Global Environmental Governance for Corporate Responsibility and Accountability
Jennifer Clapp
Global Environmental Governance for
Corporate Responsibility and
Accountability
•
Jennifer Clapp*
In the past quarter of a century, an era of rapid economic globalization, 那里
has been a remarkable growth in both the number of transnational corpora-
系统蒸发散 (TNCs) and the quantity of foreign direct investment (FDI). TNCs have
grown in number from 7,000 TNC parent ªrms in 1970 to over 65,000 在 2002.
These parent ªrms are associated with over 850,000 foreign afªliate ªrms. 到-
在一起, these globally linked ªrms make up one-tenth of world GDP and one-
third of world exports.1 Flows of FDI have grown considerably in recent decades.
在 1970 the level of FDI inºows stood at US$9.2 billion, 并由 2003 it stood at US$560 billion (down from the record breaking US$1.49 trillion in 2000).2
Given this weight of transnational investment, it is clear that TNCs are very im-
portant global actors. Because they tend to invest in sectors that are environ-
mentally sensitive, they are especially important players in international envi-
ronmental politics and policy. Though the developing world receives less than
20 percent of global FDI, it is a key source of capital for these countries and its
impacts can be enormous on the economy, and the environment.3
Marian Miller was very interested in the role of corporations in global en-
vironmental governance. Her concern lay with the power of transnational cor-
孔洞, in particular their ability to inºuence policies and environmental
outcomes in the Third World. She saw this power of corporate actors as draining
sovereignty away from Third World countries, and exhausting their resources.4
Though corporations have “greened” themselves in the course of the past 10
years by claiming to be environmentally and socially responsible via a number
of voluntary corporate-based initiatives, and even by claiming to promote sus-
* I would like to thank Sam Grey and Kate Turner for research assistance, and the Social Science
and Humanities Council of Canada for research support. I would also like to thank the anony-
mous reviewer of this paper.
1. UNCTAD 2001, 9; and UNCTAD 2002, xv and 272.
2. UNCTAD 2001, 1; World Bank 2003; and UNCTAD 2004, 1.
3. 莱顿, Roht-Arriaza, and Zarsky 2002, 3.
4. 磨坊主 1998, 174; and Miller 2001.
Global Environmental Politics 5:3, 八月 2005
© 2005 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
23
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24 • Global Environmental Governance for Corporate Responsibility and Accountability
tainable development in the South, 他们是, according to Miller, in need of
being closely watched.5
In line with this concern, the past decade has seen a growing literature on
the interface between TNCs and the environment. One strand has focused on
the environmental impact of TNCs. This literature has focused on case studies
that outline the practices of TNCs at the local level, especially in the developing
世界. Most developing countries have only put environmental regulations into
place over the course of the past decade, and monitoring and enforcement has
been patchy due to weak state capacity and pressure to attract investment. 这
literature has focused on key sectors, such as electronics, 化学品, 农业,
forestry, mining and oil exploration.6 Another strand of the literature has
looked at the inºuence of business actors in global environmental governance.7
Much of this literature has looked at the role that transnational corporations
play in inºuencing global treaties and their impact on governments, 包括
those in the Global South. Corporations and corporate advocacy groups lobby
governments and international treaty processes.8 They also use their structural
力量, and threat of relocation, to encourage governments to loosen regula-
tions or to not enforce those rules on the books (encouraging a regulatory
chill),9 as well as to inºuence the discourse on “sustainable development.”10
They also have enacted voluntary environmental and social codes of conduct,
organized primarily through industry, such as ISO 14000, Responsible Care,
and individual pledges of corporate social responsibility (CSR).11 The literature
on these developments has been extremely important in tracking and analyzing
the roles that business actors play in shaping global environmental governance.
在本文中, I argue that we must now turn our attention to another as-
pect of the politics of international business in global environmental gover-
南斯: the evolution of formal multilateral environmental governance mecha-
nisms designed to inºuence the environmental behavior of TNCs. 正式的
efforts to promote better environmental practices by TNCs that originate out-
side of corporate circles have been stepped up in recent years, alongside indus-
try-driven efforts. Recent efforts along these lines include the UN’s Global Com-
协议, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (经合组织)
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, as well as calls for an international
treaty on corporate accountability. While these external efforts are still volun-
tary, they do have the potential to become stronger if they are incorporated into
a legally binding treaty, as some NGOs are currently proposing. Such an agree-
ment would have enormous signiªcance for the countries of the Global South,
5. 磨坊主 1995, 37.
6. 看, 例如, 莱顿, Roht-Arriaza, and Zarsky 2002; Clapp 2001; 磨坊主 2001; Dauvergne
2001; and Gedicks 2001.
7. 例如, Levy and Newell 2005.
8. 看, 例如, Newell and Paterson 1998; 征收 1997; Clapp 2001; and Rowlands 2000.
9. Clapp 2002; and Neumayer 2001.
10. Sklair 2001; Levy and Newell 2002; and Levy and Egan 1998.
11. Finger and Tamiotti 1999; Clapp 1998; and Krut and Gleckman 1998.
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Jennifer Clapp
• 25
as it is often difªcult for these countries to monitor and enforce environmental
法规, particularly in a climate of regulatory chill. An externally driven
treaty could lead not only to strengthened regulations on TNCs operating in de-
veloping countries, but also to enhanced technical and ªnancial assistance for
monitoring and enforcement.
A Brief History of International Efforts to Govern TNCs
Efforts to impose some sort of external governance on TNCs are not new. Nego-
tiations were launched on a globally applicable voluntary code of conduct for
TNCs in 1977 by the UN Center for Transnational Corporations (UNCTC). 这
code of conduct included provisions on environmental practice and outlined
rights and responsibilities of TNCs.12 Set up in the early 1970s, the UNCTC was
mandated to monitor the economic, social and environmental impact of TNCs,
particularly those operating in developing countries. The idea behind the Code
of Conduct was to ensure that foreign direct investment did not have adverse
consequences for local communities or the environment. Negotiations on the
code continued for over a decade, but it was never ªnalized or adopted. Accord-
ing to NGOs involved in the negotiation of this agreement, pressure from the
US and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in the early 1990s led to
the dismantling of the UNCTC, just prior to the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. 这
UNCTC’s other activities were assumed by the United Nations Commission on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which addresses developing country trade
and investment concerns.13 In place of the UNCTC code, the Rio Earth Summit
promoted voluntary, self-regulatory initiatives developed by corporate actors
他们自己.
Many see the approach adopted at Rio as the product of heavy corporate
presence at that event.14 The participation of industry at Rio began well in ad-
vance of the conference. 在 1990, 一些 48 TNCs established a lobby group, 这
Business Council for Sustainable Development (BCSD) which became active in
promoting the business perspective in the run up to Rio. The ICC was also active
at the Earth Summit and in its follow up, forming the World Industry Council
on the Environment (WICE) 在 1992. 在 1995 the two groups merged to form
the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD). 议程 21
reºected this input from industry, endorsing private voluntary efforts on the
part of business to promote sustainable development.15
At the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), held in Jo-
hannesburg, 南非, in the fall of 2002, yet another new industry advocacy
group was formed to present a common international industry position on the
12. FOE England, Wales and Northern Ireland 1998.
13. FOE England, Wales and Northern Ireland 1998; and NGO Taskforce on Business and Industry
No Date a.
14. 例如, Chatterjee and Finger 1994; and Finger and Kilcoyne 1997.
15. See UN 1992, 议程 21, especially chapter 30.
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26 • Global Environmental Governance for Corporate Responsibility and Accountability
regulation of business. This group, the Business Action for Sustainable Develop-
蒙特 (BASD) was the result of the combined efforts of the ICC and the WBCSD
and represented over 150 TNCs. The BASD began to meet to strategize its posi-
tion on industry’s role in sustainable development a year ahead of the WSSD.16
The idea of a legally binding instrument to govern TNC practices had been
ºoated prior to the WSSD, and a main activity of the BASD was to lobby against
this proposal, promoting private voluntary measures instead.
In the course of the past decade, many TNCs, encouraged by international
industry lobby groups such as WBCSD, the ICC and the BASD, have committed
to adhering to the principles of corporate social responsibility (CSR) via a num-
ber of private voluntary initiatives. CSR entails a shift in businesses mission
statements to include stakeholders as well as society more broadly, and it incor-
porates means to operationalize that shift via management auditing and report-
ing.17 CSR initiatives include ISO 14000 environmental management standards
as a voluntary initiative with signiªcant corporate inºuence, as well as those
speciªc to certain industries, such as Responsible Care for the chemical industry,
in addition to CSR initiatives designed by individual ªrms. The proponents of
the CSR approach argue that it encourages corporations to act in ways that are
both environmentally and socially sound, in large part because adhering to CSR
principles makes “good business sense.”18 There has been a proliferation of pri-
vate and industry based CSR initiatives in recent years. Groups such as the
BASD highlight the role of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) as the key gov-
ernance structure for business with regard to CSR.19 The GRI was originally an
industry driven initiative for corporate reporting on CSR activity. The GRI is
now an independent body, which collaborates with the UN Environment
Programme (UNEP) and cooperates with the UN on the Global Compact, 迪斯-
cussed below.20
While industry interest and activity around CSR has been extremely active
in recent years, many NGOs have remained skeptical of their motives, and of the
ability of this type of private, industry led self-regulation to lead to signiªcant
environmental improvements, particularly in poor countries.21 This concern has
prompted some groups to revive the idea of an external, internationally agreed
upon corporate code of conduct to govern TNCs. Some would like to see such a
code in the form of a legally binding international agreement. Those pressing
this position argue that there is a difference between corporate responsibility and
corporate accountability. Corporate responsibility refers to recognition by indus-
try of their role in sustainable development, as well as the voluntary and self-
regulatory efforts they adopt. Corporate accountability is a much stronger no-
16. Rutherford 2003, 14.
17. 莱顿, Roht-Arriaza, and Zarsky 2002, 8.
18. Holme and Watts 2000.
19. Moody Stuart 2002, 120.
20. GRI website: www.globalreporting.org.
21. Finger and Kilcoyne 1997.
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Jennifer Clapp
• 27
的. It implies legal obligations by corporations to promote sustainable devel-
opment and to provide compensation when such obligations are breached.22
The difference between private industry-led initiatives and an externally
agreed code of conduct is an important one to consider in determining whether
ªrms will actually change their practices. A key study by UNCTAD found that
the most inºuential motivating factor for TNCs to develop corporate environ-
mental policies was government-based laws and regulations.23 Because TNCs
wish to avoid being held legally or ªnancially liable for damages linked to their
运营, they tend to be motivated to act by regulations which set out sanc-
tions for breaches of the law. Given that laws and regulations are such strong
motivators for ªrms to clean up their practices, many see that stronger state-
based regulations are extremely important, and that an externally negotiated
global set of rules is vital for improving environmental practices of TNCs, 参与-
ularly those operating in developing countries where regulations tend to be
weaker and/or harder to enforce. Recent years have seen a number of initiatives
for externally based sets of “soft” rules (including guidelines and principles) 为了
TNCs, all of which are still voluntary, but which originated outside of industry
本身. They are important to examine, as they have the potential to become le-
gally binding in future as part of some sort of global treaty.
Multilateral Efforts to Govern TNCs from the Outside
The Global Compact
The Global Compact (GC) is a pact between the United Nations and global
businesses on corporate behavior. Proposed by UN Secretary General Koª
Annan in early 1999, the pact was ofªcially launched in July 2000. The GC was
a challenge to global corporations to demonstrate their commitment to social
and environmental goals. It asks corporations to promise to become responsi-
ble corporate citizens, and asks them to adhere to ten speciªc principles, 覆盖-
ing social, environmental and human rights, and to incorporate these principles
into their mission statements as well as their actual operations.24 The main ob-
jectives of the GC are to “mainstream” environmental and social issues into op-
erations of business, and to encourage business to take action in support of UN
目标. In the area of the environment, corporations are asked to support the
precautionary approach, to undertake initiatives to promote environmental
responsibility, and to develop and diffuse environmentally friendly tech-
nologies.25
22. NGO Taskforce on Business and Industry No Date b; Bruno and Karliner 2002a; and FOEI
2001.
23. UNCTAD 1993, 38.
24. UN Global Compact website: www.globalcompact.org
25. UN No Date.
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28 • Global Environmental Governance for Corporate Responsibility and Accountability
While technically an idea originating outside of industry itself, and over-
seen by the UN, the Global Compact is still voluntary, solicits industry input,
and does not call for accountability on the part of ªrms. 相当, it promotes cor-
porate responsibility instead of strict accountability. For these reasons it has
been widely criticized by NGOs as being inadequate to elicit sufªcient change in
business practices. Some NGOs have charged that TNCs are using the GC as a
way to promote links with the UN, without having to do much in practice. 这
may be great for these ªrms’ public relations because it gives the appearance of
adherence to externally driven rules, but it still relies on voluntary improve-
ments in environmental and social practices without any monitoring, and with
no legal liability if they fall short on their promises.26 Further, many see the
compact as representing “. . . a smuggling of a business agenda into the United
Nations.”27
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises were ªrst established in
1976. These guidelines are a voluntary set of standards promoted by OECD
国家, for TNCs which are headquartered in and/or operating in OECD
国家. These guidelines cover a wide range of issues such as information dis-
closure by TNCs, taxation, labor relations and the environment. 这些年来,
the guidelines have been revised periodically, with a chapter on environmental
protection added in 1991 and updated in 2000. These latter updates included
extraterritorial application of the guidelines for TNCs headquartered in OECD
countries but operating in non-OECD countries.28
The environmental chapter of the OECD Guidelines encourages member
states to promote already existing industry-driven environmental management
standards for CSR. 同时, 然而, they also ask members to encour-
age their TNCs to adopt “measurable objectives, and where appropriate, targets
for improved environmental performance,” as well as “regular monitoring and
veriªcation of progress” on environmental and other measures. The guidelines
also call for consultation with affected communities as well as improved access
to information on the environmental activities of TNCs. The use of a pre-
cautionary approach is also endorsed.29 Other portions of the guidelines
also touch on environmental issues, such as the portions on disclosure of infor-
运动.
At the same time that these guidelines are meant to strengthen existing
measures taken by ªrms, such as CSR initiatives, they also go a bit further in that
they promote improved environmental performance rather than just improved
26. CEO No Date.
27. Bruno and Karliner 2002a, 1.
28. FOE Netherlands 2002; FOE England, Wales and Northern Ireland 1998; and OECD 2000.
29. 经合组织 2000.
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Jennifer Clapp
• 29
管理. 仍然, some environmental groups have attacked the guidelines for
being weak.30 A principal critique is that the voluntary nature of the guidelines
means that no legal obligations are placed on TNCs. 相当, they are as their
name implies—merely guidelines that OECD member countries are to encour-
age their TNCs to follow on a voluntary basis. 为此原因, environmental
NGOs have been skeptical of the ability of the OECD guidelines in their current
form to engender true change in TNC environmental practices.
Steps Toward a Legally-Binding Instrument for Corporate Accountability
Recent years have seen a growing push among environmental and other NGOs
for the adoption of a legally binding instrument at the global level to regulate
TNC activities with a view to ensuring good social and environmental perfor-
曼斯. The idea of a global framework treaty on corporate accountability was
ºoated by a number of groups in the run-up to the WSSD, including Friends of
the Earth International, Greenpeace, the World Development Movement, Chris-
tian Aid, and the Alliance for a Corporate-Free UN.31 These groups argued that a
legally binding international treaty is especially important in an era when so
many TNCs are operating at a truly global level, as it is often difªcult to ascer-
tain the “home” country of certain transnational corporations.
The Friends of the Earth International (FOEI) has put forward a detailed
proposal for a legally binding instrument for corporate accountability. This pro-
posal calls for the following:
• Legal rights for citizens to hold corporations accountable to the broader
public and the environment, rather than the present framework where
corporations are only legally accountable to shareholders.
• A requirement for corporations to fully report their social and environ-
mental impacts and for effective prior consultation with affected commu-
nities before embarking on activities which might have social and envi-
ronmental implications.
• The extension of corporations’ liability to their directors when there is a
breach of national environmental or social laws, and an extension of lia-
bility to directors and corporations for breaches of international laws and
协议.
• Rights of redress for citizens
• Community rights to control and access to resources
• Minimum environmental, 社会的, labor and human rights standards.
• Corporations that breach these new duties would be subject to certain
sanctions, such as ªnes and suspension of stock exchange listings.32
30. FOE Netherlands 2002.
31. CEO 2001, 6.
32. FOEI 2001; Phillips 2002; and Bruno and Karliner 2002b.
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30 • Global Environmental Governance for Corporate Responsibility and Accountability
All of these measures would give important rights to communities in develop-
ing countries in particular that may not have legal structures that would enable
them to sue corporations or demand compensation from corporations, 或者
where they lack rights to their own natural resources.
Greenpeace International also introduced its “Bhopal Principles on Cor-
porate Accountability” in 2002. These principles are named after the chemical
accident at a Union Carbide plant at Bhopal, 印度, 晚了 1984 which claimed
lives of thousands of people. Though initially introduced as a set of voluntary
原则, Greenpeace clearly sees this initiative as the ªrst step toward a legally
binding international treaty on corporate accountability. The Bhopal Principles
are similar to the FOEI proposal, and include measures to ensure that corpora-
tions follow key principles of the Rio Declaration, including those on liability,
double standards, the precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle. 它
also calls for extension of corporate liability beyond the home country of the
公司, including responsibility for cleanup and restoration in the case of
environmental damage.33
It is not surprising that industry is ªrmly opposed to the idea of a legally
binding treaty on corporate accountability, especially one that places such a
strong emphasis on the need to extend corporate liability for any damages
caused by their operations. Although at the BASD endorsed the idea of promot-
ing corporate responsibility and to some extent accountability at WSSD, 它也是
stressed that its endorsement “. . . refers to existing agreements and is not a call
for a new international regime.”34 Instead of placing emphasis at the interna-
tional level through an externally based treaty, industry has argued that the
most progress would be made if efforts were focused on enhancing industry ini-
tiatives and local level regulations, particularly in developing countries. As Sir
Mark Moody-Stuart, chairman of the BASD and former CEO of Shell, 状态:
“Global business is far from perfect, but the standards applied by international
companies are almost always higher than those of purely domestic companies.
To address global governance without addressing national and local governance
will lead to disappointment.”35
Those promoting a binding treaty for corporate accountability were disap-
pointed that the treaty did not receiving a strong endorsement at the WSSD.
Early drafts of the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation text prepared by the
chair of the WSSD included a commitment to “launch negotiations for a multi-
lateral agreement on corporate accountability.”36 While there are some refer-
ences to the need for corporate responsibility and accountability in the Plan, 这
ªnal text did not include the commitment to pursue a treaty, and instead fo-
cused on promoting voluntary agreements. Its removal was, according to NGOs,
the result of intense pressure from BASD. Some have charged that the BASD was
33. Greenpeace International 2002.
34. BASD 2002.
35. Moody-Stuart 2002, 121.
36. Cited in Graymore and Bunn 2002, 1.
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Jennifer Clapp
• 31
formed primarily to lobby against the idea of a globally binding treaty once it
was clear that environmental groups were going to push this idea at the WSSD.
According to Corporate Europe Observatory, “There can be little doubt that the
desire to oppose binding international regulations for corporations is a key mo-
tive behind the industry campaign towards WSSD.”37 However, the Johannes-
burg Plan of Action did call for the promotion of corporate accountability and
corporate responsibility. This could be seen as an opening for further interna-
tional level discussions on a legally binding instrument.38 But at the same time
the US government insisted, much like BASD’s argument, that references to cor-
porate accountability and responsibility in the Plan of Action referred only to
existing agreements, and not a new treaty.39
结论
The failure to include a commitment to launch negotiations on a global treaty
on corporate accountability in the WSSD documents was certainly a disappoint-
ment to those pushing the idea. A legally-binding, externally driven treaty
which requires parties to enact laws designed to enforce environmental and so-
cial accountability on TNCs, no matter where they operate, has the potential to
make an enormous difference to those communities currently facing negative
impacts from TNCs. This is especially true for such communities in developing
countries where the legal structures may not give them the right to make a claim
against corporations that are causing environmental or social damage. 这
strong opposition to such a treaty on the part of industry and of key govern-
ments such as the US was in many ways to be expected. The NGOs pushing for
the treaty no doubt knew this in advance of the WSSD. Their aim was likely to
get the issue onto the international agenda, to foster debate about it, 并
plant the seed of the idea for such a treaty for the future. The fact that they were
able to get the issue onto the agenda and generate a high proªle debate about it,
plus the fact that industry felt the need to create a lobby group speciªcally to op-
pose the idea, suggests that there is indeed wide support for the notion of a
legally-binding global treaty for corporate accountability. It is likely only a mat-
ter of time before the idea surfaces again.
参考
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