保卫美国

Defending the
美国

Jaganath Sankaran
and Steve Fetter

Revisiting National Missile Defense
against North Korea

我们. policymakers
have long feared the emergence of a North Korean intercontinental ballis-
抽动导弹 (ICBM) threat. 在 1998, the congressionally mandated bipartisan
Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, 已知的
as the Rumsfeld Commission, argued that North Korea was devoting an “ex-
traordinary level of resources” to obtain ballistic missiles to threaten and co-
erce the United States, suggesting that North Korea could acquire ICBM
capability within ªve years of deciding to do so.1 North Korea made intermit-
tent and limited progress in its nuclear and missile program since the
Rumsfeld Commission, but these programs accelerated after Kim Jong Un
came to power in 2011.2 在 2016 和 2017, North Korea conducted three nu-
clear tests, the last of which had a yield that exceeded 100 kilotons.3 In 2017,
North Korea test-launched two ICBMs: the Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15. 这
director of the U.S. Department of Defense’s Missile Defense Agency (MDA),
Lieutenant General Samuel Greaves, testiªed that the Hwasong-14 has the
range to target North America, and the Hwasong-15 can target the continental

Jaganath Sankaran is Assistant Professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the Univer-
sity of Texas, Austin. Steve Fetter is Professor at the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland,
学院公园.

The authors thank Phil Coyle, 南希·加拉格尔, Richard Garwin, Charles Glaser, Laura Grego,
Frederick Lamb, Ted Postol, Kingston Reif, Frank von Hippel, James Wells, and the anonymous re-
viewers for their detailed feedback and suggestions on various iterations of this article. Jaganath
Sankaran is grateful to Carnegie Corporation of New York for ªnancial support of his research.
The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/AYU9V4.

1. Donald H. Rumsfeld et al., Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the
美国 (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: Government Printing Ofªce [GPO], 七月 1998), https://fas.org/
irp/threat/missile/rumsfeld/toc.htm.
2. For details on the progression of the North Korean nuclear and missile programs in the 2000s,
see Daniel A. Pinkston, The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program (卡莱尔, 帕。: Strategic Studies In-
研究所, 我们. 陆军战争学院, 二月 2008); and Jaganath Sankaran, “Missile Defenses and
Strategic Stability in Asia: Evidence from Simulations,” Journal of East Asian Studies, 卷. 20, 不. 3
(十一月 2020), PP. 3–7, https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2020.10.
3. Kelsey Davenport, “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms
Control Association, 七月 2020, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron. There is some
evidence that North Korea has been able to miniaturize a nuclear device for missile delivery.
See Nicola Smith, “North Korea Likely Has Miniature Nuclear Warheads, UN Report Finds,”
Telegraph, 八月 4, 2020, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/08/04/north-korea-likely-
has-miniature-nuclear-warheads-un-report/; and Jack Kim, “North Korea Can Put Nuclear
Warhead on Mid-Range Missile—South,” 路透社, 四月 5, 2016, https://in.reuters.com/article/
uk-northkorea-nuclear-idUKKCN0X21FI.

国际安全, 卷. 46, 不. 3 (冬天 2021/22), PP. 51–86, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00426
© 2022 由哈佛大学和麻省理工学院的校长和研究员撰写.
根据知识共享署名发布 4.0 国际的 (抄送 4.0) 执照.

51

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国际安全 46:3 52

United States.4 After two years of accelerated strategic weapons testing, Kim
Jong Un, 在他的 2018 New Year’s address, declared that North Korea now pos-
sesses “a powerful and reliable war deterrent” capable of countering any U.S.
nuclear threats.5

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs have been the primary motiva-
tion for longstanding U.S. national missile defense efforts. Beginning in the
late-1990s, the United States developed at extraordinary cost a national missile
defense architecture, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) 系统, 到
deny North Korea the ability to use or threaten to use ICBMs to coerce the
United States and its allies.6 The GMD system is the only deployed missile de-
fense system devoted to defending the U.S. homeland. The GMD system’s in-
terceptors are deployed in the United States, with forty interceptors at Fort
Greely, Alaska, and four at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California.7 In the
event of a North Korean ICBM launch, space-based sensors will begin tracking
it within seconds. Ground-based radars, located worldwide, will continue
tracking the ICBM after its rocket motor burns out and the warhead is
released. The radars will guide the interceptors to a predicted intercept point.
As the interceptor nears the predicted intercept point, a kill vehicle is expected
识别, home in on, and collide with the missile warhead while it is coast-
ing in space toward the target.

More than twenty years after it was ªrst developed, the GMD system
remains limited and unproven. 尤其, the MDA has not demonstrated
GMD’s ability to defeat countermeasures that are technologically simple and
economically trivial compared with the effort needed to develop nuclear-
armed ICBMs.8 The GMD system has repeatedly suffered technical setbacks,

4. Senate Hearing 116-AS29, FY20 Priorities for Missile Defense and Defeat Programs, before the
Subcomm. on Strategic Forces, 116th Cong., 可能 8, 2019 (Statement of Lt. Gen. Samuel Greaves,
USAF, Director, Missile Defense Agency), p. 5. 在 2017, North Korea demonstrated a limited ability
to launch solid-propellant medium-range ballistic missiles, 哪个, if scaled up to intercontinental
ranges, would enable North Korea, 原则, to prepare and launch ICBMs within minutes. 看
Senate Hearing, Worldwide threats, before the Comm. on Armed Services, 四月 29, 2021 (状态-
ment of Lieutenant General Scott Berrier, 我们. Army, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency), p. 22,
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/worldwide-threats.
5. Kim Jong Un, “Kim Jong Un’s 2018 New Year’s Address,” National Committee on North Korea,
一月 1, 2018, https://www.ncnk.org/node/1427.
6. The GMD system ranks fourth among the seventy-eight most expensive major defense pro-
克. See United States Government Accountability Ofªce [GAO], “Missile Defense: 这
Warªghter and Decision Makers Would Beneªt from Better Communication about the System’s
Capabilities and Limitations” (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: GAO, 可能 2018), p. 70, https://www.gao.gov/
assets/gao-18-324.pdf.
7. 我们. 国防部, 2019 Missile Defense Review (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: 我们. Department of
Defense, 2019), p. X.
8. 理查德·L. Garwin, “Holes in the Missile Shield,” Scientiªc American, 卷. 291, 不. 5 (十一月
2004), p. 77, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26060765.

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保卫美国 53

critical program cancellations, large cost increases, and signiªcant delays.9
自成立以来, 而且, the multitude of interceptor kill vehicle designs
that have been proposed have all been unreliable. Most recently, 在八月
2019, the Department of Defense terminated the Redesigned Kill Vehicle
(RKV) program because design problems were so “signiªcant as to be either
insurmountable or cost-prohibitive to correct.”10 The RKV program had been
at the center of the MDA’s effort to improve the GMD system’s ability to deal
with the growing North Korean threat.

This article seeks to explain why the GMD system is faltering despite im-
mense funding, and why it has been so poorly executed. We trace the system’s
failings to its rushed deployment by the George W. Bush administration. Spe-
ciªcally, we argue that three causal factors—the perception of North Korea as
an imminent foreign threat, domestic politics, and technological hubris—
enabled the Bush administration to ignore warnings about technological
immaturity and discard concerns over strategic stability.

Notwithstanding its limitations, the pursuit of the GMD system has persis-
tently provoked a strong response from Russia and China.11 The Bush admin-
istration, claiming Russia was no longer a strategic adversary, argued that
strategic stability was a Cold War construct that was no longer relevant. 这
administration claimed that the United States should no longer be bound by
legacy arms control agreements. As Secretary of State Colin Powell noted in a
2002 congressional testimony, 美国. message to Russia on nuclear arms re-
ductions and national missile defense was, “This is where we are going. 我们
are going there unilaterally. Come with us or not. Stay where you are or not . . .
you can do whatever you think you have to do for your security.”12 In pursu-
ing national missile defense, the Bush administration presumed that any off-
setting counter-nuclear armament by Russia and China would not affect
我们. security and strategy.13 While these presumptions may have been plausi-

9. GAO, “Missile Defense: Observations on Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Acquisition Chal-
lenges and Potential Contract Strategy Changes” (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: GAO, 十月 21, 2020), p. 1,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-135r.pdf.
10. Jen Judson, “Pentagon Terminates Program for Redesigned Kill Vehicle, Preps for New Com-
请愿,” Defense News, 八月 21, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/08/21/
dod-tanks-redesigned-kill-vehicle-program-for-homeland-defense-interceptor/.
11. 我们. 国防部, “Layered Homeland Missile Defense: A Strategy for De-
fending the United States” (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: 我们. 国防部, 六月 22, 2020), p. 3,
https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/22/2002319425/-1/-1/1/LAYERED-HOMELAND-MISSILE-
DEFENSE-FINAL.PDF.
12. Senate Hearing 107–622, Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction: The Moscow Treaty, Day 1,
before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 107th Cong., 2d sess., 七月 9, 2002 (statement of Hon.
Colin L. 鲍威尔, Secretary of State), p. 10, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-
107shrg81339/pdf/CHRG-107shrg81339.pdf.
13. 同上.

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国际安全 46:3 54

ble at that time, they can no longer guide U.S. strategy in the current “era of
strategic competition.”14

Ballistic missile defense is now the foremost source of contestation in U.S.-
Russia and U.S.-China strategic stability conversations. 在一个 2019 joint state-
蒙特, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping
declared that the unrestricted development of national missile defense by the
United States threatens strategic stability.15 Putin has justiªed developing sev-
eral new strategic weapon systems as a measure to defeat U.S. missile de-
栅栏, which he has claimed could neutralize the vital components of Russian
nuclear deterrent forces.16 Chinese leaders have made similar arguments justi-
fying their nuclear weapons programs as a response to U.S. missile defenses.
These changes in Russian and Chinese nuclear postures are now of profound
concern to U.S. security and are weakening support for sustaining the 2011
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and other arms control
measures that provide a way to avert nuclear arms racing.17

Countering North Korean ICBMs without compromising stability with
Russia and China is challenging. Diplomatic efforts have so far failed to limit
the North Korean threat, and the prospects for North Korean disarmament are
dim. The United States is not prepared to rely entirely on the threat of devas-
tating retaliation to deter North Korea; 因此, the United States has emphasized
missile defenses. We offer an alternative missile defense architecture, an air-
borne boost-phase intercept (BPI) 系统, as a potential and more sensible way
to defend against North Korean ICBMs. Such a system would have no capabil-
ity against Russian and Chinese ICBMs, thus minimizing strategic stability
担忧. A variety of recent technological advances—such as long-endurance
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), high-performance rocket motors, 和
improvements in missile-tracking sensors—may make airborne BPI feasible
against current liquid-fueled North Korean ICBMs. Against hypothetical solid-
fueled North Korean ICBMs, airborne BPI defenses can be effective in in-

14. Berrier Statement, 四月 29, 2021, p. 2. In this testimony, LT. Gen. Berrier stated that Russia is
an “existential threat,” and China was “a major security challenge and remains a long-term strate-
gic competitor.”
15. Assistant Foreign Minister Zhang Jun, “Working Together to Maintain Global Strategic Stabil-
ity and Promote World Peace and Development,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs People’s Republic of
中国, 六月 12, 2019, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1672187
.shtml.
16. Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” speech at the Manezh Central
Exhibition Hall in Moscow, 行进 1, 2018, President of Russia, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/56957.
17. Joseph R. Biden Jr., “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance” (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: 白色的
房子, 行进 2021), p. 13, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-
1v2.pdf; and Joseph R. Detrani, “The New START Extension Lacks Critical Points for Strategic
Stability,” Hill, 七月 8, 2021, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/561774-the-new-start-
extension-lacks-critical-points-for-strategic.

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保卫美国 55

tercepting several missile trajectories launched from the eastern and central
regions of North Korea. Airborne BPI defenses would not be able to intercept
solid-fueled launches from the northwestern region of North Korea, 但是这个
limitation could be overcome with Chinese cooperation.

This article is organized as follows. In the ªrst section, we review debates
超过美国. national missile defense, including its inºuence on the concept of
strategic stability. In the second section, we outline a framework for under-
standing the rush to deploy national missile defense in the 1990s. 在里面
third section, we explore how that rush to deployment has undermined na-
tional missile defense efforts in the long-term, detailing the programmatic fail-
ures and conceptual ºaws plaguing the GMD effort. The fourth section
reviews Russian and Chinese claims that U.S. ballistic missile defense threat-
ens bilateral strategic stability, drives their nuclear modernization efforts, 和
imperils future arms control. In the ªfth section, we examine alternatives to the
GMD system and detail recent technological advances that suggest the viabil-
ity of airborne BPI systems against North Korean ICBMs. 最后, we conclude
with recommendations to meaningfully realign national missile defense efforts
to address current and future threats to U.S. 安全, including establishing a
bipartisan presidential commission.

National Missile Defense and Strategic Stability

Two important aspects of the contemporary debates over national missile de-
fense and strategic stability have roots in the Cold War. The heated debates in
the 1950s and 1960s, detailed below, led to the realization in the United States
that the deployment of national missile defenses could undermine the ability
of offensive forces that survived a ªrst strike to penetrate the defense, giving
an incentive for both sides to initiate nuclear war in a crisis. 此外, 这
deployment of defenses could provoke a nuclear arms race, as both sides in-
creased their offensive forces to ensure penetration of the adversary’s missile
defense system.18 To avert such a crisis and arms race instability, 联合
状态, and eventually the Soviet Union, accepted that negotiated limits on
national missile defense were essential to preserve stability in U.S.-Soviet nu-
clear deterrence.

在 1955, 美国. Army started work on the prototype Nike-Zeus missile de-
fense system to achieve nationwide defense against the Soviet Union.19 While

18. John D. 施泰因布鲁纳, “National Security and the Concept of Strategic Stability,》杂志
Conºict Resolution, 卷. 22, 不. 3 (九月 1978), p. 413, https://www.jstor.org/stable/173725.
19. 我们. Congress Ofªce of Technology Assessment, “Ballistic Missile Defense Then and Now,”
Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: GPO, 1985), p. 45.

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国际安全 46:3 56

the army wanted to deploy the system, the Dwight D. Eisenhower admini-
stration was unconvinced about its performance. The project acquired urgency
after the Sputnik launch in 1957.20 在 1958, the army was authorized to de-
velop the Nike-Zeus system as a damage-limitation measure against Soviet
missiles.21 This system relied on mechanically steered radars and a relatively
slow interceptor missile that had to be launched while the warhead was still
far out in space. The system was highly susceptible to decoys and saturation
missile attacks.22 These limitations, and the belief that the Soviets would offset
the missile defense system with more offensive forces, led Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara to veto the system’s deployment.23

The technical weaknesses of the Nike-Zeus system led to the development
of the Nike-X missile defense system in 1961. This newer system employed a
high-speed terminal-defense interceptor, Sprint, to work around the warhead-
decoy discrimination problem.24 It also incorporated electronic scanning ra-
dars that mitigated the offense’s ability to saturate the defense. Secretary
McNamara, 然而, remained skeptical. His objections to national missile
defense stemmed from research conducted as early as 1962 in the Pentagon’s
Systems Analysis Ofªce exploring two variants of Nike-X deployment
and their effects on strategic stability. The analysis concluded that in either
case the Soviets would be driven to respond to Nike-X deployment be-
cause the Soviets would otherwise lose their deterrent against the United
States.25 The Soviet Union had both the technological capability and the eco-
nomic capacity to respond in several ways, “including adding [多种的
Independent Reentry Vehicles] MIRV’s and penetration aids, adding sea-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBM’s) or a mobile ICBM, adding a higher pay-
load missile, or some combination of these responses.”26 Any such Soviet
response would trigger U.S. deployment of additional offensive and defensive
系统. Summarizing the arms race cycle that would unfold, the System

20. Alain C. Enthoven and Wayne K. 史密斯, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program,
1961–1969 (圣莫妮卡, 加利福尼亚州。: RAND, 2005), p. 184.
21. David N. 施瓦茨, “Past and Present: The Historical Legacy,” in Ashton B. Carter and David
氮. 施瓦茨, 编辑。, Ballistic Missile Defense (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: 布鲁金斯学会出版社, 1984),
p. 332.
22. Enthoven and Smith, How Much Is Enough? PP. 170, 185.
23. 施瓦茨, “Past and Present: The Historical Legacy,” PP. 333–335.
24. Enthoven and Smith, How Much Is Enough? p. 186.
25. In a March 1967 testimony to Congress, Secretary McNamara stated, “it is a virtual certainty
that the Soviets will act to maintain their deterrent which casts such grave doubts on the advisabil-
ity of our deploying the Nike X system.” See U.S. Congress Ofªce of Technology Assessment, “Bal-
listic Missile Defense Then and Now,” p. 46.
26. Enthoven and Smith, How Much Is Enough? p. 188.

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保卫美国 57

Analysis Ofªce warned that the deployment of Nike-X would provide no se-
curity beneªt and would lead both sides into an arms race.27

The armed forces did not accept the System Analysis Ofªce’s conclusions,
arguing that the Soviet Union did not size its nuclear arsenal using the criteria
applied by civilian analysts at the Pentagon.28 They claimed that the Soviet
Union relied on a nuclear warªghting strategy rather than the U.S. 更喜欢-
ence for punitive nuclear retaliation. The armed forces also contended that the
Soviet Union could not afford to respond to all U.S. deployments.29

By late 1966, evidence of the Soviet Union’s deployment of its Galosh missile
defense system increased pressure on the Lyndon B. Johnson administration
to deploy the Nike-X system. In an extraordinary meeting at the White House
on January 23, 1967, Secretary McNamara assembled, along with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, all past and current Special Assistants to the President for
Science and Technology and all past and current directors of defense research
and engineering to advise President Johnson on the desirability of a national
missile defense system.30 President Johnson reportedly inquired if such a sys-
tem would work against the Soviet Union, to which the overwhelming answer
was “no.”31 President Johnson was convinced to delay deploying the Nike-X
系统, a decision that would soon be altered by developments in U.S. domes-
tic politics.

In February 1967, the Republican National Committee published a mono-
graph entitled The Missile Defense Question: Is LBJ Right?, which argued
strongly for deploying the Nike-X system against the Soviet nuclear threat.32
For Johnson, the monograph’s reference to his decision to defer the deploy-
ment of Nike-X was a ploy to inºuence the 1968 election.33 In a compromise,
Johnson requested money in the 1968 ªscal year budget to procure long lead
time subsystems for Nike-X and made this funding contingent on efforts to ne-
gotiate missile defense limits with the Soviet Union.34 Unable to persuade the

27. Alain Enthoven and Wayne Smith note that this conclusion remains robust under any reason-
able range of assumptions and nuclear exchange calculations. Enthoven and Smith, How Much Is
足够的? PP. 187–188.
28. 施瓦茨, “Past and Present,” p. 337.
29. 同上.
30. Ernest J. Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy: 战略, 技术, and Politics, 1955–1972
(列克星敦: University Press of Kentucky, 1977), p. 124.
31. 同上。; Herbert F. 约克, “Military Technology and National Security,” Scientiªc American,
卷. 221, 不. 2 (八月 1969), p. 18, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24926434; 和施瓦茨, “Past
and Present,” p. 338.
32. Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy, p. 125.
33. 同上.
34. 施瓦茨, “Past and Present,” p. 337; 和美国. Congress Ofªce of Technology Assessment,
“Ballistic Missile Defense Then and Now,” p. 46.

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国际安全 46:3 58

Soviets on missile defense arms control, President Johnson moved to fund a
scaled-down Nike-X system named Sentinel in 1968.35

After its own review, 在 1969 the Richard M. Nixon administration agreed
with the Johnson administration’s position that it was desirable to limit na-
tional missile defense. In March 1969, President Nixon also announced the de-
cision to deploy the Safeguard missile defense system to defend Minuteman
ICBM sites rather than the Sentinel system that focused on national defense.36
President Nixon emphasized that “there is no way that we can adequately de-
fend our cities without an unacceptable loss of life.”37 He noted that deploying
a national missile defense system would provoke an offensive nuclear arms
buildup by the Soviet Union, fostering crisis and arms race instability.38 He
stressed that he wanted an even more scaled-down system with “no provoca-
tion which might deter arms talks” with the Soviet Union.39 By May 1971, 这
United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement on limiting missile
defenses. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was signed in May 1972,
banning national missile defense systems and limiting each country to 100 在-
terceptors for the defense of an individual region (IE。, the national capital or
an ICBM ªeld). The ABM Treaty paved the way for the ªrst agreed limitation
on offensive arms. For a decade, both states refrained from any signiªcant mis-
sile defense deployments.

In January 1983, President Ronald Reagan established a Commission on
Strategic Forces, known as the Scowcroft Commission, and charged it with ex-
amining the future of ICBM forces. Two months later, Reagan surprised de-
fense analysts by announcing the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a program
aiming to build a national missile defense shield over the United States. 这
was met with widespread skepticism over the ability to deliver what the SDI
promised. In April 1983, the Scowcroft Commission noted that prevailing tech-
nological capabilities did not provide a viable pathway to deploy national
missile defense anytime soon.40 In a 1985 address to the Philadelphia World
Affairs Council, Paul Nitze, President Reagan’s special advisor on arms con-
控制, clariªed that if technology were eventually to permit such a defense, 它

35. 施瓦茨, “Past and Present,” p. 339.
36. Richard Nixon, “The President’s News Conference: Deployment of the Anti-ballistic Missile
系统,” news conference, White House, 行进 14, 1969, 美国总统项目, https://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-153.
37. 同上.
38. 同上.
39. 同上.
40. President’s Commission on Strategic Forces, Report of the President’s Commission on Strategic
军队 (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: White House, 四月 1983), p. 9, http://web.mit.edu/chemistry/deutch/
policy/1983-ReportPresCommStrategic.pdf.

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保卫美国 59

would be deployed in a cooperative effort with the Soviet Union.41 Nitze
identiªed two criteria to evaluate the feasibility of SDI deployment.42 The ªrst
required that the defensive systems be survivable, or that the defenses should
not themselves be attractive targets for a ªrst strike. The second criterion re-
quired that the defensive systems be cost-effective at the margin. 其他
字, deploying the defensive systems should not trigger an adversary to ex-
pand its offensive arsenal, which would foster arms race instability. 没有
meeting both these criteria, Nitze said, there would be no deployment of SDI.43
Until 2001, every U.S. administration since 1968 had acknowledged the im-
portance of strategic stability and the need for balance between offensive and
defensive capabilities. President George W. Bush broke with this consensus in
a May 2001 speech at the National Defense University, in which he argued that
“Cold War deterrence is no longer enough” to deter so-called rogue states
such as North Korea.44 President Bush and his advisors declared that future
nuclear arms control would be accomplished outside of the Cold War–era
框架, abandoning the primacy of strategic stability as an organizing
concept.45 In December 2001, the president announced his decision to with-
draw from the ABM Treaty and to immediately pursue the GMD system.46

41. Paul H. Nitze, “On the Road to a More Stable Peace,” address before the Philadelphia World
Affairs Council, 宾夕法尼亚州, 二月 20, 1985 (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: 我们. Department of State, Bu-
reau of Public Affairs, 1985), PP. 1, 3.
42. 同上。, p. 2. Nitze’s criteria were not immediately accepted by the Reagan administration. 看
Nancy W. 加拉格尔, “Congress and Missile Defense,” in Catherine McArdle Kelleher and Peter
Dombrowski, 编辑。, Regional Missile Defense from a Global Perspective (斯坦福大学, 加利福尼亚州。: 斯坦福大学-
大学出版社, 2015), p. 87.
43. Nitze, “On the Road to a More Stable Peace,” p. 2.
44. 乔治·W. 衬套, “Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense Uni-
大学,” Fort Lesley J. McNair, 华盛顿, 华盛顿特区, 可能 1, 2001, White House, https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010501-10.html. An excellent theoretical
exploration of the impact of national missile defense on nuclear deterrence is Robert Powell, “Nu-
clear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense,” International Secu-
理性, 卷. 27, 不. 4 (春天 2003), PP. 86–118, https://doi.org/10.1162/016228803321951108.
45. Powell Statement, 七月 9, 2002, PP. 6–7.
46. Terence Neilan, “Bush Pulls Out of ABM Treaty; Putin Calls Move a Mistake,” New York
时代, 十二月 13, 2001, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/13/international/bush-pulls-out-
of-abm-treaty-putin-calls-move-a-mistake.html. 在 2007, the Bush administration also proceeded
to develop plans to deploy a European version of the GMD system aimed at dealing with future
Iranian ICBMs. See Karen Travers, “Bush to Putin: ‘Cold War Is Over,’” ABC News, 六月 6, 2007,
https://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id(西德:2)3245434. President Barack Obama, 然而, in an at-
tempt to reassure Russia, altered these plans and deployed a version called the European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA) missile defense system. The EPAA system was based on the less capa-
ble SM-3 interceptors. See Jaganath Sankaran, The United States’ European Phased Adaptive Approach
Missile Defense System: Defending against Iranian Missile Threats without Diluting the Russian Deter-
租 (圣莫妮卡, 加利福尼亚州。: RAND, 2015), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR957
.html; and Jaganath Sankaran, “Missile Defense against Iran without Threatening Russia,” Arms
Control Association, 十一月 2013, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013-11/missile-defense-
against-iran-without-threatening-russia#5.

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国际安全 46:3 60

The Rush to Deploy: The Genesis of the GMD System

The GMD system is the only deployed missile defense system devoted to de-
fending the U.S. homeland. The GMD system, 然而, was not the result of a
rigorous design, 测试, and validation process that explored a range of alterna-
特维斯. All major defense programs require that any new technologies and de-
signs have been validated before developing a prototype. Program managers
must show that the chosen prototype design has been rigorously tested and
has met all technical expectations set by the military end user, and they must
demonstrate the prototype’s ability to meet cost and schedule targets before
beginning production and deployment. 此外, throughout this process,
an acquisition program is subject to stringent independent oversight on cost
and quality control.47 In contrast, the GMD system was an unvalidated archi-
tecture that the George W. Bush administration cobbled together from pre-
vious experimental missile defense systems and hastily pushed forward.48

早在 2001, LT. Gen. Ronald Kadish, then director of the MDA, advised
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that the GMD system “provided the
earliest opportunity and probably the only option” that was feasible within
the next decade.49 But he also acknowledged that it had substantial technical
uncertainties.50 Yet, 经过 2004, the Bush administration had brought the GMD
system to operational status, employing an acquisition process that was criti-
cized as “buy ªrst, think later.”51 In doing so, the Bush administration cir-
cumvented the political and technological scrutiny that is usually required
for major weapons development projects. We detail below three factors—
imminent foreign threat, domestic politics, and technological hubris—that ex-
plain how the Bush administration obtained the political sanction to rush the
GMD system into deployment.52

47. GAO, “Missile Defense: Opportunities Exist to Reduce Acquisition Risk and Improve Re-
porting on System Capabilities” (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: GAO, 可能 2015), p. 6–10, https://www.gao
.gov/assets/gao-15-345.pdf; and GAO, “Missile Defense: Delivery Delays Provide Opportunity
for Increased Testing to Better Understand Capability” (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: GAO, 六月 2019), p. 5,
https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-19-387.
48. Anthony H. Cordesman, Strategic Threats and National Missile Defenses: Defending the U.S.
Homeland (韦斯特波特, 康涅狄格州: 普雷格, Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], 2002),
p. 13.
49. Bradley Graham, Hit to Kill: The New Battle over Shielding America from Missile Attack (新的
约克: Public Affairs, 2001), PP. 360–361.
50. 同上。, PP. 60–61.
51. Wade Boese, “Pentagon Outlines Missile Defense Plans to Congress,” Arms Control Today,
卷. 32, 不. 3 (四月 2002), PP. 24–25, https://www.jstor.org/stable/23626512.
52. The framework used in this article shares similarities to other theories developed to study how
major defense program acquisitions succeed. See Harvey M. 萨波尔斯基, “Success and Its Secrets,“ 在
The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government, reprint ed.

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保卫美国 61

imminent foreign threat: north korea

A broad political consensus on the North Korean missile threat to the United
States had already emerged in the mid-1990s. 在一个 1994 executive order,
President Bill Clinton declared a “national emergency” to address the “un-
usual and extraordinary” threat posed to the United States by the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery to rogue states
like North Korea.53 In a 1996 speech, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry reit-
erated the rogue state threat and argued for the “need to be ready” to deploy a
national missile defense system.54

Two events in 1998 pushed the North Korean threat further into the political
limelight and provided new impetus for national missile defense. In July 1998,
the Rumsfeld Commission warned that North Korea could acquire ICBMs
within ªve years, claiming that the prevailing geopolitical environment pro-
vided North Korea easier access to the technology, 材料, and expertise
necessary to develop ICBMs.55 The ªndings of the Rumsfeld Commission up-
ended previous intelligence estimates that attached a much longer timeline to
North Korean missile ambitions.56 The report suggested that while such mis-
siles may not match the reliability and accuracy of U.S. 系统, 他们可以
be deployed at a faster pace.57 Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich called the
commission’s ªndings “the most important [国家安全] warning” since
冷战, and he declared the immediate need to pursue a national mis-
sile defense system.58

(剑桥, 大量的。: 哈佛大学出版社, 2013); and Thomas L. McNaugher, New Weapons,
Old Politics: America’s Military Procurement Muddle (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: 布鲁金斯学会出版社,
1989).
53. 威廉·J. 克林顿, “Executive Order 12938: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”
(华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: White House, 十一月 14, 1994), https://www.archives.gov/ªles/federal-
register/executive-orders/pdf/12938.pdf.
54. 威廉·J. Perry, “Secretary of Defense Speech: Protecting the Nation Through Ballistic Missile
Defense. Prepared Remarks Defense Secretary William J. Perry, George Washington University,
华盛顿,” U.S. 国防部, 四月 18, 1996, https://web.archive.org/web/
20130715085136/http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid(西德:2)956.
55. Rumsfeld et al., Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat.
56. See Graham, Hit to Kill, PP. 50–51.
57. Rumsfeld et al., Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat. 相似地, Robert D.
Walpole testiªed in 2000 that weaker countries trying to deter, constrain, and harm the United
States do not need to deploy ICBMs “in large numbers” and the ICBMs “need not be accurate or
reliable.” He suggested that the strategic value of such ICBMs “is derived primarily from the
threat of their use, not the near certain outcome of such use.” See Senate Hearing 106-671, 纳-
tional Intelligence Estimate on the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, before the
Subcomm. on International Security, 增殖, and Federal Services of the Comm. on Govern-
mental Affairs, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 二月 9, 2000 (statement of Robert D. Walpole, 国家的
Intelligence Ofªcer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, National Intelligence Council), p. 7,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106shrg63638/pdf/CHRG-106shrg63638.pdf.
58. Graham, Hit to Kill, p. 48.

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国际安全 46:3 62

A few weeks later, North Korea launched the Taepodong-1. 根据
a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) ofªcer, 美国. intelligence commu-
nity was surprised by the North Korean attempt to launch a multiple-stage
rocket.59 Republican proponents of national missile defense portrayed the
Taepodong-1 launch as validation of the Rumsfeld Commission’s ªndings.60
These events prompted the Clinton administration to start experimental test-
ing of interceptors; 同时地, the administration opened a dialogue with
Russia on amending the ABM Treaty to accommodate deploying a limited na-
tional missile defense system.61

domestic politics

The Republican Party’s 1994 midterm election manifesto, Contract with
美国, crafted by Newt Gingrich, declared that “it shall be the policy of the
United States to deploy at the earliest possible moment an antiballistic missile
system.”62 When the Republican Party won control of both houses of Congress
in the midterm elections, it immediately demanded a commitment to missile
defenses. The provisions on missile defense in Contract with America were then
used against President Clinton in the 1996 election.63 Bob Dole, 总统
Clinton’s Republican challenger in the election, characterized Clinton’s cau-
tious approach to missile defense as “one of the most shortsighted, irresponsi-
ble and potentially catastrophic policies in history.”64 Similar to President
Johnson’s strategy in 1967, President Clinton announced his own missile de-
fense plan (known as the 3(西德:3)3 plan) to deºate Republican pressure.65 Members
of the Clinton administration admitted that the plan was heavy on rhetoric
and weak on technical feasibility.66

在 2001, the George W. Bush administration came into ofªce convinced that
it was more urgent to address the North Korean threat than Russia’s position

59. Cordesman, Strategic Threats and National Missile Defenses, p. 122.
60. Graham, Hit to Kill, p. 61.
61. 安德鲁饲料, Ballistic Missile Defence and US National Security Policy: Normalisation and Accep-
tance after the Cold War (纽约: 劳特利奇, 2015), PP. 89–90.
62. Newt Gingrich, “Republican Contract with America” (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: 我们. House of Rep-
resentatives, 九月 27, 1994), https://web.archive.org/web/19990427174200/http://万维网
.house.gov/house/Contract/CONTRACT.html.
63. Futter, Ballistic Missile Defence and US National Security Policy, p. 57.
64. Katharine Q. Seelye, “Dole Tries to Talk about Jobs, but Tobacco Keeps Intruding,” New York
时代,
六月 19, 1996, https://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/19/us/dole-tries-to-talk-about-jobs-
but-tobacco-keeps-intruding.html.
65. 这 3(西德:3)3 plan, outlined in 1996, supported the development and demonstration of a national
missile defense (NMD) system by three years, or by the year 2000. At that point, depending on the
evolution of the North Korean threat and viability of the NMD system, a decision would be made
for deployment in three years, or by the year 2003. Futter, Ballistic Missile Defence and US National
Security Policy, p. 63.
66. Futter, Ballistic Missile Defence and US National Security Policy, PP. 72–73.

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保卫美国 63

on the ABM Treaty. During his campaign, Bush had characterized North Korea
as an imminent threat to U.S. national security.67 He had promised, if elected,
to immediately build national missile defense.68 The September 11, 2001, 特尔-
rorist attacks added a sense of vulnerability that further paved the way for
an early deployment decision.69 In the immediate aftermath of the attacks,
Democrats, usually missile defense skeptics, were less willing to oppose a
president on a matter of national security.70

In December 2001, President George W. Bush announced his decision to
withdraw from the ABM Treaty. A year later, he signed a National Security
Presidential Directive stipulating deployment of missile defenses within two
years.71 In 2004, the Bush administration declared that a limited national mis-
sile defense system was operational with ªve deployed interceptors.72 In stan-
dard weapons acquisition procedures, the military typically presents its
requirements and performance expectations for responding to a well-deªned
threat. But the Bush administration reversed this process when it decided to
rapidly engineer a national missile defense system. 在 2001, Kadish declared at
a news conference, “. . . we’re going to provide the military decision-makers
and users what we can produce and ask them a very simple question—’We can
do this technically; is this good enough for you to use?’”73 He argued that “in-
stead of working very hard, very high risk, trying to meet a [warªghter] 关于-
quirement,” the initial effort was aimed at putting something in place as soon
as possible.74

technological hubris

这些年来, various proponents have referenced the United States’ unique
ability to technologically innovate as justiªcation for the George W. Bush ad-
ministration’s rush to deploy missile defenses. These proponents have argued

67. 乔治·W. 衬套, “A Period of Consequences,” speech at The Citadel, South Carolina, 塞普滕-
误码率 23, 1999, http://www3.citadel.edu/pao/addresses/pres_bush.html. See also George W. 衬套,
“President Bush Speech on Missile Defence, 可能 1, 2001,” speech at National Defense University,
华盛顿, 华盛顿特区, Federation of American Scientists, https://fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/news/
010501bush.html.
68. Cordesman, Strategic Threats and National Missile Defenses, p. 3.
69. For details on how the September 11, 2001 attacks altered the calculus on national missile de-
栅栏, see Futter, Ballistic Missile Defence and US National Security Policy, PP. 102–107.
70. 同上.
71. The White House, “National Security Presidential Directive 23,” December 16, 2002, 联邦
of American Scientists, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-23.htm.
72. MDA, “Missile Defense: The First Seventy Years” (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: 我们. Department of De-
栅栏, 八月 8, 2013), PP. 16–17, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/ªrst70.pdf.
73. Columba Peoples, Justifying Ballistic Missile Defence: 技术, 安全, 与文化 (新的
约克: 剑桥大学出版社, 2010), p. 201.
74. 同上.

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国际安全 46:3 64

that prior U.S. technological achievements demonstrated that the many chal-
lenges in building a national missile defense could be surmounted in a few
years.75 When early tests of the GMD system contradicted this optimism, 亲-
ponents dismissed the failures as temporary setbacks. 在八月 2001, for in-
姿态, Rumsfeld stated that test failures did not undermine the case for
national missile defense.76 Responding to allegations that a GMD test had used
a beacon to guide the interceptor to its quarry (IE。, the target missile’s war-
头), he reasoned that any setbacks would be corrected swiftly and argued
that opponents of missile defense were unfairly critical.77 Rumsfeld pointed to
the CORONA program that failed eleven times before its eventual success, 和
he invoked the legacy of the Wright brothers who had failed several times
before ºying their ªrst airplane.78 In testimony to the U.S. Senate, Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz argued that “there isn’t a single major
technological development in human history that didn’t proceed with a pro-
cess of trial and error, including many of our most successful weapons systems
. . . 然而, from these failures and from the successes came some of the most effec-
tive capabilities we have ever ªelded.”79 The George W. Bush administration
portrayed these test failures as a natural part of a development process that
would inevitably result in an effective system. Writing in 1969, Herbert York,
who served as the ªrst director of Defense Research and Engineering, pointed
to the logical ºaw in such false analogies:

We ªnd that some say: ‘You can’t tell me that if we can put a man on the
月亮, we can’t build an ABM.’ Others say: ‘That’s what Oppenheimer told us
about the hydrogen bomb.’ These two statements contain the same basic error.
They are examples of success in a contest between technology and nature,
whereas the ABM issues involves a contest between two technologies: 的-
fensive weapons and penetration aids versus defensive weapons and discrimi-
nation techniques. These analogies would be more pertinent if, in the ªrst case,
someone were to jerk the moon away just before the astronauts landed, or if, 在
the second case, nature were to keep changing the nuclear-reaction probabili-

75. Peoples, Justifying Ballistic Missile Defence, PP. 3, 4, 192.
76. Donald H. Rumsfeld, interview with Conan Nolan, Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with KNBC-
TV Los Angeles, 我们. 国防部, 八月 14, 2001, http://www.tep-online.info/laku/
usa/whitehou/dod/14082001.htm.
77. 同上.
78. 同上. See also York, “Military Technology and National Security,” p. 23. The CORONA
program was America’s ªrst satellite photoreconnaissance system. National Reconnaissance
Ofªce, “CORONA,” https://www.nro.gov/History-and-Studies/Center-for-the-Study-of-National-
Reconnaissance/The-CORONA-Program/.
79. Senate Hearing 107-355, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal
年 2002, before the Comm. on Armed Services, 117th Cong., 1st sess., 七月 12, 2001 (statement of
Hon. 保罗·D. Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense), p. 443, https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/CHRG-107shrg75346/pdf/CHRG-107shrg75346.pdf.

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保卫美国 65

ties all during the development of hydrogen bomb and once again after it
was deployed.80

While celebrating past technological successes, proponents of national missile
defense refused to acknowledge the rigor and discipline required to success-
fully ªeld a technologically sophisticated weapons system, despite warnings
against rushing to deployment. 例如, A 1997 我们. Government Ac-
countability Ofªce (GAO) report noted that there had been very few “hit-to-
kill” intercept tests and an even smaller number of successful trials. 那个报告
argued that these tests did not demonstrate the viability of missile defense.81
在 1998, the Report of the Panel on Reducing Risk in Ballistic Missile Defense
Flight Test Programs, known as the Welch Panel report, warned that the na-
tional missile defense efforts were “marred by poor planning, insufªcient test-
英, and political pressure” and called the planned deployment schedule a
“rush to failure.”82 In August 2000, a National Missile Defense Deployment
Readiness Review conducted by the director of the Department of Defense’s
Operational Test and Evaluation Ofªce stated that given the limited and inade-
quate testing undertaken so far, “no one can reliably predict that the NMD sys-
tem will perform” effectively under stressing real-world conditions.83

Ignoring these warnings, the Bush administration proceeded to accelerate
the program in December 2001. 自那以后, the MDA has continuously been
mandated to meet unrealistic presidentially mandated schedules in one way
or another.84 Ironically, the rush to meet politically determined deadlines has
led to a recurrent series of delays and cancellations over the last twenty years.

The Failed Experiment of the GMD System

After twenty years of dedicated effort and unconstrained funding, the GMD
system’s readiness is still in doubt. As of June 2021, the GMD system has been

80. 约克, “Military Technology and National Security,” p. 23. See also Scott D. Sagan, “Sagan Re-
sponds to Waltz” in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. 华尔兹, 编辑。, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A
Debate Renewed (纽约: W.W. 诺顿, 2003), PP. 177–179.
81. GAO, “National Missile Defense: Schedule and Technical Risks Represent Signiªcant Develop-
ment Challenges” (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: GAO, 十二月 1997), PP. 5, 7, https://www.gao.gov/
products/nsiad-98-28.
82. Graham, Hit to Kill, p. 28.
83. Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, “Report in Support of National Missile Defense
Deployment Readiness Review” (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: Ofªce of Operational Test and Evalua-
的, 我们. 国防部, 八月 10, 2000), p. 42, http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/BMD/
documents/coylereport.pdf.
84. House Hearing, FY21 Priorities for Missile Defense and Missile Defeat Programs, before the
Subcomm. on Strategic Forces, 行进 12, 2020 (statement of Christina T. Chaplain, GAO), https://
www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-490t-highlights.pdf.

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国际安全 46:3 66

ºight-tested twenty times.85 Even under idealized test conditions, 然而,
只关于 50 percent of the attempts to intercept targets have succeeded.86
此外, the ªrst ten tests (with ªve successful intercepts) were conducted
using prototype interceptors or other surrogates that may not reºect the abili-
ties of the deployed interceptors. The initial ºight tests were conducted with
cued information rather than information from the network of sensors that
would track an incoming North Korean ICBM.87 Several ºight tests were timed
to occur in the daytime and in favorable weather, thereby avoiding the uncer-
tainty of real-world conditions.88 Given these factors, the ability of the GMD
system to now offer reliable defense against North Korean ICBMs has caused
even the Joint Staff and other warªghters to question the system’s practical
utility.89 In addition to these shortcomings, debilitating programmatic failures
and conceptual ºaws have yet to be resolved.

programmatic failures: the perpetual search for a kill vehicle

The GMD program has yet to ªeld a reliable kill vehicle. The ªrst kill vehi-
克莱, the CE-I, was deployed in 2004—three years before its ªrst ºight test.90
相似地, the CE-II kill vehicle was deployed more than ªve years before its
ªrst ºight test.91 The decision to deploy these kill vehicles as an operational
system before testing not only weakened the GMD system’s reliability but also
led to costly retroªts and delays.92 The MDA has since acknowledged that the
CE-I and CE-II kill vehicle designs were “costly to produce and sustain and re-

85. MDA, “Fact Sheet: Ballistic Missile Defense Intercept Flight Test Record” (Fort Belvoir, Va.:
MDA, 2021), p. 1, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/testrecord.pdf.
86. 同上. Other U.S. regional missile defense efforts have been signiªcantly more successful in in-
tercepting target ballistic missiles in ºight tests. The Aegis BMD has a ºight test success rate of ap-
近似地 81 百分. The THAAD system, after some early missteps, has registered a
100 percent ºight test success rate. See Ibid., PP. 2–3. 除其他事项外, these better results indi-
cate the efªciency of a systems development process that is unhindered by political mandates.
87. Grego, Lewis, and Wright, Shielded from Oversight, PP. 30–31. Some corrective actions have re-
cently occurred. In March 2019, MDA conducted its ªrst salvo ºight test of the GMD system,
“ªring a CE-II Block I-equipped interceptor followed by a CE-II-equipped interceptor.” See GAO,
“Missile Defense: Delivery Delays Provide Opportunity for Increased Testing to Better Under-
stand Capability,” p. 58.
88. Grego, Lewis, and Wright, Shielded from Oversight, p. 30.
89. GAO, “Missile Defense: Further Collaboration with the Intelligence Community Would Help
MDA Keep Pace with Emerging Threats” (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: GAO, 十二月 2019), PP. 28–29,
https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-177.
90. Grego, Lewis, and Wright, Shielded from Oversight, p. 20.
91. 同上。, p. 22.
92. 例如, the CE-II kill vehicle program cost increased from $236 百万至 $1.981 billion to
“resolve the test failures and implement a retroªt program.” The reason for the increase is attrib-
uted to moving “forward with producing and ªelding interceptors before completing its ºight test
program.” See GAO, “Missile Defense: Opportunities Exist to Reduce Acquisition Risk and Im-
prove Reporting on System Capabilities,” p. 10.

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保卫美国 67

quire the warªghter to ªre more interceptors to overcome anticipated in-ºight
reliability failures.”93

在 2014, Frank Kendall, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,
技术, and Logistics, said the existing CE-I and CE-II kill vehicles were
plagued by “bad engineering” because “there was a rush” to get something
out.94 He advocated for the development of a new and more reliable kill vehi-
克莱. 在 2014, the MDA began the Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) program to
replace CE-I and CE-II kill vehicles.95

Learning from past mistakes, the MDA initially adopted a robust develop-
ment and deployment plan for the RKV program that included rigorous test-
ing and evaluation.96 But in October 2017, in response to North Korean ICBM
测试, these weapons acquisition best practices were abandoned. The MDA was
tasked with accelerating the RKV program by “concurrently performing de-
velopment and production and reducing the number of necessary ºight tests”
to increase the number of deployed interceptors from forty-four to sixty-four
经过 2023.97 The altered deployment schedule forced the contractor to hire sev-
eral new personnel to work on the project and to use “commercial off-the-shelf
hardware and re-use Aegis SM-3 Block IIA components,” both of which com-
promised reliability.98 By 2018, the RKV program was over budget and behind
schedule, prompting the Department of Defense to terminate the RKV pro-
gram in August 2019 after determining that its design ºaws were too severe to
be ªxed quickly or cheaply.99 Without an operable RKV, the plan to increase
the number of interceptors to sixty-four by 2023 is infeasible.100 Moreover, 这
GMD system will continue to operate with CE-I and CE-II kill vehicles, 更远
eroding conªdence in its effectiveness in real-world conditions.101

93. 同上。, p. 23.
94. Andrea Shalal, “Pentagon Plans Work on New Missile Defense Interceptor,” 路透社, 二月
25, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-budget-missile/pentagon-plans-work-on-new-
missile-defense-interceptor-idUSBREA1P03F20140226.
95. GAO, “Missile Defense: Opportunities Exist to Reduce Acquisition Risk and Improve Re-
porting on System Capabilities,” p. 24.
96. GAO, “Missile Defense: The Warªghter and Decision Makers Would Beneªt from Better Com-
munication about the System’s Capabilities and Limitations,” PP. 72–73.
97. 同上.
98. GAO, “Missile Defense: Delivery Delays Provide Opportunity for Increased Testing to Better
Understand Capability,” PP. 17, 18, 61.
99. Judson, “Pentagon Terminates Program for Redesigned Kill Vehicle.”
100. GAO, “Missile Defense: Delivery Delays Provide Opportunity for Increased Testing to Better
Understand Capability,” p. 18.
101. 现在, the GMD system consists of twenty interceptors armed with the CE-I kill vehicle,
sixteen interceptors armed with the CE-II kill vehicle, and eight interceptors armed with the CE-II
Block I kill vehicle. See GAO, “Missile Defense: 财政年度 2020 Delivery and Testing Progressed,
but Annual Goals Unmet” (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: GAO, 四月 2021), p. 4, https://www.gao.gov/
products/gao-21-314.

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国际安全 46:3 68

We ªnd that these failures are a result of the decisions to rush to ªeld the
GMD system. The Bush administration empowered the MDA to independ-
ently deªne system requirements, review its performance, and establish and
cancel programs without external review.102 The MDA was also exempted
from standard reporting and oversight on the program’s technological prog-
ress and cost increases.103 These exceptions allowed the MDA to circumvent
rigorous knowledge-based acquisition processes that otherwise might have
averted many of the deªciencies that now plague the efforts to develop a kill
vehicle.104 The next iteration of a kill vehicle, the Next-Generation Interceptor
(NGI), is estimated to cost $18 billion and is not expected to be ready until the late 2020s.105 Even if a high-reliability interceptor eventually emerges from the NGI program, it must overcome the enduring conceptual ºaw of the GMD system: the countermeasures challenge. conceptual ºaw: the countermeasures challenge Like all midcourse defense systems, the GMD system is vulnerable to counter- measures.106 This vulnerability of midcourse missile defense systems has long been well understood. Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, 关于- counting the U.S. reaction to Soviet missile defense deployments in the 1960s, writes that the Soviet deployment provoked extensive research to defeat the Soviet defenses.107 In a short time, the United States had developed a variety of countermeasures to confuse, deceive, and evade Soviet missile defenses.108 A high-altitude nuclear detonation is a particularly effective countermeasure.109 In the case of the GMD system, North Korea could detonate a warhead just outside the range of GMD interceptors, warheads could be designed to deto- 102. Grego, Lewis, and Wright, Shielded from Oversight, p. 10. 103. For more details, see GAO, “Missile Defense: 财政年度 2020 Delivery and Testing Prog- ressed, but Annual Goals Unmet,” PP. 5–6. 104. GAO, “Missile Defense: Observations on Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Acquisition Challenges and Potential Contract Strategy Changes,” p. 6. 105. Jen Judson, “Next-Gen Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Interceptor Estimated Cost? Nearly $18B,” Defense News, 四月 27, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2021/04/27/next-
gen-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-interceptor-estimated-to-cost-nearly-18-billion/.
106. 安德鲁·M. Sessler et al., Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness
of the Planned US National Missile Defense System (剑桥, 大量的。: Union of Concerned Scien-
tists and MIT Security Studies Program, 2019), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/ªles/2019-
09/countermeasures.pdf.
107. James R. Schlesinger, “Rhetoric and Realities in the Star Wars Debate,” 国际安全,
卷. 10, 不. 1 (夏天 1985), p. 3, https://doi.org/10.2307/2538787.
108. Hans A. Bethe, “Countermeasures to ABM Systems,” in Abram Chayes and Jerome B.
Wiesner, 编辑。, ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Antiballistic Missile System (新的
约克: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 130; and York, “Military Technology and National Security,” p. 18.
109. Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limita-
tion and U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward China,” 国际安全, 卷. 41, 不. 1 (夏天 2016),
p. 77, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00248.

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保卫美国 69

nate upon interceptor impact, or an intercept could lead to a nuclear detona-
tion of a warhead that is not one-point safe.110 In all these three instances, 这
resulting nuclear explosion would ionize a large volume of space, making ac-
curate radar tracking of follow-on warheads impractical.111

Decoys remain a major, if not insurmountable, countermeasure to the GMD
系统. Decoys such as lightweight balloons follow the same ºight path as
missile warheads in the vacuum of space, making it difªcult to distinguish
between decoy and warhead using only their trajectories. 而且, hiding
a warhead inside a balloon (IE。, an anti-simulation decoy) is an effective
countermeasure. As Richard Garwin writes, “it may be very costly and dif-
ªcult to make decoys which resemble in all observable respects real war-
heads in space, but it becomes a lot easier if the warhead is ªrst modiªed or
enclosed in a balloon so that it looks like a cheap decoy.”112 A 2010 study by
the scientiªc advisory group, JASON, conducted at the request of the U.S.
国会, concluded that “given a reasonable amount of time, 钱, initia-
主动的, and expertise, the offense can (原则) ªeld countermeasures that the
defense cannot handle at any reasonable marginal cost.”113

There is no evidence to indicate that the GMD system has overcome this
challenge. 此外, A 2019 GAO report found that a “culture exists within
这 [missile defense] agency that generally tolerates the use of [threat] 模组-
els that have not been sufªciently vetted” and the agency “is too willing to ac-
cept the associated risk.”114 The report further noted that the MDA restricts the
DIA’s “insight into and input on” developing accurate threat models, 甚至
though it is uniquely capable of assisting the MDA.115 Given these limitations,
analysts question the GMD system’s ability to respond to countermeasures,

110. One-point safety is a required criterion in U.S. nuclear weapons manufacturing. A nuclear
weapon is considered one-point safe if, “when the high explosive (HE) is initiated and detonated
at any single point, the probability of producing a nuclear yield exceeding 4 pounds of trinitrotol-
uene (TNT) equivalent is less than one in 106.” Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear
and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program Man-
瓦尔 (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: 我们. 国防部, 十二月 1996), p. 9, https://www.hsdl.org/
?看法&做过(西德:2)501.
111. This phenomenon is detailed in Hans A. Bethe, “Countermeasures to ABM Systems,”
PP. 135–142.
112. 理查德·L. Garwin, “Enforcing BMD against a Determined Adversary?” in Bhupendra Jasani,
编辑。, Space Weapons and International Security (纽约: 牛津大学出版社, 1987), PP. 71–84.
113. JASON, “MDA Discrimination,” Unclassiªed Summary (McLean, Va.: MITRE, 八月 3,
2010), p. 3, https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/mda-dis.pdf. JASON is an independent scien-
tiªc advisory group established in the 1960s to provide classiªed and unclassiªed analysis to vari-
ous agencies of the U.S. 政府. A list of reports authored by JASON can be found at
Federation of American Scientists (FAS), “JASON Defense Advisory Panel Reports,” undated,
https://irp.fas.org/agency/dod/jason/.
114. GAO, “Missile Defense: Further Collaboration with the Intelligence Community Would Help
MDA Keep Pace with Emerging Threats,” p. 35.
115. 同上。, PP. 24, 25, 30.

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国际安全 46:3 70

unexpected launch scenarios, or incomplete sensor data during an actual
North Korean attack.116

Based on available evidence, we argue that there is no lasting technical solu-
tion to the countermeasures challenge.117 North Korea might have access to
Russian or Chinese countermeasures, which are technologically mature and
are designed to breach the GMD system.118 Additionally, as long as it is easier
to reªne countermeasures than to update the GMD system, any GMD system
reªnements are unlikely to overcome this enduring conceptual ºaw.

The Geopolitical Cost of National Missile Defense

Despite its programmatic failures and vulnerability to countermeasures, 已经-
tional missile defense is at the core of strategic stability concerns in U.S.-Russia
and U.S.-China relations. 我们. leaders have insisted that national missile
defense is essential to address North Korean ballistic missile threats to the
continental United States. 我们. administrations have also consistently ar-
gued that these defenses could not alter the strategic stability with Russia or
China and their intended purpose is not to do so. 这 2020 National Defense
Authorization Act, 例如, states that the United States relies on nuclear
deterrence “to address more sophisticated and larger quantity near-peer inter-
continental missile threats to the homeland.”119 Similarly, 这 2019 Ballistic

116. Grego, Lewis, and Wright, Shielded from Oversight, PP. 30–31. See also Institute for Defense
分析 (IDA), “IDA’s Response to Questions on the ‘Independent Review and Assessment of the
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System,’” IDA, 四月 11, 2012, PP. 1, 4.
117. Advances in sensors may offer short-term reprieve. A 2012 National Academies study argued
that X-band radars and interceptor optical sensors offered some hope that “in the near term,” there
is a “reasonable chance” that the United States could stay ahead of the countermeasures challenge.
See National Research Council, Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts
and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives (华盛顿,
华盛顿特区: 美国国家科学院出版社, 2012), p. 10. The Space Development Agency is building the Hy-
personic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS). HBTSS, like the Space Tracking and Surveil-
lance System (STSS), is advertised as capable of birth-to-death tracking from space. See Nathan
Strout, “After More than a Decade, Agency to Retire Experimental Missile Warning Satellites,”
C4ISRNET, 可能 13, 2021, https://www.c4isrnet.com/battleªeld-tech/space/2021/05/13/after-
more-than-a-decade-agency-to-retire-experimental-missile-warning-satellites/. 这 2012 国家的
Academies study argued, 然而, that such space-based sensors would contribute “little if any-
thing to midcourse discrimination.” See National Research Council, Making Sense of Ballistic Missile
Defense, p. 16.
118. A 1999 National Intelligence Estimate assessed that Russia and China may sell numerous
countermeasures technologies to North Korea. See National Intelligence Council, “Foreign Missile
Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States through 2015” (洗涤-
吨, 华盛顿特区: National Intelligence Council, 九月 1999), p. 16, https://www.dni.gov/ªles/
documents/Foreign%20Missile%20Developments_1999.pdf. This assessment still seems valid.
119. United States Congress S. 1790, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020,
116th Cong., 1st sess., 一月 3, 2019, p. 584, https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/s1790/BILLS-
116s1790enr.pdf.

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保卫美国 71

Missile Defense Review conducted by the Donald Trump administration states
that the “United States relies on deterrence to protect against large and techni-
cally sophisticated Russian and Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile
threats to the U.S. homeland.”120 The Nuclear Posture Review and the National
Security Strategy released by the Trump administration made similar asser-
tions.121 The Ballistic Missile Defense Review and the Nuclear Posture Review con-
ducted under the Barack Obama administration in 2010 declared that
preserving strategic stability with Russia and China was an important goal.122
我们. policymakers have pointed out that Russia’s deployed strategic weapons
can easily defeat the comparatively limited number of GMD interceptors.123
相似地, A 2012 report drafted by an International Security Advisory Board of
美国. State Department notes that China is “determined to maintain a credi-
ble nuclear deterrent regardless of U.S. choices and will almost certainly have
the necessary ªnancial and technological resources to continue to do so. 乙酰胆碱-
cordingly, mutual nuclear vulnerability should be considered a fact of life for
both sides.”124 Despite these facts, Russia and China have remained deeply
skeptical about the limited scope of U.S. homeland missile defense.

In the next two subsections, we explore Russia’s and China’s respective
arguments about how U.S. national missile defense diminishes their nuclear
deterrent, and we summarize several weapons’ modernization initiatives that
both states claim are driven by U.S. missile defenses.

russia on u.s. national missile defense

Russian leaders have consistently linked increases in their nuclear arsenal to
我们. missile defenses. 20世纪90年代, during negotiations on amending the ABM
Treaty, Russians vehemently argued that a national missile defense system

120. 我们. 国防部, 2019 Missile Defense Review, p. 三、.
121. Ofªce of the Secretary of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: 我们. Department
of Defense, 2018), PP. 30–32, 33, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/
2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF; and White House, 国家安全
Strategy of the United States of America (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: White House, 十二月 2017), p. 8,
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905
.pdf.
122. 我们. 国防部, Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: 我们.
国防部, 二月 2010), p. 34, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defense
Reviews/BMDR/BMDR_as_of_26JAN10_0630_for_web.pdf; 和美国. 国防部,
Nuclear Posture Review Report (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: 我们. 国防部, 四月 2010), PP. 4,
29, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture
_Review_Report.pdf.
123. 我们. 国防部, “Layered Homeland Missile Defense: A Strategy for Defending
美国,” p. 3.
124. International Security Advisory Board, “Report on Maintaining U.S.-China Strategic
Stability” (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: 我们. Department of State, 2012), p. 3, https://2009-2017.state.gov/
documents/organization/200473.pdf.

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国际安全 46:3 72

once deployed could not be meaningfully limited without arms control agree-
ments.125 They threatened asymmetrical response to thwart any perceived
dangers to the Russian nuclear deterrent.126 Strobe Talbott, President Clinton’s
chief negotiator, writes that Russians worried that once the architecture was
in place, it could be expanded signiªcantly within a short period.127 He re-
counts that the Russians, basing their position on a worst-case scenario, 计算-
lated that the United States may be able to use precision weaponry to disable
90 percent of the Russian deterrent.128 Even a limited missile defense system
could then intercept the nuclear forces that might survive a U.S. ªrst strike.
Talbott writes that while the Russians acknowledged nuclear war was un-
thinkable, they also believed the combination of missile defenses and highly
capable nuclear forces would “leave them vulnerable to nuclear intimidation
in a political crisis.”129

These concerns have persisted. Russian military analysts regularly write
about a future war in which a massive air-missile strike campaign could
be mounted against Russia’s nuclear deterrent, using U.S. and NATO high-
precision conventional weapons.130 U.S. missile defense would further de-
grade Russia’s retaliatory potential, leaving Russia vulnerable to coercion.131
Although elements within Russia’s military-industrial complex often exagger-
ate these fears, several Russian analysts have raised concerns about U.S. tech-
nological dominance facilitating a coordinated high-precision aerospace strike
that theoretically could overcome limited Russian defenses.132

125. Strobe Talbott, “Unªnished Business: Russia and Missile Defense under Clinton,” Arms Con-
trol Today, 六月 2002, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002-06/features/unªnished-business-
russia-missile-defense-under-clinton.
126. 同上.
127. 同上.
128. 同上.
129. 同上.
130. Igor Morozov, Baushev Sergey, and Kaminsky Oleg, “Kosmos i kharakter sovremennykh
voyennykh deystviy” [Space and the nature of modern military operations], Vozdushno-
Kosmicheskaya Oborona [Aerospace Defense], 八月 11, 2009, http://www.vko.ru/koncepcii/
kosmos-i-harakter-sovremennyh-voennyh-deystviy.
131. “Kommentariy Departamenta Informatsii i Pechati MID Rossii v Svyazi s Novym «Obzorom
Politiki SSHA v Sfere PRO»—Novosti—Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del Rossiyskoy Federatsii”
[Commentary by the department of information and press of the Russian foreign ministry in con-
nection with the new ‘review of U.S. missile defense policy’], Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Russian Federation, 一月 18, 2019, https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset
_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3479839.
132. Some Russian analysts have noted that the threat of a technologically advanced, 高的-
precision aerospace campaign is “eagerly embraced as a new and fascinating domain of seemingly
endless competition with a worthy counterpart” to justify large defense budgets for Russia’s
military-industrial complex. See Alexey Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin, and Petr Topychkanov, “En-
tanglement as a New Security Threat: A Russian Perspective,” in James M. Acton, 编辑。, Entangle-
蒙特: Chinese and Russian Perspectives on Non-nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区:
卡内基国际和平基金会, 2017), PP. 17, 30.

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保卫美国 73

In his March 2018 presidential address to the Russian Federal Assembly,
Putin claimed that U.S. national missile defense “will result in the complete
devaluation of Russia’s nuclear” deterrence forces.133 He argued that while the
number of nuclear delivery vehicles and weapons is being reduced bilaterally,
the United States is unilaterally pursuing several ballistic missile defense sys-
tems.134 Putin outlined the development of several new Russian strategic nu-
clear weapon systems to counter U.S. missile defenses, including the Sarmat
heavy ICBM equipped with hypersonic warheads.135 He argued that the in-
creased range of the Sarmat ICBM would also allow attacks from the southern
hemisphere to avoid U.S. missile defense radars and interceptors deployed
in Alaska and other parts of the northern hemisphere. President Putin dis-
cussed several other delivery systems—including the Avangard hypersonic
boost-glide vehicle, the Kinzhal air-launched hypersonic missile, the Tsirkon
hypersonic cruise missile, the Poseidon nuclear-powered torpedo, 和
Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile. We ªnd that the common element
among these systems is that their technological features would make little or
no sense apart from their determination to evade and defeat missile defenses.

Russia also uses U.S. missile defenses to justify other actions. 例如,
在 2018, when President Trump charged Russia with violating the 1987
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Russian Deputy Foreign
Minister Sergey Ryabkov countered that the U.S. deployment of the Mk-41
ground-based Aegis Ashore missile defense system in Europe was a violation
of the INF Treaty.136 Similarly, Russian analysts claim that Russia’s pursuit of
anti-satellite weapons is a way to pressure the United States to undertake seri-
ous talks on missile defense.137

china on u.s. national missile defense

Many Chinese analysts discount the need for missile defenses to defeat the
North Korean threat to the United States and argue that China’s strategic mis-
siles are the real target of the GMD system.138 U.S. reassurances that its missile
defenses are not intended to neutralize the Chinese strategic deterrent are not

133. Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” 2018.
134. 同上.
135. Jill Hruby, “Russia’s New Nuclear Weapon Delivery Systems: An Open-Source Technical
Review” (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: Nuclear Threat Initiative, 十一月 2019), https://media.nti.org/
documents/NTI-Hruby_FINAL.PDF.
136. “Russia Slams US Aegis Ashore Missile Deployment in Europe as Direct Breach of INF
Treaty,” TASS: Russian News Agency, 十一月 26, 2018, https://tass.com/politics/1032585.
137. Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, 编辑。, Outer Space: 武器, Diplomacy, 和安全
(华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: 卡内基国际和平基金会, 2010), p. 希.
138. Tong Zhao, “Narrowing the U.S.-China Gap on Missile Defense: How to Help Forestall a Nu-
clear Arms Race” (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: 卡内基国际和平基金会, 2020), p. 36.

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国际安全 46:3 74

seen as an accurate reºection of U.S. plans by Chinese experts, who argue that
我们. promises of restraint are ephemeral and easily revoked, as evidenced by
the unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.139 Chinese experts often
note that while the system being deployed now may be limited, it could be
repurposed quickly and easily to target China’s second-strike capability.140 Ac-
cording to Chinese experts, logistical and technological limitations rather than
coherent policy choices to preserve strategic stability with China are what
drive the deployment patterns of U.S. missile defenses.141

Chinese analysts warn that U.S. missile defense deployments will provoke a
nuclear arms race.142 Chinese leaders posit an expansion in China’s nuclear
arms and postures, including the possibility of placing its nuclear forces under
a launch-on-warning high alert system, as a possible response to U.S. 导弹
defenses.143 Indeed, as noted in the Economist in July 2021, the recent con-
struction of hundreds of new missile silos may be part of this response.144
Baohui Zhang takes this analysis a step further by suggesting that China’s
anti-satellite capabilities should target U.S. early-warning satellites, 哪个
play a vital role in missile defense efforts.145

139. Lora Saalman, “The China Factor,” in Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, 编辑。, Missile De-
栅栏: Confrontation and Cooperation, 反式. Natalia Bubnova (莫斯科: Carnegie Moscow Center,
2013), PP. 233, 242, https://www.ªles.ethz.ch/isn/163188/Missile_Defense_book_eng_ªn2013 .pdf.
140. Lora Saalman, China and the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (北京: Carnegie-Tsinghua Center
for Global Policy, 2011), p. 24, https://carnegieendowment.org/ªles/china_posture_review.pdf;
and Zhao, “Narrowing the U.S.-China Gap on Missile Defense,” p. 18.
141. Ralph Cossa, Brad Glosserman, and Matt Pottinger, “Progress Despite Disagreements: 这
Sixth China-US Strategic Dialogue on Strategic Nuclear Dynamics,” Issues & Insights, 卷. 12, 不. 5
(十一月 2011), PP. 12, 30, 36, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy
_ªles/ªles/publication/issuesinsights_vol12no05.pdf.
142. Christopher P. Twomey et al., “The U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue: Phase IX Report”
(Monterey, 加利福尼亚州。: Naval Postgraduate School, 十二月 2016), p. 5, https://www.hsdl.org/
?抽象的&做过(西德:2)799076. Often Chinese opposition to U.S. missile defenses also reºect other geo-
political goals. Tong Zhao suggests that Beijing views its regional conventional missiles as “foun-
dational to its national security” and fears that any attempts to shield regional U.S. and allied
forces from China’s conventional missiles will embolden the United States and its allies in a
regional conºict. See Zhao, “Narrowing the U.S.-China Gap on Missile Defense,” PP. 24–25. A re-
view of Chinese regional missile capabilities and U.S. and allied regional missile defense counter-
efforts can be found in Jaganath Sankaran, “Missile Wars in the Asia Paciªc: The Threat of Chinese
Regional Missiles and U.S.-Allied Missile Defense Response,” Asian Security, 卷. 17, 不. 1 (2021),
PP. 25–45, https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2020.1769069; and Jaganath Sankaran, “Missile De-
fenses and Strategic Stability in Asia: Evidence from Simulations,” Journal of East Asian Studies,
卷. 20, 不. 3 (十一月 2020), PP. 485–508, https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2020.10.
143. Ofªce of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Devel-
opments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019” (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: Department of De-
栅栏, 2019), p. 67, https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA
_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf.
144. “China Is Rapidly Building New Nuclear-Missile Silos,” Economist, 七月 31, 2021, https://
www.economist.com/china/2021/07/31/china-is-rapidly-building-new-nuclear-missile-silos.
145. Baohui Zhang, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship: 这
Prospects for Arms Control,” 亚洲调查, 卷. 51, 不. 2 (March/April 2011), p. 321, https://

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保卫美国 75

How to Counter North Korea while Preserving Strategic Stability

The growing North Korean nuclear arsenal is a threat to U.S. national secu-
rity.146 As our evidence shows, the GMD system seems unable to offer a reli-
able defense. Bipartisan consensus in the United States rejects relying solely on
diplomacy or deterrence against North Korea. Diplomatic engagement with
North Korea is, 最好, expected to lead to incremental steps toward limited
reductions in North Korean capabilities.147 We believe deterrence is still the
only way to prevent unconventional means of nuclear weapon delivery (例如,
launching short-range missiles from surface ships near the U.S. coast or smug-
gling weapons into a U.S. 城市). In a militarized crisis, 然而, North Korea is
expected to threaten an ICBM nuclear attack on the United States to try to
bargain for a favorable outcome.148 Against such threats, 我们. policy places
considerable weight on national missile defense.

We suggest that an airborne BPI missile defense system is a sensible alterna-
tive to the GMD system. Airborne BPI systems could defend the United States
against current North Korean ICBMs without imposing an undue burden on
strategic stability concerns associated with midcourse defenses. Airborne BPI
systems would be designed to intercept North Korean ICBMs within minutes
after launch, before an adversary can deploy decoys, thereby avoiding the con-
ceptual ºaw that afºicts the GMD system.149 But airborne BPI is infeasible
against Russia or China because of the countries’ expansive geographies and
effective air defenses. 此外, airborne BPI missile defenses are unable to
defend against several possible locations of Russian or Chinese submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). In the remainder of this article, we exam-
ine the concept’s viability given recent technological innovations.

doi.org/10.1525/as.2011.51.2.311. For a review of Chinese anti-satellite capabilities, see Jaganath
Sankaran, “Limits of the Chinese Antisatellite Threats to the United States,” Strategic Studies Quar-
terly (冬天 2014), PP. 20–47, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/
体积-08_Issue-4/Sankaran.pdf.
146. 我们. 国防部, 2019 Missile Defense Review, p. 四号.
147. Victor Cha, “The Biden-Moon Summit: Rejuvenating and Modernizing the Alliance,” CSIS,
可能 19, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/biden-moon-summit-rejuvenating-and-modernizing-
联盟.
148. Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. 核
Weapons Policy,” 国际安全, 卷. 26, 不. 1 (夏天 2001), p. 54, https://doi.org/
10.1162/016228801753212859.
149. Some forms of countermeasures, such as salvo launches and deliberate boost-phase trajectory
maneuvers, complicate boost-phase defenses. But they are much more costly and complicated to
execute than midcourse decoys. David K. Barton et al., “Report of the American Physical Society
Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense: Scientiªc and Tech-
nical Issues,” Reviews of Modern Physics, 卷. 76, 不. 3 (July–September 2004), PP. 145–153, https://
doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.76.S1.

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国际安全 46:3 76

airborne bpi defenses

The idea of boost-phase missile defense is not new. Space-based boost-phase
missile defense efforts have been suggested as far back as the 1950s.150 After
冷战, attention shifted to limited ground-based and airborne boost-
phase missile defense systems. 例如, Garwin proposed a cooperative
missile defense architecture that would utilize hit-to-kill interceptors stationed
in Russia or near North Korea’s coast.151 In a 2000 Foreign Policy article, 约翰
多伊奇, Harold Brown, and John P. White argued for developing naval plat-
forms that could host boost-phase interceptors with signiªcant capability
against North Korea, noting that such a solution would be more responsive to
Russian concerns.152 Many other studies have debated the possibilities and
merits of land-based and airborne boost-phase missile defenses.153 Yet, 关于-
search and experimentation on boost-phase systems have been haphazard and
uncoordinated.154

We evaluate how a variety of recent technological advances may affect the
ability of airborne interceptors to kinematically reach a boosting North Korean
ICBM. Kinematic reach indicates the ability of airborne interceptors to arrive
in the same region of space occupied by the North Korean missile at the same

150. See Donald R. Baucom, “The Rise and Fall of Brilliant Pebbles 1,” in Jeremy Black and Jeffrey
Charleston, 编辑。, United States Military History: 1865 to the Present Day (伦敦: 劳特利奇, 2006);
and Keith B. 佩恩, Missile Defense in the 21st Century: Protection against Limited Threats (纽约:
劳特利奇, 1991).
151. 理查德·L. Garwin, “Berkeley Physics Graduation Speech,” Berkeley, 加利福尼亚州, 可能 19,
2000, Federation of American Scientists, https://fas.org/rlg/000519-berkeley.htm. Charles Glaser and
Steve Fetter propose a similar architecture. See Glaser and Fetter, “National Missile Defense and
the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy,” p. 53.
152. John Deutch, Harold Brown, and John P. 白色的, “National Missile Defense: Is There Another
方式?“ 对外政策, 夏天 2000, PP. 92, 98–99.
153. A very detailed study on boost-phase missile defenses is Barton et al., “Report of the Ameri-
can Physical Society Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense.”
Dissenting views against this study can be found in Richard L. Garwin, “Boost-Phase Missile De-
fense Debate Continues,” Physics Today, 七月 2004, https://physicstoday.scitation.org/doi/full/
10.1063/1.4796588; and Dean Wilkening, “Boost-Phase Missile Defense Debate Continues,” Physics
今天, 七月 2004, https://physicstoday.scitation.org/doi/pdf/10.1063/1.1784286. See also Dean A.
Wilkening, “Airborne Boost-Phase Ballistic Missile Defense,“ 科学 & Global Security, 卷. 12,
Nos. 1–2 (2004), PP. 1–67; and Congressional Budget Ofªce (CBO), Alternatives for Boost-Phase Mis-
sile Defense (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: CBO, 七月 2004), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/ªles/108th-
congress-2003-2004/reports/07-22-missiledefense.pdf. Both Dean Wilkening and the CBO study
were optimistic about boost-phase missile defense. Other prominent studies on boost-phase mis-
sile defense include F.S. Nyland, “Exploring Boost Phase Intercept Concepts for Theater Missile
Defense” (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: 我们. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 十一月 1995);
and David R. Vaughan, Jeffrey A. Isaacson, and Joel S. Kvitky, Airborne Intercept: Boost- and Ascent-
Phase Options and Issues (圣莫妮卡, 加利福尼亚州。: RAND, 1996), https://www.rand.org/pubs/
monograph_reports/MR772.html.
154. A review of recent experimental work on boost-phase missile defenses can be found in
Jaganath Sankaran and Steve Fetter, “Reexamining Homeland Missile Defense against North Ko-
雷亚,” 华盛顿季刊, 卷. 43, 不. 3 (2020), PP. 47–62, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X
.2020.1813400.

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保卫美国 77

point in time, after which a kill vehicle takes over and performs a hit-to-kill
collision with the quarry.155 The interceptor basing area plots discussed below
indicate the kinematic reach of airborne BPI systems. There are two steps
involved in developing the interceptor basing area plots. 第一的, a planar (头-
在) engagement between the ICBM and the interceptor is modeled. 然后, 我们-
ing the interceptor ground range in a planar engagement as the radius, a circle
is drawn centered on the ground intercept point. The circle represents inter-
ceptor basing areas for non-planar engagements.156

我们

examine

advances

和
interceptors—to determine variation in the performance of an airborne BPI
系统. These two subsystems are the most crucial to understanding the per-
formance, and potential, of an airborne BPI system.157

in two subsystems—launch platforms

a survey of recent technological advances

Several technological advances have occurred with launch platforms. 长的-
endurance UAVs armed with interceptors can theoretically loiter for a day
while stationed outside North Korean airspace.158
James Goodby and
Theodore Postol have proposed using the big-wing variant of the MQ-9
Reaper (Predator-B) UAV to execute airborne boost-phase intercepts of
North Korean ICBMs. They note that the long-endurance Predator-B UAV
may be able to loiter at 15 kilometers altitude for twenty-four hours, carrying
1,350 kilograms of interceptor payload.159 The Reaper UAV offers a baseline to
examine the viability of airborne BPI systems.

Our preliminary examination of the North Korean air defense network indi-

155. A more accurate technical simulation would require detailed modeling of the endgame of the
interception. While kinematic reach does not always imply successful interception, it does indicate
the ability of the combination of airborne platform and interceptors modeled to possess the means
to get the kill vehicle close enough to the quarry to attempt interception, which is a principal re-
quirement of any viable airborne BPI system.
156. For details on the process, see Barton et al., “Report of the American Physical Society Study
Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense,” PP. 55–60.
157. Other technical parameters, 然而, also inºuence the performance of a BPI missile defense
系统. 例如, the plume-to-hardbody handover problem is a challenge in BPI. See CBO,
“Alternatives for Boost-Phase Missile Defense,” p. 51. We leave exploration of other technical pa-
rameters to future work.
158. See Garrett Reim, “General Atomics Unveils ‘Ultra-long Endurance’ Replacement for MQ-9
Reaper,” FlightGobal, 九月 14, 2020, https://www.ºightglobal.com/military-uavs/general-
atomics-unveils-ultra-long-endurance-replacement-for-mq-9-reaper/140162.article.
159. James E. Goodby and Theodore A. Postol, “A New Boost-Phase Missile Defense System—and
Its Diplomatic Uses in the North Korean Dispute,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 卷. 74, 不. 4
(2018), p. 211, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1486578. A Department of Defense report on
the regular version MQ-9 Reaper notes that it can operate at 50,000 feet with an external payload
的 3,000 pounds for a duration of fourteen hours. See Director of Operational Test and Evaluation,
“FY 2017 年度报告: MQ-9 Reaper Armed Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)” (华盛顿,
华盛顿特区: Ofªce of Operational Test and Evaluation, 我们. 国防部, 一月 2018), p. 269,
https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2017/af/2017mq9reaperuas.pdf?版本(西德:2)2019-

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国际安全 46:3 78

cates that these UAVs may be safely stationed in the Sea of Japan. Several of
from the 1960s
North Korea’s air defense assets are Soviet equipment
and 1970s.160 North Korea possesses some radar systems that might track
UAVs operating at a more considerable distance outside their airspace.161
But its air defense interceptors have much shorter ranges.162 Except for the
SA-5 Gammon air defense system, most of the other systems in the North
Korean inventory have an intercept range of less than 50 kilometers.163 The
SA-5 Gammon (IE。, the S-200) air defense system has the longest interceptor
范围 (150–300 kilometers). Whether North Korea has enough SA-5 batter-
ies to defend the entire coastline effectively, 然而, is unclear. 此外,
SA-5 systems may be vulnerable to electronic countermeasures because they
depend on relatively unsophisticated mechanical scanning radars.164 At a
standoff distance of 300 kilometers, UAVs could be invulnerable to North
Korea’s air defense network.

相似地, the North Korean Air Force may not be able to challenge UAVs
operating outside its airspace. While its inventory of ªghter aircraft may be
大的, many of them may be damaged, inactive, or ineffective in combat.165 Ad-
ditionally, North Korean aircrews “accumulate less than 30 annual ºying
hours” and cannot train and maintain proªciency.166 Without a competent air
力量, North Korea might not keep the United States and allied ªghter aircraft

08-19-113931-413. The big wing MQ-9 Reaper has demonstrated the ability to ºy as long as 37.5
小时. See Tamir Eshel, “Predator B ER Spreads Bigger Wings,” Defense Update, 六月 1, 2016,
https://defense-update.com/20160601_predator-b-er-spreads-bigger-wings-3.html. Further study
is necessary to understand the performance of this UAV and future UAV variants that could be de-
signed for boost-phase missile defense missions.
160. John Reed, “What Do North Korea’s Air Defenses Look Like?“ 对外政策, 四月 1, 2013,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/01/what-do-north-koreas-air-defenses-look-like/.
161. North Korea’s Soviet P-14 radar has an approximate range of 600 kilometers. It may also have
other radar systems with a range of 200 到 300 kilometers. 此外, it seems that North Korea
has acquired phased array radars that make it possible to track multiple targets simultaneously.
See Terence Roehrig, “The Abilities—and Limits—of North Korean Early Warning,” Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, 十一月 27, 2017, https://thebulletin.org/2017/11/the-abilities-and-limits-of-
north-korean-early-warning/.
162. Some of North Korea’s air defense interceptors are SA-2 Guideline, SA-6 Gainful, SA-3 Goa,
SA-13 Gopher, SA-16 Gimlets, SA-4 Ganef, SA-5 Gammon, and SA-17 Gadºy. See Reed, “What Do
North Korea’s Air Defenses Look Like?”
163. It is possible that North Korea’s KN-06 may have ranges up to 150 kilometers. See Missile
Threat, “KN-06 (Pon’gae-5),” CSIS Missile Defense Project, 七月 31, 2021, https://missilethreat
.csis.org/missile/kn-06/.
164. 理查德·L. Garwin and Theodore A. Postol, “Airborne Patrol to Destroy DPRK ICBMs in
Powered Flight” (剑桥: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Science, 技术, 和
National Security Working Group, November 27–29, 2017), PP. 44–52, https://fas.org/rlg/
airborne.pdf.
165. Haena Jo, “Flying against the Odds: North Korea’s Air Force,” Military Balance Blog, 内特纳-
tional Institute for Strategic Studies, 二月 10, 2020, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-
balance/2020/02/north-korea-air-force.
166. 同上.

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保卫美国 79

at a far enough distance to prevent Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD)
operations against its air defense forces.

Given these factors, 我们用 100 kilometers as the minimum standoff dis-
tance for UAVs conducting BPI missile defense patrols to perform our calcula-
系统蒸发散. If SEAD aircraft and air defense escort patrols are brought into the
使命, 然而, it may be possible to operate closer to the North Korean
coast. As future UAVs acquire deep penetration and combat capabilities,
the ability to perform boost-phase missile defense against North Korea
might increase.

In the case of interceptors, several innovations in rocket motor manufactur-
ing may have created new opportunities. Garwin and Postol note that ad-
vances in lightweight and small motor casing, high fuel-to-payload mass
分数, improved thrust vector control capabilities, and high exhaust veloci-
ties have made it possible to develop boost-phase interceptors that a UAV
can carry. Drawing from existing rocket motors, such as the ASAS 13-30V, 这
STAR 37FMV, and the STAR 12GV, they propose a 5 kilometer per second air-
borne interceptor weighing approximately 500 kilograms and equipped with a
43-kilogram kill vehicle capable of generating 2 kilometer per second divert
velocity.167 While kill vehicle designs with mass less than 50 kilograms were
proposed in the 1990s, it is only recently that advances in material science and
manufacturing may have made them feasible.168 The calculations performed in
this article model a heavier 60 kilogram kill vehicle against the current
Hwasong-15 ICBM, and a 50 kilogram kill vehicle against hypothetical solid-
fueled ICBMs.

Our analysis starts by examining the performance of an airborne BPI sys-
TEM, assuming a commit time of 65 seconds after launch for liquid-fueled
ICBMs and 45 seconds after launch for solid-fueled ICBMs.169 Commit time is
the time needed to determine a ªring solution for the interceptor after the

167. 理查德·L. Garwin and Theodore A. Postol, “Technical Reªnements in Design Features of the
Airborne Patrol against North Korean ICBMs” (剑桥: 麻省理工学院
科学, 技术, and National Security Working Group, 可能 10, 2018), PP. 4–5, https://fas
.org/rlg/reªne.pdf. For details on the technical parameters for these rocket motors, see Northrop
Grumman, “Propulsion Products Catalog” (Falls Church, Va.: Northrop Grumman, 四月 5,
2016), PP. 75, 96, 118, https://www.northropgrumman.com/wp-content/uploads/NG-Propulsion-
Products-Catalog.pdf. Further engineering evaluations are needed to validate these designs.
168. Wilkening, “Airborne Boost-Phase Ballistic Missile Defense,” p. 20; and CBO, “Alternatives
for Boost-Phase Missile Defense,” p. 24. A survey of interceptors that have demonstrated boost-
phase missile defense capabilities can be found in Sankaran and Fetter, “Reexamining Homeland
Missile Defense against North Korea,” PP. 55–56. The PAC-3 missile that is the basis for one of
these interceptors has demonstrated a dual-pulse solid rocket motor that can switch thrust on and
off. “Lockheed Martin’s PAC-3 MSE reaches major milestone during successful ºight tests,”
十一月 15, 2021, https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2021-11-15-lockheed-martins-pac-3-mse-
reaches-major-milestones-during-successful-ºight-tests.
169. Commit time values were determined on the basis of Barton et al., “Report of the American

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国际安全 46:3 80

ICBM launch. Postol has argued that interceptors can be committed against
liquid-fueled ICBMs as early as 50 seconds after launch. He notes that at
50 seconds, an ICBM should reach an altitude of approximately 12 kilometers
and should be above the cloud cover and visible to the Space Based Infrared
System missile-tracking satellites, therefore providing enough data to commit
an interceptor.170

evaluating airborne bpi missile defense system against icbm targets

Using the parameters discussed above, we performed calculations to test the
airborne BPI missile defense system’s performance against two ICBM targets:
the liquid-fuel Hwasong-15 that North Korea tested in 2017; and a hypotheti-
cal solid-fuel ICBM that North Korea might develop in the future.171 We mod-
eled three North Korean launch sites to assess the airborne BPI system’s
robustness. The ªrst launch site, near Wonsan, is located on the eastern coast
of North Korea. The second site is in the central part of North Korea near
Chagang, 大约 157 kilometers from the east coast. The third site is in
the northwestern part of North Korea near Chunggangup, 大约
240 kilometers from the east coast (see online appendix).

数字 1 shows ºight trajectories of a Hwasong-15 launched from the site
near Chunggangup. The ªgure shows the trajectories of missiles targeting
several U.S. 城市. 数字 1 also indicates the impact point of the trajectories if
the thrust is terminated early by a successful boost-phase intercept. 数字 1
shows that if intercept occurs less than 270 seconds after the launch of a
Hwasong-15 ICBM, no debris will fall on U.S. 领土.

The top image in ªgure 2 shows the available interceptor basing areas for
an engagement between a 5 kilometer per second airborne BPI and the
Hwasong-15 ICBM launched from the eastern part of North Korea heading to-

Physical Society Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense,”
p. S23.
170. Theodore A. Postol, “North Korean Ballistic Missiles and US Missile Defense,” Physics & 社会-
埃蒂, 四月 2018, p. 23. Other aircraft and ships that are equipped with modern sensors may aug-
ment satellite detection capabilities. See Sankaran and Fetter, “Reexamining Homeland Missile
Defense against North Korea,” PP. 54–55; and Edward J. Walsh, “New Air-Missile Defense Radar,”
会议记录, 六月 2020, p. 89.
171. The parameters of the Hwasong-15 ICBM were derived from Postol, “North Korean Ballistic
Missiles and US Missile Defense,” PP. 16, 20. Postol models the Hwasong-15 with a total boost-
phase time of 299 seconds. The appendix also illustrates the performance for a Hwasong-15
modeled with a total boost-phase time of 290 seconds. Even with the reduced boost-phase time,
airborne BPI remains viable. But there is a slight degradation in performance for the challenging
case of launches from the northwestern part of North Korea (near Chunggangup) toward Boston.
The parameters of the model solid-fueled ICBM were derived from the model S1 ICBM detailed in
Barton et al., “Report of the American Physical Society Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Sys-
tems for National Missile Defense,” p. 265.

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保卫美国 81

数字 1. North Korean Hwasong-15 ICBM Trajectories Targeting the United States

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笔记: The launch site for this ICBM is from the northwestern launch site near Chunggangup.
The time contours across the trajectories denote the impact point of the missile payload if
interception occurs at that time in the missile’s boost-phase.

ward Boston and Los Angeles, 分别. Boston and Los Angeles are de-
picted in the ªgure because they capture the range of launch angles for North
Korean ICBMs targeting the continental United States. Missiles heading to-
ward Boston (or other sites in the eastern part of the United States) are the
most challenging trajectories because their ºight paths bend away from UAVs
stationed in the Sea of Japan. The top image indicates that against Hwasong-15
ICBMs launched from the site near Wonsan, UAVs can maintain a distance of
300 kilometers from the North Korean coast and engage the ICBM at or below
这 270 seconds threshold needed to prevent debris impact on U.S. 领土.
The bottom image in ªgure 2 shows the basing area plots for the most chal-
lenging case for the airborne BPI system—launches from the northwestern
part of North Korea, near Chunggangup. Against these launches, intercept is
possible at approximately 255 seconds from a UAV stationed 100 kilometers
from the North Korean coast.172 These results were obtained using a 60 kilo-
gram kill vehicle and a commit time of 65 seconds; 如果, as noted above, lighter
kill vehicles or shorter commit times are attainable, the UAVs could have
higher standoff distances. These preliminary results indicate that airborne BPI
defenses against liquid-fueled Hwasong-15 ICBMs may be feasible.

172. Against ICBMs launched from the central part of North Korea, intercept is possible at ap-
近似地 210 seconds after the ICBM launch. 在 210 seconds, a UAV can be stationed at 200 ki-
lometers (see online appendix).

数字 2.

Interceptor Basing Area Plots for North Korean Hwasong-15 ICBM

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笔记: The top image plots the interceptor basing area against ICBMs launched from Won-
san, 北朝鲜, and heading toward Boston and Los Angeles, 分别. The bottom
image plots the interceptor basing area against ICBMs launched from Chunggangup,
北朝鲜, heading toward Boston and Los Angeles, 分别. In each image, 这
circle with the dashed line shows the extent of the basing area for ICBMs heading to Los
安吉利斯, and the circle with the solid line shows the extent of the basing area for ICBMs
heading to Boston.

保卫美国 83

Against a hypothetical faster-burning solid-fuel ICBM (with a boost phase of
170 seconds) that North Korea might acquire in the future, the performance of
the airborne BPI missile defense system degrades. As shown in the online ap-
pendix, against certain trajectories launched from the eastern and central re-
gions of North Korea, defense may be possible while maintaining a standoff
distance of 100 kilometers, but not for missiles launched from the northwest-
ern part of North Korea targeting the eastern part of the United States.173 This
result indicates that parts of North Korea may be safe zones for the launch of
solid-fuel ICBMs against some U.S. targets. But the ability to intercept missiles
from every part of North Korea against every possible target in the United
States may be unnecessary. A less-than-perfect defense that covers a signiªcant
portion of the country could bolster deterrence, because North Korea would be
uncertain about the true capability of the defense. If deterrence fails, we argue
that a less-than-perfect but more reliable system could be a better alternative to
the GMD system. Future technological advances, such as higher velocity inter-
ceptors or UAVs that are stealthy enough to operate inside North Korean air-
空间, may remove these limitations against eventual solid-fueled North
Korean ICBMs.174

It is worth noting that boost-phase intercept of solid-fuel ICBMs launched
against U.S. targets from North Korean safe zones would be feasible if the
UAVs could be stationed in China or Russia, near North Korea’s borders. 这
会, 当然, require close military cooperation between the United States
and China or Russia. Although the political barriers to such cooperation ap-
pear enormous, Russia or China might prefer such cooperation to the uncon-
strained deployment of U.S. missile defense systems that they believe could
threaten their nuclear deterrent.

173. The results are speciªc to interception at 145 seconds. While the intercept of the modeled
solid-fueled ICBM must occur within 145 seconds of launch to avoid debris impact on U.S. terri-
保守党, a successful intercept after 145 seconds is still likely to reduce damage, even if debris does fall
关于美国. 领土. 例如, if intercept occurs 165 seconds after launch (只是 5 seconds before
the end of boost-phase), debris from an ICBM heading toward Los Angeles, 加利福尼亚州, or Boston,
马萨诸塞州, would fall in either the Paciªc Ocean or the Hudson Bay. Debris from an ICBM
heading toward Austin, 德克萨斯州, would fall approximately thirty-ªve miles from Cody, Wyoming.
While the Austin metropolitan area population is 2.2 百万, Cody’s population is 10,000. Boost-
phase intercept any time before burnout would reduce the loss of life from an attack. We leave ex-
ploration of late boost-phase interception to future work.
174. UAVs such as X-47B, Avenger, UCLASS, and Phantom Ray are some examples of technolo-
gies under development. See Jeremiah Gertler, “我们. Unmanned Aerial Systems” (华盛顿,
华盛顿特区: Congressional Research Service, 一月 3, 2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42136
.pdf. For a short write-up on the debate unfolding within the United States on the future combat
role of UAVs, see Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Mabus Sticks with UCLASS Approach (and Unisex Uni-
形式); Hill Says, Not Enough,” Breaking Defense, 可能 20, 2015, https://breakingdefense.com/
2015/05/mabus-sticks-with-uclass-approach-unisex-uniforms/.

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国际安全 46:3 84

The limited vulnerability to countermeasures and reduced impact on strate-
gic stability suggest that airborne BPI systems might be a sensible alternative
to the GMD system in addressing the North Korean threat.175 But these advan-
tages need to be prudently managed. As discussed earlier, the GMD system
was exempted from several standard weapons acquisition processes and over-
sight mechanisms that led to its recurrent programmatic failures. Any new air-
borne BPI effort should be closely monitored and reviewed periodically by
external experts to ensure program success.

结论

冷战期间, the United States and the Soviet Union developed a
shared understanding that national missile defense weakened strategic stabil-
性. Both superpowers agreed that attempts to establish an effective national
missile defense shield by either side would provoke a nuclear arms race and
increase ªrst-strike pressures during a crisis. Another lesson from this era was
that a complicated and costly midcourse national missile defense system could
be defeated by simple and inexpensive countermeasures. These lessons led to
这 1972 ABM Treaty, which substantially limited national missile defense and
made possible agreed limitations in offensive forces.

在 2001, 然而, the George W. Bush administration withdrew from the
ABM Treaty despite strident objections from Russia and China. The Bush ad-
ministration argued that Cold War–era arms control arrangements were irrele-
vant to the emerging threats of the twenty-ªrst century, insisting that nuclear
threats from rogue states such as North Korea necessitated the pursuit of na-
tional missile defense. Notwithstanding several warnings over technological
immaturity, the Bush administration rushed to deploy the GMD system. 和我们一样
have argued, even after twenty years of dedicated effort, the GMD system is
still faltering. It has endured delays, program failures, and excessive cost in-
creases. We have also shown that the GMD effort has failed to produce a reli-
able kill vehicle. The latitude granted to the MDA has remained in place,
然而, even as the GMD program has not transitioned to the warªghter.176
New efforts such as the cruise and hypersonic defense are being undertaken
that divert the efforts of the MDA.177 Furthermore, countermeasures remain a
严肃的, if not insurmountable, challenge to the GMD system’s viability.

175. BPI systems may also be cost-competitive. For some details, see Sankaran and Fetter, “Reex-
amining Homeland Missile Defense against North Korea,” p. 53.
176. 这些年来, Congress has instituted a few oversight measures for the MDA, removing the
carte blanche that it enjoyed in the early 2000s. See GAO, “Missile Defense: 财政年度 2020 Deliv-
ery and Testing Progressed, but Annual Goals Unmet,” PP. 6–7.
177. Chaplain Statement, 行进 12, 2020, p. 13.

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保卫美国 85

然而, the pursuit of the GMD system has persistently fueled Russian and
their nuclear arsenals. 俄语
Chinese fears over the survivability of
and Chinese policymakers justify several new offensive nuclear weapons pro-
grams as both a response to U.S. national missile defense and as a mechanism
to reestablish strategic stability. Russian and Chinese weapons programs de-
signed to circumvent U.S. missile defense, such as hypersonic weapons, 创造
new nuclear vulnerabilities for the United States. They are also weakening
support for sustaining existing U.S.-Russia bilateral arms control agreements,
including the New START Treaty.178

We have argued that the GMD system has imposed a high geopolitical cost
and is incapable of providing reliable defense against North Korea. 意思是-
尽管, North Korea has substantially improved the capability of its nuclear ar-
senal, and its ICBMs may soon be able to credibly threaten the U.S. homeland.
We believe the United States can effectively deter nuclear attacks by North
Korea through the threat of devastating retaliation, but U.S. policymakers have
been unwilling to rely exclusively on deterrence. This unwillingness is driven
partly by domestic politics and partly by the concerns of U.S. 盟国, who worry
that the United States might not come to their defense if North Korea can cred-
ibly threaten to attack U.S. 城市.

it should adopt an approach that

If the United States is to continue to pursue national missile defense against
is both more effective
北朝鲜,
against North Korean ICBMs and less likely to weaken strategic stability with
Russia and China. This article suggests that an airborne BPI system is a possi-
ble alternative to the GMD system. While diplomacy and deterrence can help
mitigate North Korean nuclear threats, our analysis indicates that an airborne
BPI system could offer effective defense against contemporary North Korean
ICBM threats should those efforts fail. BPI systems are less vulnerable to coun-
termeasures and cannot defend against Russian and Chinese ICBMs. 更远-
更多的, we have argued that the effectiveness of a boost-phase defense would be
bolstered if interceptors could be based in Russian or Chinese territories or air-
空间. Such cooperative missile defenses could form a central component of a
grand bargain with Russia and China. It is our recommendation that the
United States thoroughly explore the airborne BPI concept, with detailed engi-
neering studies and political analysis, to further understand its advantages
and limitations as an alternative to the GMD system.

We have argued that continuing to pursue the GMD system out of political
and bureaucratic inertia does not serve the United States’ interest. We recom-
mend that a bipartisan presidential commission be instituted to reconsider

178. Biden Jr., “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance,” p. 13; and Detrani, “The New
START extension.”

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