跨学科历史杂志, LIII:4 (春天, 2023), 599–623.
Carlos Domper Lasús and Julio Ponce Alberca
政治学, 历史, and Dictatorships:
Linz’ Limited Pluralism Theory and the Late
Francoist Regime in Spain Although authoritarianism
has been one of the most successful conceptual categories devel-
oped by political science in the twentieth century, it has not been
free of criticism, which in many cases has been directed at the def-
inition of “limited pluralism.” These criticisms have largely been
built on theoretical or conceptual arguments rather than on an
empirical analysis of the society that Linz used to develop his con-
ceptualization of pluralism. Bearing in mind that Linz’ conceptual
framework was intertwined with the theoretical paradigms that
dominated social science during the Cold War, in this article we
gauge the extent to which Linz’ theory responded to the realities
of General Francisco Franco’s dictatorship, the Spanish society on
which Linz’ research was based.
之间 1967 和 1975, though they always supported both
the dictatorship and its founding principles, various political groups
at the local and provincial level disagreed about the direction that
Franco’s dictatorship should take in order to survive the death of
their charismatic leader. An accurate portrayal of this situation can
be found in two archival sources. The first comprises the reports
written by civil governors—the main executive representatives of
the central state administration in the Spanish provinces—
regarding the 1967 election of a new group of members of the
Cortes Españolas, known as the procuradores familiares. 从此
election was the first Francoist election to choose members of an
Carlos Domper Lasús is Ramón y Cajal Research Fellow at the University of Saragossa. 他是
the author of Dictatorship and the Electoral Vote: Francoism and the Portuguese New State Regime in
比较视角, 1945–1975 (Liverpool, 2020) 和, with Giorgia Priorelli, Combining
Political History and Political Science: Towards a New Understanding of the Political (纽约,
2023).
Julio Ponce Alberca is Full Professor at University of Seville. He is editor of, with Jesús
Solís Ruiz, Historia y políticas públicas (Granada, 2019) and “Torcuato Fernández-Miranda,“ 在
José Francisco Jiménez-Díaz and Santiago Delgado-Fernández (编辑。), Political Leadership in the
Spanish Transition to Democracy (1975–1982) (Hauppauge, 纽约, 2016).
© 2023 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and The Journal of Interdisciplinary
历史, 公司, https://doi.org/10.1162/jinh_a_01907
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institution at the national level, controlling the voting was consid-
ered to be a challenge for the dictatorship. The civil governors’
reports record a local perspective, allowing an exploration of the
level of the regime’s limited pluralism throughout the country.1
Before the election of national councilors toward the end of
1975, the Delegación Nacional de Provincias (National Delegation
of Provinces, hereinafter DNP) organized a database of local party
hierarchies. These data provide an overview of the main characters
that composed the Francoist single party (FET-JONS, later the
Movimiento) in each province at that time. This archival source,
which includes names, social relations, secondments, 乃至
some assessments about them from the single-party hierarchs, 是
our second key source establishing the level of internal pluralism
toward the end of the regime.2
Both sources are complementary, given that national coun-
cilors were also procuradores, providing significant samples of
Cortes members for 1967 和 1975. 此外, both years are rel-
evant to verifying Linz’ theory because what he described—an
authoritarian regime characterized by limited pluralism—was
increasingly present throughout the dictatorship. Because Linz
began his research during the early 1960s, the hypothetical limited
pluralism is easily identifiable by 1967, and even more so by 1975.
This article uses traditional historical methods to verify the
degree of correlation between the analytical description of the
1 Cortes Españolas (Spanish Courts) was the name of the legislative institution promulgated
by Franco in 1942. The Cortes sought to present itself as the highest organizational body for
the Spanish people and to participate in the work of the state. The main function of this
institution was the development and adoption of laws, but subject to their subsequent sanction
by Franco himself. It was similar to the corporate system of Italian Fascism. Its members,
ex officio members appointed by the head of state or chosen from corporate entities, 是
known as procuradores (singular procurador), reviving a term used for legislators prior to the
Napoleonic era, and they supposedly represented the various elements of Spanish society.
The procuradores familiares (representatives of the families) made up one-fifth of the total
number of members of the Cortes Españolas. During Franco’s dictatorship, there were two
选举 (十月 10, 1967 and September 29, 1971) to choose these Cortes members. 在
those elections, see Domper Lasús, Dictatorship and the Electoral Vote: Francoism and the Portu-
guese New State Regime in Comparative Perspective, 1945–1975 (Liverpool, 2020); idem, “Voting
under Franco: The Elections of the Family Procuradores to the Cortes and the Limits of the
Opening up of Francoism,” in Miguel Ángel Ruiz Carnicer (编辑。), From Franco to Freedom: 这
Roots of the Transition to Democracy in Spain, 1962–1982 (Eastbourne, 英国, 2018), 70–100.
FET-JONS (Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindica-
2
lista) was also known as Movimiento Nacional (National Movement) or simply Movimiento.
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POLITICAL SCIENCE, H IST ORY, AND DICTATO RS HIPS
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Francoist political sphere suggested by the concept of limited
pluralism and the reality that primary sources reflect. 而且,
it aims to stimulate further research on this period of Franco’s
dictatorship, still under-represented in comparison with the earlier,
postwar years of the regime.
ORIGIN, 语境, AND CRITICISM OF LINZ’ AUTHORITARIAN REGIME
MODEL On September 15, 1950, Juan José Linz landed in New
York for the first time. He could not have imagined how impor-
tant this trip would be to the future interpretation of the political
nature of dictatorships and to the field of comparative politics.
Aged twenty-four, the young German-Spanish scholar had com-
pleted degrees in law and political science from the University of
Madrid. Linz enrolled in the Department of Sociology at the Uni-
versity of Columbia, where professors such as Paul Lazarsfeld and
the young Seymour Lipset taught classes that allowed him to come
into direct contact with the “behaviorist revolution.”3
During the 1940s, behaviorism had emerged as a response to
the harsh criticisms that many social scientists in the United States
were levelling at the excessive empiricism that had characterized
most of their disciplines during the interwar period. Behaviorists
did not reject empiricism but thought that it should be articulated
around the theoretical frameworks that guided their objectives.
Their aspiration was that the combination of theory and empirical
research would allow the social sciences to direct their attention
toward solving a set of specific problems—established in advance
and fundamentally related to political behavior—through the cre-
ation of generic models, 法律, and predictions.4
Two elements of that “behaviorist revolution” conditioned
Linz’ academic career: the renewal of data collection and analytical
3 On Linz’ life before arriving in New York, see Thomas Jeffrey Miley and José Ramón
Montero, “Un Retrato de Juan José Linz Storch de Gracia,” in idem (编辑。), Juan J. Linz. Obras
Escogidas. Fascismo: Perspectivas Históricas y Comparadas (Madrid, 2008), xxi–xxx; Juan José Linz,
“Between Nations and Disciplines: Personal Experience and Intellectual Understanding of
Societies and Political Regimes,” in Hans Daalder (编辑。), Comparative European Politics: 这
Story of a Profession ( 华盛顿, 华盛顿特区, 1997), 101–103.
4 On behaviorism see James Farr, “Remembering the Revolution: Behavioralism in Amer-
ican Political Science,” in idem, John Dryzek, and Stephen Leonard (编辑。), Political Science in
历史: Research Programs and Political Traditions (剑桥, 1995), 198–223; Robert Adcock,
“Behavioralism,” in Mark Bevir (编辑。), Encyclopedia of Political Theory (天使们, 2010),
112–114.
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techniques and the development of an empirical theory on liberal
democracy based on American democracy. Regarding the former,
Lazarsfeld’s influence was crucial in the methodology Linz used to
analyze the Franco regime. Concerning the latter, Gilman has
described how the definition of true democracy, in contrast to
Soviet models of a “people’s democracy,” became one of the star
themes of American social science during the early Cold War.
Methodologically speaking, the debate on the nature of democ-
racy was also influenced by behaviorism. 实际上, social scientists
who participated in the debate stressed that they did not intend to
develop a normative definition of democracy, 反而, as Dahl
把它, to investigate “the actual facts of political life” through
“methods, theories and criteria of proof that are acceptable
according to the canons, conventions and assumptions of modern
empirical science.” Lipset, who directed Linz’ dissertation and
became one of his closest friends, was one of the main protago-
nists of this debate.5
In that academic context, American social scientists turned
their gaze to pluralism, a concept derived from pragmatic philos-
ophy that had been introduced into political science in the early
二十世纪. Faced with the monistic interpretations of the
nineteenth century that saw in the state both the unitary represen-
tation of the community and its source of sovereignty and law,
Laski argued that society was made up of individuals with rights
inherent to their condition as human beings and independent of
the will of the state. 此外, he argued that people tended
to gather around shared interests in organizations that competed
to condition governments’ public policies. The essence of this kind
of federal articulation of society was in the way in which the dif-
ferent units that composed it were related under a consensus on
the values of liberalism that allowed anyone to be represented in
the political process through an interest group. 为此原因,
Laski considered it essential to limit the state’s ability to override
the autonomy of interest groups through its centralizing capacity,
5 Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (巴尔的摩,
2003), 47. Robert Dahl, quoted in Quentin Skinner, “The Empirical Theorists of Democracy
and Their Critics: A Plague on Both Their Houses,” Political Theory, 我 (1973), 287. Gary Marks
and Larry Diamond, “Seymour Martin Lipset and the Study of Democracy,” American Behav-
ioral Scientist, XXXV (1992), 352–362.
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POLITICAL SCIENCE, H IST ORY, AND DICTATO RS HIPS
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for which he saw the separation of powers and representation as
fundamental tools. Pluralism required such conditions.6
Throughout the 1950s, Truman, Latham, 和, 尤其,
Dahl, who would later be Linz’ department colleague at Yale,
turned this notion of pluralism into the normative basis for an
empirical theory of liberal democracy and into the main variable
to differentiate liberal democracy from totalitarianism. During that
十年, many social scientists and theorists placed the two systems
of government at the poles of the same interpretive plane. Dahl
himself used the term polyarchy to refer to truly existing—and thus
imperfect—approximations of pluralist democracy. He located
these regimes near one end of a continuum that had totalitarianism
on the other extreme. Along the same lines, the Israeli historian
Talmon located the origin of both regimes in the Enlightenment
and claimed that the pluralistic and pragmatic character of liberal
democracy to differentiate it from totalitarianism, which was in
turn imbued with a holistic and messianic character. 然而,
those who were involved in the field of comparative politics found
great difficulties in fitting the multitude of regimes that emerged after
World War II into two such dichotomous categories—a situation
that was further complicated by decolonization processes.7
Linz himself, who became familiar with the literature on plu-
ralism and totalitarianism after his arrival at Columbia, found the
two categories ineffective in his analysis of Franco’s regime. 因此,
after completing his thesis, he decided to use the case of Spain to
determine the distinctive characteristics of intermediate political
regimes. In the mid-1950s, several authors had begun to point
out the existence of an alternative type of political regime situated
somewhere on the spectrum delimited by liberal democracy and
totalitarianism, citing Spain of the Caudillo as one of its paradig-
matic examples.
6 Gilman, Mandarins of the Future, 49. For a summary of Harold Laski’s thesis and its insertion
into the debate on pluralism that took place in the heart of American political science
throughout the 1920s, see John Gunnell, “The Declination of the State and the Origins of
American Pluralism,” in Farr, Dryzek, and Leonard (编辑。) Political Science in History, 19–40. 在
the normative mechanics of pluralism, see Farr, “Remembering the Revolution,” 204–205,
and Rainer Eisfeld, “Pluralism,” in Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, and Leonardo
Morlino (编辑。), International Encyclopedia of Political Science (天使们, 2011), 1867–1868.
7 Gunnell, “The Declination of the State,” 19; Gilman, Mandarins of the Future, 49; Enzo
Traverso, El Totalitarismo. Historia de Un Debate (Buenos Aires, 2001), 104.
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在此背景下, it is not surprising that in 1957 the Committee
on Comparative Politics of the Social Sciences Research Council—
at that time focused on promoting behaviorist methodology and on
the creation of a positivist theoretical framework that could include
as many countries as possible within comparative studies—decided
to grant a scholarship to Linz to carry out this endeavor.8
While he was a visiting researcher in Spain, Linz attempted to
demonstrate the existence within Francoism of the element that,
according to his hypothesis, was key to characterizing an author-
itarian regime—limited pluralism. To that end, he developed two
different projects using public opinion. In the fall of 1960, he par-
ticipated in the organization of the first in-depth youth opinion
survey, which was commissioned by the Delegación Nacional
de la Juventud (National Youth Delegation) of FET-JONS. 这
team of young sociologists was coordinated by José Mariano
López-Cepero, a friend of Linz’ since their time as students at
the Faculty of Political and Economic Sciences in Madrid.
还, 之间 1959 和 1960, Linz collaborated with the Escuela
de Organización Industrial (School of Industrial Organization, EOI)
in an ambitious study that, based on the conception of the business
community as a de facto group of power, sought to inquire into its
members’ views on Spanish politics by conducting 460 interviews.9
此外, the period in which these two surveys were car-
ried out was characterized by two phenomena that conditioned
the observed reality—the increase in the existing divisions
between the groups that made up the coalition that supported
the Francoist regime and the social transformations, fueled by
8 Gabriel Almond, “Comparative Political Systems,” in Heinz Eulau, Samuel Eldersveld,
and Morris Janowitz (编辑。), Political Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research (Glencoe,
1956), 40; Herbert Lionel Matthews, The Yoke and the Arrows: A Report on Spain (纽约,
1957), 100; Raymond Aron, Sociologie des societés industrielles. Esquisse d’une théorie des regimes
politiques (巴黎, 1958), 50–51. Bevir and Adcock, “Political Science,” in Roger Backhouse and
Philippe Fontaine (编辑。), The History of Social Sciences since 1945 (剑桥, 2010), 87; Gilman,
Mandarins of the Future, 113–202.
9 On the preparation of this survey and Linz’ role in its methodological direction, see Miley
and Montero, “Un retrato de Juan José Linz Storch de Gracia,” xli–xlii. On the insertion of
this survey in the political dynamics of the Franco regime and its results, see Ponce Alberca,
“El régimen al final del régimen. Cambio social y último franquismo desde la Delegación
Nacional de Provincias,” Alcores, XIX (2015), 180–185. Miley and Montero, “Un retrato
de Juan José Linz Storch de Gracia,” xlii–xliii.
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POLITICAL SCIENCE, H IST ORY, AND DICTATO RS HIPS
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economic growth, that were taking place in Spain. 关于
first phenomenon, the successive government crises of 1956 和
1957 increased the tensions among the coalition, leading to an
alignment into two groups that orbited respectively around the
general secretariat of the Movimiento and the presidency of the
政府.
These groups shared their loyalty to Franco and the regime
but differed in how to ensure that the latter survived the death
of the former. That disagreement influenced the political life of
the country until 1973 和, to a large extent, revolved around
whether it was necessary to increase mechanisms for popular par-
期待. Underlying that difference was a conflict derived from
the interest of each group in ensuring the political framework best
suited to maintaining a dominant position over the other.
As for the social changes taking place in Spain, the adminis-
trative and economic reforms implemented by the technocratic
ministers since becoming part of the government in 1957 acceler-
ated a series of transformations that were already under way in
Spanish society. These transformations were a consequence of
the appearance of new professional groups, the development of
a consumer society, and the coming of age of a generation that
not only had not participated in the Civil War, but also had a cul-
ture that was substantially different from those of its predecessors.
在夏天 1963, Linz presented the first version of his
theory of authoritarian regimes at a conference of comparative
political sociology organized by the Committee on Political Soci-
ology of the International Sociology Association. In his presenta-
的, entitled “An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain,”
Linz established four variables that allowed for the classification
of a political regime as democratic, totalitarian, or authoritarian
基于; the level of pluralism tolerated by the authorities; 角色
played by ideology within it; the degree of mobilization of soci-
ety promoted by institutions; 和, finally, the type of leadership.
然而, as mentioned above, Linz considered that the main
element in determining the authoritarian nature of a regime lay
in the existence within it of certain interest groups that coexisted
with the dominant power, not competing with it but limiting it.
In the case of the Franco regime, Linz considered that political
actors that existed prior to the regime such as the Church, 这
Falange, the Army, the Opus Dei, the supporters of the monarchy,
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606
and businessmen were among the groups limiting the dictator’s
power.10
Two years after defending his text on authoritarian regimes,
Linz presented his work “Opposition and Control” at an Interna-
tional Political Science Association conference to underpin his cat-
egorization of Franco’s dictatorship as a regime of limited pluralism.
那里, Linz argued that Franco’s regime tolerated the existence of
an opposition and a semi-opposition given two circumstances that
had arisen from the historical evolution of the dictatorship: 这
widening of the differences between the groups that supported
the regime and their greater visibility, especially after the approval
of the Press Law in 1966. The concept of semi-opposition referred
to groups that contested part of the system but were willing to par-
ticipate in power without fundamentally confronting the regime.
When talking about the opposition, he distinguished between an
alegal one, which opposed the regime but was tolerated because
it lacked an organizational infrastructure, and an illegal opposition
persecuted precisely for having one.11
Linz’ theses aroused controversy in Spain, to the point that the
“debate Linz” became a relevant element in historiographical discus-
sions of the political nature of Franco’s dictatorship. The earliest crit-
icisms of his thesis appeared only after the translation of his famous
text on authoritarian regimes into Spanish. That happened in 1974,
when it was included in a book edited and prefaced by Manuel Fraga,
a former minister of Information and Tourism well known for being
a supporter of the reformist path within the dictatorship. This first
wave of objections was fundamentally focused on censuring the
strictly political-formalistic nature of the definition and its lack of
attention to the social and class dimensions of political regimes.
然而, from the 1980s on, some historians attacked Linz’ theories
more harshly. 在本质上, critics accused Linz’ conceptualization of
10 Linz’ text was published a year later with the same title in Erik Allardt and Yrjö Littunen
(编辑。), Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology
(Helsinki, 1964), 291–341. The idea of groups coexisting with the dominant power had
already been raised by Adam Bruno Ulam, Robert MacKenzie, and Jerzy Wiatr during the
Fifth World Congress of Sociology in 1962 to deny the totalitarian character of the Soviet
regime in Poland. Linz, “Report of the Discussion. First Session, Political Sociology,“ 在
Transactions of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology ( 华盛顿, 华盛顿特区, 1964), 389–390.
11 Linz, “Opposition to and under an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain,“ 在
Robert Dahl (编辑。), Regimes and Oppositions (新天堂, 1973), 171–259.
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POLITICAL SCIENCE, H IST ORY, AND DICTATO RS HIPS
“embellishing” the Franco dictatorship and separating it from the
category of right-wing dictatorships to which it belonged.12
Among the many criticisms made of Linz’ thesis, the main one
was undoubtedly addressed to his conceptualization of Francoism as
a regime of limited pluralism, as Miley has shown. It could be said
that all the critiques pivoted around the same issue. The existence of
several political currents and diverse groups organized to defend their
interests does not necessarily imply the classification of a regime as
pluralist—no matter how limited this pluralism—unless there is a
compartmentalization of political power and the possibility of ques-
tioning the charismatic leader or his regime. The objections raised to
the concept of limited pluralism by Ramírez and Tuñón de Lara
neatly summarize the critiques. The former pointed out that the
concept of pluralism could only be applied to political regimes in
which “there really were different sources of power from which such
pluralism emanated.” The latter added that even though all state for-
mation processes give rise to a “sociological plurality,” this feature
cannot be confused with a “constitutional pluralism.” Santamaría
Ossorio and others further emphasized the impossibility of “limiting
what does not exist, as was the case of pluralism in Spain.” Never-
theless, these criticisms were carried out from ideological and theo-
retical bases, but not based on research in primary sources referring to
the specific period of Francoism that Linz had analyzed to build his
theoretical framework.13
THE ELECTIONS OF FAMILY PROCURADORES IN THE CORTES OF
1967 The first election of family representatives in the Francoist
Cortes was held in October of 1967. The procedure to organize the
vote was established by the Ley Orgánica del Estado (Organic Law of
12 Linz, “Una teoría del régimen autoritario. El caso de España,” in Manuel Fraga Iribarne,
Juan Velarde Fuertes, and Salustiano del Campo Urbano (编辑。), La España de los Años Setenta: el
estado y la política. (Madrid, 1974), 三、, 1467–1531; Enrique Moradiellos, La España de Franco
(1939–1975). Política y sociedad (Madrid, 2003), 216; Ismael Saz, Fascismo y Franquismo ( Valencia,
2004), 249.
13 Miley, “Francoism as Authoritarianism: Juan Linz and His Critics,” Politics, 宗教 &
Ideology, XII (2011), 36; Manuel Ramírez, España 1939–1975: Régimen político e ideología
(巴塞罗那, 1978), 40, n. 15; Manuel Tuñon de Lara, “Algunas propuestas para análisis del
franquismo,” in VII Coloquio de Pau: De la crisis del antiguo régimen al franquismo (Madrid,
1977), 100–101, n. 12; Julián Santamaria Ossorio, “Sobre Juan Linz y la monumentalidad
de su obra,” Revista de Estudios Políticos, CLXVI (2014), 238.
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| CA RL O S D O MP ER L A S Ú S AN D JU L I O PO N C E A LB E RC A
608
the State, LOE), which was passed a year earlier. For the first time, A
relevant part of the population—heads of families and married
women—were allowed to elect their representatives in a Francoist
national institution even though they were just a portion of the
members of a legislative chamber without control over the executive.
此外, the timing of the election was important. 就其一而言
手, it took place in a climate of expectation among the politically
savvy, given the possibility that the dictatorship could evolve into
something different under the umbrella of reforms adopted during
the first half of the 1960s. On the other, the struggle waged by the Vice
Presidency of the Government and FET-JONS over the control of the
state undermined the single party’s capacity to control the election.14
最后, civil governors’ reports on the organization of
the election process reflected the conflicts that arose among the
different ideological and interest groups that supported the regime
in order to lead their preferred candidates to victory. 鉴于
political parties were banned and candidates had to run as individ-
乌尔斯, those who had the financial and/or logistical support of any
of these groups had a differential advantage with their respective
constituencies. Many reports reveal that the Francoist authorities
did not look favorably on the compartmentalization of society
或者, 首先, the development of emerging strategies and organi-
zational structures aimed at consolidating such divisions and pro-
moting advantages for some groups over the rest.15
例如, Enrique Oltra Moltó, the civil governor of
Álava, pointed out in his report that “separatists, Javierist tradition-
alists, Estoril traditionalists, Juanista monarchists, falangists, demo-
crats, ETC. polarized around certain and specific candidates.” This
political diversity was also observed in other parts of the country
with nuances necessarily arising from the political, 社会的, 经济的,
and cultural peculiarities of each province.16
14 That law not only put an end to the Francoist institutionalization process but also
reflected the rising interest among some of the political factions supporting the regime in
implementing channels that would increase the representation of its institutions. This was a
legal feature created in the nineteenth century that encompassed the member of a family, 的
legal age, on whom the other individuals in the household depend. This position was under
the control of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco’s right-hand man, and technocrats.
15
in the Archive of the Ministry of the Interior (hereinafter AMI), reference number 4,613.
16 Report by the civil governor of Álava, AMI, 4.613.
Said reports were sent to the Undersecretariat of the Ministry of the Interior and are kept
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POLITICAL SCIENCE, H IST ORY, AND DICTATO RS HIPS
| 609
The Falangists enjoyed a clear comparative advantage over the
rest of groups in Oltra’s description. 一方面, 他们骗了-
trolled the Organización Sindical Española (Spanish Trade Union
组织, OSE), the secretariat general of the single party, 和
important parts of the peripheral administration through both civil
governments and the national delegation of provinces. 上
其他, they had experience in controlling electoral processes; 他们
had overseen monitoring the elections to select representatives of
the heads of family in city councils since such elections were first
举行于 1948 as well as the two referendums organized in 1947 和
1966. By exerting such control, they had developed institutional
mechanisms that allowed them to manage candidate selection pro-
cesses in an orderly and favorable manner. 因此, the provincial
headquarters of the Movimiento managed to promote candidacies
in all of the Spanish provinces.17
To this end they resorted to militants who held positions
in various institutions of both the state and the party. Certain posi-
tions stood out above the rest, especially presidents of the provincial
associations of householders, provincial delegates of associations, 和
presidents of provincial federations of family associations. The asso-
ciations that the single party had begun to create in the late 1950s to
channel political participation through its administrative structure
played a fundamental role in this strategy.18
就其本身而言, the group, who were supported by Admiral Luis
Carrero Blanco and minister Laureano López Rodó, had no
further institutional structure other than that provided by that
ministry and the Comisaría del Plan de Desarrollo (发展
Plan Commission). Despite this, they did not hesitate to promote
their own candidates to challenge the Falangists for control of the
new group of family procuradores. 实际上, during the campaign,
López Rodó and José Solís exchanged harsh personal letters,
reproaching each other for their attempts to take control of the
new group of Cortes members. Since they had neither the
17 Domper Lasús, Dictatorship and the Electoral Vote: Francoism and the Portuguese New State
Regime in Comparative Perspective, 1945–1975 (Liverpool, 2022).
18 On this issue, see Pedro Cobo Pulido, “Las asociaciones de cabezas de familia como cauce
de representación: Un fallido intento de apertura del régimen franquista,” Espacio, Tiempo y
Forma. Serie V, Historia Contemporánea, 十四 (2001), 437–488, and Domper Lasús, “Un call-
ejón sin salida. La reforma del sistema electoral franquista, 1957–1973,” Historia Contemporánea,
LXIX (2022), 635–667.
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610
| CA RL O S D O MP ER L A S Ú S AN D JU L I O PO N C E A LB E RC A
experience nor the institutional mechanisms that the Falangists
enjoyed, the so-called technocrats turned to handpicked trusted
男人. Specifically, they promoted people with whom they were
friends and/or whom they had co-opted to work with them in
organizations linked to the presidency of the government and
the Comisaría del Plan de Desarrollo.19
The monarchists also tried to promote their own candidates.
Those who defended succession by Prince Juan Carlos de Borbón,
but were not linked to Opus Dei or the presidency of the govern-
蒙特, supported candidates like Manuel Fanjul Sedeño and
Torcuato Luca de Tena. The former was the son of Joaquín
Fanjul, who had been a rebel general in 1936. Despite being a
Falangist in his youth, Fanjul Sedeño supported Juan de Borbón,
Juan Carlos de Borbón’s father and the former pretender to the
throne of Spain. 实际上, he was one of the signatories of the man-
ifesto that in 1943 asked Franco to restore the monarchy. Fanjul
ran in Madrid and his campaign was strongly supported by the
pro-monarchy newspaper ABC, at whose helm was Torcuato
Luca de Tena, who ran in Seville. Torcuato was a member of
the Luca de Tena family of monarchist journalists and had a close
relationship with such prominent technocratic politicians as
Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora and López Rodó.20
Spanish monarchists had been divided since the nineteenth
世纪. Oltra reported that the traditionalists, 那是, the Carlists,
intended to develop a coordinated strategy in several provinces to
elect the largest possible number of procuradores in the Cortes. 这
strategy was to use their roles in the chamber to promote granting
Spanish nationality to Javier de Borbón y Parma, the Carlist pre-
tender to the throne of Spain. Even though the Carlists promoted
candidacies in provinces as diverse as Cádiz, Tarragona, Soria, 和
Valencia, the civil governors’ reports imply that it was in Álava and
19 López Rodó was the leader of the Franco government’s technocratic group and pro-
moter of the administrative reforms undertaken by the regime starting in the late 1950s. Solís
was the Minister-Secretary General of FET-JONS and leader of the OSE. López Rodó, Memorias.
Años decisivos (巴塞罗那, 1991), 259; Solis to López Rodó, 九月 27, 1967, General
Administration Archive, General Secretariat of the Movimiento, Box 102.
20 Both Fanjul Sedeño and Luca de Tena had been part of the pro-monarchy candidacy, 引领
by Joaquín Satrústegui and Joaquín Calvo Sotelo, which tried unsuccessfully to contest the
election of councilors representing the heads of family in the Madrid City Council in 1954
against the official candidacy led by FET-JONS.
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POLITICAL SCIENCE, H IST ORY, AND DICTATO RS HIPS
| 611
Navarre where they had the greatest impact. 实际上, in Navarre,
they managed to defeat candidates sponsored by FET-JONS by
mounting an intense campaign for the defense and improvement
of the Fueros in the Carlist newspaper El Pensamiento Navarro.
在这样做, they earned the support not only of the Carlists but
also of progressive Catholic sectors, moderate nationalists, 和
even members of the Catholic Action Workers’ Brotherhoods in
Pamplona and Tudela.21
Aside from these political-ideological factions—the informal
organizations that Linz controversially dubbed “families”—
different institutional and socio-economic interest groups also tried
to promote candidates that could further their aims. 实际上, several
civil governors explicitly mentioned the intervention of these
groups during the 1967 campaign. The civil governor of Valencia
blamed the unexpected triumph of Eulogio Gómez-Trénor
Fos—a member of the Citrus Group of the Provincial Union of
Fruits and Agricultural Products—on the help he received from
agricultural organizations and especially from the Chamber,
Brotherhoods, and Communities of Irrigation Farmers, who sup-
ported his candidacy and extolled his prestige as a farmer. 在
Badajoz, governor Francisco Santaolalla de la Calle accused
Antonio Cuéllar Casalduero, the provincial delegate of labor
mutual insurance companies, of receiving the determined and
open support of all the agencies dependent on the ministry of
劳动. Santaolalla did not hesitate to claim that the personnel of
the National Social Security Institute and the Labor Delegation
had not only prepared envelopes and lists of voters, but that they
had also distributed thousands of ballots and propaganda posters
favoring Cuéllar.22
21 Report by the civil governor of Álava, AMI, 4.613. The Carlist candidates were José Ángel
Zubiaur Alegre (deputy director of Finance of the Provincial Council, former provincial dep-
uty, and former councilor representative of the heads of family in the Pamplona city council)
and Auxilio Goñi Donázar (former deputy mayor of the Pamplona city council). Report by
the civil governor of Navarre, AMI, 4.613. The Fueros of Navarre (General Charter of Navarre)
were the laws of the Kingdom of Navarre until 1841—a sort of constitution that defined the
position of the king, the nobility, and the judicial procedures. This meant that royal decisions
needed to conform to the provisions set out by the charters. Franco’s regime considered Álava
and Navarre pro-Franco provinces and allowed them to maintain a degree of autonomy
unknown in the rest of Spain, with local telephone companies, provincial limited-bailiwick
police forces, road works, and some taxes to support local government.
22 Report by the civil governor of Valencia, AMI, 4.613; Report by the civil governor of
Badajoz, AMI, 4.613.
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| CA RL O S D O MP ER L A S Ú S AN D JU L I O PO N C E A LB E RC A
就他而言, Alberto Leiva Rey, the civil governor of Ávila,
reported that the secretary of the capital’s city council, 阿尔贝托
Zamora Gutiérrez, received the help of his colleagues and even
had the unofficial support of the College of Secretaries and Local
Administration Auditors. 同样地, the civil governor of Soria
denounced that the Carlist Fidel Carazo Hernández was aided
by “a pressure group characterized by its ancestral caciquismo in
the capital.” Specifically, according to the main provincial author-
性, the timber industrialists of the province had supported Carazo
in the hope that he would help them stop the remunicipalization
of public forests undertaken by more than 150 city councils in the
province, including that of the capital.23
All of these political factions and interest groups aspired to
achieve the highest possible levels of power within the institutional
framework of the dictatorship, and they agreed on basic principles.
第一的, they were firmly against any type of participation by “the
enemies of Spain”—that is, those who did not support Franco
or his regime. 第二, they defended the continuity of the regime,
were completely loyal to the figure of Franco, and strongly opposed
自由主义, communism, and multiparty systems. None of them had
the capacity to challenge Franco’s power, or even to limit it. 上
相反, they submitted to him and, in any case, tried to seduce him
in order to secure his support, which he would grant or withdraw
according to his own strategic interests.
Despite these groups’ submission to the regime, the dictator-
ship drew lines that could not be crossed. The reports of the ever-
vigilant civil governors reflected that the mere possibility that these
political factions and interest groups could dispute small spheres of
power beyond the discretionary powers of Franco or, failing that,
of the main bodies of the regime such as the Ministry of the Inte-
rior or the Movimiento, was a matter of the greatest concern even
within an electoral mechanism as restricted as the election of
family procuradores. The Falangist José Utrera Molina, civil gov-
ernor of Seville, expressed this annoyance clearly in his report, stat-
ing that during the elections of 1967 an absurd situation took place
in which “diverse groups and sectors, more or less catalyzed, 采取行动
23 Report by the civil governor of Ávila, AMI, 4.613. Caciquismo was one of the words used
by Francoist authorities to accuse those they considered their enemies to be doing liberal pol-
荨麻疹. Report by the civil governor of Soria, AMI, 4.613.
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POLITICAL SCIENCE, H IST ORY, AND DICTATO RS HIPS
directly and were not criticized” while “the Movimiento—the
men of the Movimiento themselves—could not carry out any
work related to the electoral process due to their status as militants,
as when this happened, it was immediately classified as official atti-
学习, meddling, etc.”24
| 613
Diversity arose from the outset even though the opportunities
afforded by the election were of a rather limited nature. There can
be no doubt of the reluctance reflected in the civil governors’
报告. In several of them it is easy to glimpse the fear felt by
many toward what the civil governor of Ciudad Real described
as the breakdown of the “constructive atmosphere of unity that
characterizes our political organization after the Crusade [这
Spanish Civil War].” In this sense, civil governors feared that
“pressure groups and politicians, or their more or less embryonic
organizations” could end up acting as “true political forces.”25
If that happened, the main provincial authorities of Franco’s
Spain considered that the political horizon of the regime would be
jeopardized by two intertwined processes that had begun to
emerge in the 1967 选举. The political polarization and con-
frontations between those closest to the regime was perhaps best
conveyed by the civil governor of Toledo in describing what
happened in his province: “Factions arise; personal differences
are exacerbated; restlessness grows; and people’s old resentments
are reborn.” Oltra expressed a similar sentiment, pointing out that
there had been “in some cases obvious clashes between men and
sectors close to the regime, and even though it is to be assumed
that the wounds will heal over time, it is no less true that there
will be embers that may reignite systematically.”26
The second—and potentially more dangerous—process was
the hypothetical emergence of political parties. Oltra argued that
the existing political factions and groups might become polarized
and give rise to “the more or less camouflaged operation of polit-
ical parties with leaderships and undercover organizations.” Pru-
dencio Landín Carrasco reported from Córdoba on the existence
of “more or less masked political groups.” Such factions were not
24 Report by the civil governor of Sevilla, AMI, 4.613.
25 Report by the civil governor of Ciudad Real, AMI, 4.613. Report by the civil governor of
Castellón, AMI, 4.613. Report by the civil governor of Alicante, AMI, 4.613.
26 Report by the civil governor of Toledo, AMI, 4.613. Report by the civil governor of
Álava, AMI, 4.613.
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614
only “radically contrary to our political system as established by the
fundamental laws,” but “concessions alien to the very nature of
the system.”27
THE LOCAL HIERARCHIES OF THE MOVIMIENTO TOWARD THE END OF
In preparation for the election of national councilors
THE REGIME
that was to be held toward the end of 1975, the DNP considered the
convenience of having accurate information about the local hier-
archies of the Movimiento. What was at stake was the composi-
tion of the thirteenth National Council of the Movimiento (1976)
as well as a percentage of procuradores. It was not the first time in
the dictatorship that information was collected in order to control
选举, but this had seldom been done in such a broad and sys-
tematic manner for elections within the structures of the FET-JONS.
Despite the exhaustive database that was compiled, these efforts
were ultimately in vain as that election was never held, 给定
the exceptional circumstances brought about by Franco’s death
and the forced extension of the twelfth National Council, 哪个
had been established in 1972. 尽管如此, that information is
deeply relevant today in determining the composition of the
Movimiento and the currents that developed within it at the local
等级. 换句话说, the data provide answers to the question
of whether it is accurate to speak of limited pluralism or semi-
opposition among the local hierarchies of the Movimiento toward
the end of the regime.28
同上。; Report by the civil governor of Córdoba, AMI, 4.613; Report by the civil governor
27
of Cáceres, AMI, 4.613; Report by the civil governor of Toledo, AMI, 4.613.
28 The National Council of the Movimiento was a chartered institution of the Franco dic-
tatorship that was subordinate to the head of state. Originally created under the name of
National Council of FET-JONS amid the Civil War, it continued to exist after Franco’s death
and until 1977. Its internal structure was heavily inspired by the Grand Fascist Council and the
National Council of the Italian National Fascist Party. Its councilors (limited to 50 members)
were appointed for the first time by Franco in 1937. This integrated all the political forces that
intervened in the coup of July 1936 that gave rise to the Civil War, and which had been
unified by decree in April 1937. The Francoist single party was created by Franco in 1937
as a merger of the Carlist, monarchist, and ultracatholic Traditionalist Communion with
the fascist Falange Española de las JONS. 换句话说, it was a home not only to Spanish
fascists but also to all those who supported the regime. Like the Cortes Españolas, 全国
Council was dissolved shortly before the 1977 选举. A copy of the data compiled by the
Delegación Nacional de Provincias was provided by Fernando Azancot (Secretario Nacional
de Provincias, 1974–1976). Those interested in these documents can contact Julio Ponce at
jponce@us.es
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The DNP commissioned the preparation of one file per province
with the names of its key political figures (national councilors, 家庭
procuradores, procuradores representing the local administration,
mayors, and presidents of the provincial council or Diputación),
together with an assessment of and comments on the attitude and
electoral potential of each. 而且, notes were provided regarding
other possible unofficial candidates, including those who had not
previously held positions in the Movimiento.29
The form and content of these files indicate that the Movi-
miento and its structures did not show a monolithic or homoge-
neous internal composition. 正式地, each file is divided into two
sections. The first provides a tabulated assessment of two crossed
变量, “political standpoint” and “degree,” and the other con-
tains freer commentary regarding the people in question. 在某种方式,
the first section sought to provide a quantitative snapshot of the
ideological composition of the Movimiento, while the second
offered a more qualitative, nuanced, and detailed portrayal of spe-
cific characters. One of the most striking points is that the “polit-
ical standpoint” column acknowledged the internal heterogeneity
of the organization, contemplating three options: NA (no adicto,
not close to the Movimiento), A (adicto, very close to the regime),
and AD (very close to the regime and integrated in the Movi-
miento). Each of these categories was in turn assessed on a scale
of three degrees of intensity: 1 (低的), 2 (medium), 和 3 (高的).
People could be assigned a grade for each of the three criteria,
although it was common for them only to receive grades in two
(A and AD), leaving the NA box blank. 因此, a person who was
clearly not close to the regime or Movimiento might receive a
3-1-1 respectively in the three categories (NA, A, and AD). 这
diametrically opposite situation (1-1-3) was impossible, 因为
being identified with the regime (A) and with the regime and
the Movimiento (广告) were linked. The range of people analyzed
was exhaustive, compiling data from all provinces (除了
Valencia, which did not respond) and including information from
the so-called plazas de soberanía (“strongholds of sovereignty,“ 这
Spanish towns of Ceuta and Melilla located in North Africa).
The first conclusion about the Movimiento that can be drawn
is easily developed through the analysis of these files. Officials
29 Ponce Alberca, “El régimen al final del régimen,” 175–206.
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assessed as not close (NA) were very few and for most that box was
left blank. The exceptions, to which the NA code was applied,
included officials in eight provinces: Badajoz, Baleares, Gerona,
Guipúzcoa, Murcia, Navarre, Salamanca, and Soria. Almost all
members of this small group were awarded a low (1-1-1) 或者
medium (2-1-1) grade—with the sole exception of the family pro-
curador for Gerona (Juan Botanch Dausa), who was deemed “very
dangerous” and given a 3-1-1.30
If we assign zeroes to empty squares, what we might expect
are scores such as 0-2-2 或者 0-3-3, 换句话说, political positions
whose loyalty to the regime and to the party ran parallel. 和
当然, this was true in 43 percent of the cases, yet there were
striking differences between the assessment of fields A and AD in
more than half of the cases. 此外, no one received a higher
rating in box AD than in A, but the opposite was frequent (0-3-2,
0-3-1, 0-2-1). This means that there were considerably more peo-
ple who identified with the regime alone than with the regime and
the party, reflecting a sizable dissociation between the political
regime and the Movimiento. It always ran in the same direction
in terms of preference, with the regime clearly more popular than
the party. Loyalty to the regime was considered inherent to
occupying a position, in a framework of loyalty to the Caudillo.
然而, being considered a supporter of the regime and inte-
grated in FET-JONS was a step further that required being active
within the single party and identifying with its official stances,
something not so widespread even among local hierarchies. 这是
significant that 57 percent of positions were held by figures more
characterized as “very close to the regime” rather than as “very
close to the regime and integrated into the Movimiento.” The
averages for each category exhibit the same bias: 1.75 (NA), 2.62
(A) 和 1.96 (广告).
Considering this quantitative evidence, it is clear that the
Movimiento comprised a noteworthy internal diversity. 在阿迪-
tion to the political nuances that could distinguish one official from
其他, it is worth bearing in mind the origin of each position,
which made officials more or less dependent on the government
and the Movimiento. On one end of the spectrum, 一个家庭
30 The names of the provinces follow the conventions established by the Diccionario Panhis-
pánico de Dudas, see https://lenguajeadministrativo.com/toponimos/.
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procurador relied on a popular vote to win a seat in the Cortes; 在
另一个, a national councilor owed his position to a restricted vote
from within the Movimiento. Mayors and presidents of Provincial
Councils occupied an intermediate position, owing their appoint-
ment to the government, but not directly to the single party. 这些
differences translated quite predictably into varying degrees of loy-
alty to the regime and to the Movimiento, as the data verify. Family
procuradores were awarded the lowest grades (2.44 on average in A
和 1.78 in AD) and national councilors the highest, particularly in
terms of party loyalty (2.79 in A and 2.28 in AD), with mayors (2.71
in A and 1.98 in AD) and presidents of provincial councils (2.72 在
A and 1.93 in AD) lying somewhere in between. 此外,
national councilors’ greater identification with the Movimiento
did not preclude them from maintaining higher degrees of loyalty
to the regime than to the single party.
Can this diversity be understood in Linz’ terms? Can concepts
such as limited pluralism or semi-opposition be applied to the body
of officials analyzed here? Within the DNP files—on the reverse of
each of these tables—are various comments on the electoral
potential of each figure for the two types of provincial positions
that were not appointed by the government—national councilors
and family procuradores. These positions registered the highest
and lowest values respectively for the criterion AD (as the former
were elected within the single party and the latter were elected by
the citizens).
In order to answer the question of limited pluralism, 我们将
analyze nine provinces (selected based on their average assessments
for elected and unelected positions in criteria A and AD): the three
with the lowest averages, the three occupying an intermediate
位置, and the three with the highest averages.
Logroño, Las Palmas, and Guipúzcoa show the lowest average
grades, reflecting the lukewarm attitude of officials in these prov-
inces toward the regime and the Movimiento. Logroño was a case
in point—there, national councilor José Ramón Herrero Fontana
wished to be reelected, although with little hope because “he pays
no mind to the Movimiento at all” despite a prior track record as
civil governor, a procurador in the Cortes, and a national coun-
cilor for Cáceres. His performance left so much to be desired that
the DNP endorsed other candidates more closely linked to the
派对. The family procurador Carlos Bonet Hernando was better
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| CA RL O S D O MP ER L A S Ú S AN D JU L I O PO N C E A LB E RC A
regarded, but again other candidates closer to the traditionalists
were also considered.
In Las Palmas, the councilor and businessman José Naranjo
Hermosilla was seen as a “very reserved” person going through
“a bad moment”; his possible replacement as candidate was
Manuel de la Cueva Fernández (a former youth delegate who,
多年后, founded the conservative party Alianza Popular [AP]
in the Canary Islands). The procurador Juan Marrero Portugués,
director of the Insular Savings Bank, was likewise not held in high
regard by the DNP, which considered other names to replace him,
such as Antonio Vega (president of the Council of Entrepreneurs)
or Manuel Díez (another businessman backed by the vertical
联盟). Marcelino Oreja Aguirre was a national councilor for
Guipúzcoa and the DNP resigned itself to his almost certain
re-election, despite the unenthusiastic comments recorded in his
文件. Oreja later became a minister in Adolfo Suárez’ democratic
cabinets. Something similar happened to the procurador Manuel
María Escudero Rueda (valued as 2-1-1), whose reelection was
believed to be inevitable because “he might abandon the Carlist
group and seek support with certain socialist nuances.” There
was little the Movimiento could do in Guipúzcoa but accept that
the possible replacements—Félix Egaña and Joaquín Aperribay,
both of whom were relatively far removed from the Falangist par-
adigm and connected to Basque nationalists—were also dubious.
The provinces of Pontevedra, Burgos, and Huesca were
friendlier to the Movimiento, with high averages in criteria A and
广告. In Huesca, the national councilor Mercedes Sanz Punyed and
the family procuradores (especially Francisco de Asís Gabriel
Ponce, secretary of the City Council) had no rivals. Burgos was
similarly stable, with Fernando Dancausa in a solid position as
national councilor (and a future candidate for AP in 1977) 和
family procuradores Belén Landáburu and Félix Pérez (who was
supported by the College of Veterinarians). 然而, this did not
mean that the DNP did not expect possible competitors, who in
Burgos was the deputy director general of pharmacy, Juan Manuel
Reol (a future member of Parliament in 1977), and in Huesca
Alberto Ballarín (then president of the Institute of Reform and
Agrarian Development and a future senator in 1977). In Pontevedra,
the councilor Antonio Puig Gaite (procurador in the Cortes for many
years and candidate for AP in 1977) and the family procurador Pío
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Cabanillas Gayas (minister during the dictatorship and in the dem-
ocratic era) were well established in their positions; even so, 其他
candidates were expected, including former minister Gonzalo
Fernández de la Mora and Ramón Encina (a former civil governor
who was supported by the provincial headquarters), 除其他外
possible candidates of the Movimiento “of traditionalist origin” or
even others “supported by Comisiones Obreras” (a trade union).
In provinces with average values (例如, Albacete,
Badajoz, Almería) some of these trends are again confirmed, 和
three standing out. In the first place, members of the single party
did not form a monolithic bloc and indeed exhibited considerable
diversity. 第二, that the Movimiento structures were important
when appointing positions in the province, but their influence was
neither exclusive nor unique, especially in the case of family pro-
curadores (for whom it was essential to have social support), 在里面
appointment of mayors or presidents of the provincial council (在
which the government also intervened), and even in the selection
of national councilors (who could be elected even when not sup-
ported by the DNP, a fact that points to the existence of differences
within the organization between the central and local levels).
Enrique Sánches de León managed to be reelected in 1971
despite his 1-2-1 rating, which depicted someone close to the
regime but not very attached to the Movimiento. A future leader
of Acción Regional Extremeña (a regional party from Extrema-
dura) he would go on to join Adolfo Suárez’ Unión de Centro
Democrático (Union of Democratic Center, UCD) and become
minister of health in one of his cabinets after Franco’s death. 在
Almería, national councilor Miguel Vizcaíno Márquez (a presti-
gious jurist, candidate for Alianza Popular in 1977, and later a per-
manent member of the Council of State) was not to the liking of
the provincial headquarters. The family procuradores had compet-
itors such as the president of the Mercantile Circle, a former mayor
who was a friend of then-Minister of the Interior José García
Hernández, and the president of the Workers’ Council, “a clever
and trendy man, originally from the left.” Gonzalo Botija Cabo
was the national councilor for the province of Albacete and mayor
until January 1974. A number of figures were considered as possi-
ble replacements, such as Councilor Abelardo Sánchez Moreno
(who would become mayor in the 1978–1979 biennium) 和
the former president of the provincial council José Fernández
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| CA RL O S D O MP ER L A S Ú S AN D JU L I O PO N C E A LB E RC A
Fontecha. Both candidates, according to the DNP, seemed to be
willing to be family procuradores to replace Ricardo Fernández
Gutiérrez, a procurador who was fairly assured of reelection as
president of the Caja Rural bank.
A similar situation can be seen in the remaining provinces. 在
一只手, there was considerable internal diversity, 虽然
always within the limits of pro-Franco ideological foundations.
There was a clear absence of organized groups or formal political
organizations capable of competing as such in the electoral arena.
There were indeed people affiliated with the various political
trends supporting the regime (例如, monarchists, Falangists,
members of Opus Dei, 等等). The upshot was the existence of
a constellation of sorts made up of individual figures united by only
a few common points (mainly their loyalty to the regime), 相当
than the existence of political parties or associations within the
Movimiento. Some actors did promote political groups, as in the case
of the Democracia Social group promoted by Alberto Ballarín, WHO
later became vice president of Unión del Pueblo Español (Union of
the Spanish People). But this type of organization brought together
very diverse personalities (from Adolfo Suárez and Fernando Abril
Martorell to Francisco Labadie Otermín and Carlos Pinilla Turiño)
who would follow very different paths after 1975.
These associations were neither organized parties nor coherent
associations likely to develop a homogeneous program for action.
在这方面, this is not an example of pluralism—not even of a lim-
ited type—given the absence of coordinated action by the various
团体. These groups indeed lacked internal discipline, instead form-
ing circumstantial groupings with a very relative degree of cohesion
and revolving around one or several prominent figures. 其他
字, there was no real competition between various groups in
the political arena, nor was there an organized semi-opposition
新兴的. What the gallery of political personnel described in the
DNP files shows is an image of diversity and a certain dislocation
beyond what united almost all of them—loyalty to the regime, 至少
while the dictator was alive. These loyalties would later be transferred
to the groups each figure most identified with and felt offered the
best electoral potential—UCD for some, Alianza Popular for others,
parties to the far right in some cases, and for many, given the diffi-
culties of pursuing a public career, the abandonment of politics
entirely.
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The internal diversity of the Movimiento, though more clearly
noticeable in the last few years of the dictatorship, had always been
展示. The heterogeneity of the support that the Franco regime
garnered can be traced back to the 1930s and the initial conspiracies
against the Second Republic. Although cohesive during and imme-
diately after the war, their differences became more salient as time
passed and the regime slowly evolved. At the height of 1954, 这
Count of Vallellano, then minister of public works, did not hesitate
to point out the variety of political sectors that supported the regime:
“There are many people full of good faith and enthusiasm who believe
… that in the economic and social content, especially of the Movi-
miento, and even in the political one, lies the solution to all national
问题. There are others who believe, 然而, that Franco’s
personality is stronger and more vigorous than the entire program
and ideology of the National-Syndicalist regime, which is nourished
and protected by his vigor and strength as the greatest of his positive
integrations.”
Almost all Spaniards believe in the former, and of course the
vast majority; in the latter, only its affiliates, or militants, WHO, 甚至
though they are very numerous, 不能, 当然, encompass all
Spaniards with political rights.31
It is undeniable that Linz was not only right in highlighting the
heterogeneity of the coalition that supported the Franco dictator-
船, especially since the late 1950s, but was also able to explain it
by developing a conceptualization of the regime perfectly embed-
ded in the main debates affecting the social sciences of the 1960s.
That is where the success of his model lay: in its capacity to crys-
tallize around the characterization of the political nature of Fran-
coism a whole set of previous proposals that sought to establish a
conceptual category capable of describing and analyzing those
political regimes that could not be conceptualized as either total-
itarianisms or democracies. 在这样做, Linz provided the field of
comparative politics with a concept that allowed scholars to
broach the study of a large number of political regimes that, 喜欢
Francoism, did not fit neatly into the categories of totalitarianism
or democracy.
31 Fernando Suárez de Tangil y Angulo, Las obras públicas en España y los gobiernos de autoridad
(Madrid, 1954), 20.
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| CA RL O S D O MP ER L A S Ú S AN D JU L I O PO N C E A LB E RC A
然而, the primary sources analyzed in this paper reveal
the inadequacy of the concept of limited pluralism—a cornerstone
of Linz’ theory, despite its vagueness—in accounting for the
socio-political reality of the Franco regime. 实际上, the provincial
reality that we have reconstructed with documentary sources does
not point toward the existence of politico-ideological or interest
groups organized around administrative structures beyond govern-
mental control and capable of restricting the power of the head of
状态 (limited or otherwise). Our sources do not show the exis-
tence of that semi-opposition to which Linz referred in support
of his thesis of limited pluralism. There were indeed figures who
barely identified with the Movimiento and who were even tenu-
ously Francoist. 尽管如此, it was only after 1975 that they
dared to explore paths other than those of the dictatorship. 这
was the case, 例如, of the family procurador for Girona
Juan Botanch, who would go on to join UCD and later AP after
Franco’s death. 尽管如此, there was a diversity of groups that
clearly supported the regime, particularly in terms of their vision
for its future evolution.
的确, both the reports on the 1967 elections and the inter-
nal files of the DNP provide evidence of the existence within the
Franco dictatorship of various tendencies and interests competing
to increase their spheres of power. The presence of figures who
aligned themselves with one or another current during different
phases of their political career was not exceptional, nor was the
position of others who sympathized with various sectors simulta-
neously. Ideological affiliations (Catholic, technocrats, Falangists,
traditionalists, members of Opus Dei, 等等) were as numerous
as they were ductile. 尽管如此, all were united by the funda-
mentals of absolute loyalty to the regime that emerged from the
1936 coup and, 首先, loyalty to the Caudillo. That was the
basic identification to which everyone could turn to feel like men
of the Movimiento and, 同时, within a framework that
limited their capacity for action. Even Carrero Blanco, Franco’s
right-hand man and president of the government in 1973, was never
clearly linked to any affiliation, although his Catholicism and his sup-
port for the technocrats were beyond doubt. Yet that did not
exclude him from the single party, to which he considered himself
attached in terms of loyalty to Franco. 的确, the idea of the Movi-
miento encompassed several meanings, as laid out by Carrero himself:
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| 623
POLITICAL SCIENCE, H IST ORY, AND DICTATO RS HIPS
“I am a man who wholly identifies with the political work of the
Caudillo, doctrinally embodied in the principles of the National
Movimiento and in the Fundamental Laws of the Kingdom; 我的
loyalty to his person is total, 清除, clean and without a shadow of
any intimate conditioning or the stain of any mental reservations
towards the political work of the Caudillo. On the basis of these
loyalties, my political significance, gentlemen, is very clear: I am a
man of the Movimiento.”32
Linz identified the existence of several political tendencies
within the Franco regime through his inside knowledge of the
政权, which he earned through personal experience and close
connections with some of its officers, and the use of new data col-
lection and analysis techniques. 然而, when he inserted those
tendencies into the operating logic of his conceptual framework,
he overemphasized at least two aspects of their nature. 第一的, 他
granted them a degree of internal organization that they never
有. 第二, he bestowed upon them a capacity to limit the
power of the head of state that was wholly unrealistic.
The case of Carrero, one of the people closest to Franco and
with the most significant capacity to influence him, shows that
those who supported the regime could disagree on the direction
it should take. 而且, they consequently could also disagree on
the power that those who belonged to the different factions should
have within the regime. 尽管如此, no one ever questioned
either the ideological foundations that arose from the war’s rebels’
victory (anti-liberalism, anti-communism, and anti-partisanship) 或者
Franco’s absolute power within the regime. It was loyalty to the
Caudillo and not belonging to any particular current that guaran-
teed the ability to participate in the dictatorship’s political life.
所以, it was structurally impossible for such tendencies to
limit the executive’s power or propose alternative political projects
that would modify the regime’s founding principles.
32 Manuel Campo Vidal, Información y servicios secretos en el atentado al presidente Carrero Blanco
(巴塞罗那, 1983), 71.
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