Nuclear Disarmament without the - 麻省理工学院人工智能研究专业

Nuclear Disarmament without the
Nuclear-Weapon States:
The Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty

Harald Müller & Carmen Wunderlich

这 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) represents a
daring act of self-empowerment: nuclear have-nots produced an international
disarmament treaty without the involvement of the nuclear-weapon states or
their allies. 在这篇文章中, we assess how the new treaty relates to the existing nu-
clear order and its four central norms: constraints on use, political restraint, 非-
增殖, and disarmament. We discuss the TPNW’s origin in and impact on
this contested order. At the heart of contestation are two security concepts: 阻止-
rence versus the immediate ban of nuclear arms, which result in fundamentally
different ideas on how to pursue the road to “global zero.” Whether or not the
TPNW and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are com-
patible depends on how the opponents handle their controversies. The key is to
overcome the emotionalized polarization and rediscover a common basis in order
to prevent damage to the existing nuclear order and bring forward nuclear disar-
mament in practice.

T he Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is the product

of more than fifty years of norm contestation regarding disarmament. 这是
essential to see the Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty as a dependent variable of
the politics surrounding the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT). The TPNW has not fallen from heaven and is not the result of malign inten-
系统蒸发散, but is a consequence of the history of debates on and practices of disarma-
ment since negotiations on the NPT began in the 1960s.

The TPNW, signed in 2017, represents a new approach to nuclear disarmament:
rather than being hapless bystanders, the have-nots came together and produced
an international disarmament treaty without the nuclear-weapon states (NWS)–
美国, 英国, 法国, 俄罗斯, and China–or their allies.
What looks, for the NWS, like an undesirable intrusion onto their turf represents,
for ban supporters, an act of self-empowerment in an area they regard as crucial to
their own security and survival.

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It is not, as some critics have maintained, preordained by the nature of the
TPNW that it will damage the NPT. Whether the two treaties are compatible or
not depends on how opponents and proponents of the TPNW handle their contro-
versies. Reasonable policies can create a modus vivendi. Antagonistic policies can
create incompatibility. Right now, the outcome is indeterminate.

T he TPNW debate affects the normative order concerning nuclear weapons.

在这篇文章中, we discuss four sets of norms that constitute this order: 骗局-
straints on use, political restraint, nonproliferation, and disarmament.1
We understand norms as shared understandings about appropriate behavior.2
Norms can be intended for constitutive, regulative, or procedural functions. 我们
交易, 然而, with the intentional, unintentional, or counterintentional effects
that norms have on actors. Norms can express and serve an actor’s interest, 带领-
ing to voluntary compliance on a utilitarian basis, and they can enable and con-
strain an actor’s freedom of action, making compliance more likely without de-
termining it. They can frame and solidify understanding of right and wrong, 带领-
ing to stable views of appropriate behavior. But they may also provoke resentment
and rebellion, expressed in contestation, deviant discourse, and noncompliance
including with core norms.3 “Negative” effects result when a) actors deem norms
averse to their interests or values; 乙) certain actors apply double standards to
compliance and enforcement; C) actors unilaterally prioritize certain norms over
其他的; or d) decision-making procedures are seen as unjust.

Norms concerning nuclear weapons have not emerged by strategic design.
They are the product of superpowers’ arms racing practices; experiences like the
Cuban missile crisis that enhanced efforts to prevent catastrophic nuclear escala-
的; multilateral negotiations like those on the NPT and bilateral ones like those
on SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) and START (Strategic Arms Reduc-
条约); efforts of the NWS to maintain their reputation as responsible pow-
呃; the aspiration of the NWS and their allies to preserve extended deterrence at
the lowest possible risk; and the desire of non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) 到
achieve security and risk reduction through (normative) constraints on the NWS
and disarmament. Multiple actors and motivations have rendered the nuclear or-
der a patchwork drawing together contradictory impulses, not a coherent whole.
The disparate influences of the ideas of deterrence and disarmament show in the
four central norms of the order.4

The first norm is constraint on use in which deterrers and disarmers both
have a significant interest. There is a strong presumption that nuclear use should
be avoided (though strategic debates, doctrines, and rhetoric utter occasionally
a more cavalier attitude). This norm finds expression in national doctrines like
the Chinese and Indian “no-first-use” policies or NATO’s “only in the most re-
mote circumstances.” It is legally codified in the NWS’s security guarantees to

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesNuclear Disarmament without the Nuclear-Weapon States

nuclear-weapon-free zones and politically codified in their nationally declared
security guarantees to NPT non-nuclear-weapon states, noted by UN Security
Council resolutions in 1968 和 1995. It has grown by practice and public dis-
course into a strong informal norm internalized by decision-makers: the “nuclear
taboo,” based, depending on the theoretical perspective, on moral-cultural under-
pinnings or on tradition-induced reputational concerns.

The norm is doubly contested. Nuclear strategists argue the utility and possi-
bility of nuclear use for political and military purposes. And in contrast, 有
advocates for stronger constraints (such as unconditional, treaty-based universal
security guarantees and codification of no-first-use) up to the demand to guaran-
tee nonuse through the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and renuncia-
tion of nuclear deterrence as illegitimate.

The second norm, political restraint, is even more diffuse. It prescribes behav-
ior minimizing the risk of nuclear escalation. It concerns doctrines and strategies,
nuclear rhetoric, policies by nuclear weapons possessors toward neighbors, cri-
sis avoidance and management, armament policies supporting strategic stability,
and a viable balance of forces–key principles of nuclear arms control. The func-
tion of this norm is to prevent the strategy/practice of nuclear deterrence from
getting out of control. Political restraint has been codified in the NPT preamble,
which calls for the easing of tension and strengthening of trust in order to facili-
tate nuclear disarmament, refraining from the threat and use of force against the
territorial integrity and independence of other states. Codification is found in sev-
eral U.S.-Soviet agreements in the early 1970s, the “Basic Principles” that aim at
preventing dangerous crises, the “Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War,”
and the “Incidents at Sea Agreement,” deemed so useful by U.S. admirals that
they dissuaded Reagan’s Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger from scrapping
it.5 This norm underlies the suggestion by the U.S. government to explore a secu-
rity environment conducive to nuclear disarmament.

The norm has not been contested in principle, but is frequently ignored by
great powers’ policies and armament practices. Contention comes from two an-
gles. 第一的, proponents of national superiority and territorial expansion loathe po-
litical restraint. Mutual accusations of trespassing normative thresholds (例如
during the Iraq War or Ukraine crisis) have constituted important instances of ap-
plicatory contestation.6 Ironically, the NWS that have called for political restraint
as a condition for disarmament have themselves contributed the most to an un-
favorable security environment. 第二, contesters refuse any conditionality be-
tween environment and disarmament.

The third norm of renunciation/nonproliferation (as enshrined in the NPT)
proscribes for states not possessing nuclear weapons the pursuit of them in any
方式. Contestation rages over the limits this norm imposes on the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, the intrusiveness of verification, or the strictness of nuclear-related

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149 (2) Spring 2020Harald Müller & Carmen Wunderlich

export controls. Also contested is the conditionality of such restrictions on paral-
lel progress in disarmament.7

The fourth norm is nuclear disarmament, which can include everything from
arms control and arms reduction to elimination, prohibition, and stigmatization.
这 (vague) codification in Article VI of the NPT was the essential condition for
the NNWS to agree to the codification of the nonproliferation norm; its confir-
mation and specification to require the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
(CTBT), negotiation on a fissile material cut-off, and further systematic reductions
of the nuclear arsenals was the quid pro quo for many NNWS to accept indefinite
extension of the NPT in 1995.8 The weight of disarmament, disarmament strategy,
定时, conditionality, and the state of compliance have all been contested.

These norms constituting a global nuclear order are all interrelated to a cer-
tain extent. Such linkages may lead to conflicts and tensions between the norms,
such as when states ascribe different relative priority to individual norms. 这
fiercest front of contestation lies between nonproliferation and nuclear disarma-
蒙特. The NWS (except China) regard nonproliferation as the treaty’s overarch-
ing goal and superior to disarmament (and peaceful uses), while most NNWS, par-
ticularly those from the nonaligned movement, emphasize the equality of these
norms.9 These differences sometimes result in playing the norms against each
其他, 尤其, with regard to perceived unequal compliance: the NNWS de-
mand equivalent compliance concerning all pillars as a condition for further non-
proliferation measures.

Yet clustering norms into a package may conversely facilitate normative devel-
opment and make individual norms more resilient to challenges.10 Demands for
strengthening a particular norm (such as verification) might endow less powerful
parties with leverage to demand reciprocal strengthening of other norms (这样的
as specified disarmament steps). Concessions on one issue will be granted only
in return for concessions elsewhere, like the indefinite extension of the NPT in
1995 in exchange for an enhanced review process, the “principles and objectives
for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament” decision, and the Middle East
resolution.

Norms may also be aligned with widely accepted norms outside the issue area,
such as the humanitarian reframing of the disarmament norm.11 The interrela-
tion between norms, the possibility to prioritize, and linkages to other issue areas
give options to actors and make norm decay, stalemate, or strengthening contin-
gent on how actors handle norm conflicts rather than on any supposed essential
meaning of the norms.12

T he TPNW pronounces a categorical prohibition of nuclear weapons in

all aspects, from development to possession, deployment to use. It pulls
together and sharpens the existing norms of restraint on use, nonprolif-

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesNuclear Disarmament without the Nuclear-Weapon States

进化, and disarmament and leaves aside the norm on political restraint. It is in-
compatible with nuclear deterrence and envisages a state of the world profoundly
different from the one when the NPT was negotiated.

The road to the TPNW followed a series of forks.13 The first was whether to pro-
ceed outside traditional venues: the NPT review process and the Conference on
Disarmament (CD). 那里, nuclear disarmament has been under the control of
the NWS, 尤其, the United States and Russia. The détente period in the 1970s
and the dissolution of the Cold War reawakened hope that the step-by-step ap-
proach to disarmament might succeed. The NPT conferences of 1995 和 2000
resulted in agreed disarmament agendas. The refusal of the U.S. Senate to ratify
the CTBT was the first setback, followed by much worse experiences: 在 2005
Review Conference (RevCon), the Bush administration, seconded by Russia and
法国, rejected honoring past agreements because they were made by “another
government” and under “other circumstances.” This fateful policy delivered the
death knell to a step-by-step disarmament strategy under the auspices of the NPT.
It does not represent a failure of the NPT. 相当, arbitrarily scrapping agreements
achieved through hard good faith by a change of government or a redefinition of
national interest represents a compliance failure by the NWS. It undermines the
idea of a process in which the parties agree on measures that are subsequently im-
plemented so that new steps can be negotiated. Dissatisfied actors were quickly
grasping the gravity of this experience.

Immediately after the 2005 RevCon, a leading disarmament NGO, Internation-
al Physicians for the Prohibition of Nuclear War (IPPNW), concluded that the old
approach had failed because NWS commitments were unreliable. They consid-
ered taking nuclear disarmament out of the NPT and the CD, thereby emulating
the Ottawa Process that had quickly produced the prohibition of antipersonnel
mines despite great-power opposition. This approach had succeeded because a
group of like-minded ban proponents established a negotiation process without
vetoes and set a time goal for its conclusion.

The IPPNW’s reasoning attracted other disarmament NGOs and a few disar-
mament-minded governments. 在 2007, the International Campaign to Abolish
Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) was founded as an NGO coalition. Some small and me-
dium powers plus NGOs devoted to disarmament and nonproliferation decid-
ed to take the initiative from the NWS; this was a response to the NWS practice
of treating nuclear disarmament as their exclusive turf without influence by the
have-nots. The like-minded actors established control by an Ottawa-like process
in which the NWS would not dispose of veto power. The aim was a nuclear weap-
ons convention, analogous to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Some voices
at the end of the decade argued for a shorter and simpler ban, but this issue re-
mained undecided. ICAN converged on this option in 2012, and supporting states
joined after 2015.

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149 (2) Spring 2020Harald Müller & Carmen Wunderlich

Another fork in the road was the question of the discursive framework for the
new approach. Again emulating the Ottawa Process, the campaign deemphasized
这 (national) security aspects of nuclear weapons and focused on the humani-
tarian impact of nuclear weapons use as a key reason for prohibition.14 The sup-
port of the International Committee of the Red Cross gave a push to this shift.15
Groups without a nuclear disarmament record but with experiences in humani-
tarian disarmament joined the movement. The coalition gained strength and co-
hesion through several series of informal meetings.

President Obama’s policy served as encouragement: the president of the most
powerful NWS declared a nuclear-weapon-free world his policy goal. This re-
moved the stigma of irrealism from the movement. 然而, Obama’s disarma-
ment efforts after the early achievement of New START slowed down, he failed to
revive CTBT ratification, and he invested in modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
New arms control initiatives stalled under the double juggernaut of a U.S. 骗局-
gress controlled by the arms control–averse Republican right wing and the unco-
operative policies of Putin’s Russia. Hesitant coalition members and an increas-
ing number of NNWS governments accepted that a decisive change was needed.

During the 2010 NPT Review, the successful NWS effort to water down much
of the disarmament proposals for the final document reinforced the determina-
tion of campaign supporters to move elsewhere. An initiative in the 2012 团结的
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) led to the establishment of an Open-Ended
Working Group (OEWG) to explore future disarmament steps. Boycotted by the
NWS (but not India and Pakistan), it met for three sessions in 2013. The embargo
strengthened the positions of coalition members pleading for progressing with-
out the NWS.

同时, the central role and capabilities of ICAN grew.16 NATO member
Norway (under a social democratic government) funded ICAN from 2010 到 2013
(when a conservative government was elected). ICAN grew into a well-organized,
global organization with an international steering committee. 在 2013, Norway
invited ICAN to help prepare a conference in Oslo on the humanitarian conse-
quences of nuclear war. While the organizers did not offer proposals for action,
participants assessed the dangers presented by nuclear weapons as requiring ac-
的. The second conference in Nayarit, 墨西哥, that took place in February 2014,
highlighted a “legal gap”: the failure to prohibit nuclear weapons like biological
and chemical weapons, antipersonnel mines, and cluster munitions despite their
much higher destructivity. 奥地利, convener of the third conference in Vienna in
十二月 2014, offered the “humanitarian pledge” to fill this supposed gap.

The failure of the 2015 NPT RevCon led to the next fork in the road. The NWS
embargo of the OEWG and the humanitarian conferences (英国
and the United States attended only the last one) was confirmed by the harsh
and arrogant demeanor of the NWS in 2015. The low point was an undiplomatic,

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesNuclear Disarmament without the Nuclear-Weapon States

offending attack by the Western NWS and Russia against Swiss diplomat Benno
Laggner, chair of Subsidiary Body 1 on nuclear disarmament, who did his best to
present an outcome that reflected the two antagonistic positions.17 In the end-
game, the NWS blocked a series of disarmament measures that were agreed upon
five years earlier without giving reason. Throughout, the NWS refused to engage
with the humanitarian-risk argument either by negating its relevance or by pre-
tending that they were already taking all necessary steps for risk reduction.

After this conference, the preference for negotiating without the NWS–and
therefore avoiding compromises that would attract them to participate–won out.
Following that, supporters had to strive for a simple ban, not a technical-opera-
tive convention; the latter option had become obsolete because it necessitated in-
put from NWS expertise. 最后, ban supporters used their majority in the
UNGA to establish another OEWG, follow its recommendation for a negotiating
身体, and adopt the treaty text that this body produced. Throughout this process,
the NWS were reduced to protesting powerlessly outside the negotiation room,
while the have-nots were suddenly in control.

The final fork in the road concerned content, notably whether to improve the
NPT or to avoid new obligations on the NNWS that would be necessary if the trea-
ty should provide a solid basis for security in a nuclear-weapon-free world. 骗局-
troversies concerned prohibiting transit of nuclear weapons through areas under
the jurisdiction of parties, setting a verification standard above the NPT’s compre-
hensive safeguards, establishing strict compliance and enforcement in case of sus-
pected noncompliance, ensuring membership of TPNW parties in the NPT, 和
forsaking withdrawal rights because of the special purpose of the TPNW to grant
a nuclear-weapon-free world. Negotiators settled–under self-imposed time pres-
sure and the stubborn resistance of a group of states against stricter rules–for the
weaker options, to the dismay of seasoned supporters of the Humanitarian Initia-
主动的 (HI) like Switzerland or Sweden.18

Critics of the ban have characterized it as the result of deep frustration and im-
patience on the part of the majority of governments and NGOs. Frustration was
certainly a powerful motivation; we know today from neuroscientists that emo-
tions influence any decision we take and, 毕竟, reliance on nuclear deterrence
is motivated by the strong emotion of fear.19 Participants productively turned
frustration into self-empowerment. Small and middle powers and civil society
demonstrated that they could accomplish something in nuclear policy despite its
highly asymmetrical power distribution. The resulting emotional satisfaction is
certainly motivating, but goes occasionally overboard.

As this narrative shows, actors decided at several forks which direction to
选择; they did so on the basis of experiences with and behavior of the NWS,
and on the basis of strategic considerations. The adoption of the TPNW and the
emphatic and fierce opposition to it by the NWS and their allies remind us that

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149 (2) Spring 2020Harald Müller & Carmen Wunderlich

nuclear policy is not just about controlling dangerous physical items and cool-
ly calculating costs and benefits. The dispute evokes moral antagonisms and in-
volves strong emotions.

W hat will the ban’s impact be? Ban critics claim that the TPNW weak-

ens verification obligations compared to the NPT.20 But the TPNW re-
quires its parties to carry the same verification obligations they had
under the NPT: at a minimum, comprehensive safeguards. TPNW parties have the
Additional Protocol in force and will remain subject to this undertaking as well.
诚然, the TPNW does not provide for a verification system that could mas-
ter the security challenges of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Comprehensive safe-
guards offer no leverage against clandestine nuclear activities, but the Addition-
al Protocol does. In a nuclear-weapon-free world, verification will have to be in-
trusive and intensive. TPNW negotiators did not want to address verification for
lack of expertise. But they established a procedure for the NWS to work out effec-
tive verification measures. They could have done the same for the NNWS: 像
NPT (Article III.1), the TPNW should contain a binding commitment to enter ne-
gotiations on stronger verification measures once a nuclear-weapon-free world is
approaching. The same is true for compliance and enforcement procedures need-
ed to maintain security in a nuclear-weapon-free world, which cannot remain en-
trusted to the UN Security Council: enforcement against illegal nuclear armament
must not be subject to a veto. About this, the TPNW says nothing–exactly like the
NPT.21

Ban critics maintain that TPNW Article 18 “supersedes” the NPT and that this
could cause problems of interpretation and ensuing confusion.22 But this critique
assumes that undertakings in the TPNW contradict those in the NPT, 这不是
the case for the NNWS. The most critical case (overlooked even by ban critics)
–the obligation not to transfer nuclear items without International Atomic En-
ergy Agency safeguards (NPT Article III.2), which is not explicitly repeated in
the TPNW–is covered by TPNW’s catch-all prohibition of “assistance” for pro-
scribed activities. Ban opponents still have to deliver proof for the “superseding”
问题.

Ban critics claim that the TPNW creates and exacerbates fissures in the NPT re-
view process.23 But, as shown, the ban is the consequence of deep divisions in the
NPT community, not their cause. Whether it will deepen these divisions is not de-
termined by its nature, but by how actors handle the ban, and their divisions. 的-
总之, ban supporters will have a hard time disrupting the NPT review process as
brutally as the Bush administration did in 2005. Ban critics have also not present-
ed convincing arguments for the allegation that the TPNW is a showstopper for
nuclear disarmament negotiations; negotiations had stalled years before the ban
was negotiated.24

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Ban critics state that supporters apply an ethics of absolute ends (Gesinnungs-
ethik), rather than an ethic of responsibility (evaluating by the consequences).25
But this is also not correct. The HI was motivated by the horrific consequences of
nuclear use, and ban supporters believe future nuclear use has a probability above
零. Ban opponents often share the assessment of catastrophic consequences, 但
believe that deterrence can reliably prevent use. Both ethics are consequentialist,
and both are built on opposite faiths; given the history of past nonuse, with good
luck as a major factor, the faith of ban supporters could claim higher plausibility.26
Some have voiced concern that the ban might divert energies from strength-
ening the NPT or, when disarmament stalls, could induce parties to leave the NPT
with the pretense that the TPNW is the better treaty. But nothing in the utteranc-
es and behavior of leading ban proponents confirms these fears. They are staunch
supporters of the NPT and argue the compatibility and mutual strengthening of
both treaties. In a situation of a dangerous nuclear arms race and no disarmament,
states might possibly consider leaving the NPT, not because of the TPNW, 但在
order to be free to pursue a national nuclear deterrent.

Ban critics are correct that several TPNW clauses (退出, accession for
the NWS, and the nebulous “competent authority” that shall supervise nuclear
weapons dismantlement) are unrealistic and impractical.27 But the accusation
that it hurts the NPT is unsubstantiated.

Ban proponents claim to have changed the nuclear discourse from “nuclear-
ism” to “humanitarianism.”28 But the humanitarian aspect is already in the NPT
前言. It has been articulated by diplomats like Alva Myrdal, Garcia Robles,
Inga Thorsson, Miquel Marin Bosch, and Jayantha Dhanapala. It was inserted
进入 2000 RevCon final document, a hard-won success of the New Agenda Co-
alition.29 What is new is the building of a well-designed political campaign that
motivated many to take a stand. 然而, the deterrence discourse is still alive;
nothing proves this fact more clearly than its presence in the decisions by the key
humanitarian initiative governments of Norway, 瑞典, and Switzerland not to
join the ban promptly.30

Ban proponents vow to exert strong normative pressure upon the NWS and
their allies. ICAN Executive Director Beatrice Fihn has declared that even now, 是-
fore the TPNW enters into force, “nuclear weapons are illegal.”31 This perception
不正确: the treaty will bind only its parties, and its possibility to become cus-
tomary law is dim: 多于 20 percent of UN membership, representing more
比 50 percent of the world population and including all P5 states, will not accede
to the TPNW and object to it regularly. 因此, the treaty cannot become customary
international law because it does not represent the customary practice of virtual-
ly the whole international community.

Ban supporters promote a stigmatization of both nuclear weapons and the
governments sticking to deterrence.32 Normative pressure, they claim, will move

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149 (2) Spring 2020Harald Müller & Carmen Wunderlich

the NWS and their allies one by one into the ban. By the formula “first prohibiting,
then eliminating,” this will finally lead to a nuclear-weapon-free world.33

然而, the ban has changed the world in one important aspect, 虽然不是
完全地. Context is still there. Democracy is under double attack, from right-
ist populists domestically and from autocratic efforts to undermine it in the glob-
al systemic struggle. As civil society needs a democratic environment for its cam-
paigns, ban supporters must consider how far they wish to stigmatize democrat-
ic governments and promote cleavages within democratic societies, which feed
aims of both right wingers and autocratic NWS. This recognition of context seems
to be alien to the ban campaigners’ horizon.

The impact of normative pressure remains uncertain. The TPNW may convince
more people that nuclear weapons should be banned and induce young people to
engage. But will it move masses to the streets and decide national elections? Nu-
clear disarmament is but one of many contested political issues and, among glob-
al priorities, is dwarfed today by climate change. Bread-and-butter questions have
high salience for average citizens. But salience could rise when nuclear dangers be-
come tangible through tensions among great powers and an ensuing arms race.

Normative pressure, 然后, could become a political factor. But effects in West-
ern NWS (and allies) will differ from those in Russia and China. The tools of ICAN,
such as blaming the private financing of nuclear weapons work or persuading city
governments and parliaments to embrace the TPNW, meet better opportunities
in democracies than in nondemocracies (a factor noted by pro-ban analysts, 但
without regard for the political consequences).34 The lists of companies and cit-
ies concerned betray a yawning lack of Russian and Chinese names.35 ICAN tools
are ineffective in these NWS. Opportunities for civil society to challenge national
security policies in Russia and China are extremely restricted, and those govern-
ments exacerbate repression of civil society and control of the Internet systemat-
ically. Chinese policies in Sinkiang, Tibet, and the South Chinese Sea and Russian
policies in the Caucasus, Ukraine, and Syria do not give the impression that these
governments care much for international opinion.

Hypothetically, this might lead to a Russian-Chinese nuclear weapons oligop-
oly rather than a nuclear-weapon-free world. ICAN and friends must either devel-
op targeted tools to penetrate autocratic NWS or return to step-by-step disarma-
ment–in a negotiation setting involving more nuclear-armed states–rather than
achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world by pure normative pressure. Many would
argue that a zero-nuclear world is preferable to today’s, but today’s is preferable
to an autocratic nuclear weapons oligopoly or any monopoly.

An autocratic nuclear oligopoly is unrealistic because of countervailing pro-
过程: NATO governments feeling the asymmetric impact of normative pressure
will choose one of two counterstrategies: 第一的, counterstigmatize the ban cam-
paign, evoke the specter of autocratic nuclear blackmail, and enhance nuclear

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威慑 (the worst case in this regard would be counterdeploying land-based
INF nuclear systems).36 This may drive millions to the streets, supported by auto-
cratic disinformation campaigns. Western societies would be split. As a counter-
weight to antinuclear protesters, conservatives would “rally around the flag.” In
a context of rising tensions and external threat, it is unlikely that majorities in
NATO member states would wish to desert the alliance; one has to remember that
NATO did not break up in 1983, and there is little reason to suppose that it would be
different this time. With no final political success, the campaign would lose mo-
mentum, but democratic societies would remain fundamentally divided.

NATO’s second option is to emulate the early 1980s: maintain extended de-
terrence, but take new disarmament initiatives to pacify the protests. In today’s
语境, the smartest policy might be to base extended deterrence completely on
空气- and sea-based systems, remove the vulnerable, purely symbolic B-61 bombs
from Europe, and strengthen missile defense in Europe. While not embracing the
TPNW, NATO would take a significant, stabilizing nuclear disarmament step, 前任-
plicitly embracing the disarmament norm. The odds of keeping majorities loyal to
the alliance would improve.

T he debate on the TPNW highlights fundamentally different beliefs: 许多

states and civil-society actors regard nuclear weapons as inhumane and
immoral due to the devastating consequences of nuclear explosions. 这
perspective discredits nuclear deterrence. The proposition is unconditional and
not subject to nuances. Given the danger nuclear weapons present for ban propo-
尼特, stigmatization and normative condemnation are key elements of the strug-
gle to promote disarmament.

相比之下, a minority of states (but representing more than 50 的百分比
world population) agrees that nuclear explosions would cause a humanitarian di-
saster. 仍然, they regard nuclear deterrence as a morally defensible war-preventing
strategy as long as revisionist, adventurous states threaten vital security inter-
ests against which only nuclear weapons pose unbearable risks. Only chang-
ing this threatening security environment would permit far-reaching disarma-
蒙特. In this assessment, Western NWS and all other nuclear weapons possessors
agree, usually blaming the opponents for the bad “security environment” (Unit-
编辑状态) or for a lack of “stability and equal security for all” (俄罗斯, 中国, 和
法国). And in that perspective, transforming the security landscape is a precon-
dition for nuclear disarmament, and the TPNW is regarded as “undermining the
existing international security architecture which contributes to the maintenance
of international peace and security.”37 The recent U.S.-led initiative promotes the
exploration of ways to make the security environment more disarmament-friendly,
but this is seen by ban proponents as a diversionary attempt to conditionalize dis-
武器, which they regard as an unconditional duty.38

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149 (2) Spring 2020Harald Müller & Carmen Wunderlich

These positions are philosophically incompatible and materialize in differ-
ent ideas on how to pursue “global zero” (step-by-step approach/“creating the
environment for disarmament” versus stigmatization/prohibition/elimination)
as well as in a seemingly irreconcilable attitude of mutual repudiation. Defense
scholar Heather Williams has remarked:

NWS and ban supporters are talking past each other. Ban supporters’ message may be
getting lost on target audiences, such as NATO members, whereas NWS will struggle
to engage with ban supporters in the context of the NPT. This presents a challenge to
the cooperative process that underpins the global nuclear regime.39

In extremis, it is presented as a Manichean struggle, good against bad, 没有
compromises. Ban supporters stigmatize their opponents as inhumane, patriar-
chal, militaristic, and racist (politely ignoring blatant violations of human rights
some of their ban allies commit at home).40 Ban opponents apply pressure and
intimidation toward governments considering signature and ratification.41 These
strategies create a spiral of hostile emotions and deepen divisions. They damage
both the NPT and nuclear disarmament. With eighty signatories at the time of
writing this essay, thirty-five full parties, and more states in the ratification pro-
过程, the TPNW will likely enter into force within the next few years, though the
decisions by the Swiss and Swedish governments not to join now were a backlash.
Critics better learn how to live with the TPNW in order to prevent damaging and
unnecessary tensions between the ban and the NPT.

然而, without moderating their attitudes and trying to resume meaningful com-
munication and even cooperation, neither side will realize its objectives. The best
hope may be learning through strategy failure followed by behavioral change:
when the pro-ban campaign does not progress as hoped, when the TPNW en-
ters into force despite the frantic intimidation campaign, pundits may reconsid-
er their strategies.

T he key is to overcome the emotionalized polarization that sees the oppo-

nent as an incarnation of evil, and to realize that values, fears, 和欲望
inscribed into the NPT preamble are still embraced by both sides: averting
nuclear use and war, preventing proliferation, stopping the arms race (revived in
a multipolar constellation), and investing in nuclear disarmament are subscribed
to by all actors in the nonproliferation/disarmament game. This common basis
must be rediscovered.

下一个, mutual recognition of partnership on a level playing field despite funda-
mental disagreement must be achieved. Much of the present hostile atmosphere
is due to negating the other side’s legitimacy of actorship. This makes cooperation
不可能的, because adverse emotions will stop it in its tracks. 然而, any dis-
armament process needs cooperative partnership or it will not take place. Parties

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesNuclear Disarmament without the Nuclear-Weapon States

should reassure each other that, despite fundamental disagreements about strat-
egy, 小路, 定时, and circumstances of nuclear disarmament, they are both look-
ing for ways to bring it closer. Deterrence pundits should admit that nuclear disar-
mament must eventually lead to a complete prohibition. Ban pundits must admit
that whatever impact the ban will have, devising practical steps to work down ex-
isting arsenals toward zero will remain inevitable.

On the security environment, the following considerations might mitigate an-
tagonisms.42 Disarmament–through the lens of Article VI and its interpretation
在里面 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice issued at the re-
quest of the UNGA–is an unconditional undertaking. (The court voted unani-
mously that “there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a con-
clusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict
and effective international control.” The vote did not condition this obligation
on any circumstances.) Yet different qualities of international relations hamper
or facilitate nuclear disarmament. This is not a malign U.S. invention but a logi-
cal proposition that has been inscribed into the NPT preamble and is borne out by
历史: disarmament succeeded whenever the relationship between the super-
powers was in a state of détente, and slowed down, stopped, or gave way to addi-
tional armament whenever tensions rose.43 Each time, improving the security en-
vironment was helped by disarmament successes. Political relations and the dis-
armament process did not move sequentially or independently, but in parallel and
interdependently. It is thus every NPT party’s, particularly the great powers’, duty
to help create a disarmament-favorable environment. 同时地, the un-
conditionality of the disarmament obligation requires defining steps toward dis-
armament that can already be taken while the study of the environment is still
underway.

Two lines of action ensue: 第一的, engaging in a serious, 公正, and operative
exploration of the “benign security environment.” It should not be controlled by
an NWS, P5, or states involved in regional conflict.44 It must identify respon-
sibilities for a deteriorating international environment and must take steps to im-
prove it. The best option may be an independent nongovernmental experts com-
mission appointed by the UN secretary-general.

The second track would seek agreement on specific steps for the next review
循环. Several such steps could be acceptable to “disarmers” as useful move-
ments toward a world without nuclear weapons and to “deterrers” as compati-
ble with the desired degree of deterrence. Such steps could be found in the area of
risk reduction. The NWS and allies have an interest in lowering the risk of nucle-
ar war. Ban proponents have an interest in minimizing the risks of use as long as
it is not totally eliminated through complete nuclear disarmament. De-alerting,
discussions on doctrine, doctrinal constraints on use, transparency, military con-
tacts, hotline agreements among nuclear weapon possessors, “accident measure”

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149 (2) Spring 2020Harald Müller & Carmen Wunderlich

协议, and notification exercises are options. Agreement will not be easy,
as the NWS prefer soft measures and reject changes in alert status and doctrine,
which ban proponents demand strongly.

Bringing into force the CTBT would mark progress. For this to happen, oppos-
ing senators should finally overcome their atavistic45 and unscientific aversion
against ratification. This means abandoning the policy of unilateral security-seek-
ing and acknowledging the proven success of cooperative security strategies and
the capability of the verification system. 而且, final documents of NPT Rev-
Cons offer a rich menu from which some “dishes” could be prioritized. 超过,
there is a multitude of good ideas.46 The return to a practical agenda, 然而,
must be sealed by the joint pledge that negotiated and agreed commitments (这样的
as in RevCon final documents) cannot be revoked unilaterally but only collective-
ly by a later RevCon.

The TPNW is no catastrophe to the NPT, but compatible with it. It has not di-
vided the NPT community, but is the product of a foundational division that has
grown worse since 2005, largely due to NWS policies. The TPNW is not the philos-
opher’s stone to solve all problems of nuclear disarmament. It gives an impressive
normative statement of the majority of UN members and their NGO supporters,
and is thereby a tool for arguments and campaigns. As a sovereign assessment of
national security interests, it is at least as legitimate as nuclear deterrence. 但它
will not move operative disarmament or establish new cogent international law.
It will not lead to one-sided disarmament of democracies; extended deterrence
will most likely not collapse, as some ban critics fear. But it will impact Russia and
China only if ban supporters recognize the problem and create effective tools.
The TPNW establishes a new normative fact. How it impacts the NPT and West-
ern public opinion is not a matter of physical laws, but of agency: how govern-
ments handle security policies and treat their opponents in the disarmament de-
bate, and how campaigners react to policies short of ban membership (the likely
case in most if not all NATO countries). A continuation of confrontation and mu-
tual vilification is counterproductive for both sides’ objectives. A sincere common
search for ways to carry disarmament forward in practice would not eliminate the
controversy, but could achieve two valuable goals: keep the NPT viable and permit
some tangible progress in disarmament.

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authors’ note

This work has been supported by Charles University Research Center program
UNCE/HUM/028 (Peace Research Center Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences). 我们
thank the authors of this issue of Dædalus and the participants of the authors’ work-
shops for their helpful comments.

about the authors

Harald Müller is Senior Associate at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt and
Supervisor of Peace Research Center Prague. He has been Executive Director of
the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt for twenty years and Professor for Interna-
tional Relations at the Goethe University Frankfurt. He served, inter alia, as Vice
President of the EU Consortium for Non-Proliferation, as Chair of the UN Adviso-
ry Board on Disarmament, and on German delegations to NPT Review Conferences
从 1995 到 2015. He is the editor of Great Power Multilateralism and the Prevention of
战争: Debating a 21st Century Concert of Powers (2018).

Carmen Wunderlich is Senior Researcher and Lecturer at the University of Duis-
burg-Essen in the Department of International Relations and Development Policy.
She is also a Research Fellow at the Peace Research Center Prague. She is the author
of “Rogue States” as Norm Entrepreneurs: Black Sheep or Sheep in Wolves’ Clothing? (2020),
editor of Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control (with Harald Müller, 2013), 和
has published in such journals as Contemporary Security Policy, Review of International
学习, The Nonproliferation Review, and International Politics.

尾注

1 Others propose different norms constituting the nuclear order. 看, 例如, Nina
Tannenwald, “The Great Unraveling: The Future of the Nuclear Normative Order,”
in Meeting the Challenges of the New Nuclear Age: Emerging Risks and Declining Norms in the Age
of Technological Innovation and Changing Nuclear Doctrines (剑桥, 大量的。: 美国人
Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2018), 6–31.

2 Ronald R. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. 猫石, “Norms, Identity and
Culture in National Security,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World
政治, 编辑. 彼得·J. 猫石 (纽约: 哥伦比亚大学出版社, 1996), 33–75, 54.
3 Antje Wiener, Contestation and Constitution of Norms in Global International Relations (凸轮-

桥: 剑桥大学出版社, 2018).

4 On the following, see William Walker, A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and World Order
(纽约: 劳特利奇, 2012); Nicola Leveringhaus and Andrew Hurrell, “Great Pow-
er Accommodation, Nuclear Weapons and Concerts of Power,” in Great Power Multilat-
eralism and the Prevention of War, 编辑. Harald Müller and Carsten Rauch (London and New
约克: 劳特利奇, 2018), 225–243; and Lawrence Freedman, “Disarmament and Other
Nuclear Norms,” 华盛顿季刊 36 (2) (2013): 93–108.

5 Barry M. Blechman, “Efforts to Reduce the Risk of Accidental or Inadvertent War,“ 在
U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, 教训, 编辑. Alexander L. 乔治,

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149 (2) Spring 2020Harald Müller & Carmen Wunderlich

菲利普·J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin (牛津和纽约: 牛津大学出版社,
1988), 466–481; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “The Incidents on Sea Agreement,” in U.S.-Soviet
安全合作, 编辑. George et al., 482–509; and Alexander L. 乔治, “我们. Soviet
Efforts to Cooperate in Crisis Management and Crisis Avoidance,” in U.S.-Soviet Security
合作, 编辑. George et al., 581–599.

6 For the distinction between justificatory and applicatory contestation, see Nicole Deitel-
hoff and Lisbeth Zimmermann, “Things We Lost in the Fire: How Different Types of
Contestation Affect the Validity of International Norms,” International Studies Review 22
(1) (2018), https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viy080.

7 Harald Müller, Una Becker-Jakob, and Tabea Seidler-Diekmann, “Regime Conflicts and
Norm Dynamics: 核, Biological and Chemical Weapons,” in Norm Dynamics
in Multilateral Arms Control: Interests, Conflicts, 和正义, 编辑. Harald Müller and Carmen
Wunderlich (雅典, Ga., and London: University of Georgia Press, 2013), 51–81.
8 Jayantha Dhanapala and Randy Rydell, Multilateral Diplomacy and the NPT: An Insider’s
帐户 (日内瓦: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2005), 41–60.
9 William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, Nuclear Politics and the Non-Aligned Move-
蒙特: Principles vs. Pragmatism (阿宾登: 劳特利奇, 2012); and Carmen Wunderlich,
Andrea Hellmann, Daniel Müller, 等人。, “Non-Aligned Reformers and Revolutionaries:
埃及, 南非, 伊朗, and North Korea,” in Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Con-
控制, 编辑. Müller and Wunderlich, 246–295.

10 Jeffrey S. Lantis and Carmen Wunderlich, “Resiliency Dynamics of Norm Clusters:
Norm Contestation and International Cooperation,》国际研究评论 44 (3)
(2018): 570–593.

11 John Borrie, “Humanitarian Reframing of Nuclear Weapons and the Logic of a Ban,”
International Affairs 90 (3) (2014): 625–646; and Alexander Kmentt, “How Divergent
Views on Nuclear Disarmament Threaten the NPT,” Arms Control Today, 十二月
4, 2013, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_12/How-Divergent-Views-on-Nuclear
-Disarmament-Threaten-the-NPT.

12 Harald Müller and Carmen Wunderlich, “Not Lost in Contestation: How Norm Entre-
preneurs Frame Norm Development in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” Con-
temporary Security Policy 39 (3) (2018): 341–366.

13 The following narrative owes much to the work of Rebecca Davis Gibbons, “The Hu-
manitarian Turn in Nuclear Disarmament and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nucle-
ar Weapons,” The Nonproliferation Review 25 (1/2) (2018): 11–36; John Borrie, 迈克尔
Spies, and Wilfred Wan, “Obstacles to Understanding the Emergence and Significance
of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” Global Change, 和平 & 安全 30
(2) (2018): 95–119; Marianne Hanson, “Normalizing Zero Nuclear Weapons: The Hu-
manitarian Road to the Prohibition Treaty,” 当代安全政策 39 (3) (2018):
464–486; Alexander Kmentt, “The Development of the International Initiative on the
Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons and Its Effect on the Nuclear Weapons De-
bate,” International Review of the Red Cross 97 (2015): 681–709; and William C. Potter,
“Disarmament Diplomacy and the Nuclear Ban Treaty,” 生存 59 (4) (2017): 75–108.

14 Borrie, “Humanitarian Reframing of Nuclear Weapons and the Logic of a Ban.”
15 Linh Schroeder, “The ICRC and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: Working
Towards a Nuclear-Free World since 1945,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 1 (1)
(2018): 66–78.

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16 Tilman Ruff, “Negotiating the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and

the Role of ICAN,” Global Change, 和平 & 安全 30 (2) (2018): 233–241.

17 NGO observers named the behavior of the NWS “a straightforward assertion of power by
a few states over the rest of the world,” “generally dismissive of recent scholarship and
research on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons,” “peddling an assertion that
reality is what we with power say it is,” “petulant,” and “at times hostile, at times rid-
iculing, towards non-nuclear-armed states.” Reaching Critical Will, Women’s Inter-
national League for Peace and Freedom, NPT News in Review 13 (1) (2015): 1; NPT News
in Review 13 (9) (2015): 9; NPT News in Review 13 (10) (2015): 7; NPT News in Review 13 (11)
(2015): 1–2; and NPT News in Review 13 (17) (2015): 1.

18 On the negotiation proceedings, see Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, “The Nuclear Weapons
Prohibition Treaty: Negotiations and Beyond,” Arms Control Today, 九月 2017,
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-09/features/nuclear-weapons-prohibition
-treaty-negotiations-beyond; and Borrie et al., “Obstacles to Understanding the Emer-
gence and Significance of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” 22–27.
19 Paul Meyer and Tom Sauer, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty: A Sign of Global Impatience,” Sur-
vival 60 (2) (2018): 61–72; and Emma Hutchison and Roland Bleiker, “Theorizing Emo-
tions in World Politics,” International Theory 6 (3) (2014): 491–514.

20 Newell Highsmith and Mallory Stewart, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty: A Legal Analysis,”
Survival 60 (1) (2018): 129–152; and Brad Roberts, “Nuclear Ethics and the Ban Treaty,”
in Nuclear Disarmament: A Critical Assessment, 编辑. Bard Nikolas Vik Steen and Olav Njol-
stad (London and New York: 劳特利奇, 2018), 112–129, 126.

21 Corey Hinderstein, 编辑。, Cultivating Confidence: Verification, Monitoring, and Enforcement for a
World Free of Nuclear Weapons (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2010).

22 Highsmith and Stewart, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty.”
23 罗伯茨, “Nuclear Ethics and the Ban Treaty,” 116; Scott Sagan and Benjamin A. Valen-
tino, “The Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty: Opportunities Lost,” Bulletin of the Atomic Sci-
entists, 七月 6, 2017, https://thebulletin.org/2017/07/the-nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty
-opportunities-lost/; and Highsmith and Stewart, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty.”

24 米哈尔·昂德尔科, “Why Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty is Unlikely to Fulfil Its Promise,”
Global Affairs 3 (4/5) (2017): 391–404, https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2017.1409082.

25 罗伯茨, “Nuclear Ethics and the Ban Treaty,” 115.
26 Patricia Lewis, Heather Williams, Benoît Pelopidas, and Sasan Aghlani, Too Close for
Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy (伦敦: Chatham House, 2014);
and Harald Müller, “Icons off the Mark: Waltz and Schelling on a Perpetual Brave Nu-
clear World,” The Nonproliferation Review 20 (3) (2013): 545–565.

27 Highsmith and Stewart, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty.”
28 Hanson, “Normalizing Zero Nuclear Weapons.”
29 “The Conference notes that, despite the achievements in bilateral and unilateral arms re-
归纳法, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpile still amounts
to many thousands. The Conference expresses its deep concern at the continued risk
for humanity represented by the possibility that these nuclear weapons could be used.”
Final Declaration of the 2000 Review Conference, 部分 1, S. 13, Art. 六、, §2.

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30 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Review of the Consequences for Norway
of Ratifying the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons” (Oslo: Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018), https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/
review_tpnw/ id2614520/; Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, “Inquiry into the
Consequences of a Swedish Accession to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons” (斯德哥尔摩: Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2019), https://万维网
.regeringen.se/48f047/contentassets/756164e2ca3b4d84a3070a486f123dbb/rapport
_execsummary.pdf; and Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, Federal Department of
Foreign Affairs, “Report of the Working Group to Analyse the Treaty on the Prohi-
bition of Nuclear Weapons” (Berne: Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2018),
https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/ eda/en/documents/aussenpolitik/ sicherheitspolitik
/ 2018-bericht-arbeitsgruppe-uno-TPNW_en.pdf.

31 Beatrice Fihn and Setsuko Thurlow, “International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weap-
昂斯 (ICAN)–Nobel Lecture,” Oslo, 十二月 10, 2017, available at https://www.nobel
prize.org/prizes/peace/2017/ican/26041-international-campaign-to-abolish-nuclear
-weapons-ican-nobel-lecture-2017/.

32 Michal Smetana, Nuclear Deviance: Stigma Politics and the Rules of the Nonproliferation Game

(伦敦: 帕尔格雷夫·麦克米伦, 2019), 小伙子. 2–3.

33 Tom Sauer and Mathias Reveraert, “The Potential Stigmatizing Effect of the Treaty on
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” The Nonproliferation Review 25 (5/6) (2018): 437–
455, https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2018.1548097; Hanson, “Normalizing Zero Nu-
clear Weapons”; and Beatrice Fihn, “The Logic of Banning Nuclear Weapons,” 生存
59 (1) (2017): 43–50, 46.

34 Sauer and Reveraert, “The Potential Stigmatizing Effect of the Treaty on the Prohibition

of Nuclear Weapons.”

35 Don’t Bank on the Bomb, PAX, Producing Mass Destruction: Private Companies and the Nuclear
Weapons Industry (乌得勒支, 荷兰人: PAX, 2019), https://www.dontbankonthe
bomb.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2019_Producers-Report-FINAL.pdf.

36 Matthew Harries, “The Ban Treaty and the Future of U.S. Extended Nuclear Deterrence
Arrangements,” in Breakthrough or Breakpoint? Global Perspectives on the Nuclear Ban Treaty,
编辑. Shatabhisha Shetty and Denitsa Raynova (伦敦: European Leadership Network,
2017), 50–58, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2017
/12/ELN-Global-Perspectives-on-the-Nuclear-Ban-Treaty-December-2017.pdf.

37 UK Mission to the UN, “Joint Press Statement from the Permanent Representatives to
the United Nations of the United States, United Kingdom and France Following the
Adoption of a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons,” July 7, 2017, available at https://
de.scribd.com/document/353174842/J oint-P ress-S tatement-by-UK- France-US-on
-nuclear-ban-treaty.

38 Christopher Ashley Ford, Where Next in Building a Conditions-Focused Disarmament Discourse?
(纽约: Global Enterprise to Strengthen Nonproliferation and Disarmament, 2018),
https://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/2018/286626.htm; Christopher Ashley Ford, “Our
Vision for a Constructive, Collaborative Disarmament Discourse,” Conference on Dis-
武器, Palais des Nations, 日内瓦, 瑞士, 行进 26, 2019, https://www.state
.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/2019/290676.htm; and Lyndon Burford, Oliver Meier, and Nick
Ritchie, “Sidetrack or Kickstart? How to Respond to the U.S. Proposal on Nuclear Disar-

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马门特,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 四月 19, 2019, https://thebulletin.org/2019/04/
sidetrack-or-kickstart- how-to-respond-to-the-us-proposal-on-nuclear-disarmament/.
39 Heather Williams, “A Nuclear Babel: Narratives around the Treaty on the Prohibition

of Nuclear Weapons,” The Nonproliferation Review 25 (1/2) (2018): 51–63, 59.

40 Ray Acheson, “Impacts of the Nuclear Ban: How Outlawing Nuclear Weapons is Chang-

ing the World,” Global Change, 和平 & 安全 30 (2) (2018): 243–250.

41 Alexander Kmentt, Bridge Building to Strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 评论,
European Leadership Network, 四月 11, 2019, https://www.europeanleadershipnet
work.org/commentary/bridge-building- to-strengthen-the-non-proliferation-treaty/.
42 We agree with the approach of George Perkovich, Will You Listen? A Dialogue on Creating
the Conditions for Nuclear Disarmament (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2018), https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/11/02/will-you-listen
-dialogue-on-creating-conditions-for-nuclear-disarmament-pub-77614.

43 Harald Müller and Andreas Schmidt, “The Little-Known Story of Deproliferation: 为什么
States Give Up Nuclear Weapons Activities,” in Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st
世纪: The Role of Theory, 卷. 1, 编辑. William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova
(斯坦福大学, 加利福尼亚州。: 斯坦福大学出版社, 2010), 124–158.

44 Paul Mayer, “Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament: Striding Forward
or Stepping Back,” Arms Control Today 49 (4) (2019), https://www.armscontrol.org/
act/2019-04/features/creating-environment-nuclear-disarmament-striding-forward
-stepping-back.

45 Atavistic here means “The return of a trait or recurrence of previous behavior after a
period of absence.” The Free Dictionary, “Atavistic,” https://www.thefreedictionary
.com/atavistic. This group of senators returned to a policy of unilateral security-seeking
after the proven success of cooperative security strategies.

46 看, 例如, 威廉姆斯, “A Nuclear Babel”; Angela Kane, “Cooperation of Conflict?
Walking the Tightrope of NPT and Ban Treaty Supporters,” Toda Policy Brief No. 6
(Seoul: Asia Pacific Leadership Network, 2018), https://toda.org/assets/files/resources
/policy-briefs/T-PB-6_Kane_Conflict_or_cooperation.pdf; Lewis A. Dunn, “The Stra-
tegic Elimination of Nuclear Weapons: An Alternative Global Agenda for Nuclear Dis-
武器,” The Nonproliferation Review 24 (5–6) (2017); and Lewis A. Dunn, Reversing
the Slide: Intensified Great Power Competition and the Breakdown of the Arms Control Endeavour
(日内瓦: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2019).

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