
willingness in the 1946 Acheson-Lilienthal Report and subsequent Baruch Plan
57. Some tools—such as the George W. Bush administration’s Proliferation Security Initiative—
have elements of all three categories of the strategies of inhibition.
58. Or even earlier, 作为 1943 Quebec agreement with Great Britain contained nonproliferation
clauses and was a U.S. attempt to gain control over global supplies of ªssile materials. See Susanna
Schrafstetter and Stephen Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon: 欧洲, 美国, and the Struggle
for Nuclear Nonproliferation, 1945–1970 (韦斯特波特, 康涅狄格州: 普雷格, 2004).
59. Even in a world of total disarmament, the United States has the knowledge, 基础设施,
and resources to reconstitute its nuclear weapons quicker than any other state, while possessing
superiority in most forms of nonnuclear state power.
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国际安全 40:1 26
to surrender nuclear weapons to international control. 在 1954 it proposed the
creation of an international agency to control ªssile materials. 虽然
the Soviet Union rejected the proposal, it cooperated with the United States to
create the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1957, the key global institu-
tion now responsible for monitoring and regulating nuclear activities around
世界. 在 1963, again in cooperation with the Soviet Union, 总统
Kennedy established the Partial Test Ban Treaty.60 Most signiªcantly, 这
United States again partnered with the Soviet Union to negotiate the 1968
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. 在随后的岁月里, it led numerous
efforts to strengthen the treaty and broaden the global nonproliferation re-
呻吟, including supporting the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers
Group to better regulate civilian nuclear exports, enhancing safeguards, 和
backing the permanent extension of the NPT and the approval of the 1997
Additional Protocol.
Encouraging norms against the possession of nuclear weapons and tradi-
tions or even taboos against their use provides strategic beneªts to the United
状态. As Maria Rost Rublee has argued, “我们. policymakers can take advan-
tage of situations that increase the potency of norms and, 在某些情况下, 能
help create those conditions.”61 Nina Tannenwald points out that the taboo
against nuclear use is in the United States’ interest because, with its “over-
whelming conventional superiority, only an adversary armed with nu-
clear weapons could truly threaten US forces on the battleªeld.”62 T.V.
Paul concurs, suggesting that “the preservation of the tradition” of nonuse of
nuclear weapons prevents weak states from using nuclear weapons to “thwart
我们. intervention.”63
The United States’ legal/normative inhibition policies, 然而, 已经
open to charges of hypocrisy. Rhetorically, the United States has supported
arms control and even disarmament despite continuing to spend enormous
sums of money not just on building more nuclear forces, but on building nu-
clear systems oriented toward counterforce and damage limitation.64 Poli-
抽搐地, it expended large sums of capital to negotiate nonproliferation treaties
that often required it to work against its allies and in tandem with the Soviet
60. For the explicit nonproliferation focus of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, see Marc Trachten-
伯格, A Constructed Peace.
61. Maria Rost Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint (雅典: 大学-
versity of Georgia, 2009), p. 217.
62. Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons since
1945 (剑桥: 剑桥大学出版社, 2007), p. 390.
63. T.V. 保罗, The Tradition of the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons (斯坦福大学, 加利福尼亚州。: 斯坦福大学
按, 2009), p. 190.
64. For an excellent analysis of the debates regarding the links between nuclear nonproliferation
and disarmament, see Jeffrey W. 克诺夫, “Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation: 正在检查
the Linkage Argument,” 国际安全, 卷. 37, 不. 3 (冬天 2012/13), PP. 92–132.
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Strategies of Inhibition 27
联盟. The United States’ extensive efforts to limit the spread of nuclear
知识, 材料, and technology contradict its openness mission (和, 在
the case of allies, its containment mission).65 Despite the obvious double stan-
dard, if not outright hypocrisy of these policies, U.S.-led efforts to stigmatize
the possession of nuclear weapons through treaties, international laws, 和恩-
couragement of norms and taboos have been a critical aspect of the U.S inhibi-
tion strategy. As Shane Maddock has argued, 我们. policymakers believe that
“the arguments used to dissuade other countries from acquiring nuclear arms”
did not apply to the United States.66
coercive strategies. The United States has employed various coercive
measures to inhibit proliferation. These include sanctions, sabotage, threats of
abandonment, and even preventive military strikes against nascent nuclear
节目. Such measures have been considered from the very beginning of
the nuclear age. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared in 1946, “If we were ruth-
lessly realistic, we would not permit any foreign power with which we are not
ªrmly allied, and in which we do not have absolute conªdence, to make or
possess atomic weapons. If such a country started to make atomic weapons we
would destroy its capacity to make them before it had progressed far enough
to threaten us.”67
Although preventive military action to inhibit proliferation is rarely carried
出去, that it is even considered is remarkable.68 Preventive strikes are among
the most aggressive actions a state can undertake, because they are typically
both dangerous and deeply destabilizing to the international system.69 Yet
65. For an excellent overview of such controls (and the difªculty of enforcing them), see R. 斯科特
肯普, “The Nonproliferation Emperor Has No Clothes: The Gas Centrifuge, Supply-Side Con-
巨魔, and the Future of Nuclear Proliferation.” International Security, 卷. 38, 不. 4 (春天 2014),
PP. 39–78. For examples of the Eisenhower administration’s efforts to limit the spread of gas cen-
trifuge technology, see William Burr, “The Gas Centrifuge Secret: Origins of a U.S. Policy of
Nuclear Denial, 1954–1960,” Electronic Brieªng Book No. 518 (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: National Secu-
rity Archive, 六月 2015), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb518-the-gas-centrifuge-secret-
origins-of-US-policy-of-nuclear-denial-1954-1960/index.html. For the history of nuclear secrecy,
see Alex Wellerstein, “Knowledge and the Bomb,” 博士. dissertation, 哈佛大学, 2010.
For the earlier and extensive attempts by the U.S. government to secure global supplies of nuclear
材料, located largely in the colonies of European states, see FRUS, 1947: General—The United
国家 (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: GPO, 1947), PP. 803–906, http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/
FRUS/FRUS-idx?类型(西德:2)header&id(西德:2)FRUS.FRUS1947v01.
66. Shane J. Maddock, Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World
War II to the Present (教堂山: University of North Carolina Press, 2014), p. 2.
67. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Statement of Effect of Atomic Weapons on National Security and
Military Organization,” January 21, 1946, 文档. NP00018, Nuclear Non-Proliferation collection, Dig-
ital National Security Archive (DNSA), http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver(西德:2)Z39.88-
2004&res_dat(西德:2)xri:dnsa&rft_dat(西德:2)xri:dnsa:文章:CNP00018.
68. There is obviously a controversy over whether and to what extent the 2003 我们. attack on Iraq
was driven by a desire to destroy its nuclear program and other weapons of mass destruction.
69. For preventive military action against nascent nuclear programs, see Trachtenberg, “Preven-
tive War and U.S. Foreign Policy”; and Gavin and Rapp-Hooper, “The Copenhagen Temptation.”
See also Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro, “Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty,
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国际安全 40:1 28
preventive thinking is not an isolated or a recent phenomenon, having been
displayed by both Democratic and Republic administrations and despite dra-
matic changes in the international system. 我们. policymakers considered pre-
ventive military action against the nascent nuclear programs of the Soviet
Union in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the People’s Republic of China in the
1960s, North Korea in the 1990s, and Iraq and Iran more recently.70 There is
also evidence that the United States may have considered military action
against Pakistan in the late 1970s, and that similar action was mentioned by
some U.S. advisers vis-à-vis France and India during the 1960s.71 As smaller
and “less responsible” states explored the possibility of acquiring nuclear
武器, military action appeared more palatable. According to a government
报告, this suggested that “[A] potentially important means of coping with the
problem of the nuclear-armed rufªan or racketeer may be preventive sabo-
tage.”72 One argument made on behalf of preventive action was that it might
inºuence the calculations of other potential proliferant states. These plans and
discussions typically focused only on the target’s nuclear capabilities; 那里
were rarely plans to conquer or destroy the state in question. Even in the case
of the Soviet Union, the focus of preventive thinking was largely on its nuclear
assets and not its other forms of power.
Neither the United States’ openness mission nor its containment mission is
able to fully account for this interest in preventive military action. 考虑
debate within the U.S. government over preventive military action against
中国. By the early 1960s, 我们. national security ofªcials clearly understood
that China was not an ally of the Soviet Union, and that it was quickly becom-
ing an adversary.73 There is no doubt the United States had concerns about
China’s geopolitical and ideological orientation. If containment had been the
and War,” 国际组织, 卷. 68, 不. 1 (一月 2014), PP. 1 –31; Matthew Fuhrmann
and Sarah E. Kreps, “Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace: A Quantitative Empirical
分析, 1941–2000,” Journal of Conºict Resolution, 卷. 54, 不. 6 (十二月 2010), PP. 831–859;
and Lyle J. 戈德斯坦, Preventive Attack and Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Comparative Historical
分析 (斯坦福大学, 加利福尼亚州。: 斯坦福大学出版社, 2006). For an excellent overview of the large
literature on preventive war, see Jack S. 征收, “Preventive War: Concept and Propositions,” 国际米兰-
national Interactions, 卷. 37, 不 1 (行进 2011), PP. 87–96.
70. Gavin and Rapp-Hooper, “The Copenhagen Temptation”; and Sarah E. Kreps and Matthew
Fuhrmann, “Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect Proliferation?》杂志
Strategic Studies, 卷. 34, 不. 2 (四月 2011), PP. 161–187.
71. Gavin and Rapp-Hooper, “The Copenhagen Tradition.”
72. “Report on Strategic Developments over the Next Decade for the Interagency Panel,” p. 54.
73. Lorenz M. Luthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (普林斯顿大学, 新泽西州: 王子-
吨大学出版社, 2008); Sergy Radchenko, Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for
Supremacy, 1962–1967 (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009); and Odd Arne
Westad, 编辑。, Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区:
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998).
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Strategies of Inhibition 29
only factor shaping U.S. grand strategy, 然而, one might have expected
the United States to accept or even exploit China’s independent nuclear capa-
bility vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Viewed solely through the containment lens,
it is surprising that the United States asked Soviet leaders if they wanted to
join it in a preventive strike against China, less than a year after the Cuban
missile crisis.74
Perhaps even more surprising, the United States brought pressure to bear
on allies that were thinking about acquiring their own nuclear weapons. 这
Federal Republic of Germany, perhaps the United States’ key European ally,
was often treated harshly regarding its nuclear ambitions during the 1960s.
意大利, 澳大利亚, and Japan were discouraged from acquiring independent nu-
clear weapons. Other allies, such as Israel, 台湾, 和韩国, 是
threatened with sanctions and abandonment, as was Pakistan.75 There
were even high-level discussions in the 1960s about pressuring the United
States’ closest ally, 大不列颠, to give up its nuclear weapons or at least
to decrease its reliance on independent nuclear forces.76
If containment alone drove U.S. grand strategy, it made very little sense to
anger close friends that were part of the anti-Soviet alliance. If close Cold War
allies were treated this way as part of the U.S. inhibition mission, one can
imagine the calculations that took place within countries that were neutral or
even adversaries of the United States. Any state weighing a nuclear weapons
program had to consider very seriously possible reactions of the United States
before moving forward.77
assurance strategies. Coercive inhibition policies, such as sanctions and
threats of preventive strikes, and legal/normative inhibition policies, 例如
norms and treaties, often garner the most attention from scholars. It is assur-
ance strategies, 然而, including intelligence activities, conventional arms
74. For U.S. efforts to convince the Soviet Union to join in a preventive strike, see William Burr
and Jeffrey T. Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle’: The United States and the
Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960–64,” International Security, 卷. 25, 不. 3 (冬天 2000/01), PP. 54–
99.
75. See Gerzhoy, “Coercive Nonproliferation”; and Miller, “The Secret Success of Nonproliferation
Sanctions.”
76. David James Gill, Britain and the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy, 1964–1970 (斯坦福大学, 加利福尼亚州。: 斯坦福大学
大学出版社, 2014).
77. It also explains why most potential proliferators developed their nuclear programs secretly.
参见杰弗里·T. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran
and North Korea (纽约: W.W. 诺顿, 2006). This was true even for countries that were not ad-
versaries of the United States, such as Israel and India. See Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (新的
约克: 哥伦比亚大学, 1999); and Gaurav Kampani, “New Delhi’s Long Nuclear Journey:
How Secrecy and Institutional Roadblocks Delayed India’s Weaponization,” 国际安全,
卷. 38, 不. 4, (春天 2014), PP. 79–114.
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国际安全 40:1 30
sales, and especially security agreements and alliances, that have been argu-
ably the most important and consequential of the strategies of inhibition.78
Two features of U.S. grand strategy in the postwar period stand out. First is
the United States’ deep set of sprawling military alliances and security guar-
antees. Second is the extraordinarily forward-leaning and, 有时, pre-
emptive nature of its military strategy. Neither policy has antecedents in U.S.
pre-nuclear history. 前 1950 the United States had always gone to great
lengths to avoid entangling alliances, deploying forces abroad, or maintaining
large military forces during peacetime.79 Nor can the containment mission,
which has often been defensive, fully explain these policies.80 Both, 然而,
have been key elements of the strategies of inhibition.
As the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union emerged, 联合
States entered into a series of alliances and provided explicit and implicit
security guarantees to a range of countries. The most famous was the North
Atlantic Treaty, signed in 1949, which later developed into a full-scale, 在-
tegrated military alliance.81 There were also regional treaties, 例如
1951 ANZUS agreements with Australia and New Zealand; bilateral treaties
与日本, 韩国, and Taiwan; and implicit, secret arrangements with
瑞典. As time went on, a key element of these arrangements was to connect
the military capabilities of the United States, particularly its nuclear forces,
78. For an excellent account of the United States’ extraordinary global intelligence effort to assess
which states were interested in and/or capable of developing nuclear weapons, see Richelson,
Spying on the Bomb. For the U.S. effort to use conventional arms sales to inhibit proliferation, 看
Bonny Yang Lin, “Arms, Alliances, and the Bomb: Using Conventional Arms Transfers to Prevent
Nuclear Proliferation,” 博士. dissertation, Yale University, 2012. Lin demonstrates that conven-
tional arms sales may have caused Israel and Pakistan to delay their nuclear programs and helped
induce South Korea to forgo its program.
79. Before the nuclear age, the United States fought wars by exploiting its geographical isolation,
mobilizing slowly and massively, and ªghting grinding wars of attrition, postures that allowed for
strong civilian control of the military and tight legislative oversight. See Russell F. Weigley, 这
American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (布卢明顿: 印第安纳州
大学出版社, 1960). Inhibition upended all of these traditions.
80. The earliest versions of containment, 在里面 1945 到 1950 时期, focused on economic aid, 不是
forward military deployments and deep, entangling alliances; the United States rapidly demobi-
lized its military and massively decreased its defense expenditures after World War II. The Soviet
detonation of an atomic device in August 1949, combined with the communist ascension to power
in the People’s Republic of China in October 1949, inspired a rethinking of U.S. 战略, laid out in
the document penned largely by Paul Nitze, “A Report to the National Security Council—
NSC 68,” April 12, 1950, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, President’s Secretary’s ªle, Truman
文件, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/
10-1.pdf.
81. For details of how this alliance was constructed to deal with the interlocking issues of the de-
fense of Western Europe, the German question, and nuclear weapons, see Trachtenberg, A Con-
structed Peace, 特别是PP. 95–145. Although the United States was reluctant to forwardly deploy
large forces in Europe, there was no other way to both contain the Soviet Union and prevent Ger-
many from becoming “too strong and too independent” and acquiring its own independent nu-
clear capabilities. See ibid., p. 119.
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Strategies of Inhibition 31
to the defense of these countries. This “nuclear umbrella” was designed to
help deter and defend against the Soviet Union, and was a key element of the
containment strategy.
These security arrangements also served another purpose: to inhibit the
protected state from seeking its own nuclear weapons. As Bruno Tetrais dem-
onstrates, security guarantees “have proven to be a very effective instrument
in preventing States from going nuclear.”82 Or as Jeffrey Knopf has argued,
“[S]ecurity assurances are an integral part of the nuclear nonproliferation re-
gime.”83 Countries that had the capabilities and occasionally the interest in ac-
quiring independent nuclear forces—including Australia, 瑞典, 日本, 和
West Germany—might feel reassured by the U.S. nuclear umbrella and eschew
their own weapons (and they might be reminded from time to time how reas-
sured they should feel).84 These security arrangements have continued and
even expanded since the end of the Cold War.85 And although they are no
longer needed to contain an adversary such as the Soviet Union, they still
serve to inhibit nuclear proliferation.
Writ large, these security arrangements in the nuclear age are unlike tra-
ditional, pre-nuclear age alliances, which tended to be threat speciªc, addi-
主动的, and temporary. With some exceptions, they have been suppressive and
vague, and have lasted for decades, even after the original threat that spawned
the alliance had disappeared. 在某些情况下, where the inhibition aspect looms
larger, it might be better to think of the United States and its clients as
“frenemies” rather than as traditional allies.86
82. 布鲁诺·泰特莱斯, “Security Guarantees and Nuclear Nonproliferation,” Note No. 14
(巴黎: Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, 2011), https://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/
publications/notes/2011/201114.pdf.
83. Jeffrey W. 克诺夫, “Security Assurances: Initial Hypotheses,” in Knopf, Security Assurances and
Nuclear Nonproliferation, p. 13. See also Stephen Palley, “Analyzing U.S. Extended Nuclear Deter-
rence as a Non-Proliferation Tool,” 硕士论文, 芝加哥大学, 2007.
84. On security assurance provided by the United States to Sweden, see Thomas Jonter, “这
United States and Swedish Plans to Build the Bomb, 1945–68,” in Knopf, Security Assurances and
Nuclear Nonproliferation, PP. 219–245. On U.S. security assurances to keep Japan nonnuclear, 看
Yuki Tatsumi, “Maintaining Japan’s Non-Nuclear Identity: The Role of U.S. Security Assurances,”
in Knopf, Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation, PP. 137–161. For Australia, see Christine
中号. Leah, Australia and the Bomb (伦敦: 帕尔格雷夫·麦克米伦, 2014). On the role of the United
States in keeping West Germany nonnuclear, see Francis J. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft: History and
Strategy in America’s Atomic Age (伊萨卡岛, 纽约: 康奈尔大学出版社, 2012); and Lahti, “Security
Cooperation as a Way to Stop the Spread of Nuclear Weapons?”
85. Mark Kramer suggests that Poland, 匈牙利, and Czechoslovakia eschewed developing or ac-
quiring their own nuclear weapons, in contrast to what neorealism would have predicted, and fo-
cused instead on entering the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The United States actively
supported their entry. See Kramer, “新现实主义, Nuclear Proliferation, and East-Central European
Strategies,” in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, 编辑。, Unipolar Politics: Realism and State
Strategies after the Cold War (纽约: 哥伦比亚大学出版社, 1998), PP. 385–463, at p. 429.
86. For excellent analyses of the more suppressive aspects, see Gerzhoy, “Coercive Nonprolifera-
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国际安全 40:1 32
How does the United States’ nuclear strategy play into its inhibition mis-
锡安? The efforts of the United States to achieve and maintain nuclear primacy
during the early Cold War are well known.87 Many nuclear strategists claimed
that when the United States and the Soviet Union approached numerical par-
ity in the middle of the 1960s, it would have been unwise for the United States
to spend extraordinary sums on counterforce nuclear capabilities that made
sense only as part of a so-called damage limitation strategy. Robert Jervis
asserted that the United States’ damage limitation nuclear strategies “did not
come to grips with fundamental characteristics of nuclear politics,” were “in-
相干,” and “conjured up unrealistic dangers” while “ignoring real prob-
lems.”88 Once mutual nuclear vulnerability between adversaries was achieved,
Jervis, 华尔兹, and others have argued, ªghting and winning a nuclear war
would be illogical: 所以, efforts to achieve “nuclear superiority” would
be pointless.
Despite the claims of advocates of the nuclear revolution, 美国
spent tremendous sums on missile accuracy and speed, tracking Soviet nuclear
submarines while improving the acoustic quieting capabilities of U.S. subma-
rines, hardening American nuclear targets, and increasing U.S. 智力
and defensive capabilities against nuclear weapons. Keir Lieber and Daryl
Press have described how the United States vigorously pursued a “counter-
force revolution” that produced far more accurate missiles and the potential
for a ªrst-strike capability.89 Austin Long and Brendan Green have dem-
化”; and Alexander Lanoszka, “Protection States Trust.” For an incisive exploration of the unique
characteristics of nuclear security guarantees, see Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Absolute Alliances: 说-
naling Security Guarantees in International Politics,” paper presented at the Nuclear Studies Re-
search Initiative, University of Texas, Austin, 十月 16, 2013. For alliances constructed for
reasons other than capabilities aggregation, see Christopher Gelpi, “Alliances as Instruments of
Intra-Allied Control,” in Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. 基奥哈内, and Celeste A. Wallander eds.,
Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space (牛津: 牛津大学出版社, 1999),
PP. 107–139.
87. For early efforts to achieve nuclear primacy, see David Alan Rosenberg, “The Origins of Over-
kill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960,” International Security, 卷. 7, 不. 4
(春天 1983), PP. 3–71, at pp. 20–21. Marc Trachtenberg argues that U.S. nuclear primacy, deªned
as the situation in which a preemptive nuclear strike against the Soviets might be “the least worst
option,” lasted until 1963. See Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, PP. 293–297. For the ªrst-strike
plan developed by the Kennedy administration during the Berlin crisis, see Fred Kaplan, “JFK’s
First Strike Plan,” Atlantic, 十月 2001, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/
10/jfks-ªrst-strike-plan/376432/. See also William Burr, 编辑。, First Strike Options and the Berlin Cri-
姐姐, 九月 1961, NSA EBB 56, http://www.gwu.edu/(西德:3)nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB56/. 的
课程, even after the United States lost nuclear primacy over the Soviet Union, it still retained it
vis-à-vis every other nuclear weapons state.
88. Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon
(伊萨卡岛, 纽约: 康奈尔大学出版社, 1989), p. 8. See also Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear
战略.
89. Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. 按, “The New Era of Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, 和
Conºict,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, 卷. 7, 不. 1 (春天 2013), PP. 3–14.
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Strategies of Inhibition 33
onstrated that the United States strove to meet the two greatest challenges to
threatening the survivability of Soviet strategic nuclear forces—being able
to locate and track both Soviet mobile missiles and Soviet nuclear subma-
rines. The United States never accepted the notion of mutual vulnerability
with the Soviets and worked hard to overcome it.90 There were times in the
late 1970s and 1980s that the Soviets appeared to fear that the United States
was interested in and could someday reach meaningful nuclear superiority.91
Some analysts believe it has achieved nuclear primacy vis-à-vis China and
Russia today.92
美国. drive for nuclear primacy likely had many causes, the most impor-
tant of which was a desire to achieve coercive leverage vis-à-vis the Soviets in
the past and perhaps over Russia and China today. Pursuing nuclear primacy,
然而, has two important consequences for the inhibition mission. 第一的, 交流电-
curate counterforce combined with better intelligence and defense could nul-
lify the effect of small, less sophisticated nuclear forces. By making the bar for
building a meaningful nuclear force so high, the United States might also be
able to dissuade potential proliferants from building forces it could easily
make obsolete. If states did build these forces, their vulnerability to a U.S. ªrst
strike removed at least some of their deterrent power vis-à-vis the United
States and its allies under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. 第二, by not embracing
mutual vulnerability, by pursuing a counterforce (and even a preemptive)
战略, the United States has made its commitment to defend its nonnuclear
allies more credible. If the United States had accepted nuclear parity with
苏联, few patron states would have believed its promise to de-
fend them while risking their own nuclear annihilation. 在这种情况下, 这
pressure on the nuclear state to acquire an independent deterrent would have
been strong.
Which of the strategies of inhibition discussed above has been the most ef-
有感染力的? All three come at a cost. Earlier strategies that seemed wise, such as ci-
vilian nuclear assistance to potential proliferators, backªred and were soon
90. Long and Green, “Stalking the Secure Second Strike.” For evidence that the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries viewed U.S. counterforce acquisitions and strategies in these terms, see Benjamin B. Fischer,
“CANOPY WING: 美国. War Plan That Gave the East Germans Goose Bumps,“ 国际的
Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Vol. 27, 不. 3 (2014), PP. 431–464. For the best analysis
我们. anti-submarine warfare capabilities, see Owen R. Coté Jr., The Third Battle: Innovation in the
Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines, Newport Paper No. 16 (Newport, R.I.: 我们.
Naval War College Press, 2003).
91. Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long, “Striving for Checkmate without War: Soviet
Reactions to U.S. Counterforce Capabilities 1969–1989,” paper presented to the Nuclear Studies
Research Initiative, Warrenton, 弗吉尼亚州, 可能 1, 2015.
92. Lieber and Press, “The End of MAD?”
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国际安全 40:1 34
abandoned.93 When the United States employs legal/normative strategies, 这是
open to the obvious charge of hypocrisy. Coercive policies are a double-edged
sword: threats of military action may not be credible. 另一方面, 如果
coercive threats are credible, they could spur the potential proliferant to work
harder, faster, and/or in secret to achieve a nuclear status that might protect
them against future coercion or prevention from the United States. Assurance
policies have their own difªculties. Extended deterrent commitments are
plagued by credibility problems, expose the United States to signiªcant costs
and risks (including entrapment), are not always popular with the American
民众, and allow protected states to free ride. 到目前为止, 我们. policymakers
have discovered no a priori optimal path to achieve the inhibition mission, 和
they continue to work diligently to develop the right combination of strategies.
changing expectations, adaptation, and mitigation
As with the openness and containment missions, the United States has not al-
ways pursued the inhibition mission consistently. 更重要, the strate-
gies of inhibition have not always been successful. Although there are far
fewer nuclear weapons states in the world today than anyone would have
predicted in 1960, 1975, 或者 1990, eight countries besides the United States
possess nuclear weapons.94 What explains these inconsistencies and lack of
complete success?
Enthusiasm for the inhibition mission has varied across presidential admin-
istrations, at least initially. Presidents Harry Truman, John Kennedy, Lyndon
约翰逊, Jimmy Carter, and arguably Ronald Reagan were enthusiastic, as has
been every administration since the end of the Cold War.95 Presidents Dwight
Eisenhower and Richard Nixon, 另一方面, often questioned the feasi-
bility of achieving nuclear nonproliferation. Eisenhower supported nuclear
sharing with the United States’ NATO allies.96 Nixon told his administration to
93. With Atoms for Peace, the Eisenhower administration offered the economic and technological
promise of civilian nuclear energy to states that eschewed nuclear weapons. With the Multilateral
力量, it was hoped that Western European states that might otherwise acquire their own, inde-
pendent, 核武器, would have those needs satiated by participating in a shared, multilat-
eral nuclear endeavor. Both policies, originally motivated by the inhibition mission, were dropped
in part because of fears they encouraged proliferation.
94. For an excellent analysis of how both experts and intelligence ofªcials consistently
overpredicted the number of states that would develop nuclear weapons, see Moeed Yusuf,
“Predicting Proliferation: The History of the Future of Nuclear Weapons,” Brookings For-
eign Policy Paper No. 11 (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: 布鲁金斯学会, 一月 2009), http://
www.brookings.edu/(西德:3)/media/Research/Files/Papers/2009/1/nuclear-proliferation-yusuf/
01_nuclear_proliferation_yusuf.PDF.
95. On Reagan, see Paul Lettow, Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (新的
约克: 兰登书屋, 2005).
96. The path-breaking work on Eisenhower and nuclear sharing can be found in Trachtenberg,
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Strategies of Inhibition 35
downplay the importance of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty when he
sent it to the U.S. Senate for ratiªcation.97 Caveats are in order in both cases,
然而. Nuclear sharing was understood by many in the Eisenhower admin-
istration (if not by the president himself) as an alternative to independent na-
tional nuclear forces.98 A state that decides to share its nuclear weapons is not
the same as one allowing others to develop independent national nuclear
军队. And although Nixon may not have liked the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty it inherited from the Johnson administration, it was not interested in
seeing a proliferated world.99 By 1974 the administration’s policy was unam-
biguous: “The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been a consistent and
important element of U.S. policy for the entire nuclear era. 简单的说, 我们的
强的, repeated, resolve in support of this objective has been predicated on
our belief that the instability of the world, and the danger of nuclear war, 作为
well as the problems of arms control would signiªcantly increase with an un-
restrained spread of nuclear weapons.”100
In line with this thinking, Nixon and especially his national security adviser,
亨利·基辛格, redoubled their efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons after India’s “peaceful” nuclear test in 1974, focusing especially on
tightening supplier controls on civilian nuclear assistance, including creating
the Nuclear Suppliers Group.101
Despite Eisenhower’s and Nixon’s misgivings, powerful support for the
inhibition mission emerged from other sources, either from within a presi-
A Constructed Peace, 特别是PP. 146–200. There is no doubt that Eisenhower was the least enthu-
siastic president when it came to inhibition. Even Eisenhower, 然而, was loath to see inde-
pendent national nuclear forces. For him, a “whole series of independent and uncoordinated
national programs would be unconscionably wasteful,” see ibid., p. 155.
97. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft, p. 117.
98. Consider the issues surrounding the Eisenhower administration’s proposal for an atomic nu-
clear stockpile for NATO: “We feel that a prompt U.S. initiative is required because of threat of na-
tional nuclear weapons production in Europe. . . . the primary purpose of action proposed below is
to try to head off these pressures and prevent emergence of national programs which would cer-
tainly be contrary to basic U.S. interests.” See telegram from Perkins to U.S. Secretary of State,
“Threat of National Nuclear Weapon Production Programs in Europe,“ 可能 21, 1957, 我们. 核
History collection, 文档. NH01056, DNSA, http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver(西德:2)Z39.88-
2004&res _dat(西德:2)xri:dnsa&rft_dat(西德:2)xri:dnsa:文章:CNH01056. The author thanks Nicholas Miller
for alerting him to this document.
99. This assessment reºects a shift from my earlier views of Nixon; see Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft,
PP. 117–118.
100. National Security Study Memorandum 202: 我们. Non-Proliferation Policy, 可能 23, 1974,
Richard Nixon Presidential Library, National Security Council Institutional ªles, Study Memoran-
dum (1969–1974), box H-205.
101. William Burr, “A Scheme of ‘Control’: The United States and the Origins of the Nuclear Sup-
pliers’ Group, 1974–1976,” International History Review, 卷. 36, 不. 2 (2014), PP. 252–276. 也可以看看
Or Rabinowitz and Nicholas Miller, “Keeping the Bombs in the Basement: 我们. Nonproliferation
Policy toward Israel, 南, 非洲, and Pakistan,” 国际安全, 卷. 40, 不. 1 (夏天
2015), PP. 47–86.
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国际安全 40:1 36
dent’s own administration or from the legislative branch.102 Remarkably, 这
国会, which often deferred to the executive branch on crucial issues such
as U.S. grand strategy during the postwar years, took a keen, active interest
in inhibition, even when the president in question did not.103 Since the start
of the nuclear age, Congress has passed increasingly stringent laws dealing
with nonproliferation. These include the Atomic Energy Act of 1946; the Arms
Control and Disarmament Act of 1961; the Symington and Glenn amend-
评论; the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978; the Pressler and Solarz
amendments; the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994; and a variety
of laws and sanctions against Iran, 伊拉克, and North Korea. All were meant to
prevent the president from being either encouraging or passive about prolifer-
化, and they represent rare but powerful examples of intervention in U.S.
national security policy by the legislative branch.
此外, over time the United States has become more committed to the
strategies of inhibition. Three factors have driven this change. 第一的, 我们.
policymakers have changed their calculations about the likelihood and pace of
nuclear proliferation. Early in the nuclear age, 我们. analysts often overesti-
mated the amount of time needed to develop independent nuclear forces
while underestimating the ease with which this goal could be accomplished. 在
添加, 我们. concern has increased as states developed the means—through
long-range bombers and intercontinental missiles—to strike the United States
迅速地. 第二, 我们. policymakers became increasingly convinced of both the
importance and the plausibility of the inhibition mission over time. 虽然
the United States wanted to prevent proliferation from the start of the nuclear
年龄, uncertainty existed among some policymakers about whether inhibition
was feasible, given the high cost and often painful policy trade-offs required
of the mission. 第三, the inhibition mission often competed with other
我们. grand strategic priorities. Sometimes U.S. policies were able to accommo-
date all three missions—containment, openness, and inhibition. At other
次, these missions clashed and choices had to be made among them. 全部
three of these factors coalesced in the early to mid-1960s to raise inhibition’s
importance in U.S. grand strategy: the fear of the ease, 步伐, and likelihood of
nuclear proliferation rose; the belief that something could and should be done
to halt it increased; and the period of intense containment gave way to, 如果不
102. This appears particularly true in the Nixon administration, where despite Nixon’s fulmina-
tions against the NPT, 美国. government continued to emphasize nuclear nonproliferation in its
foreign relations.
103. As Trachtenberg highlights, Eisenhower loathed the restrictions placed on him by the
McMahon Act. See Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, PP. 178, 197. See also Steve Weber, “Shaping
the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO,” in John Gerald Ruggie, 多边主义
事项: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form (纽约: 哥伦比亚大学出版社, 1993),
特别是PP. 225–262.
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Strategies of Inhibition 37
full-ºedged détente, a less aggressive Cold War competition with the Soviet
联盟. 后 1991, inhibition trumped containment as a leading mission of
我们. grand strategy.
How does one explain cases where the United States failed to prevent
states from acquiring nuclear weapons? It is important to remember that inhi-
bition is a difªcult goal; preventing sovereign states from acquiring weapons
that might guarantee their security is beyond ambitious. That this mission
would be difªcult was well understood by U.S. policymakers. As George
Kistiakowsky, who served as President Eisenhower’s science adviser, remarked:
“We must wage a campaign to keep proliferation at a minimum and be pre-
pared to lose individual battles, but not the overall war. 第一的, 我们应该
prepared to impose pressures and present inducements to others.”104
最后, the inhibition mission does not end when a targeted state acquires
核武器. 反而, the United States employs mitigation strategies, 或者
efforts to lessen the impact of nuclearization. In the most extreme case, mitiga-
tion might include efforts at nuclear rollback.105 Typically, 然而, 减轻
forces the United States to go to great lengths to convince the newly nuclear-
ized state to act in ways that would not increase the likelihood of other states
following suit. As Or Rabinowitz has demonstrated, when it became clear
that the United States could not stop Israel, 南非, and Pakistan from
developing nuclear weapons programs, it adopted a second-best approach—
pressuring them not to test a nuclear device. Failing to achieve “the primary
goal” of “stop[平] or roll[英] back existing capabilities,” the United States
pursued the “next best thing in the hierarchy of non-proliferation goals”—
preventing nuclear tests.106 This is a crucial and often misunderstood feature
of the inhibition mission: the United States does not give up on inhibition
when a state acquires nuclear weapons. 反而, it works to lessen the con-
sequences and even reverse the undesired outcome, preventing the test-
英, further proliferation, or development of sophisticated delivery vehicles.
Historical examples where the United States has been seen as unperturbed
or even supportive of proliferation—such as Nixon’s treatment of Israel or
Reagan’s of Pakistan—should be viewed in light of the efforts of U.S. 决定-
makers to mitigate the damage.107
104. “Minutes of Discussion,” January 7–8, 1965, LBJL, 盒子 9.
105. For U.S. 政策, see James Edward Doyle, “Nuclear Rollback: A New Direction for United
States Nonproliferation Policy?” 博士. dissertation, 弗吉尼亚大学, 1997; and Ariel E. Le-
vite, “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” 国际安全, 卷. 27, 不. 3
(冬天 2002/03), PP. 59–88.
106. Or Rabinowitz, Bargaining on Nuclear Tests: Washington and Its Cold War Deals (牛津: 牛津
大学出版社, 2014), p. 207.
107. By the time Nixon met with Golda Meir in September 1969, Israel had already developed nu-
clear weapons, and the inhibition strategies pursued by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations
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国际安全 40:1 38
Writ large, 我们. inhibition policies have varied less by administration and
more by period. In the earliest years of the nuclear age, 我们. policymakers
hoped that limited access to nuclear materials and technology would make in-
hibition easy. As the Soviet Union, 大不列颠, and France achieved nuclear
status—and states ranging from Israel to Sweden demonstrated an active in-
terest in nuclear weapons—many U.S. policymakers worried that inhibition
was either too difªcult or too costly to achieve. A dramatic shift took place in
the mid-1960s, as several issues—including the fears over China’s nuclear-
ization and West Germany’s interest
in nuclear weapons—elevated the
importance of inhibition in U.S. grand strategy and convinced American
policymakers to pay a high price to achieve it.108 Inhibition became even more
central to U.S. grand strategy when the objective of containing the Soviet
Union collapsed and the Cold War ended.
an often obscure strategy
There remains one ªnal question: 为什么, despite the enormous attention paid to
both U.S. grand strategy and the nuclear revolution, have scholars and even
policymakers underemphasized the strategy of inhibition since 1945? 那里
are many reasons, but six stand out.
第一的, the better known containment and openness missions have deep and
easily recognized roots in U.S. history and patterns in great power politics.
Grand strategists in the early post–World II years were able to mine the past
for lessons and examples of effective strategies to employ and policies to
避免. The containment mission, 例如, has its roots in theories and
practice of the balance of power and geopolitics. The openness mission has
been tried, off and on, by the United States since the late nineteenth century,
and was pursued by Great Britain even earlier. The nuclear revolution, 在
另一方面, presented completely new and profound challenges for U.S.
policymakers. Nuclear weapons, capable of delivering unprecedented destruc-
tion in hours and without warning by bombers and eventually in minutes by
long-range missiles, have no historical precedent and removed the United
States’ long-standing geopolitical invulnerability. The past provided few les-
儿子们, not only on how to inhibit proliferation but on whether it was even
had failed. The Nixon administration moved to the next best option—mitigating the conse-
序列. Rabinowitz argues that the conventional wisdom on U.S. policy toward Israel’s nuclear
program—that Israel was “an exception” to U.S. nonproliferation policies—is untrue. See Rabino-
witz, Bargaining on Nuclear Tests, PP. 1–2. 此外, she demonstrates that the deal with Israel
was mirrored in similar arrangements with Pakistan and South Africa.
108. For this shift, see Brands, “Non-Proliferation and the Dynamics of the Middle Cold War”;
and Gavin, “Blasts from the Past.”
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Strategies of Inhibition 39
possible or wise.109 National security ofªcials stumbled to articulate the inhibi-
tion mission, let alone devise effective policies to implement it, even as they ac-
knowledged the profound threats that a nuclearized world presented to the
美国.
第二, unlike traditional strategies, the inhibition mission has been aimed
at a particular technology—as opposed to a particular state or regime—
regardless of who possesses it. There were few usable examples from the past
where a general capability, as opposed to a speciªc state adversary, was tar-
geted. Traditional tools of statecraft, such as propaganda targeted against an
enemy and its population, were less useful in efforts to inhibit proliferation in
countries such as West Germany, 瑞典, and Pakistan.
第三, many of the tools that U.S. policymakers have used to inhibit nuclear
增殖, including arms control treaties, aggressive nuclear strategies,
and wide-ranging alliances, have also served the containment mission and
vice versa, often obscuring the divergent sources and ends of each.110 Mean-
尽管, alliances and institution building have been important components of
the openness mission. 因此, despite being independent from and even at odds
with other U.S. 使命, the strategies of inhibition have frequently comple-
mented the openness and especially the containment missions.
第四, unlike the containment and openness missions, accurately measur-
ing the success or failures of the inhibition mission can be difªcult: Would
countries such as Italy, 韩国, or Brazil, 例如, be nuclear weap-
ons states today in the absence of U.S. inhibition policies? Would more effec-
tive U.S. inhibition strategies have kept Israel or India nonnuclear? Did the
threats of coercion and preventive strikes, and/or the promise of security
guarantees and the United States’ nuclear umbrella cause otherwise nuclear-
capable states to give up their pursuit of weapons? Given how many fewer nu-
clear states there are than either policymakers or scholars predicted, 它似乎
109. As Melvyn P. Lefºer pointed out in an important article about postwar military planning,
我们. ofªcials recognized that, regardless of which state presented the threat, the United States’ na-
tional security circumstances had changed. He wrote, “Defense in depth was especially important
in light of the Pearl Harbor experience, the advance of technology, and the development of the
atomic bomb.” See Lefºer, “The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of
冷战, 1945–48,” American Historical Review, 卷. 89, 不. 2 (四月 1984), p. 350.
110. 例如, the most dangerous crisis of the Cold War—the 1958–62 standoff between the
Soviet Union and the United States—saw a conºation of the containment and inhibition missions.
The Soviet Union initiated the crisis in 1958 largely over concerns about West Germany’s nuclear
ambitions, and the crisis was resolved by 1963, when the United States agreed that West Germany
had to remain nonnuclear. This paved the way toward the superpowers working to further their
inhibition goals, ªrst through the Partial Test Ban Treaty and ultimately through the NPT. 看
Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 特别是PP. 251–256, 352–406; and Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft,
PP. 57–74.
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国际安全 40:1 40
the strategies of inhibition have been very effective. Yet this claim remains
difªcult to prove.
第五, because inhibition policies are often aimed as much against allies and
unaligned countries as adversaries, American policymakers have been more
discreet and secretive about this critical aspect of U.S. grand strategy. 这
United States’ strategies of inhibition lack a clear, explicit founding document,
such as Kennan’s “long telegram.” The best wordsmith would have trouble
converting into soaring rhetoric inhibition’s goals of working with even the
bitterest of enemies and threatening the closest of friends to prevent sovereign
states from obtaining weapons deemed crucial to their security.
Sixth, academics often misunderstand how policymakers arrive at national
security decisions, especially when the subject is nuclear weapons.111 Interna-
tional relations scholars often argue that global stability is the foremost policy
目标, when policymakers are often willing to countenance international insta-
bility to achieve national interests.112 At the same time, policymakers are far
more sensitive to low-probability, high-consequence events such as a nuclear
attack.113 These factors led U.S. decisionmakers to embrace the inhibition mis-
sion and pay higher prices to achieve it.114
For all these reasons, scholars must often dig deeper to make the con-
nections that demonstrate that the inhibition mission has been as pervasive a
component of U.S. grand strategy since the middle of the twentieth century as
111. Francis J. Gavin and James B. Steinberg, “Mind the Gap: Why Policymakers and Scholars Ig-
nore Each Other, and What Can Be Done about It?” Carnegie Reporter, 卷. 6, 不. 4 (春天 2012),
http://carnegie.org/publications/carnegie-reporter/single/view/article/item/308/.
112. Matthew Kroenig, “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?》杂志
Strategic Studies, 卷. 38, Nos. 1–2 (2015), PP. 98–125.
113. Peter D. Feaver, “Nuclear Command and Control in Crisis: Old Lessons from New History,”
in Henry D. Sokolski and Bruno Tertrais, 编辑。, Nuclear Weapons in Security Crises: What Does History
Teach? (卡莱尔, 帕。: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2013), PP. 205–
225, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdfªles/PUB1156.pdf; and Peter Feaver, “What Do
Policymakers Want from Academic Experts on Nuclear Proliferation?” Monkey Cage blog, 洗涤-
吨邮政, 七月 8, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/07/08/
what-do-policymakers-want-from-academic-experts-on-nuclear-proliferation/.
114. As Colin Kahl notes, “But, when it comes to catastrophic threats, policymakers are simply not
comforted by claims that proliferation will not lead to nuclear terrorism or nuclear cascades or nu-
clear escalation the vast majority of the time. 反而, they tend to see even miniscule risks of extraor-
dinarily bad outcomes as compelling reasons to prevent additional nuclear proliferation. . . .
Because Iran is a second- or third-tier power, Realists tend to not take the Islamic Republic very se-
riously. They do not see a nuclear-armed Iran as a game changer in the Middle East or a direct
threat to the United States. Waltz even suggests that a nuclear-armed Iran would be a net positive
for international stability by serving as a check against Israeli and American militarism and inter-
发明. Yet it is precisely because of the potential constraint on American (and Israeli) ‘freedom of
action’ in the Middle East that U.S. policymakers so heavily weight some of the ills associated with
a nuclear-armed Iran.” See Colin Kahl, “Proliferation Optimism versus Proliferation Pessimism:
The Case of Iran,” paper presented at the Nuclear Studies Research Initiative, University of Texas,
Austin, 十月 16, 2013, p. 28.
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Strategies of Inhibition 41
the containment of great power rivals and the opening of the global economic
and political system.
结论
Imagine that a cataclysmic, global war has ended. In the course of the conºict,
one of the victors—the country that emerged most powerful—has developed a
weapon that can unleash unimaginable destruction. This country decides that
a key element of its postwar grand strategy will be to undertake enormous ef-
forts to prevent or make it as difªcult as possible for other sovereign states to
independently control this weapon.
At ªrst blush, this grand strategic goal was considered audacious, for at
least two reasons. 历史上, states went to great lengths to develop or ac-
quire whatever military capabilities were necessary to protect and advance
their interests in a dangerous world. Nuclear weapons offer extraordinary
beneªts to those that acquire them: they can deter attacks on their homeland,
even from far larger and more powerful states, including those with nuclear
武器. This transformational technology allows smaller and medium-size
states to massively increase their security and power in ways unthinkable in
the pre-nuclear age, where military capabilities were directly linked to the size
of a nation’s economy and its population. Why would a state eschew such a
powerful weapon? Joining an alliance could not substitute for this capability,
因为, 历史地, it was rare for a state to place its security so deeply in the
hands of another if it could be avoided. 第二, efforts to contain the spread of
military technology in the past almost inevitably failed. From the armed
chariot to early cannons to the Gatling gun and the Dreadnought battleship,
transformative military technologies are almost always adopted quickly and
widely by states that can afford them.115
Next imagine that the state pursuing this unprecedented strategy possesses
powerful isolationist instincts, has no history of permanent alliances, and tra-
ditionally maintained a military far less powerful than it could afford. It is a
state that throughout its history preferred to remain lightly engaged in world
affairs, cushioned by two weak states on its borders and protected by two vast
oceans.116 Furthermore, its domestic practices emphasized a weak executive
115. The classic work on military technology, its diffusion, and its inºuence on power is William
H. McNeil, The Pursuit of Power: 技术, Armed Force, and Society since
1000 (芝加哥: 大学-
芝加哥大学出版社, 1982). Note Michael Horowitz’s important insight that many factors con-
tribute to whether and how well a state exploits and adapts military technology into its strategy.
See Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power.
116. International relations scholars have long been puzzled by why the United States failed to
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国际安全 40:1 42
and strong legislative oversight of national security and decisionmaking about
war and peace, as well as strong civilian control over the military. Few states
were less likely than the United States to undertake an open-ended mission
that would demand sprawling global alliances, preemptive military strategies
and pre-delegated authority to use force, concentrated executive power, 和-
crecy, nonstop diplomacy, and international treaties, as well as working with
adversaries and coercing friends.
The nuclear revolution has been with us for so long and has become so en-
meshed in world politics that one sometimes forgets the profound and unprec-
edented challenge it presented to the safety of the United States and its
freedom of action. Successive presidential administrations have responded by
employing new, untested, and often bold strategies to inhibit nuclear prolifera-
的. These strategies of inhibition are among the most underappreciated, mis-
明白了, and consequential aspects of postwar U.S. grand strategy.
Recognizing the central role of the strategies of inhibition since 1945 有
important consequences for scholars and policymakers seeking to understand
历史, 理论, and policy. The history of these strategies supplements the styl-
ized picture of the Cold War period as a simple bipolar standoff. 在这个
conventional telling,
international politics was driven almost entirely by
the ideological and geopolitical competition between the Soviet Union and the
美国; the concerns of small and medium-size powers were not of
great importance; alliances were solely additive; and the end of the Cold War
completely transformed U.S. national security interests. As is now known,
while postwar nuclear history and Cold War history overlap and are intercon-
nected, they are not the same thing.117 As a recent study points out, “[我]n the
afterglow of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, halting the spread of nuclear weapons
became central to postwar international politics.”118
Recognizing the importance of the strategies of inhibition does not displace
the centrality of the Cold War struggle between the Soviet Union and the
美国. It does, 然而, highlight how inhibition was a distinct mis-
锡安, producing even occasional cooperation with the target of containment,
Soviet Russia. It also makes clear that many U.S. alliances were oriented to-
ward both suppressing client states’ nuclear ambitions and balancing against
translate its enormous economic power into peacetime military power before 1950. See Fareed
Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (普林斯顿大学, 新泽西州: 王子-
吨大学出版社, 1999). For an excellent historical account, see Walter McDougall, Promised
Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776 (纽约: Houghton
Mifºin, 1997).
117. This is a major theme in Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft.
118. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon.
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Strategies of Inhibition 43
the Soviets. At times, the strategies of inhibition complemented the openness
and containment missions, but often they were independent drivers of U.S.
grand strategy. The strategies of inhibition help explain why there has been so
much continuity in key U.S. national security policies despite a profound
change in the international political system: the end of the Cold War.
此外, the strategies of inhibition provide a more convincing expla-
nation for many contested questions surrounding nuclear dynamics. 问题-
tion of why there has been less nuclear proliferation than expected, 为了
例子, has focused almost exclusively on the calculations of the potential
proliferants. What are their capabilities to build a nuclear weapon? What are
their motivations to either develop nuclear weapons or eschew the bomb? 这
literature on nuclear proliferation has impressively analyzed the technological,
normative, 安全, and domestic political incentives and barriers to building
a bomb.119 Understanding the strategies of inhibition, 然而, reveals that a
key—if not the key—variable in determining many proliferation outcomes
自从 1945 may have been the grand strategy of the United States. Inhibition
also bridges the divide between “supply-side” and “demand-side” explan-
ations for the rate of nuclear proliferation, given that the United States’
strategies of inhibition have targeted both. The history of the nuclear age is in-
complete unless scholars and policymakers better understand the lengths to
which the United States has gone to inhibit nuclearization and how its strate-
gies have inºuenced decisionmaking about nuclear weapons in capitals
世界各地.
Kenneth Waltz claimed that “in the past half-century, no country has been
able to prevent other countries from going nuclear if they were determined to
do so.”120 Jacques Hymans posits that “the overwhelming majority of schol-
arly work on nuclear proliferation argues that states do not directly respond to
the international environment in making their nuclear weapons choices.”121 It
seems difªcult to argue, 然而, that nuclear decisionmaking in any number
119. For an excellent summary of the academic literature on proliferation and nonproliferation,
see Jacques E.C. Hymans, “Nuclear Proliferation and Non-Proliferation,” in Robert A. Denemark,
编辑。, The International Studies Encyclopedia (伦敦: 布莱克威尔, 2010), PP. 5447–5466. For a recent ar-
ticle on security considerations, see Nuno P. Monteiro and Alexandre Debs, “The Strategic Logic of
Nuclear Proliferation,” 国际安全, 卷. 39, 不. 2 (落下 2014), PP. 7–51. For the best supply
side explanations, see Matthew Furhmann, Atomic Assistance: How “Atoms for Peace” Programs
Cause Nuclear Insecurity (伊萨卡岛, 纽约: 康奈尔大学出版社, 2012); and Kroenig, Exporting the
Bomb.
120. Kenneth N. 华尔兹, in Scott D. Sagan and Waltz, 编辑。, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: 一场辩论
Renewed, 2ND版. (纽约: W.W. 诺顿, 2003), p. 38.
121. Jacques E.C. Hymans, “Veto Players, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation: Domestic Insti-
tutional Barriers to a Japanese Bomb,” 国际安全, 卷. 36, 不. 2 (落下 2011), PP. 154–189,
at p. 154.
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国际安全 40:1 44
of states—whether it be West Germany, 日本, 韩国, 台湾, 瑞典,
or Iraq—was not profoundly inºuenced by U.S. strategies of inhibition. By ar-
resting or mitigating proliferation among key states, these strategies affected
the international environment, increasing the likely costs to proliferation while
decreasing the risks for states to remain nonnuclear.
The strategies of inhibition also challenge how defensive realism has sought
to explain the inºuence of nuclear weapons on world politics. Building on the
work of strategists such as Bernard Brodie, scholars including Robert Jervis,
Stephen Van Evera, and Kenneth Waltz have emphasized the peace-inducing
effects of nuclear weapons and have suggested that nuclear proliferation is
neither a disaster nor a cause for dramatic policy interventions. This perspec-
tive has focused on the powerful stabilizing effects of mutual vulnerability
that arise when nuclear states achieve secure second-strike capabilities. Defen-
sive realism further predicts that the United States should have been content
with its own security and the security nuclear weapons offer to other states.
The inhibition mission, 然而, explains why a variety of U.S. nuclear strate-
gies and nuclear nonproliferation policies have deviated so dramatically from
defensive realism’s predictions.
Although offensive realists have sometimes been fuzzy in explaining the im-
pact of nuclear weapons, their theory may better explain certain aspects of U.S.
strategies of inhibition.122 The seven drivers of the inhibition strategy all relate
to the power-equalizing effects of nuclear weapons and are guided by efforts
of the United States to safeguard its security, preserve its power, and maintain
its freedom of action. Regardless of the stabilizing qualities that nuclear weap-
ons may have possessed, 我们. policymakers have never accepted being de-
terred by other states and have aggressively sought to prevent the spread of
核武器.
Is the inhibition mission simply an element of a larger grand strategic goal
我们. primacy or even hegemony? It is true that the strategies of inhibition fo-
cus solely on weapons, not on territories, 市场, or resources (IE。, the typical
targets of imperial or hegemonic power).123 And unlike containment, 哪个
focused historically on adversaries, and openness, which applied largely to
122. Mearsheimer wrote, “The best way for a state to achieve nuclear superiority is by arming it-
self with nuclear weapons while making sure no other state has them. A state with a nuclear mo-
nopoly, by deªnition, does not have to worry about retaliation in kind if it unleashes its nuclear
weapons.” See John J. 米尔斯海默, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (纽约: W.W. 诺顿,
2001), p. 129.
123. The nuclear revolution may have decreased the value of imperial territory to great powers.
Although it may be a coincidence, France and Great Britain put great efforts into developing nu-
clear weapons at the same time they were losing their colonies. The author is grateful to Alexander
Lanoska for this observation.
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Strategies of Inhibition 45
盟国, the inhibition mission has applied to all states, with little regard for
their economic or political orientation, 地理位置, or power-political
地位. 此外, the inhibition mission has required the United States to
construct policies—such as semi-permanent alliances backed by a highly mo-
bilized military—that clearly break from its long-standing history and tradi-
tions.124 As the nuclear age unfolded, 然而, policymakers recognized that
the “stopping power of water” no longer guaranteed either the safety of the
United States or its freedom of action.125 The strategies of inhibition, 和
the dramatic changes that came with them, were a response to the unprece-
dented constraints placed on U.S. freedom of action and the potentially devas-
tating destruction of weapons that could be delivered to the United States by
long-range bombers or missiles in hours if not minutes.126
最后, inhibition provides insight into the debates about U.S. grand strat-
egy since the end of the Cold War. Although there are a variety of schools and
positions, the sharpest debate is between scholars who argue that the United
States is dangerously overcommitted abroad and those who believe that U.S.
engagement in the world provides tangible beneªts, especially economic
那些. 实际上, the United States’ forward-leading, deep engagement is driven,
at least in part, by the inhibition mission. 所以, assessing the costs and ef-
fectiveness of U.S. grand strategy must take the strategies of inhibition into ac-
数数. 此外, inhibition helps explain U.S. national security policies
that have long puzzled students of U.S. grand strategy, including interest in
preventive strikes and coercion vis-à-vis emerging nuclear states; the continua-
tion and broadening of Cold War alliances after the disappearance of the
苏联; and the persistent and expensive interest in ballistic missile de-
124. During the years 1945–49, when the United States possessed a nuclear monopoly, it demobi-
lized its military and demonstrated little interest in projecting its military power abroad. 它是
only after the Soviet Union detonated an atomic device—far earlier than expected—combined
with the communist victory in China and what was seen as Soviet-supported aggression on the
Korean Peninsula, that the United States began a massive military buildup that ultimately in-
cluded deploying its forces abroad and developing a forward-leaning, damage limitation nuclear
战略.
125. 米尔斯海默, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 44. The author is grateful to Alexander
Lanoska for this insight.
126. Is inhibition a product of U.S. exceptionalism or instead a leading power phenomenon that
would be embraced by any country possessing the United States’ geopolitical position? One obvi-
ous test would be to examine more closely the attitudes of the Soviet Union when it was a super-
力量. Although we know that the Soviets often cooperated with the United States during the
Cold War on nuclear nonproliferation, we know far less about their motives or whether they
would have pursued inhibition without U.S. encouragement. For an intriguing look into the Soviet
案件, see Eliza Gheorghe, “Frenemies, Nuclear Sharing, and Proliferation: The Eastern Bloc, 1965–
1969,” paper prepared for the Nuclear Studies Research Initiative workshop, Warrenton, 弗吉尼亚州,
四月 30 to May 2, 2015.
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国际安全 40:1 46
栅栏, hard-target counterforce, and command, 控制, 通讯, 和
intelligence capabilities.
This inhibition logic is at work in U.S. grand strategy today. The strategies of
inhibition help explain not only the persistence of the United States’ efforts to
keep Iran from acquiring a bomb but also its motivation. Neither the geo-
political goals nor the ideological orientation of the regime in Tehran—no mat-
ter how troublesome to U.S. policymakers—is the primary driver of U.S.
nonproliferation efforts vis-à-vis Iran. Nor are interest-driven U.S. inhibition
strategies propelled by a desire to provide public goods and global security,
though these may be welcome by-products.
There is still much to learn about the strategies of inhibition. Which of the
drivers and responses has the United States prioritized and why, 以及哪个
strategies of inhibition have policymakers found most suitable for each case of
potential proliferation? Even more importantly, how have policymakers made
trade-offs among the containment, openness, and inhibition missions, 和
have these calculations changed over time? Despite the powerful and consis-
tent desire to inhibit nuclear proliferation, 我们. grand strategy has been imple-
mented in a dynamic, ever-changing political and technological environment,
and has faced challenges it never had to deal with before 1945.
What is the future of inhibition? The United States is at a point where its
power and ability to shape world politics are widely seen as waning, 和
where calls for a more restrained U.S. grand strategy are growing in popular-
性. Yet the potential for increases in the number of states with independent nu-
clear forces is ever present. The inhibition mission has been both more
successful and more expensive and dangerous than has been recognized. Has
the high price been worth it, and should the United States continue to pay it
going forward? What happens when it is no longer willing or able to be the
main force for nonproliferation in the world? The debates over the future of
我们. grand strategy will be woefully incomplete until scholars and policy-
makers address these questions.
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