Leading Dragon Phenomenon:
New Opportunities for Catch-up
in Low-Income Countries
∗
VANDANA CHANDRA, JUSTIN YIFU LIN, AND YAN WANG
Modern economic development is accompanied by the structural transformation
from an agrarian to an industrial economy. Since the 18th century, all countries
that industrialized successfully have followed their comparative advantages and
leveraged the latecomer advantage, including emerging market economies such
as the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 印度, and Indonesia. The current
view is that Chinese dominance in manufacturing hinders poor countries from
developing similar industries. We argue that rising labor cost is causing the
PRC to graduate from labor-intensive to more capital-intensive and technology-
intensive industries. This will result in the relocation of low-skill manufacturing
jobs to other low-wage countries. This process, which we call the “leading dragon
现象,” offers an unprecedented opportunity to low-income countries.
Such economies can seize this opportunity by attracting the rising outward
foreign direct investment flowing from Brazil, the PRC, 印度, and Indonesia
into the manufacturing sectors. All low-income countries can compete for the
jobs spillover from the PRC and other emerging economies, but the winner must
implement credible economic development strategies that are consistent with its
comparative advantage.
关键词: structural transformation, 亚洲, 非洲, People’s Republic of China,
flying geese
JEL codes: B10, O10, O14, O25
我. 介绍
Many developing economies have tried to catch up with industrialized coun-
tries but only a handful of countries, mostly in East Asia, have succeeded. Entering
into the 21st century, 巴西, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 印度, 印度尼西亚,
and a number of other large developing countries achieved dynamic growth and
emerged as the drivers of global growth in a new multipolar world.
∗Vandana Chandra (Vchandra@worldbank.org) is Senior Economist at the World Bank, Justin Yifu Lin (Justinlin@
ccer.pku.cn) is founding Director and Professor of the China Centre for Economic Research at Peking University,
and Yan Wang (Ywang2005b@gmail.com) is Visiting Professor at George Washington University. This paper was
led by Justin Yifu Lin during his tenure as the Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank. 这
authors are grateful to Shahrokh Fardoust, Zia Qureshi, Changyong Rhee, Maria Socorro Gochoco-Bautista, and two
anonymous referees for their helpful comments and Kwang Park and Jian Zhang for their input. The views expressed
in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the institutions they are affiliated with.
Asian Development Review, 卷. 30, 不. 1, PP. 52–84
C(西德:3) 2013 Asian Development Bank
and Asian Development Bank Institute
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LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 53
林 (2010) and Lin and Monga (2011) show that a developing country can
achieve dynamic growth and catch up by exploiting the latecomer advantage and
developing industries that are aligned with its comparative advantage. 在本文中,
we build on this theme and use historical and comparative perspectives to show
that because of similarity in the comparative advantage of low-income countries,
the dynamic emerging economies, when they upgrade their industrial sectors, 将要
create a huge space for low-income countries. In contrast to the conventional think-
ing that the PRC’s dominance in manufacturing export dooms poor countries to
economic backwardness, we argue that its growth spiral may in fact be a boon. 作为
the PRC upgrades its labor-intensive industries and cedes market shares, millions of
labor-intensive jobs will be relocated to low-wage countries and can accelerate their
工业化. This process, which we call the “leading dragon phenomenon,”
offers an unprecedented opportunity to low-income countries. To the skeptics, 我们
point to current trends in South–South foreign direct investment (FDI) flows as
drivers of industrialization in low-income countries. If other emerging market coun-
tries such as Brazil, 印度, and Indonesia follow the PRC’s growth trajectory, 他们
will create even more labor-intensive jobs in low-income countries.
Section II motivates the analysis by reviewing the evidence on structural
transformation and its role in industrialization in the world. Section III examines the
experiences of the Industrial Revolution, the post-World War (WW) II period, 和
the more recent East Asian successes in catching up. Section IV first discusses the
failures to catch-up in various countries that followed protectionist strategies. It then
analyzes the PRC’s meteoric rise in the context of its “comparative advantage follow-
ing” strategy. Section V investigates the impact of the PRC’s rising labor costs on its
employment structure and the industrial upgrading and job relocation currently being
facilitated through outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). Section VI concludes.
二. Structural Transformation and Catch-up
A.
Catch-up in a Multipolar World
Sustained and rapid income growth is a modern phenomenon that appeared
only after the Industrial Revolution in the 18th century. Before that time, for a long
时期, almost all countries in the world had agrarian economies and were poor
relative to today. The income gap among countries was very small. The richest
country’s per capita income was only about five times greater than the poorest
country’s per capita income (Maddison 2010). The Industrial Revolution led to
accelerated growth in the Western European countries, 美国 (我们), 和
other western offshoots, but most other countries failed to do so. 作为结果,
there has been great divergence in income levels between developed and developing
countries and between developing countries with dynamic growth and those trapped
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54 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW
数字 1. Emergence of Multipolar World in the 21st Century
Contribu(西德:2)on to World GDP Growth
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
-20%
1980-1984
1985-89
1990-94
1995-1999
2000-2004
2005-2011
High income
People’s Republic of China
Developing excl BRIC
印度
巴西
Russian Federa(西德:2)在
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DCs ex-BRICS = developing countries excluding Brazil, the PRC, 印度, and Russian Federation; HICs = highly
industrialized countries; PRC = People’s Republic of China.
来源: World Bank. 2012. World Development Indicators 2012. 华盛顿, 直流.
in low-income or middle-income status (林 2011). By the end of the 20th century,
the gap had significantly widened, with per capita income of industrialized high-
income countries at more than 50 times that of low-income economies (Maddison
2010). Among the set of developing countries, only a handful were successful in
transforming their aspirations for catching up into reality. Among them were Japan
and the East Asian tigers (香港, 中国; the Republic of Korea; 新加坡;
and Taipei,中国).
The growth poles in the past were all high-income countries such as Germany,
日本, 英国 (英国), and the US. In the 1980s and 1990s, 之中
the top five contributors to global growth, all but the PRC were G7 industrial
国家. 经过 2009, all except the US were emerging economies. The replacement
of G7 by G20 as the primary global forum since the eruption of the global crisis
在 2008 underscores the emergence of a multipolar world. The sheer size of the
large emerging economies combined with their dynamic and sustained growth has
elevated Brazil, the PRC, 印度, and the Russian Federation (known as BRICs) 到
become the largest contributors to economic growth in the world (数字 1). 期间
2006–2010, almost 45% of global GDP growth was generated in the BRICs. 这
era of a multipolar world seems to have been firmly established.
乙.
Structural Transformation and Catch-up
The path to prosperity in the developed countries was marked by a pro-
cess of structural transformation as reflected in employment and value-added of
LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 55
primary, 中学, and tertiary industries. Long-term economic trends from the
pre-industrial stage of development in a large number of developed countries con-
firm that at the end of each episode of catch-up, the fast grower’s economy had
a structure closer to that of a developed country as opposed to a low-income one
(Syrquin 1988, p. 206; Chenery 1979, xvi; Abramowitz 1983, 85; 林 2009, 2010,
2011, and 2012b).
Simon Kuznets sought to understand and document long-run transformation
through a series of stylized facts, though he was reluctant to offer a theory of
发展. His empirical studies identified four features of modern economic
growth.1 According to the first Kuznets fact, structural transformation occurs when
the share of the nonagricultural sectors in an economy increases. A reconstruction
of national accounts from a variety of sources for western countries shows that such
a transformation raised overall productivity and increased the returns to workers and
首都. From 1800–1849 to 1951–1960, 例如, agriculture as a share of gross
domestic product (GDP) declined from 30% to only 5% in the UK and from 20% 到
4% in the US. The share of industry inclusive of manufacturing meanwhile increased
从 23% 到 56% in the UK and from 33% 到 43% in the US (Kuznets 1966). 第二,
this sectoral shift is mirrored in the structure of employment. 第三, 人口
is redistributed from rural to urban areas. 第四个, the capital–labor ratio in the
nonagricultural sectors of the economy rises.
History points to the critical role of industrialization as an engine of sustained
growth in the long term. Since productivity growth is associated with technological
change and industrial upgrading, it can be said that continuous structural change in
technologies and industries is the main feature of modern economic growth (Kuznets
1966, Maddison 2010). In Western Europe, the annual per capita income growth
before the 18th century was about 0.05%, accelerated to about 1% in the 18th and
19th centuries, and reached 2% in the 20th century. The required time for doubling
per capita income thus fell from 1,400 years before the 18th century to 70 years in
the 18th and 19th century and further to 35 years in the 20th century (Maddison
2010).
History also demonstrates that in the first stage of catch-up, manufacturing
was instrumental in the transfer of new technologies to nonmanufacturing sec-
tors of the economy. Manufacturing has contributed to the modernization of the
agricultural and mining sectors, which provide raw materials through backward
linkages, and spawning services through forward linkages. 此外, manufac-
turing can serve as an indirect source of demand and thus spur catch-up. 因为
there is a tight nexus with the services sector, technological progress and growth
in manufacturing lead to a larger demand for services, propelling overall economic
生长.
1Kuznets (1966, 1971).
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56 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW
数字 2. Manufacturing and Income Growth, 1993–2007—Industrialization
as Growth Engine
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来源: World Bank. 2011. World Development Indicators 2011. 华盛顿, 直流.
Except for a few oil-exporting countries, no country has achieved high-
income status without dynamic industrial upgrading. 一般来说, a change in GDP
per capita is strongly and positively correlated with growth in value-added in the
manufacturing sector (数字 2). If countries rich in natural resources or land coun-
tries have achieved a middle-income status without a large manufacturing sector,
they rarely succeeded in sustaining growth. 更重要的是, growth in the re-
sources sector does not create much employment.
三、. Industrialization, The Flying Geese Pattern, and Catch-up
in a Historical Perspective
History shows that following comparative advantage to tap the latecomer
advantage is the best way for developing countries to start and sustain a dynamic
growth path for diversification and industrialization (林 2009, Lin and Monga
2011). The spread of industrialization in Western Europe in the 19th century, 迅速的
catch-up in the post WWII period, and the East Asian miracle starting in the 1980s
are all reminiscent of the flying geese pattern. 在这个部分, we provide evidence
on this assertion.
In the 1930s, economists researching “catch-up growth models” argued that
catch-up was not random. Kuznets and Akamatsu explored the conditions under
which the Industrial Revolution occurred in the UK and how it spread only to those
countries that had sufficient accumulation of capital and skilled labor, 除其他外
LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 57
状况 (Kuznets 1930). The focus on structural transformation and industrial
upgrading (Rostow 1960) and cross-country catch-up (Gerschenkron 1962) 可
found in Akamatsu’s work (1935, 1961, 和 1962) on Japan, a country that started
from a much lower level of income than the Western European countries. 在一个
seminal paper in the 1930s, Akamatsu documented what he called the “wild-geese
flying pattern” in economic development and noted that “wild geese fly in orderly
ranks forming an inverse V, just as airplanes fly in formation” (Akamatsu 1962,
p. 11).
The flying geese pattern describes the sequential order of the catch-up pro-
cess of industrialization of latecomer economies. It focuses on three dimensions
or stages: (我) the intra-industry dimension; (二) the inter-industry dimension; 和
(三、) the international division of labor dimension. The third element in particular
involves the process of relocation of industries across countries, from advanced
to developing countries, during the latter’s process of convergence.2 A prominent
feature of this stage is that exports of consumer goods start declining and capital
goods begin to be exported. In this stage, a group of economies advance together
through emulation and learning-by-doing. The focus of this paper is on the second
and third dimensions of the flying geese model as illustrated in Figure 3 从一个
note prepared by the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo for the
GRIPS Development Forum in 2002.
A weakness in Akamatsu’s model is that it only describes the flying geese
pattern without linking it to a country’s endowment structure and comparative ad-
优势. He did not recognize that the market mechanism is a necessary condition
for a country to follow its comparative advantage successfully. 然而, he noted
that the accumulation of capital, technological adaptability of people, and govern-
ment’s protection policy to promote the consumer goods industries matter for the
flying geese pattern (Akamatsu 1962, p. 3).
There is a fundamental difference between the traditional Structuralist views
and the New Structural Economics (NSE) (林 2010). NSE contends that the flying
geese model can be used by latecomers to catch up only if they follow the comparative
advantage of their own countries. This is called the comparative advantage following,
or CAF, 方法. 换句话说, with the CAF strategy, latecomers can follow the
lead goose, whose income levels and endowment structure are not too different,
and can tap into their comparative advantage and reduce their risk and cost of
innovation.3 As long as industrialization is CAF, there is no need for government
2There is an extensive literature on the flying geese pattern, including Kiyoshi Kojima’s seminal work (2000)
and Ozawa 2004, who have contributed to the dissemination of the model outside Japan, and applied it in country-level
分析. Being a strategic think piece, a full literature review is beyond the scope of this paper.
3There is an extensive literature on the spatial patterns of production and vertical disintegration of supply
chains (Helleiner 1973, Jones and Kierzkowski 2004, and Kimura 2010). This is consistent with the NSE framework.
A country has certain natural and factor endowments which determine the comparative advantage of the country. 在
any stage of its development, the country would naturally attract those products, parts and components, 和流程
that utilize the factors that are abundant and less expensive in this country (例如, labor-intensive parts of a supply chain,
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58 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW
数字 3. International Dimensions—Asian Wild-Geese
Flying Pattern
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来源: GRIPS (On-line). 可用的: http://www.grips.ac.jp/module/prsp/FGeese.htm
to adopt protectionist policies as firms are able to withstand market competition.
相当, the government’s role is limited to facilitating firms’ entry into new industries
where the country has latent comparative advantage by overcoming externalities
and coordination issues inherent in the industrial upgrading and diversification
process.4
A.
The Spread of the Industrial Revolution: Leaders and Latecomers
The Industrial Revolution started in the UK in the 1700s, but for about 50
年, it did not spread to other countries because the British government forbade
such as assembly lines). As the country’s factor endowment upgrades, the components or processes attracted to this
country would upgrade to more capital- or technological–intensive parts of the supply chain (such as manufacturing
of electronic components). Evidence is provided in Section IV as Taiwanese investors upgrade their investment in the
PRC to manufacturing (not assembly) electronic parts and components and to services (见图 10 in section IV).
4An industry is an economy’s latent comparative advantage if, based on the factor costs of production which
are determined by the economy’s endowment structure, the economy could be competitive in this industry. 然而,
due to high transaction costs (which are determined by infrastructure), logistics, and other business conditions, 这
economy may not yet be competitive in the global market in this industry.
LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 59
the export of machinery, manufacturing techniques, and skilled workers. 最终,
in the 19th century, it gradually spread to other countries in Western Europe. 这
earliest center of industrial production in continental Europe was Belgium where
production of coal, iron, textile, glass, and armaments flourished. 经过 1830, 法语
firms had employed many skilled British workers to help establish the textile in-
工业化的, and railroad lines began to appear across Western Europe. Germany was a
latecomer in developing industry mainly because no centralized government existed
那里.
The first steam locomotive was invented in the UK in 1804, but other European
countries did not start building railroads until the 1830s. 德国, 例如,
produced its first locomotive in 1835, but railway construction lagged due to the
lack of an integrated central government. After the 1840s, German coal and iron
production skyrocketed and by the 1850s, construction began on a rail network.
After its political unification in 1871, Germany exceeded the UK in terms of the
length of new railroads, and there was a rapid catch-up process in the production of
pig iron and other industries (数字 4).
Relative to the UK, industrialization was delayed in the US because the coun-
try at that time lacked the basic factor endowments—labor and capital—to invest
in business. When it finally picked up in the 1820s, its growth was explosive. 这-
borers and capital came from Europe where political revolutions sent immigrants
to the US. The first locomotive emerged in 1826, and the first railroad in 1827.
The length of the railroad surpassed that of the UK in 1850, reaching 9,021 miles,
数字 4. Spread of the Industrial Revolution—Latecomers Catching Up, 1800–1914
Length of Railroad Lines Open (in kilometers, 1 km = 5/8 mile)
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
G.Britain,
the leader
Latecomers
德国
GB
大不列颠
法国
德国
比利时
意大利
荷兰人
西班牙
瑞典
1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900
来源: Statistical Appendices, “Fontana Economic History of Europe,” Vol. 4, from Modern History Sourcebook
(On-line). 可用的: http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/indrevtabs1.asp
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60 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW
and expanded rapidly to the west in 1890 to reach 129,774 miles, longer than
the length of railroads in the entire continental Europe (迪普 1895, p. 111).
Rapid industrialization and structural transformation then followed. 在 1800, farm-
ers comprised 85% of the US population, but the proportion declined to 50% 在
1860.
Gerschenkron (1962) observed that rapid industrialization could start from
vastly different levels of “economic backwardness.” In fact, “the more backward a
country’s economy, the greater was the part played by special institutional factors
(government agencies, 银行) designed to increase the supply of capital to the
nascent industries” (Gerschenkron 1962, p. 354).
Like Akamatsu, a weakness of Gerschenkron’s theory is that he did not stress
that for the latecomer to be competitive, it must identify industries consistent with
its comparative advantage or which are CAF. Industrialization can start from a
low level of economic development, but if the level of development is too low,
industries that are too advanced will be comparative advantage defying (CAD) 和
may require heavy subsidies and protection from the state. With government support,
it is possible to set up advanced industries—however, as long as they are CAD, 他们
will be neither viable nor competitive.
乙.
Japan’s Catch-up in the Meiji Period: 学习
by Importing then Exporting
Starting with an income level that was only one-third of that in the West
during the 1850s, Japan achieved rapid catch-up in 50 years to become the first
industrial country in Asia in 1904. After opening up trade in 1854, its government
encouraged learning from western technology and institutions by sending high-level
missions including about half of the ministers to the US and Europe for nearly 2 年
(Shimposha 2000, p. 48). After signing the Ansei Treaty in 1858, Japan lost con-
trol of its tariff policy but the government provided facilitation by building Japan’s
modern infrastructure and encouraging learning-by-doing. Telegraph services be-
tween Tokyo and Yokohama began in 1870. The first Japanese railroad connecting
Yokohama and Shinbashi was built in 1872, 并由 1900, Japan had 3,875 miles
of railroad (Ito 1992). The government also actively introduced foreign technology
by importing modern machines and hiring thousands of foreign experts to instruct
Japanese workers and managers in the late 1800s (Ozawa 2004).
Throughout the Meiji period (1868–1912) Japan’s top exports were raw silk
yarn, tea, and marine products, which were consistent with Japan’s comparative
优势. As Japan’s cotton industry grew, its imports fell steadily, 并在 1890, 它
began to export large quantities of cotton, yarn, and cloth to neighboring Asian coun-
尝试 (intra-sector upgrading as in Akamatsu 1962). On the institutional side, a bank-
ing system was organized and a central bank was established in 1882 (Ito 1992, p. 21).
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LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 61
桌子 1. Catch-Up in the Prewar and Postwar Era (Per capita GDP,
经过 1990 international GK dollars)
Europe Targeted
英国, Gaps
Were Small
Japan Targeted
Germany during the
Meiji Restoration
Japan Targeted
the US after
WWII
法国
德国
英国
我们
日本
1870
1,876
1,839
3,190
2,445
737
% 的
英国 1890
% 的
1900 德国
1950
1960
59
58
100
77
2,376
2,428
4,009
3,392
1,012
2,876
2,985
4,492
4,091
1,180
100
40%
5,186
3,881
6,939
9,561
1,921
7,398
7,705
8,645
11,328
3,986
% 的
the US
100%
35%
Asian NIEs (4 dragons)
incl. the Republic
of Korea Targeted Japan
in the 1960s–1980s
China Targeted
East Asian NIEs
incl. the Republic
of Korea
Latecomers Started
to Target PRC
后 2000
1960
1970
% 的
日本
1980
1990
% 的
共和国
of Korea
2000
2008
% 的
PRC
8,645 10,767
11,328 15,030
9,714
2,167
778
868
735
英国
20,353 23,742
我们
28,467 31,178
日本
20,738 22,816
Rep. of Korea
14,375 19,614
PRC
6,725
印度
2,975
Viet Nam
2,970
GK = Geary-Khamis, PRC = People’s Republic of China, UK = United Kingdom, US = United States.
笔记: Highlighted countries are the targeted countries.
来源: Angus Maddison Database, authors’ calculations.
12,931 16,430
18,577 23,201
13,428 18,789
8,704
1,871
1,309
1,025
3,986
1,226
662
753
799
4,114
1,061
938
757
3,421
1,892
1,809
100
25
100
23
100
44
44
Historical experiences of the Industrial Revolution offer several insights. 第一的,
countries that are on the technological frontier can play the role of the “lead geese”
as Britain did.5 Latecomers have the economic advantage of “backwardness,“ 和
under certain conditions, they can catch up quickly and even overtake the lead geese.
第二, capital accumulation was necessary but not sufficient for success. 政治的
稳定, openness to trade, and labor mobility were also important for the country
to acquire new technology and develop new industries. 此外, 政府
were required to play a facilitating role, as in the case of Germany, 日本, 和
我们. Without the existence of a centralized state in Germany since 1871, 会有
have been no railroad or Industrial Revolution.
更重要的是, selecting the right target country is critical for catching
向上. Some European countries could catch up with Britain relatively quickly because
their stages of development were not too far from the leader (桌子 1). 根据
5Britain rather than the United Kingdom is used following the convention of the literature on the Industrial
革命.
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62 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW
the estimate of Maddison (2010), per capita incomes of France, 德国, 和
US were about 60%–75% of Britain in 1870.6 During the Meiji restoration, 日本
targeted the industries of Prussia (之后, 德国) and its per capita income was
关于 40% of the latter. 因此, it was realistic for Japan to target Germany rather
than Britain or the US which were too far ahead in terms of relative stages of
发展. Even though many nation states tried to catch up, Japan succeeded
and became the first industrialized nation from the East because it chose the right
country to target.
C.
Post-WWII Era: The US Showing the Way to Japan and Others
The economies of Western Europe and Japan have enjoyed unprecedented
growth and technological upgrading in the decades since WWII in the so-called
“golden age of capitalism” (1950–1974). 在这段时期, nearly all developing
countries pursued dirigiste capitalism but, except for Japan, the Republic of Korea
and other East Asian tigers, they did not succeed. 为什么? The NSE contends that
the crux of Japan’s and East Asia’s success was that their development followed
closely their comparative advantage (or was CAF) and their governments played the
facilitator’s role (林 2010, Lin and Monga 2011).
Just before WWII, textiles and other light industrial goods accounted for
60%–75% of all Japanese exports and Japan’s textile industry was at its peak (Ito
1992, p. 24). In the 1960s, when its per capita GDP was about 40% of the US and
it had established a strong industrial base, Japan targeted US industries (桌子 1).
Japan’s historical labor statistics record that a rising share of labor in Japan’s man-
ufacturing sector coincided with a declining share of labor in the manufacturing
sectors of the US. In the 1960s–1970s, Japan supported its heavy manufacturing
部门, including machinery and automobiles. In the 1980s–1990s, just as the US
was upgrading its industrial base, Japan expanded its shares in the home appliance,
electronics, and computer markets (Figures 5–6).
数字 6 shows the employment shares in the US during 1958–2005 for
five subsectors selected from 99 manufacturing industries, ranked from most labor
intensive to most capital intensive. 全面的, as the capital–labor ratio increases
随着时间的推移, industrial and employment structures change dramatically. Specifically,
the share of labor employed in the most labor-intensive sectors such as fabrics
declined monotonically. In sectors such as computer manufacturing, the share of
labor employed first increased and then declined, showing a hump or inverse V-shape.
In industries such as aircraft and automobile manufacturing, which are capital-
intensive but subject to labor-saving scale economies, the share of labor showed a
6Britain’s per capita income in 1830 曾是 3,190 在 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars. Those of most
countries in Western Europe were in the range of 1,500–2500 IGK dollars.
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LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 63
数字 5. Structural Transformation in Japan—Manufacturing Increase Followed
by Slow Decline as Services Expanded (%)
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Services
农业, forestry, and fisheries
Manufacturing
0
2
9
1
5
3
9
1
0
5
9
1
5
5
9
1
8
5
9
1
1
6
9
1
4
6
9
1
7
6
9
1
0
7
9
1
3
7
9
1
6
7
9
1
9
7
9
1
2
8
9
1
5
8
9
1
8
8
9
1
1
9
9
1
4
9
9
1
7
9
9
1
0
0
0
2
3
0
0
2
6
0
0
2
笔记: Figures refer to shares of employment by sector.
来源: Authors based on Historical Statistics of Japan (On-line). 可用的: http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/
chouki/index.htm
数字 6. The US as Leader of Transformation—Shares in Total Employment
in Selected Subsectors, 1958–2005年
0.03
0.02
0.01
0
0.03
0.025
0.02
0.015
0.01
0.005
0
Fabric Mills
Computer and
Manufacturing
0.015
0.01
0.005
0
8
5
9
1
2
6
9
1
6
6
9
1
0
7
9
1
4
7
9
1
8
7
9
1
2
8
9
1
6
8
9
1
0
9
9
1
4
9
9
1
8
9
9
1
2
0
0
2
8
5
9
1
3
6
9
1
8
6
9
1
3
7
9
1
8
7
9
1
3
8
9
1
8
8
9
1
3
9
9
1
8
9
9
1
3
0
0
2
Aircra(西德:3) and Automobiles
Other Plas(西德:2)c Products and
Fiber Op(西德:2)cs
Aircra(西德:3) mfg
Automobile mfg
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0
8
5
9
1
2
6
9
1
6
6
9
1
0
7
9
1
4
7
9
1
8
7
9
1
2
8
9
1
6
8
9
1
0
9
9
1
4
9
9
1
8
9
9
1
2
0
0
2
8
5
9
1
3
6
9
1
8
6
9
1
3
7
9
1
8
7
9
1
3
8
9
1
8
8
9
1
3
9
9
1
8
9
9
1
3
0
0
2
笔记: The subsectors, selected from the 99 industrial sectors, are ranked by their capital–labor ratio. These are the:
(我) labor-intensive sector (行业 313210, broadwoven fabric mills), (二) mid-level capital/labor intensity (在-
工业化的 334111, electronic computer manufacturing), (三、) high capital intensity (行业 336411, aircraft &
行业 336111, automobile), 和 (四号) high technical intensity (行业 326199, other plastic products manu-
facturing including fiber lens, windshield, and optics). 这 1997 6-digit NAICS codes (473 行业) were used.
来源: Ju, 林, and Wang (2011). Based on NBER-CES manufacturing industry data for 1958–2005.
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64 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW
slow and declining trend. In the most technology-intensive sectors such as plastics
including fiber optics and lens, the share of employment shows a monotonic increase
indicating that the US still maintains a comparative advantage in these industries.
一般来说, the manufacturing sectors started to shed labor in the 1970s, 而
services sector created more jobs throughout the period. This process accelerated in
the 1990s.
Why is the employment structure in the US changing so rapidly? 第一的, 这
simultaneous improvements in education, financial, and legal institutions as well
as in hard infrastructure has allowed firms to constantly innovate and create new
industries and exhaust the set of production possibilities (Harrison and Rodriguez-
Clare 2010). 第二, this process has been accelerated by globalization. 因为
the US maintained an open trade regime and a liberal investment policy, 工业的
transformation that started in the 1970s–1980s exceeded that of other countries
(McMillian et al. 2011). 第三, the behavior of multinational corporations has played
an important role. Using firm-level data related to outward FDI from the Ministry
of International Trade and Industry (MITI) of Japan and the US, Lipsey and his
co-authors (Lipsey, Ramstetter, and Blomstrom 2000) found that:
(我) “A Japanese parent’s employment, given the level of its production, tends to be
更高, the greater the production abroad by the firm’s foreign affiliates.” This
is similar to that of Swedish firms but contrasts with that of US firms.
(二) US firms appear to reduce employment at home by allocating labor-intensive
parts of their production to affiliates in developing countries. “Among US firms,
production in developing countries is associated with lower parent employment
at home, given the level of parent output.” This could be interpreted as US
multinationals being “footloose,” allocating the more labor-intensive parts of
their output to developing countries and keeping the more capital-intensive or
skill-intensive parts in the parent facilities.
Why was economic growth in Japan not sustained after the 1970s? 从
the mid-1950s to 1973, Japan for a variety of reasons, was able to sustain rapid
growth for nearly 20 年. 在 1973, Japan’s rapid growth started declining for three
原因: oil crises, the decline in investment, and the slowdown in technological
进步. “Japan finally caught up with the US and the Western European countries
technologically in the mid-1970s . . . (和) since it was harder to develop a country’s
own new technology compared to merely obtaining a license, Japan’s growth rate
then had to fall” (Ito 1992, p. 72). 换句话说, Japan’s advantage of backwardness
had been exhausted. The Japanese economy was then constrained mainly by the
speed of indigenous innovations on the global technology frontier. Japan had to
relocate some of its production base to the Republic of Korea; Taipei,中国; 和
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LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 65
other NIEs due to rising domestic labor costs leading to the loss of its comparative
advantage in the labor-intensive sectors.
D.
The Flying Geese Pattern in East Asia
It has been well documented that several generations of lead geese played
significant roles in the rapid development of the East Asian economies. 从 1965
到 1990, Japan emerged as the world’s biggest exporter of manufactured goods,
increasing its share of the world market from about 8% to almost 12%. Japan’s
success was followed by a second generation of economies in the 1970s (香港,
中国; the Republic of Korea; 新加坡; and Taipei,中国), a third generation in
20世纪80年代 (印度尼西亚, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, or ASEAN4), 和
a fourth generation in the 1990s (the PRC and Viet Nam) (Gill and Kharas 2007,
p. 81).
What is less well studied, 然而, is how this flying geese pattern evolved at
the subsector level, how the “jumping” of an industry from one country to another
took place, and how the Republic of Korea ceded its dominance in labor-intensive
subsectors to the third generation of geese—ASEAN4, the PRC, and Viet Nam.
Using UN Comtrade data, we show graphically that:
(我) There is an inverse U-shape in some subsectors where the lead goose loses
comparative advantage to its followers (as in Akamatsu 1962). Since Akamatsu’s
transformation cycle could last for over 100 年, the inverse U-shape emerges
only when simple measures such as shares of exports in the sector are used
to illustrate the pattern. Each specific sector may have several generations of
countries playing the role of lead goose sequentially in different periods as each
country’s endowment structure changes. This is reminiscent of Akamatsu’s
theory on the international dimensions of the flying geese model (数字 3).
(二) In textiles, an upstream but labor-intensive industry, five generations emerged
sequentially. Japan ceded to the Republic of Korea in the 1980s, after which the
PRC emerged in the 1990s, though its textile exports are now losing steam as
labor costs are rising and employment shares declining. ASEAN4, 特别
Indonesia and Viet Nam, and countries which can expand market share rapidly
would have a better chance to benefit by following the PRC (Figure 7a).
(三、) In the 1970s, Japan lost its leading position in the apparel and clothing sector
to the Republic of Korea, whose clothing exports show a clear hump shape as
it ceded its leading position to the PRC in 1989. The PRC emerged later than
ASEAN4, but its low wages and efficient industrial clusters in many provinces
enabled it to gain dominance. After many years in the dominant position, 这
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66 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW
数字 7. Share of Sector Exports in Total Merchandise Exports—Several Generations of
Flying Geese
Figure 7a: Share of Textile Exports, 5 Generations
(日本, the Republic of Korea, the PRC, 印度尼西亚, and Viet Nam)
Rep. of Korea
PRC
日本
印度尼西亚
Viet Nam
2
6
9
1
5
6
9
1
8
6
9
1
1
7
9
1
4
7
9
1
7
7
9
1
0
8
9
1
3
8
9
1
6
8
9
1
9
8
9
1
2
9
9
1
5
9
9
1
8
9
9
1
1
0
0
2
4
0
0
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
0
2
Figure 7b: Share of Clothing Exports, 2 Generations
香港, 中国
Turkey
Rep. of Korea
PRC
Viet Nam
Thailand
印度尼西亚
Malaysia
日本
2
6
9
1
5
6
9
1
8
6
9
1
1
7
9
1
4
7
9
1
7
7
9
1
0
8
9
1
3
8
9
1
6
8
9
1
9
8
9
1
2
9
9
1
5
9
9
1
8
9
9
1
1
0
0
2
4
0
0
2
7
0
0
2
0
1
0
2
Figure 7c: Share of Toy Exports, 2 Generations
香港, 中国
PRC
日本
0.045
0.04
0.035
0.03
0.025
0.02
0.015
0.01
0.005
0
0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0
2
6
9
1
5
6
9
1
8
6
9
1
1
7
9
1
4
7
9
1
7
7
9
1
0
8
9
1
3
8
9
1
6
8
9
1
9
8
9
1
2
9
9
1
5
9
9
1
8
9
9
1
1
0
0
2
4
0
0
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
0
2
笔记: Figures based on SITC rev 1, 3–4 digits.
来源: UN Comtrade data via WITS.
PRC
香港, 中国
印度尼西亚
日本
Thailand
Rep. of Korea
新加坡
Malaysia
Viet Nam
菲律宾
PRC
香港, 中国
印度
印度尼西亚
日本
Thailand
Turkey
Rep. of Korea
Malaysia
Viet Nam
香港, 中国
印度尼西亚
日本
Thailand
Rep. of Korea
新加坡
Malaysia
菲律宾
PRC
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LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 67
PRC is now losing its comparative advantage due to rising wages and will
gradually cede its market shares to ASEAN4, Viet Nam, and countries that can
seize the opportunity to rapidly expand exports (Figure 7b).
(四号) In toys, the PRC has recently been losing market share in the European Union
and US markets. Shares of toys in total exports have been declining (Figures 7c).
This is consistent with what other studies have observed, though shares vacated
by the PRC have not yet been taken up by African countries (Maswana 2011).
There are large opportunities for other low-income countries to benefit from
the PRC’s graduation from these labor-intensive industries.
乙.
The Republic of Korea—An Example of Successful Industrial Upgrading7
The industrial upgrading of the Republic of Korea since 1962 is often de-
scribed as a good example of flying geese catch-up.8 The share of manufactures in
GDP rose from merely 9% 在 1953 到 30.1% 在 1988, while that of the agriculture
and mining sector shrunk to single digits in the 1990s.
During this phase of industrial upgrading guided by export-oriented indus-
trialization, the benefits of economic backwardness were exploited with sequential
structural transformation from labor-intensive industries (IE。, wood manufactures
and clothing) to capital-intensive industries (IE。, machinery and transport equip-
蒙特). Until the early 1980s, labor-intensive products, primarily wood manufactures
and clothing, had a combined share of about 60% and accounted for the majority
of total exports. 自从 1983, capital-intensive machinery and transport equipment
products have accounted for the majority of exports. After the mid-1990s, their share
exceeded half of total exports.
We argue that the Republic of Korea’s success was due in part to its adherence
to its comparative advantage which evolved over time with changes in its factor
endowments, suggesting flying geese catch-up patterns.9 For example, Figure 8a
shows the intra-industrial and inter-industrial dimension of “Flying Geese Catch-up”
图案. The Republic of Korea successfully moved up the value chain from exports
of clothing to exports of textiles and to production of synthetic fibers (Lim 2011).
In the electronics industry, a comparative advantage recorded by the net trade index
7The authors thank Kwang Park for this section on the Korean experience.
8The Republic of Korea’s industrial upgrading process between the 1960s and the 1980s can be roughly
divided into three phases: (我) the “takeoff” phase (1962–1973), (二) the Heavy and Chemical Industry (人机交互) drive
phase (1973–1979), 和 (三、) the liberalization phase (1980–later) (World Bank 1987). For details of Korea’s industry
政策, see World Bank (1987), Krueger (1997), Suh (2007), and Lim (2011).
9Some critics have argued that the Republic of Korea adopted a Comparative Advantage Defying (CAD)
战略, and there is a heated debate. For the debate on whether the HCI drive in the 1970s is CAF or CAD, see Lin
and Chang (2009). We consider Republic of Korea’s policies as being consistent with the New Structural Economics
and Growth Identification and Facilitation (GIF) framework where government plays a strong role based on market
signals to identify the latent comparative advantages.
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68 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW
Figure 8a. Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) of the Republic of Korea’s Industries
16
14
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10
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0
Clothing
Footwear
Tex(西德:2)les
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77
82
87
92
97
02
07
RCA = share of an industry in the economy’s exports/its share in global exports.
笔记: Based on SITC rev 1, 2 digits.
来源: UN Comtrade data via WITS, authors’ calculations.
reveals industrial upgrading from simple goods to more sophisticated goods (林
and Chang 2009). Starting with the assembly of radios from imported components,
the Republic of Korea obtained a comparative advantage in the home appliance
行业 (World Bank 1987). The country started to gain comparative advantage in
electronic parts and components (IE。, transistors and semiconductors) in the mid-
1980s, and later on in information, 沟通, and industrial electronics in the
1990s (Figure 8b).
Figure 8b. Trade Specialization Index (TSI) of the Republic of Korea’s Electronics
Home Appliance
通讯. and Industrial
Parts and Components
74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
笔记: TSI = (export − import)/(export + import) for each industry.
来源: Korea Electronic Association.
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LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 69
In terms of the inter-industrial dimension, the Republic of Korea maintained
a high revealed comparative advantage (RCA) in clothing exports until the end of
the 1960s, followed by footwear until the 1980s. 20世纪90年代, it rapidly developed
a high RCA in electronics exports, which was more recently replaced by transport
equipment exports.
The Republic of Korea’s flying geese catch-up also had an international
dimension involving the relocation of an industry from one country to another. 为了
例子, it gained a sharp increase in RCA in footwear in the mid-1960s partly as
a result of manufacturing alliances and technology cooperation between local and
Japanese firms prompted by increasing wages in Japan which had been weakening
the latter’s competitiveness in the sector. A steep decrease in its RCA in the mid-
1990s indicates that higher wages in the Republic of Korea had led to a relocation
of factories to the PRC, 印度尼西亚, and Viet Nam (The Committee for the 60-year
History of the Korean Economy 2010). Since the end of the 1980s when a liberal
policy was adopted, outward foreign investment from the Republic of Korea’s labor-
intensive industries has increased with its main destination being Asian countries.10
IV. Successes and Failures: CAD versus CAF
A.
Import Substitution in the 1950s–1970s
In the post-WWII period, most developing countries were keenly aware of the
role that industrialization played in accelerating structural transformation and catch-
up in Europe, 日本, and the US. Keen to emulate them, developing countries adopted
the prevailing Structuralist paradigm, which advocated an import-substitution-led
(IS-led) industrialization strategy to develop advanced industries similar to those in
the industrial countries. Examples include heavy industries such as iron and steel,
化学品, machinery, and transport equipment in countries as diverse as Brazil,
埃及, 加纳, 印度, and the Republic of Korea.
In spite of a large variety of protectionist measures including high tariffs, 甚至
the most well-intended policy interventions failed in sustaining CAD industries. 在
很多国家, most tariffs on manufactures led to effective rates of protection
(ERP) well in excess of 100%. In a sample of 10 countries chosen for a special
学习, Krueger (1983) found that all except the Ivory Coast and the Republic of Korea
pursued IS-led strategies in the 1960s and 1970s. The average ERP on manufactured
products varied from 356% in Pakistan to 384% in Uruguay.
Governments following CAD were not indifferent to the type of industries
they were protecting. 换句话说, they also “picked winners.” Brazil is notable
for starting out with high ERPs in the late 1950s but gradually shifting to a strategy
10See Section IV on FDI.
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70 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW
where protection for CAF industries was reduced but protection for CAD industries
remained high. Examples are: (我) the plastics industry, where the ERP declined
从 489% 到 332%; (二) textiles, where ERP declined from 298% 到 232%; 和
(三、) 衣服, where ERP changed from 481% 到 321% (Fishlow 1983, p. 58A). 在
巴基斯坦, during 1970–1971, the ERPs on most consumer and intermediate goods
were between 100%–200%, except for motor vehicles which had an ERP of 595%
(Guisinger 1978).
The Indian government had an elaborate brand of IS. At the start of the second
5-year plan (1957–1962), policymakers in India envisioned a country that was not
dependent on imports of either consumer or producer goods. This was achieved by
using IS to make machines as well as to make consumer products—i.e., imposing
import licensing requirements and tariffs on capital and consumer goods. 迟至
1991, the Indian economy was one of the most heavily protected economies globally
with ERPs averaging 125%, where the highest was 355% (Krueger 2002).
In contrast to Japan and East Asia which followed their comparative ad-
优势, well-intended governments across Africa, 拉美, and South Asia
adopted IS and protection in the 1960s and 1970s to achieve dynamic growth in
industries that were CAD. They assigned a high priority to the development of
capital-intensive heavy industries when in fact capital was scarce. To compensate
for the absence of private firms in capital-intensive sectors, governments leveraged
large state-owned enterprises to produce capital-intensive products. Examples of
such strategies include Indonesia’s launch of a shipbuilding industry in the 1960s
when its GDP per capita was only 10% of its main competitor, 荷兰人, 和
the attempt of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) to build an automobile
industry in the 1970s when the country’s GDP per capita was only 5% of the US,
then the industry leader (林 2011).
The Republic of Korea and Japan, 另一方面, had selected target
countries that were appropriate to their income levels during their catch-up phase.
As reflected in Table 1, Japan targeted Germany whose income was 2.5 times Japan’s
in the Meiji period, while the Republic of Korea targeted Japan whose income was
4 times that of the Republic of Korea’s in the 1970s. Countries flourish because they
have followed their comparative advantages. They fail to catch up if they do not.
乙.
The PRC as a Follower: Learning and Industrial Upgrading
The PRC’s success over the past 3 decades is the result of a two-pillar strat-
egy: (我) adopting a dual-track approach to reforms, giving transitory protection to
CAD capital-intensive sectors, and liberalizing entry to CAF labor-intensive sectors,
thereby achieving stability and dynamic transformation simultaneously; 和 (二) 作为一个
latecomer, choosing an economic development strategy that tapped into the potential
advantage of backwardness along the lines of the flying geese pattern.
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LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 71
Figure 9a. PRC’s Rapid Transformation in Export Structure Following
Comparative Advantage
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Misc.
Manufactured
氩气(西德:2)克莱斯
Machinery
和
Transport
Equipment
Crude
Fuels and
Minerals
Food and
Animals
Manufactured
Materials
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0
9
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9
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9
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9
9
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2
0
0
2
5
0
0
2
8
0
0
2
来源: UN Comtrade; Lin and Wang (2008), updated by the authors.
Industrial development in the PRC after reforms in 1979 has basically fol-
lowed the country’s comparative advantage or is CAF. The PRC was an exporter
of primary products. 在 1984, 几乎 50% of the PRC’s exports were crude oil and
agricultural products (Figure 9a). The first industrial upgrade from resources to
labor-intensive products happened in 1986, when exports of textiles and clothing
exceeded crude oil. The second upgrade happened in 1995, when Chinese exports
of machinery and electronics exceeded textiles and clothing. This indicated that the
PRC has started the transition from exporting traditional labor-intensive exports to
nontraditional labor-intensive processes (assembly lines). The third upgrade hap-
pened after 2001 following the PRC’s accession to the World Trade Organization,
locking in liberalization of trade in goods and services and making PRC laws and
Figure 9b. . . . . But Slow Transformation of the Employment Structure
Ter(西德:2)ary sector
Secondary sector
Primary sector
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
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来源: UN Comtrade; Lin and Wang (2008), updated by the authors.
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72 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW
regulations conform to international standards. Regulatory reforms led to rapidly
rising FDI inflows, bringing in new technologies and processes. 因此, the level
of product sophistication increased.11
The evolution of the PRC’s export structure in the last three decades reflects
significant structural transformation in the flying geese style that has enabled the
country to graduate from being an exporter of labor-intensive products such as
apparel, textiles, and leather to producing more sophisticated items such as home
电器, office machines, and electric machinery (数字 9).12 Unlike the case of
the Republic of Korea, FDI played a critical role in the PRC’s industrial upgrading.
The following points about this can be made:
(我) Inward FDI helps industrial upgrading. Many studies have pointed out that for-
eign investors are quick to identify a country’s comparative advantage and serve
as the most dynamic forces in industrial development and upgrading (Harrison
and Rodr´ıguez-Clare 2010; Aghion et al. 2011). In our view, 外国投资者
serve as identifiers of growth sectors, providing advanced technology and help-
ing reduce first-mover risks and transaction costs when firms attempt to enter
a new product or market. The PRC’s capital–labor ratio in the manufacturing
sector increased from 0.4 在 1985 to nearly 4.0 在 2007. Foreign-invested en-
terprises accounted for about 20% of tax revenue, 55% of imports and exports,
and over 80% of high-tech exports (MOFCOM 2011).
(二) In the last 5 年 (2005–2009), FDI inflows have been shifting towards higher
value-added products, parts and components, and subsectors including services,
as shown by Figure 10. Investors from Taipei,China have provided much-needed
technology and managerial skills that firms need in electronics and information
技术. These firms are moving the manufacturing of electronic parts and
components to the PRC. Wholesale and retailing have shown the fastest growth
rate in recent years, as the PRC moved toward promoting domestic consumption.
(三、) The process of three-stage upgrading shows the importance of learning-by-
exporting from lower-end manufacturing goods to higher-value-added goods
and subsequently to services. Initial learning activities occurred within sectors,
11有, 然而, a myth on the level of export sophistication which was discussed at length in Koopman,
王, and Wei (2008) and Lin and Wang (2008). 实际上, 超过 50% of exports in terms of value-added were foreign
value-added—i.e., goods and services produced by foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). Among high-technology
商品, 超过 80% were exported by foreign-invested firms.
12In the context of vertical disintegration of supply chains, the flying geese pattern still exists as multinationals
move the labor-intensive part of their production (often the assembly line) to the PRC and other low-wage countries,
keeping the critical components and parts at home. This does not change the fundamental premise of our paper. 作为
wages and salaries increase in the PRC, the labor intensive assembly lines will shift to other lower-income countries,
and the PRC will upgrade to higher value added components and parts, as well as higher tech products, 如图所示
数字 10.
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LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 73
数字 10. Changing Structure of FDI Flows to the PRC—From Manufacturing to Services
Growth of Approved Outward FDI from Taipei,China to the PRC, 2005–2009 (%)
Fabricated Metal Products Manufacturing
Chemical Material Manufacturing
Electrical Equipment Manufacturing
Basic Metal Manufacturing
Non-metallic Mineral Products …
Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing
……
……
Electronic Parts and Components …
High Value Added
Highh Valuee Addeed
Wholesale and Retail Trade
硒
Service sector
Servvice secctor
来源: MOEA, Taipei,中国; Rosen and Wang (2011), p. 35. Note that the manufacturing (rather than assembly) 的
electronic parts and components is not labor intensive; they belong to higher value added class.
then gradually spilled over horizontally to new sectors, and eventually diversi-
fied through outward FDI to other countries (Lin and Wang 2008).
C.
Sub-Saharan Africa—Trailing Far Behind
There are several signs of a slow deindustrialization in Africa in the last
几十年, when the PRC and India were emerging as large industrial countries and
African countries were undertaking structural reforms and liberalizing and integrat-
ing with global markets. An overview of Africa’s industrial performance during
1990–2010 indicates that 40 在......之外 45 countries had manufacturing value-added
(MVA) per capita of less than $200 and almost half experienced negative growth in MVA per capita (UNIDO 2011, p. 46). The report by UNIDO (2011) also shows how the share of labor in the man- ufacturing sector has declined, suggesting that employment in light manufacturing industries (例如, textiles, apparel, and leather products), which are labor intensive, 的- clined after 1990. A large part of the employment losses had been due to a decline in the share of textiles, 从大约 7% 在 2000 到 5% 在 2009 (UNIDO 2011, p. 27). The fact that Africa is increasingly dependent on other regions for light manufactures is significant for three reasons. 第一的, the trade deficit indicates that African economies have a sizeable domestic market for light manufactures. 第二, light manufacturing sectors are a stepping-stone towards more technologically sophisticated manufac- turing industries (UNIDO 2011). 第三, given the size of global demand for light manufactures, there is significant potential for African exports of light manufactures which can facilitate structural transformation into more advanced sectors. l 从http下载 : / / 直接的 . 米特 . / e d u a d e v / 文章 – p d l f / / / / / 3 0 1 5 2 1 6 4 0 7 3 2 a d e v _ a _ 0 0 0 0 3 压力 . 来宾来访 0 8 九月 2 0 2 3 74 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW Figure 11. Labor Productivity and Average Wage Rates in the PRC’s Manufacturing ($)
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$70,000 $60,000
$50,000 $40,000
$30,000 $20,000
$10,000 $0
$5,000 $4,720
$4,500 s r a l l o D n i s e g a W $4,000
$3,500 $3,000
$2,500 $2,000
$1,500 $1,000
$500 $0
9
7
9
1
0
8
9
1
1
8
9
1
2
8
9
1
3
8
9
1
4
8
9
1
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1
6
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1
7
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9
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1
0
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9
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2
9
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1
3
9
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9
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1
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1
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1
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9
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2
1
0
0
2
2
0
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2
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2
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0
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2
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PRC’s Labor Produc(西德:2)vity
Wages in Dollars
来源: UNIDO; National Bureau of Statistics of China. 2010. China Statistical Yearbook. 北京.
V. The Emergence of Leading Dragons
A.
The Phenomenon of Relocating Manufacturing Jobs is Not New
The PRC is at a stage where the western countries and Japan had been during
the 1970s and where other Asian economies (香港, 中国; the Republic of
韩国; 新加坡; and Taipei,中国) found themselves in during the 1980s. 作为
labor-intensive industries matured, wages increased, and firms moved into more
technologically sophisticated industries in accordance with the upgrading of the
underlying endowment structure. In the western countries and the Asian tigers,
as the capital intensity of production in manufacturing increased, there was an
overall contraction in manufacturing jobs and a reallocation of resources towards
the services sectors. For example the share of manufacturing employment in the US
reduced from 17% in the 1980s to 9% 在 2004, in Japan from 18% 到 12% 期间
the same period. When labor-intensive industries in the high-wage countries shut
向下, their jobs relocated to other lower-wage economies such as the East Asian
tigers.
The PRC’s labor cost is rising rapidly, while the structure of its industries,
exports, and employment is changing. Many Chinese economists argue that the
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LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 75
country has already absorbed its surplus labor and approached the Lewisian turning
观点 (Cai et al. 2009A, Huang and Jiang 2010). Recent data indicates that wages in
the PRC’s manufacturing sector grew rapidly, rising from just over $150 per month in 2005 to around $350 per month in 2010 (数字 11).13 更确切地说, the wage
gap between the PRC and other high middle-income countries is closing, a trend
that will likely continue with certainty over the coming decade.
The PRC’s 12th Five-Year Plan projects that during the period 2011–2015, 这
economy will grow at 7% per year on average. It also proposes that real wages will
grow as fast as GDP. Both growth rates are likely to be achieved which implies that
real monthly wages will double from around $350 per month to $700 per month over
the next decade. When combined with continued currency appreciation, the PRC’s
real wages could approach $1,000 per month within a decade or about the level of some of the higher middle-income countries (例如, Turkey and Brazil) 和 $2,000
per month by 2030 or the level of the Republic of Korea and Taipei,China today.
乙.
Significant Changes in Employment Patterns and Location
Spillovers from the leading dragon phenomenon spurred by rising Chinese
wages are already helping to relocate its labor-intensive jobs to other lower-wage
countries.14 This is happening in several ways.
(我) The most evident is the ongoing transformation in the PRC’s manufacturing
sector. Following the flying geese pattern of development, the country is tran-
sitioning from labor-intensive industries towards more advanced ones, 和
machinery becoming increasingly dominant in manufactured exports.14 New
evidence shows that urban manufacturing industries had restructured during
2002–2009. 因此, the largest decline in manufacturing employment is
currently unfolding in textile, chemical fiber, printing and record media, 到-
bacco processing, and nonmetallic mineral product industries (数字 12).
(二) The PRC’s restructuring could accelerate. 第一的, with rapid urbanization, expan-
sion of tertiary education, and greater labor market flexibility, young workers
may be unwilling to stay locked in low-skill manufacturing jobs and may begin
to seek upward mobility. Although it will remain a “labor surplus” economy
直到 2014, the growing demand for service sector employees will gradually
stretch the Chinese job market (McMillan 2011). 第二, with gross domestic
13From Oxford Analytica, 在 28 行进 2011. During 2010–2011, the PRC’s minimum wage for 30 munici-
palities rose by 25% 或者更多.
14There is a possibility of relocating labor-intensive manufacturing from coastal regions to inland regions,
but the wage rate difference between the two regions is only 30%, and transportation and transaction costs are higher
in inland regions. Multinationals will be the first to relocate to other low-income countries, and Chinese enterprises
will follow. Labor-intensive manufacturing will move to other low-income countries sooner or later, 根据
external and internal factors.
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76 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW
数字 12. Sunset Manufacturing Sectors in the PRC—Change in Employment
in 2002–2009 (%)
15.00
10.00
5.00
0.00
–5.00
–10.00
–15.00
–20.00
–25.00
笔记: This chart shows only those subsectors where employment is declining or rising more slowly than the average
for the urban manufacturing sector in the PRC.
来源: Banister and Cook 2011 and NBS, China Labor Statistical Yearbook 2010 (为了 2009 数据).
savings as high as 45% 超过 25 years and gross capital formation of over
50%, capital availability has increased substantially, with the channels for ex-
porting this capital largely open. The government encourages enterprises in
labor-intensive sectors to go global by providing guidance and incentives in-
包括, but not limited to, setting up 19 industrial zones outside the PRC.
(三、) 显然, rising wages in labor-intensive industries have already triggered re-
location of low wage jobs overseas. Many lower-wage countries in the PRC’s
neighborhood such as Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 和
Viet Nam, and even Bangladesh are emerging as the new growth nodes for gar-
蒙特, footwear, and other labor-intensive industries. The number of jobs each
country can attract depends on the incentives package it offers to investors.
(四号) Perhaps the most critical channel is outward FDI flows from the PRC and other
emerging market economies to manufacturing sectors in lower-wage countries,
as explained in the next section.
C.
Significant Potential for Relocation of Jobs to Low-Wage Countries
Due to the sheer size of the PRC’s labor market, the number of jobs that the
ongoing industrialization will create for low-income countries is potentially huge.
As employment statistics for manufacturing is extremely sparse and tentative, 我们
cannot provide any estimates of potential job relocation. 然而, rough calculations
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LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 77
桌子 2. Employment in Manufacturing, Potential Dragons, 2009–2010
Employment in Manufacturing (百万)
Population (百万)
Outward FDI ($ 十亿 2010) 来源: 国际劳工组织, Penn World Tables, UNCTAD (2011). 巴西 13.1 192 11.5 PRC 85 1,324 68 印度 8.7 1,140 14.6 印度尼西亚 12.5 277 2.7 全部的 119.3 2,934 96.8 are informative and sufficient. 现在, the PRC employs about 85 million workers nationwide in its manufacturing sector. Rising wages will force the PRC to upgrade to higher value-added and more capital-intensive and technology-intensive sectors and to relocate jobs in the existing sectors to countries that have a lower wage rate. India currently employs about 9 million workers and Brazil employs about 13 百万 (桌子 2). These emerging market countries employ about 120 million workers whose jobs could be relocated to other developing countries in the coming decades. It seems reasonable to suggest that the leading dragon phenomenon alone can create sufficient labor-intensive manufacturing jobs for developing sub-Saharan African countries to bring them to par with most industrial countries. Even if the PRC’s manufacturing sector sheds 10% of its total employment in the next few years, a pool of 8.5 million jobs will be ready to relocate overseas. The number could almost double employment in manufacturing in African countries in a few years, jumpstarting its process of industrialization. D. Accelerating the Leading Dragon Phenomenon in Sub-Saharan Africa—The Role of FDI Asian and African countries are not alone in competing for the millions of jobs relocating from the PRC. 尤其, in sub-Saharan Africa, the scarcity of local entrepreneurial skills and investment capital are invariably the top two constraints for a competitive manufacturing sector. 显然, availability of outward FDI can enable them to overcome these constraints and take advantage of the leading dragon phenomenon to finally participate in the global production of labor-intensive products. Outward FDI from developing and transition economies reached $442
十亿 2011 (UNCTAD 2012). At the helm were the Russian Federation in
2011 and the PRC in 2010, while Brazil, 印度, 印度尼西亚, and the Republic of
韩国 (集体地, BRIICK) followed as the other key sources of FDI (数字 13).
大致 60% of outward FDI from developing countries went into other developing
国家, mostly in the form of greenfield investments that can typically open
the door for South–South relocation of various industries from the PRC and other
emerging economies.
A large share of the PRC’s outward FDI is flowing to Africa, growing from
a few hundred million dollars in 2002 to a cumulative amount of $13 billion by the end of 2010, accounting for 4% of the total stock of outward FDI (MOFCOM l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / 直接的 . 米特 . / e d u a d e v / 文章 – p d l f / / / / / 3 0 1 5 2 1 6 4 0 7 3 2 a d e v _ a _ 0 0 0 0 3 压力 . 来宾来访 0 8 九月 2 0 2 3 78 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW Figure 13. Outward FDI from BRIICK Countries, 2000–2011 ($ billions)
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
–10.0
PRC 65.1
Russian Federation
67.3
Rep. of Korea
20.4
印度 14.8
Brazil–1.0
印度尼西亚 7.8
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
巴西
印度尼西亚
PRC
Rep. of Korea
印度
Russian Federation
笔记: Indonesia was added to the BRIICK countries to meet the interest of readers.
来源: UNCTAD, data accessed 27 八月 2012.
2011). 关于 22% of outward FDI from the PRC is presently concentrated in
the manufacturing sectors, second only to mining which accounts for 29%. 在 2010,
Chinese firms also increased the number of jobs created overseas by 10% and capital
investment by 2.5%. The PRC ranked eighth in the world according to job creation
overseas (FDI Intelligence 2011). Two recent papers found that the PRC’s outward
FDI has played a significant role in the growth of African countries (Weisbrod
and Whalley 2011, Mlachila and Takebe 2011). India currently invests over 40%
of its outward FDI in manufacturing. In addition to a booming economy, India’s
liberalization reforms during the 1990s also facilitated the global spread of Indian
firms (Athukorala 2009, p. 146). A recent World Bank survey shows that over 64%
of Chinese firms operating in Ethiopia engage in manufacturing, 创造 15,910
工作 (World Bank 2012, p. 12).
六、. Summary and Implications
The emergence of large middle-income countries such as Brazil, the PRC, 和
India as new growth poles in the world and their dynamic growth and ascent up the
industrial ladder offer an unprecedented opportunity to all lower-income developing
经济体, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, to accelerate industrialization and
catch-up. This paper tried to explain why.
此外, this paper argues that:
(我) Economic development is a process of continuous industrial and technological
upgrading, and modern economic development is accompanied by structural
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LEADING DRAGON PHENOMENON 79
转型. Nearly all countries that industrialized successfully adopted
CAF strategies to tap the latecomer advantage in a flying geese pattern. Suc-
cessful industrialization in Japan before 1900, the “passing of the torch” from
the US to Japan after WWII, rapid catch-up of East Asian NIEs, the ASEAN4,
and latecomers such as the PRC and Viet Nam have all followed the flying
geese pattern, albeit to varying degrees.
(二) This paper provides evidence that not only are industries jumping across borders,
but those jumping industries are also upgrading. In the late 1970s and 1980s, 这
lead geese for the PRC were the East Asian tigers. As the Republic of Korea and
Taipei,China are upgrading, industries that have relocated to the PRC are now
also ascending to higher-end products. In a fraction of the time it took Japan and
the East Asian tigers, the PRC has been able to replace simple labor-intensive
products with more sophisticated ones. This is enabled by a government that
fosters CAF industries.
(三、) Dynamic growth, high savings, and substantial investments in education have
triggered a rapid upgrading of the PRC’s factor endowments for more techno-
logically advanced industries. This has pushed up wages at an amazing rate since
2002, causing labor-intensive industries to contract. The PRC has an estimated
85–100 million workers in manufacturing, with most of them in labor-intensive
industries or labor-intensive segments of supply chains. As these industries shed
劳动, they will create a huge opportunity for lower-wage countries to start labor-
intensive manufacturing production. This process, which we call the leading
dragon phenomenon, will offer millions of labor-intensive job opportunities
to developing countries. If Brazil, 印度, 印度尼西亚, and other large middle-
income countries maintain their current pace of growth, a similar pattern and
employment space will arise.
(四号) Labor cost is only one of many factors for the flying geese and leading dragon
现象, governments in both leading and following countries have crit-
ical roles to play, as indicated in the Growth Identification and Facilitation
Framework (林 2011 and 2012b). Low-income countries must compete to
gain access to capital, 技术, and capacity development opportunities. 如果
they have the right policy framework, the industrial upgrading in large emerg-
ing market economies, especially in the PRC, would provide them a golden
opportunity for dynamic manufacturing-sector-led growth in the years to come.
In an increasingly globalized world, opportunities for economic transfor-
mation abound. The emergence of a multi-polar world is a blessing even for the
most backward economies because it provides them a chance to enter a new age
of rapid industrialization and structural transformation. 清楚地, the opportunities
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80 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW
that lie ahead for labor-abundant economies in Asia and Africa, which are cur-
rently exporting mostly minerals, are enormous—provided that they quickly formu-
late and implement credible economic development strategies consistent with their
comparative advantage. 然而, the actual benefit for countries and regions
depends very much on the right policy environment, 机构, and implemen-
tation capacities. Countries must still compete to gain access to capital, 技术,
and capacity development opportunities.
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