介绍 - 麻省理工学院人工智能研究专业

介绍

Henry E. 布雷迪 & 凯·雷曼·施洛兹曼

“So when we talk about Skid Row . . . there’s law enforcement agencies that
have created a whole lot of trauma. . . .”

—President of Los Angeles Skid Row Neighborhood Council

“We have to have a level of trust just by looking at you [警察], 步行,
你知道, observing you because you got a car, you got a badge, you got a gun.”

—Advocate for Skid Row

“We will get together and do a citizen’s arrest on every single human being
that goes against freedom of choice. You cannot mandate, you literally cannot
mandate, somebody to wear a mask knowing that mask is killing people. . . .
And every single one of you [pointing at Palm Beach County Commissioners]
that are obeying the devil’s laws are going to be arrested. And you, doctor, 是
going to be arrested for crimes against humanity. Every single one of you.”

—Witness at the County Commissioner Workshop on COVID Mask
Mandates, Palm Beach County, 六月 23, 2020

“I voted early and it went well except for . . . can’t really trust the software,
Dominion software all over.”

—Participant at the January 6th Demonstration for Trump, Interviewed
at the Demonstration1

Should we trust major American political, 经济的, and social institutions

when the people associated with those institutions are fallible and even, 在
occasion, venal or criminal? Do they really operate as trustworthy tribunes

of the people? The public is doubtful.

It is well known that trust in American government, especially in Congress and
行政部门, has been declining since the 1960s and 1970s: a period of so-
cial ferment, movements for political and social change, an unpopular war, 和
major government scandal.2 What is less well known is that the erosion of trust
seems now to have spread to many supposedly nonpolitical institutions, 包括
商业, 新闻学, 科学, 警察, religion, medicine, and higher education.3
Concern about the reliability and competence of these institutions is stoked by

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news stories–and, 最近, social media attention–reporting malfeasance
on Wall Street, errors in the media, fraud and conflicts of interest among scien-
奶嘴, misconduct by police, abuse of children by clergy, conflicting advice from
public health experts, and admissions scandals in higher education. Efforts as var-
ied as vaccinating the American public against a raging virus, reforming police de-
partments tainted by racism, validating a presidential election, and addressing cli-
mate change have been thwarted by distrust in institutions and experts.

The consequences of lack of trust depend not only on the level of trust and the
range of institutions over which it extends but also on the extent to which the fault
lines of distrust map onto other political, 社会的, and economic conflicts. In a de-
民主, political parties function to organize social and economic conflict and
make it relevant for politics. The extent to which party competition in the United
States involves not just division but distrust has varied across history, but partisan
distrust goes back to the nation’s founding and the emergence of our first political
派对. Jeffersonian Democrats vilified and distrusted “big government” Feder-
alist John Adams when he became president. 反过来, the Federalists distrusted
Thomas Jefferson once he was in the White House. The culmination of this long
历史, partisan polarization is currently at its highest point in at least a century.4
Partisan polarization over the past half-century has produced significant mu-
tual distrust between the parties. What is perhaps more surprising and more wor-
risome, the pattern of partisan polarization of trust now maps onto trust in many
supposedly apolitical institutions, including those that purport to cultivate and
disseminate knowledge and information, provide security and protection, 和es-
tablish and uphold fundamental social and ethical rules and norms. Where once
political partisans had the same level of trust in most nonpolitical institutions ex-
cept for business and labor, Democrats are now more likely than Republicans to
trust higher education, journalism and TV news, public schools, medicine, 和
科学. In turn, Republicans tend to trust the military, the police, and religion
more than Democrats do.

Should declining trust and polarized trust in nonpolitical institutions cause
concern? Do they portend widening ideological battles, an erosion of institutional
合法性, an increasing propensity to second guess experts and authorities, 和
an inability to get things done in society? The development of a partisan divide in
trust in nonpolitical institutions places additional hurdles in the path of produc-
tive public debate and successful public policy. Governing becomes much more
complicated when closed communities that differ on facts, 科学, morals, 这
rules of society, and worldview fail to communicate with one another, 少得多
agree on compromise solutions. And institutions embroiled in constant partisan
battles are hard-pressed to carry out the tasks they were designed to do. 简而言之,
distrust anchored in partisan, institutional, and cultural conflict hampers our ca-
pacity to come together to meet common challenges and solve shared problems.

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151 (4) Fall 2022Henry E. 布雷迪 & 凯·雷曼·施洛兹曼

C entral to our concerns in this issue of Dædalus are what institutions do and

why trust matters for their success.5 Although we can trace some govern-
英, 宗教的, 军队, medical, and educational institutions back thou-
sands of years, the modern profusion and rationalization of institutions dates
to the nineteenth century with the rise of corporations, 大学, hospitals,
公共教育, nonprofit organizations, philanthropy, and the professions in
response to urbanization, 工业化, and specialization.6 Scholars tell us
that institutions structure, facilitate, and regulate behavior in particular areas of
economic and social interactions, among them business, 法律, religion, 教育,
新闻学, the military, medicine, 科学, and policing.7 In higher education, 为了
例子, there are formal rules and informal norms that vary across universities
and across fields of inquiry that define appropriate ways of interacting with stu-
凹痕, disclosure of conflicts of interest in conducting scientific research, treat-
ment of evidence that disconfirms hypotheses, and recognition of the contribu-
tions of those who assisted with research. 相似地, policing has standards for
the training of police officers, the methods used to patrol a city, rules for interact-
ing with the public and with suspects, guidelines for the use of force, and review
boards to examine force incidents. All institutions have special rules and proce-
dures that order and discipline them so that they can provide goods and services
to people in acceptable ways.

For institutions to be successful, these rules, 标准, 规范, 法规,
training methods, and procedures must be seen as legitimate both by the stake-
holders associated with them and by the public at large. Legitimacy can stem from
four basic sources, and different institutions rely on different mixes of them.8 Le-
gitimacy may stem from the political system sharing its regulatory authority with
an institution–such as the military, 警察, or a corporation–based upon gov-
ernment’s power of coercion to defend the nation, keep the peace, and to en-
force contracts. As long as the institution conforms to the rules established by the
政府, it draws legitimacy from its relationship to the government in the
form of laws or charters. Legitimacy may also come from adherence to culturally
approved and accepted meanings and logics that are shaped by what is culturally ap-
propriate for each institution, 例如, in the practice of medicine, religion,
教育, and science. It may reside in moral and normative beliefs about how those
in institutions behave, 例如, in professional codes of ethics for law, medi-
cine, religion, higher education, and journalism. 最后, it may come from prag
matic authority based on efficiency and high performance in, 例如, 公司,
科学, or banks.

To be seen as trustworthy, an institution must be seen as legitimate in at least
一, and usually more than one, 方式. 例如, corporations are legitimate if
they stay within regulatory frameworks and do not overstep their authorities by
becoming monopolies or watering their stock; if they reflect the standard, 文化-

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & 科学介绍

turally acceptable practices for a corporation within a particular society by pro-
ducing products that conform to cultural models and address cultural needs; 如果
they adhere to the ethical and normative standards for businesses not only by es-
chewing bribery and other illegal practices but also by treating their employees,
suppliers, and customers fairly and ethically; and if they produce an economically
successful product. Failing on any of these dimensions risks a corporation’s legit-
imacy, and hence its trustworthiness. Universities must also stay within regulato-
ry frameworks and be financially viable, but evaluations of them are based more
upon their cultural acceptability as centers of teaching and learning and their pro-
fessional standards: their adherence to norms of free inquiry, freedom of speech,
and seeking truth. Religious institutions must be especially attentive to their cul-
tural legitimacy and their adherence to ethics and norms. Each institution holds
or loses legitimacy according to its own weighting and mix of criteria.

Presumably, if an institution is trustworthy, then people are more likely to
trust it, have confidence in it, and accept its advice and decisions as legitimate.9
They expect that it will do the right thing in an uncertain future with respect to
weighty matters that range from protecting their health and safety to providing
them with information about public issues.

During the last three years, COVID-19, Black Lives Matter, and election con-
troversies brought into bold relief the importance of institutions to our health
和福祉. Lack of trust in government, medicine, 科学, 警察, and elec-
tion administration has made it difficult to overcome a pandemic, resolve con-
cerns about public safety, and settle issues regarding an election. While the es-
says in this volume explore these issues in assorted contexts, a central theme is
the challenge to institutional legitimacy given the overall decline in the public’s
trust and the polarization of that trust between Democrats and Republicans–at a
time when we most need expertise and institutional capacity to face crises as one
国家.

O ur confidence in institutions is based upon both what we know about

them and upon what we know about how they know what they know.
Using insights gained from the field of science and technology studies
(超导系统), Sheila Jasanoff’s essay, “The Discontents of Truth & Trust in 21st Centu-
ry America,” examines the relationship between knowledge and society. Her STS
framework asserts that “it is not that expert institutions find and purvey truths
from some ‘outside’ that exists independent of society.” Hence “standards of epis-
temic correctness do not stand outside of politics but are configured through the
same processes of social authorization as political legitimacy.” The same four cri-
teria that legitimate institutions–regulatory, 文化, normative, and pragmatic
authority–also legitimate science and all knowledge. Despite the storybook ver-
sion of science in which a better-performing theory bests an old one, 实际上, 什么

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151 (4) Fall 2022Henry E. 布雷迪 & 凯·雷曼·施洛兹曼

often matters are such preexisting cultural factors as scientific paradigms or even
religious beliefs, such normative concerns as the prestige of a researcher or the
status of the methods that are used, and even such factors as the relationship of
the researcher or research institute to power.

In order to develop commonly accepted knowledge, Jasanoff explains, soci-
eties develop “civic epistemologies,” which “are the stylized, culturally specific
ways in which publics expect the state’s [or an institution’s] expertise, 知识-
边缘, and reasoning to be produced, 经测试, and put to use in decision-making.”10
Doing so involves meeting three challenges: representing problems in the world (喜欢
climate change and income inequality) in a way that resonates with those who are
做作的; aggregating disparate views from diverse sources and viewpoints to achieve
共识 (or “objectivity”) about what causes these problems (such as emissions
of greenhouse gases for climate change and technological change and tax policy
for income inequality); and bridging to fill gaps between what is known and what
is needed for problem-solving (例如, simulations to tell us how far green-
house gas emissions must be cut to prevent a climate catastrophe, or economic
models to indicate how to deal with income inequality). Jasanoff tells us that solu-
tions to these problems, especially the aggregation problem, can come from three
standpoints: “the view from nowhere (sanctioned by the methods of empirical sci-
ence and quantitative analysis); the view from everywhere (sanctioned by inclusive
representation and fair deliberation); and the view from somewhere (sanctioned by
individual witnessing and moral authenticity).” Typically, combinations of these
methods are needed in a social process that legitimates knowledge and decision-
制作, 例如, through peer-reviewed research, expert panels, public hear-
ings and comments, media commentary, commissions, and court cases.

T he remaining essays explore how well we have legitimated different in-

stitutions and the consequences of falling and polarized trust. In “Fifty
Years of Declining Confidence & Increasing Polarization in Trust in
American Institutions,” Henry E. Brady and Thomas B. Kent summarize the find-
ings from fifty years of data from three repeated surveys that asked about “confi-
dence” in the institutions or the people running them: the Gallup Poll, NORC’s
General Social Survey (GSS), and the Harris Poll. 一起, these surveys provide
information from 1972 on for four political institutions–the presidency, execu-
tive branch, 国会, and the Supreme Court–and for sixteen nonpolitical insti-
tutions: those associated with the economy such as business, 银行, Wall Street,
and organized labor; those related to knowledge and information production,
including the press and TV news, 电视, public schools, 教育, higher ed-
教育, and science; those enforcing norms and standards such as the police, 这
军队, and religion; and those providing professional services such as medicine
and law.11

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & 科学介绍

The drop in confidence in political institutions over the past fifty years has been
especially pronounced for Congress, significant for the presidency and the execu-
tive branch, and more modest but real for the Supreme Court. Less well known are
the declines in confidence in nonpolitical institutions. As with the political insti-
tutions, the declines have not been uniformly steep. Comparing the period from
1972 到 1979 with the period from 2010 到 2021 shows that average confidence has
decreased for fourteen of these nonpolitical institutions, stayed the same for one
(科学), and increased only for the military. 在多数情况下, the decline proceeded
relatively steadily over time. Wall Street, TV news, 银行, and the press sustained
the most substantial deterioration in confidence–comparable to that for Con-
国会. For public schools, medicine, 电视, 商业, and religion, the drop in
average confidence was more moderate–comparable in magnitude to those for
the presidency and executive branch. The decline in average confidence was even
smaller for law, 教育, and the police–roughly equivalent to that for the Su-
普莱梅阁. There were still smaller declines for higher education and labor.

有效, nonpolitical institutions have moved from being trusted quite a lot
to being trusted only somewhat. On a four-point scale with responses of “a great
deal of confidence,” “quite a lot,” “some,” and “hardly any at all,” in 1972–1979,
the American public expressed “quite a lot” of confidence in thirteen nonpolit-
ical institutions. Just three institutions (劳动, 法律, and television) inspired only
“some” confidence. By 2010–2021, only six institutions–the military, 科学,
higher education, 警察, 教育, and medicine–still enjoyed “quite a lot” of
confidence, and ten institutions warranted just “some” confidence. Recent data
suggest that Americans probably have only “some” confidence in higher educa-
化以及. 因此, Americans have gone from believing that thirteen of sixteen
institutions deserved quite a lot of confidence to believing that only five of sixteen
merit a lot of confidence, with eleven deserving only some confidence.

Substantial increases in partisan polarization of trust have accompanied the
significant declines in trust. In the 1970s, only business and labor showed signifi-
cant polarization, with Republicans trusting business more than Democrats, 和
Democrats trusting labor more than Republicans. By the 2010s, assessments of
every nonpolitical institution except banks were more polarized–with Republi-
cans especially likely to trust police, religion, 商业, and Wall Street, and Dem-
ocrats more trusting than Republicans of TV news, press, 劳动, 电视, 和
public schools.

Considering all the nonpolitical institutions in which trust has fallen–except
for Wall Street, 银行, 商业, and labor–shows an interesting pattern.12 Confi-
dence among partisans of the currently less-trusting party dropped especially pre-
cipitously, while the confidence of the other, more-trusting party either declined
only slightly or even increased somewhat. In the one case in which trust among
partisans of both parties and independents has increased–the military–the re-

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151 (4) Fall 2022Henry E. 布雷迪 & 凯·雷曼·施洛兹曼

sult is largely driven by the substantial increase in confidence among the partisans
of the more trusting Republican Party. The changes in trust for the four institu-
tions related to the economy are about the same across the two parties, 很少
change in trust for labor but significant declines for Wall Street, 银行, and busi-
内斯. 最后, confidence among political independents is either lower than that
of both Democrats and Republicans or between the levels for the adherents of the
two parties. The declines in trust among independents track quite closely those
for the entire population.

These data reveal several different patterns of change for nonpolitical institu-
系统蒸发散. 在某些情况下, changing confidence in a particular institution may be linked
to a large-scale event with society-wide consequences; 例如, across indi-
viduals and groups, a war might affect confidence in the military, or a financial cri-
sis might diminish confidence in banks and Wall Street. 在其他情况下, 个人
life experiences might have implications for confidence in a particular institution;
例如, being the victim of police harassment or the victim of a crime might
influence trust in the police. In a quite different pattern, a set of general nonpar-
tisan forces–affecting independents especially strongly–produces an overall de-
cline in trust in almost all nonpolitical institutions. Although different groups,
including different party groups, vary in their initial levels of confidence in var-
ious nonpolitical institutions, such forces operate more or less uniformly across
groups to diminish confidence in institutions. In a still different pattern, 有一个
partisan interaction. A set of factors leads to a decline in trust among members of
one party or the other, depending upon the institution, resulting in polarization
in confidence. The forces at work probably interact in complicated ways, 并
understand what is going on, we must consider both the multiple forces that have
led to a secular decline in trust and those that have led to partisan polarization of
相信.

T hese changes are worrying, but are these data capturing something real?

In her essay “Trustworthy Government: 政府的义务
& the Responsibilities of the Governed,” Margaret Levi expresses concern
about the meaningfulness of survey responses. Answers to questions about confi-
dence in government may simply reflect which party is in power, with supporters
of the in-party evincing trust and those of the out-party expressing lack of confi-
登塞. This criticism seems quite relevant for trust in government, but it is hard
to see how it applies to trust in ostensibly nonpolitical institutions. More to the
观点, Levi worries that responses to survey questions are not behaviors, just atti-
学习. She prefers to look at protests, compliance with laws, and other behavioral
manifestations of lack of confidence.13

Our authors provide abundant evidence that confidence in institutions has be-
havioral consequences. Brady and Kent show that lack of trust in an institution is

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & 科学介绍

highly correlated with an expressed unwillingness to have kin or friends pursue
a career in or marry someone associated with that institution.14 C. Ross Hatton,
Colleen L. Barry, Adam S. 莱文, Emma E. McGinty, and Hahrie Han demon-
strate that lack of trust in science was related to unwillingness to follow public
health guidelines during the COVID-19 pandemic, but that greater trust in local
government was associated with willingness to follow local public health dictates.
Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway argue that distrust in science is associated
with rejection of policies to address climate change. Tracey L. Meares indicates
that increasing trust in the police “is a better, 更高效, and lower-cost way
to achieve crime reduction and law compliance.” Robert Wuthnow shows that
trust in religion is a concomitant of church attendance. Max Margulies and Jessica
Blankshain find that a proxy for trust–namely, “warmth toward the military”–
is positively correlated with willingness to increase defense spending, to use force
国外, to employ more bellicose military strategies, and to evaluate wars posi-
主动地. 简而言之, survey data appear to be capturing something that is very real.

W hat then are the general factors that cause changes in trust for institu-

系统蒸发散? In his essay “What Does ‘Trust in the Media’ Mean?” Michael
Schudson focuses on the centrality of changes in journalism, arguing
that declines in trust follow from increasing journalistic skepticism about govern-
ment and other institutions over the past fifty years. The pivotal moment was the
Watergate scandal of 1972 to 1974–the years in which our data begin–that led to the
resignation of President Richard Nixon. Schudson tells us that “Journalism has
changed substantially at least twice in fifty years, and the technological change of
the early 2000s should not eclipse the political and cultural change of the 1970s
in comprehending journalism today.” Through studies of media content, Schud-
son documents the turn from “who-what-when-where” reporting to “how” and
“why” reporting in which “skepticism is approved, encouraged, and taught.” He
even implicates colleges and universities. More journalists (and more of the pub-
利克) have a college education, which encourages criticism and skepticism. 更远-
更多的, nonprofit organizations, the twenty-four-hour news cycle, and the inter-
net facilitate continuous monitoring of actions by government and other insti-
tutions. Schudson’s diagnosis is a counterpoint to that of Jasanoff. If becoming
trustworthy requires the development of civic epistemologies, then journalism’s
current mode may undermine these efforts through its constant exposure, criti-
cism, and complaint.

Lee Rainie considers the role of the internet in his essay “Networked Trust &
the Future of Media.” The decline in trust and polarization of trust began in the
1970s and 1980s before the internet and social media had become part of Amer-
ican life. The internet began to take off in the mid-1990s with the advent of the
World Wide Web, browsers, multiplexing, and fiber optic cables. 关于 50 每-

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cent of Americans used the internet in 2000, half had broadband by 2007, half
used social media by 2011, and half had a smartphone by 2013.15 Although levels of
trust began to erode in the 1970s, survey data suggest that, for many institutions,
acceleration in the decline in trust and increase in polarization of trust took place
at various times between about 1997 和 2020, as the internet became increasingly
重要的. Watershed events–among them, impeachments, 9/11, the rise of the
surveillance state, prolonged wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Tea Party, Oc-
cupy, and Black Lives Matter movements–also affected trust, but each was also in
part shaped by the growing importance of the internet.

According to Rainie, the internet matters because “every decision a person
makes about who or what to trust is a social calculation” so “there is deep inter-
section between changes in information and changes in social arrangements.”
最后, “in the age of social media, the members of users’ personal and
professional networks are key conduits of civic information and serve as key com-
mentators on that information.” Perhaps because of the creation of these new and
less familiar social networks and the concomitant damage to the media from the
internet’s cannibalizing of its advertising, “Americans believe the civic informa-
tion ecosystem is collapsing” and public confidence in social media is very low.
Almost two-thirds of the American people believe that social media has a mostly
negative effect on where the country is going, and three-quarters of Americans
believe that political partisans do not operate in a shared reality or shared moral
宇宙.

仍然, it is worth noting, as our authors observe again and again, that broad ex-
pressions of distrust in major institutions get at only part of the truth about trust.
As Rainie notes,

The same people who say they do not have confidence in the news media in general
can also cite news operations they trust, which is often tied to the partisan compo-
sition of news organizations’ audiences. Republicans and conservatives particularly
gravitate to Fox News, while Democrats and liberals say they trust multiple sources
such as CNN, 纽约时报, 公共广播公司, NPR, and NBC News.

罗伯特·J. Blendon and John M. 本森, 同时, tell us that, while Americans
distrust medicine, they trust the nurses and doctors with whom they interact. 和
Charles Stewart III remarks that voters trust their local election administration.

D eclines in trust may also follow from the actions within specific institu-

tions that violate one or more criteria for legitimacy. In “Religion, 的-
民主 & the Task of Restoring Trust,” Wuthnow paints a vivid picture
of how religious institutions have been compromised by corruption and scandal
precisely because they are the arbiters of moral virtue, and he discusses attempts
to repair lost trust through confessions, independent advisory commissions, 和

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litigation. None of these is entirely effective as “insincere confessions [是] staged
for media consumption,” investigative committees produce “toothless reports
that languish in bureaucratic darkness,” and litigation “drags on for years before
inconsequential penalties are levied.”

Meares, in “Trust & 警务模式,” notes that despite their instrumen-
tal effectiveness in crime fighting, the police are distrusted by Black adults, 哪个
she traces to a history of injustice against African Americans. In their essay “Race
& Political Trust: Justice as a Unifying Influence on Political Trust,” Cary Wu,
里玛·威尔克斯, and David C. Wilson argue that trust depends upon perceptions of
fairness and social justice and that, given their history, racial and ethnic minority
groups judge institutions through that lens:

African Americans experience higher levels of police-stops and incarceration, 和这个
pattern is contextualized against the history of a society that has used police to con-
控制, segregate, and denigrate Black people. Because of this history, 非洲裔美国人
do not see stop-and-frisk practices or mass incarceration as indications of government
performing well, although many Whites do.

Blendon and Benson suggest that, even though the public trusts doctors and nurs-
英语, the high cost of health care is a source of distrust in the medical system. In Jan-
尤里 2020, before COVID, the public’s top two domestic priorities among a list of
twenty-two possibilities were lowering the cost of health care and reducing pre-
scription drug prices–objectives shared by Democratic and Republican members
of the public. In parallel, declining trust in higher education seems to be related to
high costs.

In their essay “Specific Sources of Trust in Generals: Individual-Level Trust in
美国. 军队,” Max Margulies and Jessica Blankshain explore trust in the mil-
itary through five Ps, which are closely related to the four criteria for legitimacy:
表现, 专业精神, 劝说, personal connection, and partisan-
船. They find some evidence for performance in wars affecting trust, but “the
performance hypothesis has a hard time explaining the GSS high point for post-
9/11 military confidence in 2018.” The military gets very high marks for being eth-
ical and professional, but it is not clear how this assessment has driven trust rat-
ings over time. Positive depictions of the military in film and on television suggest
that persuasion may help to explain confidence in the military, but the evidence
is not definitive. Personal connections to the military are strongly related to con-
fidence in the military. 再次, 然而, the impact on trust in the military
over time is not clear. There are generational differences in confidence in the mili-
tary, but the most substantial gap is between Republicans and Democrats.

In “Trust in Elections,” Stewart finds two paradoxes in trust for election ad-
ministration in 2020. The first is that while the “procedures to ensure the trust-
worthiness of elections held” and “Americans were more confident in the electoral

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machinery following the 2020 election than they were in 2016,” Americans were
also more polarized than ever before. Using data from 2000 到 2019, Stewart finds
that a relatively consistent 20 到 40 percent of Democrats were very confident that
“votes nationwide were counted properly” (with upticks after Democratic wins
and downticks after Republican wins). 相比之下, the share of Republicans who
were very confident that votes were being counted properly sank from 60 百分
in the aftermath of the contentious 2000 选举, in which George W. Bush ul-
timately prevailed, to less than 20 百分比在 2018. 而且, after Biden’s victo-
ry in the 2020 选举, 尽管 60 percent of Democrats were very confident that
votes had been counted properly, 仅有的 10 percent of Republicans shared this view.
The second paradox is that, regardless of party affiliation, voters are about 20
到 30 percentage points more likely to say that their own vote was counted correct-
莱. These results suggest that different dynamics drive these two measures, “一
based upon direct experience, and the other mediated by political elites.” We see
similar patterns for other institutions in which closeness matters: doctors and
nurses who provide medical care are trusted, but not the medical system; 当地的
governments are trusted but not the federal government; experience in the mili-
tary or personal acquaintance with someone in the military increases overall trust
in the military.

H ow and why does partisanship affect trust? It is easy to see why parti-

sanship would be related to trust in government in the American system,
in which the American presidency–the most visible symbol of the gov-
ernment–combines the role of head of state with partisan policy-maker, 但它是
harder to see why it should be associated with trust in nonpolitical institutions.
One possible link is through partisan political campaigns to discredit them.

In “From Anti-Government to Anti-Science: Why Conservatives Have Turned
Against Science,” Oreskes and Conway argue that probusiness conservatives have
done just that for science because scientific findings about the negative impact of
business practices on the environment and on public health threaten to limit busi-
ness activity. Oreskes and Conway chart the progression of this effort. 第一的, 骗局-
servatives made the case that free enterprise was one of the foundations of Ameri-
can government, that economic freedom undergirded political freedom, 然后
governmental intervention in business undermined economic freedom. Ronald
Reagan encapsulated this argument in his inaugural address in 1981, asserting that
“Government is not the solution to our problem, government is the problem.” He
later incorporated into press conferences such quips as “I think you all know that
I’ve always felt the nine most terrifying words in the English language are: I’m
from the government, and I’m here to help.”16 Second, as science began to identi-
fy externalities from acid rain, tobacco use, chlorofluorocarbons, and greenhouse
气体, concerted efforts were made to cast doubt on these findings and on science

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本身. 第三, the partisan divide over science was reinforced by the growing parti-
san divide in religious identity:

As the Republican Party has become identified with conservative religiosity–in partic-
他们是, evangelical Protestantism–religious and political skepticism of science have be-
come mutually constitutive and self-reinforcing. 同时, individuals who are com-
fortable with secularism, and thus secular science, concentrate in the Democratic Party.

For Oreskes and Conway, the distrust in science is a spillover from conservative
distrust and dislike of government.

Stewart also sees a concerted effort by Republican elites, especially Donald
Trump, to discredit election administration by claiming that malevolent bureau-
cracies (“the deep state”) stole the 2020 election from Trump. In “American Trust
in Science & Institutions in the Time of COVID-19,” Hatton and his coauthors find
a decline in trust in science during the pandemic as many Republican leaders ques-
tioned the advice of experts. “With respect to differences in party affiliation, 我们
find that Republicans reported consistent declines in their trust in science during
the pandemic, while Democrats and independents remained relatively stable.”
They find that “trust in local elected officials and local and state health departments
has remained more immune from politics than other information sources.” Final-
莱, Levi notes that the “ascendant populist parties around the world and Trumpism
in the United States have self-consciously ‘weaponized distrust’ of government
and indeed of many authorities, including scientific experts and technocrats.”

A different explanation for polarization is that the leaders of these “nonpolit-
ical” institutions may actually be more partisan than in the past. A 2019 survey
discussed by Brady and Kent found that respondents attached distinctive parti-
san and ideological perspectives to the people associated with many “nonpoliti-
cal” institutions. Highly religious people, 警察, 银行家, and military generals
are seen as typically Republicans, and college professors, 记者, labor union
members, public school teachers, and scientists are viewed as Democrats. 仅有的
doctors and lawyers are considered to be, on average, neither Republicans nor
Democrats. In follow-up work, Kent has found some evidence that at least some
of the perceptions may be right. 自从 1980, some professions have become more
partisan in their political contributions in the same ways found on the surveys.17
Yet even if there is substance behind these perceptions, we really do not know
about how the public has come to these perceptions and why the partisanship
of institutional leaders seems to matter so much in the formation of judgments
about institutions.

We need a much better understanding of the forces that have precipitated the
decline in trust and polarization in confidence. One approach is to look at the sep-
arate histories of the various institutions over the past fifty years. These histo-
ries have, no doubt, been part of the story. 然而, the overall erosion of trust

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across multiple institutions and the partisan polarization of trust in most insti-
tutions suggest that we should look more widely for major social trends that have
shaped these outcomes. Three such developments with broad social consequenc-
es immediately suggest themselves. One is the increase in economic inequality in
美国, which has been implicated in the decline of social trust between people,
哪个, 反过来, is related to other forms of trust.18 Another is the massive increase
in immigration that has led to much greater diversity in America, a trend that has
also been associated with the decline in social trust in local communities, 埃斯佩-
cially when it is combined with substantial residential segregation.19 And both of
these trends have been associated with the pronounced partisan polarization of
American politics that has been catalyzed by the rising number of contested parti-
san primaries, the growth of cable news, 和, 最近, the emergence of so-
cial media.20 These trends may have incubated the distrust and misunderstanding
that have led us to where we are.

W hat is the optimal level of trust? It is dangerous to trust institutions

when they are not trustworthy, as we have learned from periodic scan-
dals that range from Watergate to the abuse of children by Catholic
priests to the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment. “The decline in trust in most institu-
tions that public polling has documented since the 1960s,” Schudson argues, “was
a decline from what was arguably much too unquestioning a level of trust. 这是
clearly true with the federal government, 媒体, 银行业, corporate America,
organized labor, and organized religion.” Margulies and Blankshain believe that
“Both high and low levels of trust in the military can have adverse consequences.”
High levels of trust in the military may “upend the hierarchical nature of proper
democratic civil-military relations” or give some leaders incentives to “use the mili-
tary as political shield/weapon when beneficial, which only serves to further elevate
the military over civilian institutions and thereby further exacerbate the trust gap.”
Levi puts it trenchantly: “When a policy depends on the most up-to-date science,
military intelligence, or other expertise, too much trust of experts can lead to trag-
ic mistakes–à la the war in Iraq or the deadline for the withdrawal from Afghan-
istan–and too little trust can lead to populations resisting what might save their
lives–à la vaccines for COVID.” Thus, there are downsides to maximizing trust.
仍然, there must be a reasonable basic level of trust for our institutions to operate
有效地. It seems likely that, at least for some institutions, trust has fallen so low
that their operations are impaired. The trick is to achieve an appropriate balance.

Partisan polarization of trust is also a problem if it turns an institution into “just
another political institution.” Indeed, Schudson ends his essay with the worry that
partisan divides will do just that by enfeebling the media, medicine, and other in-
机构. 所以, on one hand, it seems startling and counterproductive to see parti-
san divides with respect to trust in institutions. How can an institution get its work

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done when half the population distrusts it? 另一方面, polarization sug-
gests that the institution itself might need to rethink how it does its work.

更普遍, rethinking the operation of an institution might be necessary
whenever major groups in society distrust it. Nowhere is this clearer than in the
deep distrust felt for the police by African Americans, and the persistently large
gap between Whites and African Americans in trust in the police. As Meares and
also Wu and coauthors point out, perhaps the problem is the wrong model of polic-
ing and the wrong standard for legitimating the police. “If the primary reason for
public confidence in police was their effectiveness at crime-fighting,” Meares ex-
plains, “we would expect [given decreases in crime in the past thirty years] confi-
dence to rise during that time rather than to remain flat. 而且, we would expect
that the group who received the most benefits of crime-fighting, Black adults,
would register increasing ratings of confidence even accounting for low base
rates.” The problem, our authors argue, is designing policing only with regulatory
and pragmatic legitimacy in mind, while neglecting cultural and normative legit-
imacy. Effective policing requires attention to justice and fairness. 最后,
polarization of trust is a problem that requires a better understanding of how to
legitimate an institution.

W hat can be done to restore trust? These essays propose several gener-

al strategies for ameliorating distrust. Jasanoff suggests that experts
and institutions must get beyond trying to justify science, medicine,
or policing based upon regulatory authority. They must get better at cultivating
civic epistemologies–ways of justifying advice–that “give voice to diverse stand-
点, aggregate disparate opinions to produce a measure of objectivity, and find
persuasive ways to bridge the gaps between available and ideal states of knowl-
edge.” Right now, one critical arena for improvement is criminal justice policy.
Meares makes several suggestions for restoring trust in the police: better training
in procedural justice; establishment of civilian boards with authority not only to
review police actions but also to make policy; and the elimination of the legacy of
institutional racism that underlies ill-defined vagrancy and loitering laws.

Levi as well as Oreskes and Conway propose that we need a “progovernment”
narrative that convincingly explains how governments can solve problems and
improve citizens’ lives–a point that is implicit in Stewart’s argument. Republi-
can distrust of election administration demonstrates how hard that will be. 那
our election system, by and large, performs well and is worthy of trust is not suffi-
cient to produce trust in those who see government as the problem and who listen
to leaders who harp on that theme. Criticism of government has become a cultural
meme that does not require evidence. Getting beyond the neoliberal perspective
that minimizes government and enshrines market solutions requires inventing
new and more acceptable ways to think about the social welfare state model. 它

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also requires ensuring that government can actually solve problems by moderniz-
ing and improving its performance. That is a formidable agenda.

Meares, Wu and coauthors, and others emphasize the importance of a social
justice perspective in public administration to engender trust among marginal-
ized groups. Modern public administration is already pursuing a more inclusive
and justice-oriented path, but such efforts are in their infancy. On his first day in
office, President Biden signed Executive Order 13985, “Advancing Racial Equity
and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government,”
哪个, with the Office of Management and Budget’s report on assessing equity,
marked it as one of the federal government’s performance goals.21

There are also more specific suggestions. Blendon and Benson make recom-
mendations for the field of public health. During the COVID-19 pandemic, 是的-
came apparent that the public knew very little about what public health officials
做, and the media coverage of their actions did not match that of doctors and nurs-
es in hospitals. As with all governmental activity, there needs to be more visibility
for what government does and how it solves problems, but short of creating a hit
television show with a public health officer as its protagonist, it is not clear how to
do this. Blendon and Benson also suggest that there should be more separation of
public health from partisan politics, but this must be done carefully. In many cas-
es during the pandemic, public health officials could invoke sweeping emergen-
cy powers without political consultation, a strategy that, based upon Jasanoff’s
analysis and recent work on failures of governance during the pandemic, may not
succeed.22 Ensuring that those who speak on behalf of science represent both par-
ties might be useful, but it would require the development of new networks link-
ing scientists with public health. Hatton and coauthors add another useful idea:
because local governments are more trusted than the states or national govern-
蒙特, public health outreach should involve local elected and appointed officials.
当然, the internet has exacerbated the problem of trust by creating so many
diverse sources of information without mechanisms for assessing their accuracy
or dependability. Rainie proposes a series of steps for creating trust in the inter-
网. These include giving people more control of their data, changing “social me-
dia algorithms to downplay anger and divisive discourse,” finding ways to promote
“accuracy, diverse perspectives, and pathways to agreement,” embracing more
transparency by formal news operations and social media, reviving journalism–
especially local papers–and creating new programs for digital and civic literacy.
Finding a way to cope with the internet is another major project for our time.

C an we restore trust? The agenda presented in this volume is daunting:

develop new civic epistemologies, rethink how institutions (such as po-
lice) operate, reframe the role of government, improve the performance
of government, and clean up the internet. As Rainie reminds us in his essay, 我们的

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times present challenges akin to previous revolutionary moments, such as the in-
vention of the printing press, the French Revolution, or the industrial revolution,
when old authorities were overthrown and new paradigms emerged. We must re-
establish authority by finding new ways to legitimate institutions. We have a lot of
inventing, rethinking, and redoing ahead of us.

about the authors

Henry E. 布雷迪, a Fellow of the American Academy since 2003, is the Class of
1941 Monroe Deutsch Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the Uni-
versity of California, 伯克利. He served as Dean of the Goldman School of Pub-
lic Policy from 2009–2021. He is the author of Letting the People Decide: Dynamics of a
Canadian Election (with Richard Johnston, André Blais, and Jean Crête, 1992), 嗓音
and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics (with Sidney Verba and Kay Lehman
施洛兹曼, 1995), 和, 最近, Unequal and Unrepresented: Political Inequality and
the People’s Voice in the New Gilded Age (with Kay Lehman Schlozman and Sidney Ver-
ba, 2018).

凯·雷曼·施洛兹曼, 自此成为美国科学院院士 2003, 是个
J. Joseph Moakley Endowed Professor of Political Science at Boston College. 她
is the author of Unequal and Unrepresented: Political Inequality and the People’s Voice in the
New Gilded Age (with Henry E. Brady and Sidney Verba, 2018), The Unheavenly Chorus:
Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy (with Sidney Verba
and Henry E. 布雷迪, 2012), and The Private Roots of Public Action: 性别, 平等, 和
Political Participation (with Nancy Burns and Sidney Verba, 2001).

尾注

1 “Trust Talks: A Dialogue on Police and Race in Los Angeles,” USC Center for Religion
and Civic Culture, YouTube video, uploaded August 16, 2017, https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=1K0wnmLfW9A, quotation at 0:49–1:03; “Anti-Maskers Rage at ‘Dev-
il’s Laws’ Mandate in Florida’s Palm Beach,” The Star Online, YouTube video, uploaded
六月 28, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PjH1aCj510o, quotations at 1:49–
1:54 and at 1:28–2:10; and “Watch Live: Jan. 6 Committee Hearing–Day 2,” The Hill,
六月 13, 2022, https://thehill.com/video/3521036-watch-live-january-6th-committee
-hearing-day-2/, quotation at 1:59:23–1:59:32.

2 Margaret Levi and Laura Stoker, “Political Trust and Trustworthiness,” Annual Review of
政治学 3 (1) (2000): 475–507; and Marc J. Hetherington and Thomas J. Rudolph,
“Political Trust and Polarization,” in The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust,
编辑. Eric Uslaner (纽约: 牛津大学出版社, 2018).

3 David Michels, “The Trust Crisis in Business,” Forbes, 六月 17, 2019, https://www.forbes
.com/sites/davidmichels/2019/06/17/the-trust-crisis-in-business/#ed50f8844a6a;
Knight Commission on Trust, 媒体, and Democracy, Crisis in Democracy: Renewing
Trust in America (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: The Aspen Institute, 2019); National Academies

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科学系, Engineering, and Medicine, Examining the Mistrust of Science: Proceedings of a
Workshop in Brief (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: The National Academies Press, 2017), https://土井
.org/10.17226/24819; All European Academies, “Science in Times of Challenged Trust
and Expertise,” 2018 ALLEA Scientific Symposium at the 2018 ALLEA General Assem-
布莱, Sofia, Bulgaria, 可能 18, 2018, https://www.alleageneralassembly.org/2018-general
-assembly/science-in-times-of-challenged-trust-and-expertise/; Nathan James, Kristin
Finklea, Natalie Keegan, 等人。, “Public Trust and Law Enforcement–A Discussion for
Policy Makers,” R43904 (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: Congressional Research Service, 2018);
Frank Newport, “Why Are Americans Losing Confidence in Organized Religion?”
盖洛普, 七月 16, 2019, https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/260738/why
-americans-losing-confidence-organized-religion.aspx; and Jeffrey M. 琼斯, “Confi-
dence in Higher Education Down since 2015,” Gallup, 十月 9, 2018, https://消息
.gallup.com/opinion/gallup/242441/confidence-higher-education-down-2015.aspx.
4 Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America: The Dance of Ideol

ogy and Unequal Riches, 2ND版. (剑桥, 大量的。: 与新闻界, 2016).

5 Karen S. 厨师, Russell Hardin, and Margaret Levi argue, in Cooperation Without Trust? (新的
约克: 拉塞尔·塞奇基金会, 2005), that large institutions cannot be trusted, 或者, 到
be more specific, that trust only makes sense as a “relational” ideal in which the rela-
tion is with another person. According to their “encapsulated” notion of trust, trust re-
quires knowing another person well enough to believe that that person has encapsulat-
ed one’s interests, which Cook, Hardin, and Levi argue is not possible with institutions.
相比之下, Lynne Zucker, in “Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic
Structure, 1840–1920,” Research in Organizational Behavior 8 (1986): 53–111, uses “trust” to
mean institutional trust as well as personal trust. Susan Shapiro also includes institu-
tions in her understanding of trust and argues that there are trust-like methods of con-
trol of institutions–what she calls “impersonal trust.” See Susan Shapiro, “The Social
Control of Impersonal Trust,” 美国社会学杂志 93 (3) (1987): 623–658.

6 Max Weber, Economy and Society (伯克利: University of California Press, 1978 [1921]).
See also Robert Wiebe, The Search for Order: 1877–1920 (纽约: Hill and Wang, 1967).
7 Elisabeth Clemens and James M. 厨师, “Politics and Institutionalism: Explaining Dura-
bility and Change,” Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1) (1999): 441–466; Royston Green-
木头, Christine Oliver, Kerstin Sahlin, and Roy Suddaby, 编辑。, The SAGE Handbook of
Organizational Institutionalism (Thousand Oaks, 加利福尼亚州。: SAGE Publications, 2013); Seu-
mas Miller, “Social Institutions,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 一月 4, 2007, 转速.
四月 9, 2019, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-institutions/; 和W. 理查德
斯科特, Institutions and Organizations: Ideas, Interests, and Identities, 4特德. (千橡市,
加利福尼亚州。: SAGE Publications, 2014).

8 大卫·L. Deephouse, Jonathan Bundy, Leigh Plunkett Tost, and Mark C. 苏奇曼, “Orga-
nizational Legitimacy: Six Key Questions,” in The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Insti
tutionalism, 编辑. Royston Greenwood, Christine Oliver, 托马斯·B. 劳伦斯, and Renate
乙. 迈耶, 2ND版. (千橡市, 加利福尼亚州。: SAGE Publications, 2017), 27–54.

9 We use the terms “trust” and “confidence” interchangeably. On the relationship between
trust and legitimacy, see Jonathan Jackson and Jacinta M. Gau, “Carving Up Concepts?
Differentiating Between Trust and Legitimacy in Public Attitudes Towards Legal Au-
托里蒂,” in Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Trust, 编辑. Ellie Shockley, Tess M. S. Neal, Lisa
中号. PytlikZillig, and Brian H. Bornstein (占婆, 瑞士: 施普林格, 2016), 49–69.

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10 Sheila Jasanoff, “Civic Epistemologies,” https://www.sheilajasanoff.org/research/civic
-epistemologies/. See also Sheila Jasanoff, Science and Public Reason (London and New
约克: Routledge/Taylor and Francis, 2012); and Sheila Jasanoff, Designs on Nature
(普林斯顿大学, 新泽西州: 普林斯顿大学出版社, 2015). The development of “social” epis-
temologies traces back to Alvin Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World (纽约: 牛津
大学出版社, 1999). Also see Alvin Goldman and Cailin O’Connor, “Social Epis-
temology,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 二月 6, 2001, 转速. 八月 28, 2019,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-social/; and Alessandra Tanesini,
“Social Epistemology,” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online, 2017, https://www .rep
.routledge.com/articles/thematic/social-epistemology/v-2.

11 The questions in these surveys ask about “confidence” in institutions. 是一致的
endnote 9, we treat confidence as a measure of trust in our discussion. These surveys
cover most major nonpolitical institutions. Among the few that are missing are the
艺术, food systems, tech companies, public utilities, philanthropy, nonprofits, and ag-
riculture. By “political” institutions we mean those that make or adjudicate laws and
that have elected members (presidency and Congress) or many presidentially nomi-
nated and congressionally confirmed members (Supreme Court and executive branch).
By “nonpolitical” we mean institutions that are private sector (profit-making such
as business or nonprofit such as religion) or government bureaucracies that do not
make or adjudicate laws and that strive to be nonpolitical (such as the military, 酒吧-
lic schools, or the police), even though they might have some elected officials (民众
school boards) or political appointees (military and police leaders) running them.

12 These data include confidence in higher education.
13 For a full discussion of the issues, see Paul C. Bauer and Markus Freitag, “Measuring
相信,” in The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust, 编辑. Eric Uslaner (纽约:
牛津大学出版社, 2018), 15–36.

14 These findings extend the notion of “affective polarization” with respect to political par-
ty identification described in Shanto Iyengar, Yphtach Lelkes, Matthew Levendusky,
等人。, “The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States,”
Annual Review of Political Science 22 (1) (2019): 129–146.

15 皮尤研究中心, “Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet,“ 四月 7, 2021, https://万维网
.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/internet-broadband/; 皮尤研究中心, “所以-
cial Media Fact Sheet,“ 四月 7, 2021, https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet
/social-media/; and Pew Research Center, “Mobile Fact Sheet,“ 四月 7, 2021, https://
www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/mobile/.

16 “Transcript of President Reagan’s News Conference, 八月 12, 1986,” The Washington
邮政, 八月 13, 1986, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1986/08/13
/transcript-of-president-reagans-news-conference/bceaa7d7-a544-4c4e-8af1-51f303
a00e25/.

17 托马斯·B. Kent, “Institutions and Constituents: Ideological Trends Over Time,” paper
prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 奇卡-
去, 伊利诺伊州, April 7–10, 2022.

18 托马斯·皮凯蒂, Emanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman, “Distributional National Accounts:
Methods and Estimates for the United States,》经济学季刊 133 (2) (2018):
553–609; Eric Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust (纽约: 剑桥大学
按, 2002); and Kenneth Newton, Dietlind Stolle, and Sonja Zmerli, “Social and Polit-
ical Trust,” in Uslaner, 编辑。, The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust, 37–56.

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151 (4) Fall 2022Henry E. 布雷迪 & 凯·雷曼·施洛兹曼

19 Peter Thisted Dinesen and Kim Mannemar Sønderskov, “Ethnic Diversity and Social
相信,” in Uslaner, 编辑。, The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust, 175–204; and Tom
Van Der Meer and Jochem Tolsma, “Ethnic Diversity and Its Effects on Social Cohe-
锡安,” Annual Review of Sociology 40 (1) (2014): 459–478.

20 McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, Polarized America.
21 See “Advancing an Equitable Government,” Performance.gov, https://www.performance
.gov/equity/; and Office of Management and Budget, Study to Identify Methods to Assess
Equity: Report to the President (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: Executive Office of the President, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/OMB-Report-on-E013985
-Implementation_508-Compliant-Secure-v1.1.pdf.

22 Morris P. Fiorina, 编辑。, Who Governs? Emergency Powers in the Age of COVID (斯坦福大学, 加利福尼亚州。:

斯坦福大学, 胡佛研究所出版社, 即将推出).

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