Authoritarian Leadership in the - 麻省理工学院人工智能研究专业

Authoritarian Leadership in the
Post-Communist World

Eugene Huskey

抽象的: A quarter-century after the collapse of the USSR, authoritarian politics dominates seven of
the fifteen successor states. Placing the post-communist authoritarian experience in the broader frame of
nondemocratic governance, this essay explores the origins and operation of personalist rule in the region;
the relationship between time and power; and the role of Soviet legacies in shaping the agenda and tools
of leadership. It also examines the efforts of post-communist authoritarians to enhance personal and
regime legitimacy by claiming to rule beyond politics. Within the post-communist world, the essay finds
significant variation among authoritarian leaders in their approaches to personnel policy and to the use
of policies, symbols, and narratives to address the ethnic and religious awakening spawned by the collapse
of Soviet rule. The essay concludes with a brief assessment of the trajectories of post-communist author-
itarian leadership.

. . . nothing is harder to manage, more risky in the
undertaking, or more doubtful of success than
to set up as the introducer of a new order.

–Machiavelli

New countries create unique challenges and oppor-

tunities for political leadership. Founding leaders help
to establish the rules of the political game and often
acquire a personal authority that inspires deference,
or even reverence. 然而, they also face the daunt-
ing tasks of building or consolidating state and na-
tion and, 在很多情况下, of redefining relations with
an imperial power. In addition to the challenges pres-
ent in all fledgling states, leaders of new post-commu-
nist countries had to confront the peculiar legacies
of the Soviet era, which included a command econ-
奥米, one-party rule, and a single, all-embracing ide-
ology that removed religion from public life. It is no
wonder that instead of systemic change, which char-
acterized the transformational leadership of Mikhail

EUGENE HUSKEY is the William
右. Kenan, 少年. Professor of Political
Science at Stetson University. 他的
research focuses on politics and
legal affairs in the Soviet Union
and the post-communist successor
states of Russia and Kyrgyzstan. 他
is the author of Russian Lawyers and
the Soviet State (1986) and Presidential
Power in Russia (1999), and editor of
Russian Bureaucracy and the State: 的-
ficialdom from Alexander III to Vladimir
Putin (with Don K. Rowney, 2009).

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戈尔巴乔夫, most post-Soviet leaders have
focused on systemic stabilization.1 It is also
unsurprising that, with their immature po-
litical institutions and uncertain identities,
post-communist states have been a breed-
ing ground for authoritarian leaders.2 De-
spite the hopes of many in the West for
a democratic transition throughout the
post-communist world, authoritarian pres-
idents have governed in one-third of the al-
most thirty post-communist countries of
Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Many contin-
ue to do so today.

Scholars have offered compelling struc-
tural explanations of why some post-com-
munist countries have pursued authori-
tarian rather than democratic paths,3 和
new works appear regularly on individu-
al authoritarian leaders in the region, 英语-
pecially Vladimir Putin. 然而, as Tim-
othy Colton has observed, “we have not
learned nearly enough” about the nature
and impact of leadership in the post-com-
munist world.4 This comment applies with
particular force to the region’s authoritar-
ian countries, where the limited account-
ability of rulers allows them to shape po-
litical developments in ways that would be
unimaginable in democratic regimes. 在
Turkmenistan, 例如, the first lead-
er of the post-communist era, Saparmurat
Niyazov, plunged his country into diplo-
matic isolation while creating a cult of per-
sonality of epic proportions.

A quarter-century after the collapse of
苏联, this essay examines the
record of rule in seven states in order to
identify and explain patterns of author-
itarian leadership in the post-commu-
nist world and to locate the post-commu-
nist experience in the broader landscape
of nondemocratic governance. 虽然
several countries in the region, 包括
乔治亚州, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine, 有
flirted briefly with authoritarian rule, 这
main focus here is on the post-commu-
nist states that have maintained an au-

thoritarian regime for a decade or longer.
These include Belarus and Russia, 哪个
are predominantly Slavic and Orthodox
国家, and Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan,
states with majority Muslim and Turkic or
Iranian populations (见表 1).

Some may object that the concept of “au-
thoritarian leadership” is an oxymoron. 是-
cause leadership is most frequently associ-
ated with the pursuit of laudable goals by
fair-minded means, there is a reluctance to
apply the term to the exercise of power by
authoritarian rulers. Yet the most essential
element of leadership–the power to per-
suade–is found in authoritarian as well as
democratic leaders. As Sergei Guriev and
Daniel Triesman recently argued, authori-
tarian rulers today prefer to govern with a
velvet fist.5 Thus, in authoritarian regimes,
getting followers to go in the direction the
leader wants requires more than applying
力量, rigging elections, and controlling
the media.6 It also requires the exercise of
leadership in the selection of personnel, 这
adoption of public policies, the cultivation
of a compelling personal image, 和
construction and manipulation of nation-
al symbols, rituals, and narratives. 这些
universal functions of political leadership
are at the center of the analysis below.

It is tempting to regard post-communist

authoritarian leadership as a legacy of the
Soviet era, and yet in two fundamental
ways it represents a sharp break with the
过去的. Except for the period of high Stalin-
主义, the Soviet system of government was
an oligarchy, in which the power of the
general secretary was constrained by the
other members of the ruling elite and the
rules and conventions of the Communist
Party. Post-communist presidents, 在
另一方面, govern in personalist regimes
where the leaders have acquired “so much
power that they can no longer be credibly
threatened by their allies.”7

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesAuthoritarian Leadership in the Post- Communist World

桌子 1
Authoritarian Leaders in Post-Communist States

国家

Azerbaijan

Belarus

Kazakhstan
俄罗斯
Tajikistan

Turkmenistan

Uzbekistan

政体
IV
Score*
(2014)

-7

-6
4
-3

-8

-9

Leader

Heidar Aliev
Ilham Aliev
亚历山大
Lukashenka
Nursultan Nazarbaev
Vladimir Putin
Emomali Rakhmon
Saparmurat Niyazov
Gurbanguly
Berdymukhamedov
Islam Karimov

Period as Leader of
Territory

Soviet Era Post-Soviet Era

Years
在
Office+

1969–1982

1989–1991

1985–1991

1993–2003
2003–Present

1994–Present

1992–Present
2000–Present
1994–Present
1992–2006年

2006–Present

1989–1991

1992–Present

23
12

26
16#
21
31

Age+

Deceased
54

75
63
63
Deceased

* Polity IV scores, which range from 10 (consolidated democracy) 到 -10 (hereditary monarchy), classify two of
our countries (Russia and Tajikistan) as “anocracies,” which combine elements of democratic and authoritarian
治理, and the remaining five as autocracies. The index from Freedom House considers all the countries un-
der review to be “unfree,” with scores between 6 和 7, 在哪里 7 is the most unfree.

# Although Putin left the presidency to serve as prime minister from 2008 到 2012, allowing his protégé, Dmit-
rii Medvedev, to assume the presidency, Putin remained the most important leader in the country in this period.
One should also note that it was not until approximately 2003 that authoritarian rule was consolidated in Russia.
It took Lukashenka, Nazarbaev, and Rakhmon two to four years to consolidate authoritarian rule.

+ As of March 1, 2016.

How does one explain these patterns of
personalist over party rule, and what Mi-
lan Svolik has called an “established au-
tocracy” over a “contested autocracy”?8
One answer lies in the choice of institu-
系统蒸发散, specifically a semipresidential mod-
el of government that grants unusual pow-
er and prominence to an elected president.
In order to reduce the role of the Commu-
nist Party and increase the efficiency and
reform orientation of executive authori-
蒂, presidencies were created in eleven of
the fifteen republics on the eve of the So-
viet Union’s collapse. Within two years
after the breakup of the ussr, all of the
新州, except the three Baltic repub-
lics, had adopted constitutions that placed
the presidency at the center of political life,
which meant that this institution inherited

many of the functions, as well as some of
the offices and personnel, of the old ruling
communist parties. 有效, one now had
the Soviet structure of government minus
the ruling party, which placed the presi-
dent above the other branches of govern-
ment–parliament, 法院, and council of
ministers–like a republican monarch.

Not all countries under review suc-
cumbed immediately to authoritarian rule.
Whereas leaders in Uzbekistan and Turk-
menistan tolerated organized and vocal op-
position forces for only a few months af-
ter arriving in office, the Russian president
remained accountable to parliament and
people until approximately 2003. 在里面
结尾, 然而, all leaders eliminated the
primary sources of popular and elite op-
position to their rule by expanding the for-

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145 (3) Summer 2016Eugene Huskey

mal powers of the presidency; arresting,
exiling, or intimidating critics; manipulat-
ing elections; 和, with the exception of
Belarus, creating a subservient party or par-
ties that were instruments of electioneer-
ing and not governance. To paraphrase the
Russian historian Kliuchevsky, as the office
of the president swelled up–in terms of
power and size–the liberal institutions of
state grew lean. Although the substitution
of a strong president for a collective party
leadership does not lead inexorably to au-
thoritarianism in the context of post-com-
munist rule, it creates a favorable institu-
tional climate for the consolidation of per-
sonalist rule. Compared to authoritarian
regimes based on one-party rule or a mil-
itary government, presidentialism makes
oligarchy or other forms of “contested au-
tocracy” a less likely outcome because of
the symbolic majesty and extensive formal
powers of the office of the president.

The legacy of republican-level politics
in the ussr may also have contributed to
the emergence of single-man, as opposed
to oligarchic, rule in post-communist au-
thoritarian regimes. We noted above that
a collective leadership governed the coun-
try through most of Soviet history, yet one-
man rule by a party chieftain was the norm
in subnational politics in all but the Russian
共和国. Although Moscow appointed re-
publican leaders and established intricate
checking mechanisms to ensure their loy-
alty, in the individual republics, these par-
ty first secretaries tended to dominate the
political landscape. 因此, when the former
Soviet republics became independent states
晚了 1991, there was no tradition of collec-
tive leadership in their capitals.

Whatever the role of legacies in prepar-
ing the ground for one-man rule, each lead-
er employed a range of measures to ensure
that he controlled his own political allies as
well as the governed. As numerous writ-
ers on authoritarianism have pointed out,
rebellions in the street–or in the voting

booth–are less likely to topple a repressive
ruler than rebellions in the palace. To keep
their political allies in line, authoritarians
used both carrot and stick. In exchange
for their fealty, political allies received
important sinecures in the state appara-
tus and/or patronage for their lucrative
and often illicit business activities;9 为了
their part, suspect members of the polit-
ical or economic establishment were sub-
ject to prosecution or worse. It is easy to
forget, 然而, that some ties binding po-
litical allies to their leaders go beyond cal-
culations based on fear or greed. 总统
Putin, 例如, has surrounded him-
self with a team of officials and advisers
whose loyalty rests in part on lengthy per-
sonal friendships or professional collabo-
配给, or on traditions of deference devel-
oped in the security services.

Ties based on kinship or common geo-
graphic origin, which are especially preva-
lent in Central Asia and the Caucasus, 可能
also bind members of the political elite to
a ruler and discourage defection. In Ta-
jikistan, President Rakhmon has recruit-
ed his inner circle from his home region,
Kulob, while in Azerbaijan, officials with
origins in Nakhichevan or Erevan form the
president’s core support group.10 In Turk-
menistan, President Niyazov employed a
不同的, though equally effective, 战术,
surrounding himself with political eu-
nuchs: 那是, officials who had no pos-
sibility of contending for power because
they were foreigners or from minority eth-
nic groups.11 Both the kinship and the po-
litical eunuch principles have informed
the recruitment decisions of President
Nazarbaev, whose inner circle was report-
edly divided into two contending groups
at the end of 2014, one led by his daughter,
Dariga, and the other by a member of the
Uighur minority, Kasim Masimov.12 Such
tactics minimize the chances of “allies’ re-
bellions” and serve as a reminder of the ex-
traordinary diversity of leadership choic-

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesAuthoritarian Leadership in the Post- Communist World

es on matters of patronage, even within a
single region of the world.

The first post-communist authoritarians

were unlikely candidates to lead new coun-
tries experiencing an ethnic and religious
awakening. As traditional products of So-
viet rule–four had been party first secre-
taries, two collective farm chairmen, 和
one a kbg officer–they clung to many of
the political, 经济的, 和文化价值观
of the communist era, including an aver-
sion to ethnic nationalism and religious be-
lief.13 Cast against type, they faced the diffi-
cult challenge of creating a new state iden-
tity and new state policies that could satisfy
the surging nationalism of the titular peo-
普莱, while reassuring minority groups that
they had a viable future in the country. Es-
pecially in the non-Slavic authoritarian re-
gimes, like in Kazakhstan, where there was
considerable intraethnic tension based on
regional or tribal/clan loyalties, it was of-
ten necessary to move gingerly along two
tracks at once: using ethnic nationalism to
unite and appease the titular population,
while trying to transcend, or at least con-
坦, ethnic nationalism by pursuing a sym-
bolic politics that could draw together all
communities.14

Authoritarian leaders of the non-Slav-
ic countries under review reached back to
the period before the Russian conquest to
discover historical figures and/or political
communities that could be used as founda-
tions for the modern state. Where the Ta-
jik president Rahmon traced the origins of
post-communist Tajikistan to the Samanid
帝国, President Karimov sought a legit-
imating lineage in the fourteenth-century
founder of the Timurid dynasty, Tamerlane.
To bask in the reflected glory of these ear-
lier leaders or communities, the presidents
organized grand celebrations of these ide-
ational cornerstones of the new state: 660
years for Tamerlane in 1995 和 1,100 年
for the Samanid Empire in 1999.

For President Niyazov–known as the
Turkmenbashi, or Father of the Turkmen–
it was not enough to be a founding leader
of a modern state with ancient roots. 在
Paul Theroux’s words, Niyazov presented
himself as “a sort of reincarnation of Oguz
汗 [the legendary founder of the nation],
just as powerful and wise, and to prove it
he has named cities and hills and rivers and
streets after himself.”15 Leadership for Ni-
yazov was in many ways a caricature of per-
sonalist rule, where the wellsprings of legit-
imacy flowed less from the distant past than
from the nation’s present fortune of living
under the rule of the Turkmenbashi.16

Given the number of ethnic Russians in
his country and a lengthy shared border
with Russia, Kazakhstan’s Nazarbaev has
exhibited less enthusiasm for grounding
his country’s identity in distant histori-
cal symbols and events.17 Nazarbaev has
sought personal and regime legitimacy
more in current economic performance
and his ambitious plans for the future than
in connections to the Kazakh past. 这
symbols of this radiant future include the
dramatic architecture of the new capital of
Astana and the long-term strategic plans
that stretch out to 2050. Even Nazarbaev,
然而, remains vulnerable to demands
from his nationalist flank, demands that
increased in intensity after President Pu-
tin remarked in 2014 that Kazakhstan had
no state tradition and was part of the “Rus-
sian world” (russkii mir). In the context of
乌克兰危机, which raised the spec-
ter of Russian irredentism throughout the
post-communist world, Nazarbaev was
forced to respond by employing the back-
ward-looking discourse of neighboring
presidents. Acceding to the wishes of Ka-
zakh nationalists, Nazarbaev announced
that the country would celebrate in 2015
the 550th anniversary of the founding of
the modern Kazakh state.18

Unlike in Central Asia and the Caucasus,
where new states rejected much of the Rus-

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145 (3) Summer 2016Eugene Huskey

sian and Soviet inheritance in order to in-
digenize their languages, toponyms, 和
histories, in Belarus and Russia, Lukashen-
ka and Putin rehabilitated important parts
of the Soviet heritage that had been reject-
ed by earlier post-communist leaders in
each country. 实际上, nostalgia for the com-
munist era became the centerpiece of Lu-
kashenka’s leadership.19 Where his prede-
cessors in the early 1990s had highlighted
the distinctiveness of Belarusian language
and history–thereby claiming a national
identity that differed from Russia’s–Lu-
kashenka came into office intent on restor-
ing the dominant position of Russian lan-
guage and culture in the country and the
centrality of a civic identity that down-
played ethnic distinctions. Instead of at-
tempting to tame and control ethnic na-
理性主义, Lukashenka chose to suppress it.
Under Putin’s leadership, Russia has ex-
perienced a crisis of identity that is more
nuanced, and more consequential, 比
that in the imperial periphery. As Ron-
ald Suny has argued, the struggle over na-
tional identity in Russia is less about re-
lations between Russians and non-Rus-
sians within the country than about who
is a Russian and where Russia’s boundar-
ies should lie. Writing on the eve of Putin’s
accession to power, Suny noted that Rus-
sians are “deeply divided over the ques-
tion of what constitutes the Russian na-
tion and state. Russians remain uncertain
about their state’s boundaries, where its
border guards ought to patrol . . . 乃至
its internal structure as an asymmetrical
federation.”20 Where the Second Chech-
en War facilitated the rise of Putin and
his consolidation of authoritarian rule,
Putin’s recent discourse on an expand-
ed Russian identity and his military ac-
tions in Ukraine have deepened his hold
on the country and made it more difficult
to challenge state policies. 结果是
paradox of leadership on identity politics:
as Putin expands the concept of Russian-

ness to include persons living outside the
国家, he treats some of his critics liv-
ing inside Russia as unwelcome members
of the political community, claiming that
they are fifth columnists in the service of
foreign powers. A trademark of authori-
tarian leadership everywhere, this demon-
ization of the other in the post-communist
world targets enemies ranging from Islam-
ists to human rights advocates.21

Post-communist authoritarians had to
contend with religious as well as ethnic
nationalist revivals at the breakup of the
ussr. While maintaining the secular sta-
tus of their states, post-communist au-
thoritarian leaders have sought to chan-
nel religious observance into the quietism
found in established religions. Achieving
this goal has proved especially difficult for
post-communist authoritarian presidents
in Muslim-majority countries, in part be-
cause of the nonhierarchical character of
Sunni Islam, the dominant branch of the
faith in the region, and in part because the
presidents insist on using state agencies to
“manage” religions.22 Where the Moscow
patriarchate exercises control over the vast
majority of Orthodox believers in Belar-
us and Russia, there is no such authority
figure for Muslims in Central Asia. Cyni-
cal efforts by Central Asian presidents, 全部
of whom are essentially secular, to con-
trol the Islamic brand has only fed under-
ground religious resistance. In Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan, being a devout Mus-
lim is enough to incur the suspicion, 和
in some cases the wrath, of the state.

Nowhere was the cynicism in leadership
on religious matters more pronounced than
in Uzbekistan. After winning the Decem-
误码率 1991 选举, Karimov took the oath
of office on the Koran and made the hajj to
Mecca, but shortly thereafter launched a
campaign to eliminate independent Mus-
lim organizations and subordinate imams
to the state-run Muslim Directorate of Uz-
bekistan.23 Given the high level of religios-

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesAuthoritarian Leadership in the Post- Communist World

ity in Uzbekistan, President Karimov was
understandably hesitant to follow the lead
of neighboring leaders Emomali Rakhmon
and Saparmurat Niyazov, who sought to
temper Islam’s influence in their societ-
ies by legitimizing alternative belief tradi-
系统蒸发散. In the case of Rakhmon, it was Zo-
roastrianism, which recently celebrated its
three-thousandth anniversary in Tajikistan.
In Turkmenistan, it was Niyazov’s magnum
opus the Rukhnama (“book of the soul”) 那
began to displace the Koran as the country’s
holiest book in the last years of Niyazov’s
规则. In a statement a few months before his
死亡, the Turkmenbashi noted that “any-
one who reads his book three times will be-
come intelligent and understand nature,
法律, and human values. And after that he
will enter directly into heaven.”24

In Russia, the “symphonia” between ec-
clesiastical and civil authority in the Or-
thodox tradition has simplified President
Putin’s leadership on religious affairs. 铝-
though the Orthodox Church is not a
monolith, and some of its elements have
supported radical Russian nationalist ideas,
the church hierarchy has signed on with
alacrity to Putin’s recent campaign to es-
tablish a Russian cultural identity that sep-
arates the country from the “decadence”
of modern Western values on issues such
as homosexuality and freedom of expres-
sion on religious themes. President Putin
still struggles, 然而, to come to grips
with the challenges posed by Islamic reviv-
alism in a society where, 经过 2030, Muslims
may represent as much as 20 percent of Rus-
sia’s population. Even the country’s depu-
ty chief mufti recently warned that Putin’s
discourse about the “Russian world” had
alienated many Muslim youth in Russia.25
Among the many contextual differenc-

es between leadership in the democratic
and authoritarian worlds, none are more
important than the relationship between
power and time. Where democratic lead-

ers hold office pro tempore–until the vot-
呃, party or parliamentary colleagues, 或者
term limits turn them out–authoritarian
rulers view death as the only insurmount-
able threat to their tenure. 结果是
bias toward longevity in office. In the five
post-Soviet democratic or hybrid regimes
with strong presidencies, the average ten-
ure of the leader has been a little less than
六年;26 in the seven post-Soviet au-
thoritarian states, it has been sixteen-and-
a-half years, and no authoritarian leader
has served for less than nine years. 实际上,
in only two of the seven post-communist
countries under review has an authoritar-
ian leader left office. Azerbaijan’s Heidar
Aliev transferred power to his son, Ilham,
在 2003, less than two months before his
death at age eighty, and Turkmenistan’s
Niyazov died in office in 2006 at the age
of sixty-six, succeeded by the minister of
健康, Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov,
who was Niyazov’s dentist. In both in-
立场, the transitions occurred with min-
imal interelite turmoil, which is unusual by
world standards. 从 1945 到 2002, 非盟-
thoritarian rulers worldwide died in of-
fice or transferred power by constitution-
al means only one-third of the time; 在里面
remaining cases, almost two-thirds of au-
thoritarian leaders were removed by a mil-
itary coup, 12 percent by a popular revolt,
和 7 percent by assassination.27 Given this
background, authoritarian leadership in
the post-communist world has exhibited
remarkable continuity and stability.

If younger authoritarian rulers in the re-
gion may be contemplating another decade
or longer in office, older rulers, such as Uz-
bekistan’s Islam Karimov (born 1938) 和
Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbaev (born
1940), recognize that they are approach-
ing the end of their tenures. This declining
time horizon, especially when paired with
rumors of the ill-health of both men, 阿尔-
ters the political calculations of the leader,
establishment elites, and the opposition;

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145 (3) Summer 2016Eugene Huskey

it also fuels speculation about likely suc-
cessors, which can destabilize the regime.
To this point, 然而, neither leader has
been willing to identify a successor, 部分地
because to do so would eliminate the ad-
vantage of open-ended rule and transform
the president into a lame duck.28

Authoritarian leaders in the post-com-
munist world have reduced, but not elim-
inated altogether, the role of electoral cy-
cles in structuring political time.29 Through
popular referendums or legislation adopted
by quiescent parliaments, several authori-
tarian presidents in the region have extend-
ed the time between presidential elections,
which changes the calculus of leaders and
led and discourages an already weak oppo-
位置. On occasion, presidents in the re-
gion have altered electoral timing by calling
early or snap elections that are designed to
catch regime opponents off guard and avoid
going to the nation when the health of the
leader or the national economy might be in
怀疑. This desire to control the timing of
elections suggests that although post-com-
munist authoritarians possess numerous le-
vers of influence over electoral outcomes–
from disqualifying opponents to falsifying
results–they still squirm at the thought of
the “institutionalized uncertainty” repre-
sented by elections.

One measure of the degree of compet-
itiveness of elections in post-communist
authoritarian regimes is the percentage of
votes won by the ruler. As Table 2 说明,
with the exception of the election of Vlad-
imir Putin in March 2012, all authoritarian
incumbents have received over 70 百分
of the vote in their respective elections, 和
the leaders of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 和
Turkmenistan have garnered over 90 每-
cent.30 While the share of the results go-
ing to the incumbent authoritarians has
remained relatively stable in recent years,
there has been an overall decline in the re-
sults obtained by the second-place finisher,
which may be a more accurate indication of

the competitiveness of the race–and the
political system more broadly–because
it captures the strength of the opposition.
很遗憾, that indicator has its own
limitations as a measure of contestation.
Post-communist authoritarian leaders have
regularly recruited deferential opponents to
run against them in order to create the illu-
sion of competitiveness and to divide the
opposition vote so that no single contend-
er receives a substantial share of the results.
Shattering this illusion in the 2011 总统-
tial race in Kazakhstan was the public ad-
mission by one candidate that he had vot-
ed for President Nazarbaev.31

Like authoritarians everywhere, 邮政-
communist authoritarians insist on avoid-
ing genuinely competitive elections out of
fear as well as greed. In democratic societ-
是的, the loss of office reduces dramatically
the visibility and influence of leaders; in au-
thoritarian regimes it also endangers their
property and their lives. Through trusted
associates, post-communist authoritari-
ans engage in acts of political repression
and in self-enrichment on a grand scale,
which leaves them vulnerable to prosecu-
tion upon leaving office. In these circum-
立场, the only way for an authoritarian
to ensure his or her security on retirement is
to relinquish power to another leader who
is strong and loyal enough to maintain the
impunity of the former ruler.

One option, already adopted in Azerbai-
jan, is family rule. Rumors of dynastic suc-
cession involving the sons, daughters, 或者
sons-in-law of post-communist authoritar-
ian leaders have circulated widely, but is-
sues of personal character and timing com-
plicate this form of transition. For a num-
ber of years, President Karimov’s older
daughter, Gulnara, appeared to be on track
to succeed her father, but after a series of
丑闻, including accusations that Gul-
nara had extorted over $1 billion from for- eign firms, the Uzbekistani leader placed this former diplomat/businesswoman/ 76 l 从http下载 : / / 直接的 . 米特 . / 教育论文 – 压力 / 的f / / / / / 1 4 5 3 6 9 1 8 3 0 7 6 2 d a e d _ a _ 0 0 3 9 8 压力 . 来宾来访 0 8 九月 2 0 2 3 代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesAuthoritarian Leadership in the Post- Communist World Table 2 Presidential Election Results in Post-Communist Authoritarian Countries Country Azerbaijan Belarus Kazakhstan Russia Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Winner Second Place Winner Second Place Winner Second Place Winner Second Place Winner Second Place Winner Second Place Winner Second Place Election 1 60.9 33.8 80.6* 14.2 81 11.9 54.4* 40.7 59.5 34.7 99.5# 0 95.7 4.3 选举 2 98.8 1 77.4 15.7 91.2 6.6 53.4 29.5 97.6 2.1 89.2 3.2 90.8 3.3 选举 3 77.6 11.8 82.6 6 95.6 1.9 71.9 13.8 79.3 6.3 97.1 1.1 90.4 3.1 选举 6 84.5 5.5 选举 5 87.3 2.8 83.5 4.4 63.6 17.2 选举 4 75.4 15.1 79.7 2.4 97.8 1.6 71.3 18 83.9 5 * The results here are from the second round of the election. In the other elections shown, the candidates won in the first round by receiving a majority of the votes. In the first round in Belarus in 1994, Lukashenka received 44.8 percent of the vote and his closest opponent 17.3 百分; in Russia in 1996, Yeltsin received 35.8 percent in the first round and his closest opponent 32.5. # Niyazov ran unopposed and was never subject to reelection. The remaining figures in these rows are for con- tests involving President Berdymukhamedov. pop singer under house arrest in February 2014.32 President Lukashenka, for his part, has shown signs of preparing his preteen son, Nikolai (born 2004), to succeed him.33 At recent military parades Nikolai has been dressed in the uniform of a marshal of the armed forces, and on a visit to Venezuela in 2012, President Lukashenka observed that Nikolai could carry the torch of Be- larus-Venezuelan friendship in twenty to twenty-five years, at which point the pres- ident would be in his late seventies or ear- ly eighties.34 Among current authoritarian leaders in the region, President Rahmon of Tajikistan has set out the clearest path for the perpetuation of family rule. For sev- eral years, he has been grooming his son, Rustam (born 1987), the head of the coun- try’s powerful anticorruption committee, as his successor.35 In order to allow Rustam to succeed him as early as the next pres- idential election, 在 2020, President Rah- mon proposed changes to the constitution that reduce the minimum age of the pres- ident from thirty-five to thirty–Rustam would be thirty-three in 2020. As expect- 编辑, a popular referendum approved these changes overwhelmingly on May 22, 2016. Whereas numerous factors, from po- litical economy to political culture, help to create the conditions for authoritari- anism’s rise, it is the leader’s instinct for self-preservation that perpetuates author- itarian rule and makes an orderly transi- tion to constitutional governance so diffi- 邪教. 实际上, as the Russian case illustrates, the logic of self-preservation of the pres- ident, his family, and his political allies may also accelerate the transformation of a hybrid regime into an authoritarian or- l 从http下载 : / / 直接的 . 米特 . / 教育论文 – 压力 / 的f / / / / / 1 4 5 3 6 9 1 8 3 0 7 6 2 d a e d _ a _ 0 0 3 9 8 压力 . 来宾来访 0 8 九月 2 0 2 3 77 145 (3) Summer 2016Eugene Huskey der. To arrange protection for himself and his entourage, President Yeltsin and his advisers found a successor, Vladimir Pu- 锡, whose background in the security ser- vices and whose lack of an existing political base made him amenable to an agreement that secured the lives, 特性, and even some of the jobs of the Yeltsin team. By se- lecting Putin as his prime minister and heir apparent, and then stepping down from of- fice early in order to speed up the timing of the presidential election to benefit Putin, Yeltsin prevented the transfer of power to a different ruling group, which is one of the fundamental features of democratic rule. Due to its limited accountability, leader- ship in authoritarian regimes is more idio- syncratic than in democracies. Even in the seven countries under study here, one finds an unusual range of leadership styles, from the supernatural weirdness of the Turk- menbashi to the business-like pragma- tism of Nazarbaev. There is also significant variation in the use of force. While most of the presidents have favored an economy of violence, Islam Karimov has shown less hesitation in killing his enemies: witness the massive loss of life in the Andijon re- volt of 2005. All of the authoritarian lead- ers in the region, 然而, share a desire to present themselves as governing above traditional politics. Although they retain elections, 派对, and parliaments because they are universally recognized features of a modern state, post-communist author- itarians are constantly searching for dis- cursive and institutional innovations that will illustrate not just the legitimacy but the superiority and exceptionalism of their system of governance. Perhaps in no oth- er region of the world are authoritarians as conscious of their own image and that of their regime. An example of this sen- sitivity to public perception is Direct Line with Vladimir Putin, a three-hour live ques- tion-and-answer television show with the Russian president that purportedly allows unmediated contact between the leader and the people.36 Arguing that existing intermediary in- 机构, such as ngos, are unrepresen- tative of society, Putin and other author- itarian leaders in the region have created their own official substitutes. These range from youth groups like Nashi (“ours”) to the appointed State Council and Public Chambers, which compete with tradition- al elected assemblies, and the All-Russian Popular Front, a new pro-Putin protopar- ty masquerading as an inclusive, grass- roots national movement.37 In their Rous- seauist-like antipathy toward the idea of partial interests, authoritarians construct institutions that claim to represent, like the presidents themselves, the interests of society as a whole. Accompanying these institutional “in- novations” is a rhetoric of rule that em- phasizes the special knowledge wielded by the leader, whether it emanates from a transcendent vision, as was the case with Niyazov, or technocratic expertise, in the case of rulers like Lukashenka, Nazarbaev, and Putin.38 This rhetoric is grounded in ruling ideologies that challenge the as- sumptions of Western democratic thought and provide cover to authoritarian rule.39 “Sovereign democracy,” Russia’s semiof- ficial ideology, insists that the indepen- dence and interests of the state must al- ways prevail, and procedural democracy as practiced in the West is an insufficient guarantee of these values. The architect of sovereign democracy, Vladimir Surkov, holds that “the nation has not given its currently living generations the right to terminate its history,” which is another way of saying that presidential leadership bears the responsibility for protecting the country from the mistakes of its people.40 As Martha Olcott argues, this deep-seat- ed suspicion of the populace is evident in Nazarbaev’s view that “as Asians, Kazakhs 78 l 从http下载 : / / 直接的 . 米特 . / 教育论文 – 压力 / 的f / / / / / 1 4 5 3 6 9 1 8 3 0 7 6 2 d a e d _ a _ 0 0 3 9 8 压力 . 来宾来访 0 8 九月 2 0 2 3 代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesAuthoritarian Leadership in the Post- Communist World at the top of the charts. 然而, 缺点- trol of post-communist authoritarian lead- ers over their populations and their political allies has grown steadily over time.44 An ob- vious corollary of this finding is that author- itarian leaders are at their most vulnerable in the early years of power: witness the top- pling of the fledgling authoritarian regimes in Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine in 2010 和 2013. An even more difficult and weighty ques- tion is whether the successors to current rulers will continue to steer their coun- tries along an authoritarian path. 那里- cent decline in energy revenues, on which many of the region’s economies depend, as well as the growing attraction of radical religious movements for post-communist youth may lead to governing crises in one or more of our countries under review. It is far from clear, 然而, that such crises would provide an opening for meaning- ful political opposition. As Barbara Ged- des and colleagues found in their study of authoritarianism worldwide, the very structure of rule in post-communist au- thoritarian regimes may impede liberaliza- 的: transitions to democracy from per- sonalist regimes are much rarer than those from one-party or military governments.45 Moreover, the deepening regional integra- tion and mutual learning of post-commu- nist authoritarian regimes on matters of security, 执法, and economics are helping to inoculate most of the states against internal and external pressures for reform. Given the age and health of some of the region’s authoritarians, we may not have long to wait to acquire additional ev- idence on the trajectories of leadership in post-communist regimes. are not disposed by history or culture to be democratic and . . . popular rule could em- power nationalist demagogues, secession- 主义者, communists or Islamic radicals and put the future of the nation–not to men- tion economic reform–at risk.”41 Governing above politics also means avoiding accountability for policy failures. Projecting an image of invincibility while shirking responsibility for corruption, 在- competence, and poor economic perfor- mance has been raised to an art form in the post-communist world. Expressions found in the lexicon of democratic politics, like “taking personal responsibility for a prob- lem” or “the buck stops here,” are alien to the leadership style of post-communist au- thoritarians. Continuing a tradition that began in the Soviet era, authoritarian rul- ers in the post-communist world engage in blame-shifting, often through ritualized humiliation of subordinates on television, as a means of deflecting public criticism of their leadership.42 Facilitating this practice is the semipresidential form of government found in all of the states under review ex- cept Turkmenistan. By formally separat- ing the president from the council of minis- ters that oversees the budget and economic and social affairs, semipresidentialism of- fers up the prime minister as a convenient scapegoat for policy failures. From our vantage point a generation into the post-communist era, it may be worth returning to a question on leadership tra- jectories posed by Archie Brown in the late Brezhnev period of Soviet politics.43 Do post-communist authoritarian leaders, like their Soviet predecessors, strengthen their hold on power as they age in office? The evidence is compelling that post-commu- nist authoritarian leaders govern with few- er constraints the longer their tenure. Not every leader, 当然, accumulates pow- er to the same degree or at the same pace– on both scores, Karimov and Niyazov were l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / 直接的 . 米特 . / 教育论文 – 压力 / 的f / / / / / 1 4 5 3 6 9 1 8 3 0 7 6 2 d a e d _ a _ 0 0 3 9 8 压力 . 来宾来访 0 8 九月 2 0 2 3 79 145 (3) Summer 2016Eugene Huskey endnotes Author’s Note: I wish to thank Hannah Chapman, William Fierman, Joel Moses, Alesia Sedziaka, Paul Steeves, and Joshua Solomon for their comments on an earlier version of this article. 1 For a discussion of the concept of transformational leadership, see Archie Brown, The Myth of the Strong Leader: Political Leadership in the Modern Age (纽约: 基础书籍, 2014), 小伙子. 4. 2 New states give birth to 36 percent of “authoritarian spells” worldwide, where a spell is an uninterrupted period of authoritarian rule in a single country. Milan W. Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (剑桥: 剑桥大学出版社, 2012), 26. 3 看, 例如, 中号. Steven Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics (剑桥: 剑桥大学出版社, 2005). 4 Timothy J. Colton, “Political Leadership after Communism,” Demokratizatsiya 20 (2) (春天 2012): 65. 5 Sergei Guriev and Daniel Triesman, “The New Dictators Rule with a Velvet Fist,” The New York Times, 可能 24, 2015. 6 瓦. H. Cowley, “Three Distinctions in the Study of Leaders,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psy- chology 23 (July–September 1928): 145, cited in Glenn D. Paige, The Scientific Study of Political Leadership (纽约: The Free Press, 1977), 74. 7 Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, 6. 8 同上. 9 As Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy explain, “Participants in the system are not bought off in the classic sense of that term. They are compromised; they are made vulnerable to threats. . . . Loyalty is ensured through blackmail.” Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy, 先生. Putin: Oper- ative in the Kremlin (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: 布鲁金斯学会, 2013), 215. 10 Farid Guliyev, “Post-Soviet Azerbaijan: Transition to Sultanistic Semiauthoritarianism? An Attempt at Conceptualization,” Demokratizatsiya 13 (3) (2005): 402–405. 11 Sebastien Peyrouse, Turkmenistan: Strategies of Power, Dilemmas of Development (阿蒙克, 纽约: M.E. 夏普, 2012), 73–76. According to Peyrouse, because Niyazov “had developed a patho- logical distrust toward his whole entourage, especially the Turkmen, [the Presidential Guard] was composed primarily of Russians, 土耳其人, 阿拉伯人, and Caucasians.” Ibid., 76. 12 “Rakhat Aliev: deianie Nazarbaeva kvalifitsirovat’ mozhno tol’ko kak prestuplenie i preda- tel’stvo kazakhskogo naroda,” Svobodakz.net, 十月 31, 2014, http://www.svobodakz.net/ soprot/268-rahat-aliev-deyaniya-nazarbaeva-kvalificirovat-mozhno-tolko-kak-prestuplenie -i-predatelstvo-kazahskogo-naroda.html; and Sebastien Peyrouse, “The Kazakh Neopatri- monial Regime: Balancing Uncertainties among the ‘Family,’ Oligarchs, and Technocrats,” Demokratizatsiya 20 (4) (落下 2012): 359. 13 The one exception to this pattern may be Vladimir Putin, whose expressions of Orthodox pi- ety may be more than a political tactic. 14 Identity divisions in post-communist states rarely ran neatly along ethnic lines. In Kazakh- 斯坦, many Russified, 城市的, and secular Kazakhs had more in common with ethnic Russians in the republic than with their more religious, Kazakh-speaking kin from the countryside. Cengiz Surucu, “Modernity, Nationalism, Resistance: Identity Politics in Post-Soviet Kazakh- 斯坦,” Central Asian Survey 21 (4) (2002): 385–402. 15 Paul Theroux, Ghost Train to the Eastern Star: On the Tracks of the Great Railway Bazaar (纽约: Houghton Mifflin, 2008), 107; and Michael Denison, “The Art of the Impossible: Political Symbolism, and the Creation of National Identity and Collective Memory in Post-Soviet Turk- menistan,” Europe-Asia Studies 61 (7) (九月 2009): 1167–1187. 16 Under Niyazov’s successor, Berdymukhamedov, Turkmenistan shed some of the symbolic excesses of the Turkmenbashi era. Abel Polese and Slavomir Horak, “A Tale of Two Presi- 80 l 从http下载 : / / 直接的 . 米特 . / 教育论文 – 压力 / 的f / / / / / 1 4 5 3 6 9 1 8 3 0 7 6 2 d a e d _ a _ 0 0 3 9 8 压力 . 来宾来访 0 8 九月 2 0 2 3 代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesAuthoritarian Leadership in the Post- Communist World dents: Personality Cult and Symbolic Nation-Building in Turkmenistan,” Nationalities Papers 43 (3) (2015): 457–478; and Peyrouse, Turkmenistan, 108–131. 17 The exception is the celebration of the December 1986 uprising in Almaty, then the capital of Kazakhstan, when crowds protested the appointment of an ethnic Russian from outside Kazakhstan to lead the republic. 18 Ekaterina Kravets, “Nazarbaev otvetil Putinu, ob’iaviv o 550-letii gosudarstvennosti Kazakhsta- 已经,” Birzhevoi lider, 十月 24, 2014, http://www.profi-forex.org/novosti-mira/novosti-sng/ kazakhstan/entry1008231993.html. 19 Steven M. Eke and Taras Kuzio, “Sultanism in Eastern Europe: The Socio-Political Roots of Authoritarian Populism in Belarus,” Europe-Asia Studies 52 (3) (2000): 526. 20 Ronald Grigor Suny, “Provisional Stabilities: The Politics of Identities in Post-Soviet Eurasia,” International Security 24 (3) (冬天 1999/2000): 148. 21 Henry E. 黑尔, “民主, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia,” 世界政治 58 (1) (十月 2005): 147. 22 Only Azerbaijan among the region’s Muslim-majority countries has a predominantly Shi’a population. 23 Shireen Hunter, “Islam and Politics in Central Asia,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics, 编辑. John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin (牛津: 牛津大学出版社, 2013), 313. 24 “Niyazov po dogovorennosti s Allakham poshlet v rai vsekh turkmen, prochitavshikh ego Rukh- namy tri raza,” Newsru.com, 行进 20, 2006, http://www.newsru.com/world/20mar2006/ ruhnama.html. 25 Igor Gashkov, “Musul’mane khotiat drugoi russkii mir,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 行进 18, 2015, http://www.ng.ru/ng_religii/2015-03-18/3_musulmane.html. 26 This excludes the parliamentary republics of Estonia, 拉脱维亚, 和立陶宛. 27 Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, 41; and Milan W. Svolik, “Power Sharing and Leader- ship Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes,” American Journal of Political Science 53 (2) (四月 2009): 478. Unlike in Africa, 拉美, and the Middle East, the military stays in the barracks at moments of crisis in the post-communist world. 28 黑尔, “民主, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia,” 135. 29 The one exception was Turkmenistan’s Niyazov, who became president for life at the end of 1990s. 30 In the case of the initial post-communist presidential elections in Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, and the first two elections in Russia, authoritarian rule had not yet been consolidated and so the winners were not authoritarian incumbents. 31 Viktor Khrapounov, Nazarbaev: votre ami le dictateur (巴黎: Editions du Moment, 2013), 206. 32 Joanna Lillis, “Uzbekistan: Telecoms Firms Paid Gulnara up to $1 Billion in Backhanders—

Watchdog,” Eurasianet.org, 行进 23, 2015, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/72656.

33 Lukashenka is estranged from his two older sons and their mother. These sons complained
that “now we all live encircled by barbed wire, but what will happen to us, 爸爸, when you
stop being president?” Vladimir Shlapentokh, “Are Today’s Authoritarian Leaders Doomed
to be Indicted when They Leave Office? The Russian and Other Post-Soviet Cases,” Commu-
nist and Post-Communist Studies 39 (4) (2006): 452. As Karen Dawisha points out, the same logic
applies to those at lower levels of the establishment. “Attempts to safeguard one’s children
and oneself from possible persecution by former colleagues along the ‘power vertical,’ along
with the desire to maximally enrich oneself while in power, has become practically the main
purpose of all political and economic decisions.” Karen Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns
俄罗斯? (纽约: 西蒙 & Schuster, 2014), 348.

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145 (3) Summer 2016Eugene Huskey

34 Shaun Walker, “Who’s that Boy in the Grey Suit? It’s Kolya Lukashenko, the Next Dictator of
Belarus. . .” The Independent, 七月 29, 2012, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/
whos-that-boy-in-the-grey-suit-its-kolya-lukashenko-the-next-dictator-of-belarus-7897089.html.
35 Nadin Bakhrom, “Will Tajikistan Be Ruled by an Emomali Dynasty?” Silk Road Reporters, 九月-
木材 1, 2015, http://www.silkroadreporters.com/2015/09/01/will-tajikistan-be-ruled-by-a
-emomali-dynasty/.

36 Lara Ryazanova-Clarke, “The Discourse of a Spectacle at the End of the Presidential Term,”
in Putin as Celebrity and Cultural Icon, 编辑. Helena Goscilo (伦敦: 劳特利奇, 2013), 104–110.
President Nazarbaev also experimented with this institution from 2005–2009.

37 Richard Sakwa, in “Putin’s Leadership: Character and Consequences,” Europe-Asia Studies 60 (6)
(2008): 879–897, calls these practices “para-constitutional.” See also Andrew Wilson, Virtual Pol-
荨麻疹: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World (新天堂, 康涅狄格州: 耶鲁大学出版社, 2005); 和
Nikolay Petro, Maria Lipman, and Henry E. 黑尔, “Three Dilemmas of Hybrid Regime Gover-
南斯: Russia from Putin to Putin,” Post-Soviet Affairs 30 (1) (2014): 10. Throughout the region, 非盟-
thoritarian leaders reacted to the color revolutions in neighboring countries by clamping down
on ngos, which were seen as instruments of revolution and potential agents of the West.
38 Karimov distinguishes himself, with his “scientific world view,” from the “barbarians . . .
ignorant, uneducated people who use pseudo-Islamic slogans to increase their own power.”
Adeeb Khalid, “A Secular Islam: 国家, 状态, and Religion in Uzbekistan,” International Jour-
nal of Middle East Studies 35 (4) (十一月 2003): 587.

39 Karimov’s “national ideology” is “an extended argument against politics.” Andrew F. 行进,
“From Leninism to Karimovism: 霸权, Ideology, and Authoritarian Legitimation,”
Post-Soviet Affairs 19 (4) (2003): 308, 310.

40 V. 我. Surkov, “Nationalization of the Future: Paragraphs pro Sovereign Democracy,” Russian

Studies in Philosophy 47 (4) (春天 2009): 18.

41 Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise, 转速. 编辑. (华盛顿, 华盛顿特区: Carnegie En-

dowment for International Peace, 2010), 89.

42 Masha Gessen, The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin (纽约: Riverhead
图书, 2012), 265; Helena Goscilo, “Russia’s Ultimate Celebrity: vvp as vip Objet d’Art,”
in Putin as Celebrity and Cultural Icon, 编辑. Goscilo, 19; and Eke and Kuzio, “Sultanism in Eastern
欧洲,” 531.

43 阿奇·布朗, “The Power of the General Secretary of the cpsu,” in Authority, 力量, and Policy
in the USSR, 编辑. 时间. H. Rigby, 阿奇·布朗, and Peter Reddaway (伦敦: Macmillan, 1980), 136.
44 The only exception to this pattern may have been during the Medvedev interregnum in Rus-
sia from 2008–2012, when there was a “tandemocracy,” with Putin as prime minister and
his younger client, Dmitrii Medvedev, as president; even here Putin’s role as the “national
leader” remained unquestioned, and once Putin returned to the presidency in 2012, his grip
on the reins of power tightened further.

45 Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, “Autocratic Breakdowns and Regime Tran-

地点: A New Data Set,” Perspectives on Politics 12 (2) (六月 2014): 313–331.

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesAuthoritarian Leadership in the Post- Communist World
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