China in Transnational Extractives - 麻省理工学院人工智能研究专业

China in Transnational Extractives
Governance: A Mapping Exercise

(西德:129)
Hyeyoon Park*

抽象的

China became one of the biggest players in the global extractive resource supply chain,
along with increasing extractive resource demand for green industries. 有趣的是, 超过
过去二十年, Chinese actors started participating in transnational extractive gov-
ernance initiatives (TEGI) supporting transparency, a norm for governance-by-disclosure.
This article aims to answer the question of what types of Chinese actors engage in what
TEGIs regarding transparency. Based on mapping forty-eight TEGIs, this article shows a
nuanced pattern of China’s involvement in extractives governance beyond a dualistic
approach to China in global governance—whether China is a threat or nonthreat. Impor-
急切地, China does not act as a uniﬁed monolithic actor; 相当, different types of actors
engage TEGIs distinctively. Chinese corporations are most actively engaging in thin trans-
parency TEGIs lacking stringent veriﬁcation rules and featuring limited multistakeholder
参与. It could potentially accelerate the risk of green washing of those companies
and disempower weaker actors.

The sustainability of the global extractive resource supply chain has become a
signiﬁcant issue in global environmental governance. This issue is exacerbated
by the growing international demand for mineral resources that are critical to
green industries, such as cobalt, which is used to produce lithium-ion batteries
in solar panels and electric vehicles. China has become one of the biggest
players in the global market for extractive sources over the last few decades—
今天, China controls almost 60 percent of the global lithium supply chain
(Foreign Policy 2019, 5) and runs more than 70 percent of copper and cobalt
mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Prasso 2022). 而且,
the Xi regime’s national grand strategy, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 有
expanded China’s inﬂuence in the global extractive sector (Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development 2018, 24) by supporting Chinese com-
panies seeking to develop infrastructure and operate large-scale mining projects
in resource-rich countries. Despite their rapidly growing impacts on the extrac-
tive sector, previous studies in global governance have not sufﬁciently investi-
gated Chinese actors’ roles in governing the issue.

* 通讯作者: achesler@nd.edu

Global Environmental Politics 23:4, 2023, https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00707
© 2023 麻省理工学院. 根据知识共享署名发布 4.0 国际的
(抄送 4.0) 执照.

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2 (西德:129)

China in Transnational Extractives Governance

Since the early 2000s, the international community has established several
transnational extractive governance initiatives (TEGI), such as the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) (see Auld et al. 2018), which provide
guidelines meant to enhance the transparency of governments and mining com-
panies and make extractive projects more sustainable. The basic idea behind
TEGIs is that enhanced transparency in the global extractive resource supply
chain can mitigate negative social and environmental impacts, 例如
resource curse that plagues many resource-rich countries (Alstine 2014;
David-Barrett and Okamura 2016; Humphreys et al. 2007). 例如, 迪斯-
closing ﬁnancial transactions between resource suppliers and buyers through
TEGIs’ transparency policies might curb corruption in those developing coun-
tries where resource extraction results in conﬂict and poverty ( Weinthal and
Luong 2006). 这样, TEGIs function as platforms for the development
of international transparency norms and work as global norm entrepreneurs.
另一方面, we cannot understand the actual effects of TEGIs without
reviewing China’s involvement in TEGIs. If China, one of the world’s biggest
players in resource extraction, does not participate in transnational governance
mechanisms advocating transparency norms, then TEGIs cannot effectively
achieve their intended policy goals. 因此, this article explores China’s engage-
ment in TEGIs and its impact on the development of global transparency
规范.

The so-called China threat debate in today’s academic and policy discus-
sions provides skeptical views on China’s role in global governance. This per-
spective asserts that China is challenging the existing norms of “good
governance”—for example, transparency, human rights, environmental rights,
and democracy—advocated by traditionally powerful governance actors, 这样的
as the World Bank, 美国, and the European Union (Kopinski and
Sun 2014). Some scholars have shown different characteristics of Chinese
versions of global governance and highlighted how Chinese investment and
business operations in resource-rich developing countries focus on so-called
effective governance rather than upholding values; 那是, these actors focus
on the proﬁtability of their operations (例如, Mol 2011; Power et al. 2012;
张 2011). 另一方面, diverse types of Chinese actors have recently
begun to participate in some TEGIs developing global transparency standards. 它
is noteworthy that most TEGIs are “good governance” initiatives advocating
global transparency norms (Alstine et al. 2014), and China has become a part
of the governance architecture. 例如, Chinese government agencies and
companies participated in the seventh EITI Global Conference (Cordy 2016).
此外, the International Council on Mining and Minerals (ICMM) 和
the Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals, and Chemical
Importers and Exporters (CCCMC) 同意, in December 2017, to promote sus-
tainable development in Chinese overseas mining investments (国际的
Council on Mining and Minerals 2017). Increasing Chinese involvement in
such TEGIs raises the question of whether Chinese actors accept or challenge

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Hyeyoon Park (西德:129) 3

the transparency norms forwarded or supported by these governance initiatives,
based on their unique values and growing international power.

Whereas some studies have examined the environmental and social
impacts of Chinese investment and extractive projects overseas at the local level
(González-Vicente 2013; Mol 2011), there is a lack of studies examining the role
of China in the existing global extractives governance architecture. This gap
exists in part because most previous studies of TEGIs employed a single case
study approach. 除少数例外 (例如, Auld et al. 2018), a lack of academic
research shows a comprehensive topology of the current transnational extrac-
tives governance. 此外, there have been no attempts to explain different
types of Chinese actors’ roles in developing global norms in the governance
realm. Many previous studies, especially in international relations (和), analyze
China as a uniﬁed, monolithic actor so that they often provide a simpliﬁed view
of whether China is a threat or a nonthreat. This study ﬁlls these gaps in the
literature by conducting a mapping exercise and attempting to chart the general
tendencies of Chinese actors’ involvement in TEGIs where transparency norms
are developed and translated into global public policies. It seeks to examine,
首先, which TEGIs produce and reproduce what type of transparency norms pro-
jected onto their policies; 第二, which Chinese actors are involved in which
TEGIs; 第三, how these actors engage in TEGIs that emphasize transparency
规范; and fourth, the distinct conditions under which Chinese actors engage
in TEGIs.

The article is organized as follows. The second section provides a brief
overview of transnational extractives governance, especially vis-à-vis transpar-
ency. The third section describes the current debates about China as an emerg-
ing power in transnational extractives governance. The fourth section shows the
results of the study’s empirical analysis of forty-eight TEGI governance platforms
aimed at improving the social and environmental responsibility of the extractive
sector. This section reveals different types of transparency norms within TEGIs
and patterns of Chinese actors’ participation in TEGIs. The last section discusses
the implications of China’s normative role in global extractives governance.

Transnational Extractives Governance and Transparency

Transnational extractives governance is a relatively recent phenomenon com-
pared to other global environmental governance areas (Auld et al. 2018). Grow-
ing international demand to solve diverse issues in the global extractive
resources supply chain—including corruption, the use of child labor, and water
pollution at mining sites—has led to the establishment of several TEGIs in the
past two decades. TEGIs function as governance platforms, developing new
global policies and norms. They help stakeholders come together to develop
new global policies and norms and identify common principles or voluntary
standards regarding the environmental and social elements of resource extrac-
tive projects. TEGIs like EITI grew out of a sense that top-down regulations

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4 (西德:129)

China in Transnational Extractives Governance

within a country’s jurisdictional territory could not effectively govern various
actors in the global supply chain (Hauﬂer 2010a, 2010乙). For similar reasons,
many previous studies emphasize the increasing demand for transnational
multistakeholder networks and have provided an abundance of theoretical
terminology within the ﬁeld of global environmental politics, such as global
private governance (Cashore 2002; Pattberg 2005), transnational multistake-
holder governance (Pattberg and Widerberg 2016), and transnational public–
private governance (Andonova et al. 2009; Bäckstrand 2006).

Despite the theoretical richness of these global environmental politics per-
spectives, the literature lacks research that sees the TEGI as an independent
realm of global governance—one distinct from other environmental concerns,
such as climate change (Auld et al. 2018; exceptions include Acosta 2013;
Carbonnier et al. 2011). Previous studies of TEGIs usually focus on a speciﬁc
extractive sector, such as gold (Auld et al. 2018; Bloomﬁeld 2017) or diamonds
(Hauﬂer 2010b), or they look at a single initiative as a case study. Of the latter
团体, most studies focus on the EITI. These studies often examine the institu-
tional traits of the EITI in the context of the implementation of policy, com-
pliance of EITI members (David-Barrett and Okamura 2016; Ihugba 2016), 或者
the local impacts of the EITI (Öge 2016; Papyrakis et al. 2017; Sovacool and
Andrews 2015). 简而言之, there is no comprehensive picture of existing TEGIs
that creates globally shared norms for resource governance.

Most global governance scholars recognize norms as critical components
of transnational governance systems (Bernstein and Cashore 2007). Transpar-
ency has been a principal norm in transnational extractives governance, initially
advanced as a core norm to combat corruption linked to resource extraction
projects by disclosing the information of ﬁnancial transactions between extrac-
tive companies and governments (Alstine 2014). EITI has taken a leading role in
consolidating transparency as a global norm in transnational extractive gover-
南斯 (Rustad et al. 2017) since it was created in 2002, after the Publish What
You Pay campaign. The basic idea supporting the transparency norm in resource
governance is that the public disclosure of information of powerful actors can
make them accountable because other actors, particularly civil society actors,
become accessible to the information and monitor them more easily (Hauﬂer
2010A). 在这个意义上, transparency could empower weaker agents by ﬁxing a
problem of information asymmetry among powerful and less powerful actors
(Florini 2007).

另一方面, even though most TEGIs commonly highlight trans-
parency as a principal norm (Alstine 2014; David-Barrett and Okamura 2016),
there has been no uniﬁed understanding or application of transparency among
TEGIs. TEGIs appear to support transparency norms centered on different
extraction-related issues, 例如, 腐败, violent conﬂicts linked to
mineral extraction (例如, Kimberley Process), or sustainability (ICMM) (看
Fonseca 2010; Sethi and Emelianova 2006). 尤其, each TEGI’s target of
transparency has been diversiﬁed. 最近, EITI started emphasizing the

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Hyeyoon Park (西德:129) 5

necessity of disclosing members’ environmental and ecological impacts
(Ponsford et al. 2018). It seems to be a meaningful shift to govern transnational
environmental challenges caused by resource extractions, because transparency
centered on environmental aspects have been relatively marginalized in trans-
national extractive governance. Bleischwitz (2014) also argues that transparency
norms in resource extraction need to be broadened to include environmental
担忧. Despite this complex picture of transparency norms in transnational
extractives governance, most of the existing literature does not reﬂect the full
variety of transparency norms operated in TEGIs because of its heavy focus
on the EITI as a single case study. 因此, by drawing a comprehensive map of
different types of TEGI transparency norms, particularly examining transparency
norms intersected with environmental concerns, this article makes a substantial
contribution to the previous literature in the ﬁeld of global environmental
政治.

The Rise of China in the Extractive Sector

The rise of China has been one of the most hotly debated issues in IR scholar-
ship in recent decades. 例如, some scholars have tried to discern whether
an emergent China will attempt to challenge American hegemony and reshape
norms and values in the existing world order (Brooks and Wohlforth 2016;
米尔斯海默 2010). Particularly, the Belt and Road Initiative has been viewed
as a symbol of China’s emerging power over traditional great powers. The BRI is
China’s intercontinental investment program targeting infrastructure develop-
ment and close economic cooperation with countries mostly in the Global
南, and currently, 147 countries participate as partners.1 The BRI’s massive
infrastructure projects have greatly expanded China’s inﬂuence in the develop-
世界 (Economist 2018). Particularly, extractive sectors became a major focus
in China’s BRI investment due to China’s domestic shortages of natural
资源 (加拉格尔 2016, 2019). 例如, Chinese companies operate or
ﬁnance ﬁfteen of nineteen cobalt mines in the DRC, one of the BRI countries
(Searcey et al. 2021). In this light, the BRI has been a useful platform for
Chinese extraction companies to access mining sites around the world.

同时, many studies have emphasized potentially growing negative
impacts of China’s dominant inﬂuence. 第一的, one of the major concerns is that
China could “weaponize” mineral resources against foreign countries for polit-
ical purposes, similar to a past event—China’s military blockage of rare-earth
mineral exports to Japan in 2010 (Klinger 2018). 第二, increasing research
and public media examine negative environmental and social impacts of
China’s BRI investment and growing resource extractions in resource-rich

1. https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/, last accessed January 13,

2023.

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6 (西德:129)

China in Transnational Extractives Governance

developing countries. Some previous studies have emphasized the negative
impacts of China’s increased investment on the environment and recipient
国家 (Chin 2012; 张 2011). 例如, Kopinski and Sun (2014)
explained that Chinese investment is based on project-type ﬁnancing, 哪个
emphasizes proﬁtability and is therefore distinct from the World Bank’s
program-type ﬁnancing, which considers a project’s potential environmental
and social impacts as a rule. 休斯 (2019) speciﬁcally argues that the BRI
could lead to serious threats to biodiversity in China’s BRI partner countries.

The China threat narrative often highlights Chinese actors’ different behav-
ioral patterns and explains them with reference to Chinese values and norms.
Several scholars have explained how Chinese government actors and companies
violate transparency norms in resource-rich developing countries. 例如,
Harvey’s (2014) work links Chinese investment in Africa to the low level of Afri-
can development via the opaque relationship between Chinese national banks
and government elites (see also Power et al. 2012). Bond and Garcia (2015)
advance a similar argument that China intensiﬁes the unfair relationship
between local people and local elites through tax evasion or mispriced minerals.
此外, Tuman and Shirali (2017) suggested that Chinese business
文化, especially social networks and guanxi,2 can help explain the preference
of Chinese ﬁrms in African countries for informal avenues as opposed to legal
channels. A recent New York Times series on China’s critical mineral extractions
in the DRC showed similar transparency problems. According to the report,
some Chinese mining companies bribed employees into secrecy to cover
workers’ injury tallies (Searcey et al. 2021). 而且, 二月里 2022, a local
court at Lubumbashi ruled to suspend China Molybdenum’s mining activities
because the company did not declare copper and cobalt reserves and royalties to
the DRC government (Lipton and Searcey 2022). To mitigate China’s negative
effects in the global extractive supply chain, some scholars claim that China
should more actively participate in TEGIs supporting transparency norms, 这样的
as EITI, and enhanced environmental reporting (Klinger 2018; Preston et al.
2016). 然而, there is a distinct lack of studies observing China’s involve-
ment in the global extractives governance process of creating and disseminating
transparency norms at the transnational level. 的确, the role of actors from the
Global South has been overlooked in global governance studies in general
(Hale and Held 2011), and only a few studies in the global extractives gover-
nance literature have focused on China. 例如, Mouan (2010) exception-
ally describes how Western actors’ principles and values hinder China’s active
participation in the EITI. 此外, Auld et al. (2018) pointed out the signif-
icance of examining the increasing inﬂuence of emerging economies in

2. Even though these authors do not directly mention guanxi, their argument explicitly describes
how Chinese business culture and social norms inﬂuence Chinese behavior in African coun-
尝试. Guanxi is a unique Chinese cultural element of business relationships, emphasizing
interpersonal rather than ofﬁcial connections.

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Hyeyoon Park (西德:129) 7

transnational extractives governance, such as China and India, given that their
growth and emergence might cause new governance challenges. For these rea-
儿子们, this article aims to reveal Chinese actors’ involvement in the existing
extractives governance architecture pertaining to transparency as a principal
norm in the governance realm.

Research Method and Data

This research is based on an analysis of forty-eight cases of TEGIs that were
active as of 2020. The forty-eight TEGIs are listed in Table 1. Cases were iden-
tiﬁed by drawing on the International Trade Centre Standards Map and several
lists from the scholarly literature (Auld et al. 2018; Bauchowitz 2014). I selected
the initiatives that govern extractive sectors (mining oil, 气体, metals, and min-
erals) through “steering, rule-making, implementation, or enforcement” based
on “transnational” interactions among public and private actors by following
the criteria used in Auld et al. (2018, 433). To focus on examining global gov-
ernance dynamics related to the extractive sectors, I excluded regional and local
governance initiatives.

These lists were then cross-checked with the list of voluntary responsible
mining initiatives in the 2015 white paper of the World Economic Forum and
RESOLVE. The main data source was written documents—including meeting
minutes, annual reports, governance guidelines, and member lists—published
by each TEGI and made accessible on their ofﬁcial websites. Analysis of these
documents was supplemented with three expert interviews: one with a senior
staff member of an international nongovernmental organization, one with a
director of a Chinese government agency, and one with a Chinese scholar
who specializes in this topic as a target group. The expert interviews provided
crucial background knowledge that helped the author to interpret the coding
results and increase the credibility of the data analysis.3 Additionally, I cross-
checked the interview contents with accessible academic and policy literature
for credibility.

The TEGI data were analyzed through a two-tier coding cycle (比照. Saldaña
2016) and by applying abductive analysis, which pursues “a ﬁnding of surprise,
puzzle, or anomaly” (Timmermans and Tavory 2012, 180). Abductive analysis
is an ongoing reasoning process that repeats cycles between analysis and data
搜集 (Timmermans and Tavory 2012, 175) so that a researcher can deter-
mine which anomalous cases should be highlighted. TEGI data were compiled
and coded in Microsoft Excel in terms of the TEGI’s approach to the issue of
transparency, the types of actors involved (例如, 公司, 银行, 政府
机构), and the nature of Chinese actors’ participation. This analysis aims to
show the primary characteristics of the transparency of current TEGIs and reveal

3. The interviewees’ anonymity has been assured and protected for privacy reasons.

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8 (西德:129)

China in Transnational Extractives Governance

桌子 1
The Forty-Eight TEGI Analyzed in the Study

TEGI

Africa Mining Vision

Alliance for Responsible Mining

Alliance for Responsible Mining Fairmined Initiative

Aluminum Stewardship Initiative

Better Gold Initiative

Devonshire Initiate

Diamond Development Initiative International

Dow Jones Sustainability Index

Dubai Multi Commodities Centre

Equator Principles

Equitable Origin

European Partnership and Responsible Minerals

Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

FTSE Russell

Global e-Sustainability Initiative

Global Reporting Initiative

Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance

Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and

Sustainable Development

International Council on Mining and Metals

International Cyanide Management Code

International Finance Corporation

International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation
Association Oil and Gas Industry Guidance on Voluntary
Sustainable Reporting

International Seabed Authority Mining Code

International Tin Research Institute Tin Supply Chain Initiative

ISO14001 Standard for Environmental Management Systems

Kellogg Innovation Network

Kimberley Process
London Bullion Market Association’s Program
Mining Association of Canada–Towards Sustainable Mining

Acronym

AMV

ARM

ASI

BGI

DDI

DJSI

DMCC

EPRM

EITI

FTSE

GeSI

GRI

IRMA

IGF

ICMM

ICMC

IFC

IPIECA

ISA

ITRI

国际标准化组织

KIN

LBMA

TSM

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桌子 1
(Continued)

TEGI

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

(经合组织) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises

Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada e3 plus

RESOLVE Deep Seabed Mining Projects

Public-Private Alliance for Responsible Minerals Trade

Responsible Artisanal Gold Solutions Forum

Responsible Business Alliance

Responsible Cobalt Initiative

Responsible Jewelry Council

Responsible Minerals Initiative

Responsible Mining Foundation

Responsible Steel TM

Social Accountability 8000 标准

Solutions for Hope Tantalum Project

The International Tin Association Code of Conduct

The International Union for Conservation of Nature Global

Business and Biodiversity Programme

United Nations Global Compact

Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights

World Economic Forum Responsible Mineral Development

倡议

World Gold Council

Hyeyoon Park (西德:129) 9

Acronym

经合组织

PDAC

DSM

PARMT

RAGS

RBA

RCI

RJC

RMI

RMF

RSTM

SA8000

SHTP

ITS

GBBP

UNGC

VPSHR

RMDI

WGC

various patterns in Chinese actors’ involvement in the transnational extractive
governance architecture. I assume that Chinese actors’ active engagement in
certain TEGIs reﬂects their adoption of primary norms projected onto the TEGIs’
政策.

Transparency in TEGI
This research conﬁrms that transparency is a primary norm of TEGIs. 这
disclosure of information via audits or reporting is a common policy tool
for improving accountability in all forty-eight TEGIs analyzed in this study.

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10 (西德:129) China in Transnational Extractives Governance

数字 1
Different Transparency-Related Issues Among the Forty-Eight TEGIs Analyzed in the Study

数字 1 displays the types of information members of these initiatives are
required to disclose. 数字 1 also shows how TEGIs have expanded the scope
of information they require and thus broadened the meaning of transparency
beyond focusing on the disclosure of ﬁnancial information in the extractives
sector. Forty-seven of the forty-eight TEGIs asked companies to report on social
问题, such as human rights, labor rights, and public health, and forty-six
demanded that companies disclose information on their operations’ environ-
mental effects. 此外, half of the forty-eight initiatives ask participants
to report on all four different types of information, while only ten initiatives
focus on one or two types of transparency-related issues.

This analysis also reveals an important distinction between the thick and
thin versions of the transparency projected by TEGIs. Schleifer et al. (2019) 迪斯-
tinguish between shallow and deep transparency, and Bloomﬁeld (2017) distin-
guishes between ﬁrst-, second-, and third-party governance initiatives. 这些
scholars’ categories imply that there are degrees of transparency in decision-
making procedures and that substantial policy outcomes are decided in part
by “what information is disclosed by whom, and for whom” (Schleifer et al.
2019, 4). 简而言之, these scholars suggest that if transparency standards are cre-
ated and implemented by industrial actors alone, and compliance and verifying
mechanisms are not developed and enforced by outside parties, transnational
governance systems would lack legitimacy and accountability.

This article distinguishes between thick and thin transparency initiatives
based on the ﬁndings of the studies mentioned earlier. It deﬁnes a thick trans-
parent initiative as one possessing a more accountable governance mechanism
and a thin transparent initiative as one lacking verifying systems—particularly
those that share only a limited amount of information with the public. Apply-
ing the evaluation criteria of previous literature, the forty-eight TEGIs in this

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Hyeyoon Park

(西德:129) 11

study were coded as promoting thick transparency if they met all of the
following criteria (similar to deep transparency and third-party governance
initiatives in Bloomﬁeld 2017; Schleifer et al. 2019): 首先, they disclose informa-
tion about multistakeholder rule-setting processes to the public; 第二, 一个
independent third party is present in the monitoring process; 第三个, 他们
disclose a substantial amount of information about their monitoring results
to the public.

The coding results show that most initiatives project thin transparency
through their governance mechanisms. Only eleven of the forty-eight initiatives
(大约 23%) satisfy all three thick transparency criteria (数字 2);
twenty-seven (多于 50%) met only one condition or none, and ten ful-
ﬁlled two criteria. The prominence of thin transparency in these TEGIs indicates
that the public has limited access to information about companies’ behaviors in
the extractive sector. This could in turn foster doubt regarding the credibility and
efﬁcacy of TEGIs.

Chinese Engagement in TEGI

A considerable number of Chinese actors engage with TEGIs. Chinese compa-
人们, government agencies, 银行, 学者, and civil society actors participate
in twenty-nine of the forty-eight TEGIs examined in this study. The growing
presence of Chinese actors in TEGIs indicates that China is not rejecting global
transparency norms; 反而, it is becoming an active player by adopting the
transparency standards of transnational extractive governance mechanisms. 的
these twenty-nine TEGIs featuring Chinese participants, twenty-one advanced
thin transparency.

Transnational governance scholars differentiate between public, 私人的,
and hybrid initiatives based on the types of actors involved (Abbot and
Snidal 2009). 数字 3 shows how Chinese actors tend to take part in more pri-
vate initiatives than other types of TEGIs, 那是, those regulated by companies

数字 2
Thick and Thin Transparency TEGIs

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12 (西德:129) China in Transnational Extractives Governance

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数字 3
Mapping the Forty-Eight TEGIs by Their Main Participants, Including Chinese Participants

or banks (thirteen of the twenty-nine TEGIs with Chinese participants). 这
concentration is notable because the majority (twenty-six) of the forty-eight
TEGIs analyzed in this study are hybrid; 那是, they are led by all three types
of actors (government agencies, 公司, and nongovernmental organiza-
系统蒸发散 [NGOs]). By mapping Chinese involvement in these forty-eight TEGIs,
we can see that Chinese actors seem to prefer private governance arrangements
(corporation-centric mechanisms) over hybrid schemes jointly operated by
公司, 政府, and NGOs. Abbot and Snidal (2009) claim that such
private initiatives are instances of ﬁrms’ self-regulation and do not necessarily
lead them to act in the public interest because of the absence of states and
NGOs playing an essential role in monitoring and enforcement processes. 从
this perspective, China’s preference for private initiatives could create account-
ability issues in global extractives governance generally.

It is worth acknowledging that China does not participate in TEGIs as a
uniﬁed, monolithic actor to ﬁgure out major Chinese actors in the global extrac-
tives governance realm. 数字 4 demonstrates different Chinese actors’ partici-
pation in TEGIs. The graph identiﬁes the total number of TEGIs open to

Hyeyoon Park

(西德:129) 13

数字 4
Types of Chinese Actors Participating in TEGIs

different kinds of actors; 那是, the circle on the right indicates private TEGIs
with business participants, and the center in the three bubbles represents hybrid
initiatives consisting of all three types of participants. 数字 4 also shows the
number of participants with direct Chinese participants—not all forty-eight
TEGIs are open to all types of actors. 例如, Chinese companies are part
of twenty-two of the forty-three TEGIs available to them, and Chinese banks
participate in about 45 percent of the eleven TEGIs available to them. 这
participation rates of Chinese companies and banks are distinctly higher than
those of Chinese government agencies (eight of thirty-three available TEGIs)
and civil society actors (ﬁve of thirty-one available TEGIs). 换句话说,
Chinese market actors are more active participants in the current TEGI architec-
ture than their government or civil society counterparts. 下文中, 这
study details how Chinese companies and government agencies show distinc-
tive engagement patterns.

Chinese Companies

Chinese companies are the most prominent type of Chinese participants in
TEGIs. 作为 2020, 大约 208 Chinese companies had joined 24 TEGIs.
These companies included China’s largest extractive companies—both state-
owned companies, such as the China Minmetals Corporation (participating
in ﬁve TEGIs: 国际标准化组织, UNGC, ITS, ISA, and DSM) and China National Gold
公司 (UNGC and ICMC), and private companies, such as the Zijin
Mining Group (DJSI and LBMA) and China Molybdenum (RMI and DJSI).
数字 5 shows that most Chinese companies are active participants in TEGIs;
那是, they accept a formal obligation to comply with transparency require-
ments and can participate in decision-making processes related to transparency
norm development within the initiative itself. The active participation of

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14 (西德:129) China in Transnational Extractives Governance

数字 5
Numbers of Chinese Companies Participating in TEGIs and Their Engagement Types

China’s largest private- and state-owned extractive companies is remarkable
given their growing inﬂuence overseas. Other companies involved in these
TEGIs include the electronics giants Huawei and ZTE. This latter group tends
to be sensitive to the reputations of their brands, given the demands of global
consumers and foreign NGOs (Drezner and Lu 2009, 188). To improve their
market image, these companies put pressure on their upstream resource sup-
pliers to follow corporate social responsibility standards of TEGI-like codes of
执行, including transparency measures.4

Another major characteristic of Chinese companies’ participation in TEGI
is that most companies are engaging with initiatives that advance thin transpar-
ency. 数字 5 shows that Chinese companies actively participated in ﬁfteen thin
transparency TEGIs and only seven thick transparency TEGIs. 全面的, 大约-
马特利 70 的百分比 208 Chinese companies mentioned above are involved
in thin transparency TEGIs. As mentioned above, these types of initiatives usually
lack governance mechanisms that make them accountable to the public, 因此
raise concerns that TEGIs serve the interests of powerful companies by enhancing
their reputation and not guaranteeing their actual compliance with environmental
法规 (Dingwerth and Eichinger 2014, 243). 的确, Drezner and Lu (2009)
suggested that Chinese companies lean toward voluntary CSR programs that have
weak enforcement mechanisms, and other experts have shown that Chinese com-
panies are concerned that stringent global standards may restrain their business
opportunities and competitiveness (Guo et al. 2013, 3). A senior director in a
Chinese government agency explained that high global standards could be
burdensome for Chinese companies due to their short history of learning

例如, Huawei published a statement regarding its cobalt supply chain requiring its
upstream suppliers to avoid any social and environmental harm by using certain global
governance mechanisms, such as the RCI and RBA (more information is available at:
https://www.huawei.com/en/declarations/statement-on-responsible-cobalt-supply-chain, 最后的
一月访问 9, 2023).

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Hyeyoon Park

(西德:129) 15

CSR.5 For the same reason, another expert interviewee who works in an INGO
closely partnering with China also expected Chinese companies to keep reacting
passively to a transparency policy with high scrutiny.6

另一方面, this ﬁnding reveals a few exceptional cases showing
Chinese companies’ involvement in thick transparency TEGIs. It is worth men-
tioning that thirty-two Chinese companies are active members in the London
Bullion Market Association’s Program (LBMA), a thick transparency governance
mechanism which oversees the largest global bullion market. The LBMA trades
大约 900 tons of gold every day and has about 150 members from
多于 30 状态 (Hobson 2018). Its members are required to follow several
transparency standards in order to maintain their membership status (LBMA
2020). 例如, Daye Nonferrous Metals Co., one of the largest Chinese
copper manufacturing companies, joined the LBMA in 2007. It has since
published reports which afﬁrm its compliance with LBMA guidelines and
程序, including publishing a list of its suppliers, its third- party audit
信息, and the company’s due diligence management policy (Deloitte
2021). LBMA membership is an entry ticket to the world’s largest bullion
market—in other words, access to the market depends on companies’ compli-
ance with the LBMA’s transparency standards. This strong market incentive may
explain Chinese companies’ unusually high rate of participation in this partic-
ularly thick transparency TEGI.

总共, Chinese companies’ involvement in existing TEGIs appears to
reﬂect their business interests. Their participation can be interpreted as a reac-
tion to increasing international scrutiny of their corporate practices (Economy
and Levi 2014, 100) and their desire to improve their reputation in global
markets for the economic beneﬁts they hope to derive from having such a
reputation (Guo et al. 2013). 简而言之, China’s adoption of transparency rules
seems to be aiming not at fulﬁlling grassroots demands for information and the
right to know but rather at developing market efﬁciency and attracting foreign
investors (Florini and Jairaj 2014).

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Chinese Government Agencies

Chinese government agencies prefer thin transparency initiatives as well (看
数字 6). Compared to Chinese companies, Chinese government agencies par-
ticipate in fewer TEGIs and are more passive participants—they tend to support
transparency norms symbolically, 例如, by signing memoranda of
understanding or acting as partners on temporary projects (skirting the formal
obligation to follow TEGI rules and having only limited say in decision-making
流程). The Chinese government’s passive engagement with TEGIs signals its
limited commitment to existing transparency norms. 有趣的是, Chinese gov-
ernmental agencies engage actively in some TEGIs when initiatives are formed

5.
In-person interview, 七月 21, 2019.
6. Telephone interview, 七月 23, 2019.

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16 (西德:129) China in Transnational Extractives Governance

数字 6
Chinese Government Agencies’ Participation in TEGIs

by a sub-body of a traditional intergovernmental organization and the Chinese
government is an ofﬁcial member of that organization (例如, 国际
Seabed Authority).

There seem to be two explanations for the Chinese government’s passive
engagement with TEGIs. 第一的, the credibility of a given TEGI partially deter-
mines the degree of the Chinese government’s active engagement. 根据
to a Chinese expert on Chinese environmental foreign policy, the Chinese gov-
ernment regards the United Nations as a strategic platform to strengthen China’s
green leadership.7 It has been supposed that, 例如, Chinese ofﬁcials
prefer the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) to the EITI, which they
perceive as a “Western NGO” (Economy and Levi 2014, 109). 虽然
Chinese government supported the EITI at the 2009 G20 Summit (Economy
and Levi 2014, 108) and at least 130 Chinese companies follow the EITI’s
reporting process in twenty-four EITI implementing countries (Extractive Indus-
tries Transparency Initiative [EITI] 2016乙), China is not currently a member
state of the EITI. 反而, China participates in the EITI passively, 例如,
as an invited conference participant (EITI 2016a).

第二, Chinese government agencies engage in TEGIs passively when
their primary rules are already set up by foreign actors. This shows China’s reluc-
tance to be regulated by foreign institutions. Drezner and Lu (2009) claim that
China does not follow international standards when it perceives that these stan-
dards are imposed by foreign countries. One of this study’s expert interviewees
also emphasized Chinese actors’ skepticism regarding international standards
created without China’s input, such as the EITI.8 According to a statement by
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China worries that EITI standards may vio-
late China’s noninterference principle (Economy and Levi 2014, 109). 这
stance emphasizes the Chinese government’s autonomy and has been observed
across other global governance issues (Bevir and Gaskarth 2015, 80–81).

In-person interview, 一月 14, 2020.

7.
8. Telephone interview, 七月 23, 2019. See also Preston et al. (2016).

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Hyeyoon Park

(西德:129) 17

Instead of actively participating in TEGI standards imposed by foreign
国家, Chinese governmental agencies have begun to develop their own
domestic standards and TEGIs. 例如, the CCCMC developed its Guide-
lines for Social Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investment in 2014
(Chinese Ministry of Commerce 2018) and Chinese Due Diligence Guidelines
for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains in 2015 (Chinese Chamber of Com-
merce of Metals, Minerals, and Chemical Importers and Exporters [CCCMC]
2016A), initiated the Responsible Cobalt Initiative (RCI), and published the
Cobalt Reﬁner Supply Chain Due Diligence Standard based on the OECD
Due Diligence Guidance in 2017 in collaboration with the RMI. Through these
努力, the Chinese government aims to resolve many social and environmental
problems regarding cobalt production—particularly in the DRC. The RCI
appears to be the ﬁrst Chinese-led global governance initiative advocating for
the responsible global supply of the extractive sector. Some large, well-known
corporations—including Apple, Hewlett-Packard, 华为, Samsung SDI, 和
LG Chemistry—participate in the RCI as ofﬁcial members. Signiﬁcantly, 这
RCI did not passively adopt existing global guidelines but instead applied
Chinese-derived transparency rules.

There is no clear evidence to describe the actual impact of these Chinese
versions of global extractives governance rules on the global governance archi-
结构. 然而, Chinese governance mechanisms seem to be supporting a
thin transparency norm. Although the RCI’s membership continues to increase,
there is a distinct lack of publicly available RCI documents, and the RCI lacks an
ofﬁcial website. This limited accessibility and the lack of civil society actors
participating in the mechanism seem to reﬂect a preference for thin transparency
TEGIs.

结论
This mapping exercise shows some signiﬁcant ﬁndings regarding transparency
in current transnational extractives governance and China as one of the most
inﬂuential actors in the governance realm. 第一的, transparency is a dominant
norm as a guiding principle in the existing transnational extractives governance
建筑学. This concept of the transparency norm has been expanded beyond
its anticorruption origins to include a wide range of social and environmental
aspects. From the global environmental politics perspective, it is especially
worth noting that most TEGIs started setting the standards and policies that
require members to disclose their environmental impacts (例如, EITI’s environ-
mental impact assessment reporting). 另一方面, more than a majority
of TEGIs are operated based on a thin version of transparency norms without
sufﬁcient veriﬁcation mechanisms and information disclosure to the public.
This ﬁnding resonates with critical approaches to transparency as governance-
by-disclosure that question transparency for whom (古普塔 2010; Mason and
古普塔 2014; Mol 2008).

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18 (西德:129) China in Transnational Extractives Governance

第二, many Chinese actors take part in the existing transnational extrac-
tive governance landscape, mostly in TEGIs supporting a thin transparency
norm. This ﬁnding seems to show that China is engaging in this governance
structure and adopting a global transparency norm through its participation
in TEGIs like other private business actors from North America or Europe do.
Despite many concerns about China’s threat to the current norm-based global
命令, this indicates that China is becoming incorporated into the global trans-
parency norm architecture. This ﬁnding seems to counter the China threat
narrative: China is breaking the existing world order. 同时, this research
reveals China’s involvement in global governance in a more nuanced way
than the previous IR debates about China as a threat or nonthreat in global
治理.

Most importantly, it conﬁrms that China does not act as a uniﬁed mono-
lithic actor in global extractives governance; 相当, different types of actors
engage TEGIs distinctively. In the governance architecture, Chinese companies
(particularly top Chinese extractive and electronic corporations that are sensitive
to their market reputation risk) participate actively in thin transparency TEGIs.
另一方面, almost no Chinese civil society actors and a few very small
number of Chinese government agencies are involved in TEGIs. Chinese govern-
ment agencies are more passive TEGI participants than companies because they
are reluctant to be bound by “foreign rules.” In response, they developed
Chinese versions of transparency standards and their own global initiative,
RCI (CCCMC 2016b). This result suggests that Chinese companies and govern-
ment agencies adopt global transparency norms to the extent to which they
could uphold their uncompromising values—market interests and Chinese
sovereignty, 分别.

总共, the most common type of increasing China’s presence in transna-
tional extractives governance is that Chinese “companies” participate in thin
transparency TEGIs and mostly in private governance mechanisms, 组成
of market actors in the global extractive resource supply chain. These Chinese
actors’ preference for thin transparency TEGIs would be reinforcing a thin trans-
parency norm through their increasing political and market inﬂuence. Thin
transparency connects to market-focused accountability over democratic
accountability in global civil society. 所以, a potential risk here is that this
growing Chinese company participation in private TEGIs may not foster funda-
mental behavioral changes due to a lack of monitoring and information disclo-
sure to the public, thereby leading to green- or whitewashing of the companies.
在这种情况下, the TEGIs function as unaccountable private clubs supporting pri-
vate interest over public interest by excluding diverse stakeholders, 特别
civil society actors, as Abbot and Snidal (2009) argue. Regarding this point, 这是
also important to note that Chinese civil society actors play a limited role as
watchdogs to monitor Chinese companies.

This ﬁnding reconﬁrms the signiﬁcance of examining transparency in
transnational extractives governance critically by questioning transparency for

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Hyeyoon Park

(西德:129) 19

whom (Mol 2008) and who knows what (古普塔 2010). A transnational gover-
nance system based on thin transparency may not lead to positive policy out-
comes on the ground, especially regarding democratic values (Dingwerth and
Eichinger 2014). It is highly possible that the public and the affected people
couldn’t access information about social and environmental impacts fairly in
系统. Based on a thin transparency norm in TEGIs, companies aim to
enhance their image without incurring signiﬁcant costs. This often empowers
large companies and other powerful actors in the market and disempowers
weaker agents, such as indigenous communities in mining-affected regions.
China’s increasing involvement in TEGIs and China’s thin transparency norm
采取, 尤其, could accelerate the current business-to-business transpar-
ency, captured by powerful actors like large corporations (Mason and Gupta
2014; Mol 2014). 在这个意义上, developing a thick version of transparency
norms in TEGIs and Chinese actors’ participation in thick transparency TEGIs
matter to empower the most affected communities, 人们, and nature in the
global extractive resource supply chain (看, 例如, Steinberg 2019; Vijge 2018).
还, this is about “just governance” regarding the issue of who is included
and excluded in the current transnational extractive governance structure.

China does not challenge the current transnational extractive governance
system operated based on transparency as a norm for governance-by-disclosure.
Yet this mapping exercise highlights the fact that there are more complex pat-
terns in Chinese actors’ engagement in existing TEGIs. It is beyond a dualistic
approach to China in global governance—whether China is a threat or a non-
threat to the existing governance order and norms. 同时, several questions
remain that this research is limited from answering. 第一的, it is too early to assess
the extent to which Chinese actors’ participation in thin transparency TEGIs
leads to negative social and environmental impacts on local mining sites. 未来
research should examine the correlation between the global and local levels as a
multilevel analysis, 例如, by exploring how Chinese extractives compa-
nies’ involvement in thin transparency TEGIs affects nature in the DRC. 第二,
the ﬁnding is limited to conﬁrming that non-Chinese extractive ﬁrms participate
more in thick transparency TEGIs than non-Chinese companies. A further
comparison between Chinese and non-Chinese actors would be a valuable
future study. 第三, this analysis using one-year data is limited to judging
whether Chinese actors would learn transparency rules via their engagement
in TEGIs and tend to follow a thick version of transparency over time.9 There-
fore future research needs to investigate potential evolutionary processes and
examine what factors foster or hinder their actual behavioral changes.

Hyeyoon Park is a postdoctoral fellow in political science at Lund University.
Her research focuses on global environmental governance, with a special focus
on the issues of mineral resources and climate ﬁnance. She obtained her PhD

9. 例如, Berliner and Prakash (2012) emphasize companies’ social learning effects.

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20 (西德:129) China in Transnational Extractives Governance

from Colorado State University with a dissertation on “China and Transparency
Norm Development in Global Extractives Governance.” She coauthored “Extrac-
tive Industries and Mineral Resources: Turbulence All Around” in Global Envi-
ronmental Politics in a Turbulent Era (edited by Peter Dauvergne and Leah
Shipton, 2023) and “When Only China Wants to Play: Institutional Turmoil
and Chinese Investment in Brazil,” Brazilian Journal of International Politics
(2022). Current projects include “Financing Industrial Decarbonization.”

致谢

I thank the three anonymous reviewers and the GEP editors for their insightful
comments and suggestions. I am particularly grateful to Michele Betsill, 彼得
哈里斯, Robert Duffy, Stephanie Malin, and YuJung Julia Lee for their incredible
support of and feedback on this article from early stages. 此外, I thank
Stacy VanDeveer, Graeme Auld, Saleem Ali, Susan Park, and Diane Tang-Lee for
giving me valuable suggestions on developing this research. 最后的, I gratefully
acknowledge valuable feedback from discussants and panelists at the 2019
Earth System Governance conference and the 2019 ISA Toronto conference,
including Rita Abrahamsen.

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