Akira Iriye
Beyond imperialism: the new internationalism
Much has been said about the United
States having become, or having to be-
come, an empire. To provide the chaotic
世界, especially in the wake of the Cold
战争, with some semblance of law and
命令, it has been asserted, the interna-
tional community needs a new world
命令, a global empire, a superpower that
can speak on behalf of all countries and
all peoples, a power willing to use its
military and economic resources to pro-
tect all against the forces of violence and
anarchy. There is only one nation that
can ful½ll the task: 美国. 在
the twenty-½rst century, 所以, 胡-
mankind may be forced to choose be-
tween continued disorder and imperial
governance instituted by the United
状态.
Akira Iriye, Charles Warren Professor of Ameri-
can History at Harvard University, has written
widely on the history of international relations
和美国. foreign affairs. His books include “Cul-
tural Internationalism and World Order” (1997),
“Japan and the Wider World: From the Mid-
Nineteenth Century to the Present” (1997), 和
“Global Community: The Role of International
Organizations in the Making of the Contempo-
rary World” (2002). 他曾是该协会的院士
美国学院自 1982.
© 2005 由美国艺术学院颁发
& 科学
So one side of the argument goes. 但
others dispute this contention, insisting
that for practical or moral reasons the
United States should never take on an
imperial role.
A historian can only contribute to this
debate by historicizing it–that is, 经过
noting what empires and imperialism
have meant in the past, and by examin-
ing what these might mean in today’s
世界. This essay seeks to put empires
and imperialism in the context of mod-
ern world affairs and to discuss how they
contributed, or failed to contribute, 到
stabilizing international order.
It cannot be denied that there was a
time when empires provided some sort
of world order. In the ½rst half of the
十九世纪, the globe was dotted
by huge territorial empires, 包括
the Ottoman, Persian, Mughal (Mogul),
俄语, and Chinese (Qing). They pre-
sided over large, multiethnic popula-
tions and kept (with varying degrees of
成功) local tensions under control.
These were traditional imperial states
under the rule of dynasties whose ori-
gins went back several centuries. 他们
governed essentially contiguous territo-
里斯, thereby establishing some sem-
blance of regional order. One might in-
clude the United States in this list as
108
代达罗斯之泉 2005
我
D
哦
w
n
哦
A
d
e
d
F
r
哦
米
H
t
t
p
:
/
/
d
我
r
e
C
t
.
米
我
t
.
/
e
d
你
d
A
e
d
A
r
t
我
C
e
–
p
d
/
我
F
/
/
/
/
/
1
3
4
2
1
0
8
1
8
2
8
9
1
9
0
0
1
1
5
2
6
0
5
3
8
8
7
3
9
2
p
d
.
F
乙
y
G
你
e
s
t
t
哦
n
0
8
S
e
p
e
米
乙
e
r
2
0
2
3
出色地: 它, 也, grew as a territorial empire
during the nineteenth century, expand-
ing northward, westward, and south-
病房, with the central government es-
tablishing its authority over all parts
of its territory, at least after the Civil
战争.
These landed empires were joined by
the maritime empires of Britain, 法国,
西班牙, and other European nations that
superimposed a commercial regime over
the vast, traditional empires of the Mid-
德尔东, 南亚, and East Asia. 这
relationship between the landed and
maritime empires was sometimes vio-
lent–for example, in India during the
1850s when Britain displaced the Mu-
ghal Empire with its own colonial re-
呻吟. 总体上, 然而, the tradi-
tional empires continued to function,
even as merchants, sailors, and mission-
aries from the maritime powers in½ltrat-
ed their lands.
Until the last decades of the nine-
十世纪, these territorial and mar-
itime empires constituted an interna-
tional order. The system of international
law that had originated in Europe in the
seventeenth century steadily spread to
other parts of the world, and all these
empires, as well as other independent
状态, entered into treaty relations with
另一个. This was an age of multiple
empires. When we talk of empires today,
or of the United States having become
an empire, we obviously do not have in
mind such a situation. 相当, many ob-
servers draw the analogy between em-
pire today and the British and other mar-
itime empires that emerged at the end of
the nineteenth century when a handful
of colonial regimes established near-
total control over most of the world’s
land and people. This distinction is im-
重要的, since much depends on what
historical antecedent one is referring to
when one talks about an empire.
Likewise signi½cant, in contemporary
discussions the ‘imperialism’ that is
most relevant is the ‘new imperialism’
that emerged in the last decades of the
nineteenth century and persisted only
through the ½rst decades of the twenti-
eth. A handful of nations whose empires
were both territorial and maritime exer-
cised the new imperialism; great mili-
tary powers such as Britain, 法国, 格尔-
许多, 俄罗斯, 美国, 和
Japan incorporated overseas territory
into their respective domains, 从而
emerging as world powers. Most of Af-
里卡, 中东地区, 亚洲, and the Pa-
ci½c were carved into their colonies and
spheres of influence. Once acquired,
these lands were governed by cadres of
administrators recruited both at home
and in the colonies; and these colonial
regimes were in turn protected by of½-
cers and men sent from the metropoles
and by troops and police recruited local-
莱. The new imperialists vied with one
another for control over land, 资源,
和人, and in the process they
fought many colonial wars. Instead of
producing global chaos and anarchy as a
consequence, 然而, these empires at
times managed to establish some sort of
world order. They did so both by seeking
to stabilize their relationships with one
another and by making sure the people
they controlled would not threaten the
系统.
The Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905)
and its aftermath serve as a good illustra-
的. Ignited by Russia and Japan’s clash-
ing ambitions in northeast China (男人-
churia) and the Korean peninsula, 这
½rst major war of the twentieth century
was a typically imperialistic war. 什么时候
negotiations to de½ne their respective
spheres of domination failed, the two
countries fought on land and at sea, 但
not on Russian or Japanese soil; the Chi-
nese and Koreans themselves had no say
超过
帝国主义:
the new
国际米兰-
nationalism
我
D
哦
w
n
哦
A
d
e
d
F
r
哦
米
H
t
t
p
:
/
/
d
我
r
e
C
t
.
米
我
t
.
/
e
d
你
d
A
e
d
A
r
t
我
C
e
–
p
d
/
我
F
/
/
/
/
/
1
3
4
2
1
0
8
1
8
2
8
9
1
9
0
0
1
1
5
2
6
0
5
3
8
8
7
3
9
2
p
d
.
F
乙
y
G
你
e
s
t
t
哦
n
0
8
S
e
p
e
米
乙
e
r
2
0
2
3
代达罗斯之泉 2005
109
Akira Iriye
在
帝国主义
in this war that would determine their
nations’ futures. Victorious, Japan won
control over Korea and southern Man-
churia, turning the former into its col-
ony and the latter into its base of opera-
tion on the Chinese mainland. The oth-
er Great Powers, assuming their own
imperial domains would not be directly
threatened by the conflict or its eventual
outcome, did not intervene, but in the
end the United States offered mediation
with a view to preventing further blood-
shed and regional disorder. Within two
years of the war’s end, 而且, 俄罗斯
and Japan reconciled and agreed to di-
vide Manchuria (and later, Inner Mon-
golia) 它们之间.
The two empires had fought an impe-
rialistic war and, just as quickly, had de-
cided to preserve their imperial spheres
through cooperation. Such behavior was
typical in the age of the new imperial-
主义. The other imperialists essentially
stood by, accepting the new status quo
in Asia, although the United States, 和
its empire in the Paci½c, began to view
Japan’s growing power with alarm. 仍然,
the United States and Japan reached
agreement that they would not challenge
their respective empires: 联合
States would not dispute Japanese con-
trol over Korea or southern Manchuria,
and Japan would not infringe on U.S.
sovereignty in the Philippines, Guam,
or Hawaii. The Japanese also accepted
French control over Indochina and
Dutch control over the East Indies, 的-
spite the movements against colonialism
that were developing in those colonies.
Some of these movements’ leaders
looked to Japan, the only non-Western
Great Power, for support, but Japan
chose to identify itself with the other
imperialists.
At least for the time being, the imperi-
al powers colluded with one another to
keep their respective colonial popula-
tions under tight control. The world or-
der they established entailed a division
of humankind between the ruler and the
ruled, the powerful and the weak, 这
‘civilized’ and the ‘uncivilized.’
The world of the new empires had its
heyday at the beginning of the twentieth
世纪, but it disintegrated rapidly fol-
lowing the Great War. The German,
Austrian, and Ottoman Empires col-
lapsed after the four years of ½ghting,
while the Russian Empire, on the oppo-
site side of the conflict, was undone by
the revolutionaries who came to power
during the war. The empires of Britain,
法国, 日本, and the United States did
not disappear, but they were no longer
capable of providing the globe with sys-
tem and order. They might have tried to
cooperate with one another to preserve
the new imperialism, but they had nei-
ther the will nor the resources to do so.
Imperialistic collusion broke down, 和
Japan began challenging the existing em-
pires in Asia and the Paci½c in the 1930s.
Under Nazi leadership a new German
empire emerged, and Japan and Ger-
many in combination collided head-on
with the remaining empires of Europe
和美国.
In that sense, World War II was an im-
perialistic war, but it was also the begin-
ning of the end of all empires, new and
老的. By seeking to destroy each other, 这
empires had committed collective sui-
cide–but that was only one reason be-
hind the demise of imperialism. 更多的
fundamental was the emergence of anti-
imperialism as a major force in twenti-
eth-century world affairs.
Anti-imperialistic nationalism had
many sources–ideological, 政治的, 所以-
cial, and racial–but above all, it was fos-
tered by the development of the transna-
tional forces that are usually identi½ed as
全球化. The age of the new impe-
110
代达罗斯之泉 2005
我
D
哦
w
n
哦
A
d
e
d
F
r
哦
米
H
t
t
p
:
/
/
d
我
r
e
C
t
.
米
我
t
.
/
e
d
你
d
A
e
d
A
r
t
我
C
e
–
p
d
/
我
F
/
/
/
/
/
1
3
4
2
1
0
8
1
8
2
8
9
1
9
0
0
1
1
5
2
6
0
5
3
8
8
7
3
9
2
p
d
.
F
乙
y
G
你
e
s
t
t
哦
n
0
8
S
e
p
e
米
乙
e
r
2
0
2
3
rialism coincided with the quickening
tempo of technological change and of
international economic interchanges;
more and more quantities of goods and
capital crossed borders, and distances
between people of different countries
narrowed dramatically, thanks to the
development of the telegraph, the tele-
电话, the steamship, the automobile,
and many other devices.
These advances in science and tech-
nology at one level facilitated imperialis-
tic control over distant lands–and for
this reason most historians tend to claim
that imperialism and globalization went
hand in hand. Without the international
order sustained by the imperial powers
(尤其, by the British Empire), 它
is often argued, economic globalization
would have been much more dif½cult, 如果
不是不可能, to develop. The empire
provided a political and legal frame-
工作, backed up by military force, 为了
the economic transactions and techno-
logical developments of the day. The im-
perial administrators built roads, 建立-
lished schools, and helped eradicate dis-
eases in their colonies and spheres of in-
fluence, thereby modernizing these ar-
eas and incorporating them into an in-
creasingly integrated globe. 因此, if one
accepts such a perspective, 有可能的
to say that imperialism and globalization
reinforced one another, even that they
were two sides of the same phenome-
non–something like the development of
a stable and interdependent world order.
But it is also clear that globalization
facilitated the growth of colonial resist-
ance to imperialist domination. 至
extent that globalization was an integra-
tive force, bringing people of all coun-
tries closer together, it undermined one
essential condition of imperialism: 这
rigid separation of colonizer and colo-
尼泽德. The blurring of the distinction
took many forms: mixed marriages be-
tween these two groups of people, com-
pradors acting as middlemen between
colonial administrators and the native
人口, and the education of colo-
nial elite in the schools and universities
of the European metropoles. Imperial-
ism would have ceased to function if
such blurring continued–and that was
为什么, even while colonizer and colonized
were intermingling at one level, at an-
other a system of rigid social and cultur-
al distinction was maintained. Such dis-
tinction in turn aroused resistance and
opposition from the indigenous popula-
系统蒸发散, reinforcing anticolonialist senti-
评论.
If globalization, in short, facilitated
the new imperialism, it also provided
favorable conditions for the emergence
of anti-imperialism. And in the end,
anti-imperialism proved to be a far
stronger imperative than imperialism.
Before the Great War, anti-imperialists
in Tunisia, 埃及, 印度, 中国, 韩国,
and elsewhere were already aware that
modern transportation and communica-
tions technology could serve their inter-
ests as well as they had served those of
their colonial masters. Anti-imperialists
could use railways and steamships to
travel long distances and organize resist-
ance movements; they could use the
mass media and circulate handbills and
newspapers among an increasingly liter-
ate populace; and they could even estab-
lish transnational connections and con-
vene international congresses against
帝国主义.
Although some in the metropoles sup-
ported the anti-imperialist movement,
before the Great War it had not signi½-
cantly weakened or altered the structure
of imperial governance. Yet even as large
numbers of colonial troops were recruit-
ed to ½ght for their respective masters,
the war experience did nothing but en-
courage the growth of anti-imperialism.
超过
帝国主义:
the new
国际米兰-
nationalism
我
D
哦
w
n
哦
A
d
e
d
F
r
哦
米
H
t
t
p
:
/
/
d
我
r
e
C
t
.
米
我
t
.
/
e
d
你
d
A
e
d
A
r
t
我
C
e
–
p
d
/
我
F
/
/
/
/
/
1
3
4
2
1
0
8
1
8
2
8
9
1
9
0
0
1
1
5
2
6
0
5
3
8
8
7
3
9
2
p
d
.
F
乙
y
G
你
e
s
t
t
哦
n
0
8
S
e
p
e
米
乙
e
r
2
0
2
3
代达罗斯之泉 2005
111
Akira Iriye
在
帝国主义
Both the Bolshevik revolutionaries’ anti-
imperialist ideology and Woodrow Wil-
son’s conception of self-determination
indicated that even among the victori-
ous Allies the ranks of the imperialist
powers were breaking down. The pro-
cesses of globalization that had facilitat-
ed imperialism were now encouraging
the spread of anticolonial nationalism. 如果
empires had de½ned the nineteenth cen-
图里, then nationalism would de½ne the
twentieth.
This became quite evident after the
Great War, when economic globaliza-
tion resumed, buttressed by such tech-
nological inventions as the airplane,
收音机, and the cinema. Imperialism,
然而, was not reinforced by this pro-
cess but, on the contrary, was eclipsed
by an ever-more vociferous clamor for
national liberation all over the world.
When the remaining imperial powers
failed to respond in unison to such
voices, or to prevent another calamitous
war from breaking out between them-
自己, anti-imperialist movements grew
so strong that by the end of World War
二, nationalism had come to be seen as a
plausible alternative to imperialism as
the basis for reconstructing world order.
Instead of a handful of large and pow-
erful empires providing law and order
在世界上, 现在, after World War II,
sovereign states were expected to act as
both the constituents and guardians of
the international system. The former
empires that were now shorn of colo-
人们, the newly decolonized countries,
and the countries that had been inde-
pendent but noncolonial states–all
would be equal players in the postwar
world order. They would ensure domes-
tic stability while at the same time coop-
erating with one another through the
联合国, an organization whose
basic principle is national independence
and sovereignty. The so-called West-
phalian system of sovereign states that
had provided the normative framework
for European international affairs since
the seventeenth century would now be
applied to the entire globe, as country
after country achieved independence in
非洲, 中东地区, 亚洲, and else-
在哪里. Global governance would no
longer be based on a vertical division
of the world into the ruling powers
and all the rest, but instead established
through a horizontal system of coop-
eration among nations of presumably
equal status.
The history of the world in the second
half of the twentieth century was to
展示, 然而, that sovereign states
were no more capable of producing sta-
ble international order than the empires
曾经是: nearly as many lives were lost
in interstate and civil wars after 1945 作为
in World War II. With rare exceptions,
the United Nations proved incapable of
preventing such conflict when national
interests collided, and few countries
were willing to give precedence to the
principle of international cooperation.
It is often argued that the postwar in-
ternational system was de½ned by the
cold war in which the United States and
the Soviet Union effectively divided the
globe into two counterbalancing spheres
of influence. The two countries, 哪个
controlled the domestic affairs of their
allies and client states to maintain local
命令, managed to prevent a third world
war from erupting. If we accept this
看法, we are in effect saying the United
States and the Soviet Union behaved like
erstwhile empires, as providers and sus-
tainers of local and international order.
But it must be recognized that unlike the
nineteenth-century empires, they did
not discourage nationalism.
美国, 毕竟, continued
to espouse the principle of national self-
112
代达罗斯之泉 2005
我
D
哦
w
n
哦
A
d
e
d
F
r
哦
米
H
t
t
p
:
/
/
d
我
r
e
C
t
.
米
我
t
.
/
e
d
你
d
A
e
d
A
r
t
我
C
e
–
p
d
/
我
F
/
/
/
/
/
1
3
4
2
1
0
8
1
8
2
8
9
1
9
0
0
1
1
5
2
6
0
5
3
8
8
7
3
9
2
p
d
.
F
乙
y
G
你
e
s
t
t
哦
n
0
8
S
e
p
e
米
乙
e
r
2
0
2
3
决心, and the Soviet Union, 为了
its part, preached ideological anti-impe-
rialism. Both superpowers supported co-
lonial liberation movements, 虽然
in practice they did not always ½nd them
compatible with their global strategies.
同时, the independent states of
亚洲, 中东地区, 非洲, and Latin
America often refused to heed the dic-
tates of the Cold War antagonists. Na-
理性主义, once unleashed, could not be
contained even by the Cold War’s new
empires.
Globalization proceeded apace after
World War II, but this was not because
of the Cold War or postcolonial nation-
救世主, but rather in spite of them. 生态-
nomic, 社会的, and cultural bonds of in-
terdependence were strengthened across
nations by supranational entities (埃斯佩-
cially regional communities) 并由
non-state actors (such as multinational
enterprises and international nongov-
ernmental organizations). Regional
社区, most notably the Euro-
pean Economic Community, sought to
subordinate separate national interests
to considerations of collective well-
存在. The idea had always been there
–after all, it was well recognized that
globalization implied some sort of trans-
nationally shared interest–but it was
not put into practice until a group of Eu-
ropean countries agreed to put an end to
their history of internecine wars and to
give up part of their respective sovereign
rights for the sake of regional peace and
团结.
The number of non-state actors grew
rapidly after World War II. Whereas in
the quarter century after 1945 the num-
ber of independent states nearly dou-
bled, international nongovernmental
organizations and multinational enter-
prises increased even more spectacular-
莱. While the superpowers worked to
advance their own geopolitical agendas,
and independent states continued to
look after their own parochial interests,
these non-state actors together promot-
ed globalization and a sense of transna-
tional interdependence.
The question, 然后, was whether the
non-state actors would be able to pro-
vide global order if this task could not be
entrusted to the superpowers or the sov-
ereign states.
This was the key question that had to
be addressed in the last three decades of
the twentieth century–and it remains
the key question today. 的确, it is the
question at the heart of the contempo-
rary debate on empire.
During the 1970s and 1980s, as Cold
War tensions abated, fresh national ri-
valries were unleashed, fracturing Afri-
加州, 中东地区, Central Asia, 和
Southeast Asia. 同时, 军队
for transnational interconnectedness
were strengthened. The European Eco-
nomic Community, now joined by Brit-
ain, steadily effected regional integra-
的, and its success encouraged similar,
if smaller-scale, arrangements else-
在哪里, such as the Association of South-
east Asian Nations and the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Area.
Whether such regional entities would,
by themselves, succeed in establishing a
new international order remained to be
见过. If such communities developed as
exclusionary groupings, pursuing only
their internally shared interests, 他们
might end up dividing the world. 但
other developments in the last decades
of the century tended to encourage
international and interregional coopera-
tion and to generate conditions for the
emergence of a new, stable order. 期间
the 1970s, 例如, issues such as
environmental degradation and human
rights abuses were becoming so serious
that they would have to be solved
超过
帝国主义:
the new
国际米兰-
nationalism
我
D
哦
w
n
哦
A
d
e
d
F
r
哦
米
H
t
t
p
:
/
/
d
我
r
e
C
t
.
米
我
t
.
/
e
d
你
d
A
e
d
A
r
t
我
C
e
–
p
d
/
我
F
/
/
/
/
/
1
3
4
2
1
0
8
1
8
2
8
9
1
9
0
0
1
1
5
2
6
0
5
3
8
8
7
3
9
2
p
d
.
F
乙
y
G
你
e
s
t
t
哦
n
0
8
S
e
p
e
米
乙
e
r
2
0
2
3
代达罗斯之泉 2005
113
Akira Iriye
在
帝国主义
through transnationally coordinated
行动. The United Nations sponsored
conferences to deal with them, and it
was joined by newly formed nongovern-
mental organizations that were transna-
tional in character, such as Friends of the
Earth and Amnesty International. Acts
of international terrorism also aroused
global awareness, evoking calls for col-
lective response.
These issues were no longer con½ned
to speci½c countries or regions. It was no
事故, 然后, that international organi-
zations of all sorts, but especially of the
nongovernmental variety, grew spectac-
ularly in the last decades of the century.
At a time when sovereign states were
proving incapable of constructing a vi-
able international order, and when the
Cold War was ebbing, regional commu-
实体, 国际组织, 和
non-state actors were actively seeking
an alternative–a global community that
did not rely for its viability on the exist-
ing governments and armed forces, 但
on the transnational activities of indi-
viduals and organizations. These were
all aspects of the globalizing trend of in-
ternational affairs.
Can such transnational forces and ac-
tivities somehow manage to combine
to establish a global structure of gover-
南斯? That is the major challenge
今天.
A hundred years ago, 全球化
had coincided with the new imperial-
主义. By the late twentieth century, 九-
teenth-century-style imperialism had
long since disappeared from the scene,
but the postcolonial states had proved
no more capable of establishing a stable
world order than the older nations that
had been in existence for a long time.
Would the regional communities pro-
vide the answer? 如果不, would transna-
tional non-state entities such as non-
governmental organizations and multi-
national enterprises be able to construct
a global civil society? How could non-
state bodies establish any sort of govern-
ing structure to provide law and order?
How would they de½ne their relation-
ship to the existing states?
These were serious questions to which
no satisfactory answer was readily avail-
有能力的. It may have been for this reason
that some began to look back fondly on
empires as providers of international
命令. Two developments at the end of
the twentieth century and the beginning
of the twenty-½rst made the question of
effective world governance extremely
紧迫的. One was the frequency and geo-
graphical spread of international terror-
主义, and the other, the proliferation of
核, 生物, and chemical weap-
ons across national boundaries.
Both were serious challenges to the
whole world, requiring an effective re-
sponse from all–states, international
组织, regional communities,
and non-state actors. Such cooperation,
然而, would take a long time to de-
velop, so in the meantime the United
States took it upon itself to punish ter-
rorist groups and the ‘rogue states’ sus-
pected of harboring weapons of mass
破坏. For those who believed that
international order must be buttressed
by a great military power willing to use
its resources for this purpose, 联合
States provided the ready, and possibly
仅有的, 回答. The nation would carry
out the functions that the earlier em-
pires had performed. It would be the
empire for the twenty-½rst century.
But today there is little tolerance for
any sort of imperialism anywhere in the
世界. Although old-fashioned imperial-
ism is far from dead, it has no legitimacy
in the international community, 哪个
是, 至少在理论上, constructed on the
114
代达罗斯之泉 2005
我
D
哦
w
n
哦
A
d
e
d
F
r
哦
米
H
t
t
p
:
/
/
d
我
r
e
C
t
.
米
我
t
.
/
e
d
你
d
A
e
d
A
r
t
我
C
e
–
p
d
/
我
F
/
/
/
/
/
1
3
4
2
1
0
8
1
8
2
8
9
1
9
0
0
1
1
5
2
6
0
5
3
8
8
7
3
9
2
p
d
.
F
乙
y
G
你
e
s
t
t
哦
n
0
8
S
e
p
e
米
乙
e
r
2
0
2
3
principles of national self-determination
and human rights. 而且, the Atlan-
tic world, which dominated modern
international relations and of which the
United States was an integral part, 能
no longer claim the same degree of hege-
mony in world affairs.
一方面, European countries have
tended to move within the framework of
their regional community, quite inde-
pendently of the transatlantic ties. 在
另一方面, 中国, 印度, 还有一些
Latin American and Middle Eastern
countries are likely to develop as centers
of economic and even military power. 到
the extent that the new imperialism of a
hundred years ago was largely a product
of Western civilization, today we must
reckon with the fact that non-Western
civilizations have grown in strength and
自信. If a new empire were to
emerge, 所以, it would not be able
to function if it were identi½ed solely
with the West. Such an empire would
have to accommodate different civiliza-
tions from all regions of the Earth, and it
would need to be mindful of the transna-
tional networks of goods, 首都, ideas,
and individuals that constitute global
civil society.
换句话说, a new empire for the
new millennium would not be an empire
in any traditional sense.
What may have worked briefly a hun-
dred years ago cannot be expected to re-
appear and function in the same way to-
天. 有, 然而, another nine-
teenth-century legacy that might, 在其
twenty-½rst-century incarnation, 亲-
vide a more relevant solution to today’s
问题: the legacy of international-
主义.
It is sometimes forgotten that the age
of the new imperialism was also a time
when modern internationalism was vig-
orously promoted, by governments, 在-
vate organizations, and individuals. 这
Olympic Games were one example, 这
Permanent Court of Arbitration in the
Hague, 其他. The internationalists
established transnational organizations
and convened world congresses. 他们
sought an alternative to a world order
that was dominated by the imperialists.
Yet the contest for influence between
imperialism and internationalism ap-
peared to be decided in the former’s
favor when, despite the international-
ists’ ardent pleas for peace and under-
standing among nations, 世界
powers chose war.
But the Great War proved to be the
swan song of empires, and their certain
demise was implicit in the establishment
of the League of Nations, an internation-
alist project par excellence. 虽然
League did little about the existing em-
pires besides placing Germany’s former
colonies and those of its wartime allies
under a system of mandates, and while it
proved powerless to check the aggressive
imperialism of Germany and Japan in
the 1930s, its internationalist vision nev-
er died. The international body, assisted
by a host of nongovernmental organiza-
系统蒸发散, kept up the efforts–even during
the dark days of World War II–to de½ne
norms of behavior for nations and indi-
个人, efforts that laid the ground for
conceptions of human rights, 犯罪
against humanity, and universal equality
and justice under the law. 联合
States and Great Britain, even as they
fought against the Axis Powers, 没有
hesitation embraced this internationalist
legacy that became the basis of the Unit-
ed Nations.
Even if somehow a new empire were
to emerge, that empire would have to
embody principles of human rights and
justice for all. It would have to be an em-
超过
帝国主义:
the new
国际米兰-
nationalism
我
D
哦
w
n
哦
A
d
e
d
F
r
哦
米
H
t
t
p
:
/
/
d
我
r
e
C
t
.
米
我
t
.
/
e
d
你
d
A
e
d
A
r
t
我
C
e
–
p
d
/
我
F
/
/
/
/
/
1
3
4
2
1
0
8
1
8
2
8
9
1
9
0
0
1
1
5
2
6
0
5
3
8
8
7
3
9
2
p
d
.
F
乙
y
G
你
e
s
t
t
哦
n
0
8
S
e
p
e
米
乙
e
r
2
0
2
3
代达罗斯之泉 2005
115
Akira Iriye
在
帝国主义
pire of freedom in support of the emer-
gent transnational institutions of global
civil society.
Since such a development is highly un-
likely, we would do better to explore the
选择. 毕竟, there actually are
other ways of securing international
命令. And there is no reason why the
internationalist legacy, 而不是
legacy of the briefly dominant new im-
perialism, should not serve humankind
今天.
我
D
哦
w
n
哦
A
d
e
d
F
r
哦
米
H
t
t
p
:
/
/
d
我
r
e
C
t
.
米
我
t
.
/
e
d
你
d
A
e
d
A
r
t
我
C
e
–
p
d
/
我
F
/
/
/
/
/
1
3
4
2
1
0
8
1
8
2
8
9
1
9
0
0
1
1
5
2
6
0
5
3
8
8
7
3
9
2
p
d
.
F
乙
y
G
你
e
s
t
t
哦
n
0
8
S
e
p
e
米
乙
e
r
2
0
2
3
116
代达罗斯之泉 2005
下载pdf