Mark Juergensmeyer

Gandhi vs. 恐怖主义

Immediately after the September 11,

2001, attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon, the idea of taking a
nonviolent stance in response to terror-
ism would have been dismissed out of
手. But now, after the invasion and
occupation of two Muslim countries by
美国. 军队, the loss of thousands
of American soldiers and tens of thou-
sands of innocent Afghanis and Iraqis,
and the start of a global jihadi war that
seems unending, virtually any alterna-
tive seems worth considering. It is in this
context that various forms of less mili-
tant response, including the methods of
conflict resolution adopted by India’s
nationalist leader, Mohandas Gandhi,
deserve a second look.

Like us, Gandhi had to deal with ter-
rorism, and his responses show that he
was a tough-minded realist. I say this

Mark Juergensmeyer is professor of sociology and
global studies and director of the Orfalea Center
for Global and International Studies at the Uni-
versity of California, 圣巴巴拉. He is the
author of numerous publications, including “The
New Cold War?” (1993), “Terror in the Mind
of God” (revised edition, 2003), and “Gandhi’s
Way” (revised edition, 2005).

knowing that this image of Gandhi is
quite different from what most West-
erners have in mind when they think
of him. The popular view in Europe and
the United States is the one a circle of
Western paci½sts writing in the 1920s
promoted–the image of Gandhi as a
saint.

在一个 1921 lecture on “Who is the Great-

est Man in the World Today?” John
Haynes Holmes, the pastor of New York
City’s largest liberal congregation, 前任-
tolled not Lenin or Woodrow Wilson
or Sun Yat-sen but someone whom
most of the crowd thronging the hall
that day had never heard of–Mohandas
Gandhi.1 Holmes, who was later credit-
ed with being the West’s discoverer of
Gandhi, described him as his “seer and
saint.”2

实际上, the term ‘Mahatma,’ or ‘great
soul,’ which is often appended to Gan-
dhi’s name, probably came not from ad-
mirers in India but from the West. 是-

1 John Haynes Holmes, “Who is the Greatest
Man in the World Today?” a pamphlet pub-
列于 1921 and reprinted in Charles Chat-
场, 编辑。, The Americanization of Gandhi: 图片
of the Mahatma (New York and London: Gar-
land Publishing, 1976), 98.

2 John Haynes Holmes, My Gandhi (纽约:
Harper and Brothers, 1953), 9.

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Gandhi vs.
恐怖主义

fore the Indian philosopher Rabindra-
nath Tagore used the term in his letter
welcoming Gandhi to India in 1914,
members of an American and European
mystical movement, the Theosophists,
had applied this name to Gandhi. 最多
likely, they were the ones who conveyed
it to Tagore, and since then the term has
persisted, even though it was Westerners
rather than Indians who ½rst regarded
Gandhi in such a saintly mien.

In India, Gandhi was seen as a nation-
alist leader who, though greatly revered,
was very much a politician. 尽管
Gandhi was nominated for a Nobel
Peace Prize on several occasions, 这
selection committee hesitated, 思维
that the choice of an activist rather than
an idealist would stoke political contro-
versies. Gandhi was indeed in the midst
of political battle, and in the process he
had to address the violence of both his
side and the opponents, acts that looked
very much like the terrorism of today.
India was on the verge of a violent

confrontation with Britain when, 在 1915,
Gandhi was brought into India’s inde-
pendence movement from South Africa,
where as a lawyer he had been a leader
in the struggle for social equality for im-
migrant Indians. In India, as in South Af-
里卡, the British had overwhelming mili-
tary superiority and were not afraid to
use it. 在 1919, in the North Indian city of
Amritsar, an irate British brigadier-gen-
eral slaughtered almost four hundred In-
dians who had come to the plaza of Jal-
lianwala Bagh to protest peacefully.

But the nationalist side was countering
with violence of its own. In Bengal, Sub-
has Chandra Bose organized an Indian
National Army, 和, in Punjab, 领导者
of the Ghadar movement–supported by
immigrant Punjabis in California–plot-
ted a violent revolution that anticipated
boatloads of weapons and revolutionar-
ies transported to India from the United

状态. These Indian anarchists and mili-
tant Hindi nationalists saw violence as
the only solution to break the power of
the British over India.

Gandhi’s views about violent struggle

were sharpened in response to Indian
activists who had defended a terrorist
attack on a British of½cial. The incident
occurred in London in 1909, shortly be-
fore Gandhi arrived there to lobby the
British Parliament on behalf of South
African Indian immigrants. An Indian
student in London, Madan Lal Dhingra,
had attacked an of½cial in Britain’s India
of½ce, Sir William H. Curzon-Wylie, 在
protest against Britain’s colonial control
over India. At a formal function, Dhin-
gra pulled out a gun and, at close range,
½red ½ve shots in his face. The British
of½cial died on the spot. Dhingra was
immediately apprehended by the police;
when people in the crowd called him a
murderer, he said that he was only ½ght-
ing for India’s freedom.

Several weeks after Gandhi arrived in
伦敦, he was asked to debate this is-
sue of violence with several of London’s
expatriate Indian nationalists. His chief
opponent was Vinayak Savarkar, a mili-
tant Hindu who would later found the
political movement known as the Hindu
Mahasabha, a precursor to the present-
day Hindu nationalist party, the Bharati-
ya Janata Party. At the time of the 1909
assassination Savarkar was reputed to
have supplied the weapons and ammuni-
tion for the act, and to have instructed
the ardent Hindu assassin in what to say
in his ½nal statement as he was led to the
gallows. The young killer said that he
was “prepared to die, glorying in martyr-
dom.”3

3 Indian Sociologist, 九月 1909, quoted in
詹姆斯·D. 打猎, Gandhi in London (新德里:
Promilla and Co., 出版商, 1973), 134. 我的
thanks to Lloyd Rudolph for reminding me of
this incident.

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Juergens-
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nonviolence
& 暴力

Shortly before the debate, Gandhi
wrote to a friend that in London he had
met practically no Indian who believed
“India can ever become free without re-
sorting to violence.”4 He described the
position of the militant activists as one
in which terrorism would precede a gen-
eral revolution: Their plans were ½rst to
“assassinate a few Englishmen and strike
terror,” after which “a few men who
will have been armed will ½ght openly.”
然后, they calculated, eventually they
might have to lose “a quarter of a million
男人, 或多或少,” but the militant In-
dian nationalists thought this effort at
guerilla warfare would “defeat the Eng-
lish” and “regain our land.”5

During the debate, Gandhi challenged
the logic of the militants on the grounds
of political realism. They could hardly
expect to defeat the might of the British
military through sporadic acts of terror-
ism and guerilla warfare. 更重要的是-
坦特, 然而, was the effect that violent
tactics would have on the emerging In-
dian nationalist movement. He feared
that the methods they used to combat
the British would become part of India’s
national character.

Several weeks later Gandhi was still

thinking about these things as he board-
ed a steamship to return to South Afri-
加州. He penned his response to the Indi-
an activists in London in the form of a
书. In a preliminary way, 这篇文章,
which Gandhi wrote hurriedly on the

4 Gandhi’s letter to Ampthill, 十月 30, 在
Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, 卷. 9 (Del-
你好: Publications Division, Ministry of Informa-
tion and Broadcasting, Government of India,
1958), 509.

5 Mohandas Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 或者, Indian
Home Rule, 2ND版. (Ahmedabad, 印度: Nava-
jivan Publishing House, 1938; originally pub-
列于 1910), 69.

boat to Durban in 1909 (writing ½rst
with one hand and then the other to
avoid getting cramps), set forth an
approach to conflict resolution that he
would pursue the rest of his life. 这
书, Hind Swaraj, 或者, Indian Home Rule,
went to some lengths to describe both
the goals of India’s emerging indepen-
dence movement and the appropriate
methods to achieve it. He agreed with
the Indian radicals in London that Brit-
ain should have no place in ruling India
and exploiting its economy. 而且,
he thought that India should not try to
emulate the materialism of Western civi-
化, which he described as a kind of
“sickness.”

The thrust of the book, 然而, 曾是
to counter terrorism. Gandhi sketched
out a nonviolent approach, 开始
with an examination of the nature of
冲突. He insisted on looking beyond
a speci½c clash between individuals to
the larger issues for which they were
½ghting. Every conflict, Gandhi rea-
soned, was a contestation on two levels
–between persons and between princi-
普莱斯. Behind every ½ghter was the issue
for which the ½ghter was ½ghting. Every
½ght, Gandhi explained in a later essay,
was on some level an encounter between
differing “angles of vision” illuminating
the same truth.6

It was this difference in positions–
sometimes even in worldviews–that
needed to be resolved in order for a ½ght
to be ½nished and the ½ghters recon-
ciled. In that sense Gandhi’s methods
were more than a way of confronting an
enemy; they were a way of dealing with
conflict itself. For this reason he grew

6 Gandhi, writing in Young India, 九月 23,
1926. I explore Gandhi’s ideas further in my
书, Gandhi’s Way: A Handbook of Conflict Reso-
溶液, 转速. 编辑. (伯克利: University of Califor-
nia Press, 2005).

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Gandhi vs.
恐怖主义

unhappy with the label, ‘passive resist-
安斯,’ that had been attached to the
methods used by his protest movement
in South Africa. There was nothing pas-
sive about it–in fact, Gandhi had led the
movement into stormy confrontations
with government authorities–and it was
more than just resistance. It was also a
way of searching for what was right and
standing up for it, of speaking truth to
力量.

在 1906 Gandhi decided to ½nd a new
term for his method of engaging in con-
冲突. He invited readers of his journal,
Indian Opinion, to offer suggestions, 和
he offered a book prize for the winning
entry. The one that most intrigued him
came from his own cousin, Maganlal,
which Gandhi re½ned into the term,
satyagraha. The neologism is a conjunct
of two Sanskrit words, satya, ‘truth,' 和
agraha, ‘to grasp ½rmly.’ Hence it could
be translated as ‘grasping onto truth,' 或者
as Gandhi liked to call it, “truth force.”
What Gandhi found appealing about

the winning phrase was its focus on
truth. Gandhi reasoned that no one
possesses a complete view of it. 这
very existence of a conflict indicates a
deep difference over what is right. 这
½rst task of a conflict, 然后, is to try to
see the conflict from both sides of an
问题. This requires an effort to under-
stand an opponent’s position as well as
one’s own–or, as former U.S. Secretary
of Defense Robert McNamara advised
in the documentary ½lm The Fog of War,
“Empathize with the enemy.”

The ability to cast an empathetic eye
was central to Gandhi’s view of conflict.
It made it possible to imagine a solution
that both sides could accept, 至少在
part–though Gandhi also recognized
that sometimes the other side had very
little worth respecting. In his campaign
for the British to ‘quit India,’ for in-
姿态, he regarded the only righteous

place for the British to be was Britain.
Yet at the same time he openly appreci-
ated the many positive things that Brit-
ish rule had brought to the Indian sub-
continent, from roads to administrative
of½ces.

After a solution was imagined, the sec-
ond stage of a struggle was to achieve it.
This meant ½ghting–but in a way that
was consistent with the solution itself.
Gandhi adamantly rejected the notion
that the goal justi½es the means. Gandhi
argued that the ends and the means were
ultimately the same. If you fought vio-
lently you would establish a pattern of
violence that would be part of any solu-
tion to the conflict, no matter how noble
it was supposed to be. Even if terrorists
were successful in ousting the British
from India, Gandhi asked, “Who will
then rule in their place?” His answer
was that it would be the ones who had
killed in order to liberate India, 添加,
“India can gain nothing from the rule of
murderers.”7

A struggle could be forceful–often it
would begin with a demonstration and
“a refusal to cooperate with anything
humiliating.” But it could not be violent,
Gandhi reasoned, for these destructive
means would negate any positive bene-
½ts of a struggle’s victory. If a ½ght is
waged in the right way it could enlarge
one’s vision of the truth and enhance
one’s character in the process. 什么
Gandhi disdained was the notion that
one had to stoop to the lowest levels of
human demeanor in ½ghting for some-
thing worthwhile.

This brings us to the way that Gandhi

would respond to terrorism. 开始
和, Gandhi insisted on some kind of
response. He never recommended do-

7 Indian Sociologist, 九月 1909, quoted in
打猎, Gandhi in London, 134.

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Juergens-
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& 暴力

ing nothing at all. “Inaction at a time of
conflagration is inexcusable,” he once
wrote.8 He regarded cowardice as be-
neath contempt. Fighting–if it is non-
violent–is “never demoralizing,” Gan-
dhi said, while “cowardice always is.”9
And perhaps Gandhi’s most memora-
ble statement against a tepid response:
“Where there is only a choice between
cowardice and violence, I would advise
violence.”10

Occasionally violence does indeed
seem to be the only response available.
Gandhi provided some examples. 一
was the mad dog. On confronting a dog
with rabies, one must stop it by any
means possible, including maiming or
killing it.11 Another case that Gandhi
offered was a brutal rapist caught in
the act. To do nothing in that situation,
Gandhi said, makes the observer “a part-
ner in violence.” Hence violence could
be used to counter it. Gandhi thus con-
cluded, “Heroic violence is less sinful
than cowardly nonviolence.”12

推而广之, one could imagine Gan-

dhi justifying an act of violence to halt
an act of terrorism in progress. If Gan-
dhi had been sitting next to the suicide
bomber in the London subway during
这 2005 攻击, 例如, he would
have been justi½ed in wrestling the man
to the floor and subduing him. If no oth-
er means were available than a physical
assault–even one that led to the man’s
death–it would have been preferable to
the awful event that transpired when the
bomb exploded.

8 Harijan, 四月 7, 1946.

9 Young India, 十月 31, 1929.

10 Young India, 八月 11, 1920.

11 Gandhi, Collected Works, 卷. 14, 505.

12 Gandhi, Collected Works, 卷. 51, 17.

代达罗斯冬天 2007

Responding to terrorism after the
事实, 然而, is quite a different mat-
特尔. What Gandhi argued in Hind Swaraj
was that violence never works as a re-
sponse to violence. It usually generates
more violence as a result, and precipi-
tates a seemingly endless litany of tit-
for-tat militant engagements.

Gandhi was adamantly opposed to the

political positions that justi½ed terror-
主义, but he was remarkably lenient to-
ward the terrorists themselves. 在里面
case of the assassination that occurred
when Gandhi was in London in 1909, 他
did not blame Dhingra, the assassin of
Curzon-Wyllie. He said that Dhingra as a
person was not the main problem. 拉斯-
是, Gandhi said, he was like a drunkard,
in the grip of “a mad idea.”13

The dif½culty was the “mad idea,” not
the terrorists. Though he might have jus-
ti½ed killing them if he had caught them
in the act, after their tragic mission was
超过, Gandhi’s attitude toward those
who carried out terrorist acts was more
of pity than of revenge. He would not let
them go free, 当然, but he treated
them as misguided soldiers rather than
as monsters.

而且, Gandhi thought it quite
possible that the ideas for which the
violent activists were ½ghting could
be worthy ones. In the case of Dhingra
and the Indian militants in 1909, for in-
姿态, they were championing a cause
that Gandhi himself af½rmed. Hence it
would be an enormous mistake–fool-
什, from a Gandhian point of view–to
½xate on terrorist acts solely as deviant
behavior without taking seriously the
causes for which these passionate sol-
diers were laboring.

A Gandhian strategy for confronting
恐怖主义, 所以, would consist of
下列:

13 Indian Sociologist, 九月 1909, quoted in
打猎, Gandhi in London, 134.

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Gandhi vs.
恐怖主义

Stop an act of violence in its tracks. 这

effort to do so should be nonviolent
but forceful. Gandhi made a distinc-
tion between detentive force–the use
of physical control in order to halt vio-
lence in progress–and coercive force.
The latter is meant to intimidate and
destroy, and hinders a Gandhian ½ght
aimed at a resolution of principles at
stake.

Address the issues behind the terrorism. 到
focus solely on acts of terrorism, Gandhi
争论, would be like being concerned
with weapons in an effort to stop the
spread of racial hatred. Gandhi thought
the sensible approach would be to con-
front the ideas and alleviate the condi-
tions that motivated people to under-
take such desperate operations in the
½rst place.

Maintain the moral high ground. A belli-

cose stance, Gandhi thought, debased
those who adopted it. A violent posture
adopted by public authorities could lead
to a civil order based on coercion. 为了
this reason Gandhi insisted on means
consistent with the moral goals of those
engaged in the conflict.

These are worthy principles, but do

they work? This question is often raised
about nonviolent methods as a response
to terrorism–as if the violent ones have
been so effective. In Israel, a harsh re-
sponse to Palestinian violence has often
led to a surge of support for Hamas and
an increase in terrorist violence. 这
我们. responses to jihadi movements af-
ter the September 11 attacks have not
diminished support for the movements
nor reduced the number of terrorist in-
cidents worldwide. Militant responses
to terrorism do not possess a particular-
ly good record of success.

Yet there is a recent example of a suc-
cessful end to terrorism that was forged
through nonviolent means. This is the

case of Northern Ireland, a region
plagued by violence for decades.

The troubles of Northern Ireland
could be traced back to the British es-
tablishment of the Ulster Plantation
在 1610, though the most recent round
of violence began after a free Irish state
was established in 1921. Catholics in
the Northern Ireland counties felt mar-
ginalized in what they claimed to be
Irish territory. Protestants feared they
would become overwhelmed and ban-
ished from what they regarded as a part
of Britain.

Violence erupted in the summer of
1969 in the Bogside area of the city of
Londonderry. Following the clash, Prot-
estants revived an old militia, the Ulster
Volunteer Force, and militant Catholics
created a ‘provisional’ version of the
Irish Republican Army that would be
more militant than the old ira.

在 1971, Northern Ireland of½cials
adopted a preemptive stance and be-
gan rounding up Catholic activists
whom they regarded as potential ter-
罗斯特. The activists were detained
without charges. Within hours, rioting
and shooting broke out in the Catholic
neighborhoods of Belfast and adjacent
城市. The government, 而不是
retreating from its hard line, pressed
在, declaring a war against terrorism.
The suspects were beaten and tortured
in an attempt to elicit information. 他们
were forced to lie spread-eagle on the
floor with hoods over their heads, 和
subjected to disorienting electronic
声音.

The government’s attempt to end the
violence by harshly treating those it sus-
pected of perpetrating violence back-
½red. The Catholic community united
solidly behind the insurgency, 和
violence mounted. Later the Home Min-
ister who sanctioned the crackdown ad-
mitted that the hard-line approach was

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“by almost universal consent an unmiti-
gated disaster.”

The violence of the early 1970s came

to a head on what came to be called
‘Bloody Sunday,’ when a peaceful pro-
test march against the internment of
Catholic activists turned ugly. 英国人
troops ½red on the crowd, killing thir-
青少年.

For over twenty years the violence
continued. Tit-for-tat acts of terrorism
became a routine affair. The British em-
bassy in Dublin was burned, British sol-
diers were attacked, police stations were
bombed, and individual Catholics and
Protestants were captured by opposing
sides and sometimes hideously tortured
and killed.

在 1988 an internal dialogue began to
take place within the Catholic side be-
tween a moderate leader, John Hume,
and the activist leader, Gerry Adams. 在
1995, former U.S. Senator George Mitch-
ell was invited to Northern Ireland to
help broker the peace talks. Initially they
were unsuccessful, but then Mitchell re-
turned for eight months of intensive ne-
gotiations. The talks involved members
of Irish and British governments and
eight political parties on both Catholic
and Protestant sides of the Northern
Irish divide. They reached an agreement
on April 10, 1998–a day that happened
to be Good Friday, the Christian holiday
that precedes Easter.

The Good Friday Agreement is a re-

markable document. It attempted to
provide structural resolutions to sever-
al different problems at the same time.
To respond to the public mistrust and
insecurity brought on by years of vio-
伦斯, the Agreement set up Human
Rights and Equality Commissions. 它
called for an early release of political
prisoners, required the decommission-
ing of paramilitary weapons, prescribed
reforms of the criminal justice system

and the policies of police, and supplied
funds to help the victims of violence. 它
also addressed the problem of balanced
governance by setting up a parliament
with proportional representation, 前任-
ecutive branch that guaranteed repre-
sentation from both communities, 和
a consultative Civic Forum that allowed
for community concerns to be expressed
directly from the people. The Agreement
also dealt with relations among the three
key states involved–Ireland, Great Brit-
ain, and Northern Ireland–by establish-
ing several councils and mediating bod-
是的.

Prior to the Agreement, 英国人
government and the paramilitary forces
on both the Unionist and ira sides had
found themselves in a situation similar
to many violent confrontations. 他们的
positions had been staked out in ex-
treme and uncompromising terms, 和
the methods used by all sides were so
harsh as to be virtually unforgivable. Ul-
timately they were able to break through
this impasse by employing several basic
nonviolent techniques:

Seeing the other side’s point of view. 什么时候

the British began to open lines of com-
munication to the radical leaders on
both sides, they began to break through
the ‘we-they’ attitude that vexes most
hostile confrontations.

Not responding to violence in kind. A se-
ries of cease½res–including unilateral
cease½res by the ira–were critical in
helping to break the spiral of violence.
Even as severe an incident as the Omagh
terrorist bombing on August 15, 1998,
did not elicit retaliatory attacks.

Letting moderate voices surface. Once the
spiral of violence had been broken, 和
both sides no longer felt under siege,
there was room for moderate voices to
surface within the warring camps.

Isolating radical voices. The peace nego-
tiators did not try to change what could

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Gandhi vs.
恐怖主义

not be changed. Hence they did not
waste time in trying to reason with the
militant Protestant leader, Reverend
Ian Paisley, who had opted out of the
过程.

Setting up channels of communication.
They involved an outsider–Senator
Mitchell–to play a mediating role, 和
set up impartial frameworks of commu-
nication for the two sides, which had
been deeply mistrustful of one another.
Peace in Northern Ireland was not in-
evitable, and there is no assurance that
the agreement will last forever. 暴力
may again return to that troubled area
of Ireland. Yet for a time the bombs have
been silenced. At least in one case in re-
cent political history terrorism has come
to an end–through nonviolent means.

It is reasonable to ask whether the

approach taken in Northern Ireland
could work in other situations. 可以
it work in Kashmir, 例如, a re-
gion that is also claimed by two reli-
gious communities backed by powerful
政府? It would not take a huge
stretch of imagination to think that In-
dia and Pakistan could join in a settle-
ment surprisingly similar to the Good
Friday Agreement. The Israeli-Palestin-
ian conflict is more complex, but like
Northern Ireland it is essentially a con-
flict over territory in which both sides
have a moral and political claim. 自从
the Oslo Agreement in 1993 a negotiated
settlement in the region has seemed a
realistic though still elusive possibility.
But what about the global jihadi war?
This is the global conflict that President
乔治·W. Bush designated “the war on
terror” shortly after September 11, 2001,
and relabeled “the struggle against radi-
cal Islam” in July 2005. Osama bin Laden
enunciated his own proclamation of this
war in a fatwa against the United States
在 1996. Bin Laden called on Muslims to

join him in “correcting what had hap-
pened to the Islamic world in general”
since the end of the Ottoman Empire.
The aim, according to bin Laden, 曾是
“to return to the people their own rights,
particularly after the large damages and
the great aggression on the life and the
religion of the people.”14

Groups sharing an Al Qaeda perspec-

tive have attacked the very centers of
Western power in New York, Madrid,
and London, but their struggle is not
in any simple sense about territory. 它
is a war without a frontline and without
clear geographic lines of control. 上
jihadi side it is a war without a conven-
tional army and without the apparatus of
a political state. For that matter, the jiha-
di movement seems to be without much
centralized control at all.

With no one clearly in charge, nego-
tiation is a dif½cult affair. It is unlikely
那个美国. of½cials would hike into the
mountains of Pakistan to chat with bin
Laden, if indeed he could be found. 和
even if there were such conversations,
what would be the point? He has no real
control over the policies of the Middle
East and is in no position to negotiate
a settlement of the underlying issues
of Western influence that his fatwa de-
scribes. To acknowledge bin Laden as
a representative of the Muslim people
would be to magnify his importance and
reward his terrorism with political legiti-
macy. The United States has already ex-
aggerated his importance–and unwit-
tingly enlarged his support within the
Muslim world–by singling him out as
the global enemy of the United States.
Negotiations with renegade extremists
like bin Laden would not achieve any

14 Osama bin Laden, “Declaration of War
against the Americans Occupying the Land of
the Two Holy Places,” ½rst published in Arabic
in Al Quds Al Arabi, a London-based newspaper,
八月 1996.

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标记
Juergens-
meyer
在
nonviolence
& 暴力

changes in underlying policy positions
that would lessen tensions in the Middle
East.

Behind the jihadi war is a conflict be-
tween ideas and worldviews. In saying
this I do not mean to belittle the impor-
tance of the struggle, for ideas can have
enormous power. But because the con-
test is between differing ways of per-
ceiving the world and the relationship
between political and moral order, 这
struggle has had a remarkably moralis-
tic tone. The enemies are not really in-
dividuals as much as they are ways of
思维.

Both sides de½ne their goal as free-

多姆. On one side it is the liberty to
choose a nation’s own of½cials through
democratic elections. On the other side
it is liberation from outside influence
and control. On both sides these posi-
tions have been magni½ed into a moral
contest of such proportions that it has
become a sacred struggle. The enemies
have become cosmic foes. Large num-
bers of innocent people have been killed
with moral indifference–or worse, 和
the self-righteous thinking that God is
on one’s side.

Is a nonviolent approach to conflict
resolution relevant to the global jihadi
战争? Consider the guidelines that Gan-
dhi enunciated in response to the terror-
ism of the Indian activists in London in
1909. They might be applied to the cur-
rent situation in the following way:

Stop a situation of violence in its tracks.
The ½rst rule of nonviolence is to stop
an act of violence as it occurs–or better,
to prevent it before it happens. Gandhi
would have approved of efforts to cap-
ture those involved in acts of terrorism
and bring them to justice, and he would
have applauded attempts to ward off fu-
ture terrorist assaults through the legal
forms of surveillance and detection that
have been adopted after September 11.

Even those measures that seem to be
aimed only at giving the appearance
of security have a certain utility, 自从
they diminish the prime effects of ter-
rorism–fear and intimidation. 但即使
though Gandhi occasionally supported
military action, including the British de-
fense against Hitler in World War II, 它
is doubtful that he would have accepted
large-scale military operations as a re-
sponse to terrorist acts, especially if they
left large numbers of casualties in their
wake. Nor would he have approved of
changes in the legal system that would
deprive the public of its rights.

Address the issues behind the violence. 这

crucial part of nonviolent resolution is
to look behind the violence at the issues
that are at stake. Gandhi’s goal was to
form a resolution with the best features
of both sides of a dispute. In the case of
the global jihadi war, this would mean
af½rming the positive principles of both
sides–though the ‘sides’ in this case are
not only state and non-state organiza-
tions but also the concerned publics that
stand behind them. Gandhi might have
approved of the principles of both sides:
the desire of many traditional Muslims
in the Middle East to be free from Amer-
ican and European domination, 和
expectation of those who hold modern
social values that all societies should re-
spect peoples of diverse cultures and be
democratically governed. Since these
goals are not necessarily incompatible, A
resolution that accepts them both is con-
ceivable.

最终, tensions might not be ful-

ly resolved until there are signi½cant
changes in the political culture of Mid-
dle Eastern countries and dramatic re-
versals of the West’s military and eco-
nomic role in the Middle East. But in the
meantime small steps can make a large
difference. Any indication that either or
both sides accept both sets of principles

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would be a positive shift toward recon-
ciling the underlying differences and
diminishing the support for extremists’
positions.

Maintain the moral high ground. 作为
Gandhi remarked to the Indian activ-
ists in London who proposed a violent
overthrow of British control of India,
violence begets violence. Proclaiming
a ‘war on terrorism,’ from Gandhi’s
point of view, is tantamount to sinking
to the terrorists’ level. The very idea of
war suggests an absolutism of conflict,
where reason and negotiation have no
place and where opponents are enemies.
Though violent extremists are indeed
dif½cult opponents, and Gandhi would
not expect one to negotiate with them,
he would be mindful that the more im-
portant struggle is the one for public
支持. This support could shift either
方式, and it would be a tragic error–and
perhaps a self-ful½lling prophecy–to re-
gard potential supporters as enemies.
Mistreatment of those suspected of
being involved in terrorist acts can al-
so lead to a loss of public support. Gan-
dhi urged that the assassin, Dhingra,
be treated with caution but also with
尊重, as any suspect in a crime would
be treated. Torture, from Gandhi’s point
of view, is ineffective not just because
it rarely produces useful information
but also because it corrupts the moral
character of a society that allows it to
be used. This was the point he made in
Hind Swaraj when he stressed that the
means of freeing India from British con-
trol should be consistent with the goals
a free Indian society would want to
达到.

Many of these guidelines have been
part of the public debate in the United
States in the years following the Sep-
木材 11 attacks. Thus a nonviolent
response to terrorism is already an ele-
ment of political discourse. It is not a

Gandhi vs.
恐怖主义

new idea, but rather a strand of public
thinking that deserves attention and,
Gandhi might argue, 尊重. As a prag-
matic idealist, Gandhi would be pleased
to know that nonviolent approaches to
terrorism were taken seriously, 不仅
because they invariably were the right
thing to do, but also because on more
than one occasion they have worked.

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