Asian Americans, Affirmative Action & - 麻省理工学院人工智能研究专业

Asian Americans, Affirmative Action &
the Rise in Anti-Asian Hate

Jennifer Lee

No court case in recent history has propelled Asian Americans into the political
sphere like Students for Fair Admissions v. 哈佛, and no issue has galvanized
them like affirmative action. Asian Americans have taken center stage in the latest
battle over affirmative action, yet their voices have been muted in favor of narra-
tives that paint them as victims of affirmative action who ardently oppose the policy.
Bridging theory and research on immigration, 刻板印象, and boundaries, I pro-
vide a holistic portrait of SFFA v. Harvard and focus on Asian Americans’ role in
它. Immigration has remade Asian Americans from “unassimilable to exceptional,”
and wedged them between underrepresented minorities who stand to gain most
from the policy and the advantaged majority who stands to lose most because of
它. Presumed competent and morally deserving, Asian Americans subscribe to the
stereotype, and wield it to their advantage. Competence, moral worth, and respect-
ability politics, 然而, are no safeguards against racism and xenophobia. As fears
of the coronavirus arrested the United States, so too has the rise in anti-Asian hate.

N o recent court case has propelled Asian Americans into the political

sphere like Students for Fair Admissions v. 哈佛, and no issue has gal-
vanized them like affirmative action.1 The plaintiffs allege that Harvard
discriminates against Asian applicants by holding them to higher academic stan-
dards and rating them poorly on personal characteristics such as “likeability,”
“fit,” and “courage” in order to suppress their rate of admission. Invoking Har-
vard’s past practice of using subjective measures like character to limit the num-
ber of Jewish students in the 1920s, the Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) allege
that the university is now repeating its ugly history with Asians. Charging Har-
vard of imposing a racial penalty and a de facto quota on Asians, SFFA’s proposed
solution is to retreat from race: to eliminate the consideration of race and ethnici-
ty in all admissions decisions, 哪个, 反过来, would effectively eliminate affirma-
tive action.

On September 30, 2019, after nearly a year of deliberation, District Court Judge
Allison D. Burroughs ruled that Harvard does not discriminate against Asian
American applicants–a decision upheld by a federal appeals court on November

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12, 2020–thereby allowing the university to continue its practice of affirmative
action to pursue the benefits of diversity. Supporters of the policy hailed the rul-
ing a victory, while opponents decried it a moral failing, and one they aim to have
overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court. With the confirmation of Justice Amy
Coney Barrett to the bench, SCOTUS is now stacked in SFFA’s favor, and the fu-
ture of affirmative action is in peril. While Asians have taken center stage in the
latest battle over affirmative action, their attitudes have been drowned out by the
inflammatory rhetoric of SFFA, 一方面, and the staunch advocates of af-
firmative action, 在另一.

Moving beyond the rhetoric, I bridge theory and research on immigration, ste-
reotypes, and boundaries to provide a holistic portrait of SFFA v. Harvard and focus
on Asian Americans’ role in it. I begin by showing how the changing selectivity of
contemporary U.S. Asian immigration has recast Asian Americans from “unassim-
ilable to exceptional,” resulting in their rapid racial mobility.2 This mobility com-
bined with their minoritized status places them in a unique group position in the
我们. racial hierarchy, conveniently wedged between underrepresented minorities
who stand to gain most from the policy and the advantaged majority who stands
to lose most because of it. It also marks Asians as compelling victims of affirma-
tive action who are penalized because of their race.

It is a mistake to assume, 然而, that Asians have been passive agents in this
项目. Presumed competent and morally deserving, Asian Americans subscribe
to the stereotype, and wield it to their advantage. Asian, 然而, is a catch-all
category that masks more than it reveals. While the majority of Asian Americans
support affirmative action, one group stands apart in their opposition: Chinese
美国人. And because Chinese is synecdoche for Asians,3 their attitudes have
been blithely taken (or more precisely, mistaken) to represent the views of all
Asians, resulting in biased narratives of Asian Americans.

Competence, moral worth, and respectability politics are no safeguards against
the virulent anti-Asian racism that has surfaced since the outbreak of the corona-
病毒, flagrantly dubbed by the Trump administration as the “China virus” and
“kung flu.” Faulting China for the spread of COVID-19, Trump turned a blind
eye to the subsequent surge in attacks against Asian Americans who have been
stabbed, beaten, spit on, harassed, vilified, and scapegoated. Trump’s racist and
xenophobic “China virus” rhetoric reanimated a century-old trope that Asians
are vectors of filth and disease, exposing not only the precariousness of their sta-
tus but also the country’s nativist fault line.4

L ess than a century ago, Asians were described as marginal members of the

human race, full of filth and disease, and unassimilable.5 Confined to ethnic
enclaves, barred from White schools, and denied U.S. 国籍, Asians
were not extended the right to become naturalized citizens until the passage of

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150 (2) Spring 2021Jennifer Lee

the McCarren-Walter Immigration and Naturalization Act in 1952. Yet despite de-
cades of legal exclusion, institutional discrimination, and racial prejudice, Asians
now boast the highest educational outcomes and highest median household in-
comes of all U.S. 团体. How did the status of a group once considered the “yel-
low peril” change from unassimilable to exceptional in the course of a century?

Asian Americans’ rapid racial mobility stems from the change in U.S. immigra-
tion law. Abolishing national origin quotas, 这 1965 Immigration and Nationality
Act created new preferences for foreign-born applicants based on family reuni-
fication, 技能, and refugee status. The change in legislation legally engineered a
new stream of highly educated Asian immigrants who fulfilled high-skilled labor
shortages in the United States. 因此, contemporary Asian immigrants in the
United States are, 一般, more likely to have graduated from college than their
nonmigrant counterparts in their countries of origin, and also more likely to hold
a college degree than the U.S. 意思是. Their dual positive immigrant selectivity–
what Min Zhou and I have referred to as hyper-selectivity–is the most distinctive
feature of contemporary Asian immigration.6

A look at the five largest U.S. Asian immigrant groups–Chinese, Indians, Fili-
pinos, Vietnamese, and Koreans–shows that all five are highly selected from their
country of origin, and all but Vietnamese are hyper-selected.7 As Figure 1 节目,
55.1 percent of Chinese immigrants in the United States have graduated from col-
lege compared with only 3.6 percent of adults in China, meaning that U.S. 志-
nese immigrants are more than eighteen times as likely to have graduated from
college than Chinese adults who did not emigrate. 我们. Indian immigrants are ten
times more likely to have a B.A. compared with their nonmigrant counterparts
in India, 和美国. Vietnamese, Korean, and Filipino immigrants are three to four
times more likely than their respective nonmigrant counterparts. 而且, apart
from Vietnamese, the other Asian groups are also more highly educated than the
general U.S. 人口, reflecting their dual positive immigrant selectivity. 他们的
hyper-selectivity gives them and their U.S.-born children an edge over other U.S.
groups–including native-born Whites–in the domain of education.

While the hyper-selectivity of Asian immigrants has led to the rapid racial mo-
bility of Asian Americans, their mobility has come with social costs.8 Deemed
highly competent, Asian Americans are also perceived as cold, calculating, 和
too narrowly focused on success at all costs.9 The vulnerable combination of high
competence and low warmth not only relegates Asians as an out-group, 但是也
serves as the bases of anti-Asian bias.10 It has also made Asian Americans ideal
candidates for SFFA to recruit in their mission to dismantle affirmative action.

“W ere you rejected from the University of Texas, Harvard or the Univer-

sity of North Carolina? It may be because you were the wrong race.”
The question appears on SFFA’s website followed by an invitation:

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesAsian Americans, Affirmative Action & the Rise in Anti-Asian Hate

数字 1
Percent of First- and Second-Generation Asians and Nonmigrant
Counterparts to Graduate from College

79.2 80.3

75.2

55.1

62.4

70.9

58.1

53.9 53.4

26.0

20.8

3.6

8.0

16.4

6.7

Chinese

Indian

Filipino

Vietnamese

Korean

First-Generation

Second-Generation

Nonmigrant

白色的

黑色的

来源: Van Tran, Jennifer Lee, and Tiffany Huang, “Revisiting the Asian Second-Generation
Advantage,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 42 (13) (2019): 2248–2269.

“Students for Fair Admissions would like to hear from you. Tell us something
about yourself.” They do not specify who they would like to hear from, but a photo
of more than fifty Asian Americans in front of a banner that reads, “Harvard: STOP
Discriminating Against Asian American Students” beckons its intended audience.
In the photo are individuals holding signs lambasting Harvard’s use of racial
quotas and discriminatory practices in the name of diversity. One sign summons
博士. Martin Luther King Jr.’s famous “I have a dream” speech but flips the script to
read: “I Am Asian American. I Have A Dream Too.” Here Dr. King’s call for equal-
ity of opportunity for African Americans has been reinscribed by Asian Ameri-
can opponents of affirmative action who equate the alleged discrimination expe-
rienced by Asians in the twenty-first century to the brutal, de jure discrimination
experienced by African Americans in the early twentieth. In so doing, SFFA evokes
a false equivalency of race, minoritized status, and moral deservingness.11

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150 (2) Spring 2021Jennifer Lee

Michael Wang’s narrative is emblematic of the racial discrimination experi-
enced by Asian Americans, according to the Students for Fair Admissions.12 The
only son of Chinese immigrants, Michael had his sights set on Harvard since he
was eight years old. With the help of his parents and especially his father (a former
teacher in China), Michael began working diligently toward this goal a decade be-
fore he applied to Harvard. When Michael was in elementary school, his father tu-
tored him in math and petitioned the local middle school to allow Michael to take
classes there. By seventh grade, he was taking math classes at the local high school.
So academically advanced was Michael that he skipped the eighth grade altogether.
By the time Michael applied to college, he boasted a perfect ACT score, a near-
perfect SAT score of 2230 在......之外 2300 (which placed him in the ninety-ninth per-
centile), thirteen Advanced Placement courses, and a 4.67 grade point average. Sa-
lutatorian of his high school class, Michael’s academic profile was buttressed by his
impressive extracurricular record: he played piano, founded his high school’s math
club, was on his school’s debate team, and sang at President Barack Obama’s first
inauguration as part of the San Francisco Boys Chorus. Armed with a stellar record,
Michael applied to seven Ivy League universities and Stanford, but was rejected by
all except the University of Pennsylvania. He was wait-listed at Harvard and Colum-
bia, yet was eventually rejected by both. He was admitted, 然而, to the Universi-
ty of California, 伯克利, and Williams College, and chose to attend Williams.

The rejections prompted him to file a complaint with the U.S. Department of
Education against Princeton, 耶鲁大学, and Stanford, charging that these elite insti-
tutions rejected him because of his race. Michael was not alone. In March 2016, A
coalition of 132 Asian American organizations filed complaints with the U.S. 的-
partment of Education against Yale, Dartmouth, 和布朗, alleging that these
Ivy League universities make decisions based on informal racial quotas that ef-
fectively cap the number of Asian American students. The year prior, 在 2015, 这
coalition targeted Harvard.

In the Students for Fair Admissions, Michael Wang found an institutional ally,
and in Michael Wang, SFFA found a model candidate to hail as a victim of dis-
crimination and affirmative action. With the election of Donald Trump as U.S.
president in November 2016, both SFFA and Michael Wang found and seized an
opportune political moment. Despite its namesake, 然而, the Students for Fair
Admissions is not an organization established by aggrieved students like Michael
Wang who were rejected by Harvard. 相当, it is an organization founded by Ed-
ward Blum, a White, male former stockbroker turned legal entrepreneur and ar-
dent anti-affirmative action crusader who fought to dismantle race-conscious
policies for decades, including a key portion of the Voting Rights Act. In Shelby
County v. Holder (2013), Blum fought and succeeded in freeing nine states, 大部分
in the South, to change election laws without prior federal approval. With support
from conservative donors and high-powered, Republican lawyers, Blum orches-

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesAsian Americans, Affirmative Action & the Rise in Anti-Asian Hate

trated more than two dozen lawsuits challenging voting rights laws and affirma-
tive action practices across the country.13

Blum arranged the lawsuit against Harvard under the rubric of the Students for
Fair Admissions, as well as the more recent suit against the University of North
Carolina, 教堂山, the closing arguments for which took place on November
19, 2020. 此外, he organized the lawsuit against the University of Texas in
Fisher v. University of Texas, and its appeal, in which Abigail Fisher–a White wom-
an–charged the University of Texas with denying her admission because of her
种族. But Abigail Fisher was far from the model candidate to challenge UT Austin’s
policy of race-conscious affirmative action. A White woman with a 3.59 年级
point average and an SAT score of 1180 在......之外 1600, Fisher’s academic record was
by no means exceptional nor did it make her an obvious selection for admission to
the University of Texas’s flagship campus at Austin.

Recognizing that Fisher’s record failed to match her sense of entitlement,
Blum admitted, “I needed Asian plaintiffs.” And he got them. Using advertise-
ments showcasing pensive-looking East Asians (见图 2), Blum recruited
Asian American plaintiffs by raising the provocative question, “Were You Denied
Admission to Harvard? It may be because you’re the wrong race.” He used the
same question and rhetoric to recruit Asian Americans in his fights against the
University of North Carolina and the University of Wisconsin.

A s details of SFFA v. Harvard unfolded, both camps of the affirmative action

debate held their ground, but one particular allegation drew widespread
ire. SFFA claimed that admissions officers categorically rated Asian ap-
plicants poorly on character traits such as “likeability,” “courage,” and “fit,“ 和
used these subjective measures as the bases for denying admission to academi-
cally and morally deserving applicants. That Asian Americans scored highest on
measures like grades and test scores but lowest on personal characteristics corre-
sponds with the stereotype that Asians are competent but cold: technically strong
but socially weak; model students and workers but poor visionaries and leaders.
This argument hit home for many Asian Americans–including myself–who bat-
tle these stereotypes every day.

So what are we to make of this allegation? 第一的, the “personal” rating is not a
measure of “personality,” as it has been popularly described. 相当, it includes
factors such as the applicants’ intended major and career, the neighborhood in
which they grew up, whether they were raised by a single parent who did not at-
tend college, or raised by two parents who graduated from Harvard. It also allows
admissions officers to consider whether the applicants are refugees, whether they
had to work to support their families during high school, whether they hail from
a rural background, 等等. So rather than relying solely on standardized test
scores like the SAT, which account for only 2.7 percent of the variation in freshman

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150 (2) Spring 2021Jennifer Lee

Asian Americans, Afﬁ rmative Action & the Rise in Anti-Asian Hate

数字 2
Students for Fair Admissions Advertisements Seeking Plaintiffs against
哈佛, the University of North Carolina, and the University of
威斯康星州

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186

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来源: Jenn Fang, “#IAmNotYourWedge: Lawsuits against Harvard and UNC Assert Anti-
Asian Discrimination in Admissions,” Reappropriate, 十一月 19, 2014. Original ads taken
from http://harvardnotfair.org/; http://uncnotfair.org/; and http://uwnotfair.org/.

grades after students’ backgrounds are taken into account, admissions officers can
consider applicants as a “whole person” and evaluate candidates holistically.14

第二, the difference in personal ratings between Asian and White applicants
是, 一般, 0.05 points on a 6-point scale. Asians received an average rating of
2.82, while White applicants, an average of 2.77, 其中 1 denotes “outstanding”
和 6 “worrisome.” Hence, contrary to SFFA’s claim, Asian American applicants
were not rated significantly poorer than White applicants.15 Third, analyses show
variation in the personal ratings of Asian American applicants. Asian females, 在
average, received higher personal ratings than Asian males, and Asians from Cali-
fornia received the highest ratings compared with those from other regions of the
国家. The intragroup variation in the personal ratings of Asian American appli-
cants indicates that there is not uniform, categorical bias against them on the part
of admissions officers.

最后, analyses of the admissions data from the opposing camps differed in a
crucial way. SFFA excluded legacies, recruited athletes, and the children of faculty
and donors from their analyses. The omission is consequential since applicants
from these special interest groups are admitted at significantly higher rates than
those who do not belong to these categories. That Asian applicants are underrep-
resented in each of these categories served to amplify SFFA’s claim that Asians ex-
perience bias in admissions.

187

150 (2) Spring 2021Jennifer Lee

Here it is worth underscoring that eliminating bias has never been the core of
SFFA’s mission. If it were, SFFA would have championed eliminating the bias for
遗产: applicants whose parents attended Harvard. The legacy effect is potent.
Harvard’s own analysis shows that legacies received a 40 percent boost in their
chances of admission. 之间 2010 和 2015, the admission rate for legacies was 34
百分, compared with less than 6 percent for nonlegacies, indicating that legacies
are nearly six times as likely to be admitted than nonlegacies. Double legacies–ap-
plicants with both parents who attended Harvard–receive a more generous boost.
Not surprisingly, Harvard’s legacies are largely White, and the number of
White legacy admits exceeds the number of Asian, 黑色的, and Hispanic legacy ad-
mits combined. Close to 22 percent of White admits at Harvard are legacies. 头发-
vard’s preference for legacies places all non-White applicants at a disadvantage,
which feels especially acute since the admissions rate dropped to a historic low of
4.5 百分比在 2019. Harvard’s bias for legacies and SFFA’s decision not to focus on
them also reveals a glaring affirmative action paradox. While race-conscious policies
have been on trial time and again, categorical preferences for legacies continue to
go unchallenged and unchecked. Looking ahead, it remains to be seen whether
Harvard’s preference for legacies will remain intact as Asian American applicants
become an increasingly larger share of the university’s legacy pool.

At the moment, 然而, the question that remains unanswered is wheth-
er Harvard’s inclusion of a “personal” rating is a measure of “included variable
bias,” in which the variable itself is the product of and, 所以, masks evidence
of discrimination. As one group of statistical analysts articulate in a Boston Re-
view feature, “If personal ratings were awarded in racially discriminatory ways, 它
would be inappropriate to appeal to them to explain disparities in admissions.”16
They add, “Even if a variable helps to explain away a disparity between groups,
that variable may itself be the product of discrimination or have little rational
relation to a legitimate policy goal.” Harvard’s history of deploying “character”
ratings to disadvantage Jewish applicants to cap their numbers in the 1920s lends
credibility to this possibility.

But it is a mistake to reduce the alleged bias against Asian applicants to the
overt bias against Jewish applicants in the 1920s, which is based on yet another
false equivalency: that of equating affirmative action to negative action. Begin-
ning in the 1920s, 哈佛, 耶鲁大学, and Princeton began requiring recommendation
字母, personal interviews, 论文, and descriptions of extracurricular activities,
哪个, 反过来, dissuaded and disadvantaged “the wrong kind” of college appli-
cant.17 Consequently, these Ivy League schools could shroud their admission pro-
cess through layers of subjectivity, and cap the number of Jewish students they
could admit without overtly discriminating against them.

Quotas used to cap the number of Jewish students at Harvard, 耶鲁大学, and Prince-
ton in the 1920s were a negative action against Jewish applicants, and were ruled

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesAsian Americans, Affirmative Action & the Rise in Anti-Asian Hate

unconstitutional in University of California v. 巴克 (1978). A quota implemented to
limit or designate the number of slots allotted to a particular ethnic or racial group
wholly differs from race-conscious affirmative action: the former predetermines
results based on ethnicity and race; the latter allows ethnicity and race to be con-
sidered among many factors in admissions decisions. Apart from the crucial sub-
stantive difference, there is a fundamental arithmetic difference that opponents
of affirmative action have failed to reconcile: the growth of the Asian American
student population at Harvard and other elite universities has occurred in tandem
with the growth of affirmative action.18

T here is yet another flaw in the false equivalency of touting Asian Ameri-

cans as the “new Jews”: in the 1920s, the Jewish community unanimously
denounced Harvard’s cap on Jewish students; 今天, Asian Americans are
more divided about affirmative action. Michael Wang and Thang Diep represent
opposing sides of the divide; the former opposes affirmative action, while the lat-
ter supports it. Thang Diep is a Vietnamese refugee who migrated to the United
States at the age of eight with parents who did not attend college. A student at
Harvard at the time of the trial, Thang testified on the university’s behalf. 尽管
Michael and Thang did not apply to Harvard at the same time, 值得
compare their records nevertheless. A quick glance at grades and test scores puts
Michael ahead. Michael’s GPA was 4.67, while Thang’s was 4.325; Michael’s SAT
score was 2230 while Thang’s was 2060. Michael’s SAT score placed him in the
ninety-ninth percentile for college bound seniors, while Thang’s score placed him
in the ninety-fifth percentile and also placed him in the bottom quartile of his ma-
triculating class of 2019 at Harvard. Despite Michael’s superior academic record,
he was wait-listed and eventually rejected by Harvard, while Thang was accepted.
Both records are exceptional for graduating high school seniors, but neither
stands out among Harvard’s applicants. Of the forty-thousand applicants who ap-
plied to Harvard last year, more than eight thousand had perfect grade point aver-
年龄, three thousand four hundred had perfect SAT scores in math, and two thou-
sand seven hundred had perfect SAT scores in English. With only two thousand
coveted slots, Harvard could fill its entering class many times over with applicants
with perfect grades and test scores. 因此, admissions officers rely on other mea-
sures in their evaluation such as extracurricular activities and a personal rating,
as well as overall excellence. What set Thang Diep apart from the throngs of oth-
er applicants was his personal rating. A report by an alumni interviewer noted
that his openness to new ideas was “truly unusual” and added that Thang would
be an “outstanding” roommate. In short, Thang’s personal rating boosted his
应用.

While Thang Diep and Michael Wang represent competing narratives of Asian
美国人, the latter has dominated the discourse in the current battle over affir-

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150 (2) Spring 2021Jennifer Lee

mative action. In part, this is because Michael Wang’s exceptional competence
fits the prevailing stereotype of Asian Americans, while Thang Diep’s warmth de-
fies it. But it is also because the default for Asian is East Asian. For the majority
of Americans, their concept of who counts as Asian is East Asian: nearly four in
five Americans consider Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans as Asian or Asian Amer-
伊坎人 (81 百分, 80 百分, 和 78 百分, 分别).19 相比之下, 仅有的 70
percent of Americans consider Southeast Asians like Filipinos as Asian or Asian
美国人, and a mere 46 百分比和 37 percent claim the same of Indians and Pa-
kistanis, 分别 (见图 3).

此外, because Chinese boast the longest history in the United States and
are the largest U.S. East Asian group, accounting for one in five Asian Americans,
Chinese has become synecdoche for Asian.20 This form of boundary contraction
affects which Asian American narratives are privileged and accepted, 以及哪个
are challenged and rejected. 在这种情况下, when narratives of Chinese are privileged
over others, and then serve as the proxy for all Asian Americans, we paint an in-
complete and biased portrait of Asian Americans’ experiences and attitudes, 在-
cluding their support for affirmative action.21

在 2012 和 2016, AAPI Data surveyed Asian American registered voters about
their views of affirmative action by posing several different questions of the poli-
赛, including the following, which is adapted from a Pew Research Center survey:
“Thinking about colleges and universities, do you favor, 反对, or neither favor
nor oppose giving blacks, 女性, and other minorities better access to higher ed-
教育?” In 2012, three-quarters (75 百分) of Asian Americans supported af-
firmative action in higher education, but by 2016, the figure dropped to 65 百分.
When Chinese Americans are excluded from the analyses, 然而, 亚裔美国人-
icans’ support for the policy remained unchanged, with nearly three-quarters ex-
pressing support for affirmative action at 73 percent.22

如图 4 节目, the precipitous decline in support for affirmative action
among Chinese Americans in the four-year period between 2012 和 2016 交流电-
counts entirely for the drop in support for the policy among Asian Americans–
pointing to a pattern of Chinese exceptionalism. When we draw on the views of Chi-
nese Americans to represent the views of all Asian Americans, we misrepresent
Asian Americans’ support for affirmative action.

I mmigration has remade Asian America time and again. Most recently, 这

1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act ushered in a new stream of immi-
grants from Asia who are more highly educated and more positively select-
ed than their counterparts of yore. Not only are contemporary Asian immigrants,
on average, more likely to have graduated from college than their nonmigrant
counterparts from their countries of origin, but they are also more likely to hold
a college degree than the U.S. 意思是. The dual positive immigrant selectivity–

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesAsian Americans, Affirmative Action & the Rise in Anti-Asian Hate

数字 3
Percent of Americans Who Consider Each Group as “Asian” or
“Asian American”

Chinese

Japanese

Korean

Filipino

Indian

Pakistani

46%

37%

81%

80%

78%

70%

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Arab

31%

来源: Jennifer Lee and Karthick Ramakrishnan, “Who Counts as Asian,” Ethnic and Racial
学习 43 (10) (2020): 1733–1756.

数字 4
Percent of Asian Americans Who Support Affirmative Action

Other Asians

2012

2014

2016

Chinese

来源: Karthick Ramakrishnan and Janelle Wong, “Survey Roundup: Asian American Atti-
tudes on Affirmative Action,” Data Bits, a blog for AAPI Data, 六月 18, 2018, http://aapidata
.com/blog/asianam-affirmative-action-surveys/.

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150 (2) Spring 2021Jennifer Lee

their hyper-selectivity–has resulted in the rapid racial mobility of Asian Americans.
Deemed subhuman and unassimilable in the nineteenth century, Asians have be-
come America’s exceptionally competent minority in the twenty-first.

Their rise in mobility has come with social costs, 然而. Presumed compe-
帐篷, Asian Americans are also perceived to lack warmth, creativity, and vision.
Technically strong, but socially weak, Asians are stereotyped as hard-working
students and diligent workers, but poor visionaries and implausible leaders.23
The combination of high competence and low warmth, 然而, has made them
credible candidates to challenge affirmative action. Under the rubric of the Stu-
dents for Fair Admissions, Edward Blum recruited Asian Americans whose stellar
grades, exceptional test scores, and bevy of extracurricular activities failed to gain
them admission to Harvard, and then pointed to admissions officers who rejected
them based on their poor rating on personal characteristics like character, cour-
年龄, and fit. The personal rating encompasses far more than personal character-
主义, yet SFFA has reduced it to personality, and touted it as the source of the al-
leged bias against Asian Americans–a provocative allegation that resonated with
Asians and non-Asians alike.

While the debate about bias against Asian Americans continues to rage, 头发-
vard’s bias for legacies remains unchecked. Legacies are nearly six times as like-
ly to be admitted than nonlegacies, and the majority of Harvard’s legacies are
白色的. Rather than fighting to dismantle all categorical bias, Edward Blum and
SFFA have targeted the so-called Asian penalty. Hailing Asians as the meritorious,
morally deserving minority who are unjustly penalized because of their race, SFFA
has held up Asians as both victims of discrimination and victims of affirmative
行动. In the process, they have falsely equated affirmative action with negative
action against Asians by arguing that undeserving minorities like African Ameri-
cans and Hispanics get a boost because of their race at Asians’ expense. But affir-
mative action is neither a quota nor can it be reduced to negative action. 的确,
the Asian American student population has increased in tandem with affirmative
行动. The missing component in SFFA’s calculation is legacies whose birthright
entitles them a lift in admissions, thereby placing all minoritized groups–includ-
ing Asian Americans–at a disadvantage.

It is worth underscoring that Asians are overrepresented as a proportion of
their population at elite universities like Harvard. They make up only 6.6 百分
美国的. 人口, 但 24.4 percent of Harvard’s most recent freshman class.
Where Asians are underrepresented is in the executive ranks and leadership posi-
tions in the workplace as they bump up against a career ceiling, otherwise known
as the bamboo ceiling. College-educated Asians fall behind their White counter-
parts in earnings, and fall behind all groups in advancement beyond the profes-
sional ranks, even after adjusting for potential covariates, including native-born
status.24

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesAsian Americans, Affirmative Action & the Rise in Anti-Asian Hate

Recent reports of top technology firms in Silicon Valley show that Asians are
the least likely racial group to be promoted into managerial and executive po-
sitions.25 Asian men and women are half as likely to advance into the executive
ranks as their White counterparts, with Asian women the least likely of all groups
to be promoted–reflecting their acute intersectional disadvantage. A similar pat-
tern emerges in law where Asians make up 10 percent of graduates of top-thirty
law schools, 但仅 6.5 percent of all federal judicial law clerks. While Asians are
the largest minoritized group in major law firms, they have the highest attrition
rates and lowest ratio of associates to partners of all groups, at four to one, com-
pared with two to one for Blacks and Hispanics, and parity for Whites.26

Even in academia, where Asian Americans are overrepresented as students in
elite universities, they are nearly absent in leadership ranks, representing only 2
percent of college presidents. Asians are not well represented among the ranks of
tenured faculty either. Take Harvard, 例如. The current freshman class is
24.4 percent Asian American, but among its tenured faculty, 仅有的 11 percent are
Asian. And there is a stark gender divide: 8 percent are Asian men, and a mere
3 percent are Asian women. Even rarer are Black, Hispanic, and Native Ameri-
can faculty. 组合, they account for less than 8 percent of Harvard’s tenured
professors. By far, the majority of Harvard’s tenured faculty are White (80 每-
分), with White men constituting the lion’s share at 61 百分. Asian Ameri-
cans who oppose affirmative action in university admissions will find that they
have shot themselves in the foot when they confront the career ceiling in the
workplace.27

While the reigning misperception is that Asians are ardent opponents of affir-
mative action, the majority of Asian American registered voters support the poli-
赛. One group, 然而, stands apart: Chinese Americans. This sobering finding
highlights both the heterogeneity of the U.S. Asian population and the salience of
data disaggregation in accurately reporting their narratives.28 Data disaggregation
will become even more critical as the fastest growing U.S. racial group continues
to diversify through immigration. 自从 2000, the East Asian population dropped
从 43 到 37 percent of the Asian American population, and the South Asian pop-
ulation increased from 19 到 27 百分. The share of the Southeast Asian popula-
tion dropped slightly from 36 到 34 percent.29

As the U.S. Asian population grows and diversifies, so too do their political
attitudes. While Asian Americans have become increasingly progressive, 一个新的
brand of Asian immigrants has entered the political sphere whose attitudes depart
from the Asian American college student activists of the 1960s.30 From opposing
Proposition 16 (which would have reversed Proposition 209 and removed the ban
on affirmative action in California), to protesting New York City’s attempt to re-
form specialized high school tests, to siding with the Students for Fair Admissions
in the fight against affirmative action at Harvard, this faction of politically conser-

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150 (2) Spring 2021Jennifer Lee

vative Asian immigrants has no intention of following their liberal-leaning prede-
cessors, nor do they intend to stay silent.

Politically conservative Asian immigrants who are calling for a retreat from
race do not seek to deny opportunities for others: from their perspective, 他们
seek to open opportunities for all. They believe in the American dream and im-
migrated to the United States because they subscribe to the creed of America’s
open opportunity structure: those who get ahead do so on the bases of talent, 难的
工作, and grit. They also believe that one’s racial status should be neither a penal-
ty nor a reward, and are committed to protecting the opportunities for their U.S.-
born children who they have watched work hard, follow the rules, yet in some cas-
es be denied university admission nevertheless. This group of Asian immigrants
has aligned with conservatives like Edward Blum, the Students for Fair Admis-
西翁, and the Department of Justice under the Trump administration in the fight
to dismantle affirmative action.

Whether more Asian Americans will choose to side with conservatives like
Blum and Trump and splinter along political lines, or whether they will choose
to forge a collective Asian American alliance will depend on whether U.S. Asians
recognize and embrace their ethnic and class diversity. Will they forge a sense of
linked fate akin to that which has guided the political attitudes and voting behav-
ior of Black Americans?31 Beyond these poles lies yet another possibility: an Asian
America that recognizes the precariousness of their racial status and one that also
recognizes the precariousness in status of all U.S. minoritized groups. The corona-
virus crisis has presented us with the unique opportunity to embrace such a possi-
能力, and reimagine what Asian America could look like.

早在 2020, as fears about the coronavirus arrested the United States, attacks
on Asian Americans mounted steeply. In a one-month period beginning mid-
行进 2020, the Asian Pacific Policy and Planning Council received more than
1,500 reports of anti-Asian hate incidents, with the majority of the reports made
by Asian American women. Ranging from verbal harassment to physical assaults,
Asian Americans have been vilified based on the false assumption that they are to
blame for the deadly pandemic. In Texas, 例如, a man stabbed a Burmese
American family–a father and two young children (ages two and six)–because
he thought they were Chinese and were infecting people with the coronavirus. 在
布鲁克林, a man poured acid on an Asian woman while she was taking out the
trash in her home, severely burning her head, neck, 然后回来. In midtown Man-
hattan, a Korean woman was grabbed by the hair and punched in the face.

Accusing China of manufacturing the coronavirus as a deliberate act of bio-
恐怖主义, and then faulting China for its spread, Trump flagrantly dubbed it the
“China virus,” the “Wuhan virus,” and “kung flu,” and then turned a blind eye to
the rise in anti-Asian racism and hate. The horrors of the coronavirus pandemic are
already leaving scars: so potent was this rhetoric that just three weeks of “China

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代达罗斯, 美国艺术学院学报 & SciencesAsian Americans, Affirmative Action & the Rise in Anti-Asian Hate

virus” in the media offset more than three years of prior declines in anti-Asian
bias.32 The pandemic–and Trump’s glib designation of it–has revived the cen-
tury-old trope that Asians are vectors of filth and disease, and has exposed Amer-
ica’s nativist fault lines.

Politically conservative Asian Americans are arriving at the brutal realization
that the ally with whom they have sided in their fight against affirmative action
has elected not to side with them when they are the target of attack. In this de-
fining political moment, they are learning that their perceived competence and
moral worth are no shields from xenophobia and racism, and their elite degrees
and respectability politics are no protection from anti-Asian hate. This moment
of reckoning presents Asian Americans–regardless of political persuasion–an
opportunity to reimagine what racial justice and multiracial coalitions could look
喜欢. 的确, the coronavirus pandemic presents all Americans an opportunity to
reimagine what equity, 共情, and moral worth could look like.33

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author’s note

This research was supported by grants from the National Science Foundation, 这
Russell Sage Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the Social Science Research
理事会. For critical comments and suggestions, the author thanks colloquium par-
ticipants at Columbia Law School, Columbia Population Research Center, 头发-
瓦德大学, 普林斯顿大学, Stanford Law School, and the Russell Sage
基础. For feedback and support during this project, the author thanks Aixa
Cintrón- Vélez, Karthick Ramakrishnan, Van Tran, Janelle Wong, and Kaia.

关于作者

Jennifer Lee is the Julian Clarence Levi Professor of Social Sciences at Columbia
University and President of the Eastern Sociological Society. She is author or coau-
thor of four award-winning books, including The Asian American Achievement Paradox
(2015), The Diversity Paradox (2010), Civility in the City (2002), and Asian American Youth
(2005). Her research focuses on the implications of contemporary U.S. immigra-
tion–particularly Asian immigration–on the native-born population. She has been
a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford, A
Fellow at the Center for the Study of Race, Politics and Culture at the University of
芝加哥, a Visiting Scholar at the Russell Sage Foundation, and a Fulbright Scholar
to Japan. Committed to public engagement, she has written for The New York Times,
The Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, San Francisco Chronicle, CNN, 以及各种
other media outlets.

195

150 (2) Spring 2021Jennifer Lee

尾注

1 I use the terms Asian and Asian American interchangeably throughout the essay.

2 Jennifer Lee, “From Undesirable to Marriageable: Hyper-Selectivity and the Racial Mo-
bility of Asian Americans,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Sci-
恩斯 662 (1) (2015): 79–93; and Jennifer Lee and Min Zhou, “From Unassimilable to
Exceptional: The Rise of Asian Americans and ‘Stereotype Promise,’” New Diversities 16
(1) (2014): 7–22.

3 Cathy Park Hong, Minor Feelings (纽约: One World, 2020).

4 Jennifer Lee and Monika Yadav, “The Rise in Anti-Asian Hate in the Wake of Covid-19,”
Items, Social Science Research Council, 可能 21, 2020, https://items.ssrc.org/covid-19
-and-the-social-sciences/the-rise-of-anti-asian-hate-in-the-wake-of-covid-19/.

5 李, “From Undesirable to Marriageable”; and Jennifer Lee and Frank Bean, The Diversity
Paradox: Immigration and the Color Line in Twenty-First Century America (纽约: 拉塞尔
Sage Foundation, 2010).

6 Jennifer Lee and Min Zhou, The Asian American Achievement Paradox (纽约: 拉塞尔

Sage Foundation, 2015).

7 Van Tran, Jennifer Lee, and Tiffany Huang, “Revisiting the Asian Second-Generation

Advantage,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 42 (13) (2019): 2248–2269.

8 李, “From Undesirable to Marriageable.”
9 Jennifer Lee, Civility in the City (剑桥, 大量的。: 哈佛大学出版社, 2002); 苏珊
时间. Fiske, “Stereotype Content: Warmth and Competence Endure,” Current Directions in
心理科学 27 (2) (2018): 67–73; Susan T. Fiske, Amy J. C. Cuddy, and Peter
Glick, “A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth Re-
spectively Follow from Perceived Status and Competition,” Journal of Personality and So-
cial Psychology 82 (6) (2002): 878–902; and Douglas S. 梅西, “Racial Formation in
Theory and Practice: The Case of Mexicans in the United States,” Race and Social Prob-
莱姆斯 1 (1) (2009): 12–26.

10 Tiane Lee and Susan T. Fiske, “Not an Outgroup, Not Yet an Ingroup: Immigrants in the
Stereotype Content Model,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations 30 (6) (2006):
751–768; and Monica H. 林, Virginia S. 是. Kwan, Anna Cheung, and Susan T. Fiske,
“Stereotype Content Model Explains Prejudice for an Envied Outgroup,” Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin 31 (1) (2005): 34–47.

11 Jennifer Lee and Van Tran, “The Mere Mention of Asians in Affirmative Action,” Socio-
logical Science 6 (21) (2019): 551–579; and Michèle Lamont, “From ‘Having’ to ‘Being’:
Self-Worth and the Current Crisis of American Society,” The British Journal of Sociology 70
(3) (2019): 660–707.

12 Esther Wang, “Michael Wang Didn’t Get into Harvard, He Thinks It’s Because He’s
Asian,” Buzzfeed News, 十月 13, 2018, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/esther
wang/chinese-americans-harvard-affirmative-action-asian-americans.

13 Anemona Hartocollis, “He Took On the Voting Rights Act and Won. Now He’s Tak-
ing On Harvard,“ 纽约时报, 十一月 19, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/11/19/us/affirmative-action-lawsuits.html.

14 Jesse M. Rothstein, “College Performance Predictions and the SAT,” Journal of Econome-

trics 121 (1–2) (2004): 297–317.

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15 Margaret M. Chin, OiYan Poon, Janelle Wong, and Jerry Park, “Here Are TEN Reasons
NOT to Fall for the ‘Asian American Penalty’ Trap in Admissions!” Medium, 二月
23, 2019, https://medium.com/@dddefenddiversitydd/anti-asian-american-bias-exists
-but-here-are-ten-reasons-not-to-fall-for-the-asian-american-71ef01195189.

16 Andrew Gelman, Sharad Goel, and Daniel E. Ho, “What Statistics Can’t Tell Us in the
Fight over Affirmative Action at Harvard,” Boston Review, 一月 14, 2019, http://boston
review.net/law-justice/andrew-gelman-sharad-goel-daniel-e-ho-what-statistics-cant
-tell-us-fight-over.

17 Jerome Karabel, The Chosen (纽约: Houghton Mifflin, 2005).
18 Jerry Kang, “Negative Action Against Asian Americans,” Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liber-
ties Law Review 31 (1996): 1–47; and Goodwin Liu, “The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and
the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions,” Michigan Law Review 100 (1) (2002):
1045–1107.

19 Jennifer Lee and Karthick Ramakrishnan, “Who Counts as Asian,” Ethnic and Racial Studies

43 (10) (2020): 1733–1756.

20 洪, Minor Feelings.
21 Lee and Ramakrishnan, “Who Counts as Asian.”
22 Karthick Ramakrishnan and Janelle Wong, “Survey Roundup: Asian American Attitudes
on Affirmative Action,” Data Bits, a blog for AAPI Data, 六月 18, 2018, http://aapidata
.com/blog/asianam-affirmative-action-surveys/.

23 Justine Tinkler, Jun Zhao, Yan Li, and Cecilia L. Ridgeway, “Honorary Whites? Asian

American Women and the Dominance Penalty,” Socius 5 (2019): 1–13.

24 Richard Alba and Guillermo Yrizar Barbosa, “Room at the Top? Minority Mobility and
the Transition to Demographic Diversity in the USA,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 39 (6)
(2016): 917–938; and Chang Hwan Kim and Yang Zhao, “Are Asian American Women
Advantaged? Labor Market Performance of College Educated Female Workers,” Social
军队 93 (2) (2014): 623–652.

25 Buck Gee and Denise Peck, The Illusion of Asian Success: Scant Progress for Minorities in Cracking
the Glass Ceiling from 2007–2015 (纽约: Ascend, 2017), https://cdn.ymaws.com/
www.ascendleadership.org/resource/resmgr/research/theillusionofasiansuccess.pdf;
and Buck Gee, Denise Peck, and Janet Wong, Hidden in Plain Sight: Asian American Leaders
in Silicon Valley (纽约: Ascend, 2015), https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.ascendleader
ship.org/resource/resmgr/research/hiddeninplainsight_paper_042.pdf.

26 Eric Chung, Samuel Dong, Xiaonan April Hu, 等人。, A Portrait of Asian Americans in the Law
(新天堂, 康涅狄格州: Yale Law School and National Asian Pacific American Bar Associ-
化, 2017), https://www.apaportraitproject.org/.

27 Jennifer Lee, “Why California Needs Affirmative Action Now More than Ever,” The Los
Angeles Times, 六月 26, 2020, https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-06-26/
affirmative-action-california-asians; and Jennifer Lee, “Why Asian Americans Shouldn’t
Chuck Affirmative Action Out the Window,” Zócalo, 六月 9, 2015, https://www.zocalo
publicsquare.org/2015/06/09/why-asian-americans-shouldnt-chuck-affirmative-action
-out-the-window/ideas/nexus/.

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150 (2) Spring 2021Jennifer Lee

28 Jennifer Lee, Karthick Ramakrishnan, and Janelle Wong, “Accurately Counting Asian
Americans is a Civil Rights Issue,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and So-
cial Science 677 (1) (2018): 191–202.

29 我们. Census Bureau, American Community Survey 2013–2015, available through IPUMS

美国 (Integrated Public-Use Microdata Series), https://usa.ipums.org/usa/.

30 Janelle Wong, Karthick Ramakrishnan, Taeku Lee, and Jane Junn, Asian American Politi-
cal Participation (纽约: 拉塞尔·塞奇基金会, 2011); Rong Xiaoqing, “The Rise
of the Chinese-American Right,” 国家评论, 七月 17, 2019, https://www.national
review.com/2019/07/chinese-american-right-new-generations-immigrants/; and Jan-
elle Wong, Immigrants, Evangelicals, and Politics in an Era of Demographic Change (纽约:
拉塞尔·塞奇基金会, 2018).

31 Michael Dawson, Behind the Mule (普林斯顿大学, 新泽西州: 普林斯顿大学出版社, 1995).
32 Sean Darling-Hammond, Eli K. Michaels, Amani M. 艾伦, 等人。, “After ‘The China Vi-
rus’ Went Viral: Racially Charged Coronavirus Coverage and Trends in Bias Against
Asian Americans,” Health Education & Behavior 47 (6) (2020): 870–879, https://doi.org/
10.1177/1090198120957949; and Ed Yong, “Where Year Two of the Pandemic Will Take
Us,” The Atlantic, 十二月 29, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/
2020/12/pandemic-year-two/617528/.

33 Alondra Nelson, “Society after Pandemic,” Social Science Research Council, 四月 23, 2020,
https://items.ssrc.org/covid-19-and-the-social-sciences/society-after-pandemic/; 三月-
tha Minow, When Should Law Forgive (纽约: 瓦. 瓦. 诺顿, 2019); Bruce West-
ern, Homeward: Life in the Year After Prison (纽约: 拉塞尔·塞奇基金会, 2018);
Prudence Carter, “Education’s Limitations and Its Radical Possibilities,” Contexts 17 (2)
(2018): 22–27; and Lamont, “From ‘Having’ to ‘Being.’”

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