Planetary Humanities: Straddling the - 麻省理工学院人工智能研究专业

Planetary Humanities: Straddling the
Decolonial/Postcolonial Divide

Dipesh Chakrabarty

This essay argues that while the science of climate change treats the Earth as one,
political responses to climate change are marked profoundly by the fact that hu-
manity can never speak as one. Questions of climate justice and sustainable human
futures have deepened fractured and contested histories of modernity in which the
West/non-West division intersects with emergent distinctions between postcolonial
and decolonial approaches. But none of these distinctions are absolute. By discuss-
ing the works of Déborah Danowski and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, I seek to show
how traditions of European and non-European thought remain entangled even
as we seek, intellectually, to decolonize the world. In a connected world, the not-
one-ness of humanity acts as a ground for dissension within the humanities but not
for any absolute differences.

H owever one looks at the difficulties of creating a politics of climate

改变, the question of “anthropological difference” seems to be at
the root of those difficulties. Issues of “climate justice,” for instance,
or those about historical responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions point, ul-
timately, to inequalities and power relations between rich and poor nations as
well as between the rich and the poor generally, across and inside nations. 什么
makes for a “climate emergency” is the fact that a humanity that is not one finds
it difficult to respond as one to a calendar of carbon budgets and coordinated ac-
tions issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 哪个,
in effect, treats the planet as one. How to think about intrahuman differences
in the face of a planet that climate scientists see as “one” has become “the one
and the many” aspect of climate politics. Sociologists Nigel Clark and Bronislaw
Szerszynski have recently sought to introduce the idea of “planetary multiplici-
ties” (by which they refer to the undeniable fact that “the Earth has an inherent
potential to shift from one state to another and to do this quickly”), but acknowl-
edge the oneness of this planet by seeing it as “a dynamic and self-organized” en-
tity.1 Come to think of it, all the scenarios of transition to a “zero carbon” global
economy and the carbon budgets chalked up by the IPCC do not make sense un-
less one assumes the planet to be one. Differences between humans have there-

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fore emerged as the truly political aspect of what the IPCC sees as a “climate
emergency.”2

What I wish to do in this essay is show how the humanist literature on the pol-
itics of attending to the challenges of planetary climate change draws on two con-
trasting ways of thinking about “modernity” and thus about differences between
人类. One might broadly imagine these approaches as reflecting an emergent
decolonial/postcolonial divide, a division that is, I hasten to add, by no means to-
的. There are many connections between these approaches. They also draw, iron-
ically but differently, on some identifiable traditions of European thought, 参与-
ularly French theory after May 1968. My treatment of these approaches is neces-
sarily partial, preliminary, exploratory, and illustrative. There are critical aspects
to these approaches that I have deliberately left out of consideration for reasons
of space.

P hilosopher Déborah Danowski and anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de

Castro’s compelling and thoughtful book The Ends of the World gives me an
excellent starting point not least because they put forward their proposi-
tions with such admirable clarity.3 I appear in the section of the book in which
they criticize my having resorted to the biological concept of “species” (as used by
the recently departed E. 氧. Wilson) in the original version of my 2009 essay “The
Climate of History: Four Theses,” now revised and reprinted as chapter 1 of The
Climate of History in a Planetary Age.4 As they explain,

We must begin by rejecting any sole candidate to the (在)dignity of being the Anthro-
pocene’s eponymous. 这 [乙. 奥。] Wilsonian notion of species is dismissed less on the
grounds of its phenomenological evanescence, as in Chakrabarty, than because it is a
tributary of modernity’s apolitical, ahistorical conception of Nature, as well as of the Science’s
absolute power of arbitrage. But neither are the revolutionary masses of the classical left,
that other recurring incarnation of the modern universal, up to the task; . . . their lib-
eration continues to depend on a generalization and intensification of the moderniza-
tion front, on the practical (environmental destruction) as well as theoretical (the cult
of Nature and Reason) levels.5

Their particular criticism of my essay is not important here. Instead I want to
highlight two terms of their critique that are central to this discussion: “moderni-
ty’s apolitical, ahistorical conception of Nature” and “Science’s absolute power of
arbitrage.” Danowski and de Castro go on to write:

The properly ethnopolitical situation of “human” as intensive and extensive multiplic-
ity of peoples must be acknowledged as being directly implicated in the Anthropo-
cene crisis. If there is no positive human interest, it is because there is a diversity of
political alignments among the various world peoples or “cultures” with several other

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151 (3) Summer 2022Dipesh Chakrabarty

non-human actants and peoples (constituting what Latour calls “collectives”) 反对
the self-appointed spokespeople of the universal Human.6

This line of critique is in continuity with the intellectual program that de Cas-
tro had mapped out in his earlier collection of essays Cannibal Metaphysics.7 That
program was to make anthropology into a “permanent exercise in the decoloniza-
tion of thought.”8 Based on his imaginative reading and analysis of what he called
Amerindian “perspectivism” and their “multi-naturalism,” this decolonizing vi-
sion saw both humans and the world as “non-unified,” with all prospects of uni-
fication lying “in the future, under what we would call a multiple hypothetical
mode, and will depend on negotiating capacities once the ‘war of the worlds,’ as
Latour has called it . . . has been declared.”9 As de Castro’s writings make clear and
as he often explains, much of the inspiration for this particular mode of decolo-
nizing thought came from the explosive impact that Deleuze and Guattari’s work
on the figures of the “savage,” the “primitive,” the “rhizomatic,” and the nomad
had on French thought following the events of May 1968, when France was rocked
by a revolutionary upheaval of working-class and student protesters, 导致
many weeks of violent civil unrest, economic and political uncertainty, and a pro-
found questioning of orthodox Communists. “For my generation,” writes de Cas-
tro, “the name of Gilles Deleuze immediately evokes the change in thought that
marked the period circa 1968, when some key elements of our contemporary cul-
tural apperception were invented. The meaning, consequences and the very re-
ality of this change have given rise to a still-raging controversy.”10 He introduc-
es his own book Cannibal Metaphysics as one that “puts forward and illustrates a
theory of multiplicities–the Deleuzian theme that has carried the greatest re-
percussions in and for contemporary anthropology,” influencing, 除其他外,
Latour’s critique of modernity in his We Have Never Been Modern.11 As de Castro
further explicates, echoing the title of Latour’s book,

the concept of multiplicity may have only become thinkable–and therefore think-
able by anthropology–because we are currently entering a nonmerologic, postpop-
ular world where we have never been modern; a world that, more through disinterest
than any Aufhebung, is leaving in the dust the old infernal distinction between the One
and the Multiple that governed so many dualisms, the anthropological pairs and many
others as well. . . . Thinking through multiplicities is thinking against the State.12

And then again: “Multiplicity is not something like a larger unity, a superior plu-
rality or unity; rather it is a less than one obtained by subtraction (hence the impor-
tance of the idea of the minor, minority, and minoritization in Deleuze).”13

Whether we look at de Castro and Danowski’s work or that of Deleuze and
Guattari, the Indigenous remains the privileged site and the original instance of
this subversive principle of multiplicity, often seen as embodying some kind of

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesPlanetary Humanities: Straddling the Decolonial/Postcolonial Divide

an Other to the statist ideas of history and modernization that imperial Europe
epitomized.14 “Thinking through multiplicities,” writes de Castro, “is thinking
against the state.”15 In a significant footnote, de Castro mentions that he wrote
this sentence in memory of Pierre Clastres, “who was (and remains) one of the
rare French anthropologists who knew how to make something out of Anti-
Oedipus’s ideas, besides being one of the inspirations for the theory of the war ma-
chine developed in Plateaus 12 和 13 of A Thousand Plateaus.”16 Indeed, one of the
pivotal oppositions around which the text of Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus
turned was that between the nomadic and the sedentary. In his preface that de-
scribed the book as an “introduction to the non-fascist life,” Michel Foucault ex-
horted the reader to

withdraw allegiance from the old categories of the Negative (法律, limit, castration,
lack, lacuna), which Western thought has so long held sacred as a form of power and
an access to reality. Prefer what is positive and multiple, difference over uniformity,
flows over unities, mobile arrangements over systems.

And in all this the figure of the nomad that subsumed that of the “savage” or the
“primitive” came to occupy a central position. Foucault’s injunction to the reader
of Deleuze and Guattari was telling: “Believe that what is productive is not seden-
tary but nomadic.”17

Deleuze and Guattari opened the famous third chapter of their Anti-Oedipus–
“Savages, Barbarians, Civilized Men”–by asking, “where do we find enough in-
nocence” that would allow humans to generate “universal history” after “the uni-
versal” had been brought to an end by “the conditions determined by an apparent-
ly victorious capitalism?”18 “Innocence” was not a matter of a dialectical reversal
of a binary opposition, not in the way that the idea of a “primitive communism”
would be preserved and sublimated into the Marxist ideal of communist society.
For Deleuze and Guattari recognized that “universal history” was always “the his-
tory of contingencies, and not the history of necessity.” The “primitive system”
was self-sustaining, its “death . . . always comes from without: history is the histo-
ry of contingencies and encounters.”19 The path back to universal history would
similarly include “ruptures and limits,” “great accidents . . . and amazing encoun-
ters that . . . might have never happened.”20 The “primitive” or the “savage,” how-
曾经, supplied a principle critical to the generation of a universal human history,
the potential for which capital had destroyed. And hence Deleuze and Guattari’s
perennial interest in the ethnographic literature on segmentary, acephalic societ-
是的. The critical political principle was articulated by placing the nomadic in oppo-
sition to the State in their respective relationships to the Earth. “Only the appara-
tus of the State will be territorial,” write our authors, citing Engels, for “it ‘subdi-
vides not the people but the territory,’ and substitutes a geographic organization
for the organization of gens.” But “where kinship seems to predominate over the

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151 (3) Summer 2022Dipesh Chakrabarty

earth, it is not difficult to show the importance of local ties.” Deleuze and Guat-
tari continue:

This is because the primitive machine subdivides the people, but does so on an indivis-
ible earth where the connective, disjunctive, and conjunctive relations of each section
are inscribed along with other relations (因此, 例如, the coexistence or comple-
mentarity of the section chief and the guardian of the earth). When the division ex-
tends to the earth itself, by virtue of an administration that is landed and residential,
this cannot be regarded as a promotion of territoriality; on the contrary, it is rather the
effect of the first great movement of deterritorialization on the primitive communes.
. . . Hence the savage, primitive was indeed the only territorial machine in the strict
sense of the term. . . . before there is State.21

Ethnographic information about “primitive, segmentary societies” was even-
tually worked up into the science of nomadology, the twelfth chapter of A Thou-
sand Plateaus, published in 1980 as the second volume of Anti-Oedipus. A part of
this chapter–Proposition II–was written in amicable disagreement with but also
as “a tribute to the memory” of Pierre Clastres.22 The starting point once again
was the observation that “primitive, segmentary societies” were not only “soci-
eties without a State”; they were actively organized to keep the state at bay. 在
disagreement with Clastres, 然而, Deleuze and Guattari also claimed that
such societies did not inhabit “a state of nature” that would enable them to re-
main untouched by the state. The sedentary and nomadic thus did not consti-
tute a mutually exclusive binary.23 “The law of the State is not the law of All or
Nothing (State-societies or counter-State societies) but that of interior and exte-
rior.”24 There are “huge worldwide machines”–like multinational corporations
or religious organizations–that “enjoy a large measure of autonomy in relation
to States,” and there are also “local mechanisms of bands, margins, minorities,
which continue to affirm the rights of segmentary societies in opposition to the
organs of State power.”25 Together they constitute the exterior to the state but not
a binary outside. And “local mechanism” of bands and minorities embodies and
illustrates the principles of nomadology.

It is on this terrain of thought–and especially the pacesetting work of Deleuze
and Guattari in the wake of May 1968–that the figure of the Indigenous presents
itself on the pages of Latour’s We Have Never Been Modern and in Danowski and de
Castro’s decolonizing exercise in The Ends of the World. Three parties are created in
effect in this narrative of a global history of modernity and modernization. I will
present them as they are depicted in Danowski and de Castro’s text, which is in
deep conversation with Latour’s work, predominantly the latter’s two books, 我们
Have Never Been Modern and Facing Gaia.26 These parties are–in order of their “im-
portance” and in my terminology–“the original Moderns,” “the Indigenous,”
and “the later moderns.” I am not sure where the enslaved of the North Atlantic

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesPlanetary Humanities: Straddling the Decolonial/Postcolonial Divide

would fall in this three-fold distinction, but some of their representatives will turn
up in my discussion below. 目前, let me stay with this three-fold division.

We know the theoretico-historical lineages of the Indigenous in this body of
thought on the Europeanization of the Earth. They are designated “non-Mod-
erns.” Who are the original-Moderns and why are they “original”? The “original-
Moderns” are North-Western Europeans, for they are the “Humans of the Holo-
cene” against whom the Terrans (the living who are opposed to the forces that
cause global warming) are up in arms in the geostory that Latour presented in his
Gifford Lectures published as Facing Gaia. As Danowski and de Castro gloss La-
tour’s text, “These are, it is well understood, none other than the Moderns, 那
race–originally North-Western, but increasingly less European and more Chinese,
Indian, Brazilian.”27 The “Original-Moderns” are “original” in two senses. 他们
are the first to become “modern”; it is only later that they discover that, “in the
East and in the South, other people had learned their lesson too well, taking upon
themselves the will and the responsibility for modernization, but in their own,
frightful terms.”28 Thus, as modernizers in the East and the South, the Chinese,
[the Japanese], the Indians, the Brazilian, and others become un-original in two
senses: they are un-original in that they come later with the Europeans as their
前辈, but they are also un-original in that they are “derivatives,” pale cop-
是的, as indeed the etymology of the word “original”–from Latin origo meaning
来源, birth–suggests.

Danowski and de Castro are aware of the contemporary demographic weight
of the unoriginal-Moderns compared to numbers of the non-Moderns. 这 370
million Indigenous people “spread over 70 countries in the world, 根据一个
recent United Nations Permanent Forum of Indigenous Issues (2009) estimate,”
are “certainly nowhere near the roughly 3.5 十亿 (read half the human species)
crowding our ‘technical metropolises,’ around a billion of which, it should be not-
编辑, live in not particularly ‘technical’ slums.”29 Yet in spite of their demograph-
ic minority–or because of it–the “non-Moderns” will carry in Danowski and
de Castro’s account a moral weight far out of proportion to their numbers. 这
reason is simple. The Moderns, original or late, represent a failed project that has
now resulted in a catastrophe:

Assured of their privileged access to Nature, Moderns saw themselves as a civilizing
force come to convince recalcitrant people to rally to the flag of a common world (A
single ontological and cosmopolitical regime) that was also, not by coincidence, 这
world of the Moderns.30

The scientific facts are not at issue, for “we are not discussing if there are
such things as global warming and an ongoing environmental collapse; these are
among the best-documented . . . phenomena in the history of sciences. . . . [时间]这里
is hardly any significant controversy among scientists concerning the anthropic

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151 (3) Summer 2022Dipesh Chakrabarty

origin of climate catastrophe.”31 The dissemination of this knowledge may even
be an “important factor” in bringing people over to the side of the good. 但是
project of the Moderns cannot unite humanity anymore. “All unification lies in
未来,” in a postcatastrophic world.32 The forces for the good “cannot but be
an ‘irremediably minor’ people” (minor in a Deleuzian sense), resembling

less the “phantom public” of Western democracies than the people that is missing which
Deleuze and Guattari speak of: Kafka and Melville’s minor people, Rimbaud’s infe-
rior races, the Indian that the philosopher becomes . . . – the people, 那是, to come;
capable of launching a “resistance to the present” and thus of creating a “new earth,”
the world to come.33

It is in “a post-catastrophic time, 或者, if one wishes, in a permanently diminished
human world” that “the generally small populations and ‘relatively weak’ tech-
nologies of indigenous peoples and so many other sociopolitical minorities of the
Earth could become a crucial advantage and resource.”34

N ow, the question is not whether Indigenous peoples’ thoughts and prac-

tices could provide both intellectual and practical resources as humans
search for a way out of their planetary environmental crises. 他们, 的
课程, 做, and Danowski and de Castro’s work (here and elsewhere) shows us
如何. But it is interesting to observe that their method of effecting a “permanent
decolonization” of anthropological thought–much like the Deleuzian tradi-
tion from which they take inspiration–does not connect with the emancipatory
dreams not only of the late and revolutionary modernizers of Japan, 中国, 印度,
和非洲, but also of someone like Franz Fanon or, for that matter, 乙. 右. Ambed-
kar, the greatest modern leader of the Dalits in India, who once publicly asked for
Indian society to be completely rebuilt on the principles of liberty, 平等, 和
fraternity!35 反而, these late-Modernizers, considered “unoriginal” and “de-
rivative,” are folded back into the story of the “original” European-Moderns. 但
this is ignoring–to continue to speak with Deleuze and Guattari–the ruptures,
discontinuities, and contingencies that made modernity what it was in Asia, Afri-
加州, and Latin America, where lives were impacted by the domination and racism
of European powers but without, as in the case of India, any active elaboration of
the near-genocidal logic of European settler-colonial rule.36 Without that history
of Asia (and parts of Africa and Latin America), as we have seen, human histo-
ry would not have undergone the Great Acceleration or acquired its complexity,
what Foucault, always more of a historian than Deleuze and Guattari, called “our
immediate and concrete actuality.”37

Imagine how the present could have been different if the human population
had stabilized in the 1950s or if the world had sourced its energy requirements
from nuclear power. Many of our current problems would have still been there

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesPlanetary Humanities: Straddling the Decolonial/Postcolonial Divide

and the problem of disposing of radioactive waste would have been much more
激烈的, but the warming would have been less. There is no politics of the plan-
etary predicament of humans without dealing with issues of climate justice that
have to do, profoundly, with the emancipatory aspirations and expectation, 和
not just fossilized carbon, that still fuel the desire for “growth and development”
在新的, populous nations that have now experienced for decades the phenom-
enon of “mass poverty.” There is nothing morally wrong, 像这样, with humans
wanting to live better and longer, so long as they did not imperil themselves. 是-
sides, while I agree with Latour, de Castro, and others that the consumerist model
of capitalist development is unsustainable for most humans, nothing guarantees
de Castro’s hope: that a climate disaster resulting in “permanently diminished”
human capabilities will give humanity yet another chance at flourishing by mak-
ing the right use of the accumulated wisdom of the Indigenous non-Moderns.
That may or may not come to pass.

B runo Latour and historian Christophe Bonneuil have helpfully reminded

us that there are many ideas about planetarity that circulate at any given
time.38 This was as true of the past and as it is of the present. From the pre-
historic humans who settled the Pacific Islands thousands of years ago navigat-
ing the seas by the night sky to ancient Greek and Indian astrology to peasants’
sayings about seasons, through to the Copernican revolution in the sciences and
its consequences: these are all instances of planetary thinking. Bonneuil, borrow-
ing from Hartog’s expression “regimes of historicity,” makes the additional useful
suggestion that while there have been different traditions of planetary thinking,
there have also been dominant regimes of planetarity–planetary ideas that en-
joyed the backing of powers that be in any society.39

One could similarly argue that the “Earth system” that Earth system science
speaks of–a planet for which geological and biological processes and histories
cannot be thought in complete separation from one another–is a particular way
of conceiving of the planet we live on, while there may very well be other com-
peting ways of thinking about the planet (as both Latour and Bonneuil show),
ancient, 现代的, and non-Modern. I would also happily concede the point that
Earth system science, given the role it has played in both positing and explain-
ing the anthropogenic origins of the current episode of planetary warming that
the Earth is undergoing, represents a dominant regime of planetarity, given the
big-ticket funding that has made this science possible, and the backing it has re-
ceived from the powerful nations of the world, the United Nations, and various
other international organizations. This is also what gives this science a touch of
irony. It is a product of the Cold War and is dependent on the technological ad-
vances that conflict produced. As Paul Crutzen, the pioneer of the Anthropocene
idea in our generation, once said, putting a positive spin on the irony:

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151 (3) Summer 2022Dipesh Chakrabarty

Our negative impacts help us to understand the world. My research on our atmo-
sphere has really terrified me. But finally I thought: What would we have known about
the atmosphere if it had not been polluted? Because pollution gave us the impetus and
triggered the funding to study the workings of the environment.40

I would also submit, against those who seem to conflate “scientific knowl-
edge” with the power structures within which scientific research is embedded,
that while power structures may very well determine what kinds of knowledge the
sciences will produce–a poorly funded climate science may indeed look different
(whence follow the politics of funding)–the knowledge produced still must go
through the acceptable procedures and protocols of such production. Every con-
sensus in the sciences exists only to be challenged by new research, 这就是为什么
consensuses are much harder won than in the humanities, which in contrast and
by its very nature often appears to be a collection of schismatic churches and their
conflicting dogma.

What distinguishes “the regime of planetarity” that Earth system science rep-
resents is what the singular word system suggests. It refers to the way that geol-
ogy and biology have come to combine in the history of this planet to act like a
system supporting the existence of life–complex, multicellular life–on Earth,
making it the only “Goldilocks planet” we so far know.41 This system is not some-
thing we can directly perceive or experience even through a telescope; 这个单词
system here refers to an implicitly heuristic model built on the basis of both ob-
served data and computer modeling, something that seeks to approximate how
the Earth system works. Unlike in the case of Indigenous or peasant ideas of plan-
etarity, the idea of the Earth system refers to the roles that parts of the planet that
humans have never experienced–the deep seas, 例如, or the ozone layer
or the carbon cycles of the planet–play in maintaining its climate system, a sys-
tem thought of as planetary in scope. Unlike in many other traditions of planetary
思维, Earth system science speaks of time and space on scales that go far be-
yond what humans can phenomenologically experience. It is for this reason that,
read through the findings and propositions of Earth system science, 气候
crisis becomes a human encounter with the idea of ourselves as a geological force,
an encounter, 那是, both with geological deep time and with our entanglement
with other forms of life and thus with the geobiological history of the planet. 胡-
manists are still working out the implications of this encounter.

The problem of the “we” is, 实际上, the most critical human aspect of our cur-
rent planetary crisis. There is no one we to respond to a planet that is studied by
climate scientists as one. If the evidence of human history is anything to go by,
there never has been a one we of humans. Yet a fallacious aspect of much ratio-
nal thinking in the humanities is signaled by the constant invoking of a potential
we of humans as part of conditional solution-proposing statements that take the

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesPlanetary Humanities: Straddling the Decolonial/Postcolonial Divide

form of “If only we . . . .” Steven Pinker, the well-known devotee of the European
Enlightenment and its legacies, is a good case in point. Here is how he explains his
“conditional optimism,” faced with the facts of anthropogenic climate change:

Despite a half-century of panic, humanity is not on an irrevocable path to ecologi-
cal suicide. The fear of resource shortage is misconceived. So is the misanthropic en-
vironmentalism that sees modern humans as vile despoilers of a pristine planet. . . .
Problems are solvable. That does not mean they will solve themselves, but it does
mean that we can solve them if we sustain the benevolent forces of modernity that
have allowed us to solve problems so far, including societal prosperity, wisely regulat-
ed markets, international governance, and investments in science and technology.42

Pinker’s conditional optimism leads him to support physicist David Keith’s
projects for “moderate, responsive, and temporary” climate engineering de-
signed “only to give humanity breathing space until it eliminates greenhouse gas
emissions and brings the CO2 in the atmosphere back to preindustrial levels.”43
But there is no agreement among even those who study the phenomenon of geo-
engineering that it will be an unmixed good for humanity. 有, 例如,
philosopher Frédéric Neyrat’s considered, humanist, and thoughtful critique of
geoengineering that argues for humans acquiring “a capacity for stepping back
and regaining some distance [from what they have an impact on]” in a gesture
that does not assume a seamless continuity between humans and their “envi-
ronment.” But will Neyrat’s argument find any more consensus than Pinker’s?
One can safely say, “no.” Yet the question of “what is to be done?” will resonate
through human thought even as humans remain decisively not-one. This mis-
match between the oneness of the planet (IPCC’s assumption) and the not-one-
ness of humans will keep open the place for decolonial and postcolonial political
thought jostling together and around the intensifying problems of anthropogenic
climate change.

关于作者

Dipesh Chakrabarty is the Lawrence A. Kimpton Distinguished Service Profes-
sor of History, South Asian Languages and Civilizations at the University of Chi-
卡戈. He is the author of The Climate of History in a Planetary Age (2021), Some Aspects
of Labour History of Bengal in the Nineteenth Century: Two Views (with Ranajit Dasgupta,
2018), and The Crises of Civilization: Exploring Global and Planetary Histories (2018).

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151 (3) Summer 2022Dipesh Chakrabarty

尾注

1 Nigel Clark and Bronislaw Szerszynski, Planetary Social Thought: The Anthropocene Challenge

to the Social Sciences (剑桥: 政体, 2021), 11, 21.

2 “IPCC Report: ‘Code Red’ for Human Driven Global Heating, Warns UN Chief,” UN

消息, 八月 9, 2021, https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/08/1097362.

3 Déborah Danowski and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, The Ends of the World, 反式. Rodrigo

Nunes (剑桥: 政体, 2017; first published in Portuguese in 2014).

4 Dipesh Chakrabarty, The Climate of History in a Planetary Age (芝加哥: The University

芝加哥出版社, 2021).

5 Danowski and de Castro, The Ends of the World, 90 (添加了强调).

6 同上.

7 Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Cannibal Metaphysics, 编辑. and trans. Peter Skafish (Minne-

apolis: Univocal Publishing, 2014; first published in French in 2009).

8 同上。, 48. See also the statement “Anthropology is ready to fully assume its new mission of
being the theory/practice of the permanent decolonization of thought.” Ibid., 40.
9 Danowski and de Castro, The Ends of the World, 90. See also de Castro, Cannibal Metaphysics,
小伙子. 2 和 3, for explication of the ideas of “perspectivism” and “multinaturalism.”

10 De Castro, Cannibal Metaphysics, 97.
11 同上。, 108. In personal conversations, Latour has mentioned to me the influence of Deleuze
on his thinking. See also Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 反式. Catherine
Porter (剑桥, 大量的。: 哈佛大学出版社, 1993; first published in French in
1991).

12 De Castro, Cannibal Metaphysics, 108–109.
13 同上。, 110.
14 See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 反式.
Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen Lane (明尼阿波利斯: University of Minnesota
按, 1983; first published in French in 1972), 小伙子. 3.

15 同上。, 109.
16 同上。, 109, n. 64.
17 米歇尔·福柯, “Preface” to Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, xiii.
18 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 139.
19 同上。, 195.
20 同上。, 140.
21 同上。, 145–146.
22 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 反式.
Brian Massumi (明尼阿波利斯: University of Minnesota Press, 1991, 1987; first pub-
lished in French in 1980), 357.

23 同上。, 359.
24 同上。, 360.

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesPlanetary Humanities: Straddling the Decolonial/Postcolonial Divide

25 同上.
26 Bruno Latour, Facing Gaia, 反式. Catherine Porter (剑桥: 政体, 2017).
27 Danowski and de Castro, The Ends of the World, 92–93 (添加了强调).
28 同上。, 91.
29 同上。, 96.
30 同上。, 91.
31 同上.
32 同上。, 90.
33 同上。, 94–95.
34 同上。, 95.
35 乙. 右. Ambedkar cited in Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought
and Historical Difference (普林斯顿大学, 新泽西州: 普林斯顿大学出版社, 2000, 2008), 246.
See also the discussion in ibid., 小伙子. 2.

36 On the genocidal logic of settler-colonial rule, see Patrick Wolfe, Traces of History: Ele-

mentary Structures of Race (伦敦: Verso, 2016).

37 Michel Foucault cited in Naoki Sakai, The End of Pax Americana: The Loss of Empire and

Hikikomori Nationalism (达勒姆, 北卡罗来纳州: 杜克大学出版社, 2022), 177.

38 See Bruno Latour and Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Conflicts of Planetary Proportions,“ 杂志
of Philosophy of History 14 (3) (2020); and Christophe Bonneuil, “Der Historiker und der
Planet–Planetaritätsregimes an der Schnittstelle von Welt-Ökologien, ökologischen
Reflexivitäten und Geo-Mächten,” in Gessellschaftstheorie im Anthropozän, 编辑. Frank Ad-
loff und Sighard Neckel (法兰克福: Campus Verlag, 2020), 55–94.

39 Bonneuil, “Der Historiker und der Planet,” 73–74.
40 Christian Schwägerl, “‘We Aren’t Doomed’: An Interview with Paul Crutzen,” in Wel-
come to the Anthropocene: The Earth in Our Hands, 编辑. Nina Möllers, Christian Schwägerl,
and Helmuth Trischler (慕尼黑: Deutsches Museum, 2015), 36.

41 Jan Zalasiewicz and Mark Williams, The Goldilocks Planet: The Four Billion Year Story of the
Earth’s Climate (牛津: Oxford University Press, 2012); Julia Adeney Thomas, 标记
威廉姆斯, and Jan Zalasiewicz, The Anthropocene: A Multidisciplinary Approach (剑桥:
政体, 2020); and Julia Adeney Thomas, 编辑。, Altered Earth: Getting the Anthropocene Right
(剑桥: 剑桥大学出版社, 2022).

42 Steven Pinker, Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, 科学, Humanism, and Progress (新的

约克: Viking, 2018), 154–155 (添加了强调).

43 同上。, 153.

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151 (3) Summer 2022Dipesh Chakrabarty
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