Jonathan Schell & 罗伯特·S. Boynton

People’s power vs. 核电:
a conversation

robert s. boynton: When did you
½rst start thinking about the idea of
cooperative power and people’s war?

jonathan schell: In the late 1980s,
shortly before the collapse of Commu-
nism. I’d been a reporter in Vietnam in
the mid-1960s, an experience that had
led me to reflect on the extraordinary
power that local peoples have to expel
invaders wielding superior military

Jonathan Schell is the Harold Willens Peace Fel-
low at the Nation Institute and the peace and dis-
armament correspondent at “The Nation.” His
numerous publications include “The Time of Il-
lusion” (1976), “The Fate of the Earth” (1982),
“The Unconquerable World: 力量, Nonviolence,
and the Will of the People” (2003), and “A Hole
in the World” (2004), a compilation of his “Let-
ter From Ground Zero” columns.

罗伯特·S. Boynton is the director of the graduate
magazine journalism program at New York Uni-
大学. He is the author of “The New New Jour-
nalism” (2005). His profiles and essays have ap-
peared in “The New Yorker,” “The New York
Times Magazine,” “The Atlantic Monthly,“ 和
“Lingua Franca,” among other publications. 他的
conversation with Schell took place on July 28,
2006.

力量. The United States won almost all
the battles, but it didn’t matter. It won
itself to defeat. The process was observ-
able on a day-to-day basis. The ½ghting,
with its indiscriminate destruction, 曾是
driving the population into the hands of
the adversary. You didn’t have to be a
geopolitican to see it. 实际上, geopolitics
got in the way of seeing it.

然后, in the early 1970s, I got to know
some Polish folks, Jan and Irena Gross,
who had been driven out of their coun-
try in 1968 for protesting censorship by
the Communist regime. They were send-
ing care packages–practical articles, 在-
cluding consumables, plus subversive
literature–to their high school friends
in Poland who were continuing to op-
pose the regime. Over the years these
friends became some of the intellectual
leaders of the Worker’s Defense Com-
mittee, the predecessor to Solidarity.
Among them were Adam Michnik and
Jacek Kuron. 所以, through that personal
联系, I gained a vicarious experi-
ence of the events in Poland. At the time,
I had little inkling of the global impor-
tance of what was afoot. It was only lat-
er that it became clear that these more
or less accidental personal experiences
had opened up a small window for me
on what turned out to be a pivot of late
twentieth-century history, 即, 这
dissolution of the Soviet Union.

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People’s
power vs.
核
力量

在 1985, I was invited by Irena Gross to
write an introduction to a wonderful col-
lection of essays, called Letters from Pris-
在, by Michnik. That introduction gave
me my ½rst chance to reflect on people’s
movements more generally. By now, 我
had had a taste of imperial defeats in
two parts of the world. The empires–
American and Soviet–were very differ-
耳鼻喉科, and so were the movements, 但
they had something in common: 这
power of politics was beating the pow-
er of superior arms. In Vietnam, 甚至
as I admired the spectacular courage of
the resistance, I did not admire the one-
party system they seemed bent on es-
tablishing and did establish. In Poland,
where the resistance was democratic,
my admiration was unreserved.

Both experiences also gave me occa-
sion to reflect on the relationship of im-
perial control to nuclear arms, 一些-
thing that had become a strong interest
of mine. In Vietnam, the whole concept
of ‘limited war’ had been born out of
the paradoxical requirements of nuclear
战略. The idea was that although you
could not ½ght a ‘general’–i.e., nucle-
ar–war, you could ½ght a ‘limited’ war.
When it came to Poland, it seemed to
me that perhaps it was because of nucle-
ar paralysis that enough time was avail-
able for the slow process of nonviolent
resistance to take root and succeed.
These events made me wonder whether,
if other totalitarian regimes, 包括
Hitler’s, had not been smashed by mili-
滞留力, they might also eventually–
unlikely as it may seem–have fallen in
the face of a people’s movement. We’ll
never know.

rsb: The Unconquerable World does seem
to alternate between your long-standing
concerns over nuclear weapons, 和
your exploration of the role of people’s
movements in history. Would it be too

much to say that, 也许, one was the
condition for the fruition of the other?

js: The two were especially close in the
trajectory of the cold war. 当然,
the nonviolent people’s movements of
the twentieth century got going long be-
fore there was any nuclear standoff, 或者
even before the start of either of the two
world wars. So you can’t really say that
the people’s struggles depended on the
nuclear standoff, but the two phenome-
na did seem to intersect in ways that are
still not clear to me and that are worth
思考.

例如, in both the revolution-
ary theater of people’s movements and
the geostrategic theater of nuclear war,
violence seems to be transcended. 它
falls into a certain irrelevance. 那是,
it loses its deciding character, its histor-
ic role as the ‘½nal arbiter.’ In people’s
struggles violence doesn’t decide be-
cause it’s overmatched by other positive
expressions of popular will, 经常被称为
政治的. In nuclear war, violence can’t
decide anything because nuclear war
blows up everything that people might
½ght about. In both cases, there occurs
what I call a dematerialization of power.
But why power should have lost its ma-
terial basis in these two very different
ways at the same time is not clear to me.
All I can suggest is that the fantastic
rise in the twentieth century of violence
to a point where it defeated itself creat-
ed a need for something else, 然后
something turned out to be political
斗争. The colonized peoples of the
great Western empires were faced with
an awesome disparity in power. 人们
like Gandhi realized that they weren’t
going to win against the empire if they
tried to do it with an army. So the ques-
tion of how to act in what we today call
an ‘asymmetrical situation’ was present
as soon as Western imperialism was

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乔纳森
Schell &
罗伯特·S.
Boynton
在
nonviolence
& 暴力

launched upon the world. In these set-
tings, the people’s movements began as
a solution to the problem of the over-
whelming material power–military and
economic–of the imperial states. 这
colonies responded by developing the
immaterial power of people’s will ex-
pressed politically.

rsb: So nuclear weapons were less the
condition for the possibility of a people’s
war than they were the circumstances
under which people’s war found its most
potent expression?

js: I believe so. At that point, force be-
came self-paralyzing, and therefore the
invitation to make something happen in
this world through other strategies be-
came stronger than ever. The remarkable
thing is that these strategies were found.

rsb: You chart the various waves dur-
ing which people have assumed their
‘rightful stations’: following the Ameri-
can War of Independence, 从 1905 到
the mid-1970s, 进而 1989 to the pres-
耳鼻喉科. Do you believe that the emergence
of what you call cooperative power is
something historically foreordained, 或者
do you believe history is simply “one
damned thing after another”? Do you
believe, like Francis Fukuyama, 那一个
tendency toward freedom is working its
way through history in a Hegelian man-
ner?

js: I’m agnostic about it. It’s conceivable
that one day we’ll look back and see that
history was developing in a certain di-
反应, but I’m rather doubtful about it.
I certainly don’t believe in necessity in
历史. It is one thing to detect a phe-
nomenon that has developed over a very
long period of time–I certainly see ex-
amples of that. 考虑, 例如,
the development of market economics

over some ½ve hundred years or more.
But it is quite a different thing to identi-
fy even a long-term trend as the working
of History, as if history were a person
that did things itself. The development
of cooperative power does, at the very
至少, seem to constitute one of the very
long-term trends. It is certainly striking
how long that development has already
been taking shape, if you date its begin-
ning, as I do, with the American Revolu-
的.

rsb: Your concept of people’s power
is very suggestive, especially when you
use it to narrate an alternative history of
the past few hundred years. Is it robust
enough to help you understand those
occasions in which people’s power has
been stymied, 例如 1989 uprising
in Tiananmen Square?

js: A people’s movement is much more
likely to work if it is directed against a
foreign power, and less likely if it is a re-
bellion against an authentic, 国内的
政权, such as the Chinese government.
It is hard to ½nd many failures when the
program has been to kick out the foreign
invader. Foreign rule seems to be some-
thing that people ½nd especially offen-
西韦, that galvanizes them into action,
and that has an incredible staying power.
It seems that domestic tyranny is harder
to ½ght.

The Soviet Union is an interesting
case in this regard. The movements
were strongest in such places as Poland
or Hungary or Czechoslovakia, 在哪里
Soviet power was most clearly felt to
be imperial power. And the movement
was paradoxically the weakest in the so-
called center, in Russia itself. The differ-
ence in the revolutions corresponds to
a difference in the outcomes. The stron-
ger the nonviolent resistance movement
曾是, the more likely it was to produce a

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People’s
power vs.
核
力量

democratic regime. 例如, Czech-
oslovakia, 匈牙利, and Poland still have
democratic regimes, whereas Russia
seems to be slipping back in an authori-
tarian direction. And in Central Asia,
where the anti-Soviet movements were
perhaps weakest, you have many out-
right dictatorships. Resistance was pres-
ent in Russia, but it wasn’t like Poland’s
Solidarity, which had something on the
order of 10 million members.

rsb: But doesn’t the presence of an anti-
imperial movement often lead to surges
of destructive nationalism, which is a bi-
zarre form of ‘cooperative people’s pow-
是,’ isn’t it? You could make the argu-
蒙特, 然后, that Yugoslavia was cursed
by not having been suf½ciently under
the boot of the Soviet Union–the result
being that their rebellion was against it-
自己, not the Soviet oppressors.

js: I think that’s right. If you look at
the American Revolution, you see that
it was both a democratic movement
and a movement for independence and,
所以, a nationalistic movement. 在
that respect, there can be a dark side to
these movements. Nationalism hasn’t
always been a positive force, to put it
mildly. I was dismayed to discover that
many of the techniques for acquiring
power that were deployed by democrat-
ic movements–techniques such as cre-
ating parallel structures of governance
–were also used by Hitler before his
takeover in 1933.

rsb: You make a provocative argument
that contrary to the common under-
standing of the revolutions of the past
few hundred years–the French, the Rus-
sian–the rebellion phase actually came
off with very little violence and the
founding phase is when violence actual-
ly occurred. Why do you think this is?

js: I’m not sure how to understand it,
but it is a historically observable fact
that the storming of the Bastille in 1789
and the initial moments of the Bolshe-
vik Revolution involved relatively little
暴力. 然而, 在这两种情况下, the revolu-
tionaries then brought to power were
quite willing to shed rivers of blood. 的
课程, in neither case did they have any
philosophical commitment to nonvio-
伦斯. Quite the contrary: When Trotsky
was masterminding the Bolshevik take-
超过, Lenin was actually disappointed
to see so little violence occurring. 如何
could it really be a revolution if it didn’t
spill blood, he wondered.

It seems that the following stage,
where the factions of the new regime
½ght with one another to de½ne the new
安排, often becomes the occa-
sion when the blood starts to flow most
copiously. 当然, Lenin saw to that
in the Russian case.

One fascinating study would be to in-
vestigate why certain nonviolent revo-
lutions produce violent regimes while
other nonviolent revolutions produce
comparatively gentle, peaceful regimes.
You’d certainly want to look at the Iran-
ian Revolution. There was very little vio-
lence at the time of rebellion, but once
in power the new government unleashed
oppression against its opposition in the
French and Russian style.

Another paradox that struck me was
the fact that the people in power when
revolution is developing–even those
with a history of violence–often fail to
fully unleash the violence at their dispos-
阿尔. That was true of the Tsar’s regime
and even of the Shah of Iran. Most no-
tably, it was true of the Soviet Union,
which had more violence at its ½nger-
tips, 也许, than any regime on the
face of the earth, yet did not unleash it.

It is a great moral and intellectual puz-
zle how a system as violent as the Soviet

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乔纳森
Schell &
罗伯特·S.
Boynton
在
nonviolence
& 暴力

government was capable of producing
a man like Gorbachev, who exercised
such remarkable restraint. There must
have been something that we misunder-
stood about that system that prevented
us from seeing that such a man and such
an act were conceivable.

rsb: The peaceful collapse of the Soviet
Union seems like the paradigmatic act
of nonviolent people’s power for you.
How do you respond to critics who say
that this analysis gives insuf½cient cred-
it to the military expenditures pushed by
the Thatcher and Reagan governments,
which allegedly crippled the Soviet eco-
nomy?

js: I don’t think the Soviets were spent
into bankruptcy by the Reagan military
buildup. 实际上, if you look at the ½gures
for the Reagan period, you ½nd that the
rate at which the Soviets increased their
military spending stayed constant. 仍然,
there is an element of truth in this analy-
姐姐. The technical success of the West–
economically and militarily–provided
a devastating point of comparison for
the Soviet people and government. 他们
saw that they were losing both races, 和
that was very important to them. Not to
mention the lure of Western consumer
culture for people who had so much less
than we did. Soviet leaders were certain-
ly unnerved by Reagan’s Star Wars proj-
ect, and would have gone to consider-
able lengths to stop it. Yet even before
Reagan left of½ce, they concluded that
the system would not work, and could
be countered easily and inexpensively.

rsb: Now all we have to do is overcome
our belief in it!

js: 是的, we have to learn the same lesson
the Russians learned twenty-½ve years
前.

代达罗斯冬天 2007

rsb: In The Unconquerable World you
quote Lawrence Freedman as saying,
“The Emperor Deterrence may have
no clothes, but he is still emperor,“ 在
making a convincing argument that the
threat of nuclear weapons has created a
situation in which all-out war is virtually
难以想象的. This position, 虽然不是
identical to the theory of nuclear deter-
rence that shaped the cold-war period, 是
certainly compatible with it. How would
you distinguish your position from the
traditional deterrence argument?

js: The question is very complicated.
第一的, it is indisputable that the pres-
ence of nuclear weapons in the arsen-
als of the great powers gave them a tre-
mendous, perhaps a decisive, reason not
to go to war. The whole deterrence doc-
trine is a sort of a fantastic overelabora-
tion of the elemental fact that two coun-
tries with nuclear weapons are unlikely
to ½ght each other for fear of annihilat-
ing one another and even the whole
世界. When you consider that today
tiny little North Korea with its putative
nuclear arsenal can probably deter the
mighty United States, you can see the
power in the idea of nuclear deterrence.
So I do think that there is a solid core of
truth in it.

The question, 相当, is whether it’s a
good plan to constantly threaten annihi-
关系, more or less in perpetuity, as your
means of avoiding conventional war. 我的
answer is that the bargain is a senseless
and terrible one. It commits even the
most supposedly civilized countries to
executing genocidal policies, in the strict
de½nition of the term, in certain circum-
立场. Surely there has to be a better–
shall I say, a more civilized–way of as-
suring civilization’s survival than living
with the unremitting threat to pull the
trigger on that same civilization. 和,
human beings being what they are, 它

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People’s
power vs.
核
力量

must one day fail. For that reason alone,
deterrence cries out to be replaced by a
better system.

rsb: What about the Cuban missile cri-
姐姐?

js: It is easy to see that a war could have
broken out. I believe that both Khru-
shchev and Kennedy were keenly aware
of the danger, and for that reason both
pulled back. 另一方面, the Cu-
ban missile crisis was caused in the ½rst
place by nuclear weapons!

rsb: In this case one might say about
nuclear weapons what Karl Kraus said
about psychoanalysis: that they are a
disease for which they pretend to be a
treatment.

js: 是的, that was exactly the situation in
the Cuban missile crisis.

rsb: You do an excellent job of showing
how nuclear weapons have supplanted
conventional war. Nonviolent people’s
wars are one by-product of this state of
affairs, but isn’t terrorism as well?

js: 是的, although I think you have to
draw a very sharp distinction between
terrorists who actually represent a mass
movement, which is the case of Hezbol-
lah in Lebanon, and the less serious case
–despite all the damage they can cause
–of terrorists who are, essentially, 出去
there freelancing. Bin Laden may be in
that category. For all his popularity in
certain parts of the world, you can’t
point to any speci½c population whose
interests he represents.

rsb: In The Time of Illusion you describe
the increasing role of “appearance” both
in politics and in nuclear politics partic-

ularly in the 1970s. Is “appearance” more
or less important in politics today?

js: 出色地, 恐怖主义, 对于一个, is a form of
warfare that depends utterly on appear-
ances. Think of September 11. It was an
attack designed for the maximum spec-
tacle. It was almost an enactment of
what you might see in a disaster movie,
and it was picked up by television sta-
tions all over the world. 从某种意义上说, 这
美国, and the whole world, 跌倒了
into a trap that bin Laden deliberately
laid, and invested what he had done–
which of course has a terrible intrinsic
importance–with an apocalyptic impor-
tance that neither he nor his deeds actu-
ally have.

The United States waged actual war in

Vietnam for the sake of the credibility
of American power–in order to create
an appearance that would be so fear-
some to other countries that they would
do what we wanted them to do. 恐怖-
ists are involved in the same thing in the
sense that they, 也, are using violence
to send a message. It seems to me that
this is another sense in which violence
in general has become dematerialized:
people are using it to create a psycholog-
ical impression more than to actually
blow up objects or kill people. The real
power of bin Laden was not to defeat the
United States–which would be absurd–
but to precipitate something like a large-
scale transformation in the way the U.S.
government and its political system
作品, which is happening. That is real
力量: to be able to change radically the
behavior of the most powerful country
在世界上.

rsb: Liberals are often faulted for hav-
ing an insuf½ciently developed sense of
evil. That isn’t something one could say
about you because of your ½xation on
the dangers of nuclear weapons. 什么

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乔纳森
Schell &
罗伯特·S.
Boynton
在
nonviolence
& 暴力

is the role of the nuclear threat in your
思维?

js: It is at the center of a stream of
thinking that started with the Vietnam
战争. When I returned from Vietnam, 我
started looking at the question of why
America had gotten involved in Viet-
nam, and why it was having such trou-
ble getting out. I came to understand
that the answer to both these questions
was deeply bound up with nuclear poli-
赛. Vietnam was conceived as a limited
战争; and limited war was the alterna-
tive to general war, which meant nucle-
ar war. The policymakers at that time
were beginning to realize that nuclear
weapons were not the instruments of
power they had hoped they would be
at the beginning of the nuclear era: nu-
clear weapons paralyzed war rather than
enabled military action; 他们, 实际上,
bound you hand in foot. In their search
for usable military instruments, 人们
like Henry Kissinger and General Max-
well Taylor hit upon the idea that the
United States still had freedom of action
on the so-called periphery, in places like
越南.

But the solution had unexpected costs
attached to it. 第一的, it pushed the United
States into the buzz saw of the anti-im-
perial movement, as we discussed. 但,
第二, just because ‘limited war’ was an
alternative to nuclear war, it was caught
up in the obsession with the ‘credibility’
of American power that bedeviled nucle-
ar policy. The problem was that if limit-
ed wars like Vietnam were the only ones
you could ½ght, then you had to win
them because you had staked the whole
credibility of American power on them.
所以, no matter how crazy your
war turned out to be in itself, 不管
how costly, no matter how worthless
the speci½c objectives might be on the
地面, you felt you had no choice but

to persist, in the name of the credibility
of American power.

There is another, more elemental way
that Vietnam led me to think about nu-
clear weapons. I got to Vietnam when
I was twenty-three, and like all of us I
had seen the apparatus of American
economy and life used largely for ordi-
nary bene½cial purposes: taking kids to
学校, putting food in the supermar-
kets, 等等. When I got to Viet-
nam I saw all that wealth and power
turned to a senselessly destructive pur-
姿势. I came to understand that a few
bad decisions could turn the world up-
side down, that all powers and talents
could be systematically devoted to ab-
surd or evil ends. The experience opened
my mind to the idea that the disposition
of nuclear arms might be equally mis-
guided, equally perverse. That is what
I came to believe and still believe.

rsb: Do you think Americans have
come around to your way of thinking
about nuclear weapons since, 说, 1982,
when you published The Fate of the
Earth?

js: 不, on the contrary. I was just read-
ing Adam Michnik’s essay, “The Ultras
of moral revolution,” on the dangers
of the extremes of the left and right.
Those dangers are real enough. 但
what strikes me most forcibly now is
the extremism of the center. 考虑
global warming. It is the product of
business as usual, yet it threatens a slow
devastation of the only planet we know
of that is ½t for human habitation. 你
don’t have to do anything ‘extreme’ or
‘fanatical’ or ‘crazy’ to ruin the planet;
you only have to go on living the life
that is set before all of us.

Nuclear arms are in the same catego-
里. The idea of abolishing nuclear arms
is called ‘extreme.’ But these weapons

代达罗斯冬天 2007

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themselves have conducted us all to the
brink of the utmost extreme–the anni-
hilation of cities, nations, even the spe-
化学系. 然而, 今天, the nuclear-armed na-
系统蒸发散, including the latest ones in South
亚洲, consider nuclear weapons entire-
ly normal, as if they were just one more
appliance in the home, like a dishwash-
er or a toaster, something that every self-
respecting nation should possess.

Another example is the war in Iraq,
哪个, from my point of view, was from
the very outset an outlandish, fantastical
项目, doomed from the start to failure
更糟糕的是. I feel entitled to say this now
because I said it all before the war even
began. 笔记, by the way, that the war is
a product of the untenable global double
standard regarding nuclear weapons. 它
is a ½rst application of the radical new
Bush policy of using force to oppose pro-
liferation–a reversal of ½fty years of
American policy that cannot possibly
succeed and, 的确, has already failed.
今天, support for nuclear arsenals is a
centrist tenet, rarely questioned, 甚至
though those weapons threaten us with
our complete annihilation.

The ‘center’ is extreme in another
感觉. Almost wherever we look, 它
seems to me, we are seeing new con-
centrations of power–joining political
力量, money power, military power,
and media power into huge combines
that are proving more and more dif½cult
for ordinary people to ½ght. You see this
concentration of power–the very thing
the checks and balances of the Constitu-
tion were designed to prevent–in one
form in the United States, and you see
it in another, more entrenched form in
Russia and China. Italy’s Berlusconi, 为了-
tunately now out of of½ce though his in-
fluence remains great, personi½ed this
趋势. These concentrations, so danger-
ous to freedom, likewise are not the
product of fanaticism of right or left or

any other enthusiasm. 他们, 也, 生长
quietly out of business as usual.

rsb: Do you see any possibility that the
neglect of nuclear danger will end?

People’s
power vs.
核
力量

js: 我愿意. Whereas in the 1990s the issue
was forgotten completely, it has now at
least moved back into our conscious-
内斯. If you stop and think about it, 你
realize that nuclear danger–and, 更多的
宽广地, weapons of mass destruction
–has been at the center at least of the
declaratory policies of the Bush adminis-
翻译. We went into Iraq to head off ‘a
mushroom cloud over an American city.’
And the entire Bush Doctrine built up
about September 11 really put the dan-
ger of nuclear weapons and other weap-
ons of mass destruction at its center.
And most of the crises–with North Ko-
rean and Iran–have to do with this. 所以
it has once again returned to the center
of policy.

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代达罗斯冬天 2007

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