From East-West Balancing to Militant - 麻省理工学院人工智能研究专业

From East-West Balancing to Militant
Anti-Communism

The Socialist International and the Beginning
of the Cold War, 1947–1949

✣ Ettore Costa

介绍

在 1947 the International Socialist Conference (the provisional Socialist Inter-
national) published an international journal under the name Socialist World.
The parties involved believed the publication would appeal to a global audi-
ence of those favoring socialist policies. Socialist World did not have a long
and glorious history—its seventh and ﬁnal issue was published in 1949—but
it nevertheless is an instructive case.

Socialist World is a vantage point for observing the European Socialist
movement at the beginning of the Cold War in the midst of the rapid trans-
formation that reshaped the world for decades to come. The ﬂuidity of the
period is reﬂected in the chaotic process of preparing and publishing the jour-
纳尔. The articles reveal the uncertainty of the Socialists trying to make sense
of a world changing before their eyes. The publishing schedule failed to keep
up with the pace of transformation. The journal’s brief history can be divided
into two periods, with the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia in February
1948 as a watershed. Issues one to four were completed before the Czechoslo-
vak coup, and issues ﬁve to seven were prepared after, with issue four being
ﬁnished before the event but printed after.1

Periodicals cannot simply be used as a source for the facts and opin-
ions they reported. Their production, reception, and connection to a larger

1. Edward Thompson to Vilmos Böhm, 22 四月 1948, in International Institute of Social His-
保守党 (IISH), 阿姆斯特丹, Socialist International (和), General Correspondence Socialist World 1948,
Box 455.

冷战研究杂志
卷. 24, 不. 2, 春天 2022, PP. 95–131, https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_01044
© 2022 哈佛大学和麻省理工学院院长和研究员
技术的

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political and social context must also be studied.2 Although these elements are
usually harder to investigate, we can draw on the archives of the International
Socialist Conference and prominent ﬁgures involved. As an institution, Social-
ist World was an instrument through which the afﬁliated Socialist parties tried
to frame information and analysis and inﬂuence public opinion. As a cultural
产品, it was consumed by British and overseas readers. 最后, as a textual
语料库, it serves as evidence not just of the ideas and attitudes the Socialists
expressed but also of what they involuntarily revealed.

Cold War and Socialist Internationalism

The dearth of studies on Socialist internationalism in the late 1940s is a re-
sult of the limited role Social Democrats played in traditional narratives of
the origins of the Cold War. According to Donald Sassoon, foreign affairs
were not a ﬁeld of Socialist action but simply a source of constraints that
Social Democrats accepted to bind themselves to the nation-state and pur-
sue consensual policies as the price to achieve their domestic goals; 因此,
Socialist internationalism was meaningless.3 Their agency is dismissed and
their actions are reduced to adaptation to a hostile environment dominated
by U.S. hegemony and bipolar tension. The role of West European Social
Democrats, the argument goes, was to play the junior partner in the creation
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (北约), to accept the “politics
of productivity,” and to curb labor militancy and Communism.4 The his-
tory of East European Social Democracy is reduced to its dismantling by
Communist inﬁltration, 恐怖主义, and conspiracy. “[A]s a result, their own
ideological dilemmas and struggles to come to terms with the post-war re-
ality have been at best ignored, at worst dismissed as irrelevant.”5 Relations

2. Stephen Vella, “Newspapers,” in Miriam Dobson and Benjamin Ziemann, 编辑。, Reading Primary
来源: The Interpretation of Texts from Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century History (伦敦: 溃败-
壁架, 2009), PP. 192–200; and Adrian Bingham, Family Newspapers? 性别, Private Life, and the British
Popular Press 1918–1978 (牛津, 英国: 牛津大学出版社, 2009), PP. 8–9.

3. Donald Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century
(伦敦: Tauris, 2010), PP. 112–113, 171, 239–240.

4. “But Allied pressure did not motivate U.S. action.” Melvyn P. Lefﬂer, For the Soul of Mankind: 这
美国, 苏联, and the Cold War (纽约, 纽约: Hill and Wang, 2007), p. 79; 和
Charles Maier, “The World Economy and the Cold War in the Middle of the Twentieth Century,“ 在
Melvyn P. Lefﬂer and Odd Arne Westad, 编辑。, 剑桥冷战史, 卷. 1: Origins
(剑桥, 英国: 剑桥大学出版社, 2010), PP. 44–66.

5. Anita J. Prazmowska, “The Polish Socialist Party 1945–1948,” East European Quarterly, 卷. 34,
不. 3 (夏天 2000), p. 337.

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The Socialist International and the Beginning of the Cold War, 1947–1949

between East and West European Social Democrats are often reduced to mu-
tual incomprehension.6

Talbot Imlay has argued that this national framework cannot explain the
intense involvement of Socialist leaders in Socialist internationalism and its
inﬂuence on national parties.7 The challenge to methodological nationalism
has recently allowed a ﬂourishing of studies on the Social Democratic transna-
tional network and how it inﬂuenced policies, socialization, and the exchange
of ideas from the 1940s to the 1970s.8 This article contributes to the ﬁeld by
focusing on a seminal period when the network was still ﬂuid and open to
different outcomes.

The 1940s were a turning point for Social Democracy. 战争, reconstruc-
的, and the nascent Cold War deﬁned the environment in which Social
Democrats would operate in the second half of the twentieth century. 后
Germany’s surrender, Social Democrats were among the many who believed
that the unlikely alliance of Western Allies and the Soviet Union would con-
tinue and be the foundations of a new world order. Socialists in Eastern Eu-
绳索, 意大利, 法国, 比利时, and Finland formed popular-front governments
with the Communists. Even the anti-Communist Morgan Phillips, who was
the UK Labour Party’s General Secretary, hoped for understanding with the
Soviet Union—“cooperation, or at least mutual tolerance.”9 When the Inter-
national Socialist Conference was formed in May 1946, it included both pro-
Communist and anti-Communist Socialist parties from Eastern and Western
欧洲.

Intensiﬁed international tension made this alliance impossible. 尽管
some reassurances in Yalta, Joseph Stalin could not accept any independence
在东欧, because of the weakness of local Communists—as demon-
strated by the Hungarian elections of 1945. The local countries, if left on
their own, would never come under Communist rule. Coercion, subversion,

6. Peter Heumos, “Einleitung,” in Peter Heumos, 编辑。, Europäischer Sozialismus im Kalten Krieg: Briefe
und Berichte 1944–1948 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2004), PP. 13–17.

7. Talbot C. Imlay, The Practice of Socialist Internationalism: European Socialists and International Poli-
抽动症, 1915–1960 (牛津, 英国: 牛津大学出版社, 2017), PP. 10–11.

8. Brian Shaev, “Workers’ Politics, the Communist Challenge, and the Schuman Plan: A Compara-
tive History of the French Socialist and German Social Democratic Parties and the First Treaty for
European Integration,” International Review of Social History, 卷. 61, 不. 2 (春天 2016), PP. 251–
281; Peter Van Kemseke, Towards an Era of Development: The Globalization of Socialism and Christian
民主: 1945–1965 (Leuven, 比利时: Leuven University Press, 2006); Matthew Broad, Harold
Wilson, Denmark and the Making of Labour European Policy (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press,
2017); and Christian Salm, Transnational Socialist Networks in the 1970s: European Community Devel-
opment Aid and Southern Enlargement (伦敦: 帕尔格雷夫·麦克米伦, 2016).

9. Frank Roberts to Christopher F. A. 华纳, 23 八月 1946, in The National Archives of the United
王国 (TNAUK), FO 371/56768-N10977.

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and electoral fraud followed in Bulgaria in 1945, Poland and Romania in
1946, and Hungary in 1947. Behind the Iron Curtain—a term made pop-
ular by Winston Churchill in early 1946—the Communist takeover meant
the persecution of Socialists or their forced fusion with the Communists. 在
转动, the Truman administration’s policy of containment required develop-
ing the Western occupation zones in Germany, giving military aid to Greece
and Turkey, and offering economic assistance to Europe under the Marshall
Plan. Western Socialists backed the U.S. policy and accepted the expulsion of
Communist parties from the governments of France and Belgium—but not in
意大利. At a meeting in the Polish village of Szklarska Por˛eba in September 1947,
the Soviet Communist party (VKP(乙)) and other major European Commu-
nist parties established the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) 到
bring the European Communist movement under closer Soviet control. 这
purpose of the new organization was laid out in a keynote “Two Camps”
speech by Stalin’s close aide Andrei Zhdanov, who asserted that the interna-
tional system was “irrevocably divided” between the Communist world and
the capitalist world. This theme was regularly repeated in the Cominform’s
journal, For Lasting Peace, for People’s Democracy. VKP(乙) ofﬁcials encouraged
Western Communists to intensify political and industrial struggle and East
European Communists to consolidate their power, a process that culminated
in the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia

The Czechoslovak coup was a shock to many in western Europe, 远远超越
the anti-Communist Right. . . . Most important was the feeling within the
non-Communist western European Left—socialists and social-democrats—that
Soviet expansionism and Communist militancy now were a direct threat to them
and not only to the old elites.10

After the events in Czechoslovakia, the identiﬁcation of Social Democracy
with anti-Communism was no longer in doubt, even in neutral Austria and
瑞典. The Labour government in Britain helped draft the North Atlantic
Treaty, and other Social Democratic parties in Western Europe accepted it.
The Italian Socialist Party (PSI), unwilling to break with the Italian Commu-
nist Party (PCI) and the Soviet Union, was expelled from the International
Socialist Conference.

By examining the creation, 管理, and failure of Socialist World
and the articles it published, my analysis here shows how European Social-
ists dealt with the onset of the Cold War and the contingent problems of

10. Odd Arne Westad, The Cold War: A World History (伦敦: 企鹅图书, 2016), p. 96.

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The Socialist International and the Beginning of the Cold War, 1947–1949

international Socialist cooperation. The editorial process of Socialist World in-
volved complex problems: soliciting and collecting articles, translating them
into English, and stimulating the distribution of the journal in Britain and
国外. With no regular writers, the editors collected contributions from So-
cialists around the world. Contributors did not agree on the discourse to
生产, and so the journal was contested ground for Socialists of different
nationalities, who tried to reach a common understanding of the world situ-
ation through transnational exchange and multilateral negotiation. Socialists
felt they belonged to an international community, and they sought regular
contact with their foreign counterparts. This helped them balance their hy-
brid national and international identity. The articles of Socialist World tried
to frame the concerns and ideals of the national parties in an internationalist
way to make them acceptable to other Socialists.11 The journal had a basic
editorial line that adhered to the political line of the International Socialist
会议. At ﬁrst, Socialist World served as an instrument of conciliation
with the pro-Communist Socialists from Eastern Europe and Italy, but after
二月 1948 it unequivocally took a stance against Communism.

A survey of Socialist World gives a sense of the main topics of discussion,
concern, and interest inside the Socialist movement in the early postwar years.
The journal covered the Cold War and international affairs, the rebuilding
of the Socialist International, colonialism, nationalization, and postwar re-
建造. Equally important, 然而, are the topics Socialist World was
reluctant to cover.

The silences of Socialist World are important evidence for the study of
socialist internationalism, particularly the problem of reconciling internation-
alism with government responsibilities and nationalist respectability. Avoiding
embarrassment was the paramount goal of the Socialists in their interactions
with their foreign comrades, but this limited the effectiveness of internation-
救世主. Conservatives had traditionally used internationalism to charge the
Socialists with being unpatriotic, and this accusation was still in use in the
postwar era.12 More practically, Socialist leaders feared that an international
Socialist organization could commit the national parties to policies they did
not agree with. Although binding decisions had never been imposed (也不
could they be), declarations or symbolic gestures could be read as signaling
a preference for some policy or another, as contradicting national policies,

11. Imlay, Practice of Socialist Internationalism, PP. 2–3.

12. Rolf Steininger, “British Labour, Deutschland und die SPD 1945/46,” Internationale wis-
senschaftliche Korrespondenz zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, 卷. 15, 不. 2 (春天
1979), p. 207.

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and as raising uncomfortable questions, thus giving international legitimacy
to minority factions that dissented with their national leaders.13 What was
“embarrassing,” however, was ambiguous and shifting, although the adjective
was generally invoked to classify international activity that went against do-
mestic priorities.

Concerns about such matters reﬂected the larger phenomenon of the na-
tionalization of Socialism. In the decades after its birth, the European Social-
ist movement underwent a radical transformation from its origins as a protest
movement of the subordinate classes against capitalist exploitation. 虽然
Socialists had once envisioned various courses of action to achieve political
results—for example, general strikes, building counter-society organizations,
or violent insurrection—Socialist parties by the second half of the twentieth
century had converged on one model: reformist social democracy commit-
ted to liberal democracy, anti-Communism, and state-centered solutions. 在
the new perspective, only national governments could take effective measures.
Political parties and movements served only to formulate policies and win
选举. As Harold Wilson said in 1963, there were three kinds of social-
ist parties: the parties in government, the parties with the potential to be in
政府, and the parties not mature enough.14

The nationalization of socialism also affected the Socialist International.
The idea that class identity was stronger than nationalism was the founda-
tion of traditional socialist internationalism. The Second International, born
在 1889, had the stated goal of stopping the wars started by the ruling class,
but in 1914 it collapsed as Socialist leaders and workers rallied to the cause
of national defense. The new Labour and Socialist International (LSI), born
在 1923, tried again to defend peace and stop the advance of fascism but be-
came paralyzed by division. After a slow agony throughout the 1930s, the LSI
collapsed in 1940. Having failed to avert two world wars, Western Socialists
changed their worldview, coming to appreciate deterrence by superior power
and military alliances (例如, 北约) as the only guarantees of national security
and peace.

Unable to be an agent for peace, the role of the Socialist International
had to be radically revised. At the end of the Second World War, 约翰

13. As Bevan said, “We are not committed to that resolution because resolutions have to be adopted
by the Socialist parties of the member states before they become instruments of national policy. 但
nevertheless we did state our position and as the resolutions were drafted by the British delegates we are
to some extent committed to them.” Labour Party Annual Conference Report (伦敦: British Labour
Party, 1957), p. 180.

14. Guillaume Devin, L’Internationale Socialiste: Histoire et sociologie du socialisme international (1945–
1990) (巴黎: Presses de la Fondation national des sciences politiques, 1993), p. 292.

100

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The Socialist International and the Beginning of the Cold War, 1947–1949

Price—a trade unionist close to Ernest Bevin and the British Labour
leadership—drafted a plan for practical internationalism.15 Price recognized
that the Socialist International could not directly intervene in international af-
fairs and could not give orders to the national parties, as the Communist Inter-
national did. An international organization also had no good reason to impose
disinterested internationalism on the selﬁsh national parties. Price adopted the
liberal internationalist assumption that legitimate national interests were not
inherently incompatible, arguing that harmonization would bring the great-
est good for everyone. The failure to appreciate this self-interested cooperation
was the result of inadequate information about international affairs and faulty
communication of legitimate aspirations and concerns.

The task of the Socialist International was to collect and exchange infor-
运动, in addition to fostering the interest of Socialist leaders in international
affairs. Price’s approach was elitist. Whereas traditional Socialists believed in
the instinctive internationalist spirit of workers, Price assumed that the masses
and even the majority of leaders lacked adequate consciousness to appreciate
the international dimension of most political problems. The masses could be
mobilized only around highly emotional issues and, even then, only for a short
时间. Episodic gestures such as boycotts against aggressive countries had little
价值. Manifestations of international solidarity or the celebration of interna-
tional recurrences (May Day or International Women’s Day) served only to
remind the apathetic masses of internationalism. Only the national govern-
ments could intervene in international affairs and exercise regular inﬂuence
on events. 所以, Socialist leaders should act through their governments,
which required them to be seen as “ﬁt to govern” by electors. The Socialist In-
ternational envisioned by Price would cater exclusively to Socialist leaders by
providing them with a regular ﬂow of information, by exchanging opinions,
and by holding regular meetings with the Socialist leaders of various countries.
To ensure that Socialist leaders in government could make informed deci-
西翁, the organization was to be a forum encouraging frank discussion about
common problems. Price gave priority to internal communication. Commu-
nicating information to the public, he felt, was a responsibility of the national
parties and publicity inhibited frank discussion.

然而, the Socialist International was not simply a forum. It of-
fered private opportunities for Socialist leaders to be frank without fearing

15. Ettore Costa, The Labour Party, Denis Healey and the International Socialist Movement, Rebuilding
the Socialist International during the Cold War, 1945–1951 (占婆, 瑞士: 帕尔格雷夫·麦克米伦,
2018), PP. 145–148.

101

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embarrassment, but the Congresses of the Socialist International and the Con-
ferences of Socialist Leaders were often well-publicized events intended to
increase the prestige of participating leaders and to serve as public rituals
afﬁrming ideological commitment and the unity of the movement.16 It was
difﬁcult to dispel the common assumption in Socialist culture that the role of
the Socialist International was to be a public symbol and the mouthpiece of
the world movement.

Most international organizations dealing with international issues (例如,
international institutions and non-governmental organizations) have little or
no power to intervene directly. One way to act is by mobilizing national public
opinion to pressure governments—ideally in coordination with other coun-
尝试. But unless an international agency has a mass organization to spread
its message, access to the media is a prerequisite for effective action. 其他
way to inﬂuence international affairs is to encourage informal dialogue and
socialization among the elite members of rival countries.17 In this case, 媒体
scrutiny is a liability not an asset. The Socialist International swung between
these two models.

Introducing the ﬁrst issue of Socialist World (June–August 1947), Socialist
veteran Philip Noel-Baker stated two goals for the journal. National debates
over the effectiveness of Socialist policies often referred to the success or fail-
ure of similar policies in other countries. The ﬁrst goal of the journal was to
share experiences and thus allow Socialists to take the achievements of their
foreign comrades as a model and, 反过来, to offer the public a justiﬁcation
for the failures of Socialist counterparts in other countries. The second goal
was to foster reciprocal understanding, preventing mistrust and nationalist
sentiments. “There can be no true co-operation and understanding without
知识, which must not be conﬁned to experts, but must be widely dis-
seminated in the rank-and-ﬁle of the Socialist movement in all countries.”18
The assumption was that public communication and the involvement of the
masses would be more effective than conﬁdentiality in building familiarity
and trust. In devising Socialist World as a magazine for the wider public, 它是
founders saw no contradiction between propaganda and conﬁdentiality.

16. Devin, L’Internationale Socialiste, PP. 311–318, 351.

17. Dalia D. Kaye, Talking to the Enemy: Track Two Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia (Santa
莫妮卡, CA: RAND National Security Research Division, 2007), PP. xi–xix, 8.

18. Philip Noel-Baker, “A Message by the Rt. Hon. 磷. J.-Noel-Baker,” Socialist World, June–August
1947.

102

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The Socialist International and the Beginning of the Cold War, 1947–1949

Creation of Socialist World

After the inglorious death of the LSI, not many Socialists were keen on resur-
recting the old International. This was especially the case in the British Labour
Party.19 The parties aspiring to govern did not want any embarrassing com-
mitment; disagreement was strong over the issue of Germany and cooperation
with the Communists. As a temporary solution, Denis Healey, then interna-
tional secretary of the Labour Party, convened the ﬁrst International Socialist
Conference on 17–19 May 1946, inviting only the Socialist parties operat-
ing legally. He excluded the exile groups and the German Social Democratic
Party (SPD) but included the pro-Communist parties of Eastern Europe. 这
delegates decided that the Conference would meet twice a year and set up
a permanent ofﬁce, the Socialist Information and Liaison Ofﬁce (SILO), 到
keep contacts between the parties and exchange information. The German
Jewish Socialist exile Edith Loeb was put in charge as administrative secretary.
At the next conference (8–10 November 1946), the delegates decided to
publish a quarterly bulletin of around 50 pages to keep all parties informed
about Socialist activities in other countries. The SILO would publish an En-
glish edition that was to be circulated to the other parties, which could publish
a local edition in their own languages.20 Whether the role of this bulletin was
to exchange information and opinions among the members of the organiza-
tion or was to serve as a press organ for the wider public was not made clear.
因此, when the time came to put this commitment into practice, SILO’s
consultative committee decided to publish two bulletins: a monthly bulletin
that included conﬁdential material and was circulated only to party headquar-
特尔斯; and a quarterly bulletin that included non-conﬁdential material. The ex-
pected cost was around £2,000 per year.21 The second bulletin was clearly
meant to be a magazine for the Socialist public. In March 1947, the consulta-
tive committee decided to produce a new magazine called Socialist World and
hire Edward Thompson to assist with editorial duties.22

The ﬁrst year of Socialist World was not successful. In September 1947,
Loeb wrote that orders from the member parties had been disappointing, 和

19. Imlay, Practice of Socialist Internationalism, PP. 282–284; and Costa, Labour Party, PP. 151–158.

20. Denis Healey to the parties of the International Socialist Conference, 15 十一月 1946, in IISH,
和, Box 47. Cf. Labour Party Annual Conference Report, 伦敦, 1947, p. 18.

21. Minutes of the Consultative Committee Meeting, 12 十二月 1946, in IISH, 和, Box 47.

22. Minutes of the Consultative Committee, 7 行进 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 47.

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that the journal would have to be discontinued unless orders increased.23 The
consultative committee agreed to try to boost circulation, but in December
1947 SILO acknowledged that the English edition of Socialist World was not
a commercial success and that the Labour Party could not continue to bear
the ﬁnancial loss.24

What saved Socialist World was the Communist takeover in Czechoslo-
vakia. Not needing to keep under the same roof anti-Communist and pro-
Communist Socialists anymore, the period of democratic socialism’s paralysis
and ambiguity came to an end. The Cold War simpliﬁed political options
to a binary opposition that encouraged activism and militancy. 虽然
operations of SILO and Socialist World had been disappointing, optimism
dictated that a complete overhaul and a new sense of direction would help to
fulﬁll their mission.25 As Thompson said:

The future of SILO will not be decided until the Vienna Conference—if then.
现在, it seems that we just go on as before, without much direction. 我
expect that “Socialist World” will appear—nobody has said that it will not—but
I shall not be surprised at anything.26

The Vienna Conference (4–7 June 1948) expressed once more the commit-
ment to publish Socialist World, including in a French and German edition.
The journal was given an editorial board of well-known Socialist journal-
主义者: Victor Larock, editor of the Belgian Socialist newspaper Le Peuple, 路易斯
征收, London correspondent of the French Socialist newspaper Le Populaire,
Michael Foot, editor of the leftwing Labour magazine Tribune.27 The board
discussed many options to relaunch Socialist World, including distributing it
in Austria, increasing its size, including a summary of the activities of the

23. Edith Loeb to the parties of the International Socialist Conference, 20 九月 1947, in IISH,
和, Box 47.

24. “Minutes of the consultative committee meeting of the International socialist conference, Sixth
会议,” 26 九月 1947, in Labour History Archive and Study Centre, People’s History Mu-
seum, 曼彻斯特 (LHASC), Labour Party Archive (LP), International Sub-Committee, Minutes and
Documents; and Circular 77, Notes of Agenda, 23 十二月 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 47.

25. Martin C. Bolle, “Statement of the activities and ﬁnance of the Socialist Information and Liaison
Ofﬁce and the Sub-Committee of Comisco in charge of it,” 27 可能 1948, in IISH, 和, Box 47.

26. Thompson to Nus Moldovanu, 20 四月 1948, in IISH, 和, Box 455, General Correspondence
Socialist World 1948.

27. “Report to the National Executive Committee on International Socialist Conference, 维也纳, 六月
4/7 1948,” in LHASC, LP, International Sub-Committee, Minutes and Documents, 1947; and Cir-
cular 103, Meeting of the Committee of the International Socialist Conference, 3 六月 1948, in IISH,
和, Box 47.

104

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The Socialist International and the Beginning of the Cold War, 1947–1949

member parties, and publishing a survey of Communist activities.28 After
publication in Austria proved impossible, the editorial board and the secre-
tary of SILO argued that, given the long distance and the dilated time of mail
delivery, it would be difﬁcult to continue a regularly published international
journal like Socialist World. They suggested scrapping the enterprise and re-
placing it with a newsletter and single-issue pamphlets. Comisco—the new
executive committee of the International Socialist Conference—approved the
editorial board’s recommendations in December 1948.29 The seventh issue of
Socialist World (December 1948–February 1949) was the last.

The Management of Socialist World
and its Editorial Line

The management and content of Socialist World are worthy of scrutiny be-
cause they reveal the contemporary features of the European Socialist move-
蒙特. Socialist World employed no regular journalists. The editorial staff of
二, Loeb and Thompson, presumably wrote only the unsigned “Notes of
the Quarter” and “Reviews” for each issue. Their main job was to edit the
contributions from the national parties and individual writers, turning them
into articles. In the ﬁrst year, many articles were speciﬁcally written for the
journal, either on spec or at the journal’s invitation, although Socialist World
was “frightfully poor” and “did not pay anything.”30 Later, Socialist World was
mainly assembled from articles taken from other sources, a sign of the lesser
involvement of the parties. Some articles were translations from other publi-
阳离子, such as the Austrian Zukunft, the Norwegian Verdens gang, the French
Populaire and Revue socialiste, and the English-language bulletin of the SPD.
The Dutch Socialist Gerard M. Nederhorst had transcriptions of two of his
speeches published.31

28. Circular 117, “Report by M. C. Bolle (Holland) on Activities since the Vienna Meeting of
Comisco (3 六月 1948),“ 十一月 1948, in IISH, 和, Box 47.

29. Circular 121, Comisco Meeting, 3 十二月 1948, in IISH, 和, Box 47; and Circular 122, Pub-
lications, 17 十二月 1948, in IISH, 和, Box 47.

30. Loeb to Henry Usborne, 23 七月 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 454, General Correspondence 1947.

31. Thompson to Oscar Pollak, 29 一月 1948; Thompson to Willem Thomassen, 30 一月 1948;
Thompson to Leon Blum, 12 六月 1948; Thompson to Thomassen, 16 六月 1948; Thompson to
Guy Mollet, 26 八月 1948; Thompson to Haakon Lie, 26 八月 1948; Thompson to Pollak, 11
九月 1948; Thompson to Pippa Harris, 30 十月 1948; and Heinz Putzrath to Thompson,
10 November 1948—all in IISH, 和, Box 455, General Correspondence Socialist World 1948.

105

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Although a wide variety of nationalities were represented in Socialist
世界, gender diversity was non-existent. No signed article bears the name
of a woman, although Loeb was coeditor and must have written part of the
“Notes of the Quarter” or “Reviews.” This reﬂects a period when female par-
ticipation in the leadership of the Socialist movement was at a low point.
Although prominent women had been among the pioneers of Socialism, 这
movement as it became more respectable adopted the biases of bourgeois so-
ciety.32 Prominent women leaders were much more common among the older
一代 (Angelica Balabanoff, Isabelle Blume, Anna Kéthly) than among
the new.

Socialist World was not just a magazine with a political agenda but the
media branch of the International Socialist Conference. First and foremost,
it served as an instrument of internal communication, describing the confer-
ences and the development of the International Socialist Conference.33 It also
hosted internal debates. Although the British Labour Party wanted to keep
the International Socialist Conference an informal organization, the Belgian,
Swiss, and French Socialists wanted a full restoration of the International.
The second issue of Socialist World (September–November 1947) published
the arguments that the leader of the Belgian Socialist Party, Max Buset, 有
presented at the Zurich Conference (6–9 June 1947).34 For issue four (哪个
appeared in March 1948, after the Communists seized power in Czechoslo-
vakia), Loeb staged a debate on the rebuilding of the Socialist International,
presenting one article in favor and one against.35 Vilém Bernard, a leader from
the right wing of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party ( ˇCeskoslovenská
sociální demokracie, ˇCSSD) and editor of the Czechoslovak Social Demo-
cratic weekly, wrote against rebuilding the Socialist International as a cen-
trist organization, arguing that informal cooperation was better suited to the
different conditions in which Socialists operated. The basis of Socialist
cooperation was(1) recognizing the autonomy of individual parties amid the
deepening division of Europe and (2) avoiding encouraging the mistrust of
Communists.36 The Austrian Oscar Pollak—editor of the Socialist newspaper

32. Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism, p. 412.

33. “Notes of the Quarter,” Socialist World, March–May 1948, PP. 3–6; “Notes of the Quarter,” So-
cialist World, June–August 1948, PP. 2–4; and “Notes of the Quarter,” Socialist World, 十二月
1948–February 1949, PP. 2–3.

34. “Stenogramme,” 8 六月 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 235, PP. 3–24.

35. Loeb to Victor Larock, 27 六月 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 454, General Correspondence 1947.

36. Vilém Bernard, “International Socialist Co-operation,” Socialist World, March–May 1948, PP. 7–
14.

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The Socialist International and the Beginning of the Cold War, 1947–1949

Arbeiter-Zeitung and the weekly Der Kampf, known for their anti-Communist
editorial line—wrote in favor of turning the Socialist International into a
“third force,” an alternative between the extremes of capitalist and Catholic
reaction and totalitarian Communism.37

The admission of a party to the International Socialist Conference was of-
ten the main topic of debate: “All the post-war international conferences have
concentrated on organizational questions: who belongs to the International,
who is admitted to conferences, what kind of permanent organization is to
发展?”38 Socialist World offered a platform for aspiring parties to present
their credentials and ask for help. Applicants included the International Jewish
Labor Bund and two competing Socialist parties from India—the Congress
Socialist Party (Jayaprakash Narayan) and the Radical Democratic Party
(Manabendra Nath Roy). The most contentious issue for the International
Socialist Conference was the admission of the SPD.39 Another contentious
issue was the split of the Italian Social Democrats (PSLI) from the PSI (这
main Italian Socialist Party) 在一月 1947 over the latter’s alliance with the
Communists. The PSLI asked to be recognized as the true Italian Socialists or
at least for the intervention of the International in this internal dispute. 这
ofﬁcial Italian party, led by Pietro Nenni, used its article to reject the PSLI’s
pretenses.40

In the case of Socialist World, editorial choices were also political choices.
Until the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia, the main concern of in-
ternational Socialism was to accommodate the needs of the pro-Communist
Socialist parties of Eastern Europe and Italy. Disputes arose immediately about
the feasibility of cooperating with Communists, but all the parties of the In-
ternational Socialist Conference assumed that cohabitation of different forms
of Socialism was possible. As long as some form of political pluralism and
democracy seemed possible in the “people’s democracies,” Western Socialists
did not insist that the Social Democrats of Eastern Europe should break with
the Communists. 反而, they wanted cooperation to continue so that they

37. Oscar Pollak, “The Third Force,” Socialist World, March–May 1948, PP. 15–20.

38. 同上。, p. 19.

39. Loeb to Lujan Blit, 1 七月 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 454, General Correspondence 1947; Lujan Blit,
“The Bund—A Jewish Socialist Movement,” Socialist World, September–November 1947, PP. 16–19;
Jayaprakash Narayan, “An Indian Plan for Socialism,” Socialist World, June–August 1947, PP. 11–
18; V. 乙. Karnik, “The Radical Democratic Party of India,” Socialist World, September–November,
1947, PP. 32–35; and Erich Ollenhauer, “The Revival of German Social-Democracy,” Socialist World,
December 1947–February 1948, PP. 30–36.

40. An Italian correspondent, “Italy—Political Background,” Socialist World, September–November
1947, PP. 10–15. See Antonio Varsori, “Il Labour Party e la crisi del socialismo italiano (1947–1948),”
in I socialisti e l’Europa (米兰: 佛朗哥·安杰利, 1989), PP. 159–211.

107

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could prevent a Communist power monopoly and facilitate the “socialist roll-
back of Eastern Europe.”41

In the ﬁrst four issues, Socialist World was committed to preserving this
plurality of views, despite difﬁculties. As Loeb explained: “You will see that
here too we have to try to balance East and West—a trick that needs as much
skill as eating fried eggs on a cross-Channel steamer.”42 The ﬁrst issue (June–
八月 1947) explicitly invoked this balancing act by presenting two articles
by the Dutch Labor Party and ˇCSSD as examples of the different problems of
Socialists in government.43 Although Issue 4 came out in March 1948 (IE。, af-
ter the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia), it featured a debate between
Pollak and Bernard (“What they have in common is much more important
than their disagreements”) and invited readers to accept the differences be-
tween Socialists while recognizing the underlying unity of the movement.44

Post-war political developments in Europe have meant that socialist parties in
different countries are working under widely dissimilar conditions, have meant
especially that there are differences between parties in Eastern and Western Eu-
绳索. But the essential socialist principles remain the same in all countries.45

Studied ambiguity was the key to cohabitation. Criticism of Communism was
not presented as an ideological imperative and was limited to countries where
the local labor movement was already anti-Communist—for example, 加拿大
and the United States.46 The survey of recent events in Issue 3 (十二月
1947–February 1948) attempts the delicate balancing act of describing the
decline of Communism in most West European countries. Although the ar-
ticle describes French Communism as “authoritarian,” it tacitly approves the
alliance of the PSI with the Communists as a bulwark against neofascism.47 In
私人的, Healey warned: “Co-operation between the Socialist Parties in East
and West is based on the tacit principle of non-interference in one another’s
spheres.”48

41. Heumos, “Einleitung,” p. 33.

42. Loeb to Ian Mackay, 11 十二月 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 454, General Correspondence 1947.

43. “Notes of the Quarter,” Socialist World, June–August 1947, PP. 3–10.

44. “Notes of the Quarter” (March–May 1948), p. 4.

45. 同上.

46. David Lewis, “Canada and the CCF,” Socialist World, June–August 1947, PP. 26–32; and Philip
Taft, “American Labour Trends,” Socialist World, June–August 1947, PP. 33–38.

47. “Notes of the Quarter,” Socialist World, December 1947–February 1948, PP. 2–3.

48. Healey to Robert B. Kirby, 19 行进 1947, in LHASC, LP, International Department (ID), DH,
Box 9, Folder 5.

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The Socialist International and the Beginning of the Cold War, 1947–1949

At this stage, the main criticism was that the Communists subtracted
votes and activists from the Social Democrats, making Socialists in govern-
ment less able to enact Socialist reforms and weaker against the growing threat
of conservatives and reactionaries.49 The Finnish Social Democrats, 为了考试-
普莱, had to appeal to local conditions to justify their anti-Communist tone.50
Strong criticism was usually kept in bounds, 然而. 例如, just by
mentioning the names of Henryk Erlich and Victor Alter, 国际
Jewish Labor Bund subtly reminded readers that they had been murdered at
Stalin’s behest.51

The tone of the SPD was particularly harsh because they were not ac-
cepted into the International Socialist Conference until November 1947 和
had to defend their credentials against the attacks of Communists and East
European Socialists. They denounced the totalitarian regime being built by
the Socialist Unity Party (SED) in the Soviet Zone of Occupation, the sub-
servience of the Communists to Soviet interests, and the persecution of Social
Democrats, drawing comparisons with Nazism.52 Their article, which came
out in December 1947, anticipated the tone of the ﬁnal three issues of the
journal.

尽管如此, supporters of an alliance with the Communists found a
platform in Socialist World to explain their situation and justify their be-
行为. Italian Socialists criticized monopoly capitalists for sabotaging recon-
struction and obstructing Socialist economic policies. They also accused the
Catholic Church of “clericalism” and embracing ex-Fascists.53 The alliance
with the Communists was not just defensive but allowed the Socialists to de-
velop ties with industrial workers and peasants, building credibility that, 在
the long term, allowed them to become the working-class alternative to the
Communists.

ˇCSSD members defended their government’s record, which had resulted
in the radical restructuring of society through nationalization and planning.54

49. Karl Fredriksson, “Social Democracy in Sweden since the War,” Socialist World, September–
十一月 1947, PP. 27–31; and Ollenhauer, “The Revival of German Social-Democracy,” PP. 30–36.

50. Vaino Leskinen, “Finland since the Armistice,” Socialist World, December 1947–February 1948,
PP. 4–10.

51. Blit, “The Bund,” PP. 16–19.

52. Ollenhauer, “The Revival of German Social-Democracy,” PP. 30–36; and “Reviews,” Socialist
世界, March–May 1948, PP. 36–39.

53. An Italian correspondent, “Italy—Political Battleground,” PP. 10–15.

54. A member of the Research Dept., Czechoslovak Social-Democratic Party, “Czechoslovakia on the
Road to Socialism,” Socialist World, June–August 1947, PP. 19–25; and Bernard, “International So-
cialist Co-operation,” PP. 7–14.

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Western Socialists they argued, should have balanced their criticism of East
European Socialists with understanding and comradeship. The achievements
of the Czechoslovak people’s democracy, they claimed, were superior to those
of the Socialist parties in Western Europe, excepting the British Labour Party.
Alliance with the Communists, the argument went, was necessary to defend
those achievements against the Germans and the reactionary classes. Hungar-
ian Social Democrats also celebrated the scope of their economic and social
revolution, insisting that only the help of the Red Army had made it possible
to abolish feudalism. The alliance between Socialists and Communists was the
driving force of these reforms.55 In an unpublished article, Julian Hochfeld,
the leading intellectual of Polish Socialism, defended the right of the Polish
revolution to use defensive violence, while also rejecting a dogmatic interpre-
tation of Marxism.56

Geographical determinism was an argument often invoked to downplay
差异. Since the eighteenth century, Western Europe had deﬁned East-
ern Europe “as its complementary other half,” with the West identiﬁed with
文明, 原因, and progress and the East with backwardness, barbarism,
and autocracy.57 This division was sometimes invoked to excuse violations of
political democracy: East European Socialists, 例如, stressed the ab-
sence of traditions of democracy and tolerance.58 Instead, Eastern Europe,
through expropriation, socialization of heavy industries, and land redistri-
bution, was supposedly developing forms of economic democracy more ad-
vanced than those in Western Europe. Buset insisted that the synthesis of
economic democracy in the East and political democracy in the West would
produce full Socialism.59 Bernard endorsed this interpretation: “We must de-
mand that the socialist programme in both East and West should unite the
principle of democracy and the principle of Socialism so that the two aspects
of socialist activity are equally balanced.”60

This was the line of Socialist World: It invited readers to take geogra-
物理层, 历史, and national character into consideration before judging other

55. Anonymous [Vilmos Böhm], “Social Revolution in Hungary,” Socialist World, March–May 1948.

56. Julian Hochfeld, “Les problèmes de la nouvelle époque,” in IISH, 和, Box 454, Correspondence
with printers re “Socialist World,” materials which have not been used 1947, PP. 1–15.

57. Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment
(斯坦福大学, CA: 斯坦福大学出版社, 1994), p. 4.

58. Blit, “The Bund,” PP. 16–19.

59. Max Buset, “A New Socialist International,” Socialist World, September–November 1947, PP. 6–9.

60. Bernard, “International Socialist Co-operation,” p. 8

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countries.61 Czechoslovak and Polish Socialists warned: “Any observer who
judges Czechoslovak post-war economic developments by Western Euro-
pean standards can easily reach false conclusions.”62 Massive nationalization
through expropriation, the expulsion of ethnic Germans, and the persecu-
tion of the opposition were unpalatable, but—Eastern Socialists argued—they
were the results of the national context, not of their intentions.63 Hochfeld
claimed that Poland was dealing with the same problems of capital accumula-
的, state building, and bourgeois revolution that England had encountered
from the time of Henry VIII, through Oliver Cromwell, to the Reform Act
的 1832 that abolished rotten boroughs. British parliamentarianism and the
industrial revolution, Hochfeld argued, had been made possible by violence,
theft, expropriation, revolution, dictatorship, 和腐败. “It is equally
hard to believe that someone had to take ‘fair play’ or the principles of democ-
racy into account then.”64 Some political actions that would have been unac-
ceptable in the civilized West were tolerated when they took place in the East.
This denied the responsibility of the Eastern Socialists as well as the Western
Socialists’ complicity.

The Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia started a complete
reorientation of the International Socialist Conference, forcing the newsletter
and Socialist World to be “more challenging in their contents.”65 The goal for
the ﬁnal three issues of Socialist World was to publicize the anti-Communist re-
sistance in Europe, drawing comparisons with the resistance against Nazism.66
The struggle waged by the citizens of Berlin and Vienna was a continuation
of their battle against Nazism in 1933 和 1934: “Reliable eye-witnesses re-
port that there was no difference at all between these SED demonstrators
and the raiding-squads of Nazi Storm Troopers in the thirties. It is against
this that Berliners, led by the Social Democratic Party, are ﬁghting.”67 In this
“microcosm of the European conﬂict,” the destiny of the world was in bal-
安斯: “Berlin is the point where it will be decided whether or not Germany

61. “Reviews,” Socialist World, September–November 1947, PP. 36–39.

62. A member of the Research Dept., Czechoslovak Social-Democratic Party, “Czechoslovakia on the
Road to Socialism,” PP. 19–25. See also Blit, “The Bund,” PP. 16–20.

63. A Polish correspondent, “Poland’s Three-Year Plan,” Socialist World, December 1947–February
1948, PP. 16–20.

64. Hochfeld, “Les problèmes de la nouvelle époque,” p. 9.

65. Bolle, “Statement of the activities and ﬁnance of the Socialist Information and Liaison Ofﬁce.”

66. “Notes of the Quarter” (June–August 1948), PP. 2–4.

67. News from Germany—SPD, “Berlin—City of Decision,” Socialist World, September–November
1948, p. 3.

111

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and Western Europe can be saved for the ideals of liberal democracy.”68 The
journal also said that “Berlin became a battleﬁeld in the struggle between
democracy and terror.”69

This rhetoric signaled a reorientation of attitudes toward Germany af-
ter the February 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia. Since the beginning, Socialist
World had treated the German question, particularly the fate of industry in
the Ruhr, as the key postwar issue: “The future of Germany is to-day perhaps
the greatest enigma in the international political scene.”70 Western Socialists
put their trust in the German Social Democrats for the democratization of
Germany and socialization of industry as the means to disarm war-mongering
German capitalists. For Eastern Socialists the matter was different. They iden-
tiﬁed the Germans as their main foe, as both military aggressors and capital-
ist owners of industry and land in Eastern Europe. Czechoslovak and Polish
Socialists used their articles in Socialist World to justify the expropriation of
German property, the expulsion of ethnic Germans, and the extraction of
reparations from Germany, such steps being necessary for the security and
prosperity of their countries.71 Eastern Socialists would not accept Germany’s
restoration on an equal basis; it had to be kept to a lesser status for many years,
until complete reeducation had been achieved. 反过来, the German Social
Democrats reasserted their anti-fascist credentials to demand self-government,
German unity, the return of the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line, 和
better living conditions and food to stave off extremism.72 The only way to
ensure a peaceful Germany, they argued, was to create a socialist economy by
nationalizing heavy industry, which meant preservation of the Ruhr’s indus-
tries for reconstruction and planning in a democratic Germany.

With Eastern Socialists out and bipolar tension escalating, 西方的
Socialists aligned themselves with the U.S. strategy for European reconstruc-
的. The restoration of German industrial production was a key component
of the Marshall Plan. Economic reconstruction would lead eventually to the
creation of a West German state and years later to German rearmament and
West Germany’s integration into NATO. The Western Socialists accepted this
过程, although they stressed their support for international control of the

68. 同上.

69. Kurt Mattick, “Berlin Fights for Freedom,” Socialist World, December 1948–February 1949, p. 19.

70. “Notes of the Quarter” (June–August 1947), p. 5.

71. A member of the Research Dept., Czechoslovak Social-Democratic Party, “Czechoslovakia on the
Road to Socialism,” PP. 19–26; and A Polish correspondent, “Poland’s Three-Year Plan,” PP. 16–
19.

72. Ollenhauer, “The Revival of German Social-Democracy,” PP. 30–36.

112

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Ruhr industries through the International Authority for the Ruhr approved
by the London Six-Power Conference in June 1948.73 Leon Blum’s article in
Socialist World (June–August 1948) signaled the willingness of French Social-
ists to give up earlier plans to limit German rebirth, although he demanded
supranational control over Ruhr industries in the form of “international na-
tionalisation.”74 This was a contentious issue, with the other Socialists accus-
ing the German Social Democrats of nationalism.75 However, resolution of
the matter laid the foundations for European integration.

Socialist World not only celebrated the heroism of those resisting total-
itarianism but also commemorated the tragic fate of the East European So-
cialists who were persecuted or made refugees by the Communist regimes. 在
this case the journal’s volte-face was more explicit, insofar as East European
Socialists, including Bernard, had previously defended the alliance with the
Communists. Now Bernard and the Hungarian leader Antal Bán recounted
the destruction of their Socialist party at the hands of the Communists.76
Rather than glossing over the recent past, the Socialists reframed it. They said
they had sincerely tried to cooperate with the Communists, but their trust
had been misplaced.

这些中的每一个 [East European] parties tried to maintain its independence while
at the same time collaborating in a coalition government with the Communists.
But loyal collaboration was not enough for the Communists; they were satisﬁed
with nothing less than complete domination.77

Bernard stressed that “healing of the breach in the working class movement
dating from 1920” was necessary, but it had to result from “the expression of
free will and not . . . blackmail and brute force.”78 Bán said the majority of
Socialists had not been anti-Soviet and had desired a working agreement with
the Communists to ﬁght reactionary forces.

Bernard and Bán focused on the destruction of the independent So-
cialist Party as the worst crime of the Communists. The Communists had
used treachery, intimidation, and violence to silence democratically elected

73. “Notes of the Quarter” (June–August 1948), PP. 2–4.

74. Leon Blum, “The Problem of the Ruhr,” Socialist World, June–August 1948, p. 6.

75. Shaev, “Workers’ Politics, the Communist Challenge, and the Schuman Plan,” PP. 251–281.

76. Antal Ban, “The Last Months of Social Democracy in Hungary,” Socialist World, June–August
1948, PP. 33–36; and Vilém Bernard, “The Suppression of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic
Party,” Socialist World, September–November 1948, PP. 38–39.

77. “Notes of the Quarter” (December 1948–February 1949), p. 2.

78. Bernard, “The Suppression of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party,” p. 39.

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Socialist party ofﬁcials and to install Communist-backed Socialists in their
地方. By ﬁrst incapacitating the democratic functioning of the Socialist Party,
imposing fusion, then “swallow[英] up hundreds of thousands of organized
Social Democrats” and forcing them into an organization with no democratic
expression, the Communists had destroyed the only genuine organization rep-
resenting the working class.79 Bernard asserted that bourgeois political parties
had been left alone because they lacked a social base after nationalization had
destroyed the other classes. Destroying the Socialist parties signiﬁed that the
Communist regime would impose dictatorship and exploitation on the work-
呃. To stress the similarities between Nazism and Communism, the article
about the persecution of Hungarian Social Democrats (June–August 1948)
was preceded by an article about the persecution of Spanish Socialists.80

East European Socialists argued that the free spirit of the workers and
sympathy for democratic Socialism were still alive, and Socialist World an-
nounced the creation of an organization of East European Socialist exiles to
prepare the future struggle.81 However, the morality tale of the destruction
of East European Socialism clearly worked better for Western Socialists than
for Eastern Socialists, who did not have freedom to organize or debate. 帕-
ticularly useful for delegitimizing internal dissent were Bernard’s and Bán’s
damning descriptions of leftwing Socialists, who had backed an alliance with
the Communists. The left wing had falsely claimed that it would favor Social-
ism over Communism and would remain independent. 事实上, the leftwing
Socialists proved to be Communist stooges, backing the Communists instead
of the Socialist party or workers.

The deﬁnition of democratic Socialism changed amid these upheavals.
Socialist World no longer celebrated the economic changes in Eastern Europe
as the foundations of economic democracy. Political democracy, the journal
stressed, was a prerequisite. Without individual freedom, economic democ-
racy was impossible. The International Socialist Conference in Vienna (六月
1948) embraced liberal deﬁnitions of freedom, 权利, and pluralism.82 These
human rights were not limited by historical conditions or geography and in-
stead were universal. When Norwegian and Danish Socialists stressed their
economic and social achievements, they reassured readers that they had not

79. 同上。, p. 38.

80. Rodolfo Llopis, “Spanish Socialists Fight on,” Socialist World, June–August 1948, PP. 26–32.

81. “Notes of the Quarter” (December 1948–February 1949), PP. 2–3.

82. “Notes of the Quarter” (June–August 1948), PP. 2–4.

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The Socialist International and the Beginning of the Cold War, 1947–1949

infringed individual rights.83 Although political democracy was the necessary
precondition, it was not sufﬁcient. Socialism’s ambition was to develop the full
potential of democracy by promoting economic rights. The Soviet-dominated
“people’s democracies” had nothing to do with Socialism:

政治上, these governments are the negation of all civic rights and of the funda-
mental freedoms. Economically, they are inclined to substitute state-capitalism
for private capitalism. They betray both democracy and socialism which they
claim to represent. The International Socialist Conference meeting in Vienna,
declares that Socialism, being inseparable from political democracy, aims at com-
pleting the latter by economic democracy; this is its fundamental objective.84

The change of editorial line marked a turning point for the International
Socialist Conference, which could no longer be a loose organization in which
variations of Socialism coexisted or in which “a superior synthesis . . . of demo-
cratic socialism in the West and of revolutionary socialism of the East” was at-
tempted.85 The Socialist International, ofﬁcially reborn in 1951, turned into
an exclusive “club” enforcing one deﬁnition of democratic Socialism by set-
ting strict conditions for afﬁliation.86 Although this was partly a contingent
result of the Cold War, it also reﬂected the long-term evolution of Socialist
parties into parties of government and the reconciliation of Socialism and lib-
eral democracy. The unique problems of the parties operating outside the lib-
eral democratic framework of Western Europe found little space in the pages
of Socialist World. The articles by the Spanish and Greek Socialists stand out
for their language and content. Like the articles by East European exiles, 他们
mostly served the ideological needs of the legal parties—in this case, 平衡
anti-Communism with anti-fascism.

Interests and Concerns of the Socialist Movement

Socialist World offers a sample of the interests and concerns of Socialists during
the ﬁrst few years after World War II. The aim of Socialist World was “to
concentrate on two different types of articles: Some will report on political
情况; others will express different shades of opinion of socialist theory,

83. Haakon Lie, “Norway since Liberation,” Socialist World, September–November 1948, PP. 17–20;
and Jorgen Paldam, “Denmark’s Economic Position,” Socialist World, September–November 1948,
PP. 21–25.

84. “Notes of the Quarter” (June–August 1948), p. 2.
85. Șerban Voinea, “The International Problem,” in IISH, 和, Box 454, Correspondence with printers
re “Socialist World,” materials which have not been used 1947, p. 10.

86. Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism, p. 210.

115

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method and aim.”87 The journal was supposed to carry straightforward factual
reports as well as opinion pieces.88

Most issues of Socialist World included book reviews. One publisher com-
plained that the reviews were “cursory,” sometimes with only a few lines ded-
icated to each book.89 Although most of the reviews were not insightful, 他们
did show which books British Socialists were reading (mostly publications by
the Fabian Society or authors close to it). Reviews of non-English books ap-
peared only in later issues to promote publications by Austrian and German
Socialists.90

Some general themes emerge across the articles. The most common types
of article were national surveys explaining the local environment and recent
事件, especially concerning labor parties and trade unions. The Socialists
used these opportunities to justify their policies or present their case for ad-
使命. The reviews also mention many books of labor history.

Economic challenges were the most discussed problem. 虽然
task of recovery and reconstruction was daunting, wartime planning offered
a model for managing the economy: “Surely, if economic planning can help
to win a war, it must have some virtues even in peacetime?”91 Large sections
of articles or even entire articles were devoted to surveys of the economic
conditions of countries before and after the war. Industrial production, 骗局-
消费, and regulations were described in full detail, presenting a wealth
of statistical data in text and tables. Not only was the long enumeration of
numbers and percentages dreary; it left the distinct impression that the writ-
ers wanted to pad their articles with statistics. 然而, these articles also
showed that Socialists were proud of having rescued their countries from the
destruction of war.

Contributors to Socialist World were in broad agreement that reconstruc-
tion along Socialist lines demanded a managed economy, increased productiv-
性, full employment, and expanded exports to pay for food and capital goods.
Opinions on how to achieve these goals differed. Some parties presented
their experience as a successful model of Socialism. East European Socialists
continually emphasized their achievements in reconstruction, socialization,

87. “Notes of the Quarter” (June–August 1947), p. 3.

88. Loeb to Tullio Vecchietti, 1 八月 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 454, General Correspondence 1947.

89. J. Guttmann & Co to Edward Thompson, 10 十一月 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 454, General
Correspondence 1947.

90. “Reviews,” Socialist World, June–August 1948; and “Reviews,” Socialist World, December 1948–
二月 1949, PP. 38–40.

91. “Reviews,” Socialist World, December 1947–February 1948, p. 38.

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and planning. British and Swedish Socialists celebrated their successes in deal-
ing with crisis and enacting socialist policies.92 Austrian Socialists defended
Red Vienna as “the testing ground for planning” and “a school in socialist
economy and administration for younger generations of socialists.”93

The nationalization of key industries was widely discussed. Despite a shift
in attitude after the February 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia, the division of
opinion did not simply follow Cold War lines. East European Socialists de-
fended nationalization of heavy industries as an important economic mea-
sure and also as a means of weakening “reactionary forces” and strengthening
民主. This line was not exclusive to them, 然而; even the British
Labour Party embraced it.94 Karl Waldbrunner—the strongest intellectual
voice for nationalization among Austrian Socialists and later minister for the
nationalized enterprises—argued that the prewar Austrian experience showed
that planning was impossible without public control over key sectors of the
经济, such as banking, 活力, and basic industries. He claimed that the
Austrian Socialist Party had promoted extensive nationalization after the war
to overcome the power of economic oligarchs and ensure democratic stability,
but that they also supported increasing productivity and full employment.95
The articles of Danish and Norwegian Socialists appearing after the Com-
munist takeover in Czechoslovakia did not emphasize that Socialist policies
would strengthen democracy; 相当, they argued that Socialist policies were
not incompatible with democracy.96

The most thorough analysis of planning and nationalization was a series
of three articles by the Dutch Socialist economist Nederhorst. Having sur-
veyed Dutch economic conditions and state policies in the issues of March
and June 1948, Nederhorst dealt with the nature and implications of plan-
ning in the September 1948 issue.97 He argued that Socialists did not in-
vent planning but adopted it from private industries and the Soviet Union.

92. A British Correspondent, “Britain Meets the Crisis,” Socialist World, September–November 1947,
PP. 22–26; and Fredriksson, “Social Democracy in Sweden since the War,” PP. 27–31.

93. Karl Waldbrunner, “Socialism and Planning in Austria,” Socialist World, September–November
1948, p. 12.

94. A British Correspondent, “Britain Meets the Crisis” pp. 22–26.

95. Waldbrunner, “Socialism and Planning in Austria,” PP. 12–16; and Karl Waldbrunner, “Austria’s
经济未来,” Socialist World, December 1948–February 1949, PP. 27–30.

96. Lie, “Norway since Liberation,” PP. 17–20; and Paldam, “Denmark’s Economic Position,” PP. 21–
25.

97. Gerard M. Nederhorst, “Holland’s Economic Position,” Socialist World, March–May 1948,
PP. 21–25; and Gerard M. Nederhorst, “Nationalisation in Holland,” Socialist World, June–August
1948, PP. 9–15.

117

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“And at the present moment planning and socialism are so closely linked with
each other that no socialist party would question the very great importance of
planning.”98

Coalitions between Social Democrats and Christian Democrats were an
obstacle to nationalization in Continental Europe, but Nederhorst said that
even Socialists with a large majority in Britain and Sweden could not carry
out radical nationalization because of opposition in the civil society. In any
案件, nationalization was not the only way to ensure public control over the
private economy. Mixed committees of employers, trade unionists, and gov-
ernment representatives could achieve the same goal while avoiding excessive
bureaucracy.

International events were also a recurrent topic in Socialist World. 这
Cold War weighed heavily on Socialists and shaped their reﬂections. 评论
mentioned books that would provide a better understanding of the world’s
hot spots and centers of power, such as the United States, 苏联,
德国, 希腊, 和中国. A recurring argument was that geopolitical and
technological developments were limiting national sovereignty. Pollak wrote,
“There has been increased incorporation of small and medium nation-states,
no longer capable of independence, into the power blocs of the great pow-
ers.”99 The editorial staff and the British and Scandinavian parties favored
forms of intergovernmental cooperation instead of federalism and suprana-
tionality, whether in the form of a world government or European integra-
tion.100 However, after the coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948, Socialist World
gave a platform to federalist Socialists who linked nationalization and public
control of the economy with the interdependence of states.

Leon Blum was the best-known ﬁgure to write on this topic, but a partic-
ularly insightful article was written for the June–August 1948 issue by Cerilo
斯皮内利, a federalist Socialist and brother of Altiero Spinelli. Cerilo Spinelli
recognized the end of the old order of European sovereign states, balance of
力量, and European supremacy. 欧洲国家, 他争辩说, were no longer
able to control much bigger countries on other continents. Destroyed by war
and dependent on the United States and the Soviet Union, “Europe has lost
the power to determine the course of history.”101 Through federation the

98. Gerard M. Nederhorst, “International Socialist Planning,” Socialist World, September–November
1948, PP. 4–5.

99. Pollak, “The Third Force,” p. 17.

100. “Notes of the Quarter,” Socialist World, September–November 1947, PP. 3–5; and “Reviews”
(September–November 1947), PP. 36–39.

101. Cerilo Spinelli, “European Unity and European Reconstruction,” Socialist World, June–August
1948, p. 16.

118

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Europeans would be able to regain independence and mediate between the
two blocs.

Conservatives conceived united Europe as a military bloc against the So-
越南联盟. Liberals and democrats saw in the federation an opportunity to
abolish economic nationalism and promote free trade:

United Europe has become more and more a problem of the progressive adap-
tation of the various national reconstruction programmes to the demands
of general European recovery—that is, progressive integration of the various
national economies by means of a co-ordinated policy of trade, tariffs and
investments.102

Spinelli approved the goal of modernization and economic integration, 但
he argued that only centralized planning, nationalization, and control of in-
vestments would destroy monopolistic privileges, reduce the human costs of
economic dislocation, and achieve the Socialist goal of full employment. 欧洲联盟-
ropean uniﬁcation with the help of the Marshall Plan would provide the
Socialists with the radical economic policy they needed to stave off the Com-
munists. By exploiting the misery of the people, the Communists had taken
over the leadership of the working class in some countries. Only the Social-
ists who had remained independent of the Communists and identiﬁed with
the trade unions had been able to keep their presence in the working class.
Socialists wanted to regain the allegiance of the working class from the Com-
munists by matching their radicalism in defending workers. “This objective
can only be achieved by recapturing the trade unions and factory organi-
zations, and by a ﬁnancial policy which ensures just redistribution of the
national income.”103 Being in government was useful only when the Social-
ists were powerful enough to enact Socialist reforms, otherwise the Socialists
would lose their credibility. Spinelli’s line is signiﬁcant because it matched
British Labour’s conception of Socialism, which Healey was trying to encour-
age among the Italian Social Democrats at the time.104

In the following issue (September–November 1948), Nederhorst also rec-
ognized that “for most countries planning on a national scale is no longer an
adequate means of raising the people’s standard of living.”105 The problem was

102. 同上。, p. 21.

103. 同上。, p. 23.

104. Ettore Costa, “The Socialist International and Italian Social Democracy (1948–50): 文化
Differences and the ‘Internationalisation of Domestic Quarrels,’” Historical Research, 卷. 90, 不. 251
(冬天 2018), PP. 160–184.

105. Nederhorst, “International Socialist Planning,” p. 7.

119

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that the strength of Socialists differed from country to country. 英国和
Swedish socialists wanted to avoid integration because it would prevent them
from enacting Socialist policies at the national level. 相比之下, Nederhorst
believed that building Socialism in one country, especially a small one, 曾是
不可能的. “I have no hesitation in answering that it is our duty to venture
on international co-operation even when international co-operation means,
for a short time, that we must give up some parts of our socialist policy in
the national ﬁeld.”106 Nederhorst identiﬁed international socialization, 或
least international control, of coal and steel as the ﬁrst step for international
合作, followed by international management of public utilities, ﬁnan-
cial systems, investment policies, and trade policies: “If the Western European
countries were represented on foreign markets as if they were one country,
comparable with Russia and the United States, then their position would be
stronger and would enable them to compete successfully with those coun-
tries.”107 Nederhorst also correctly identiﬁed the possible problems of a single
市场, such as a race to the bottom for wages and taxation.

In the ﬁnal issue of Socialist World (December 1948–February 1949),
Waldbrunner envisioned the integration of Austria into a European planned
economy as well.108 The French economist Jean Weiller also argued that
national markets were insufﬁcient for modern production. Economic inte-
gration had to be followed by rationalization, increased productivity, 和
rising standards of living. The “Western Union” would control currency, 前任-
改变, and customs. The choice was between liberal integration, with non-
intervention in social and economic matters, and socialist integration. “这
second alternative would involve a federation of states with common socialist
原则, or at least prepared to carry out a common policy on a European
scale.”109 However, he wanted a gradual approach and to preserve states’ power
of intervention, at least for the time being.

Anti-colonialism is one of the “silences” of Socialist World. Critical voices
cannot be found, references in generalist articles are mostly absent or eu-
phemistically couched, and the three articles speciﬁcally dedicated to colonial
issues are extremely defensive and apologetic. The British articles (from De-
十二月 1947 and December 1948) celebrate the fair treatment of the colonies,

106. 同上。, p. 8.

107. 同上。, p. 9.

108. Waldbrunner, “Austria’s Economic Future,” PP. 27–30.

109. Jean Weiller, “Some Aspects of Western Union,” Socialist World, December 1948–February 1949,
p. 22.

120

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The Socialist International and the Beginning of the Cold War, 1947–1949

their self-government, and the role of colonization in modernization110 “Thus
progress and socialism go hand in hand.”111 The French article (十二月
1948) was sympathetic with Vietnamese nationalism and blamed the war in
Indochina on Charles de Gaulle and other French party leaders, while also
blaming extremists on both sides.112

The early issues of Socialist World expressed a strong interest in Social-
ist movements outside Europe, especially those in India, 加拿大, 联合
状态, and Latin America. This seems to have been a form of compensation
for the strong Eurocentric character of the International Socialist Conference,
which Commonwealth and Latin American Socialists denounced.113 “The Eu-
ropean Socialists continue to pay absolutely no attention to the mere existence
let alone the importance of the Latin-American Socialist Parties.”114 At the
同时, outreach to other continents worked as a form of escape from the
contentious issues in Europe.115

Despite the initial intentions of the editorial staff, ideological issues were
rarely discussed, except by parties at the margins.116 Nonetheless, some of the
international discussions contain the germs of Socialist revisionism, 哪个
wanted to detach Socialism from nationalization and its classist and Marxist
起源. Revisionism identiﬁed Socialism with equality, liberty, and democ-
racy and opened the movement to the middle classes and religious people.117
The Dutch, Swedish, and Belgian Social Democrats were at the forefront of
this transformation, which found expression in Hugh Gaitskell’s Labour Party
and the Bad Godesberg Program of the SPD.118 A German socialist reading
Socialist World would have found an early version of the slogan “as much
competition as possible—as much planning as necessary” in the program of

110. H. D. 休斯, “Labour’s Colonial Policy,” Socialist World, December 1948–February 1949,
PP. 4–11.

111. J. D. Krivine, “Imperialism—New Style,” Socialist World, December 1947–February 1948, p. 29.

112. Georges Brutelle, “French Policy in Indo-China,” Socialist World, December 1948–February
1949, PP. 12–17.

113. “Stenogramme,” 8 六月 1947, PP. 24–27.

114. 罗伯特·J. 亚历山大, “Socialism in Latin-America,” Socialist World, December 1947–February
1948, p. 20.

115. This was the case in the 1950s. See Van Kemseke, Towards an Era of Development, p. 277.

116. Narayan, “An Indian Plan for Socialism,” PP. 11–18; Karnik, “The Radical Democratic Party of
印度,” PP. 30–36; and Achilles Gregoroyannis, “The Socialist Movement in Greece,” Socialist World,
March–May 1948, PP. 26–30.

117. Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism, p. 242.

118. Koos Vorrink, “The Dutch Labour Party,” Socialist World, June–August 1947, PP. 39–41; 和
Victor Larock, “The United States and Socialism,” Socialist World, December 1947–February 1948,
PP. 11–15.

121

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the Swedish Social Democratic Party published in the September–November
1947 issue.119

The articles in the journal underscore that the Socialists loved to talk
about themselves, especially about their national and international organiza-
的, recent history, and ideas. Their goal was to justify their political choices,
especially the contentious ones, to other Socialists. Socialist World was above
all an internal bulletin. Whether the intention of creating a journal for the
common reader was ever put into practice or even taken seriously thus seems
dubious. It is hardly surprising that the wider public had no interest in such
solipsism.

The Reach of Socialist World

The reason Socialist World was an international journal is not simply that it
had international contributors but also, more importantly, that it was meant
to be read around the world in its basic English edition—which was sold in
the newsstands of Great Britain and sent to British and foreign subscribers—
as well as in localized editions.

The editors were aware of the problem of language. Socialist World was
open to contributions from non-native English speakers and was intended
either to be read by a large public of non-native speakers or to be easily trans-
lated. One contributor, J. D. Krivine, complained that the changes made to
his article altered its meaning, but Loeb explained that they were necessary
because half the journal’s readers could not read English easily.120 Most of the
contributions were translated from languages other than English.121

Despite the small size and limited circulation—because of costs and
restricted paper allocation—Loeb expected the magazine to be inﬂuential
thanks to its intellectual weight and appeal to the educated public.122 “It is
certainly a non-popular cover which will not appeal to any except serious

119. Fredriksson, “Social Democracy in Sweden since the War,” p. 28.

120. J. D. Krivine (Central Ofﬁce of Information) to Mrs. 罗伯茨, 14 十一月 1947, in IISH, 和,
Box 454, General Correspondence 1947; Loeb to Krivine, 20 十一月 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 454,
General Correspondence 1947; and Krivine, “Imperialism—New Style.”

121. Marinus Van der Goes van Naters to Healey, 13 行进 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 454, General
Correspondence 1947; and Julian Hochfeld to Loeb, 6 八月 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 454, Corre-
spondence with printers re “Socialist World,” materials which have not been used 1947.

122. Loeb to Blackfriars Press Ltd, 31 四月 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 454, Correspondence with printers
re “Socialist World,” materials which have not been used 1947.

122

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The Socialist International and the Beginning of the Cold War, 1947–1949

readers.”123 “As you see it is of a fairly serious—even high-brow—nature and
aims at being serious.”124 This perception justiﬁed a cover price of one shilling.
“It will, 然而, be the sort of magazine one reads rather than skims.”125 Loeb
hoped that Socialist World would ﬁll a gap for all Socialists interested in inter-
national affairs.126

Loeb worked to put out localized editions of Socialist World. The ˇCSSD
immediately agreed to print a Czech edition that would come out simultane-
ously with the English edition, under the title Socialistický svˇet: Mezinárodní
socialistický ˇctvrtletník (The Socialist World: International Socialist Quarterly).
SILO was much satisﬁed with the Czech edition, the only version of Social-
ist World to ﬁnd a public: “in appearance and production, your version is
much better than ours.”127 The second issue sold 3,000 copies and turned
a proﬁt.128 SILO hoped that the Swiss, 法语, and Belgian socialists would
print a French edition, although the consultative committee had to renew—in
vain—its appeal in October 1947.129 The Uruguayan Socialist Party welcomed
the publication of Socialist World as a bridge between South American and Eu-
ropean Socialists, and expressed willingness to publish the Spanish edition on
the condition that other Spanish-speaking parties shared the expense.130 Noth-
ing came of it. The Greek Socialists said they could not sell copies or print a
Greek edition. They did not have the money, few people spoke English, 和
the police harassed the Socialist press.131

The original English edition had a planned circulation of 4,000 copies.132
The Dutch and Swedish Socialists bought 100 copies each, although currency
exchanges put the purchase at risk.133 However, the delivery of these copies

123. 同上.

124. 同上.

125. 同上。; 原文强调.

126. Loeb to M. 艾伦, 5 六月 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 454, General Correspondence 1947.

127. Thompson to Vilém Bernard, 20 十一月 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 454, General Correspon-
登塞 1947.

128. Circular 77, 23 十二月 1947.

129. Loeb to Blackfriars Press Ltd, 15 四月 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 454, Correspondence with printers
re “Socialist World,” materials which have not been used 1947; and Loeb to Mollet, 2 十月 1947,
in IISH, 和, Box 454, General Correspondence 1947.

130. Mario Jaunarena to Morgan Phillips, 15 七月 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 454, General Correspon-
登塞 1947.

131. Alexandros Svolos to Loeb, 24 行进 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 454, General Correspondence
1947.

132. Loeb to H. L. Schollick, 11 八月 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 454, General Correspondence 1947.

133. Thomassen to Loeb, 26 六月 1947, Thomassen to Loeb, 22 九月 1947, and Kaj Björk to
汤普森, 15 December 1947—all in IISH, 和, Box 454, General Correspondence 1947.

123

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to Sweden was irregular and met ﬁnancial and practical difﬁculties, 制作
it harder to increase circulation.134 This must have discouraged the Swedish
Social Democratic Party from supporting Socialist World further.

Loeb wanted to spread 3,000 copies around Britain, for which she sought
commercial advice from the The New Statesman, which suggested that the
Divisional Labour Parties be encouraged to order copies.135 Five subscribers
from each of the 640 Labour Party units would mean an income of £700 per
年, a solid basis for the future. Loeb also had the W. H. Smith retail chain
命令 1,000 copies to sell in selected towns.

The ﬁrst year of publication was not a success. The initial issue of Socialist
世界 (June–August 1947) 有 284 individual subscribers. Fifty copies were
sold through Socialist bookshops, 250 were given to afﬁliated parties, 和 500
were sold through W. H. 史密斯. The total, 1,084 copies, meant the Labour
Party was left with almost 3,000 unsold copies.136 Orders for the second issue
(September–November 1947) were similar to those of the ﬁrst. For the third
问题 (December 1947–February 1948), W.H. Smith ordered just 500 copies
and Socialist bookshops only twelve.137

The February 1948 coup cancelled the only successful version of Social-
ist World. The editorial board in July 1948 studied the possibility of having
a German edition appear in Austria, where the Socialist Party had a strong
organization and a long internationalist tradition. 然而, the party could
not obtain a license to import periodicals.138 Because this plan was the only
remaining possibility for Socialist World to survive as a regular publication, 这
failure of it meant the end of the whole enterprise.

The Failure of Socialist World

Socialist World was a failed experiment—Czechoslovakia aside—that proved
there was no room for an international Socialist journal. What is open to
question is whether it was a promising project that failed because of lack of

134. Björk to Thompson, 2 七月 1948, in IISH, 和, Box 455, General Correspondence Socialist World
1948; and Björk to Thompson, 11 八月 1948, in IISH, 和, Box 455, General Correspondence
Socialist World 1948.

135. Loeb to Healey, 23 行进 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 454, General Correspondence 1947.

136. Minutes of the Consultative Committee, 26 九月 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 47.

137. Secretary’s Report, 5 十一月 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 47; and Thompson to Finance Depart-
蒙特, 17 十二月 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 454, General Correspondence 1947.

138. Circular 117, C. 十一月 1948.

124

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The Socialist International and the Beginning of the Cold War, 1947–1949

support and internationalism from the national parties or whether the global
audience its founders imagined was out of reach given the technical and cul-
tural limits of the contemporary media landscape.

Lack of interest was an important reason, especially from the richer par-
领带. The Dutch Socialist leader Koos Vorrink complained that Socialist World
had not been properly supported.139 The Swedish Social Democrats, 之一
the richest parties, refused to write on international issues for the journal
and approved of its cancellation.140 The Danish Social Democrats, 寻求
to avoid embarrassment, refused to send an article covering pending inter-
national questions, submitting instead a factual article on economic issues.141
This silence over international affairs might have satisﬁed the Socialist leader-
船, but it made Socialist World a poor journal. Other symbolic measures to
emphasize international Socialist cooperation, such as an international stamp
or a joint May Day manifesto, were equally unsuccessful.142

In addition to the lack of interest, Socialists were divided over which di-
rection and media strategy the Socialist International needed to adopt.143 The
British and Scandinavian parties wanted to turn the Socialist International
into an international Fabian Society, to pool technical knowledge on how to
enact Socialist policies at the national level. When Socialist World ceased pub-
应用, SILO’s ofﬁces were restructured to collect technical information, 或者-
ganize conferences of Socialist experts, and produce pamphlets on the model
of the Fabian tracts. 然而, the frank exchange of opinions by experts de-
manded strict conﬁdentiality, as the Danish Social Democrats requested.

French and Dutch Socialists wanted international Socialism to take the
lead in European federalism, but in 1948 the Swedish Social Democrats re-
fused to ﬁnance the French proposal for an international Socialist center for
documentation and propaganda devoted to European uniﬁcation. As Neder-
horst noted, the lack of agreement on political issues limited the extent of
technocratic cooperation.144 Without a common position on the renunciation

139. Circular 121, 3 十二月 1948.

140. Klaus Misgeld, Sozialdemokratie und Aussenpolitik in Schweden: Sozialistische Internationale, 欧洲联盟-
ropapolitik und die Deutschlandfrage 1945–1955 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 1984), p. 100;
and Circular 121, 3 十二月 1948.

141. Alsing Andersen to Thompson, 15 七月 1948, in IISH, 和, Box 455, General correspondence
Socialist World 1948; and Thompson to Andersen, 22 七月 1948, in IISH, 和, Box 455, General
correspondence Socialist World 1948.

142. Costa, Labour Party, p. 277.

143. 同上。, PP. 265–272.

144. Circular B.17/52, 26 六月 1952, in IISH, 和, Box 65.

125

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of national sovereignty, the Socialists could not solve questions concerning in-
整合, 贸易, 投资, 运输, or energy.

The journal’s most successful product for media consumption was an is-
sue on which all the national Socialist parties were in agreement: the sad fate
of Socialists behind the Iron Curtain. Socialist exiles from the East produced a
highly successful narrative of the Communist takeovers, and the Western So-
cialist parties spread it, ﬁrst in Socialist World, then through a booklet, Curtain
Falls, prepared by Healey with contributions from Bán and Socialist leaders
from Poland and Czechoslovakia.145 The booklet was translated into French
和意大利语, gaining an international reach that Socialist World never had.146

Although lack of commitment was an important factor in the journal’s
failure, it was not the only one. In the ﬁrst half of 1948, SILO was engaged in
frantic activity that kept Socialist World alive longer than necessary. The edito-
rial board of expert journalists decreed that the efforts had yielded insufﬁcient
returns and that the international journal had failed to reach an international
民众. 然而, publication of any international journal faced important ob-
stacles during that period. A key question for Socialist World was whether there
were enough international English-speaking Socialists with ﬁnancial means
to support an international journal. This was the problem in Greece, 哪个
was both poor and authoritarian, but it was also true even in a wealthy and
democratic country like Denmark, where the local Socialist party had prob-
lems ﬁnding more than 30 subscribers for the English edition.147 In addition,
currency problems, lack of paper, and regulation hampered the circulation of
printed material across national borders. The only way a similar enterprise
could be successful was by localization. Curtain Falls was successfully trans-
lated, but the only way a regular Socialist publication could survive was if the
party machinery committed to promoting its sale. The leaders of the British
Labour Party put some effort into distributing the journal among the local
派对, but the base did not respond accordingly, as already during the war
the rank and ﬁle had been lukewarm toward continental Socialists.148

145. Denis Healey, 编辑。, The Curtain Falls: The Story of the Socialists in Eastern Europe (伦敦:
Lincolns—Prager, 1951).

146. Denis Healey, 编辑。, Le rideau tombe: Histoire des socialistes en Europe orientale (巴黎: Dominique
Wapler, 1952); and Denis Healey, 编辑。, La cortina cade: La storia dei partiti socialisti nell’Europa orientale
(Florence: Nuova Italia, 1953).

147. Olaf Carlsson to Thompson, 18 九月 1948, in IISH, 和, Box 455, General Correspondence
Socialist World 1948.

148. Phillips to divisional and local parties, [日期不详。], in IISH, 和, Box 454, General Correspondence
1947; and Andrew Thorpe, Parties at War: Political Organization in Second World War Britain (牛津,
英国: 牛津大学出版社, 2009), PP. 203–204.

126

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The Socialist International and the Beginning of the Cold War, 1947–1949

The Czech edition of Socialist World was successful because of factional-
主义. Factional inﬁghting among Socialists tended to spill across national bor-
德斯. National debates over strategy or ideology became debates for the entire
movement; 反过来, international debates assumed a domestic dimension as
the factions inside each Socialist party took one side or the other. Controversy
and factionalism were the keys to success, 国内外, of simi-
lar editorial enterprises. In the same years of Socialist World, the journal of the
Labour left (Tribune) sold 10,000 copies and still struggled ﬁnancially.149 In
20世纪50年代, the periodicals of the British left served as a vehicle for internal de-
bate, thriving in factional controversy. Sales of Tribune rose to 18,000 copies
thanks to the quarrel between the Bevanites and the Labour right. This did
not exclude success abroad. The New Statesman, the most successful journal—
the only successful journal—sent 20,000 copies overseas, a quarter of its entire
circulation.150

The reason that only the Czech edition of Socialist World was success-
ful is precisely that factional struggle in Czechoslovakia made international
activities meaningful. Before the February 1948 Communist takeover, East
European Socialists debated whether to fuse with the Communists or to pre-
serve a distinct Socialist identity and ties with Western Socialists.151 Right-
wing Socialist elements like Bernard, Hochfeld, and the Hungarian Vilmos
Böhm wrote for Socialist World because their faction gained legitimacy and
deﬁned its identity by associating with Western Socialists. Right-wing So-
cialists sought a political and cultural alternative to the single-party state, A
synthesis of East and West by extending social rights and preserving political
pluralism, freedom of association, and worker self-management.152 Buset had
put forward this vision at the Zurich Conference, but it was Bán who asked
that the speech be published in Socialist World.153 The Polish rightwing So-
cialists used Socialist World to present their economic plan, which was based
on consumer goods, cooperatives, and a mixed economy, 相比之下

149. 肯尼思·O. 摩根, Michael Foot: A Life (伦敦: Harper Press, 2007), PP. 130–132, 160.

150. Lawrence Black, The Political Culture of the Left in Afﬂuent Britain, 1951–1964: Old Labour, 新的
英国? (贝辛斯托克, 英国: 帕尔格雷夫·麦克米伦, 2003), p. 171.

151. Karel Kaplan, Das verhängnisvolle Bündnis: Unterwanderung, Gleichschaltung und Vernichtung
der Tschechoslowakischen Sozialdemokratie 1944–1954 (Wuppertal: Pol—Verlag, 1984), PP. 107–
116.

152. Brandley F. Abrams, The Struggle for the Soul of the Nation: Czech Culture and the Rise of Commu-
nism (拉纳姆, 医学博士: 罗曼 & 利特尔菲尔德, 2004), PP. 220–221.

153. “Stenogramme,” 8 六月 1947, Annexe 6.

127

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Costa

Communist policy of complete nationalization, central direction, and heavy
industries.154

For some Socialist authors, Socialist World was the only platform available.
Böhm found that leftwing Socialists barred him from publishing his articles in
the party press in Hungary.155 To avoid being sidelined by the Polish embassy,
Hochfeld sent his article in French to Socialist World via the Labour attaché
at the British embassy in Warsaw. He trusted this line of communication and
wanted nothing to do with any channel controlled by the Polish Ministry of
外交事务, run by Communists.156

Socialist literature was not just a matter of supply but also of demand. 在
1945 the secretary of the ˇCSSD requested Socialist texts from Great Britain.
The same year, the craving of Czechoslovak citizens for British cultural prod-
ucts (报纸, 图书, 电影, and magazines) impressed a delegation of
the British Labour Party.157 Socialist World answered the needs of the ˇCSSD,
which had every interest in supporting the journal.

Even outside Czechoslovakia the demand for Socialist pamphlets and ar-
ticles was considerable, with requests coming to Britain from South America,
德国, 意大利, and Austria.158 The Labour Party was willing to meet this
overseas demand, seeing a genuine need to transmit Socialist articles across
national borders using the international Socialist network. Socialist World was
successful when it could facilitate this operation. 然而, an international
journal was not the best vehicle because of its limited public exposure and the
small number of people involved in its organization.

The many silences of Socialist World stemmed from overbearing rules
meant to forestall embarrassment. The entire structure of Socialist inter-
nationalism after the Second World War had been built around avoiding
controversy and embarrassment for the most important parties rather than
struggling toward a common goal. As Healey wrote, the role of an interna-
tional organization was “not so much . . . promoting positive action, 作为 . . .

154. A Polish correspondent, “Poland’s Three-Year Plan.”. See also Krystyna Kersten, The Establish-
ment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943–1948 (伯克利: University of California Press, 1991), p. 366.

155. Ullin J. McStea, “The Hungarian Social Democrats and the British Labour Party, 1944–8,” Ph.D.
指责。, University of the West of England, 2003, PP. 266–267. Böhm asked to publish the article
anonymously. Böhm to Thompson, 27 十二月 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 454, General Correspon-
登塞 1947.

156. Thompson to Hochfeld, 19 六月 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 454, General Correspondence 1947;
和M. Armstrong to Healey, 1 九月 1947, Hochfeld to Loeb, 6 八月 1947.

157. [Tom Williamson], “Czechoslovakia,” in LHASC, LP, International Sub-Committee, Minutes
and Documents, 1945.

158. Costa, Labour Party, Denis Healey and International Socialist Movement, PP. 63–64.

128

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The Socialist International and the Beginning of the Cold War, 1947–1949

preventing action by one member which might seriously but unintentionally
damage another.”159 This meant that Socialist World was wary of treating is-
sues that could damage the respectability of Socialists, question their ﬁtness
to govern, delegitimize their colonial policies, or stimulate factional struggle.
Loeb established the principle that Socialist World was “committed to pub-
lishing only articles advocating a policy with which the national party is in
agreement”—for example, asking the French for permission to publish an ar-
ticle about the Monnet Plan.160

Articles about the colonial situation were solicited from Socialists in col-
onizer counties, which explains why they were so defensive.161 Loeb requested
an article on developments in the Socialist movements in the British Empire
from Krivine, an employee of the Foreign Ofﬁce, specifying that the article
should be factual and avoid being overly critical.162 In 1948 Thompson in-
vited Socialists from Britain, 法国, and the Netherlands to produce a series
of articles about their colonial policies.163 For an article about the labor move-
ments of Latin America, SILO asked Robert J. 亚历山大, who was an expert
in the ﬁeld but also a Socialist activist in the United States who had worked
closely in this area with Jay Lovestone, who aided the “labor diplomacy” of
美国. State Department and CIA.164

到年底 1947, divergent political imperatives and a lack of clarity
about what the journal was allowed to publish made running Socialist World
difﬁcult. Loeb argued that SILO should have set up a steering committee to
lay down an editorial line, solve contentious issues, and decide on the degree
of controversy and criticism allowed.165 Could the journal have published per-
sonal contributions by well-known British Socialists with whom the Labour
Party was not in agreement—such as Leonard Woolf or G. D. H. Cole—or

159. Donald Healey [Denis Healey], “The Workers’ Internationals,” Tribune, 15 二月 1946.

160. Loeb to Usborne, 23 七月 1947; and Loeb to Henri Hauck, 31 行进 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 454,
General Correspondence 1947. No such article was published.

161. Loeb to Thomassen, 26 六月 1947.

162. Loeb to Cynthia Clarke, 16 十月 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 454, General Correspondence 1947;
and Krivine to Roberts, 1 十一月 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 454, General Correspondence 1947.

163. Thompson to M. H. Malacrida, 6 十月 1948, Thompson to Thomassen, 6 十月 1948,
and Thompson to Michael Foot, 6 October 1948—all in IISH, 和, Box 455, General Correspondence
Socialist World 1948. The articles were Hughes, “Labour’s Colonial Policy,” PP. 4–11; and Brutelle,
“French Policy in Indo-China,” PP. 12–17. The Dutch did not write anything.

164. Loeb to Robert Alexander, 3 七月 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 454, General Correspondence 1947.
See Jack Ross, The Socialist Party of America: A Complete History (华盛顿, 直流: Potomac Books,
2015), p. 435.

165. “Some proposals on the running and administration of the Socialist Information and Liaison
Ofﬁce,” 5 十一月 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 47.

129

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Costa

could only the parties publish such texts? Could the Polish Socialists have
offered comments on Britain? As the media outlet of a deeply divided move-
蒙特, Socialist World could not be an efﬁcient journal.

Anti-Communism proved to be an ideal opportunity to deploy a simple
narrative and powerful rhetorical arguments, 然而. The Socialists could
rally against their enemy, mourn their martyrs, damn their traitors, and cele-
brate their identity.

另一方面, some of the best lines of Socialist World can be
found in its merciless attacks against conservatives. The journal called Road to
Serfdom “shabby claptrap” and highlighted “the pitiful inadequacy of Hayek’s
political and economic theories.”166 Of The Case for Conservatism by a Con-
servative member of Parliament, Quintin Hogg, the journal proclaimed: “[他]
devotes nearly twice as much space and a great deal of woolly verbiage to his
任务, and succeeds only in showing that there is no case for conservatism.”167
The governments that were complicit with prewar appeasement were also easy
targets.

Cooperation with the Communists before the February 1948 coup in
Czechoslovakia, European integration, and nationalization were controversial
问题, and they forced the Socialists to explain their national situations and
to justify their policies. Other issues, such as economic planning, did not lend
themselves to public debate, and many parties preferred to keep such discus-
sions private. Criticism of fellow Socialists was to be kept tactful, making it
hard to have a proper debate. As Thompson conceded, one could not call
French Socialists “bloody fools” in a magazine they partly paid for, 即使
they deserved it.168

The failure of Socialist World was attributable to many factors, 但, 多于
全部, topics that would have made for interesting reading were too embarrass-
ing or controversial to publish, and safe topics were not of great interest. 这
journal faced other obstacles, including language barriers and regulations, 但
the poor sales offered no incentive to overcome them. Socialist World was the
answer to a real need—the circulation of propaganda, 观点, and informa-
tion among Socialist leaders—but it was not the best answer. The Socialist
International found cooperation with the Information Research Department
(IRD) much more fruitful.

166. “Reviews” (September–November 1947), p. 38.

167. “Reviews” (March–May 1948), p. 39.

168. Thompson to William Pickles, 30 七月 1948, in IISH, 和, Box 455, General correspondence
Socialist World 1948.

130

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The Socialist International and the Beginning of the Cold War, 1947–1949

Employees of the Information Service of the British Foreign Ofﬁce had
already written for Socialist World, but systematic cooperation between inter-
national Socialism and the British state started only in January 1948 和
the creation of the IRD, a special unit of British intelligence responsible for
distributing anti-Communist information and propaganda.169 As part of the
British propaganda offensive of 1948, the British Council distributed some
issues of Socialist World abroad.170 The Socialist International developed close
relations with the IRD, and Healey provided a list of reliable Socialist lead-
ers who could spread propaganda material in their books and newspapers.171
Material also came from the United States: Samuel D. Berger, the labor at-
taché of the U.S. embassy and a friend of Healey, provided an article by a
我们. writer for Socialist World (September–November 1948).172 From the be-
ginning, SILO passed the documents of the IRD to the Social Democrats
of Europe, and the IRD distributed material by the Socialist International, A
mutually beneﬁcial relationship that lasted for many years.173

Socialist World represented the unresolved contradiction of international
Socialist cooperation. One pole sought to emphasize the public and unani-
mous nature of the Socialist International to show the strength of the move-
ment and increase the prestige of its leaders, whereas the other pole strove
to create a forum based on conﬁdentiality and trust in which Socialist lead-
ers could exchange information and debate controversial issues frankly.174
One pole courted public opinion; the other shunned it. Both functions were
重要的, indeed essential, for international Socialist cooperation. In later
几十年, the Socialists adopted ﬂexible structures and instruments for such
合作, choosing public attention or conﬁdentiality according to their
goal.175 Socialist World had proved in the late 1940s that an instrument trying
to reconcile both functions was bound to fail.

169. Andrew Defty, 英国, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda, 1945–53: The Information
Research Department (伦敦: 劳特利奇, 2004), PP. 40–74; and Hugh Wilford, The CIA, 英国人
左边, and the Cold War: Calling the Tune (伦敦: 劳特利奇, 2003), PP. 48–49.

170. C. 右. Billob (British Council, Periodicals Department) to Socialist World, 11 二月 1948, 在
IISH, 和, Box 455, General Correspondence Socialist World 1948.

171. Healey to J. H. 沃森, 6 十二月 1948, in TNAUK, FO 1110/47-PR1211/G.

172. Mildred Wallace to Healey, 25 行进 1947, in IISH, 和, Box 454, General Correspondence
1947.

173. Thompson to Andersen, 28 六月 1948, in IISH, 和, Box 455, General Correspondence Socialist
世界 1948; and Costa, Labour Party, p. 64.

174. Devin, Internationale socialiste, PP. 182, 311–318.

175. Salm, Transnational Socialist Networks in the 1970s, p. 152.

131

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