巴格达之间的机动 - 麻省理工学院人工智能研究专业

巴格达之间的机动
and Tehran

North Korea’s Relations with Iraq
and Iran during the Cold War

✣ Balázs Szalontai and Yoo Jinil

介绍

The hitherto published academic literature on North Korea’s policy toward
the Middle East can be grouped into two main categories. Some scholars
have examined Pyongyang’s bilateral relations with individual Middle East-
ern states (mainly Iran, 叙利亚, and Egypt) and armed political organizations
(首先, the various Palestinian groups and Lebanon’s Hezbollah), 寻求
to identify the factors that induced and enabled North Korea to forge partner-
ships with these entities.1 Other scholars have sought to provide an overview
of DPRK activities in the entire region or a speciﬁc subregion (像
Persian/Arabian Gulf ) or described North Korea’s policy toward the Middle

1. 看, 除其他外, Shirzad Azad, “Iran and the Two Koreas: A Peculiar Pattern of Foreign Policy,”
Journal of East Asian Affairs, 卷. 26, 不. 2 (Fall/Winter 2012), PP. 163–192; Lyong Choi, Jong-dae
Shin, and Han-hyung Lee, “The Dilemma of the ‘Axis of Evil’: The Rise and Fall of Iran-DPRK
关系,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 卷. 31, 不. 4 (十二月 2019), PP. 595–611;
Mark Fitzpatrick, “Iran and North Korea: The Proliferation Nexus,” 生存, 卷. 48, 不. 1 (2006),
PP. 61–80; Alon Levkowitz, “Iran and North Korea Military Cooperation: A Partnership within the
‘Axis of Evil,’” Iran-Pulse, 不. 10 (2007), PP. 1–3; Christina Y. 林, “The King from the East: DPRK-
Syria-Iran Nuclear Nexus and Strategic Implications for Israel and the ROK,” Korea Economic Institute
Academic Paper Series, 卷. 3, 不. 7 (2008), PP. 1–13; Bruce E. Bechtol, “North Korea and Syria: 部分-
ners in Destruction and Violence,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 卷. 27, 不. 3 (九月
2015), PP. 277–292; Yitzhak Shichor, “Evil from the North: The DPRK-Syria Axis and its Strate-
gic Dimensions,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 卷. 19, 不. 4 (2007), PP. 71–92; Satoru
Miyamoto, “DPRK Troop Dispatches and Military Support in the Middle East: Change from Mili-
tary Support to Arms Trade in the 1970s,” East Asia, 不. 27 (2010), PP. 345–359; Balázs Szalontai,
“Courting the ‘Traitor to the Arab Cause’: Egyptian–North Korean Relations in the Sadat Era, 1970–
1981,” S/N Korean Humanities, 卷. 5, 不. 1 (行进 2019), PP. 103–136; and Carl Anthony Wege,
“The Hizballah–North Korean Nexus,” Small Wars Journal (23 一月 2011), PP. 1–8.

冷战研究杂志
卷. 25, 不. 2, 春天 2023, PP. 179–247, https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_01119
© 2023 哈佛大学和麻省理工学院院长和研究员
技术的

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Szalontai and Yoo

East as one segment of Pyongyang’s overall strategy toward the Third World.2
The aforesaid themes were usually placed into the broader context of inter-
Korean competition or North Korean arms trade, with a focus on the security
threats and diplomatic challenges that the DPRK’s presence in the Middle
East posed to the Republic of Korea (ROK), 以色列, 和美国.
A few authors (Shirzad Azad, Christina Y. 林, Yitzhak Shichor, and the trio
of Lyong Choi, Jong-dae Shin, and Han-hyung Lee) have created models of
triangular or quadrangular relations (Iran-DPRK-ROK, Iran-DPRK-United
状态, Iran-Syria-DPRK, Syria-DPRK-Israel-ROK) to assess the extent of co-
operation between Pyongyang and its Middle Eastern partners against Wash-
ington and Seoul or to call for joint action against the allied “rogue states.”

This article on North Korea’s triangular relationship with Iraq and Iran
approaches Pyongyang’s policy in the region from a partly different angle,
seeking to ﬁll gaps in the literature. Earlier studies, focused as they are on the
DPRK’s cooperation with Iran, 叙利亚, and Egypt, pay far less attention to the
history of Iraqi–North Korean interactions. A few scholars (Azad, Barry Gills,
and Chung-in Moon) have brieﬂy noted that “traditionally, the DPRK had
enjoyed a close and amicable relationship with Iraq” (which they contrast with
Baghdad’s long reluctance to engage Seoul), but they cover the Iraqi–North
Korean partnership only in a couple of paragraphs or sentences, and their ob-
servations even contain factual inaccuracies.3 So far, no article or chapter has
been devoted speciﬁcally to the history of Iraqi-DPRK relations—an omission
presumably inﬂuenced by the fact that military assistance played a less promi-
nent role in Pyongyang’s cooperation with Baghdad than in its partnerships
with Cairo, Damascus, and Tehran.

第二, the earlier triangular models of North Korea’s strategy in the
Middle East analyze either Pyongyang’s cooperation with a regional state

2. Shirzad Azad, Koreans in the Persian Gulf: Policies and International Relations (伦敦: 劳特利奇,
2015); Bruce E. Bechtol, “Creating Instability in Dangerous Global Regions: North Korean Prolifer-
ation and Support to Terrorism in the Middle East and South Asia,” 比较策略, 卷. 28,
不. 2 (2009), PP. 99–115; Joseph S. Bermudez, Proliferation for Proﬁt: North Korea in the Middle East
(华盛顿, 直流: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1994); Joseph S. Bermudez, 恐怖主义:
The North Korean Connection (纽约: 泰勒 & Francis, 1990); Kenneth Katzman and Rinn-Sup
Shinn, 北朝鲜: Military Relations with the Middle East, CRS Report for Congress (华盛顿,
直流: Congressional Research Service, 1994); Chung-in Moon, “Between Ideology and Interest: 北
Korea in the Middle East,” in Park Jae Kyu, Byung Chul Koh, and Tae-Hwan Kwak, 编辑。, The Foreign
Relations of North Korea (博尔德, 一氧化碳: 西景出版社, 1987), PP. 379–410; Barry K. Gills, Korea ver-
sus Korea: A Case of Contested Legitimacy (伦敦: 劳特利奇, 1996); and Benjamin R. Young, Guns,
Guerrillas, and the Great Leader: North Korea and the Third World (斯坦福大学, CA: 斯坦福大学
按, 2021).

3. Moon, “Between Ideology and Interest,” p. 396. See also Azad, Koreans in the Persian Gulf, PP. 21,
29, 76–78; and Gills, Korea versus Korea, PP. 67, 103–104, 118–119, 132–133.

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Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran

against other powers that DPRK leaders regarded as inherently hostile (南
韩国, 美国, and Israel) or its trilateral alliance with two regional
states that were on good terms with each other (Iran and Syria). 相比之下,
this article explores (1) how North Korean leaders tried to maneuver between
two Middle Eastern states that were on hostile terms with each other but were
regarded by the DPRK as potentially attractive partners; (2) which external
and internal conditions enhanced or reduced the DPRK’s chances to gain a
foothold in Baghdad or Tehran; (3) which beneﬁts the DPRK could draw
from the Iraq–Iran rivalry and which obstacles it placed in the way of their
diplomatic efforts; 和 (4) how North Korea reacted to the various shifts in
Iraqi and Iranian domestic and foreign policies. In parallel with this analy-
姐姐, the article also investigates how Iranian and Iraqi policymakers viewed the
Korean question.

Iran and Iraq were selected for analysis because of the signiﬁcant role they
played not only in Middle Eastern power politics in general but in North
Korea’s strategy toward the Middle East in particular. Both countries had suf-
ﬁcient population, oil reserves, and military power to aspire to regional hege-
mony in the Persian Gulf and exert a substantial inﬂuence in the eastern part
of the Arab world (the Mashriq). By pressuring or propping up the so-called
front-line states (埃及, 叙利亚, and Jordan), they could have a stronger im-
pact on the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conﬂict than, 说, Algeria and South
Yemen could—countries that had adopted an intransigent stance toward Is-
rael and maintained friendly relations with the DPRK but whose geographical
remoteness prevented them from playing a major role in the Arab-Israeli con-
ﬂict. The regional ambitions of Iran and Iraq eventually reached such a height
that they ended up on a collision course not only with each other (as oc-
curred in 1980, leading to the longest and most destructive interstate war in
post-1945 Middle Eastern history) but also with the United States.

Their conﬂicts with each other, and with Israel and the United States, 在
turn created opportunities for North Korean diplomacy to gain footholds in
Baghdad and Tehran. The initial stage of North Korea’s strategy toward the
中东 (1957–1966) focused on outcompeting Seoul in the diplomatic
sphere, 那是, to set up embassies, or at least trade ofﬁces and consulates-
一般的, in the various Middle Eastern countries, sign cultural and trade agree-
ments with the host authorities, and dissuade the latter from establishing
contacts with the South Korean “puppet regime.” In the aftermath of the
Six-Day War (1967), the DPRK started to provide military and economic as-
sistance to various Arab states and guerrilla organizations. In the 1970s and
1980s, the global oil shocks and North Korea’s debt crisis induced DPRK

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Szalontai and Yoo

leaders to seek to obtain crude oil and convertible currency from oil-rich Iraq
and Iran. Because of the deﬁciencies of the North Korean economy, arms sales
became the most effective means to achieve these aims. 开始于 1980, 这
Islamic Republic of Iran was usually ﬁrst among the countries purchasing mil-
itary equipment from the DPRK, its purchases gradually evolving from tanks,
炮兵, and ﬁghter planes to medium-range ballistic missiles.

The analysis here relies on a combination of primary sources: the reports
of Soviet-bloc diplomats, now accessible in the Hungarian National Archives
(Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár) and the Digital Archives of the Woodrow Wil-
son Center; 我们. and British diplomatic ﬁles, available in the U.S. 国家的
Archives and the UK National Archives; and North Korean media sources.
Whereas earlier authors (Azad, Gills, Moon, and Benjamin R. Young) cite
Rodong sinmun (the daily newspaper of the Korean Workers’ Party, KWP)
and other North Korean press organs mainly to illustrate speciﬁc episodes of
North Korean foreign policy and to show the tone of North Korean propa-
ganda, this article also analyzes the ﬂuctuating trends in North Korean media
coverage of developments in Iraq and Iran, comparing Rodong sinmun’s com-
ments on these events with the positions of other Communist states. 反而
of placing Pyongyang’s interactions with Baghdad and Tehran solely in the
context of inter-Korean rivalry, the article also examines the similarities and
differences between North Korean and Soviet/Chinese/East German attitudes
toward Iran and Iraq.

In comparing Rodong sinmun’s standpoint with that of other Commu-
nist regimes, the article pays particular attention to Neues Deutschland, East
Germany’s party newspaper, on the following grounds: East Germany, 喜欢
the DPRK, was a divided country, and thus its diplomatic activities in the
Middle East were as strongly motivated by its perennial competition with
West Germany as Pyongyang’s policies were driven by its rivalry with Seoul.
同时, East German leaders consistently sought to achieve their
aims within the conﬁnes of Soviet policy toward the Middle East, adapting to
the latter’s priorities, sympathies, and antipathies to a far greater extent than
post-1960 North Korean diplomacy. By using the Neues Deutschland articles
as a control group, the article can better illustrate the distinctive elements of
Rodong sinmun’s position than if the DPRK newspaper had been examined in
isolation. 幸运的是, the full set of Neues Deutschland issues (1946–1990) 是
available in a searchable format.4

4. All cited articles from Neues Deutschland are available online at https://www.nd-archiv.de/.

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Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran

Through a Glass Darkly: North Korea Faces
Iran and Iraq, 1950–1957

North Korea established diplomatic relations with the Republic of Iraq in
1968 and the Imperial State of Iran in 1973. At ﬁrst sight, this relatively
small chronological difference might create the impression that Iraqi-DPRK
and Iranian-DPRK relations developed largely in parallel. 事实上, 德-
gree of North Korean interest in these two Middle Eastern countries, 和
scope of Pyongyang’s contacts with them, showed strong divergence and ﬂuc-
tuation during the Cold War. 从 1946 to the mid-1950s, Rodong sinmun
paid much greater attention to Iran than to Iraq. Following the republican
takeover in Baghdad (14 七月 1958), Iraq suddenly eclipsed Iran on North Ko-
rea’s priority list, but more than eight years of persistent North Korean efforts
were needed to upgrade Iraqi-DPRK cooperation from the ﬁrst economic and
cultural agreements to ambassadorial relations. 相比之下, Iran established
full diplomatic contacts with the DPRK after hardly any preliminary steps,
quickly switching from a hostile relationship to a cordial one. 从 1973 到
1979, Pyongyang sought to stay on good terms with both Middle Eastern
权力, but in 1980 the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War created a permanent
imbalance in this triangle. The collapse of the already weakening Iraqi-DPRK
partnership was offset by the emergence of a strong Iranian–North Korean
联盟.

In the formative stage of the North Korean regime and during the Ko-
rean War, the North Koreans lacked any direct contact with either Iran or
伊拉克 (or with any other Middle Eastern state, for that matter). Seen from this
看法, Rodong sinmun’s strikingly uneven coverage of the two countries
may appear peculiar. 例如, during the ﬁrst nine months of 1950 这
newspaper carried thirteen articles on Iran but only a single one about Iraq.
在 1951, the number of articles on Iran increased to 64, whereas those about
Iraq reached only six. Rodong sinmun’s strong interest in Iran manifested itself
as early as the spring of 1946 (during the dispute at the United Nations over
the prolonged presence of Soviet troops in northern Iran), when it published
nine articles about Iranian events from 5 二月至 17 April.5 At that time,
Iran lay just as far beyond the reach of North Korean diplomacy as Iraq, 和
thus the conspicuous attention it received from Rodong sinmun can hardly be
attributed to practical political considerations.

5. 看, 除其他外, “Ajebejan munjen˘un Iran’gwa Ssory˘on chikch˘om kyos˘op-anj˘on pojang-
wiw˘onhoen˘un shirhoe chungji,” Rodong sinmun (Pyongyang), 5 二月 1946, p. 1; and “Iranjudun
Ssory˘on’gun ilbuch’˘olt’oer˘ul kaeshi,” Rodong sinmun, 6 行进 1946, p. 1.

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Szalontai and Yoo

如果, 然而, one compares the patterns of North Korean media coverage
with the number of articles published by the Soviet party newspaper Pravda
on Iran and Iraq, the reason Rodong sinmun covered the former country far
more extensively than the latter becomes clearer. Pravda also devoted much
greater attention to Iran than to Iraq. 例如, 在 1947 it carried as many
作为 109 articles on Iran but only 15 on Iraq, 而在 1948 和 1949 这
proportion of articles was 126 到 18 和 60 到 10, 分别. These dif-
ferences seem to have reﬂected Soviet geopolitical priorities. In Soviet foreign
policy under Joseph Stalin, Iran—a country that shared a 1,690-kilometer
land border with the USSR and that was partly occupied by Soviet troops
从 1941 to 1946—occupied a far more prominent place than Iraq, a non-
neighboring state then ﬁrmly belonging to Britain’s sphere of interest. 这
impact these Soviet priorities made on North Korean propaganda may be de-
tected not only in the number of articles but also in their content. The start
of Rodong sinmun’s interest in Iran may be traced to United Nations(和) 硒-
curity Council Resolution 2 (30 一月 1946), which called on the Soviet
Union and Iran to resolve their conﬂict. The newspaper’s ﬁrst article on Iran
(5 二月 1946) covered the UN dispute over the crisis, and in the fol-
lowing three months the majority of Iran-related articles were focused on the
various episodes of Soviet-Iranian relations (such as the gradual withdrawal
of Soviet troops and the visit of Iranian Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam to
莫斯科). One of the Rodong sinmun articles lavishly praised Soviet policies
toward Tehran as a major contribution to world peace.6 Similar tendencies
may be observed in Rodong sinmun’s coverage of Iraq. One of its early ar-
ticles, dated 24 六月 1949 and describing the deterioration of Iraqi-Syrian
关系, seems to have been inspired by a Soviet Pravda article of 17 六月
1949.7

因此, Rodong sinmun’s unusually strong initial interest in Iran and its
relative indifference toward Iraq was more a reﬂection of Soviet geopolitical
preferences than an attitude based on North Korea’s own diplomatic priori-
领带. During these early years, North Korean perceptions of the Middle East
were heavily dependent on Soviet narratives, not only because of Pyongyang’s
political alignment with Moscow but also because of the KWP leaders’ overall
unfamiliarity with this faraway and culturally alien region.

These characteristics of North Korea’s initial approach toward the two
Middle Eastern states (IE。, its adherence to the standpoint of its superpower

6. “Ssory˘on-Iran ch’ins˘on˘un segyep’y˘onghwae kiy˘o,” Rodong sinmun, 17 四月 1946, p. 4.
7. “Obostrenie otnoshenii mezhdu Siriei i Irakom,” Pravda (莫斯科), 17 六月 1949, p. 4; and “Irak’˘u
Ssiria˘ui kwan’gyen˘un nalloak’wa,” Rodong sinmun, 24 六月 1949, p. 4.

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Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran

patron, combined with a lack of direct involvement) were partly mirrored in
the attitudes that Iraq and Iran adopted toward the Korean question in 1947–
1949. During the ﬁrst UN General Assembly vote on Korea (23 九月
1947), Iran sided with the United States, whereas Iraq abstained.8 On 12
十二月 1948, when the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 195 到
recognize the South Korean administration as a freely elected and lawful gov-
政府, both countries followed Washington’s lead. This position reﬂected
their largely pro-Western orientation, but otherwise they were considerably
less active at the UN sessions on Korea than during the debates over is-
sues that were of direct concern to them (such as Palestine, 印度尼西亚, 和
利比亚).9

Iranian and Iraqi reactions to the outbreak of the Korean War were of a
similarly ambivalent nature. When the UN Security Council passed Resolu-
的 80 (27 六月 1950) to authorize military assistance to South Korea, 伊朗
strongly supported it, whereas Iraq expressed support for the action “within
the framework of the Charter.”10 The Iranian leaders’ standpoint was evidently
inﬂuenced by their fears of Soviet designs on Iran. According to a telegram
sent on 2 七月, Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi told U.S. Ambassador
Henry F. Grady that Iran felt “heartened by evidence US prepared [到] sup-
port small nations when confronted by armed Communist aggression.” Grady
noted that the Shah “obviously had idea in mind that time might come when
he would need such assistance.”11 Striking a more reserved tone, the Iraqi
chargé d’affaires to the United States “privately” assured the Department of
the State that “Iraq [曾是] not neutral but lined up solidly with West.”12

在实践中, 然而, both countries (like the other Middle Eastern states)
refrained from sending troops to the defense of South Korea—a decision that
Pravda promptly depicted as a ﬁasco of U.S. diplomacy.13 Iranian leaders, 为了
their part, were anxious not to provoke their powerful northern neighbor,
all the more so because they harbored doubts about the extent of military

8. Gills, Korea versus Korea, p. 43.

9. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948–49 (纽约: United Nations Department of Public Infor-
运动, 1950), PP. 193–194, 234, 258–261, 289.

10. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950 (纽约: 哥伦比亚大学出版社, 1951), p. 225.

11. “The Ambassador in Iran (Grady) to the Secretary of State,” Telegram, 3 七月 1950, 在我们中. 的-
partment of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, 卷. V, 医生. 257 (hereinafter referred
to as FRUS, with appropriate year and volume numbers).

12. “The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Ofﬁces,” Circular Telegram, 21 七月 1950, in FRUS,
1950, 卷. VII, 医生. 337.

13. “Arabskie strany ne khotyat uchastvovat’ v agressii,” Pravda, 19 七月 1950, p. 4; and “Otkaz Irana
posylat’ voiska v Koreyu,” Pravda, 27 七月 1950, p. 4.

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Szalontai and Yoo

support they might receive from the United States against a Soviet invasion.14
In a conversation with U.S. counselor Arthur Richards, the Shah

attributed great initial successes of North Koreans to the fact that ROK had
not been supplied with more heavy equipment and from this he indicated that
decision supply Iran with military equipment useful primarily maintain inter-
nal security would be, as in Korea, completely inadequate withstand any armed
Soviet aggression.15

Lacking a common border with the USSR, Iraq had much less to fear from a
direct Soviet onslaught, but the Iraqi government, like the other Arab states,
nursed a grievance against the United States and the UN for the partition of
Palestine, and hence it felt little inclination to provide any material support
to the UN effort on behalf of the ROK.16 On 21 九月 1950, Iraqi UN
delegate Mohammad Fadhil al-Jamali commended “the efﬁcacy and justice of
meeting aggression in Korea” but lamented “why the Security Council did not
and does not act with similar promptness and efﬁcacy in cases of aggression in
Palestine.”17 By the end of the year, only Israel and Lebanon among Middle
Eastern states had offered to give humanitarian aid to South Korea. 在里面
later stage of the war, 埃及, 叙利亚, and Saudi Arabia made some token aid
contributions, but Iraq did not, whereas an Iranian offer of fuel was turned
down by the UN Command on logistical grounds.18

在夏天 1950, Soviet and North Korean leaders had good reason
to welcome the Middle Eastern countries’ desire to avoid taking sides in the
Korean War, but in the winter of 1950–1951, when Chinese–North Korean
troops drove back the UN forces, 莫斯科, 北京, and Pyongyang were far
less pleased by their neutrality. 在 5 十二月 1950, thirteen African and
Asian countries (including both Iran and Iraq) appealed to the DPRK and
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to “declare that it was not their inten-
tion that any forces under their control should cross to the south of the 38th
parallel,” but to no avail.

14. Azad, Koreans in the Persian Gulf, PP. 16–17.

15. “The Ambassador in Iran (Grady) to the Secretary of State,” Telegram, 3 八月 1950, in FRUS,
1950, 卷. V, 医生. 265.

16. “Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State,” 9 十一月 1950, in FRUS, 1950,
卷. V, 医生. 303.

17. United Nations General Assembly, 5th Session, 280th Plenary Meeting, 21 九月 1950, 的-
ﬁcial Records, A/PV.280, PP. 35–36.

18. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950, PP. 225–228; Yearbook of the United Nations, 1951 (新的
约克: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1952), p. 253; and Yearbook of the United
国家, 1952 (纽约: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1953), p. 220.

186

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Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran

在 14 十二月 1950, in response to a joint draft resolution submitted
by these states, the Iranian president of the UN General Assembly, Nasrollah
Entezam, set up a committee to “determine the basis on which a satisfactory
cease-ﬁre in Korea could be arranged,” whereupon the Soviet delegate charged
that this proposal was merely a “camouﬂaged” U.S. attempt to give a “breath-
ing spell” to the beleaguered UN troops. 在 22 十二月, the PRC declared
that “if the Asian and Arab nations wished to achieve genuine peace, 他们
must free themselves from United States pressure . . . and give up the idea of
achieving a cease-ﬁre ﬁrst and negotiations afterward.”19

Exasperated by the intransigence of the Communist powers, the Iraqi
UN delegate told John C. Ross, the Deputy U.S. Representative on the UN
Security Council, that “from beginning of Chinese Communist intervention
in Korea he had felt it was essential to give them rope enough to hang them-
selves” (IE。, to expose their unwillingness to seek a peaceful settlement). Jamali
rebuffed an Indian proposal to discuss China’s intervention together with the
Taiwan issue on the grounds that this would be tantamount to “paying reward
for aggression.”20 Diverging from the neutralist position embraced by Egypt
和叙利亚, both Iran and Iraq supported the draft resolutions that branded the
PRC as an aggressor in Korea (1 二月 1951) and called for an embargo
against North Korea and China (18 可能 1951). The Korea-related votes that
the two Middle Eastern states cast in 1952 were likewise at variance with the
Soviet standpoint. Iraq consistently sided with the United States, whereas Iran,
then governed by the radical nationalist Premier Mohammad Mossadegh, 关于-
peatedly abstained, but this did not prevent the Soviet delegate from con-
fronting his Iranian counterpart during the session of 24 November.21

Throughout these tumultuous events, Rodong sinmun’s articles on Iran
and Iraq continued to reﬂect Soviet (rather than North Korean) priorities
和兴趣. Although the newspaper mentioned the effort by twelve Arab-
Asian countries to pursue an independent course in the UN, most of the arti-
cles were unrelated to the position that Tehran and Baghdad adopted on the
Korean War.22 Instead, they focused on local workers’ protests, political dis-
putes over a British-Iraqi oil agreement (3 二月 1952), the British-Iranian

19. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950, PP. 245–251.

20. “The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State,” Tele-
公克, 27 十二月 1950, in FRUS, 1950, 卷. VII, 医生. 1091.

21. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1951, PP. 224, 228, 264; and Yearbook of the United Nations, 1952,
PP. 198–207.
22. “Arap min Asea 12kaeguk taep’yod˘ul 7kaeguk hoe˘ui sojibane taehan suj˘ongan chech’ul,” Rodong
sinmun, 2 二月 1951, p. 4.

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Szalontai and Yoo

conﬂict triggered by Mossadegh’s nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil
公司 (1 可能 1951), 和美国. role in the military coup against
Mossadegh (19 八月 1953), placing these episodes into the context of the
global anti-imperialist struggle.23

The way Rodong sinmun followed Pravda’s lead is demonstrated by the
following examples: Mossadegh’s referendum on the dissolution of the parlia-
蒙特, held in Tehran on 3 八月 1953, was covered by Pravda and Rodong
sinmun on 4 和 10 August respectively.24 The Soviet newspaper published
a long article on the ﬁrst coup attempt against Mossadegh (15 八月) 作为
early as 17 August and continued to report on the events in Tehran on a
daily basis.25 In contrast, Rodong sinmun published its ﬁrst articles about the
Iranian crisis as late as 24 和 28 八月; 那是, only after Mossadegh’s
downfall.26

The fall of Mossadegh and the restoration of the Shah soon made an im-
pact on Iran’s attitude toward Korea, 也. Abandoning Mossadegh’s neutralist
姿态, the new Iranian administration adopted a consistently pro-Western
position on each occasion when the UN discussed the Korean question. 在
3 十二月 1953, no other Middle Eastern country but Iran and Israel sup-
ported a draft resolution condemning North Korean and Chinese atrocities
against the UN prisoners-of-war—Iraq and four other Arab states abstained.27
The Iranian government took a harder stance toward the DPRK, the PRC,
and East Germany than toward the USSR and the other East European coun-
尝试, not least because the former group lacked diplomatic relations with the
美国. Iranian ofﬁcials knew that U.S. policymakers did not want
to see inroads by North Korea, 中国, and East Germany into the Middle
East.28 Hence, the Iranian authorities maintained cordial relations with the

23. 看, 除其他外, “Chegukchu˘ui ch’imnyak˘ul pandaehan˘un Iran inmind˘ur˘ui t’ujaenggojo-s˘okyu
munjee kwally˘ondoenmigug˘ui kans˘ob˘ul paegy˘ok,” Rodong sinmun, 27 可能 1951, p. 4; and “Y˘ongguk
hoesawa˘ui s˘okyu hy˘opch˘ong pijun˘un Irak’˘u ch˘onggyee ky˘okpun˘ul yagi,” Rodong sinmun, 24 二月
1952, p. 4.

24. “Referendum v Irane,” Pravda, 4 八月 1953, p. 4; and “Iran kuk’oe haesane kwanhan kung-
min t’up’yor˘ul chinhaeng,” Rodong sinmun, 10 八月 1953, p. 4 (obtained and translated by Yoo
Jinil).

25. “Proval popytki sovershit’ gosudarstvennyi perevorot v Irane,” Pravda, 17 八月 1953, p. 4.
26. “Iran sat’ae chaech’a ak’wa,” Rodong sinmun, 24 八月 1953, p. 4; and “Iranes˘o Mosadik’i
ch˘ongbur˘ul pandaehay˘o wangdangp’a k’udet’a kamhaeng,” Rodong sinmun, 28 八月 1953, p. 4
(both articles obtained and translated by Yoo Jinil).

27. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1953 (1954; 纽约: Kraus reprint, 1980), p. 152.

28. On U.S. distinctions between East Germany, 中国, and the other Communist states, see “United
States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East,” Staff Study Prepared in the Department
of State, 30 十月 1957, in FRUS, 1955–1957, 卷. XII, 医生. 270.

188

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Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran

Czechoslovak and Polish legations even after Soviet-Iranian relations turned
sour, but they did not establish any ofﬁcial contacts with North Korea, 这
PRC, or East Germany.29 North Korean interactions with Iran were lim-
ited to the occasional visits of Iranian trade union delegations in Pyongyang
(1957–1958), which were more likely to irritate than to please the Iranian
government.30

因此, North Korea could not draw any beneﬁts from the cautious rap-
prochement that occurred in Soviet-Iranian relations in 1956–1957, 尽管
Rodong sinmun dutifully covered the Shah’s visit to the USSR and the resulting
Soviet-Iranian agreements.31 The DPRK labored under even greater handicaps
than East Germany, which managed to forge at least some economic ties with
Iran by the late 1950s.32 Under such conditions, North Korean leaders seem to
have kept an eye on Iran mainly because their Soviet allies attributed great im-
portance to the country. 例如, Rodong sinmun’s reaction to the Iranian
earthquake of 2 七月 1957 stands in marked contrast with that of East Ger-
many’s party newspaper. Starting on 5 七月, Neues Deutschland carried a series
of news reports about the catastrophe, whereas Rodong sinmun said nothing
about it until 14 七月, when it announced that the USSR gave 50,000 rubles’
worth of humanitarian aid to Iran.33

在这段时期, Iraq proved an even less hospitable environment than
Iran for North Korean diplomacy. Whereas the Iranian monarchy found it ad-
visable to interact with at least a few Communist states, the Kingdom of Iraq,
having broken diplomatic relations with the USSR in January 1955, refused
to establish contacts with any Communist power, not least because it was

29. On Iran’s relations with China, East Germany, and the East European states, see Hungarian For-
eign Ministry, Memorandum, 2 八月 1965, in Hungarian National Archives (Magyar Nemzeti Lev-
éltár, MNL), XIX-J-1-j Iran, 1965, 59. doboz, IV-142, 004374/1965; Hungarian Embassy to Iran,
报告, 25 九月 1965, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iran, 1965, 59. doboz, IV-105, 004674/1965; 和
British Embassy to Tehran to the Foreign Ofﬁce, 4 十一月 1971, in The National Archives of the
英国 (TNAUK), former Public Record Ofﬁce (PRO) Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce
(FCO) 33 001346 001.
30. “Iran min t’airodongjoham chidojad˘ul P’y˘ongyange toch’ang,” Rodong sinmun, 21 十二月
1957, p. 3.
31. “Iran wangi Ssory˘on pangmun yej˘ong,” Rodong sinmun, 23 四月 1956, p. 6; and “Ssory˘on’gwa
Iran’gane kukky˘ong munjee kwanhan hy˘opch˘ong choin,” Rodong sinmun, 16 可能 1957, p. 4. 也可以看看
Roham Alvandi, “Flirting with Neutrality: The Shah, Khrushchev, and the Failed 1959 Soviet-Iranian
Negotiations,” Iranian Studies, 卷. 47, 不. 3 (2014), PP. 421–422.

32. Economic and Commercial Department of the British Embassy to Tehran to the Foreign Ofﬁce,
15 十月 1959, in TNAUK, PRO FO 371 145528 001.

33. “Erdbeben forderte 1000 Tote,” Neues Deutschland (柏林), 5 七月 1957, p. 5; “5000 Tote in Iran,”
Neues Deutschland, 6 七月 1957, p. 5; and “Ssory˘oni Iran˘ui chijin p’ihaejad˘ur˘ul wihay˘o 5man rub˘ulli
ch˘ungj˘ong,” Rodong sinmun, 14 七月 1957, p. 4.

189

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unwilling to host a Communist diplomatic mission in Baghdad.34 In 1954–
1957, Iraq routinely supported the U.S.-sponsored draft UN resolutions on
the Korean question, thus diverging from the neutrally inclined Arab states
(例如, Syria and Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt).35 不出所料, Rodong
sinmun’s articles on Iraq showed the same patterns as in earlier years. 对于前-
充足, their number (1954: 二; 1955: 十三; 1956: six; 1957: ﬁve) consis-
tently lagged behind those on Iran (1954: ﬁfteen; 1955: 21; 1956: ten; 1957:
ten). 第二, most articles were of a critical nature. Following Moscow’s lead,
Rodong sinmun condemned the Turkish-Iraqi Pact of Mutual Cooperation,
known as the Baghdad Pact, in ten articles.36

The First Breakthrough: Gradual Expansion
of Iraqi-DPRK Relations, 1958–1968

在 14 七月 1958, a miliary coup in Iraq headed by Abd al-Karim Qasim
resulted in an abrupt change in Iraq’s domestic and foreign policies, reori-
enting North Korea’s attention from Iran to Iraq and eventually enabling the
DPRK to gain a foothold in this hitherto inaccessible country. KWP lead-
ers reacted to the coup with unusual alacrity. On 15–17 July, Rodong sinmun
welcomed the Iraqi “revolution” in fourteen articles, protesting against a per-
ceived U.S. intervention plan.37 North Korea’s decision to recognize the new
republican regime, announced on 18 七月, followed the analogous steps of the
Soviet and Chinese governments (16 七月) far more closely than a few months
前, when the DPRK recognized the newly proclaimed United Arab Re-
民众 (UAR; a union of Egypt and Syria) more than a week later than the
USSR and China did.38 The North Koreans’ optimistic expectations proved
at least partly justiﬁed. As early as 19 七月, Rodong sinmun reported that the

34. British Embassy to Baghdad (赖特) to the Foreign Ofﬁce, 29 二月 1956, in TNAUK, PRO
FO 371 124301 001; and Tareq Y. Ismael and Andrej Kreutz, “Russian-Iraqi Relations: A Historical
and Political Analysis,” Arab Studies Quarterly, 卷. 23, 不. 4 (落下 2001), PP. 88–89.

35. 看, 除其他外, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1956 (纽约: United Nations Department
of Public Information, 1957), PP. 128–130; and Yearbook of the United Nations, 1957 (纽约:
United Nations Ofﬁce of Public Information, 1958), p. 90.
36. 看, 除其他外, “T’oigi-Irak’˘u choyang ch’egy˘ore kwanhan Moss˘uk’˘uba ch’ulp’anmult˘ur˘ui
ronp’y˘ong,” Rodong sinmun, 3 行进 1955, p. 4.
37. 看, 除其他外, “Irak’˘u inmind˘ul hy˘ongmy˘ong ch˘ongbur˘ury˘olly˘orhi hwany˘ong,” Rodong sin-
mun, 16 七月 1958, p. 4.
38. “Kim Ils˘ong susang Irak’˘u Konghwaguk ch’angg˘one chehay˘o Irak’˘u Konghwaguk susang Ap˘udel
K’arim K’asemege ch˘onmun,” Rodong sinmun, 18 七月 1958, p. 1.

190

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Qasim regime had restored diplomatic relations with the USSR, and later it
announced a Chinese-Iraqi agreement to exchange ambassadors.39

仍然, Iraq’s post-coup rapprochement with the Soviet bloc did not auto-
matically lead to a breakthrough between Iraq and North Korea. Paradoxically,
the distinctions that Qasim made between the various Communist states had
certain similarities with the position of the Iranian government (with which
he was on mostly bad terms). “The government of the Iraqi Republic passed
a resolution to establish diplomatic relations with the countries of the so-
cialist camp,” Ho S˘oksin, a deputy departmental head of the North Korean
Foreign Ministry, told the Communist ambassadors, “but for the time being
it does not speak about either the Mongolian People’s Republic or the Ger-
man Democratic Republic or the Democratic Republic of Vietnam or the
DPRK.”40 By November 1958, the USSR, 中国, and several East European
countries had set up embassies in Baghdad, but the East Germans had to con-
tent themselves with opening a trade ofﬁce, and the Iraqi authorities were
not yet ready to conclude any agreement with North Korea or North Viet-
nam.41 In December 1958, an Iraqi “people’s delegation” touring the Com-
munist countries visited the DPRK, where even Kim Il-Sung was ready to
meet them, but this non-governmental visit was greatly overshadowed by East
German Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl’s January 1959 trip to Baghdad.42
The fact that North Korea faced greater obstacles than China, East Germany,
and the other East European countries did in Qasim’s Iraq contradicts the nar-
ratives of Barry Gills (who strongly emphasizes the DPRK’s ability to exploit
Iraq’s “reversal from a conservative to a radical regime”) and Moon Chung-
在 (who claims that, in the 1950s, the “radical Arab countries . . . 成为
staunch supporters of, as well as spokesmen for North Korea in international
councils”).43

39. “Irak’˘u konghwaguk Ssory˘on’gwa oegyo kwan’gye hoebokk’iro ky˘olch˘ong,” Rodong sinmun, 19
七月 1958, p. 6; and “Chunggukkwa Irak’˘uga taesar˘ul kyohwanhagiro ky˘olch˘ong,” Rodong sinmun, 28
八月 1958, p. 4.

40. Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, 报告, 25 八月 1958, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1945–
1964, 5. doboz, 5/F, 005458/1958.

41. On Iraqi relations with East Germany, 匈牙利, and North Vietnam, see “Handelsvertretung in
Bagdad eröffnet,” Neues Deutschland, 21 十一月 1958, p. 5; Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告,
23 十月 1958, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1945–1964, 3. doboz, 5/C, 005947/1958; and Hungar-
ian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 30 可能 1960, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1945–1964, 3. doboz, 5/bf,
004529/1960.
42. “Kim Ils˘ong susang Irak’˘u inmin taep’yodan˘ul ch˘opky˘on,” Rodong sinmun, 13 十二月 1958,
p. 1; “Erfolgreiche Verhandlungen DDR-Irak,” Neues Deutschland, 12 一月 1959, p. 2; and Hun-
garian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 13 一月 1959, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1945–1964, 3. doboz,
5/bc, 00857/1959.

43. Gills, Korea versus Korea, p. 67; and Moon, “Between Ideology and Interest,” p. 380.

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Implying that the Iraqi government and the Communist camp had com-
mon enemies, Rodong sinmun devoted several articles to the tension that
Qasim’s coup had created in Iraq’s relations with the United States, 英国,
Turkey, and Jordan.44 In contrast, the newspaper seems to have paid little at-
tention to the growing friction between Iraq and Iran, though Iran’s hostile
attitude toward the new Iraqi government was noticed by Soviet-bloc diplo-
mats as early as September 1958. By November, Qasim had become con-
vinced that Iran and the United States were hatching a conspiracy against his
regime.45 Ironically, the factor that ﬁnally enabled North Korean diplomacy
to gain Qasim’s trust was not Iraq’s quarrel with the pro-American Iranian
government but the conﬂict that erupted between Qasim and another “pro-
gressive” Arab regime with which the DPRK had just established commercial
关系: Nasser’s UAR.46

Qasim’s cooperation with the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) aroused
Nasser’s ire, inducing him to provide covert support to a failed coup attempt
against Qasim in the city of Mosul (7–11 March 1959). Nasser’s involve-
ment in the plot triggered a ﬁerce public row between Baghdad and Cairo,
one in which the Communist powers were also caught up. Because Nasser
accused Qasim of collaborating with the “Communist agents of a foreign
power” against the UAR, the USSR and China felt compelled to weigh in
on Qasim’s side.47 In the escalating dispute, North Korean leaders followed
the line taken by their Communist allies, even though this meant confronting
the same UAR government they had eagerly engaged in 1957–1958. Having
covered the Iraqi crisis since 11 行进, Rodong sinmun had reached the point
经过 17-18 March of quoting the critical remarks that Nikita Khrushchev and
the ICP’s newspaper made about Nasser, and on 20–22 March it expressly
condemned Nasser’s anti-Communist campaign against Iraq.48

44. 看, 除其他外, “Irak’˘u ch’imgong˘ul chunbihago inn˘un T’oigie ky˘onggo (Ssory˘on ch˘ongbuga
T’oigi ch˘ongbuebimangnong ch˘ondal),” Rodong sinmun, 27 七月 1958, p. 4.

45. Hungarian Embassy to Iran, 报告, 24 九月 1958, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1945–1964,
3. doboz, 5/C, 005442/1958; and “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq,” 4
十二月 1958, in FRUS, 1958–1960, 卷. XII, 医生. 145.

46. On the establishment of a North Korean trade ofﬁce in Cairo in July 1958, see Hungarian Foreign
Ministry to the Hungarian Embassy in the UAR, 9 七月 1958, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Egypt, 1945–1964,
1. doboz, 1/A, 004488/1958.

47. Anthony Nutting, Nasser (伦敦: Constable, 1972), PP. 256–259; Johan Franzén, Red Star over
伊拉克: Iraqi Communism before Saddam (纽约: 哥伦比亚大学出版社, 2011), p. 102; 和
Yitzhak Shichor, The Middle East in China’s Foreign Policy, 1949–1977 (剑桥, 英国: 剑桥
大学出版社, 1979), p. 87.
48. 看, 除其他外, “Irak’˘u ch˘ongbugun pallan todang˘ul chinap,” Rodong sinmun, 11 行进 1959,
p. 6; “Irak’˘u sahoe y˘oron irak’˘ue taehan nasser˘u˘ui pibang˘ul kyut’an,” Rodong sinmun, 17 行进 1959,

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Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran

After the 1959 coup attempt, Qasim, who had previously tried to al-
lay Nasser’s suspicions by keeping his contacts with the Communist powers
within limits, took the opposite tack. Seeking to overcome Iraq’s diplomatic
isolation, Qasim’s government hastily signed agreements of cultural cooper-
ation with the USSR, 中国, East Germany, and ﬁve other East European
countries in April–May 1959 through a spectacular exchange of delegations.49
The DPRK also took advantage of this opportunity. The Iraqi government
invited delegations from numerous countries to celebrate the ﬁrst anniver-
sary of the “July 14 革命,” and on 4 July Rodong sinmun announced
that a North Korean government delegation would also attend the celebra-
tions.50 The delegation, headed by Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister
Nam Il, urged Qasim to establish diplomatic relations. Because the Iraqi
government was not yet ready for this step, the North Koreans had to con-
tent themselves with signing a trade and payments agreement and a cultural
cooperation agreement and with obtaining Qasim’s consent to the opening of
a DPRK trade ofﬁce in Baghdad.51 Judging from Rodong sinmun’s earlier arti-
克莱斯, the North Koreans were keenly aware of Iraq’s trade and cultural agree-
ments with East Germany and other Communist states, and they probably
cited them as precedents, asking for equal status under the principle of non-
discrimination.52 But initially the legal framework of cooperation did not put
the DPRK on a par with East Germany, which was able to open a trade ofﬁce
in Iraq a month after concluding a trade agreement. 相比之下, a Hungarian
report dated November 1960 noted that North Korea had not yet opened its
own trade ofﬁce.53

p. 6; and “Arap Y˘onhap Konghwaguk˘ui panirak’˘u kkamppaniyan˘un chegukchu˘uijad˘urege toum˘ul
chulppunida,” Rodong sinmun, 22 行进 1959, p. 6 (translated by Peter Ward).

49. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 13 一月 1959 (see note 42 supra); Hungarian Embassy to
伊拉克, 报告, 15 四月 1959, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1945–1964, 3. doboz, 5/bc, 003098/1959; 和
Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 13 可能 1959, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1945–1964, 3. doboz,
5/bc, 003098/1/1959.
50. “Irak’˘u Konghwaguk kukky˘ongj˘ol kiny˘om haengsae ch’amgahal Chos˘on Minjuju˘ui Inmin Kongh-
waguk ch˘ongbu taep’yodan P’y˘ongyang˘ul ch’ulbal,” Rodong sinmun, 4 七月 1959, p. 1.

51. Record of Conversation between Nam Il and M. Zimyanin, Head of the Far Eastern Department
of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, “K besede s Nam Irom (spravka),” 30 六月 1959 (in Russian), 在
T’ongil munhwa y˘onkuso, Py˘ongyang sory˘on taesakwan pimil s˘och’ol (Seoul: K’oria k’ont’ench’u raep,
2002), File KM012101, PP. 6–7; “Uri narawa Irak’˘u Konghwaguk kane munhwa hy˘opchoe kwanhan
hy˘opch˘ong choin,” Rodong sinmun, 26 七月 1959, p. 1; and Gills, Korea versus Korea, p. 67.
52. “Minju Togilgwa Irak’˘ugane t’ongsang hy˘opch˘ong ch’egy˘ol,” Rodong sinmun, 30 十月 1958,
p. 6; and “P’aran’gwa Irak’˘ugane munhwahy˘opchoe kwanhan hy˘opch˘ong choin,” Rodong sinmun, 5
四月 1959, p. 6.

53. Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, 报告, 21 十一月 1960, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1945–
1964, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 008454/1960.

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North Korea’s rapprochement with Iraq encountered other stumbling
blocks within less than a year. In February 1960, Qasim sought to reduce
his dependence on the ICP and the Soviet bloc by licensing an ICP faction
headed by Daud al-Sayegh, rather than the majority group, as the country’s
single legal Communist party.54 This maneuver earned the veiled disapproval
of the Communist powers, all the more so because Qasim attempted to im-
prove his relations with Iran and took repressive measures against the main
ICP group.55 North Korea reacted to the controversy in a belated and low-key
manner but in line with the position of its Communist allies. In contrast to
Neues Deutschland (which reported the ICP’s split and its conﬂict with Qasim
as early as January–February 1960), Rodong sinmun did not mention this sen-
sitive topic until 23 行进, 和, when it did so, it extensively quoted the
complaints that Zaki Khayri (a leader of the ICP’s majority group) voiced
about Qasim’s preference for Daud al-Sayegh’s faction but added no com-
ment of its own.56 Notably, the article cited China’s Xinhua News Agency as
its source.57 In February 1961, Rodong sinmun quoted the Soviet Afro-Asian
Solidarity Committee’s protest against the persecution of the ICP, then pub-
lished a similar statement issued by Pyongyang’s analogous committee.58 At
同一时间, KWP leaders had grievances of their own against Qasim. 在
1960, the Iraqi authorities invited not only a DPRK delegation to the anniver-
sary of the “July 14 Revolution” but also a South Korean delegation. 虽然
the Iraqi government did not conclude any agreement with the South Kore-
答案, the latter’s presence greatly annoyed the North Korean delegates, who did
their best to convince their hosts not to deal with the ROK.59

54. Franzén, Red Star over Iraq, PP. 112–116.

55. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 13 行进 1960, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1945–1964, 3.
doboz, 5/bc, 002979/1960; Hungarian Embassy to the USSR, 报告, 20 七月 1960, in MNL, XIX-
J-1-j Iraq, 1945–1964, 3. doboz, 5/加州, 005522/1960; 和美国. Central Intelligence Agency (中央情报局),
“The Iraq Communist Party and the Question of Legalization,” Report, 8 行进 1961, in CIA Elec-
tronic Reading Room (CERR), CIA-RDP78-00915R001300180001-7. This and all subsequently
cited CERR documents are available at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/home.
56. “Vor der Gründung geplatzt,” Neues Deutschland, 31 一月 1960, p. 7; and “Volkseinheitspartei
Iraks nicht zugelassen,” Neues Deutschland, 25 二月 1960, p. 7.
57. “Irak’˘u kongsandang˘ui chojige taehan shinch’˘onggwa kwally˘onhan Chak’i K’airi˘ui s˘ongmy˘ong,”
Rodong sinmun, 23 行进 1960, p. 4 (translated by Peter Ward).
58. “Sory˘on˘ui sahoe tanch’ed˘uri Irak’˘uaegukchad˘ure taehan pak’aer˘ul chungjishik’il k˘os˘ul Irak’˘u su-
sanges˘o yogu,” Rodong sinmun, 14 二月 1961, p. 6; and “Uri nara sahoe tanch’ed˘ures˘o Irak’˘u
Konghwaguk susangege ch˘onmun,” Rodong sinmun, 16 二月 1961, p. 3 (both articles translated
by Peter Ward).

59. Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, 报告, 21 十一月 1960, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1945–
1964, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 008454/1960.

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Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran

These disputes seem to have at least partially found reﬂection in Rodong
sinmun, which after publishing as many as 52 articles on Iraq in 1958 和
66 在 1959, made only a single brief reference to the country in April–May
1960 and carried no articles about it at all from August to December. 为了-
tunately for the DPRK, neither Qasim nor the Kremlin wanted to escalate
the ICP controversy to such an extent that it would have seriously dam-
aged Soviet-Iraqi cooperation.60 Thanks to the efforts of Soviet diplomacy,
at the UN meetings held on 12 四月 1961 和 13 十二月 1961, the Iraqi
delegation—unlike the other Arab states—voted in favor of inviting both the
DPRK and the ROK to the discussion of the Korean question.61

The process of Iraqi-DPRK rapprochement, less than smooth as it was,
inevitably overshadowed Iran in North Korean press coverage, all the more
so because Iran remained inaccessible to North Korean diplomats. Reversing
the pre-1958 trend, Rodong sinmun consistently carried fewer articles on Iran
(1958: six; 1959: 九; 1960: 二; 1961: ﬁve; 1962: 一; 1963: 一) than on
伊拉克 (1958: 52; 1959: 66; 1960: eleven; 1961: twelve; 1962: 23; 1963: 22).
开始于 1960, the number of Iran-related articles underwent a particularly
conspicuous decline, which had much in common with China’s temporary
loss of interest in Middle Eastern affairs (1960–1963) but stood in a glaring
contrast to the keen attention Neues Deutschland continued to pay to Ira-
nian politics.62 For instance, the East German newspaper covered both the
student protests of January–February 1962 and the uprising of June 1963,
whereas Rodong sinmun ignored both events.63 Judging from these patterns,
North Korea’s ﬂagging interest in Iran was a symptom of its growing inde-
pendence from the USSR (to which East Germany remained ﬁrmly loyal).
In 1958–1959, Rodong sinmun’s Iran-related articles had explicitly reﬂected
the Kremlin’s concerns about U.S.-Iranian military cooperation, but in 1960
North Korean ofﬁcials seem to have concluded that they no longer had to

60. Hungarian Embassy to the USSR, 报告, 20 七月 1960, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1945–
1964, 3. doboz, 5/加州, 005522/1960; and Oles M. Smolansky and Bettie M. Smolansky, 这
USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Inﬂuence (达勒姆, NC: 杜克大学出版社, 1991),
p. 16.

61. “Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 7 December 1960,” Archive of
Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), Fond 0102, Opis’ 16, Delo 7, Llisty 172–200,
反式. by Gary Goldberg, in Woodrow Wilson Center Digital Archive, 医生. 不. 116143; Yearbook
of the United Nations, 1960 (纽约: United Nations Ofﬁce of Public Information, 1961), p. 168;
and Yearbook of the United Nations, 1961 (纽约: United Nations Ofﬁce of Public Information,
1963), p. 137.

62. Shichor, The Middle East in China’s Foreign Policy, p. 97.

63. Davoud Norouzi, “Teheraner Studenten stürmen gegen den Pfauenthron,” Neues Deutschland, 6
二月 1962, p. 5; and “100 Tote bei Unruhen,” Neues Deutschland, 15 六月 1963, p. 5.

195

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Szalontai and Yoo

devote a large number of articles to this faraway and inaccessible country re-
gardless of whether it had attracted Pravda’s attention.

Nor did KWP leaders make any notable effort to exploit the deteriora-
tion of Iran-Iraq relations. Since May 1959, the Qasim regime and the Iranian
government had been increasingly at odds over such matters as Iranian nav-
igation rights on the Shatt al-Arab (a river constituting the southern section
of the Iran-Iraq boundary) and other territorial issues. By December 1959,
the escalating conﬂict provided an opportunity for the USSR to make further
inroads in Iraq, as it readily supplied Baghdad with torpedo boats to patrol
the disputed waters.64 Still, Rodong sinmun did not devote any articles to the
Iraqi-Iranian conﬂict, either in 1959 or in 1961–1962 (when Baghdad clashed
with Tehran over Qasim’s territorial claim to Kuwait and Iran’s covert support
to the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq).65

North Korean leaders seem to have taken this stance on the grounds that
a rift between Iraq and another Middle Eastern state was of less importance
and ideologically less useful than a conﬂict between Baghdad and the West-
ern powers. 例如, Rodong sinmun made no comment on Qasim’s ir-
redentist claim against Kuwait (25 六月 1961)—which encountered strong
opposition not only from Kuwait and Iran but also from Nasser—until 6
七月, and then it directed its criticism against Britain’s military “interference”
in the Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute, instead of siding with either Qasim or Nasser.66
Pyongyang’s position was effectively patterned on the similarly evasive atti-
tude that the USSR and China adopted toward the crisis.67 Notably, Rodong
sinmun’s 6 July article was published two days after Renmin ribao made an
authoritative statement on the dispute: “On the question of the sovereignty
of Kuwait, there exist different views among the Arab countries,” but “any

64. 中央情报局, “Central Intelligence Bulletin: Daily Brief,” 18 十二月 1959, in CERR, C03007362;
and CIA, “The Dispute over the Shatt al-Arab,” Intelligence Report, 22 一月 1960, in CERR,
CIA-RDP08C01297R000600010049-4.

65. On Iranian-Iraqi friction over Kuwait and the Kurds, see Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告,
1 七月 1961, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1945–1964, 3. doboz, 5/bf, 005692/1961; Hungarian Em-
bassy to Iraq, 报告, 25 九月 1961, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1945–1964, 3. doboz, 5/加州,
006687/1/1961; and Edgar O’Ballance, The Kurdish Struggle 1920–94 (Houndmills, 英国: Palgrave
Macmillan, 1996), p. 52.
66. “K’uweit’˘u˘ui sat’aee taehan mury˘ok kans˘ob˘ul chungjihara,” Rodong sinmun, 6 七月 1961, p. 4
(translated by Peter Ward). On Nasser’s opposition to Qasim’s territorial claim, see Nutting, Nasser,
PP. 283–285.

67. On Soviet criticism of Britain and the United States over Kuwait, see “Konﬂikt um Kuweit spitzt
sich zu,” Neues Deutschland, 2 七月 1961, p. 7.

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Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran

conﬂict among the Arab countries can only be to the advantage of imperialist
intervention and aggression.”68

This evasive and opportunistic attitude toward Middle Eastern politi-
cal altercations may have prevented KWP leaders from exploiting Qasim’s
conﬂict with Iran but ultimately enabled them to retain a foothold in Iraq
even after Qasim’s downfall, when the violent takeover of the Ba’ath Party
(8–10 February 1963) triggered an increasingly acrimonious dispute between
Baghdad and Moscow. The Communist powers were initially willing to come
to terms with the regime change in Iraq, recognizing the new administra-
tion one by one (苏联: 11 二月; 中国: 12 二月; 北朝鲜: 13
二月).69 Rodong sinmun even published a critical assessment of Qasim’s
post-1960 policies, pointing out that his campaign against the ICP had un-
dermined the stability of his regime. 同时, the article, unlike
the Soviet-bloc diplomats in Baghdad, held the Kurds, rather than Qasim,
responsible for the outbreak of the First Iraqi-Kurdish War (1961–1970)—
a view foreshadowing North Korea’s reluctance to criticize the anti-Kurdish
policies of the successive Ba’athist regimes (1963, 1968–2003).70

仍然, the Ba’ath Party’s brutal retaliation for the ICP’s pro-Qasim actions
during the coup was bound to displease the Communist powers. As early
作为 16 二月, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the So-
越南联盟 (CPSU) issued a protest against the persecution of the ICP.71 By
mid-1963, Soviet-Iraqi relations had become so hostile that the Soviet Peace
Committee appealed to the UN Security Council against the Ba’athists’
“genocidal” war against the Kurds.72 In contrast, Chinese protests, 哪个
started only on 22 二月, remained conﬁned to the sphere of mass organi-
zations and effectively ceased by mid-March.73 In July, China’s acquiescence in

68. “Stop British Armed Intervention against Kuwait! Says Jen-min Jih-pao,” New China News Agency
(北京), 4 七月 1961, quoted in Survey of China Mainland Press (我们. Consulate General in Hong
孔), 不. 2534 (11 七月 1961), p. 31.

69. “UdSSR erkennt an,” Neues Deutschland, 12 二月 1963, p. 5; Mohamed Bin Huwaidin,
China’s Relations with Arabia and the Gulf, 1949–1999 (伦敦: 劳特利奇, 2002), p. 139; 和
“Pak S˘ongch’˘ol oemusang Irak’˘u Konghwaguk oesangege ch˘onmun (urinaraj˘ongbuga Irak’˘u Kongh-
waguk shinj˘ongbur˘ul s˘unginhagiro ky˘olch˘onghan k˘otkwa kwally˘onhay˘o),” Rodong sinmun, 14 Febru-
和 1963, p. 1.
70. “Kunsa ch˘ongby˘oni ir˘onan Irak’˘u,” Rodong sinmun, 12 二月 1963, p. 3 (translated by Peter
Ward). On Soviet-bloc views about Qasim’s responsibility for the Kurdish insurgency, see Hungarian
Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 1 十一月 1961, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1945–1964, 3. doboz, 5/加州,
006687/2/1961.

71. “ZK der KPdSU brandmarkt Terror in Irak,” Neues Deutschland, 17 二月 1963, p. 7.

72. “Wieder irakische Patrioten ermordet,” Neues Deutschland, 25 六月 1963, p. 7.

73. 看, 除其他外, “ACFTU Condemns Iraqi Persecution of Communists,” New China News
机构, 22 二月 1963, quoted in Survey of China Mainland Press, 不. 2927 (我们. Consulate

197

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Ba’athist rule was clearly expressed by the attendance of high-ranking Chinese
leaders at the Iraqi ambassador’s reception, an event the Soviet-bloc diplomats
demonstratively boycotted. China was evidently more interested in exploit-
ing the Soviet-Iraqi conﬂict than in championing the cause of the pro-Soviet
ICP.74

North Korea’s attitude toward the Ba’ath regime was far closer to the
PRC’s than to Moscow’s. 从 23 二月至 20 行进, Rodong sinmun car-
ried six articles about the persecution of Iraqi Communists, but these protests
were issued by North Korean social organizations rather than the party or
state leadership.75 In April–August 1963, the newspaper pointedly ignored
伊拉克, then abruptly changed tack and devoted as many as ﬁve articles (包括-
ing an illustrated one) to the Iraqi ambassador to Beijing, who visited North
Korea to attend the celebrations of the DPRK’s ﬁfteenth anniversary and was
received with evident hospitality by KWP leaders (including Kim Il-Sung).76
Anxious to retain a foothold in Iraq, the North Koreans decided to make
their peace with the Ba’ath regime instead of confronting it in the same way
the Soviet-bloc states had and thus exposing themselves to the same kind
of retaliatory measures the latter encountered. In July 1963, Iraqi authori-
ties broke diplomatic relations with Mongolia and expelled six East European
diplomats.77

North Korean leaders had every reason to tread with caution. They would
not have been able to offset a deterioration of their relations with Iraq by
reaching out to Iran in the same way the Soviet Union did. 例如, 在
七月 1963 the USSR undertook to assist Tehran in the construction of two
dams and a hydropower station, and in November 1963 Leonid Brezhnev
(then the head of the USSR Supreme Soviet) visited Iran and invited the Shah

General in Hong Kong, 27 二月 1963), p. 29; and “Jen-min Jih-pao Commentator Protests against
Atrocities in Iraq,” New China News Agency, 15 行进 1963, quoted in Survey of China Mainland Press,
不. 2942 (我们. Consulate General in Hong Kong, 20 行进 1963), p. 27.

74. Shichor, The Middle East in China’s Foreign Policy, p. 104; and “Deterioration Continues in Soviet-
Iraqi Relations,” in Sino-Soviet Affairs (华盛顿, 直流: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence
and Research, 九月 1963), PP. 5–7, in TNAUK, PRO FO 371 171525 001.
75. 看, 除其他外, “Irak’˘u ch˘ongbun˘un Irak’˘u aegukchad˘ulgwa p’y˘onghwa t’usad˘ure taehan
pib˘opch˘ogin t’anap choch’ir˘ul ch˘ukshi ch’˘orhoehara!,” Rodong sinmun, 23 二月 1963, p. 3; 和
“Irak’˘u kongsandangw˘ond˘ure taehan t’anab˘ul chungjihara,” Rodong sinmun, 20 行进 1963, p. 3
(both articles translated by Peter Ward).
76. 看, inter alia, “Konghwaguk ch’angg˘on 15chuny˘on ky˘ongch’uk haengsae ch’amgahal Irak’˘u
Konghwaguk ch˘ongbu ch’ins˘on taep’yodoch’ak,” Rodong sinmun, 3 九月 1963, p. 1 (翻译的
by Peter Ward).

77. “Deterioration Continues in Soviet-Iraqi Relations,” p. 6.

198

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Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran

to visit the Soviet Union.78 In contrast, North Korea found itself increasingly
at odds with Iran. At the UN meeting of 11 十二月 1962, no Middle East-
ern state except Iran voted against a draft resolution on inviting both Koreas to
the debate—Iraq and ﬁve other Arab states expressed support for the proposal,
and two hitherto pro-ROK Arab countries switched to abstention.79 The Arab
states seem to have reacted to the recent establishment of Israeli–South Ko-
rean diplomatic relations (9 四月 1962), but Iran, having granted recognition
both to Israel (24 七月 1960) and the ROK (23 十月 1962), did not feel
compelled to follow suit.80 Similarly, 在 13 十二月 1963 only Iran and Is-
rael voted for a U.S.-sponsored UN resolution on the Korean question—every
other Middle Eastern state preferred to abstain.81

The Iran-DPRK rift was further deepened by the fact that North Korea’s
partners in the Middle East were at loggerheads with Tehran’s regional al-
谎言. During the North Yemen Civil War (1962–1970), Iran and South Korea
cooperated with Saudi Arabia (which actively supported the royalist forces)
and refused to grant recognition to the Egyptian-backed Yemeni Arab Repub-
利克 (YAR). 相比之下, in October 1962 KWP leaders readily recognized the
YAR—a step that helped North Korea to establish full diplomatic relations
with Nasser’s Egypt (which had broken relations with Iran in 1960).82

The precariousness of North Korea’s presence in the region was brought
into sharp relief by a new Iraqi coup in November 1963 that replaced the
Ba’ath regime with a military junta headed by Abdul Salam Arif and Abdul
Rahman Arif. Because of this unexpected regime change, North Korea’s readi-
ness to reach a modus vivendi with Ba’ath leaders became a potential liability
in the course of barely two months. Although Soviet leaders had every reason
to regard the coup as a turn for the better (a view that Isvestiya expressed as
early as 14 十一月), the North Koreans, having just reached out to the

78. “Sowjetunion unterstützt Iran,” Neues Deutschland, 29 七月 1963, p. 2; and “Breshnew: Gute
Beziehungen zu Iran,” Neues Deutschland, 19 十一月 1963, p. 5.

79. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1962 (纽约: United Nations Ofﬁce of Public Information,
1964), p. 123.

80. Guy Podoler, “Enter the ‘Far East’: Korean Culture in Early South Korea-Israel Relations,” 国际米兰-
national Journal of Cultural Policy, 卷. 20, 不. 5 (2014), p. 524; and Azad, Koreans in the Persian
Gulf, p. 21.

81. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1963 (纽约: United Nations Ofﬁce of Public Information,
1965), p. 40.

82. Hungarian Embassy to Egypt, 报告, 7 一月 1963, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Yemen, Top Secret
Documents, 1945–1964, 1, doboz, IV-10, 00434/1963; “Yemen Arap Konghwaguk susang Ab˘udulla
Sallal kak’a (Chos˘on Minjuju˘ui Inmin Konghwaguk naegak susang Kim Ils˘ong),” Rodong sinmun, 15
十月 1962, p. 1; Moon, “Between Ideology and Interest,” p. 383; and Abdeldayem M. Mubarez,
“Foreign Policy Making in the Yemen Arab Republic Civil War Period: A Study of Four Major Deci-
西翁,” 博士. Diss, 伦敦政治经济学院, 1991, PP. 41, 230.

199

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Szalontai and Yoo

Ba’ath, were less eager to welcome it. Rodong sinmun waited until 20 诺维姆-
ber to publish a single brief article about the coup, describing it in a studiously
neutral tone.83 The North Koreans seem to have tried to maintain their del-
icate foothold in Iraq no matter who happened to be in charge in volatile
Baghdad. In certain respects, this approach paid off insofar as they managed
to forge ties with the Arif regime, 也. They signed a cultural exchange plan
(一月 1964) and hosted an Iraqi cultural delegation (六月 1964) and a
reporters’ delegation (September–October 1964).84 仍然, the meagerness of
these interactions indicates that no major breakthrough had yet occurred in
Iraqi-DPRK relations. 相反, at the UN General Assembly session
的 9 十二月 1963 the Iraqi delegation abstained from voting on a draft
resolution to invite both Koreas, thus temporarily reversing the supportive
attitude that Qasim had adopted in 1961–1962.85

The complicated nature of the Iraqi political situation may be gauged
from the fact that, 二月里 1965, the post-Ba’athist authorities decided to
庆祝 8 二月 (the date of the Ba’ath’s 1963 coup) as a national hol-
iday and reprimanded the Communist diplomats (including the representa-
tive of the North Korean trade ofﬁce) who refused to offer their felicitations.86
Throughout 1965, the foreign policies of the successive Iraqi governments
were strongly inﬂuenced by their determination to suppress the Kurdish in-
surgency through military force. They adopted a reserved and sometimes crit-
ical attitude toward the USSR (which suspended its arms supplies in protest
against the Kurdish war), sought to cooperate with Western countries (从
which they obtained modern arms), and strove to achieve a rapprochement
with the Iranian government (which they tried to dissuade from assisting the
Kurds).87 Under such unfavorable conditions, Iraqi-DPRK cooperation re-
mained conﬁned to such forms as a cultural exchange plan (十月 1965)

83. “Auseinandersetzungen in Bagdad,” Neues Deutschland, 15 十一月 1963, p. 8; and “Irak’˘ues˘o
k’út’et’a palsaeng,” Rodong sinmun, 20 十一月 1963, p. 4 (translated by Peter Ward).
84. “Uri narawa Irak’˘u kan˘ui 1963–1964ny˘ondo munhwa kyoryu kyehoeks˘o choin,” Rodong sin-
mun, 26 一月 1964, p. 4; “Irak’˘u kyoyung munhwa taep’yodan toch’ak,” Rodong sinmun, 2 六月
1964, p. 3; and “Irak’˘u kija taep’yodan P’y˘ongyange toch’ak,” Rodong sinmun, 23 九月 1964,
p. 3.

85. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1963, p. 39.

86. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 17 二月 1965, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1965, 59. doboz,
IV-1, 002241/1965.

87. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 3 可能 1965, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1965, 59. doboz,
00711/2/1965; Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 6 十一月 1965, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq,
1965, 59. doboz, 0034614/14/1965; and Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 7 十一月 1965, 在
MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1965, 59. doboz, 00922/6/1965.

200

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Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran

and a trade agreement (十二月 1965).88 仍然, at the UN meeting of 20
十二月 1965 the Iraqi delegation resumed its support for the idea of invit-
ing both Koreas.89

In the spring of 1966, Iraqi leaders switched to a new approach. By ex-
pressing readiness to seek a negotiated solution to the Kurdish conﬂict, 他们
managed to persuade the USSR to resume its arms supplies to Baghdad,
whereupon Iraq’s relations with the Soviet bloc underwent a marked improve-
蒙特. This favorable atmosphere may have facilitated the efforts of a North
Korean delegation headed by Kang Ryang’uk (the vice chair of the Supreme
People’s Assembly’s Presidium) that visited Iraq in July 1966. The host au-
thorities agreed to upgrade the North Korean trade ofﬁce in Baghdad to a
consulate general (a status that East Germany had achieved as early as June
1962).90

At the UN meetings held in September and December 1966, Iraq inched
closer to the DPRK by supporting the Soviet position on key questions (在-
vitation of both Koreas, withdrawal of all foreign forces from the ROK, 和
dissolution of the UN Commission for the Uniﬁcation and Rehabilitation
of Korea, the UNCURK), 但, unlike Syria and Algeria, it continued to ab-
stain on two other issues (placing the Korean question on the agenda and
UNCURK’s report). 相比之下, Iran consistently supported the U.S. posi-
tion on all four questions, with one minor and partial exception: on the issue
of invitations, the Iranian delegation voted for the U.S. draft resolution, 但
instead of voting against the Soviet-supported proposal to invite both Koreas
(as Israel did) it preferred to abstain.91 This symbolic gesture indicated that the
gradual improvement of relations between Iran and the Soviet bloc—such as
the Shah’s visits in the USSR (June–July 1965) and a few East European coun-
尝试 (九月 1966)—induced the Iranian government to soften its stance
vis-à-vis Moscow over the Korean question. 尤其, in April 1967 a North
Korean delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister H˘o S˘oktae asked the
Hungarian Foreign Ministry to provide active support to the DPRK’s diplo-
matic initiatives, whereupon their hosts promised that they would try to sway
Iran to adopt a more favorable attitude toward North Korea. At the same

88. “Uri narawa Irak’˘u kane 1965–1966ny˘ondo munhwa kyoryu kyehoeks˘o choin,” Rodong sinmun,
7 十月 1965, p. 4; and Azad, Koreans in the Persian Gulf, p. 76.

89. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1965 (纽约: United Nations Ofﬁce of Public Information,
1967), p. 184.

90. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 6 二月 1967, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1967, 47. doboz,
001377/1967; and “DDR-Generalkonsulat in Irak,” Neues Deutschland, 18 六月 1962, p. 2.

91. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1966 (纽约: United Nations Ofﬁce of Public Information,
1968), p. 143–145.

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Szalontai and Yoo

时间, the meagerness of Iran’s gesture also revealed how limited the beneﬁts
were that North Korea could draw from the Soviet-Iranian rapprochement.92
Under such conditions, Rodong sinmun continued to ignore Iran.

In the wake of the disastrous Six-Day War (5–10 June 1967), Iraq’s pub-
lic attitude toward the Korean question underwent a drastic change. 在
UN meetings held in October–November 1967, the Iraqi delegation actively
supported the Soviet position on every Korea-related dispute, including ques-
tions on which it had abstained in earlier years. Because Iraq, unlike front-line
Egypt and Syria, had not received economic or military aid from North Korea
in the aftermath of the 1967 战争, this sudden policy shift cannot be easily
explained within the framework of bilateral relations. North Korea’s vocal sol-
idarity with the Arab side and South Korea’s perceived pro-Israel stance must
have been an important factor (as suggested by Gills). In the fall of 1967,
when the DPRK’s deputy consul general asked Iraqi Foreign Minister Ismail
Khairallah whether the Iraqi authorities intended to receive a South Korean
goodwill delegation touring the Middle East, Khairallah responded with an
emphatic “no” on the grounds that “during the Israeli aggression, the South
Korean government showed an unfriendly attitude toward the collective Arab
struggle.” Still, the pro-Western Arab states (约旦, Lebanon, Tunisia, 和
the Kingdom of Libya) continued to abstain during UN votes on Korea, 和
Saudi Arabia, 约旦, and Kuwait were willing to receive the same South Ko-
rean delegation to which Iraq denied entry.93

In all probability, Iraqi leaders modiﬁed their UN position to please the
苏联, whose material assistance they greatly needed to recover from the un-
expected defeat. As early as 7 六月, the Iraqi government asked for immediate
Soviet military aid, and by July the state-controlled Iraqi media were effusively
praising the support provided by the Communist states.94 The Six-Day War
built new bridges between the militant Arab states and the Soviet bloc. 这
hardline Arab states severed diplomatic relations with the United States, 和
the Soviet-bloc countries other than Romania broke relations with Israel. 不是

92. Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Memorandum, 24 四月 1967, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Files unrelated
to individual countries, 1967, 103. doboz, V-40, 001509/2/1967; and Hungarian Foreign Ministry,
Memorandum, 27 二月 1968, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iran, 1968, 44. doboz, 63, 001478/1968.

93. Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Memorandum, 12 十月 1967, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j South Korea,
1967, 61. doboz, 81, 003977/1967; Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 29 十一月 1967, 在
MNL, XIX-J-1-j South Korea, 1967, 61. doboz, 81, 003977/1/1967; Yearbook of the United Nations,
1967 (纽约: United Nations Ofﬁce of Public Information, 1969), PP. 148–150; and Gills, 韩国
versus Korea, PP. 114, 164.

94. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 22 六月 1967, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1967, 47. doboz,
62–42, 003395/1967; and Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 13 七月 1967, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j
伊拉克, 1967, 47. doboz, 62–221, 001374/7/1967.

202

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Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran

only Iraq but also Egypt, 叙利亚, and Algeria adopted a consistently pro-Soviet
stand on the Korean question, and they also offered facilities to the Soviet
navy. 相比之下, no Middle Eastern states other than Iran and Israel gave
consistent support to the U.S. position on Korea.95

The post–Six-Day War shift in Iraq’s foreign policy also enabled North
Korea to establish ambassadorial relations with Iraq. The ofﬁcial date of this
act (30 一月 1968) reveals that it was carried out by the relatively non-
ideological administration of Abdul Rahman Arif (16 April 1966–17 July
1968), rather than by the radical Ba’ath leaders who deposed him half a year
之后 (as Shirzad Azad erroneously claims).96 再次, the broader diplo-
matic context of the event needs to be taken into consideration. 伊拉克, hav-
ing broken diplomatic relations with Mongolia in 1963, restored ties at the
ambassadorial level in November 1967, shortly before establishing an analo-
gous relationship with the DPRK. In March 1968, the Hungarian embassy in
Baghdad reported that in recent months the Iraqi government had dispatched
ambassadors to nearly every Soviet-bloc country and opened a consulate gen-
eral in East Berlin. Ambassadorial relations with North Vietnam were estab-
lished a few days before the Ba’athist coup of 17 七月 1968.97 因此, the act
that crowned the decade-long process of Iraqi-DPRK rapprochement cannot
be attributed solely to North Korea’s own efforts but must also be credited to
Iraq’s desire to broaden its institutional contacts with as many Communist
countries as possible.

Benefiting from the Iraq-Iran Conflict: The DPRK
and the Ba’ath Regime, 1968–1972

The Ba’athist takeover in Baghdad gave an additional impetus to Iraqi–North
Korean collaboration. 不像 1963 Ba’ath regime, the new leaders opted
for a course of enhanced cooperation with the Soviet bloc as early as August
1968 (when they approved of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia),
not least because both the pro-American Iranian monarchy and numerous

95. Saïd K. Aburish, Nasser: The Last Arab (纽约: 英石. 马丁出版社, 2004), p. 292; and Yearbook
of the United Nations, 1967, PP. 148–150.

96. Moon, “Between Ideology and Interest,” p. 383; and Azad, Koreans in the Persian Gulf, p. 76.

97. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 30 十一月 1967, in MNL, XIX-J-1-k Iraq, 1967, 20.
doboz, 2623/5/1967; Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 13 行进 1968, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq,
45. doboz, 62-2, 001006/1/1968; Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Memorandum, 20 七月 1968, 在
MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1968, 45. doboz, 62-2, 002947/1/1968; and “Minister Sölle empﬁng irakischen
Generalkonsul,” Neues Deutschland, 21 十二月 1967, p. 2.

203

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Szalontai and Yoo

Arab states—Egypt, 叙利亚, and Algeria—adopted a reserved and distrustful
attitude toward Iraq.98 The process of Iran-Iraq rapprochement initiated by
Arif in 1966 abruptly ground to a halt, and numerous armed border incidents
took place. Seeking to disrupt Iran’s support to the Kurds, the Ba’ath regime
in January–February 1969 held show trials whose Jewish and “reactionary”
defendants were convicted (and publicly executed) on spurious charges of es-
pionage for the United States, 以色列, and Iran, whereupon in April the Ira-
nian government abrogated the 1937 Iraq-Iran treaty over the Shatt al-Arab.99
作为回应, Ba’ath leaders further broadened their contacts with the Soviet
bloc. 在 10 可能 1969, they established ambassadorial relations with East
德国, coaxing the latter into making a public statement that condemned
Iran’s hostile acts against Iraq (for which the Iranian government promptly
retaliated by halting all trade relations with East Germany).100

North Korean leaders must have found these developments advantageous
to their interests. In the ﬁrst ﬁve months of 1969, Rodong sinmun carried as
many as six articles about the Ba’ath Party’s repressive measures against the al-
leged U.S. and Israeli spies (8 一月, 30–31 January, 2 二月, 22 四月, 24
可能), taking a laudatory tone that stood in sharp contrast to the single laconic
article that Neues Deutschland published about the spy hunt and the critical
comments that various Arab newspapers (例如, Egypt’s semi-ofﬁcial Al-Ahram)
made on the public hangings.101 In an interview given to Iraq’s state-run news
机构, Kim Il-Sung described the hangings as a “perfectly correct action,”
declaring: “You must have no mercy on imperialist spies who menace your

98. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 26 九月 1968, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1968, 45.
doboz, 62, 002947/9/1968; and Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 18 十一月 1968, in MNL,
XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1968, 45. doboz, 62-1, 001008/1/1968.

99. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 27 一月 1969, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1969, 46. doboz,
62-1, 001281/1969; Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 27 一月 1969, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq,
1969, 46. doboz, 62-2, 001280/1/1969; and Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 2 四月 1969, 在
MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1969, 46. doboz, 62-1, 001280/3/1969.

100. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 14 可能 1969, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1969, 46. doboz,
62-1, 001282/2/1969; “Kommuniqué DDR-Irak,” Neues Deutschland, 11 可能 1969, p. 2; and British
Embassy to Tehran to the Foreign Ofﬁce, 4 十一月 1971, in TNAUK, FCO 33 001346 001.
101. 看, 除其他外, “Irak’˘ues˘o p’agoehwaltong˘ul kamhaenghary˘od˘on Mije˘ui apchabi Is˘urael
kanch’˘omnomd˘ur˘ul chaep’an,” Rodong
sinmun, 8 一月 1969, p. 5; “Irak’˘ues˘o Mije˘ui
kanch’˘opt˘ur˘ul tanhohi ch’˘odan,” Rodong sinmun, 30 一月 1969, p. 4; “Mijungangj˘ongbogug˘ui
kanch’˘obaktangd˘ure taehan Irak’˘uj˘ongbu˘ui chun˘omhan chingb˘ol,” Rodong sinmun, 31 一月 1969,
p. 4 (all three articles translated by Hanna Kim); “Spione in Irak zum Tode verurteilt,” Neues Deutsch-
土地, 21 二月 1969, p. 7; and “Moscow Says Executions Were ‘Justiﬁed’ While Arab World Takes
Dim View of Spectacle,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency Daily News Bulletin, 卷. 36, 不. 23 (3 二月
1969), p. 2.

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Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran

country’s sovereignty and security.”102 By North Korean standards, public ex-
ecutions were perfectly comme il faut as long as they expressed Iraq’s readiness
to confront “American imperialism.”

The DPRK beneﬁted from Iraq’s worsening relations with Iran and the
Western powers and Iraq’s rapprochement with the Soviet bloc. 在八月
1969, Iraq joined the Arab states that cosponsored a Soviet-backed draft res-
olution calling for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea (a gesture
that only Algeria and Syria had made in 1966–1968). 在 3 十月 1969, 一个
Iraqi UN delegate mentioned Korea in his opening speech for the ﬁrst time,
discussing it together with the Arab-Israeli conﬂict, the Iran-Iraq dispute, 这
Vietnam War, and East Germany.103 In previous years, Iraqi opening speeches,
focused as they were on Israel and other Middle East problems, consistently
ignored Korea. As late as October 1968 (IE。, after the Ba’ath takeover), 这
Iraqi delegation linked the problem of Palestine only with Vietnam and Africa,
making no reference to Korea, 伊朗, or Germany.104

Despite the signiﬁcant (和, from North Korea’s perspective, advanta-
geous) role that the Iran-Iraq conﬂict played in Baghdad’s post-1968 policy
转移, Rodong sinmun paid peculiarly little, 如果有的话, attention to it. Of the six
articles about the alleged espionage against Iraq, only two mentioned Iran’s
involvement, and even these brief references targeted the U.S. consulate in
Abadan (30 一月) 和美国. military forces stationed in Iran (2 Febru-
和), rather than the Iranian government.105 Although the ﬁrst Iraqi trials did
single out Israel and the United States as the prime culprits, Rodong sinmun’s
exclusive focus on the United States and Israel persisted as late as 24 可能;
那是, after the Iraqi authorities had staged new spy trials explicitly directed
against Iran. 例如, ﬁve people were sentenced to death on 12 可能
1969 for spying for Iranian and Israeli intelligence.106 Nor did Rodong sinmun
cover the Iran-Iraq dispute over Tehran’s unilateral abrogation of the 1937
treaty or publish any articles speciﬁcally about Iran throughout 1969.

102. Kim Il-Sung, “Answers to Questions Raised by Taha al-Basri, Assistant Director General of the
Iraqi News Agency,” 1 七月 1969, in Kim-Il Sung, Works, 卷. 24 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages
Publishing House, 1986), PP. 80–81.

103. United Nations General Assembly, 24th Session, 1777th Plenary Meeting, 3 十月 1969, 的-
ﬁcial Records, A/PV.1777, PP. 8–11.

104. United Nations General Assembly, 23rd Session, 1691st Plenary Meeting, 11 十月 1968,
Ofﬁcial Records, A/PV.1691, p. 3.
105. “Irak’˘ues˘o Mije˘ui kanch’˘opt˘ur˘ul,” p. 4; and “Irak’˘ues˘o Mije˘ui kanch’˘opt˘ure taehan saeroun
chaep’an˘ul kaeshi,” Rodong sinmun, 2 二月 1969, p. 4 (both articles translated by Hanna Kim).
106. “‘Spies’ Given Death Penalty,” Canberra Times, 14 可能 1969, p. 5; and “Irak’˘ues˘o
chegukchu˘uijad˘ur˘ui chojonghae kanch’˘op’aengwir˘ul kamhaenghan panhy˘ongmy˘ongbunjad˘ur˘ul
ch’˘odan,” Rodong sinmun, 24 可能 1969, p. 5 (translated by Hanna Kim).

205

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Szalontai and Yoo

Because North Korea lacked any contacts with Iran and the latter’s voting
record in the UN was consistently at odds with the DPRK’s interests, 北
Korea’s conspicuous silence cannot be attributed to the sort of considerations
that motivated Soviet neutrality on the Shatt al-Arab dispute. Soviet lead-
ers had a stake in remaining on good terms with both Baghdad and Tehran,
whereas North Korea had little to lose by confronting Iran.107 Indeed, 这
North Koreans must have been dismayed by Iran’s decision to sign a treaty of
friendship with South Korea on 5 可能 1969.108 即使是这样, the North Koreans
refrained from openly taking sides in the Iran-Iraq conﬂict, probably on the
grounds that a recurrent territorial dispute between Iraq and another Middle
Eastern country, like the Iraqi–Kuwaiti dispute of 1961, was ideologically less
useful and of lower strategic importance than a conﬂict between Baghdad and
the “main enemy”: 美国. The diversity of Arab reactions to the
Shatt al-Arab dispute also militated in favor of a cautious approach, as Syria’s
pro-Iraq stance stood in marked contrast to Egypt’s impartial attitude.109

North Korea’s determination to avoid taking sides in the Iran-Iraq dispute
manifested itself in an especially clear form in the aftermath of a failed Iraqi
coup attempt in which the Iranian government was deeply involved (20–21
一月 1970). Ba’ath leaders did their best to expose Iran’s role in the plot,
expelling the Iranian ambassador and four other diplomats and closing the
Iranian consulates in Baghdad, Karbala, and Basra.110 In contrast, the two ar-
ticles Rodong sinmun published about the crushed plot (23–24 January 1970)
expressed support for the Iraqi government’s punitive measures but made
no reference to Iran; 反而, they singled out the United States, 以色列, 和
West Germany as the powers conspiring against the “anti-imperialist” Iraqi
regime.111 Rodong sinmun’s silence on Iran’s role appears particularly conspic-
uous if compared with Neues Deutschland’s attitude. On 22–30 January 1970,
the East German newspaper devoted as many as eight articles to the plot.

107. On Soviet attitudes toward the Shatt al-Arab dispute, see Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Memo-
randum, 23 可能 1969, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1969, 46. doboz, 62-1, 001281/3/1969.

108. “S. 韩国, Iran Sign Treaty,” Canberra Times, 6 可能 1969, p. 7.

109. Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, The Foreign Relations of Iran: A Developing State in a Zone of
Great-Power Conﬂict (伯克利: University of California Press, 1974), p. 166.

110. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 19 二月 1970, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1970, 43.
doboz, 62, 00947/2/1970; and Bryan R. 吉布森, Sold Out? US Foreign Policy, 伊拉克, the Kurds, 和
冷战 (纽约: 帕尔格雷夫·麦克米伦, 2015), PP. 122–123.
111. “Irak’˘u inmin˘un pandongnomd˘ur˘ui majimaksogulkkaji ch’˘olch˘ohi sot’angham˘uross˘o mod˘un
panhy˘ongmy˘ongj˘ok˘ummor˘ul chonggukch˘ok˘uro punswaehagoya mal,” Rodong sinmun, 23 Jan-
尤里 1970, p. 5;
sach’ongmit’e
panj˘ongbu˘ummor˘ul kkuminbanhy˘ongmy˘ongbunjad˘ur˘ul ch’˘ohy˘ong,” Rodong sinmun, 24 一月
1970, p. 5 (both articles translated by Hanna Kim).

and “Irak’˘u t’˘ukpy˘olgunsajaep’ansoga

chegukchu˘uijad˘ur˘ui

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Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran

Although the East German newspaper focused its attacks on West Germany’s
alleged involvement, it also enumerated many speciﬁc details about Iran’s role
in the conspiracy and later criticized Iran’s military threats against Iraq.112 Ira-
nian diplomats promptly complained that the Soviet bloc’s press reports on
the incident were based exclusively on the Iraqi narrative.113

But if North Korea’s attitude toward the Iran-Iraq conﬂict was less close
to Baghdad’s position than that of the Soviet-bloc states, the reverse was true
as far as Israel was concerned. Fixated as the radical Ba’ath leaders were on the
armed liberation of Palestine, they deplored Moscow’s willingness to seek a ne-
gotiated solution to the Middle East crisis and showed a palpable preference
for the Communist regimes that took an uncompromising stance vis-à-vis
以色列. The Iraqis also sought to avoid entanglement in the Sino-Soviet con-
ﬂict. These considerations made them especially favorably disposed toward
North Korea and North Vietnam, which had a long record of armed struggle
against the United States, lacked any contacts with Israel, and sought to guard
their independence from both Communist giants. 像这样, they could be ex-
pected to provide open or tacit political support to Iraq’s militant position
and thus alleviate the isolation that the extremist Ba’ath leaders faced within
the Arab world.114 Unlike the USSR and China, the DPRK did not recog-
nize Israel’s right to exist. In July 1970, when Nasser and the Soviet Union
expressed their readiness to accept a ceaseﬁre plan proposed by U.S. Secretary
of State William P. 罗杰斯, the North Korean media did not condemn these
diplomatic initiatives as explicitly as China did but pointedly ignored them.
反而, the North Koreans praised the armed struggle of the Palestinian guer-
rillas, both against Israel and against King Hussein during the Jordanian Civil
战争 (16–27 September 1970).115 These views were in accordance with the
standpoint of the radical Ba’ath leaders, who had deplored the Rogers Plan
and encouraged the Palestinian guerrillas to topple Hussein.116

112. 看, 除其他外, “Putschisten verurteilt,” Neues Deutschland, 23 一月 1970, p. 7; and “Iran
auf dem Schachbrett der USA-Globalstrategen,” Neues Deutschland, 11 二月 1970, p. 7.

113. Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Memorandum, 4 二月 1970, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iran, 1970,
43. doboz, 63-146, 001065/1/1970.

114. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 年度报告, 17 六月 1970, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1970, 43.
doboz, 62-142, 002264/1/1970.

115. Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, 报告, 一月 20, 1971, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1971,
68. doboz, 82, 001209/1971; and Moon, “Between Ideology and Interest,” p. 403. On China’s posi-
的, see Shichor, The Middle East in China’s Foreign Policy, PP. 149, 176.

116. Bruce Riedel, “Fifty Years after ‘Black September’ in Jordan,” Studies in Intelligence, 卷. 64, 不. 2
(2020), p. 37.

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Szalontai and Yoo

反过来, the North Koreans evidently welcomed Iraq’s decision to rec-
ognize Norodom Sihanouk’s Beijing-based government-in-exile (其中
DPRK recognized as early as 7 可能 1970 but which the USSR declined
to recognize until 1973) as the sole legal government of Cambodia. 对于在-
姿态, in June–July 1970 Rodong sinmun carried three articles on Sihanouk’s
meetings with the Iraqi ambassador to Pyongyang and a delegation of Iraqi
journalists.117 The far-reaching (but not complete) consensus between Iraqi
and North Korean views was summed up in Iraqi Foreign Minister Abdul
Karim al-Shaikhly’s speech at the UN on 30 九月 1970, which casti-
gated “Zionist aggression,” rejected the Rogers Plan, held the United States
responsible for the Jordanian Civil War, expressed unconditional support to
Sihanouk and the “just struggle of the Vietnamese people,” and condemned
美国. occupation of South Korea, but also devoted ﬁve whole paragraphs
to the Iran-Iraq dispute—a theme Rodong sinmun continued to ignore.118

In the spring of 1971, Iraqi–North Korean cooperation reached its zenith
in several respects. 第一的, the bilateral partnership was extended to the sphere
of interparty relations. In April, Iraqi leaders sent a combined delegation from
the Ba’ath Party and the government to the DPRK, and on 24–31 May a
KWP-government delegation headed by Vice Premier Pak S˘ongch’˘ol visited
Iraq.119 These mutual visits constituted a new phenomenon. 从 1959 到
1968, North Korean leaders had sent only government delegations to partici-
pate in the annual celebrations of Iraq’s “July 14 革命,” but from 1969
on they also dispatched combined party and government delegations, 因此
indicating their readiness to establish interparty relations with the Ba’ath.120
Ba’ath leaders were similarly interested in forging such ties, though for rea-
sons of their own. Seeking to isolate and suppress the domestic Communist
movement, they forcefully insisted on establishing interparty relations with

除其他外,

“K’ambojyagukka w˘onsuimy˘o K’ambojya minjok t’ongilch˘ons˘on
117. 看,
wiw˘onjangin Norodom Shihanuk’˘uch’inwangi uri narae wainn˘un Irak’˘u Konghwaguk taesar˘ul man-
natta,” Rodong sinmun, 20 六月 1970, p. 2. On North Korea’s support to Sihanouk’s exile government,
see Balázs Szalontai, “In the Shadow of Vietnam: A New Look at North Korea’s Militant Strategy,
1962–1970,” Journal of Cold War Studies, 卷. 14, 不. 4 (2012), p. 162.

118. United Nations General Assembly, 25th Session, 1854th Plenary Meeting, 30 九月 1970,
Ofﬁcial Records, A/PV.1854, PP. 13–16.
119. “Chos˘on Rodongdang chungangwiw˘onhoewa Chos˘on Minjuju˘ui Inmin Konghwaguk nae-
gages˘o Arap Sahoebuh˘ungdang mit Irak’˘u Konghwaguk ch˘ongbudaep’yodan˘ui urinara pangmun˘ul
hwany˘onghay˘o y˘onhoer˘ul ch’ary˘otta,” Rodong sinmun, 22 四月 1971, p. 1; and Hungarian Embassy
飞往伊拉克, 报告, 21 六月 1971, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1971, 66. doboz, 81-10, 002560/1971.
120. “Urinara tang mit ch˘ongbudaep’yodani Irak’˘u Konghwaguk taet’ongny˘ong˘ul pangmun,” Rodong
sinmun, 23 七月 1969, p. 1.

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Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran

the friendly Communist regimes to dissuade the latter from maintaining con-
tacts with the ICP.121

As far as the Soviet bloc was concerned, Iraq’s efforts were only partly
successful because the USSR and its satellites opted for dual-track diplomacy.
例如, the Soviet hosts of an international Communist meeting held
in April 1970 invited both an ICP delegation and a Ba’ath delegation and
later criticized the Iraqi regime’s repressive measures against Communists.122
相比之下, Chinese leaders rebuffed the Ba’ath’s request to establish inter-
party relations, but they also scorned the pro-Soviet ICP, from which only a
small radical faction broke away to follow the Chinese line.123

Under such conditions, Ba’ath leaders probably appreciated that North
Korea was closer than either the Soviet Union or China to Iraq’s position on
various matters. The North Koreans sought to expand their inﬂuence in Iraq
by pursuing interparty cooperation with the Ba’ath Party but adopted a ne-
glectful attitude toward the ICP (whose pro-Soviet line had little in common
with their own). In 1964–1972, Rodong sinmun largely ignored the ICP. 为了
实例, it did not cover the party’s Second Congress (九月 1970) 在
the same way Pravda and Neues Deutschland did.124 When the KWP held its
own Fifth Congress (2–13 November 1970), the North Korean press men-
tioned the congratulations of the ICP, but the Iraqi newspapers whose fa-
vorable comments on the congress were quoted in Rodong sinmun lacked
any afﬁliation with the ICP. 相反, al-Thawra and al-Jumhuriyya
were mouthpieces of the Ba’ath Party and the Iraqi government respectively.125
These newspapers’ willingness to publish North Korean propaganda materi-
als implied a close relationship between Pyongyang and Baghdad. Ordinarily,
Soviet-bloc embassies had difﬁculty publishing their own articles in these two
North Korean dailies. 仍然, Rodong sinmun’s claims about how effusively the
Iraqi press hailed Kim Il-Sung must be read with caution. The intensity of
this propaganda reveals more about the vast amounts of money Pyongyang

121. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 年度报告, 17 六月 1970, in MNL.

122. “Liste der Delegationen,” Neues Deutschland, 23 四月 1970, p. 3; and Francis Fukuyama, 这
Soviet Union and Iraq since 1968, RAND Note N-1524-AF (圣莫妮卡, CA: RAND Corporation,
1980), PP. 28–29.

123. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 6 二月 1972, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1972, 45. doboz,
62-10, 001577/1972; and Haﬁzullah Emadi, “China and Iraq: Patterns of Interaction, 1960–1992,”
Economic and Political Weekly, 卷. 29, 不. 53 (1994), p. 3316.

124. “Parteitag der irakischen Kommunisten,” Neues Deutschland, 27 九月 1970, p. 7.

chungang

(Pyongyang: Chos˘on
125. Chos˘on
ch’ulp’anmulsuch’uripsa, 2004) (obtained and translated by Peter Ward); and “Chos˘on Rodongdang
chungangwiw˘onhoe chuwie ch˘onch’edangw˘ond˘ulgwa k˘ullojad˘ur˘un kutke tan’gy˘oltoey˘oitta,” Rodong
sinmun, 14 十一月 1970, p. 11 (translated by Hanna Kim).

(1970–1979), K’˘omp’yut’˘ojaryo

ny˘on’gam 4

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Szalontai and Yoo

invested in such activities than about the ideological afﬁnities of the Iraqi
报纸. 在 1970, the North Korean press secretary readily paid the Bagh-
dad Observer 250–300 Iraqi dinars for the publication of a single Kim Il-Sung
speech, whereas the Polish embassy could not afford to pay more than ten to
ﬁfteen dinars per article.126

第二, the mutual visits of April–May 1971 brought a sea change in
North Korea’s hitherto evasive and indifferent attitude toward the territo-
rial conﬂict between Iraq and Iran. In the joint communiqué published on 2
六月 1971, the DPRK delegation expressed its “full support” for Iraq’s stand-
point not only with regard to the Palestinian resistance movement and the
Oman-based Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf
(PFLOAG) but also with regard to the Shatt al-Arab dispute—a statement
that the Hungarian embassy in Baghdad correctly interpreted as an “indirect
thrust against Iran.” Actually, the two governments proved more able to reach
a full consensus over the Shatt al-Arab question than over certain other issues.
At a mass meeting held in Baghdad’s Khuld Hall, the DPRK delegates readily
joined their hosts in denouncing the Rogers Plan, but the resulting commu-
niqué sidestepped this thorny issue, presumably because the North Koreans
wanted to avoid offending the Egyptian government (哪个, unlike Iraq, 有
accepted the Rogers Plan). Because the DRPK maintained full diplomatic re-
lations with Egypt but lacked any contacts with Iran, North Korean leaders
seem to have concluded that confronting Iran carried less risk than challeng-
ing Egypt. Their extensive but still partial adaptation to Iraq’s priorities was
mirrored by the attitude of the Ba’ath leaders, who readily condemned “Amer-
ican imperialism” and the “Park Chung Hee clique” in the joint communiqué
but refused to denounce Japan (as the North Korean delegation would have
preferred).127

From the perspective of the Ba’ath leaders, North Korea’s public endorse-
ment of their territorial claims against Iran must have been a much-welcomed
gesture, all the more so because they could not expect the Soviet-bloc coun-
tries to act likewise. During the subsequent visit of Soviet Deputy Prime
Minister Vladimir Novikov (16–24 June 1971), Iraqi leaders made a sim-
ilar effort to persuade the Soviet delegation to condemn Iran in the joint
communiqué, but Novikov rebuffed their request on the grounds that “the
good relationship between the USSR and Iran was ultimately advantageous to

126. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 17 二月 1970, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1970, 43.
doboz, 62-81, 001319/1970.

127. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 21 六月 1971.

210

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Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran

Iraq’s interests, too.”128 Thus, the support Iraq received from North Korea
at Iran’s expense helped the DPRK to forge a “special relationship” with the
Ba’ath regime. Iraqi leaders’ public statements about North Korea’s economic
and social achievements explicitly attributed these successes to Kim Il-Sung’s
chuch’e idea, a doctrine the Kremlin was as reluctant to praise as it was to en-
dorse Iraq’s territorial claims. Their welcoming ceremony for the DPRK del-
egation headed by Vice Premier and KWP Politburo member Pak S˘ongch’˘ol
met the standards of a full state visit, whereas Novikov was greeted with per-
ceptibly less pomp and ceremony.129

在 30 十一月 1971, the forcible Iranian seizure of the islands of Abu
Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs (which then belonged to the newly
formed United Arab Emirates, although Iran claimed them on the basis of
earlier Persian ownership) brought the growing tension between Iraq and Iran
to the breaking point. The Ba’ath leaders, imbued with a radical pan-Arab na-
tionalist outlook, refused to accept any sort of foreign (British or Iranian) 骗局-
trol over what they called the Arabian Gulf. As early as July 1971, 他们寻求
to use the issue of Iran’s ambitions in the Gulf as a rallying point for inter-Arab
合作 (and thus overcome the isolation they continued to face within
the Arab world).130 现在, in response to the Iranian occupation of the is-
lands, they promptly broke diplomatic relations with Tehran, and on 3 的-
十二月 1971 they joined forces with Algeria, South Yemen, and Muammar
al-Qadhaﬁ’s Libya to place the issue on the agenda of the UN Security
Council.131

At ﬁrst sight, North Korea’s reaction to Iraq’s new conﬂict with Iran
seemed fully in accordance with the joint communiqué of 2 六月 1971. 在
28 十二月, Rodong sinmun published an article whose very title (“Egypt,
伊拉克, and other Arab and African countries condemned the criminal act of
伊朗, which occupied three islands in the Persian Gulf”) expressed evident
sympathy with Iraq’s position.132 As such, it stood in marked contrast to the

128. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 17 七月 1971, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1971, 52. doboz,
62-10, 001791/4/1971.

129. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 21 六月 1971; and Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 17
七月 1971.

130. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 15 八月 1971, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Arab states, 1971, 108.
doboz, 202-10, 001253/10/1971.

131. For an overview of the crisis, see Kourosh Ahmadi, Islands and International Politics in the Persian
Gulf: Abu Musa and the Tunbs in Strategic Perspective (伦敦: 劳特利奇, 2008), PP. 101–109.

132. “Aegeupgwa Irakeureul birotan yeoreo Arapnaradeulgwa Apeurikanaradeureseo Pereusyamanui
3gae seomeul gangjeomhan Iranui beomjoehaengwireul gyutan,” Rodong sinmun, 28 十二月 1971,
p. 6.

211

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Szalontai and Yoo

noncommittal stance that both the USSR and China adopted toward the dis-
pute. Even though Soviet ofﬁcials viewed Iran’s forceful seizure of the islands
as incompatible with international law, they also believed that Iran’s territo-
rial claims had merit and that Iraq’s standpoint (IE。, confronting Iran over an
area that had not been a part of Iraq’s territory) was “of a peculiar nature.”133
仍然, Rodong sinmun’s article was published nearly a month after the outbreak
of the crisis, whereas Neues Deutschland devoted two brief factual articles to
the dispute as early as the ﬁrst days of December.134 The North Korean out-
let’s conspicuous delay implies that KWP leaders initially tried to dodge this
thorny issue and that, when they ﬁnally took a stand against Iran, they did so
under pressure from Iraq and the other radical Arab states.135

Because North Korean leaders had explicitly sided with Iraq against Iran
in the joint communiqué of 2 六月 1971, their conspicuous slowness in adopt-
ing a similar position only six months later may appear strange. One factor
that probably inﬂuenced their attitude was that on 17 八月 1971 (之间
the two events described above), Iran established diplomatic relations with
China—a decision promptly reported by Rodong sinmun.136 During this pe-
里约德, Sino-North Korean relations were perceptibly closer than Soviet-North
Korean relations, and thus leaders in Pyongyang were presumably reluctant
to confront a country with which their chief ally had just reached a rap-
prochement.137 The North Koreans may have also taken into consideration
that the various Arab states were by no means of one mind about how to re-
spond to Iran’s action. 例如, Egypt—a country speciﬁcally mentioned
in Rodong sinmun’s 28 December article—argued that the issue should be
handled by the Arab League rather than the UN Security Council (the venue
chosen by Iraq).138 Having refrained from challenging Egypt in the June 1971

133. Hungarian Embassy to the USSR, 报告, 16 十二月 1971, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Arab states,
1971, 108. doboz, 202-10, 001253/31/1971; and Mohamed Mousa Mohamed Ali Binhuwaidin,
“China’s Foreign Policy towards the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Region, 1949–1999,” Ph.D. 指责。,
University of Durham, 2001, p. 350.

134. “Iran besetzte drei Golﬁnseln,” Neues Deutschland, 1 十二月 1971, p. 7; and “Irak brach
Beziehungen ab,” Neues Deutschland, 2 十二月 1971, p. 7.

135. A parallel may be drawn with Rodong sinmun’s similarly much-belated reaction to Anwar al-
Sadat’s 1977 visit to Israel, an attitude that reﬂected North Korea’s delicate maneuvering between
埃及 (which expected Pyongyang to welcome Sadat’s initiative) and the radical Arab states (哪个
condemned Sadat’s action). See Szalontai, “Courting the ‘Traitor to the Arab Cause,’” pp. 119–120.
136. “Chunggukkwa Irani oegyogwan’gyer˘ul surip,” Rodong sinmun, 20 八月 1971, p. 6.

137. Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng, A Misunderstood Friendship: Mao Zedong, Kim Il-sung, and Sino–
North Korean Relations, 1949–1976 (纽约: 哥伦比亚大学出版社, 2018), PP. 211, 223.

138. Hungarian Embassy to the USSR, Telegram, 3 十二月 1971, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Arab states,
1971, 108. doboz, 202-10, 001253/30/1971.

212

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Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran

communiqué, the North Koreans probably sought to formulate a position
sufﬁciently compatible with both Iraqi and Egyptian views.

Despite the initial procrastination, North Korea’s condemnation of Iran’s
action seems to have reinforced Iraqi-DPRK cooperation against Iran. Dur-
ing Vice Premier Ch˘ong Chunt’aek’s visit to Iraq in late February 1972, 两个都
sides showed readiness to take each other’s priorities into consideration. Iraqi
leaders demanded that all U.S. troops be withdrawn from South Korea, 那
UNCURK be dissolved, and that peaceful national uniﬁcation be accom-
plished in the spirit of Kim Il-Sung’s latest proposals. 反过来, Ch˘ong ex-
pressed support for the Iraqi position that the Palestinian problem could not
be solved by any means other than armed struggle and condemned Iran’s
seizure of the three Gulf islands, its unilateral abrogation of the 1937 博尔-
der treaty, and its armed provocations against Iraq.139

North Korea’s need for Iraq’s solidarity vis-à-vis the United States and
South Korea seems to have enabled the Ba’ath leaders to coax the DPRK into
adopting an explicitly critical stance vis-à-vis Iran—a step that neither the
USSR nor China was willing to take. During Vice President Saddam Hus-
sein’s visit to the USSR in mid- 二月 1972, Soviet leaders reiterated that
they did not intend to develop their relations with Iraq at the expense of their
cordial relationship with Iran (which Hussein depicted as an “advance base of
American imperialism”), and the Chinese government went so far as to show
preference for Iran over Iraq. In September 1972, the Iraqi ambassador to
Beijing complained to a Hungarian colleague that China had granted a bigger
loan to Iran than to Iraq.140 The Ba’ath leaders’ dissatisfaction with the atti-
tude of the Communist great powers probably reinforced their determination
to secure North Korea’s public support against Iran.

Iraqi-DPRK cooperation against Iran may not have been conﬁned to the
sphere of propaganda. In February–May 1972, the Iranian authorities brought
to trial the leaders of an armed revolutionary group known as the People’s
Mujahedin Organization of Iran (Mujahedin-e-Khalq, MKO), who were said
to have received ﬁnancial support from Iraq and guerrilla training in North
韩国. The extent of direct North Korean assistance to the MKO is difﬁcult
to ascertain, but we know for sure that the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO), which ﬁrst provided guerrilla training for the Mujahedin in 1970,

139. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 四月 2, 1972, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1972, 58. doboz,
10, 002160/1972.

140. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 29 行进 1972, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1972, 45. doboz,
62-10, 001625/4/1972; and Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Telegram, 7 九月 1972, in MNL,
XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1972, 45. doboz, 62-10, 001577/1/1972.

213

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Szalontai and Yoo

beneﬁted from both Iraqi and North Korean support.141 What is also known
for certain is that in May–June 1972 a delegation of the Tudeh Party (Iran’s
Communist party) visited the DPRK, where it was welcomed by Kim Il-Sung
and its activities were extensively covered by Rodong sinmun.142 In light of
the illegal status of the Tudeh Party, this visit was hardly conducive to the
improvement of Iranian–North Korean relations.

A Balancing Act: North Korea between Iraq
and Iran, 1972–1978

Paradoxically, North Korea’s cooperation with Iraq against South Korea and
Iran hit a snag soon after it reached its zenith. When the DPRK reversed its
confrontational stance toward the South Korean government and the two Ko-
reas issued a joint declaration calling for “a great national unity . . . transcend-
ing differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems” (4 七月 1972), Iraqi leaders
were caught off guard. A high-ranking ofﬁcial of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry
told a Hungarian diplomat that the declaration was potentially harmful to
the Arab cause because “Western Europe might use [this precedent] to call
for direct negotiations between the Arabs and Israel”—an idea patently un-
acceptable to the Ba’ath leaders, who did not recognize Israel’s right to exist
and stressed that armed struggle was the sole appropriate method to solve the
Palestinian problem.143

Worse still, North Korea’s attitude toward Iran also underwent an un-
expected shift from criticism to rapprochement, thus abruptly reversing the
recent trend of Iraqi-DPRK cooperation against Tehran. 再次, Py-
ongyang’s diplomacy seems to have taken inspiration from China’s actions.
在 23 九月 1972, Rodong sinmun reported that Iran’s Queen Farah,
accompanied by Premier Amir-Abbas Hoveyda, visited the PRC, and on
26–29 September it carried three articles about the visit of an Iranian ta-
ble tennis team to the DPRK.144 That visit had much in common with the

141. Bermudez, 恐怖主义, p. 72; and Ervand Abrahamian, Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin (朗-
大学教师: 我. 乙. Tauris, 1989), PP. 127–135.
142. 看, 除其他外, “Ky˘ongaehan˘un sury˘ong Kim Ils˘ong dongjikkes˘o Iranin mindang-
daep’yodan˘ul mannashiy˘otta,” Rodong sinmun, 1 六月 1972, p. 1.

143. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, Telegram, 七月 1972, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1972, 59. doboz,
81-107, 00958/29/1972.
144. “Iran wanghuga Chungguk˘ul pangmunhagi wihae peijinge toch’ak,” Rodong sinmun, 23 塞普滕-
误码率 1972, p. 4; and “Ch’ins˘on˘ui t’akkugy˘onggi (urinara P’y˘ongyangshinamny˘os˘onsudani Iran-
namny˘os˘onsudan˘ul kakkagirw˘otta),” Rodong sinmun, 26 九月 1972, p. 6.

214

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Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran

Sino-American “ping-pong diplomacy” (四月 1971), all the more so because
this initial contact in the “neutral” sphere of sports paved the way for the es-
tablishment of political relations. 尤其, the Iranian players were cordially
received by Vice Premier Pak S˘ongch’˘ol—the very same leader who had vis-
ited Iraq in May 1971.145

Following the visit of the Iranian players from October 1972 to Febru-
和 1973, Rodong sinmun published ﬁve articles about Iran’s foreign and eco-
nomic policies, far fewer than the number that discussed Iraq (十月 1972:
ten; 二月 1973: twenty) and also lagging behind Neues Deutschland’s
thirteen Iran-related articles. 然而, the tone of the ﬁve articles was un-
mistakably cordial rather than hostile. By presenting Iran as a country that
maintained friendly relations with Communist states (the USSR and Ro-
狂躁) and sought to protect its national interests vis-à-vis the Western oil
公司, the articles implied that the DPRK regarded Iran as a poten-
tially acceptable partner rather than an “advance base of U.S. imperialism.”146
Although Rodong sinmun’s continued preference for Iraq suggested that the
North Koreans intended to broaden their relations with Iran without weak-
ening their partnership with Iraq, the Iraqi government had little reason to
welcome the DPRK’s warmer stance toward Iran at a time when Iraqi-Iranian
relations remained as tense as ever. 在 5 十月 1972, Iraq’s UN delegate
once again denounced Iran’s hostile actions—the seizure of the Gulf islands
and the abrogation of the 1937 treaty—at length, only to receive a dismissive
Iranian response.147

In contrast to the long and gradual process of Iraqi–North Korean rap-
prochement (1959–1968), Iranian-DPRK relations progressed from the ﬁrst
tentative contacts to the establishment of full diplomatic relations without fur-
ther preliminaries. By reaching out to the Iranian ambassador in Beijing, 这
North Koreans took the initiative, but Iran proved just as ready to fulﬁll their
request. 在 13 四月 1973, a North Korean delegation headed by Minister of
Finance Kim Ky˘ongryon arrived in Tehran under the guise of economic dis-
批评, 并由 19 April the Iranian government had announced its decision
to recognize the DPRK. The alacrity with which Iranian leaders responded to

145. “Naegang chepususang Pak S˘ongch’˘ol tongjiga Irant’akkus˘onsudan˘ul mannatta,” Rodong sinmun,
29 九月 1972, p. 2.
146. “Iran kukwangi Ssory˘on˘ul pangmunhagi wihae Mos˘uk’˘ubae toch’ak,” Rodong sinmun, 13
suhohagi wihay˘o
十月 1972, p. 6; and “Iran’kukwangi chagi nara˘ui minjokch˘ongniik˘ul
chegukchu˘uis˘okyudokch˘omny˘onhapch’ewa˘ui hy˘opch˘onggihan˘ul y˘on’gihaji an˘ul ˘uihyang˘ul p’yoshi,”
Rodong sinmun, 30 一月 1973, p. 5.

147. United Nations General Assembly, 27th Session, 2055th Plenary Meeting, 5 十月 1972, 的-
ﬁcial Records, A/PV.2055, p. 3.

215

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North Korea’s initiative is all the more remarkable insofar as they took this step
in deﬁance of strong opposition from Seoul and Washington.148 On 18 四月,
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Ahmad Mirfendereski gave the following
response to the U.S. ambassador’s objections:

In Iran’s view, the situation of Korea was somewhat similar to that of Ger-
许多, the eastern part of which Iran had recently recognized. Keeping the North
Koreans isolated would not serve a useful purpose; on the contrary, 带来
them more fully into the diplomatic world would make them behave more
responsibly.149

Iranian recognition of the DPRK seems to have been an integral part of a new
Iranian policy toward countries that were divided into two parts—one Com-
munist and the other non-Communist. In earlier decades Iran had avoided
the Communist parts, but in the early 1970s Iran established diplomatic re-
lations not only with North Korea but also with East Germany (7 十二月
1972) and North Vietnam (4 八月 1973).150 因此, the sudden political
breakthrough between North Korea and Iran—just like the establishment of
Iraqi–North Korean diplomatic relations in January 1968—is only marginally
attributable to the DPRK’s own diplomatic efforts. 仍然, North Korea’s short-
lived rapprochement with South Korea seems to have inﬂuenced Iran’s de-
切除术. The visit of the Iranian table tennis players took place a few months
after the July 1972 North-South declaration, and in January 1973 Iranian
Foreign Minister Abbas Ali Khalatbari pointedly remarked that the establish-
ment of contacts between the two Koreas opened the way for Iran to forge
ties with North Korea.151 Thus, the July 1972 declaration that had generated

148. 我们. Embassy in Seoul to the Secretary of State, “Iranian recognition of North Korea,” Telegram,
17 四月 1973, 在我们中. National Archives (奈良), Central Foreign Policy Files 1973–1979, RG 59,
Electronic Telegrams, 1973, 医生. 不. 1973SEOUL02368; 和美国. Secretary of State to U.S. Em-
bassy in Kathmandu, Telegram, “Arrival in Tehran of North Korean delegation and possible establish-
ment of Iranian–North Korean diplomatic relations,” 18 四月 1973, 在我们中. National Archives and
Records Administration (奈良), Central Foreign Policy Files 1973–1979, Record Group (RG) 59,
Electronic Telegrams, 1973, 医生. 不. 1973STATE072356. (All NARA documents cited in this arti-
cle were viewed on the Access to Archival Databases website, https://aad.archives.gov/aad/index.jsp.)
The establishment of Iranian-DPRK diplomatic relations was ofﬁcially dated 15 四月 1973.

149. 我们. Embassy in Tehran to the Secretary of State, “Imminent Iranian recognition of North Ko-
雷亚,” Telegram, 18 四月 1973, in NARA, Central Foreign Policy Files 1973–1979, RG 59. Electronic
Telegrams, 1973, 医生. 不. 1973TEHRAN02588.

150. “Iran, Österreich, Burundi und Schweden stellen diplomatische Beziehungen zur DDR her,”
Neues Deutschland, 8 十二月 1972, p. 1; and “Beziehungen DRV-Iran,” Neues Deutschland, 6 Au-
gust 1973, p. 7.

151. Azad, Koreans in the Persian Gulf, p. 73.

216

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Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran

friction between Iraq and North Korea probably facilitated the normalization
of Iranian-DPRK relations.

From North Korea’s perspective, the Shah’s willingness to develop cor-
dial relations with both Koreas had advantages and disadvantages. 就其一而言
手, it enabled the DPRK to gain a foothold in a hitherto inaccessible coun-
尝试. As early as June 1973, North Korea opened its embassy in Tehran.152 On
另一方面, the Iranian government’s even-handedness was hardly com-
patible with Pyongyang’s determination to isolate Seoul. 例如, Iranian
leaders maintained that both Koreas should be admitted to the UN—an idea
far more palatable to Park Chung Hee than to Kim Il-Sung. In sharp contrast
飞往伊拉克 (which continued to sponsor pro-DPRK resolutions in the UN), 伊朗
opposed the dissolution of UNCURK.153

North Korea therefore had good reason to stay on amicable terms with
伊拉克, 也. Even as Kim Ky˘ongryon visited Tehran to establish diplomatic re-
lations with the Iranian monarchy, North Korean leaders sent a KWP delega-
tion headed by candidate Politburo member Yang Hy˘ongs˘op to Syria (18–25
四月) 和伊拉克 (26 April–5 May) to conduct interparty talks with Ba’ath lead-
呃. The North Koreans seem to have been favorably impressed by the strength
and discipline of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party, the Iraqi leaders’ efforts to ﬁnd a po-
litical solution to the Kurdish problem, Baghdad’s close cooperation with the
Soviet bloc, and the recent improvement of Egyptian-Iraqi relations, 尽管
they noted that Iraqi and Syrian leaders, driven by a passionate hatred for
Israel and the United States, often showed indecisiveness and uncertainty in
taking concrete actions.154

Despite seeking to maintain a solid partnership with Iraq, the North Ko-
reans evidently did not intend to adapt to Iraq’s priorities in every respect.
They reached out to Iran at a time when Iraqi-Iranian relations were still
tense. Not until October 1973 (during the Yom Kippur War) did Iraq and
Iran restore their diplomatic relations—a step facilitated by Iran’s declarations
of solidarity with the Arab states’ struggle against Israel. The temporary im-
provement of Iran-Iraq relations enabled the Iraqi government to send troops
to the Syrian front, but when the ceaseﬁre of 25 十月 (which Baghdad

152. 同上。, p. 102.

153. 我们. Embassy in Tehran to the Secretary of State, “Korea at 28th United Nations General As-
sembly,” Telegram, 29 八月 1973, in NARA, Central Foreign Policy Files 1973–1979, RG 59, 电气-
tronic Telegrams, 1973, 医生. 不. 1973TEHRAN06143; and Yearbook of the United Nations, 1973
(纽约: United Nations Ofﬁce of Public Information, 1976), p. 158.

154. Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, 报告, 10 八月 1973, in MNL, XIX-J-1-k Korea, 1973,
31. Doboz, 3701, 6613-1/1973.

217

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Szalontai and Yoo

ﬁercely opposed) put an end to the war, hostilities between Iraq and Iran soon
resumed and escalated.155

As early as 12 二月 1974, Iraq called for an urgent meeting of the UN
Security Council to consider the armed clashes that had occurred along the
Iran-Iraq border since 24 January.156 Following a ceaseﬁre agreement reached
在 7 行进, the two states made efforts to normalize their relations, 但是
resurgence of Kurdish guerrilla activities in Iraq (with the active support of
the Iranian government) led to new border clashes in August–September 1974
and the winter of 1974–1975.157 On 26 August and then on 20 十二月, 这
Iraqi Foreign Ministry appealed for support from Communist diplomats (在-
cluding the North Korean ambassador) in denouncing Iran’s hostile actions.158
The Soviet Union did repeatedly urge the Shah to refrain from confrontational
脚步, but Iraqi leaders believed that the Soviet government, anxious to stay on
good terms with Tehran, did not strive hard enough to restrain Iran.159 Neues
Deutschland carried only a few brief and factual news reports on the border
clashes, which showed a subtle preference for the Iraqi narrative but stopped
short of criticizing Iran.160

If the Soviet-bloc states were reluctant to get involved in the Iraq-Iran
冲突, this was doubly true for North Korea. During the entire period of
hostilities (January 1974–February 1975), Rodong sinmun failed to publish a
single article on the dispute, though it did quote an Iraqi news bulletin on
the Kurdish insurgency.161 North Korea’s attitude was clearly expressed in an
article that strongly emphasized North Korea’s solidarity with Iraq vis-à-vis

155. Hungarian Embassy to Iran, 报告, 30 十一月 1973, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Middle East, 1973,
122. Doboz, 213-1, 00970/336/1973; and Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 5 十二月 1973,
in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Middle East, 1973, 122. Doboz, 213-1, 00970/343/1973.

156. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1974 (纽约: United Nations Ofﬁce of Public Information,
1977), p. 252.

157. Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Memorandum, 29 十月 1974, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1974,
52. Doboz, 62-10, 001722/13/1974; and Hungarian Embassy to Iran, Telegram, 18 十二月 1974,
in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1974, 52. Doboz, 62-10, 004984/1/1974.

158. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, Telegram, 26 八月 1974, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1974, 52.
Doboz, 62-10, 001722/12/1974; and Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, Telegram, 20 十二月 1974, 在
MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1974, 52. Doboz, 62-10, 004984/4/1974.

159. Hungarian Embassy to Iran, Telegram, 11 行进 1974, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1974, 52.
Doboz, 62-10, 001722/8/1974; and Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, Telegram, 22 十月 1974, 在
MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1974, 52. Doboz, 62-10, 005357/1974.

160. 看, 除其他外, “Bewaffneter Zusammenstoß an irakisch-iranischer Grenze,” Neues Deutsch-
土地, 12 二月 1974, p. 7; and “Zwischenfall Iran-Irak,” Neues Deutschland, 19 十二月 1974,
p. 7.
161. “Irak’˘ues˘o Parajanidodang˘ui mujangballan˘ul chinap’an’g˘otkwa kwally˘onhan ch˘ongbugongboga
palp’yodoey˘otta,” Rodong sinmun, 22 可能 1974, p. 5.

218

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Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran

Israel and the United States but made no mention of Iran.162 During this pe-
里约德, Rodong sinmun carried 136 articles concerning Iraq, and the number of
articles about Iran stood at 66. Despite this 2-to-1 proportion, a closer ex-
amination reveals that many of the Iraq-related news reports merely summa-
rized the pro-DPRK articles the Iraqi press had published at the instigation
of the North Korean embassy—a propaganda opportunity denied to North
Korean diplomats in Tehran. Factual news reports frequently praised Iraq’s
economic development and periodically mentioned Iran’s interactions with
various developing countries but carefully dodged any controversial themes
(例如, Iraq’s disputes with Egypt and Syria and Iran’s cooperation with the
美国).163

The two events to which Rodong sinmun paid the closest attention of-
fer insight into the differing nature of North Korea’s relations with the two
Middle Eastern countries. In January–February 1975, the newspaper carried
eleven articles about a pro-DPRK international solidarity conference held in
Baghdad (thus presenting Iraq as an anti-imperialist ideological ally), 然而
in November–December 1974 it devoted nine articles to the spectacular visit
of Abdul Reza Pahlavi, the Shah’s half-brother, to North Korea (thus em-
phasizing the DPRK’s cordial state-to-state relations with the Iranian monar-
chy).164 The combination of these articles reﬂected North Korea’s uneasy
balancing act between Iraq and Iran.

The precarious nature of North Korea’s situation was further accentuated
by the fact that its commitment to Iraq was limited not only by its coopera-
tion with Iran (and vice versa) but also by its collaboration with other Middle
Eastern states with which either Iraq or Iran was on unfriendly terms. 为了
实例, Iraqi leaders, who pointedly told Soviet-bloc diplomats that they
would be gravely disappointed if Brezhnev visited Egypt or Syria before Iraq,
were probably displeased when North Korean Vice Premier Kim Y˘ongju,
Kim Il-Sung’s special envoy to the Middle East in April–May 1974, took a

162. “Irak’˘uinmin˘ui ch˘ong˘ui˘ui wi˘ob˘ul ch˘okk˘uk chijihanda,” Rodong sinmun, 30 十月 1974, p. 6
(translated by Peter Ward).
163. 看, 除其他外, “Irak’˘u nongch’ones˘o ch’ujindoegoinn˘un ch˘on’gihwawa sudog˘ons˘ol,” Rodong
sinmnu (Pyongyang), 4 六月 1974, p. 6; and “Rebanonch’ongniga Iran˘ul pangmun,” Rodong sinmun,
22 六月 1974, p. 6.
164. 看, 除其他外, “Chos˘on˘un ˘ott˘ohan oese˘ui kans˘opto ˘opshi Chos˘oninminjashine ˘uihay˘o
t’ongiltoey˘oyahanda (Irak‘˘ues˘o chinhaengdoen Chos˘oninmin’gwa˘ui kukchej˘ongny˘ondaes˘onghoe˘u-
ies˘o ch’aet’aektoen ch’ongs˘on˘on),” Rodong sinmun, 25 一月 1975, p. 1; and “Ky˘ongaehan˘un
sury˘ong Kim Ils˘ong dongjikkes˘o Iranjekuk hwangjedongsaeng˘ul ch˘opky˘onhashiy˘otta,” Rodong sin-
mun, 24 十一月 1974, p. 1.

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Szalontai and Yoo

Cairo-Damascus-Baghdad route.165 The Iraqis believed that the regional
itineraries of high-ranking “fraternal” visitors reﬂected the latter’s diplomatic
priority-setting, and the DPRK evidently attributed greater strategic impor-
tance to front-line Egypt and Syria (which received North Korean military
aid and training before and during the Yom Kippur War) than to Iraq (哪个
relied on Soviet and East European, rather than North Korean, military assis-
坦斯).166 与此相类似, Pahlavi’s trip to the DPRK was closely preceded
by a visit of South Yemeni president Salim Rubai Ali, who managed to per-
suade the North Koreans to give military aid to the same PFLOAG guerrillas
in Oman against whom the Shah had dispatched Iranian combat troops.167

North Korean leaders thus had good reason to avoid any sort of entan-
glement in the Iraqi-Iranian dispute, but their neutral position was implicitly
more advantageous to the Iranian side (which presumably appreciated that the
North Koreans had tacitly abandoned the hostile attitude they had adopted in
1971–1972) than to Iraqi leaders (WHO, judging from their appeals to the sol-
idarity of the Communist ambassadors, would have preferred if North Korea
had stuck to its earlier standpoint). 因此, the gradual but perceptible cooling
of Iraqi–North Korean relations in the second half of the 1970s may be traced
back to the events of 1974–1975.

Caught between the two quarreling Middle Eastern states, North Ko-
rean leaders seem to have been elated when the Shah and Saddam Hussein
signed the Algiers Agreement (6 行进 1975) to settle their disputes.168 On
13 行进, Rodong sinmun described the terms of the agreement (本质上,
an Iraqi territorial concession in the Shatt al-Arab dispute in exchange for the
discontinuation of Iranian support to the Kurdish insurgency) in great detail

165. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 16 九月 1974, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1974, 52.
Doboz, 62-10, 004983/1974; “Chos˘on Minjuju˘ui Inmin Konghwaguk kukkajus˘ong Kim Ils˘ong
dongji˘ui t’˘uksaro aeg˘ub˘ul pangmunhan˘un Kim Y˘ongju puch’ongniga Kkahirae toch’ak,” Rodong sin-
mun, 24 四月 1974, p. 1; “Chos˘on Minjujui Inmin Konghwaguk kukkajus˘ong Kim Ils˘ong dongji˘ui
t’˘uksa˘ui Suria ch’eryu,” Rodong sinmun, 3 可能 1974, p. 1; and “Chos˘on Minjuju˘ui Inmin Kongh-
waguk kukkajus˘ong Kim Ils˘ong dongji˘ui t’˘uksaro Irak’˘ur˘ul pangmunha,” Rodong sinmun, 5 可能 1974,
p. 1.

166. Miyamoto, “DPRK Troop Dispatches and Military Support in the Middle East,” PP. 349–
351; 中央情报局, “Intelligence Memorandum: Recent Trends in Communist Economic and Military Aid
飞往伊拉克,” March 1972, in CERR, CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030031-3; and Hungarian Embassy
to the DPRK, Telegram, 10 八月 1972, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j, Files unrelated to individual countries,
1972, V-590, 00630/12/1972.

167. Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, 报告, 27 十一月 1974, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j South
也门, 1974, 56. Doboz, 70-10, 006054/1974. On Iranian counterinsurgency operations in Oman,
see Abdel Razzaq Takriti, Monsoon Revolution: Republicans, Sultans, and Empires in Oman, 1965–1976
(牛津, 英国: 牛津大学出版社, 2013), PP. 293–295.

168. Hussein Sirriyeh, “Development of the Iraqi-Iranian Dispute, 1847–1975,” Journal of Contem-
porary History, 卷. 20, 不. 3 (1985), PP. 489–490.

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Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran

and with evident approval. By presenting the agreement as the “restoration
of the traditional friendship between Iran and Iraq,” the article constructed
a narrative that was greatly at variance with the historical facts but clearly
reﬂected Pyongyang’s yearning for an Iraqi-Iranian reconciliation that would
enable North Korea to engage both Middle Eastern countries without incur-
ring the risk of alienating either.169 In a similar vein, Rodong sinmun duly
reported the protocol signed by the Iraqi and Iranian foreign ministers (17
行进 1975) and the Iran-Iraq Treaty on International Borders and Good
Neighborly Relations (13 六月 1975).170 These articles conﬁrm that Rodong
sinmun’s earlier silence about the Iraq-Iran conﬂict had not resulted from a
lack of interest but from North Korean leaders’ unwillingness to get involved
in a dispute in which they did not want to take sides and which would not
have ﬁt into North Korea’s dominant propaganda narrative, directed mainly
against the United States, 以色列, 和韩国.

Potentially hampered by the earlier friction between Iraq and Iran, 北
Korean leaders were not necessarily able to draw concrete beneﬁts from the
Iraq-Iran reconciliation. 相反, the DPRK’s relations with both
Middle Eastern countries hit a snag as early as 1976, though for different
原因. For Iraqi leaders, the Algiers Agreement provided an opportunity to
lessen their dependence on the Soviet bloc and broaden their contacts with the
Western powers, but they did not cut their ties with the USSR as drastically
as Egypt’s Anwar al-Sadat did.

This new situation probably reduced North Korea’s importance in the
eyes of the Ba’ath leaders and limited the range of ﬁelds in which the two
states could cooperate. In 1971–1972, the Iraqi authorities had appreciated
North Korea’s solidarity vis-à-vis Iran (which distinguished North Korea from
China and the USSR) and its support to the PFLOAG, but now, as the Algiers
Agreement obligated the Iraqis to discontinue their assistance to the Omani
guerrillas, they decided to engage Saudi Arabia and the Omani monarchy
instead.171 At the same time, they vehemently rejected the Egyptian-Israeli
Sinai Interim Agreement (4 九月 1975)—an agreement the Soviet bloc

169. “Iran’gwa Irak’˘un˘un s˘ollin’gwa u˘ui˘ui ch˘ont’ongj˘ongny˘on’gyer˘ul hoebok’alg˘oshida (伊朗-
jeguk’wangjewa Irak’˘uhy˘ongmy˘ongjido risahoe puwiw˘onjangi kongdongk’ommyunik’ee choin),”
Rodong sinmun, 13 行进 1975, p. 6 (translated by Peter Ward).
170. “Iran’gwa Irak’˘usaie punjaenghaegy˘ore kwanhan ˘uij˘ongs˘o choin,” Rodong sinmun, 20 行进
1975, p. 6; and “Irak’˘uwa Irani kukky˘ong min s˘ollinjoyak˘ul maej˘otta,” Rodong sinmun, 26 六月 1975,
p. 6.

171. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 30 行进 1976, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1976, 65. Doboz,
62-10, 002146/2/1976.

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Szalontai and Yoo

likewise opposed but which North Korea tacitly welcomed.172 Iraqi leaders
also opposed the proclamation of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic
(SADR), and hence they were probably less than pleased when the DPRK,
unlike China and the Soviet bloc, recognized the SADR as a sovereign state
(16 行进 1976).173

Iraq’s enduring commitment to the Palestinian movement provided the
best opportunity for Iraqi-DPRK cooperation, and North Korean leaders ea-
gerly played the “Palestinian card” to buttress their partnership with Iraq.
In March 1976, the North Korean government sent 12,000 tons of mili-
tary equipment (mostly submachine guns and other light arms) to the PLO,
formally in exchange for a shipload of ﬁgs. To underline the importance of
the event, Foreign Minister H˘o Tam personally presented badges engraved
with Kim Il-Sung’s portrait to the crew of the Iraqi ship that transported the
weapons to the Middle East.174

尽管如此, the North Koreans could not prevent the eruption of a seri-
ous conﬂict of interest between Iraq and the DPRK at the Fifth Summit Con-
ference of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Colombo in mid-August
1976. Both countries strove to assume a prominent role in the NAM, 和
their competing ambitions, which were compounded by the contrast between
North Korea’s militant anti-American attitude and the moderate stance Iraq
adopted at the summit, pitted them against each other. Because both Iraq and
the DPRK had applied for membership in the NAM’s Coordinating Bureau
(where eight seats were allocated to Asian countries), they came to perceive
each other as rivals, all the more so because Iraq favored Vietnam’s candi-
dacy over North Korea’s. 到底, both Iraq and Vietnam were admitted
to the bureau, but North Korea was not.175 The extent to which this rivalry

172. Hungarian Embassy to Canada, Telegram, 11 九月 1975, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j United
Arab Republic, 1975, 54. Doboz, 36-121, 004794/20/1975; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK,
Telegram, 6 十月 1975, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j United Arab Republic, 1975, 55. Doboz, 36-121,
004794/45/1975; and “Ein problematisches Teilabkommen,” Neues Deutschland, 3 九月 1975,
p. 7.

173. Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Memorandum, 5 二月 1976, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1976,
65. Doboz, 62-146, 00576/1/1976; and Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Memorandum, 27 四月 1976,
in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1976, 81. Doboz, 1, 002965/1976.

174. Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Memorandum, 27 四月 1976, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1976,
82. Doboz, 4, 002964/1976.

175. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 年度报告, 1 七月 1976, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iraq, 1976, 65.
Doboz, 62-142, 004219/1976; Hungarian Embassy to Mongolia, 报告, 15 十二月 1976, 在
MNL, XIX-J-1-j, Non-aligned countries, 1976, 148. Doboz, 209-1, 004500/56/1976; 和美国. 在-
terests Section in Baghdad to the Secretary of State, “Iraq and Colombo non-aligned summit,” Tele-
公克, 14 八月 1976, in NARA, RG (RG) 59. Central Foreign Policy Files 1973–1979, Electronic
Telegrams, 1976, 医生. 不. 1976BAGHDA01129.

222

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alienated Iraq from its erstwhile partners may be gauged from what Ismet Ket-
taneh, director-general of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, told U.S. diplomats in
Baghdad about North Korea’s performance at the Colombo conference of the
NAM:

根据 [到] Kettaneh, North Koreans made pests of [他们]selves with Iraqis
and other delegations, with incessant jawboning and arm-grabbing in the cor-
ridors. Although Iraq, he said, neither spoke for nor sponsored North Korea’s
位置, Iraq did vote for North Korean language. . . . Kim Il Sung’s absence
at least prevented [Korean] question from assuming major importance. . . . 经过
giving “unanimous” approval of Vietnamese candidacy over North Korea’s, 骗局-
ferees were rewarding polished Vietnamese behavior at conference and rebuking
presumptuous, self-important North Koreans.176

The Imperial State of Iran, which had joined the Baghdad Pact in Novem-
误码率 1955, was not a member of the NAM (despite what Azad erroneously
索赔).177 相反, the Iranian government promptly took offense
when South Yemen and Libya used the Colombo summit as a forum to casti-
gate Iran’s military intervention in Oman, and the Shah was deeply irritated
about the pro-DPRK resolution adopted by the conference.178 Thus, 北
Korea’s newly forged contacts with the Iranian monarchy were not a spur for
Kim Il-Sung’s policy toward the NAM, nor did Iranian recognition of the
DPRK bring about a major shift in Iran’s position on the Korean question. 在
the UN sessions of October–November 1975, Iran supported the pro-ROK
draft resolution as usual, though it preferred to abstain during the vote on
the pro-DPRK resolution, instead of opposing it (as Israel, Saudi Arabia, 和
Oman did).179

Despite these limitations, both North Korea and Iran considered it pos-
sible to work together in other ﬁelds. 例如, in April 1974 Iran’s am-
bassador to the DPRK told a Hungarian diplomat that the two countries’
economic proﬁles were sufﬁciently compatible to create opportunities for
合作. North Korea was a cement exporter but lacked oil reserves,

176. 我们. Interests Section in Baghdad to the Secretary of State, “Iraqi perceptions of Colombo sum-
mit,” Telegram, 31 八月 1976, in NARA, RG 59. Central Foreign Policy Files 1973–1979, 电气-
tronic Telegrams, 1976, 医生. 不. 1976BAGHDA01263.

177. Azad, Koreans in the Persian Gulf, p. 73.

178. Hungarian Embassy to Iran, 报告, 25 十月 1976, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j, Non-aligned coun-
尝试, 1976, 148. Doboz, 209-1, 004500/48/1976; 和美国. Embassy in Tehran to the Secretary of
状态, “Soviet demarche to Shah,” Telegram, 22 八月 1976, in NARA, RG 59. Central Foreign
Policy Files 1973–1979, Electronic Telegrams, 1976, 医生. 不. 1976TEHRAN08487.

179. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1975 (纽约: United Nations Ofﬁce of Public Information,
1978), PP. 203–204.

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Szalontai and Yoo

whereas oil-rich Iran had to import cement to meet the growing demand
created by its ambitious construction projects.180 This view was shared by
North Korean leaders. 在八月 1974, Kim Il-Sung told Bulgarian Vice Pre-
mier Pencho Kubadinski that the DPRK was keenly interested in broaden-
ing its trade with Iran and other Middle Eastern countries.181 In the end,
然而, economic relations became a source of friction between North Ko-
rea and Iran because their shared interest in cooperation could not over-
come the obstacles posed by North Korea’s economic deﬁciencies and U.S.
disapproval.

在 16 行进 1975, Vice-Premier Pak S˘ongch’˘ol and Iranian Minister
of Commerce Fereydoun Mahdavi signed a letter of understanding on the
exchange of goods worth $700 million during the next ﬁve years. North Ko- rea undertook to supply steel, cement, chemical fertilizers, corn, and other agricultural products, for which Iran was to pay $200 million in advance.182
Although a South Korean attempt to block the deal ended in a ﬁasco, 这
credit agreement remained unimplemented.183 Adopting an evasive attitude
in the face of North Korea’s insistent prodding, the Iranian authorities kept
deferring the credit disbursements, partly because they were “uncomfortable
with both the sorts of goods which the North Koreans would export to Iran
as well as the ability of the DPRK to repay,” and partly because the U.S. 嗯-
bassy did its best to dissuade them.184 In early 1976, the Iranians reluctantly
agreed to provide the DPRK with $60 百万, but only on condition that Pakistan’s Zulﬁkar Ali Bhutto—who had persuaded Iran to fulﬁll Pyongyang’s request—personally guaranteed that the DPRK would deliver the contracted cement and rice. Despite Bhutto’s assurances, North Korea failed to fulﬁll its export obligations. 在 1977, North Korea asked Iran for up to 400,000 tons of crude oil and $350 百万, but Iranian leaders refused to supply oil unless the

180. Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Telegram, 25 四月 1974, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j, 韩国, 1974,
65. Doboz, 81-10, 003091/1974.

181. Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Telegram, 15 八月 1974, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j, 韩国, 1974,
66. Doboz, 81-50, 004564/1974.

182. 我们. Embassy in Tehran to the Secretary of State, “Iran/North Korea trade relations,” Telegram,
17 行进 1975, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1973–1979, Electronic Telegrams,
1975, 医生. 不. 1975TEHRAN02481.

183. 我们. Secretary of State to CINCPAC, “ROKG attempting to thwart Iranian–North Korean deal,”
Telegram, 28 六月 1975, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1973–1979, Electronic Tele-
克, 1975, 医生. 不. 1975STATE153446.

184. 我们. Embassy in Tehran to the Secretary of State, “Iran/North Korea trade credit agreement,”
Telegram, 21 九月 1976, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1973–1979, Electronic
Telegrams, 1976, 医生. 不. 1976TEHRAN09522.

224

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Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran

DPRK paid in cash. The Iranians vowed they would pay only upon delivery
of the promised North Korean goods.185

Unable to obtain credit from Iran, cash-starved North Korea approached
Iraq instead. 在 18 七月 1978, the Iraqi government undertook to provide
the DPRK with an interest-free loan worth $50 百万, to be disbursed in two equal installments in January 1979 and January 1980. North Korea was expected to repay $10 million per annum starting in 1985. Compared to
the earlier Iranian-DPRK credit agreement, this deal was to yield a smaller
amount of money but under more favorable terms. North Korea evidently ap-
pealed to Iraq’s revolutionary solidarity when pursuing the credit agreement,
which declared that “the loan stems from friendly relations between the two
countries and their joint desire to strengthen the struggle against colonialism
and imperialism.”186

尽管如此, the revolutionary rhetoric could not disguise the fact that
Iraqi leaders were no longer exclusively committed to economic cooperation
with North Korea. In March 1977 (the same month a delegate of Iraq’s Ba’ath
Party attended the DPRK-sponsored World Conference for the Indepen-
dent and Peaceful Reuniﬁcation of Korea in Brussels), the Iraqi government
awarded, for the ﬁrst time, A $30.6 million contract to South Korea’s Shinwon Construction Company.187 The Iraqi authorities must have been satisﬁed with the South Korean ﬁrm’s performance because in 1978 they awarded a $130
million infrastructure contract to Hyundai. 为了确定, these Iraqi-ROK deals
were dwarfed by South Korea’s extensive economic cooperation with Iran.
例如, 在 1976 the Iranian government undertook to build a crude oil
reﬁnery in the ROK, increase its trade with Seoul to $2 billion during the 1976–1980 period, and supply it with 60,000 barrels of crude oil per day for ﬁfteen years. 作为回报, South Korea promised to build a jointly owned tex- tile factory in Iran. 到年底 1978, the number of South Korean citizens residing in Iran had risen to 12,000. 仍然, the entry of South Korea’s highly competitive corporations into the Iraqi construction market, limited as it was 185. Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Telegram, 23 十二月 1977, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j, 韩国, 1977, 79. doboz, 81-5, 006346/1977. 186. 我们. Interests Section in Baghdad to the Secretary of State, “Iraqi ratiﬁes interest-free loan to North Korea,” Telegram, 29 十月 1978, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1973–1979, Electronic Telegrams, 1978, 医生. 不. 1978BAGHDA02238; 和美国. Interests Sec- tion in Baghdad to the Secretary of State, “Iraqi loan to North Korea,” Telegram, 31 十月 1978, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1973–1979, Electronic Telegrams, 1978, 医生. 不. 1978BAGHDA02262. 187. “Iraqi Ba’th Party Member,” Korean Central News Agency [KCNA] (Pyongyang), 9 行进 1977, quoted in Translations on North Korea No. 517 (Arlington, VA: Joint Publications Research Service, 29 行进 1977), p. 27. 225 l 从http下载 : / / 直接的 . 米特 . 呃呃 / j c w s / 文章 – p d l f / / / / 2 5 2 1 7 9 2 1 4 0 9 7 0 / j c w s _ a _ 0 1 1 1 9 压力 . 来宾来访 0 7 九月 2 0 2 3 Szalontai and Yoo for the time being, presented an economic challenge that the DPRK could not match.188 Pyongyang and Tehran versus Baghdad: The Emergence of the Iranian-DPRK Alliance, 1979–1988 Thus, North Korea’s relations with both Middle Eastern countries were in a less than satisfactory state when the ﬁrst rumblings of the Iranian revolution sent shock waves through the region, eliciting sharply divergent reactions from the DPRK’s various Arab partners. Syrian and South Yemeni leaders clearly sympathized with the escalating protest movement on the grounds that the collapse of the monarchy would greatly weaken U.S. inﬂuence in the Middle East, whereas their Iraqi counterparts monitored the Iranian political crisis with growing anxiety, as they feared that the Shah’s downfall would under- mine the Algiers Agreement and stimulate a resurgence of Kurdish and Shia opposition to the Ba’ath regime.189 In light of North Korea’s radical reputation, Rodong sinmun’s consistent lack of coverage of Iran’s revolutionary upheaval may appear peculiar. From January 1978 (when the ﬁrst protests erupted in the city of Qom) to January 1979, the newspaper did not publish a single article about the burgeoning opposition movement. 相反, the newspaper’s reports invariably struck an optimistic and laudatory tone, with a focus on Iran’s dynamic eco- nomic development, its friendly relations with the various Communist states and developing countries, and its ceremonial interactions with the DPRK.190 The North Koreans’ growing awareness of the Iranian crisis was expressed 188. 我们. Interests Section in Baghdad to the Secretary of State, “GOI signs contract with South Korean company,” Telegram, 2 四月 1977, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1973– 1979, Electronic Telegrams, 1977, 医生. 不. 1977BAGHDA00550; 我们. Embassy in Tehran to the Secretary of State, “Iranian-South Korean economic relations,” Telegram, 10 十一月 1976, in NARA, RG 59. Central Foreign Policy Files 1973–1979, Electronic Telegrams, 1976, 医生. 不. 1976TEHRAN11243; and Azad, Koreans in the Persian Gulf, PP. 54, 68–69. 189. Hungarian Embassy to South Yemen, Telegram, 16 一月 1979, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j, 伊朗, 1979, 66. doboz, 63-2, 0053/14/1979; Hungarian Embassy to Syria, Telegram, 18 一月 1979, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j, 伊朗, 1979, 66. doboz, 63-2, 0053/18/1979; and Hungarian Embassy to Lebanon, 报告, 29 一月 1979, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j, 伊朗, 1979, 66. doboz, 63-2, 0053/36/1979. 190. 看, inter alia, “Sae sahoe k˘ons˘or˘ul wihan t’ujaeng˘ui kires˘o: Iran˘ui minjokkong˘op,” Rodong sinmun, 19 一月 1978, p. 6; “Iran˘ul pangmunhan˘un uri nara ch˘ongbudaep’yodani T’eherane toch’ak,” Rodong sinmun, 24 可能 1978, p. 3; and “Hwa Kukpong jus˘ogi Iran˘ul kongshing ch’ins˘onbangmunhagi wihay˘o T’eherane toch’ak,” Rodong sinmun, 1 九月 1978, p. 6 (all ar- ticles obtained and translated by Yoo Jinil). 226 l 从http下载 : / / 直接的 . 米特 . 呃呃 / j c w s / 文章 – p d l f / / / / 2 5 2 1 7 9 2 1 4 0 9 7 0 / j c w s _ a _ 0 1 1 1 9 压力 . 来宾来访 0 7 九月 2 0 2 3 Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran only in a roundabout way. From November 1978 to January 1979 (the most turbulent phase of the revolution), Rodong sinmun effectively imposed a news blackout, devoting only a single ceremonial greeting to Iran. The diversity of Arab states’ reactions to the upheavals warranted caution, and the North Kore- ans were also motivated by the consideration that any reference to the protests might incur Iran’s displeasure and damage the image of a stable Iranian-DPRK partnership—an assumption that seemed reasonable, given that the Iranian ambassador to Damascus complained about the Syrian media’s biased coverage of the Iranian events.191 During the ﬁrst eight months of 1978 (at which time East German leaders were busily preparing for an expected visit of the Shah), Neues Deutschland likewise refrained from covering the Iranian protests. The East German newspaper’s ﬁrst article on the Iranian crisis appeared on 11 九月 1978 in the same issue announcing that the Shah, having declared martial law, had abruptly canceled his planned visit to East Germany.192 From September 1978 to January 1979, Neues Deutschland carried as many as 48 articles on the Iranian protests. 相比之下, Rodong sinmun’s ﬁrst report about the crisis, a laudatory article on the victorious struggle of the Ira- nian masses against an oppressive dictatorship, appeared as late as 13 Febru- 和 1979, 那是, after the Shah’s departure and the collapse of Shahpour Bakhtiar’s provisional government.193 North Korean leaders evidently wanted to wait out the revolutionary storm, refraining from taking a stand as long as it was uncertain who might come out on top in Tehran. But as soon as Aya- tollah Ruhollah Khomeini established his new administration, North Korean diplomats in Tehran made frantic efforts to get in his good graces. From the time of Khomeini’s return (1 二月 1979) until January 1980, the North Korean ambassador visited him as many as six times, far more frequently than any other ambassador.194 His efforts seem to have paid off, since he managed to persuade Khomeini to issue a statement calling for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea.195 The North Korean media, silent on Iran before 191. Hungarian Embassy to Syria, Telegram, 18 一月 1979, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j, 伊朗, 1979, 66. doboz, 63-2, 0053/18/1979. 192. “Schahanschah sagt Reisen nach Rumänien und in die DDR ab,” Neues Deutschland, 11 塞普滕- 误码率 1978, p. 2; and “Iran: Parlament behandelt Kriegsrechtsbestimmungen,” Neues Deutschland, 11 九月 1978, p. 5. 193. “Iranes˘o hwangjej˘onggw˘oni mun˘ojigo panhwangjesery˘ogin inminundongsery˘ogi kukkagw˘olly- ˘ok˘urinsu,” Rodong sinmun, 13 二月 1979, p. 6 (obtained and translated by Yoo Jinil). 194. Hungarian Embassy to Iran, 报告, 5 二月 1980, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j, 韩国, 1980, 84. doboz, 133, 001472/1980. 195. 我们. Embassy in Tehran to the Secretary of State, “Korean squabbling in Iran,” Telegram, 29 七月 1979, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1973–1979, Electronic Telegrams, 1979, 医生. 不. 1979TEHRAN07979. 227 l 从http下载 : / / 直接的 . 米特 . 呃呃 / j c w s / 文章 – p d l f / / / / 2 5 2 1 7 9 2 1 4 0 9 7 0 / j c w s _ a _ 0 1 1 1 9 压力 . 来宾来访 0 7 九月 2 0 2 3 Szalontai and Yoo January 1979, now extensively covered the “progressive” measures taken by the revolutionary regime: its efforts to curtail U.S. inﬂuence in Iran, its sever- ance of diplomatic relations with Israel, and its decision to nationalize private banks.196 After the takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran (4 十一月 1979), the DPRK was one of the few states to take Iran’s side in the dispute.197 Start- ing on 8 十一月, Rodong sinmun carried numerous articles on the hostage crisis, highlighting the Iranian government’s determination to resist U.S. pres- sure and quoting Khomeini’s accusations of espionage against the U.S. diplo- mats.198 On 23 十一月 (after the imposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran), the newspaper published H˘o Tam’s letter of support to his Iranian counter- 部分, and the next day it carried a long article that presented the hostage issue as a mere pretext for U.S. hostile actions against Iran. Unlike Neues Deutsch- 土地, which extensively covered the UN Security Council’s discussions of the crisis and quoted its call for the immediate release of the hostages, Rodong sinmun made no reference to the Security Council debate beyond quoting a few Iranian statements that rejected the Council’s “interference.” Iranian leaders must have appreciated these gestures, for the Iranian media promptly announced the DPRK’s statement of support.199 If North Korean leaders hoped that these expressions of solidarity would persuade the new Iranian authorities to give preferential treatment to Py- ongyang over Seoul, their expectations were only partly fulﬁlled. 从 10 到 17 一月 1980, a DPRK delegation headed by Vice Premier Kong Chint’ae traveled to Tehran to sign a one-year trade agreement—the ﬁrst that the 196. 看, 除其他外, “Iranes˘o chinboj˘okchoch’id˘ur˘ul kyesong ch’wihago itta,” Rodong sinmun, 9 行进 1979, p. 6; “Irani Migug˘ui naej˘onggans˘ob˘ul paegy˘ok,” Rodong sinmun, 25 可能 1979, p. 6; and “Iranes˘o ky˘ongjesaenghwar˘ul ch˘ongsanghwahagi wihan illy˘on˘ui p˘omny˘ong˘ul ch’aet’aek, mod˘un kaein˘unhaengd˘ur˘ul kukyuhwa,” Rodong sinmun, 11 六月 1979, p. 6 (all articles obtained and trans- lated by Yoo Jinil). 197. Hungarian Embassy to Iran, Ciphered Telegram, 11 十二月 1979, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j Iran, 1979, 66. doboz, 63-3, 005660/28/1979. 其他的, among “Iranoegyobuga ch˘omg˘owa 198. 看, kwally˘onhay˘o s˘ongmy˘ong palp’yo,” Rodong sinmun, 8 十一月 1979, p. 6; “Iranes˘o subaeng- manmy˘ong˘ui panmishiwi chinhaeng,” Rodong sinmun, 10 十一月 1979, p. 6; and “‘T’eheranjujae Mi taesagwaninjilt˘ur˘un kanch’˘opt˘urimy˘o Iran p˘omnyure ttara chaep’an˘ulbadado tangy˘onhada’ (Iranhoegyojidoja K’omeiniga ˘onmy˘ong),” Rodong sinmun, 20 十一月 1979, p. 6 (all articles obtained and translated by Yoo Jinil). Iranhaksaengd˘ur˘ui Miguktaesagwan 199. Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, 报告, 11 十二月 1979, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j, 伊朗, 1979, 66. doboz, 63-3, 005660/35/1979; “Sicherheitsrat: Resolution zu Konﬂikt USA-Iran,” Neues Deutsch- 土地, 6 十二月 1979, p. 5; and “Iran˘un Migugin inminmunjewa kwally˘onhay˘o Yuenanborisa- hoees˘o ch’aet’aektoen˘un ˘ott˘ohan ky˘or˘uido paegy˘ok’alg˘oshida,” Rodong sinmun, 29 十一月 1979, p. 6 (obtained and translated by Yoo Jinil). 228 l 从http下载 : / / 直接的 . 米特 . 呃呃 / j c w s / 文章 – p d l f / / / / 2 5 2 1 7 9 2 1 4 0 9 7 0 / j c w s _ a _ 0 1 1 1 9 压力 . 来宾来访 0 7 九月 2 0 2 3 Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran Islamic Republic concluded with a Communist country. The North Koreans were disappointed when Khomeini did not receive them, but they held nego- tiations with ten Iranian ministers and offered to assist Iran in ﬁelds in which the DPRK had ample expertise, such as mining, rice cultivation, and the con- struction of irrigation systems. The agreement called for the exchange of goods worth $280 百万, a volume far beyond what the notoriously unreliable
North Koreans could be expected to deliver. The DPRK undertook to sup-
ply machine tools, steel ware, light industry products, and agricultural goods
in exchange for manufactured products, chemical goods, and dried fruit. 但
when Kong Chint’ae asked for 1.5 million tons of crude oil, Iranian Minister
of Petroleum Ali Akbar Moinfar ﬂatly refused to sell more than 500,000 吨,
set a minimum price of $28 per barrel, and demanded payment in convert- ible currency. 到底, Moinfar largely managed to impose his terms on the North Korean delegation. The Hungarian ambassador surmised that North Korea intended to re-export the Iranian oil (presumably to obtain convertible currency) rather than use it for its own needs.200 In a conversation with the Hungarian ambassador, North Korea’s envoy in Iran optimistically described the trade agreement as a turning point in the de- velopment of Iranian–North Korean relations. 仍然, the partial achievements of Kong’s visit revealed that neither the Iranian revolution nor the DPRK’s attempts to gain Khomeini’s goodwill could bring about a complete reorien- tation of Iranian policy. The North Korean ambassador failed to persuade the Iranian government to close the South Korean embassy.201 The North Ko- reans made greater efforts to please Iran than vice versa, but they could not wholly achieve their aims—an indication that Iran’s bargaining position was still considerably stronger than North Korea’s. At the same time that Iranian-DPRK cooperation expanded, North Ko- rea’s relations with Iraq entered a downward spiral. 在某种程度上, the two processes may have been interrelated. Iraq’s Ba’ath leaders, whose relations with the newly established Khomeini regime went from bad to worse, had little reason to welcome North Korea’s efforts to woo Iran.202 For instance, the Iraqi authorities, unlike the DPRK, deplored the takeover of the U.S. 嗯- bassy in Tehran, not least because their own diplomats in Khorramshahr and 200. Hungarian Embassy to Iran, 报告, 5 二月 1980. 201. Azad, Koreans in the Persian Gulf, PP. 68, 84–85. 202. For an overview of Iraq-Iran relations in 1979–1980, see Stephen C. Pelletiere, The Iran-Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum (纽约: 普雷格, 1992), PP. 16, 29–32. 229 l 从http下载 : / / 直接的 . 米特 . 呃呃 / j c w s / 文章 – p d l f / / / / 2 5 2 1 7 9 2 1 4 0 9 7 0 / j c w s _ a _ 0 1 1 1 9 压力 . 来宾来访 0 7 九月 2 0 2 3 Szalontai and Yoo Kermanshah also encountered Iranian harassment.203 Still, the issue that seems to have annoyed Iraq more than anything else was North Korea’s unwilling- ness to break with Sadat in the wake of the Camp David Accords (17 塞普滕- 误码率 1978) and the Egypt-Israel peace treaty (26 行进 1979). Iraqi leaders played a particularly active role in the all-Arab campaign against Camp David, hosting ﬁrst an Arab League summit (2 十一月 1978) and then a meet- ing of Arab foreign and economic ministers (31 行进 1979) to pressure and ostracize Sadat.204 For this reason, they strongly disapproved of North Korea’s close military, 政治的, and economic cooperation with Egypt. 反过来, Rodong sinmun pointedly ignored the inter-Arab meetings of November 1978 and March 1979—an attitude that stood in striking contrast to that of Neues Deutschland (which devoted as many as ten articles to the ﬁrst Baghdad summit).205 The extent to which North Korea’s attitude irritated Iraqi leaders may be gauged from a conversation that the Iraqi ambassador to Pyongyang held with his Hungarian counterpart on 7 一月 1980. After pointing out that the annual volume of Iraqi-DPRK trade stood at a mere $5 百万, he noted that
the North Koreans were seeking to obtain crude oil from Iraq at below-market
价格. They had offered to increase their cement exports from 100,000 吨
到 300,000 吨, but Iraq had consistently rebuffed their requests for oil on
the grounds that a country collaborating with Sadat was ineligible for such
preferential treatment. 伊拉克, the ambassador said, did supply oil to some Asian
states at pre-1973 prices, but only on condition that they condemned Sadat’s
policy—a condition the DPRK was unwilling to meet.

The Iraqi ambassador scorned North Korea’s attempts to outcompete
South Korea in the Third World by pointing out that the South Koreans were
far more capable than North Korea of providing desirable goods to Third
World countries. The only thing the North could supply was ideology. 这
ambassador effectively lumped North and South Korea together by stressing
that the Iraqi government did not intend to broaden its contacts with either
韩国 (which he labeled a U.S. client state) or North Korea (which he

203. 我们. Interests Section in Baghdad to the Secretary of State, “Conversation with Iraqi ofﬁcial,”
Telegram, 19 十一月 1979, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1973–1979, Electronic
Telegrams, 1979, 医生. 不. 1979BAGHDA02432.

204. Elie Podeh and Onn Winckler, “The Boycott That Never Was: Egypt and the Arab System,
1979–1989,” Durham Middle East Paper No. 72, Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies,
University of Durham, 达勒姆, 英国, 2002, PP. 2–4.

205. For an overview of Egyptian-DPRK relations in 1978–1981, see Szalontai, “Courting the ‘Traitor
to the Arab Cause,’” pp. 123–127. For East Germany’s coverage of the Baghdad summit, see “Arabis-
che Gipfelkonferenz setzte ihre Beratungen fort,” Neues Deutschland, 4 十一月 1978, p. 7.

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Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran

described as a collaborator of another U.S. client state, 埃及).206 因此, 北
Korea’s relations with Iraq had reached an impasse well before the outbreak of
the Iraq-Iran War on 22 九月 1980). Whereas Iran’s revolutionary lead-
ers showed readiness to supply at least a limited amount of oil to the DPRK,
Iraq ﬂatly turned down the North Korean requests. Seen from this perspec-
主动的, North Korea’s wartime tilt toward Iran was not as mysterious as Chung-in
Moon presented it.207

This is not to say that North Korea publicly sided with Iran in the face of
the Iraqi invasion. 相反, Rodong sinmun, unlike Neues Deutschland,
ignored the initial conﬂicts between Baghdad and Teheran that occurred in
the spring of 1980 and published only a single article (27 九月 1980)
on the outbreak of the war. That article adopted a strictly neutral position,
to such an extent that it failed to mention that the war started with an Iraqi
攻击. It called on the two antagonists to settle their territorial dispute in a
peaceful way, stressing that no one but the “imperialist forces” would beneﬁt
from their conﬂict.208 Rodong sinmun’s perspective was thus fairly similar to the
line adopted by Soviet Pravda on 24 September.209 Still, the Soviet-bloc media
(including Neues Deutschland) covered the initial phase of the war almost on
a daily basis, whereas Rodong sinmun, having stated its position, 有效地
ignored the topic over the entire duration of the conﬂict. Its article titles did
not mention Iraq again until 21 七月 1988, when the newspaper announced
that Iran had accepted the UN Security Council’s call for a ceaseﬁre.210

Rodong sinmun’s long news blackout on Iraq resulted not only from a re-
luctance to cover the Iran-Iraq War but also from the collapse of the decades-
long Iraqi-DPRK partnership. 在 10 十月 1980, the Iraqi government
broke off diplomatic relations with North Korea and promptly expelled all
North Korean diplomats on the grounds that the DPRK had recently started
to supply arms to Iran.211 Several factors may explain why North Korean

206. Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, 报告, 8 一月 1980, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j, 韩国, 1980,
84. doboz, 10, 001156/1980.

207. Moon, “Between Ideology and Interest,” p. 396.
208. “Arapmanjiy˘oges˘o˘ui pij˘ongsangj˘ogin sat’ae,” Rodong sinmun, 27 九月 1980, p. 6 (obtained
and translated by Yoo Jinil). On the earlier Iran-Iraq conﬂicts, see “Yasser Arafat bietet Vermittlung
zwischen Iran und Irak an,” Neues Deutschland, 10 四月 1980, p. 5.

209. “‘Prawda’ zum iranisch-irakischen Konﬂikt,” Neues Deutschland, 25 九月 1980, p. 5.
210. “Irani Iran-Irak’˘usai˘ui ch˘onghwar˘ul hosohan Yuenanborisahoe ky˘or˘uir˘ul kongshiksu,” Rodong
sinmun, 21 七月 1988, p. 6 (obtained and translated by Yoo Jinil).
211. Irak’˘u, pukkoewa tan’gyo,” Dong-A Ilbo (Seoul), 11 十月 1981, p. 1 (obtained and translated
by Lee Junhee); Moon, “Between Ideology and Interest,” p. 383; and Azad, Koreans in the Persian Gulf,
p. 77.

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Szalontai and Yoo

leaders abandoned their long-standing neutrality in the Iran-Iraq conﬂict and
why Iraq reacted to their action in such a drastic manner.

第一的, Iraq’s decision to sever diplomatic relations with the DPRK was
not an isolated action. That same day, Iraqi leaders also broke diplomatic ties
with Syria and Libya, both of which were heavily involved in shipping mili-
tary equipment to Iran.212 The fact that these Arab states threw their weight
behind Iran probably inﬂuenced North Korea’s decision. By supplying arms
to Iran, the North Koreans were able to reinforce their ties with Syria, 也.
In December 1980, the Iraqi ambassador to Hungary told his hosts that Syria
was training Iranian soldiers to operate the Soviet-made light arms provided
by North Korea.213

第二, the North Koreans could take advantage of Iran’s international
isolation to forge a special relationship with the Islamic Republic. During the
ﬁrst phase of the war (22 September–31 December 1980), Iraq was able to
purchase ample quantities of arms (a total of $1 十亿) from a variety of West and East European suppliers. 相比之下, 伊朗, which had been placed under a Western arms embargo after the seizure of the U.S. embassy, could obtain only a small fraction of this amount. The Iranians became heavily dependent on the few countries that were willing to come to their aid.214 Third, North Korean leaders may have been concerned that the outbreak of the war would prevent the implementation of the recently signed trade agreement with Iran unless the North Koreans made additional efforts to ensure Iranian cooperation. The agreement stipulated that the Islamic Republic would supply 500,000 tons of crude oil, but Iran, whose oil production had drastically declined after the 1979 revolution, could deliver only 250,000–300,000 tons by February 1981, with the rest to be shipped later in 1981.215 Because Iraqi leaders had a stake in keeping Iran isolated, their prompt re- taliation for North Korea’s arms sales to Tehran seems to have been inﬂuenced by their intention to dissuade the other Communist countries from following Pyongyang’s example. The Hungarian embassy in Baghdad concluded that the expulsion of the DPRK’s diplomats, along with Iraq’s accusations about Vietnam’s alleged arms shipments to Iran, was intended as a warning to the 212. Jubin Goodarzi, Syria and Iran: Diplomatic Alliance and Power Politics in the Middle East (伦敦: 金牛座学术研究, 2006), PP. 35–36. 213. Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Memorandum, 3 十二月 1980, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j, 伊拉克, 1980, 65. doboz, 62-11, 006342/3/1980. 214. 中央情报局, “Iran-Iraq: Buying Weapons for War,” Intelligence Assessment, 可能 1984, in CERR, 中央情报局- RDP85T00283R000500120005-5. 215. Hungarian Trade Ofﬁce in Pyongyang, Memorandum, 3 行进 1981, in MNL, XIX-J-1-k Ko- 雷亚, 1981, 55. doboz, 81-57, 618/1981. 232 l 从http下载 : / / 直接的 . 米特 . 呃呃 / j c w s / 文章 – p d l f / / / / 2 5 2 1 7 9 2 1 4 0 9 7 0 / j c w s _ a _ 0 1 1 1 9 压力 . 来宾来访 0 7 九月 2 0 2 3 Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran Soviet bloc.216 At the same time, Iraqi leaders were genuinely outraged by what they regarded as North Korea’s perﬁdy. 十一月 1980, Karim al- Jasim, the chairman of Iraq’s Peasant Union and a member of the Iraq-DPRK Friendship Association, told the Hungarian ambassador that he was stunned by North Korea’s action, all the more so because he had been on such good terms with the North Korean diplomats in Baghdad that they could visit him at any time.217 In May 1983, Naim Haddad, the speaker of Iraq’s National Assembly, indignantly told a Hungarian delegation that the DPRK, after re- ceiving loans from Iraq, spent the money on arms purchases and then resold the arms to Iran.218 The collapse of the already strained Iraqi-DPRK partnership was more than offset by the dynamic expansion of North Korean cooperation with Iran. Iran’s initial dependence on North Korean arms seems to have enhanced the DPRK’s bargaining power. Iranian leaders had good reason to appreciate the DPRK’s readiness to provide massive quantities of military equipment, train Iranian ofﬁcers and pilots, and dispatch military advisers to Iran.219 For instance, in 1982–1983 the Islamic Republic received T-62 tanks, MiG-19 ﬁghter aircraft, BM-11 multiple rocket launchers, and 130-mm towed ar- tillery from North Korea.220 Most likely, this is why Iranian leaders became more willing to fulﬁll North Korea’s economic requests. In April 1982, when Premier Ri Chong’ok visited Tehran, the Iranians undertook to supply the DPRK with 1 million tons of crude oil per annum over the next three years in exchange for arms and other equipment (1,000 rice-planting machines, 1,500 irrigation pumps, electric motors, transformers, facilities for ore enrichment, iron plates, and zinc), rather than hard currency. Another manifestation of Iran’s growing ﬂexibility was the restraint exer- cised by Iranian ofﬁcials, who habitually urged their trade partners to import a wide variety of Iranian goods. They no longer pressured the North Koreans to purchase non-oil products. North Korean ofﬁcials would have preferred to 216. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, Ciphered Telegram, 24 十月 1980, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j, 伊拉克, 1980, 65. doboz, 62-10, 002090/39/1980. 217. Hungarian Embassy to Iraq, 报告, 17 十二月 1980, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j, 伊拉克, 1980, 65. doboz, 62-10, 002090/88/1980. 218. Tibor Peth˝o (Press Publishing House) to Deputy Foreign Minister Róbert Garai, 报告, 31 可能 1983, in MNL, XIX-J-1-k, International organizations unrelated to the UN, 1983, 168. doboz, VI-18, 3582-1/1983. 219. Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, 报告, 18 一月 1982, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j, 韩国, 1982, 80. doboz, 40, 00991/1982; and Hungarian Embassy to Iran, Ciphered Telegram, 29 十月 1982, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j, 韩国, 1982, 80. doboz, 81-104, 003495/1/1982. 220. 斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所 (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database, https:// www.sipri.org/. 233 l 从http下载 : / / 直接的 . 米特 . 呃呃 / j c w s / 文章 – p d l f / / / / 2 5 2 1 7 9 2 1 4 0 9 7 0 / j c w s _ a _ 0 1 1 1 9 压力 . 来宾来访 0 7 九月 2 0 2 3 Szalontai and Yoo receive cash payments for their arms shipments, but by re-exporting the oil they obtained from Iran they managed to earn some much-needed hard cur- rency.221 The wartime trade with Iran thus had considerable advantages for the cash-starved DPRK. The sudden increase in Iranian-DPRK trade mod- iﬁed North Korea’s trade portfolio to such a great extent that, 在 1981, the combined share of capitalist and developing countries (52 百分) surpassed the share of Communist states (48 百分) trading with North Korea. In that year, the total volume of North Korea’s trade with the developing countries reached 560 million rubles (a 3.5-fold increase compared to 1980). Of that, Iranian-DPRK trade contributed nearly 250 million rubles.222 Despite the evident material beneﬁts of Iranian-DPRK cooperation— which stood in glaring contrast to the increasing strain on Iraqi–North Ko- rean relations—North Korean leaders did not intend to make an unequivocal commitment to Iran against Iraq. 相反, they soon started making behind-the-scenes efforts to patch up relations with Saddam Hussein, not least because they were acutely aware of the fact that their conﬂict with Iraq hin- dered their interactions with Jordan and Kuwait as well.223 As early as January 1982, they invited an Iraqi delegation to Pyongyang to hold talks about the restoration of diplomatic relations, but the distrustful Iraqi leaders sent only an unofﬁcial representative.224 In March 1983, the head of the North Korean trade ofﬁce in Kuwait visited Iraq to persuade Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz to let North Korea reopen its embassy in Baghdad. The North Korean ofﬁcial disingenuously argued that DPRK arms shipments to Iran were based on an earlier (presumably prewar) agreement and that, once the North Korean gov- ernment fulﬁlled its contractual obligations, it would not supply additional arms to Iran. 作为回应, Aziz pressed him to back up his words with a pub- lic statement about the discontinuation of arms shipments. When the North Korean diplomat demurred, the Iraqis concluded that North Korean pledges 221. Hungarian Embassy to Iran, 报告, 6 六月 1982, in MNL, XIX-J-1-k, 韩国, 1982, 58. doboz, 81-10, 5909/1982; Hungarian Embassy to Iran, 报告, 24 十一月 1983, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j, 伊朗, 1983, 63. doboz, 63-103, 006137/1983; Hungarian Embassy to Kuwait, 报告, 21 二月 1984, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j, 伊朗, 1984, 72. doboz, 63-42, 001593/1984; 和美国. Embassy in Abu Dhabi to the Secretary of State, “North Korea: arms for Iran; invite to UAE VIPs,” Telegram, 17 可能 1982, in Digital National Security Archive (DNSArchive), The United States and the Two Koreas, 第一部分: 1969–2010, DNSArchive Accession No. KO00420. 222. Hungarian Trade Ofﬁce in Pyongyang, Memorandum, 30 四月 1982, in MNL, XIX-J-1-k, Ko- 雷亚, 1982, 80. doboz, 81-142, 004038/1982. 223. Hungarian Embassy to Kuwait, 报告, 19 一月 1982, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j, Kuwait, 1982, 82. doboz, 85-103, 001099/1982; and CIA, “The Two Koreas and the Iran-Iraq War,” Memorandum, 22 行进 1984, in CERR, CIA-RDP04T00367R000201390001-8. 224. Hungarian Embassy to Kuwait, 报告, 13 二月 1982, in MNL, XIX-J-1-k, 韩国, 1982, 58. doboz, 81-10, 2895/1982. 234 l 从http下载 : / / 直接的 . 米特 . 呃呃 / j c w s / 文章 – p d l f / / / / 2 5 2 1 7 9 2 1 4 0 9 7 0 / j c w s _ a _ 0 1 1 1 9 压力 . 来宾来访 0 7 九月 2 0 2 3 Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran lacked credibility.225 In the summer of 1984, Iraq made another attempt to wean North Korea from Tehran by offering to purchase large quantities of North Korean arms, but to no avail.226 In August, the head of a division in the Iraqi Foreign Ministry told a U.S. diplomat that “Iraq felt it had been close to agreement with North Korea on stopping the latter’s arms shipments to Iran, but North Korea in the end had backed away from an agreement, and decided to continue to supply Iran.”227 North Korean leaders thus tried to play both ends against the middle. 在- stead of wholeheartedly siding with Iran against Iraq or reverting to their pre- 1980 neutrality, they attempted to restore their relations with Iraq without losing the lucrative Iranian arms market. Their clumsy balancing act ended in a predictable ﬁasco. The Iraqi government seems to have entered talks with North Korea for the sole purpose of halting its arms shipments to Iran. Worse still, the unresolved Iraqi-DPRK conﬂict induced the Ba’ath leaders to broaden their contacts with South Korea—a process that ran directly counter to North Korea’s diplomatic aims. “The Iraqis—in part to punish the North Koreans—permitted the South to establish consular relations in April 1981,” the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (中央情报局) reported.228 In a similar vein, Iraq awarded several large-scale construction projects to South Korean companies and imported more than $1.6 billion worth of South Korean goods during
the war.229

From North Korea’s perspective, the expansion of Iraqi-ROK coopera-
tion was partly offset by the restrictive measures the Iranian authorities took
against South Korea. In June–July 1981, Rodong sinmun triumphantly an-
nounced that the Iranian government had abrogated a ﬁshing agreement with
the ROK, downgraded diplomatic relations to the level of chargé d’affaires,
and instructed the South Korean embassy to reduce its staff.230 The timing
of these steps suggests that Iran’s hardening stance toward South Korea may

225. Hungarian Embassy to Kuwait, 报告, 14 四月 1983, in MNL, XIX-J-1-k, Kuwait, 1983, 85-
57, 316-10/1983.

226. 中央情报局, “Iraq: The Quest for US Arms,” Memorandum, 20 十一月 1984, in CERR, 中央情报局-
RDP85T00287R001302340001-0.

227. 我们.
provement
RDP90BO137OR000801070046-6.

Interests Section in Baghdad to the Secretary of State, 主题: “Possible Im-
in CERR, 中央情报局-
in Iraqi-South Korean relations,” Telegram, 20 八月 1984,

228. 中央情报局, “The Two Koreas and the Iran-Iraq War.”

229. Azad, Koreans in the Persian Gulf, p. 70.
230. “Irani Namjos˘on’goeroedodanggwa maej˘ott˘on susanhy˘opch˘ong˘ul ch’wiso,” Rodong sinmun, 12
六月 1981, p. 5; and “Irani Namjos˘on’gwa˘ui oegyogwan’gye˘ui ky˘ok˘ul taeridaesag˘ub˘uro natch’ugiro
ky˘olch˘ong (3my˘ong˘ui Namjos˘ont’enjoegyogwant’ent’˘ur˘ul ch’ubang),” Rodong sinmun, 9 七月 1981,
p. 1 (both articles obtained and translated by Yoo Jinil).

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Szalontai and Yoo

have been inﬂuenced by the rapprochement between Iraq and South Korea.
The Iranian authorities gave no reason for their move against the South Ko-
rean embassy, but their action, taken on 7 七月, closely followed Seoul’s public
announcement of the establishment of consular relations with Iraq (1 七月).231
仍然, Iranian leaders did not intend to cut all ties with the South Koreans. 迪斯-
regarding North Korea’s shrill calls for a boycott, Iran’s delegates duly attended
the 70th Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in Seoul (2–13 Octo-
误码率 1983), leaving it of their own accord when the meeting’s draft resolution
on the Iran-Iraq War did not tally with their standpoint.232

在 1983, South Korean civilian exports to Iran stood at $650 百万, making the Islamic Republic the ﬁfth-largest trade partner for South Korea.233 South Korean ﬁrms even sold various types of military equipment to Iran. 经过 1983, such sales had become signiﬁcant enough to elicit U.S. complaints.234 Iran’s interests were therefore better served by simultaneous cooperation with both Koreas than by an unequivocal preference for Pyongyang over Seoul.235 Neither the DPRK nor the Islamic Republic was willing to burn its bridges to the state that its partner regarded as its main opponent, but Iran’s balancing act between the two Koreas proved far more successful than North Korea’s post-1980 maneuvering between Iran and Iraq. Iran’s unwillingness to break with South Korea in favor of North Korea constituted but one example of the two regimes’ divergent geopolitical priori- 领带. As far as the United States and Israel were concerned, Rodong sinmun was ready to express support for Iran’s standpoint. 例如, it condemned the failed U.S. airborne operation to rescue the hostages and insinuated that the South Korean government sympathized with the intervention.236 The news- paper presented the Algiers Accords (19 一月 1981) as an Iranian victory, only to point out soon afterward that the United States continued to increase its threatening naval presence along Iran’s territorial waters despite the release 231. “Ajawi ch’ongy˘ongsa puim, Han’guk-Irak’˘u y˘ongsagwan’gye surip,” Dong-A Ilbo (Seoul), 2 七月 1981, p. 1 (obtained and translated by Lee Junhee); and “S. Korea Told to Recall Diplomats,” Canberra Times, 9 七月 1981, p. 4. 232. Interparliamentary Union Conference, Report of the United States Delegation to the 70th Conference of the Interparliamentary Union Held at Seoul, 韩国, October 2–13, 1983 (华盛顿, 直流: 我们. Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1984), PP. 2–9. 233. 中央情报局, “The Two Koreas and the Iran-Iraq War.” 234. Paul Wolfowitz to the Deputy Secretary (Kenneth W. Dam), “Your trip to Korea—Overview,” Brieﬁng Memorandum, 11 十月 1983, in DNSArchive, The United States and the Two Koreas, 第一部分, DNSArchive Accession No. KO00465. 235. 概览, see Azad, “Iran and the Two Koreas,” PP. 174–177. 236. “Iraninmin˘ul pandaehan˘un hoengp’ohan mury˘okkans˘op’aengwi,” Rodong sinmun, 30 四月 1980, p. 6 (obtained and translated by Yoo Jinil). 236 l 从http下载 : / / 直接的 . 米特 . 呃呃 / j c w s / 文章 – p d l f / / / / 2 5 2 1 7 9 2 1 4 0 9 7 0 / j c w s _ a _ 0 1 1 1 9 压力 . 来宾来访 0 7 九月 2 0 2 3 Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran of the hostages.237 By contrast, Rodong sinmun consistently ignored certain regional conﬂicts to which Iran’s UN delegates paid particularly strong at- 注意力, such as the Iraq-Iran War and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. As early as October 1979, the Islamic Republic started to criticize the Afghan regime’s ultra-leftist policies, which had triggered a ﬂow of refugees into neigh- boring Iran. From North Korea’s perspective, 然而, the Afghan govern- ment’s decision to recognize the DPRK as the sole legitimate Korean state (九月 1978) was sufﬁcient reason to maintain a foothold in Afghanistan even after the Soviet invasion of December 1979. 同时, Afghan leaders’ complaints about Iran’s assistance to the mujahideen guerrillas fell on deaf ears in North Korea.238 Iran’s UN delegates placed the Korean question at the bottom of their pri- ority list. Their speeches at the opening of the UN sessions of October 1979 and October 1980 made no mention of Korea, and their statements of 1981– 1983 devote several pages to Iraq, a couple of paragraphs to Afghanistan, and only one or two sentences to Korea.239 At the Seventh Non-Aligned Sum- mit Conference (新德里, 7–12 March 1983), the North Korean delega- tion played an active role in the dispute over Vietnamese-occupied Cambodia, whereas the speech of Iranian Premier Mir-Hossein Mousavi, which focused on Israel, 伊拉克, and Afghanistan, made no reference to Korea or Cambodia.240 Thus, the overlap between Iranian and North Korean positions seems to have been narrower than the consensus reached by the DPRK and Ba’ath-ruled Iraq in 1970–1972. North Korean diplomacy and Iranian-DPRK military cooperation seem to have proceeded along partly divergent paths. In the public sphere, North Korean leaders showed strong reluctance to take a stand on the Iran-Iraq War. 237. “Irani Migugininjilt˘ur˘ul s˘okpang (Migugi injilmunjewa kwally˘onhan Iran˘ui yogur˘ulch˘opsu),” Rodong sinmun, 22 一月 1981, p. 6; and “Iranhy˘ongmy˘ong˘un ch˘onjinhago itta,” Rodong sinmun, 11 二月 1981, p. 6 (both articles obtained and translated by Yoo Jinil). 238. United Nations General Assembly, 34th Session, 21st Plenary Meeting, 4 十月 1979, Ofﬁcial Records, A/34/PV.21, PP. 447, 457; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, 报告, 18 十一月 1985, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j, 阿富汗, 1985, 24. doboz, 1-25, 005921/1985; and Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, 报告, 28 七月 1986, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j, 韩国, 1986, 88. doboz, 81-10, 00528/1/ 1986. 239. United Nations General Assembly, 36th Session, 26th Plenary Meeting, 5 十月 1981, Ofﬁcial Records, A/36/PV.26, PP. 547–553; United Nations General Assembly, 37th Session, 27th Plenary Meeting, 12 十月 1982, Ofﬁcial Records, A/37/PV.27, PP. 515–522; and United Nations General Assembly, 38th Session, 13th Plenary Meeting, 30 九月 1983, Ofﬁcial Records, A/38/PV.13, PP. 186–192. 240. Hungarian Embassy to India, Ciphered Telegram, 11 行进 1983, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j, Non- aligned countries, 1983, 130. doboz, 209-10, 0020/52/1983; and Hungarian Embassy to Iran, 报告, 26 四月 1983, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j, Non-aligned countries, 1983, 130. doboz, 209-10, 0020/79/1983. 237 l 从http下载 : / / 直接的 . 米特 . 呃呃 / j c w s / 文章 – p d l f / / / / 2 5 2 1 7 9 2 1 4 0 9 7 0 / j c w s _ a _ 0 1 1 1 9 压力 . 来宾来访 0 7 九月 2 0 2 3 Szalontai and Yoo When various Third World leaders such as Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak (四月 1983) and Cuba’s Fidel Castro (行进 1986) asked Kim Il-Sung to make use of his contacts with Iran to put an end to the war as soon as possible (IE。, to halt North Korean arms shipments to Iran), Kim did his best to dodge this thorny issue. 同时, the North Koreans tacitly disagreed with Khomeini’s conditions to end the war (the dismissal of Saddam Hussein and the payment of reparations) on the grounds that these demands were neither appropriate nor enforceable. Their attitude thus differed from the position of Iran’s Arab allies, Syria and Libya, both of which had openly called for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Yet these diplomatic reservations did not pre- vent North Korea from gradually expandng its military assistance to Iran. 经过 1986, its involvement in the war had become so extensive that North Korean ofﬁcers and artillerymen directly participated in the planning and conduct- ing of Iranian offensive operations.241 In 1986–1987, the weaponry North Korea supplied to Iran included such new categories as Hwas˘ong-5 (Scud-B) short-range ballistic missiles, KN-1 (HY-2 Silkworm) anti-ship cruise mis- siles, 170-mm self-propelled artillery, anti-tank missiles, and Chaho-class fast attack patrol boats.242 Judging from the contrast between the two states’ large- scale material cooperation and their limited diplomatic consensus, the CIA had good reason to conclude that “Iranian–North Korean relations are based more on economic realities than on any sense of common struggle against ‘imperialism.’”243 In the last stage of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran’s occasional military clashes with the United States—a U.S. attack on an Iranian minelaying vessel (21 九月 1987), the destruction of two Iranian oil platforms (19 十月 1987), a naval clash (18 四月 1988), 和美国. shootdown of an Ira- nian passenger airplane (3 七月 1988)—created an opportunity for North Korean leaders to demonstrate their public solidarity with Iran. On each occasion, Rodong sinmun promptly denounced the United States, highlight- ing the opprobrium that these actions generated in the Communist and de- veloping countries.244 In response to the shootdown of Iran Air Flight 655, 241. Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, 报告, 17 四月 1983, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j, 埃及, 1983, 50. doboz, 36-10, 002775/1983; and Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, 报告, 28 七月 1986; and Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, p. 82. 242. SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. 243. 中央情报局, “Iran: The Struggle to Deﬁne and Control Foreign Policy,” Research Paper, 可能 1985, in CERR, CIA-RDP86T00587R000200190004-4. See also Bermudez, Proliferation for Proﬁt, p. 3. 244. “Irans˘onbak˘ul konggy˘ok’an Miguk˘ul tanjoe,” Rodong sinmun, 26 九月 1987, p. 6; “Mijega Irane taehan mury˘okch’imnyak˘ul kamhaeng,” Rodong sinmun, 22 十月 1987, p. 6; and “Mijega 238 l 从http下载 : / / 直接的 . 米特 . 呃呃 / j c w s / 文章 – p d l f / / / / 2 5 2 1 7 9 2 1 4 0 9 7 0 / j c w s _ a _ 0 1 1 1 9 压力 . 来宾来访 0 7 九月 2 0 2 3 Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran the newspaper published as many as 26 articles.245 Unlike Neues Deutschland (which regularly reported Iran’s attacks on Kuwaiti and European oil tankers), North Korean propaganda did not cover the ongoing Iran-Iraq War—an omission that rendered it easier to present U.S. military operations in the Gulf as acts of unprovoked aggression.246 In the long run, the U.S.-Iranian clashes had a mixed impact on North Korean policy. The increasing risk of a large-scale confrontation with the United States, coupled with Iraq’s growing military strength, eventually com- pelled the reluctant Iranian leaders to end the war without the fulﬁllment of their oft-repeated demands for reparations and the dismissal of Saddam Hussein.247 Khomeini compared this concession to “drinking hemlock,” but North Korean leaders seem to have welcomed it, presumably on the grounds that the end of the Iran-Iraq War would enable them to cooperate with both Middle Eastern states and extricate themselves from a situation that strained their relations with numerous countries. Rodong sinmun promptly reported Iran’s decision to accept UN Security Council Resolution 598 (18 七月 1988), the end of combat operations (8 八月 1988), and the restoration of peace (20 八月 1988), and the North Korean Foreign Ministry issued two pub- lic statements expressing its satisfaction with these steps.248 Yet the end of hostilities proved insufﬁcient to overcome the rift that the war had created between Iraq and North Korea. Despite the DPRK’s public sympathies with Iraq during the Gulf War of January–February 1991, the cruise missile strikes of September 1996, the air raids of December 1998 and March 1999, and ﬁnally the invasion of March 2003, Iraqi-DPRK diplomatic relations were Irane taehae kangdoj˘ogin mujanggonggy˘ok˘ul kamhaeng,” Rodong sinmun, 20 四月 1988, p. 6 (all articles obtained and translated by Yoo Jinil). 245. 看, 除其他外, “Mijega hor˘umuj˘uhaehy˘opsanggonges˘o paekchue Iranly˘ogaekkir˘ul ss- watt˘olgun˘un nalgangdoj˘ogint’erohaengwir˘ul kamhaeng,” Rodong sinmun, 5 七月 1988, p. 6; and “‘Mije˘ui Iranly˘ogaekky˘okch’usag˘on˘un konggongy˘onhan kukchet’erohaengwi’ segye y˘or˘o narad˘uri kyut’an,” Rodong sinmun, 7 七月 1988, p. 6 (both articles obtained and translated by Yoo Jinil). 246. “Besorgnis in der UNO über Eskalation des Golfkonﬂikts,” Neues Deutschland, 19 十月 1987, p. 1; and “Großtanker beschossen,” Neues Deutschland, 21 十二月 1987, p. 5. 247. James G. Blight et al., Becoming Enemies: U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979–1988 (拉纳姆, 医学博士: 罗曼 & 利特尔菲尔德, 2012), PP. 162–164. 248. “Irani Iran-Irak’˘usai˘ui ch˘onghwar˘ul hosohan Yuenanborisahoe ky˘or˘uir˘ul kongshiksurak,”’ Rodong sinmun, 21 七月 1988, p. 6; “Urin˘un Irani ch’wihan choch’ir˘ul hwany˘onghanda (Chos˘on Minjuju˘ui Inmin Konghwaguk oegyobudaeby˘onin tamhwa),” Rodong sinmun, 22 七月 1988, p. 4; “Iran-Irak’˘u ch˘onjaeng˘ui ch˘onghwanalcha palp’yo,” Rodong sinmun, 11 八月 1988, p. 6; and “Iran- Irak’˘usaie ch˘onghwaga shirhy˘ondoen k˘os˘ul hwany˘onghanda (Chos˘on Minjuju˘ui Inmin Konghwaguk oegyobudaeby˘onin tamhwa),” Rodong sinmun, 22 八月 1988, p. 4 (all articles obtained and trans- lated by Yoo Jinil). 239 l 从http下载 : / / 直接的 . 米特 . 呃呃 / j c w s / 文章 – p d l f / / / / 2 5 2 1 7 9 2 1 4 0 9 7 0 / j c w s _ a _ 0 1 1 1 9 压力 . 来宾来访 0 7 九月 2 0 2 3 Szalontai and Yoo not restored until 2008, by which time the Ba’ath regime was no longer in power.249 Epilogue and Conclusions Unable to reconcile with Iraq, North Korea continued to rely on Iran, but the end of the war seems to have enhanced Iran’s bargaining position vis-à- vis the DPRK. In the immediate aftermath of the war, Iran broadened its contacts with both Koreas. In January 1989, Iran and South Korea agreed to restore ambassadorial relations, and Iranian–South Korean economic cooperation started expanding once again.250 In 1988–1989, Iranian diplo- mats in Pyongyang openly expressed their agreement with Hungary’s decision to recognize South Korea—a step furiously opposed by North Korea.251 In parallel with these developments, Iranian President Ali Khamenei visited the DPRK in May 1989 to conclude new military and economic agreements. Having suffered massive damage during the eight-year war, Iranian ofﬁcials were eager to learn how North Korea had undergone reconstruction after the Korean War. North Korean leaders agreed to assist Iran in mining, shipbuild- 英, the construction of irrigation systems, and ballistic missile technology, whereas Iran was to supply the DPRK with crude oil.252 In 1991–1993, North Korea provided the Islamic Republic with Hwas˘ong-6 (Scud-C) 弹道导弹- siles (which had an operational range of 500 kilometers and served as the model for Iran’s Shahab-2) and later with Hwas˘ong-7 (Nodong-1) medium- range missiles, the model for the Iranian Shahab-3.253 Still, the upgrading of North Korean military assistance could not pre- vent the decline of Iranian-DPRK economic cooperation. At ﬁrst, Iranian oil 249. 看, 除其他外, “Manjiy˘okch˘onjaeng˘un tangjang chungjidoey˘oya handa Mijega Irak’˘ue tae- han kunsaj˘okkonggy˘ok˘ul hwaktae (Irak’˘udaet’ongny˘ongi ch’imnyak˘ul chitpusy˘ob˘oril k˘os˘ul hoso),” Rodong sinmun, 18 一月 1991, p. 6; “Miguk Irak’˘ue taehan sunhangmissail konggy˘ok˘ul kamhaeng, kinjanghan ch˘ongse chos˘ong,” Rodong sinmun, 5 九月 1996, p. 6; “Spokesman for DPRK For- eign Ministry on U.S. military attack on Iraq,” KCNA, 18 十二月 1998; “我们. air raid on Iraq must be stopped at once,” KCNA, 11 行进 1999; and “Spokesman for DPRK FM blasts U.S. assertion about Iraqi regime change,” KCNA, 31 行进 2003. 250. Azad, Koreans in the Persian Gulf, PP. 90–91. 251. Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, 报告, 13 二月 1989, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j, 韩国, 1989, 51. doboz, 81-14, 00294/1/1989. 252. Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, 报告, 29 可能 1989, in MNL, XIX-J-1-j, 伊朗, 1989, 41. doboz, 63-13, 002626/1989; and Levkowitz, “Iran and North Korea Military Cooperation,” p. 2. 253. Nelson E. 汉森, “North Korean-Iranian Cooperation in Ballistic Missile Development,” in Jungmin Kang, 编辑。, Assessment of the Nuclear Programs of Iran and North Korea (多德雷赫特: 施普林格, 2013), p. 116; and SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. 240 l 从http下载 : / / 直接的 . 米特 . 呃呃 / j c w s / 文章 – p d l f / / / / 2 5 2 1 7 9 2 1 4 0 9 7 0 / j c w s _ a _ 0 1 1 1 9 压力 . 来宾来访 0 7 九月 2 0 2 3 Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran shipments remained at the wartime level (1989: 920,000 吨; 1990: 980,000 吨), but as early as 1991–1992 they dropped to 220,000 tons per annum. 在 1995, regular Iranian oil shipments were evidently discontinued altogether. Because Russian oil shipments were halted as early as 1991, the discontinua- tion of Iranian oil supplies has effectively made North Korea dependent on a single supplier: China.254 Nor did North Korean receive much support from Iran or Iraq when the North Korean nuclear weapons program was ﬁrst placed on the agenda of the UN General Assembly in the broader context of nuclear safety. When UN General Assembly Resolutions 49/65 (15 十二月 1994) 和 50/9 (1 十一月 1995) were passed, the DPRK was the sole state to cast a negative vote. On the ﬁrst occasion, Iraq voted in favor of the draft resolution, and Iran abstained; on the second occasion, Iran voted for the draft resolution, and Iraq did not participate in the voting.255 Certain elements of North Korea’s maneuvering between Tehran and Baghdad persisted even in the post–Cold War era. 20世纪90年代, the United States pursued a policy of “dual containment” toward Iraq and Iran, yet “the two neighbors continued to view each other and not the United States as their greatest source of insecurity.”256 Facing their ongoing rivalry, North Korean propaganda preferred to highlight efforts by Iran and Iraq to reach a modus vivendi, rather than their recurrent disagreements. Presenting the United States as the main threat to the Middle East, Rodong sinmun duly reported the occasional acts of cooperation between Iraq and Iran: Saddam Hussein’s decision to reconﬁrm the Iraq-Iran border as it had been delineated by the 1975 Algiers Agreement, Iran’s protests against U.S. air raids on Iraqi civilian targets, Iran’s humanitarian aid to war-torn Iraq, the exchange of Iraqi and Iranian prisoners-of-war, and so on.257 254. David von Hippel and Peter Hayes, “Fueling DPRK Energy Futures and Energy Security: 2005 Energy Balance, Engagement Options, and Future Paths,” Nautilus Institute Special Report, 六月 2007. 255. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1994 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), p. 927; and Yearbook of the United Nations, 1995 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997), p. 1063. 256. Anoushiravan Ehteshami, “Iran-Iran Relations after Saddam,” 华盛顿季刊, 卷. 26, 不. 4 (2003), p. 122. 257. “Irak’˘uga kukky˘ongmunje t˘ung Iran˘ui yogujog˘on˘ul surak,” Rodong sinmun, 22 八月 1990, p. 6; “Iranoemus˘ong Irak’˘u˘ui min’ganinjiy˘okt˘ure taehan Migug˘ui kongs˘ub˘ul kyut’an,” Rodong sin- mun, 23 一月 1991, p. 6; “Irani Irak’˘uinmine taehan kukchej˘ogin injoju˘uij˘ogw˘onjoe hy˘omny˘ok,” Rodong sinmun, 28 一月 1991, p. 6; “Irak’˘uwa Irani ch˘onjaengp’orogyohwan chaegae,” Rodong sinmun, 18 行进 1992, p. 6; “Irani Irak’˘uwa˘ui punjaengmunjer˘ul hoedam˘ul t’onghae haegy˘orhal ripchang˘ul p’yomy˘ong,” Rodong sinmun, 17 可能 1995, p. 6; and “ ˘Uigy˘onsangi munjer˘ul haegy˘orhago hy˘opchohary˘on˘un Iran’gwa Irak’˘u,” Rodong sinmun, 9 十二月 1997, p. 6. 241 l 从http下载 : / / 直接的 . 米特 . 呃呃 / j c w s / 文章 – p d l f / / / / 2 5 2 1 7 9 2 1 4 0 9 7 0 / j c w s _ a _ 0 1 1 1 9 压力 . 来宾来访 0 7 九月 2 0 2 3 Szalontai and Yoo In the sphere of public diplomacy, North Korea adopted a more ambiva- lent attitude. 从 1992 到 1995, when the UN General Assembly regularly discussed the issue of human rights violations in Iran and Iraq, the votes cast by North Korea, 伊朗, and Iraq followed a fairly consistent pattern. If a draft resolution targeted Iran’s human rights violations, North Korea invariably op- posed it, whereas Iraq usually supported it; if a resolution was directed against Iraq, Iran invariably supported it, and the DPRK preferred to abstain. Iraq and Iran actively used the human rights issue to discredit each other, whereas Pyongyang sought to stay clear of their rivalry but showed a perceptible pref- erence for Iran over Iraq. Apart from the fact that North Korea lacked diplo- matic relations with Iraq, the DPRK may have taken into consideration that, in these years, Iraq faced extreme international isolation, and only a few states (Sudan and Libya) were ready to defend its human rights record. 相比之下, the number of countries that proved willing to throw their weight behind Iran steadily grew from ﬁfteen in 1992 到 26 在 1995, including such major states as China, 印度, 巴基斯坦, and Indonesia.258 In the sphere of raw power politics, North Korea’s post–Cold War maneu- vering between Iran and Iraq was of an especially unsavory nature. In 1999– 2001, the North Koreans held secret negotiations with Iraq about the transfer of technology for a surface-to-surface ballistic missile with a range of 1,300 kilometers (a range comparable to that of Iran’s DPRK-inspired Shahab-3) but in the end failed to deliver the equipment for which Iraq had paid $10
million in advance, nor did they heed Iraq’s demands for a refund.259 Apart
from ﬁnancial considerations, North Korea’s decision to enter talks with Iraq
was probably inﬂuenced by Saddam Hussein’s growing assertiveness vis-à-vis
美国. 从 1998 到 2000, North Korean propaganda noted that
the United States was no longer able to create a coalition against Iraq as it had
done in 1991 and praised Baghdad’s decision to expel the UN inspectors.260

For North Korea, the resurgence of Iraqi military power appeared to be
a favorable development, but Iranian leaders had good reason to regard it

258. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1992 (多德雷赫特: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), PP. 789,
792; Yearbook of the United Nations, 1993 (多德雷赫特: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994), PP. 936,
938; Yearbook of the United Nations, 1994, PP. 1088, 1092; and Yearbook of the United Nations, 1995,
PP. 800, 803.

259. Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD with Addendums: Delivery
系统 (华盛顿, 直流: 我们. Government Printing Ofﬁce, 2004), PP. 58–61; and David E. Sanger
and Thom Shanker, “For the Iraqis, a Missile Deal That Went Sour; Files Tell of Talks with North
韩国,“ 纽约时报, 1 十二月 2003, p. A4.

260. “我们. is not ‘only superpower,’” KCNA, 8 十二月 1998; “Behavior of Japan, political dwarf,”
KCNA, 23 十二月 1998; and “Imperialists’ high-handed and arbitrary practices assailed,” KCNA,
3 可能 2000 (the last article was obtained by Hong Yong Ja).

242

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Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran

as a security threat, all the more so because Saddam Hussein’s efforts to re-
sume his missile program were at least partly motivated by his ongoing rivalry
with Iran.261 In 1999 和 2001, angered by Hussein’s support to the exiled
Mujahedin-e-Khalq guerrillas, Iran repeatedly ﬁred missiles at guerrilla camps
in Iraq.262 North Korea’s missile talks with Iraq constituted an act of double
deception insofar as they disregarded the security interests of Iran but also
broke promises to Iraq.

North Korea’s policies toward Iran and Iraq, both during and after the
冷战, showed several long-term patterns. 第一的, North Korea’s commit-
ment to Iraq vis-à-vis Iran, or to Iran vis-à-vis Iraq, was by no means as perma-
nent and unconditional as the solidarity the DPRK expected vis-à-vis South
韩国. Even when North Korea’s political or military collaboration with one
of the two antagonistic states (such as with Iraq in 1971–1972 or with Iran in
1982–1984) reached a high level, and its contacts with the other state were al-
most non-existent, North Korean leaders were eager to reach out to the other
country if they saw a chance for rapprochement, no matter whether their old
partner liked it or not. If the new partner (例如, Iran in 1972–1973) 发生了
to maintain closer relations with South Korea, the North Koreans strove to
challenge the ROK on home ground by gaining a foothold in this hitherto
inaccessible country, instead of sticking to the state that loyally adhered to
North Korea’s standpoint on the Korean question.

第二, North Korean leaders usually sought to avoid taking a public
stand on the Iraq-Iran dispute. They adopted an evasive stance not only in
the years when they maintained cordial relations with both sides (as in 1974–
1975) but also when they were on good terms with one state and lacked any
contacts with the other (例如, 1969–1970). Even when they deﬁnitely sided
with one country against the other (例如, with Iraq against Iran in 1971–1972
or with Iran against Iraq in 1980–1981), they refrained from launching the
same type of sustained propaganda campaign against their partner’s opponent
that they directed against the United States, 韩国, and Israel. 他们
praised the occasional attempts by Iraq and Iran to settle their differences (作为
在 1975, 1988, 1991, ETC。).

第三, North Korea was likewise disinclined to confront Iraq and Iran
over matters of domestic politics. Save a few critical comments that Rodong
sinmun made on the persecution of the ICP from 1960 到 1963 (inspired by

261. Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor, p. 4.

262. Amin Tarzi and Darby Parliament, “Missile Messages: Iran Strikes MKO Bases in Iraq,” Nonpro-
liferation Review, 卷. 8, 不. 2 (2001), PP. 125–133.

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Szalontai and Yoo

the attitude of the DPRK’s Communist allies), North Korean propaganda pre-
ferred to publish only good news about the domestic conditions in Iraq and
伊朗. Unlike Neues Deutschland, it ignored Iraq’s repressive measures against
the Kurds but readily welcomed the occasional attempts to settle the Kurdish
conﬂict by peaceful means.263 Nor did it pay attention to the animosity be-
tween the ICP and the second Ba’ath regime, except when the two parties
reached a temporary rapprochement.264 In contrast to the Soviet Union and
中国, North Korean leaders were willing to forge interparty ties with the
Ba’ath at the expense of the ICP. In the same vein, Rodong sinmun failed to
publish any article on the Iranian revolution until its decisive victory and ig-
nored domestic crises of the Islamic Republic that were at least brieﬂy covered
by Neues Deutschland (例如, the terrorist attacks of 1981 and the leadership’s
anti-Communist turn in 1983).265 In the face of various regime changes in
1963, 1968, 和 1979, North Korean leaders tried to stay on good terms
with the latest rulers in Iraq and Iran.

第四, North Korea’s opportunistic and low-key attitude toward the
twists and turns of Iraqi and Iranian politics was peculiarly combined with
an occasional readiness to adopt an unusually extreme position in support of
one or both—a stance that the Communist great powers were reluctant to
拿. 例如, the North Koreans praised the public hanging of Jewish
“spies” in Baghdad, expressed agreement with the Ba’ath Party’s uncompro-
mising attitude toward Israel, temporarily backed Iraq’s claims to the Shatt
al-Arab, condemned the Iranian seizure of the Gulf islands, reached out to
Khomeini soon after his homecoming, approved of the Iranian occupation of
美国. embassy, and shipped arms to the Islamic Republic shortly after the
outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War.

When these seemingly incongruous patterns are examined together, 他们
reveal a picture that is even more complex than the model that Lyong Choi,
Jong-dae Shin, and Han-hyung Lee created to describe the Iranian-DPRK
partnership. Pointing out that “despite its ideological ties with Pyongyang,
Tehran had no qualms working with North Korea’s enemy,” these authors
attributed Iran’s limited commitment to the DPRK to three factors: 这

263. “Irak’˘ues˘o K’ur˘ud˘ujongmunjehaegy˘ollo minjokch˘okt’ongiri
iru˘ojy˘otta,” Rodong sinmun, 17
行进 1970, p. 6; and “K’ur˘ud˘umunje˘ui haegy˘or˘un Irak’˘u˘ui minjuju˘uij˘ong palch˘on˘ul pojang-
hay˘oss˘umy˘o pandongsery˘ogen˘un k’˘un t’agy˘ok˘ul chu˘otta,” Rodong sinmun, 16 行进 1971, p. 6.
264. “‘Ch’ukch˘on’ Irak’˘ugongsandang chungangwiw˘onhoe,” Rodong sinmun, 22 八月 1973, p. 1.
On the Ba’ath-ICP rapprochement in 1972–1973, see Tareq Y. Ismael, The Rise and Fall of the Com-
munist Party of Iraq (剑桥, 英国: 剑桥大学出版社, 2008), PP. 168–169.

265. “Bombenanschlag in Teheran,” Neues Deutschland, 30 六月 1981, p. 1; and “Erklärung des Aus-
landskomitees der Tudeh-Partei Irans,” Neues Deutschland, 17 可能 1983, p. 6.

244

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Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran

material beneﬁts that Iranian leaders could draw from their economic coop-
eration with South Korea and from a nuclear deal with the United States;
the logistical unfeasibility of direct military cooperation; and the different
geopolitical positions of the two states.266 Such practical considerations must
have inﬂuenced North Korea’s Iraq/Iran diplomacy in at least some of the
episodes described here. In 1972–1973 and then in 1979–1980, North Ko-
rean leaders had good reason to expect that a diplomatic opening to oil-rich
Iran would bring substantial material beneﬁts—beneﬁts that could offset the
risks of alienating Iraq.

在其他情况下, 然而, North Korea had little to gain (or potentially
much to lose) by refraining from giving full support to either Iraq or Iran. 为了
例子, in 1969–1970 Iran was ﬁrmly allied with South Korea and showed
no interest in cooperating with the DPRK, yet North Korea did not take sides
with Iraq against Iran, no matter how ﬁrmly Iraq championed North Korea’s
cause in the UN. In 1982–1983, when Iranian leaders were determined to in-
vade Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein, the risks of North Korea’s attempt
to restore diplomatic relations with Iraq greatly outweighed the potential ben-
eﬁts, but North Korean leaders were not daunted.

The supreme objective of North Korea’s diplomatic strategy toward the
Middle East and the Third World in general, and toward Iraq and Iran in
特别的, seems to have been to maximize the number of partners rather
than to make a stable and preferential commitment to speciﬁc states. 不-
tably, North Korean leaders’ efforts to avoid entanglement in the disputes of
their Middle Eastern partners were not conﬁned to their Iraq/Iran diplomacy.
They adopted a similarly evasive attitude toward multiple conﬂicts: 之间
Kuwait and Qasim’s Iraq, Ba’ath-ruled Syria and Ba’ath-ruled Iraq, Iraq and
Sadat’s Egypt, Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, 等等. 是-
cause North Korea’s overall policy in the Third World was aimed at eclipsing
South Korea in the UN and the NAM, the DPRK was interested in cooperat-
ing with as many states as possible.267 From this perspective, it made sense to
avoid taking sides in intraregional disputes, to welcome attempts at Iran-Iraq
reconciliation, and to target propaganda primarily against the United States
and Israel. 例如, 在 1974, North Korean leaders could gain more from
simultaneously engaging Iraq, 埃及, 叙利亚, 伊朗, and South Yemen than from
forging ties with only one or two of these competing ﬁve states and neglecting
其他.

266. Choi, Shin, 和李, “The Dilemma of the ‘Axis of Evil,’” pp. 598–599.

267. For an overview of the DPRK-ROK rivalry in the UN and the NAM, see Gills, Korea versus
韩国; Moon, “Between Ideology and Interest”; and Young, Guns, Guerrillas, and the Great Leader.

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Szalontai and Yoo

The USSR, East Germany, and other Communist powers adopted a
largely similar attitude toward the Middle East. In the face of Qasim’s territo-
rial claims on Kuwait or the recurrent Iran-Iraq disputes, Soviet ofﬁcials usu-
ally encouraged both sides to solve their disputes by peaceful means, looked
the other way, or singled out the United States or Britain as the main culprit.
Because North Korea’s early maneuvering vis-à-vis Iraq/Iran (1958–1963)
faced greater handicaps than that of the USSR, East Germany, and the other
East European countries, North Korean leaders had a strong incentive to stay
on the good side of the host authorities, by one means or another. Once they
gained a diplomatic foothold in a country, they sought to retain (or regain) 它
at any cost—hardly an easy task because Middle Eastern leaders were unusu-
ally prone to break off diplomatic or trade relations with a state that aroused
their ire for one reason or another (as occurred in Iraqi-Mongolian relations
在 1963, in Iraqi-U.S. relations in 1967, in Iranian–East German relations in
1969, and in Iraqi-DPRK relations in 1980). 在某些情况下 (例如, 这 1963
Ba’ath coup in Iraq or the 1978 Iranian protests), these conditions induced
the North Koreans to adopt a more opportunistic and less critical attitude
than the Soviet-bloc states did. 在其他情况下 (例如, Iraq in 1969–1972 and
Iran in 1979–1980), they sought to gain the trust of the radical Middle East-
ern regimes by confronting the latter’s opponents more aggressively than the
other Communist powers were willing to do.

尽管如此, the net result of these complicated maneuvers was not nec-
essarily as favorable as North Korean leaders hoped. Their Middle Eastern
partners (especially the Iraqi Ba’ath regime) eventually came to perceive the
DPRK as a state that often adopted a shifty, unreliable, hypocritical, and op-
portunistic attitude toward Mideast issues, yet selﬁshly, aggressively, and dog-
matically pursued its own national interests; whose economic capabilities fell
behind those of South Korea; and which thus could hardly be regarded as an
optimal ally unless Iraq or Iran faced serious international isolation and badly
needed a partner willing to adapt to its extremist position.268

Paradoxically, the conditions that offered the best chance for the creation
of a close relationship between North Korea and a Middle Eastern state—that
是, the various intraregional conﬂicts—were largely at variance with the general
approach of the DPRK’s diplomacy in the Middle East. In several cases (例如,
Qasim’s clash with Nasser in 1959, Iraq’s conﬂict with Iran in 1969–1972,
and Iran’s war with Iraq in 1980), North Korean diplomacy directly beneﬁted
from the intraregional disputes, yet KWP leaders did not draw the conclusion

268. On Arab perceptions of North Korean shiftiness, opportunism, and selﬁshness, see also Szalontai,
“Courting the ‘Traitor to the Arab Cause,’” pp. 116–117.

246

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Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran

that they should make a stable and preferential commitment to their new
partner vis-à-vis its regional opponent. 相反, they readily explored
opportunities to reach out to the enemy of their ally. Their attempts to play
both ends against the middle rarely achieved much success.

致谢

The authors want to thank Joseph S. Bermudez, Charles Kraus, Andrei
Lankov, Alon Levkowitz, B.R. 迈尔斯, Christian Ostermann, Joshua Pollack,
Shin Jongdae, Dae-Kyu Yoon, and the three anonymous reviewers for the ad-
vice and support they provided in preparing this article. We are especially
indebted to Peter Ward and Hanna Kim for their invaluable assistance in
providing access to a list of Rodong sinmun titles and the related articles and
for translating numerous articles. Lee Junhee obtained and translated articles
from Dong-A Ilbo, while Hong Yong Ja tracked down a difﬁcult-to-access Ko-
rean Central News Agency article. Georgina Asfaw and Joseph Gilling from
泰勒 & Francis’ Cold War Eastern Europe database generously provided ac-
cess to numerous documents obtained from the UK National Archives. Mary
Curry kindly assisted with citations of documents from the U.S. Digital Na-
tional Security Archive (DNSArchive). Caroline Kobin-Haube helped us to
gain access to the on-line archives of Neues Deutschland. This work was sup-
ported by the Laboratory Program for Korean Studies through the Ministry
of Education of the Republic of Korea and the Korean Studies Promotion Ser-
vice of the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2019-LAB-1250001) (for Balázs
Szalontai) and Hankuk University of Foreign Studies’ Research Fund (for Yoo
Jinil).

247

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