Guillermo B.. Bonvillen y Charles Weiss
Taking Covered Wagons East
A New Innovation Theory for Energy and
Other Established Technology Sectors
Frederick Jackson Turner, historian of the American frontier, argued that the
always-beckoning frontier was the crucible shaping American society.1 He retold
an old story, arguing that it defined our cultural landscape: when American settlers
faced frustration and felt opportunities were limited, they could climb into covered
wagons, push on over the next mountain chain, and open a new frontier. Even after
the frontier officially closed in 1890, the nation retained more physical and social
mobility than other societies. While historians debate the importance of Turner’s
tesis, they still respect it.
The American bent for technological advance shows a similar pattern.
Typically, we find new technologies and turn them into innovations that open up
new unoccupied territories—we take “covered wagon” technologies into new tech-
nology frontiers. Information technology is an example. Before computing
arrived, there was nothing comparable: there were no mainframes, desktops, o
Internet before we embarked on this innovation wave. IT landed in a relatively
open technological frontier.
This has been an important capability for the U.S. growth economics has made
it clear that technological and related innovation is the predominant factor driv-
ing of growth.2 The ability to land in new technological open fields has enabled the
A NOSOTROS. economy to dominate every major Kondratiev wave of worldwide innovation
Guillermo B.. Bonvillian directs MIT’s Washington office and was a Senior Adviser in the
A NOSOTROS. Senate. He teaches innovation policy on the Adjunct Faculty at Georgetown
Universidad.
Charles Weiss is Distinguished Professor at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of
Foreign Service, and formerly chaired its program in Science, Tecnología, y
International Affairs. De 1971 a 1986, he was Science and Technology Adviser to
the World Bank.
In this article the authors draw on the more extensive discussions of their ideas in their
new book, Structuring an Energy Technology Revolution (Cambridge, MAMÁ: CON
Prensa, Abril 2009).
© 2009 Guillermo B.. Bonvillen y Charles Weiss
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since the mid-19th century. 3 Information technology and biotech are the newest
chapters in this continuing story.
REVERSING THE COVERED WAGONS:
LANDING IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY
While we appear to have a capacity for standing up technologies in open fields to
form new complex technology sectors, we have not been as good at taking our cov-
ered wagons back east. Nosotros
find it hard to go back over
the mountains to bring inno-
vation into the already occu-
pied territory of established
complex technology sectors.
In typical American fashion,
we’d rather move on than
move back. This helps to
explain why a cab ride over
the highway system from New
York’s Kennedy Airport into
Manhattan has a distinctly
Third World feel, or why
Thomas Edison would be very
comfortable with our current
electrical grid.
While we appear to have a
capacity for standing up
technologies in open fields to
form new complex technology
sectors, we have not been as
good at taking our covered
wagons back east. We find it
hard to go back over the
mountains to bring innovation
into the already occupied
territory of established complex
technology sectors. In typical
American fashion, we’d rather
move on than move back.
Por supuesto, the story is
más
than
complicado
Turner’s frontier thesis about
American culture. It’s hard to
reverse the covered wagons
and go back to occupied terri-
conservador. Over time, established
technology sectors develop
resist
características
cambiar. The underlying technologies themselves become cost efficient through
standardization, and the phenomenon of “lock-in” sets in. Firms go through
Darwinian evolution; the leading technology competitors survive, expandir, y
become adept at fending off new entrants. They build massive infrastructure that
is resistant to competitive models, and they form alliances with government to
obtain subsidies, typically through the tax system, to tilt the playing field toward
their model.
eso
En otras palabras, established complex sectors, often themselves the result of ear-
lier waves of innovation, combine into a technological/economic/political para-
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Taking Covered Wagons East
digm that is very difficult to unseat;4 they plant a series of sophisticated minefields
to protect their model and resist its disruption. This pattern applies to highly com-
plex sectors of the economy where technologies are a factor; examples include
energía, health care delivery, transport, construction, and physical infrastructure,
education, and food and agriculture. A complex, established technology sector can
be defined as one that involves products and platforms, that groups complex tech-
nologies in the way a car holds an internal combustion engine, drive train, battery,
computers, fueling systems and tires. Complex sectors also have their own infra-
estructura, and are supported by established technologies, economic models, pub-
lic policies, public expectations, patterns of technical expertise and trained work-
forces. In combination, these sectors become the technological/economic/political
paradigma.
The concept of the complex sector is broader than that of complex technolo-
gy introduced by Robert Rycroft and Donald Kash,5 and is closer to Christopher
Freeman’s idea of technology clusters that dominate innovation waves.6 The idea
of such a sector has features in common with the idea of “dominant design,” intro-
duced by William Abernathy and James Utterbach7 and based on Raymond
Vernon’s product cycle theory:8 once such a paradigm has set in, the emphasis
shifts away from innovation in the overall system towards component innovation
in technologies that can be launched on existing platforms.
To be sure, the U.S. is not the only nation to experience the economic and
political barriers of complex established sectors. Japan’s economy would be
stronger if it could bring IT-driven retail efficiencies to a nation of small shops or
to pursue large-scale agriculture, not simply small family farms. The frontier the-
sis aside, innovation in established complex sectors becomes even more complex
once technological lock-in has set in.
LESSON FROM CHINA
The remarkable, sustained, double-digit growth of the Chinese economy is due in
part to the application of up-to-date technology to established sectors like trans-
puerto, health care, construction, and energy. Chinese strategy for catching up to the
developed economies is based on a unique model that calls for moving to and even
extending the technological frontier in these and other sectors, even as it applies
well-known technology to huge projects that will modernize its infrastructure. Él
has organized its economy with large doses of capital, labor, innovation and stern
political directives, relying on a rapidly expanding private sector using up-to-date
technology to provide the resources to support an inefficient public sector that it
will eventually supplant. China’s model of pervasive technology advance through-
out its economy, por supuesto, has a precedent. in the economy-wide catch-up
approach in postwar Japan and in Korea in the 1970s and 1980s.
There is a lesson here for the U.S. If innovation is key to growth, and if a nation
is bringing innovation into many sectors—both established sectors and those at
the technological frontier—then it may be able to boost its growth rate significant-
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ly. A NOSOTROS. growth might look different if we could find ways to cut the Gordian knots
that tie up our ability to innovate in established complex technology sectors and
bring innovation into those occupied territories, not just into the cutting econom-
ic edge of advances in new breakthrough technologies.
This might mean bringing innovation into our inefficient and expensive
healthcare delivery system, along with new biotech-derived drugs. It could mean
bringing IT simulations and game-based learning into K-12 education, or new
materials and information technology into our transportation or construction
infrastructure, or e-government into the widespread delivery of government serv-
ices. The list of possibilities is long. Perhaps we could even take our innovation
covered wagon back east and bring innovation into our complex, deeply
entrenched, heavily subsidized energy sector.
UNIFYING THE THREE MODELS OF INNOVATION
In order to contemplate stretching our scientific and technological capabilities to
established sectors of the economy, like energy, we need a working theory of inno-
vation for these sectors. Its design depends on a clear concept of how technologi-
cal innovation takes place in the sectors in response to market forces, and how this
process can be influenced by public policy. We see three models of this process,
each of them the product of a particular period of technological history.
The first of these models is the so-called pipeline or linear model, associated
with Vannevar Bush,9 in which basic research intended to push back the frontiers
of knowledge leads to applied research, which in turn leads to invention, to proto-
typing, to development, and finally to innovation, by which we mean widespread
commercialization or deployment. While subsequent literature showed that this
process wasn’t really linear—technology influenced science as well as the other way
around10—“pipeline” is still the term generally associated with this technology sup-
ply approach.
This model was inspired by the World War II–era success of atomic energy,
radar, and other technologies derived from advances in fundamental scientific
conocimiento;11 it regained prominence in the 1990s from the example of the infor-
mation revolution12 and from the promise of similar revolutions in bio- and nan-
otechnology. En estos ejemplos, el gobierno, and often the military establish-
mento, played a prominent role in shepherding these technologies through the
innovation process. This is a “technology push” model, with the government sup-
porting R&D and to an extent helping push the resulting advances toward the
marketplace.
The second of these models is the so-called induced innovation concept
explored in detail by the late Vernon Ruttan,13 in which technology and technolog-
ical innovation respond to the economic environment. This concept holds that the
technology in use in any economic sector—and, given enough time, the direction
of development and research—responds to changes in the market, Por ejemplo, a
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Taking Covered Wagons East
price signals by minimizing the use of expensive inputs and maximizing the use of
inexpensive ones.
By extension, this model would predict that technology and technological
innovation would also respond to the policy environment, for example by improv-
ing worker and product safety and decreasing pollution as policies in these areas
are tightened. The induced innovation model was one of several models that
responded to the realization that nations that were superior in basic research, semejante
as the Great Britain of the 1950s and 1960s, were not necessarily leading innova-
tores, and that a majority of new products used existing technologies to meet new
market needs rather than emerging from basic research. This model involves “mar-
ket pull”: the market inspires and pulls technological innovations from firms
toward implementation in the market.
The third concept can be only sporadically glimpsed in the innovation litera-
ture.14 However, we argue that innovation requires not only technology supply and
a corresponding market demand for that technology, but also organizational ele-
ments that are properly aligned to link the two. There must be concrete institutions
for innovation, and organizational mechanisms connecting these institutions, a
facilitate the evolution of new technologies in response to the forces of technology
push and market pull. We need this third element in our innovation model frame-
trabajar: the idea that innovation requires organizations anchored in both the public
and private sectors, to form the new technology and to launch it, if innovation the-
ory is to be practical, creating ideas we can actually implement.
These three theories fit into a historical context. The induced technology
model was partly a product of the historical perspective of the 1960s through the
1980s, with advances derived largely from incremental gains in existing technolo-
gy. Throughout that era, por supuesto, the kind of innovation described by the
pipeline model was humming along, bringing out an IT revolution in the 1990s
after decades of government R&D inputs. While the induced model best fits incre-
mental innovation, the pipeline model best fits breakthrough or radical innova-
ción. Underlying both of these developments were organizational issues, vital for
our innovation system, yet largely unexplored.
The induced and pipeline models have been viewed as separate and distinct
paths, one led by industry, the other largely by government. We must combine and
integrate these induced and pipeline innovation models if we are to adequately
describe the innovation framework we will require for innovation in energy or
other complex technology. The induced technology literature has rested primarily
on market pull and the role of firms in filling technology needs based on changing
market signals. It does not deal directly with the role of government. The pipeline
literature, in contrast, discusses the government role. A focus on the organization
for innovation offers us the opportunity to bring these separate strands together.
Although the literature is limited, the organization of innovation at the institu-
tional level reflects on connections between firms, the academy, and government
entities like the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
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Firms, universidades, and government organizations will be major players in new
energy technology. What is more, the dominant literature on technological inno-
vation in recent years has remained focused on the strengths and weaknesses of the
pipeline model, because of the importance of the IT and the biotech innovation
waves for which this model provides a good description. This pipeline literature
pays too little attention to how the overall economic and policy environment
affects technological innovation in complex networks of both related and unrelat-
ed technologies, and the induced model often pays too little attention to the gov-
ernmental role.15 To date neither has focused much on the third direction, innova-
tion organization.
En suma, the literature on innovation policy, whether pipeline, induced, or orga-
nizational, has not fully confronted the problems involved in complex technology
sectors. These sectors require a very different analysis from the three separated
strands that have been the focus of the American literature on technological inno-
vación. Each of these models does helpfully describe aspects of the innovation
process relevant to energy technology. But only by integrating all three in a unified
approach can we move toward a better grasp of the task before us: innovation in a
complex established sector. En efecto, in taking on this task we will be able to draw a
new series of policy prescriptions quite different from the approaches that have
been articulated to date in other sectors.
INNOVATION IN ENERGY: THE FOUR-STEP ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
The most difficult step in developing and deploying new technology in energy and
other complex, established sectors will be launching these technologies into
extremely complex and competitive markets for technology. This “point of market
launch” perspective is the basis for our argument that any program of government
support for innovations in these technologies should be organized around the
most likely bottleneck to their introduction to the market.16 This goes beyond the
long-standing focus of pipeline theorists on the valley-of-death stage between
research and late-stage development.17
We start with the principle that public policies to encourage technological
innovation should enable alternative technologies to compete on their merits; eso
es, they should be as technology-neutral as possible. This leads us to argue for an
integrated consideration of the entire innovation process, including research,
desarrollo, and deployment or implementation, in the design of any program to
stimulate innovation in energy or any other complex, established technology. Este
requires drawing on both pipeline and induced innovation models. Además, nosotros
see deep systems issues of organization for innovation that must be considered,
because new organizational routines will be needed across both the public and pri-
vate sectors to facilitate integrated policies to support innovation.
These considerations lead to a new framework for innovation policy, which we
have worked out in some detail for energy technology. It requires a four-step analy-
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Taking Covered Wagons East
hermana, which we propose as the basis for innovation policy in this area. We believe that
a similar approach is likely to be applicable to technological innovation in sectors
of comparable complexity.
The first step of this analysis requires assessing many promising technologies,
based on the likely bottlenecks in their launch path, and classifying them into
groups that share the same likely bottlenecks. For the energy sector, we found the
following technology pathways:
Experimental Technologies. This category includes experimental technologies
that require extensive long-range research. The deployment of these technologies
is sufficiently far off that the details of their launch pathways can be left to the
future. Examples include hydrogen fuel cells for transport, genetically engineered
bio-systems for CO2 consumption, y, in the very long term, fusion power.
Disruptive Technologies. These are potentially disruptive technological innova-
tions18 that can be launched in niche markets and that may expand from this base
as they become more price-competitive. Examples include LEDs and wind and
solar electric, which are building niches in off-grid power.
Secondary Technologies—Uncontested Launch. This group includes secondary
(component) innovations that will face market competition the moment they are
launched, but will likely be acceptable to recipient industries if their price range is
reasonable. These technologies must face the rigors of the tilted playing field, semejante
as a competing subsidy or the obstacle of a major cost differential, without the
advantage of an initial niche market. Examples include advanced batteries for
plug-in hybrids, and enhanced geothermal and on-grid wind and solar technolo-
gies.
Secondary Technologies—Contested Launch. These are secondary (component)
innovations that have inherent cost disadvantages, and/or that can be expected to
face economic, political, or other non-market opposition from recipient industries
or environmental groups. They must overcome these obstacles in addition to those
facing the technologies in the two preceding categories. Examples include carbon
capture and sequestration, biofuels, and fourth-generation nuclear power.
All four of above categories segment evolving technologies into different
launch pathways, so that relevant policies for each can be designed to support their
launch. A significant majority of energy technologies now contemplated are com-
ponent or secondary technologies that fall into the third and fourth categories
arriba. This complicates the technology launch picture because component tech-
nologies will not land in open frontiers, but will land in existing systems or plat-
forms—that is, in occupied territory. While the potential for disruptive technolo-
gies that can open new energy frontiers will increase, that opportunity will take
time to evolve.
There are two other categories that must be accounted for. These are crossovers
because they include the above new technology categories as well as existing ener-
gy-related technologies:
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Incremental Innovations in Conservation and End-Use Efficiency. For the ener-
gy sector, a focus on conservation and end-use efficiency can yield early and wide-
spread gains. The implementation of these innovations is limited by the short time
horizons of potential buyers and users, who typically refuse to accept extra initial
costs unless the payback period is very short. Examples include improved internal
combustion engines, building technologies, efficient appliances, improved light-
En g, and new technologies for electric power distribution.
Improvements in Manufacturing Technologies and Processes. These are improve-
ments for which investment may be inhibited because cautious investors are reluc-
tant to accept the risk of increasing production capacity and driving down manu-
facturing costs until they see an assured market. To drive down costs and improve
efficiency will require advances in both manufacturing processes and technologies
appropriate to the new energy technologies summarized above; support will also
be required to scale up manufacturing so that efficient new products can move
into the market more quickly.
The second step of our analysis is to classify support policies for encouraging
energy innovation into technology-neutral packages, and then to match them to
the technology groupings developed in the first step of the analysis. Here we see
three policy elements.
“Front-End” Technology Nurturing. For technologies in all six of the categories
arriba, technology support is needed on the front end of innovation, before a tech-
nology is close to being commercialized. This includes direct government support
for R&D in both the long term and short term, and for technology prototyping
and demonstrations.
“Back-End” Incentives. Incentivos (carrots) to encourage technology transition
on the “back end” may also be needed as a technology closes in on commercializa-
ción. Such carrots can encourage secondary/component technologies facing both
uncontested and contested launch, along with incremental innovations in technol-
ogy for conservation and end use, and technologies for manufacturing processes
and scale-up. They may also be relevant to some disruptive technologies as they
transition from niche areas to more general applicability. These incentives include
tax credits of various kinds for new energy technology products, loan guarantees,
low-cost financing, price guarantees, government procurement programs, buy-
down programs for new products, and general and technology-specific intellectu-
al property policies. As one example, procurement by the U.S. Defensa
Departamento, the nation’s largest owner of buildings and facilities, could offer
potential energy cost savings to the department over time by using its facilities as
an efficiency testbed, and could help ascertain the optimal approaches to building
tecnología. Sin embargo, there are challenges: How can abuses be avoided that may
arise in deviating from lowest-cost procurement criteria? How could such procure-
ment be reconciled with the technology-neutral strategy advocated here? A pesar de
potential complications, this may be one of the better levers for lifting energy
infrastructure out of the current technology “steady-state.”
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“Back-End” Regulatory and Related Mandates. Regulatory and related man-
fechas (sticks), also on the back end, may be needed in order to encourage compo-
nent technologies facing contested launch and also some conservation and end-
use technologies. These include standards for particular energy technologies in the
building and construction and comparable sectors, regulatory mandates such as
renewable portfolio standards and fuel economy standards, and emission taxes.
Just as there is no “one-size-fits-all” R&D program, which requires R&D efforts
to be tailored to particular technology categories, so particular “carrots” and
“sticks” may fit one group of technologies but not another. Loan guarantees may
work for major utilities building next generation nuclear power plants, but likely
will not be useful to small firms and startups with limited capital access deploying
new solar technologies. Analytical work is needed to evaluate the relative econom-
ic efficiency of particular back-end incentives or regulations. It should be noted,
también, that in the energy sector, a system of carbon charges, such as a cap-and-trade
programa, can substitute for many (although certainly not all) of the back-end pro-
posals listed above, both carrots and sticks, because it would induce similar effects.
As suggested in the previous section, the optimal approach to bringing inno-
vation into complex, established sectors would bring to bear three models of the
innovation process: the induced, the pipeline and the organizational models. A
technology supply approach is unlikely to be effective unless it is accompanied by
the demand-side price signals called for by the induced innovation model. Incluso
when they are technically ready, new entrants cannot compete on price with exist-
ing mature, efficient, and cheap energy technologies because the fossil fuel-based
industry does not have to pay for the environmental and security externalities that
it can now avoid. On the other hand, induced innovation depends on a robust
technology supply program, supported by a strong pipeline innovation system, a
enable the technologies that are needed to create alternatives and drive down costs.
This is particularly true when the technology transformation being sought is as
dramatic as the one we seek in energy. Innovation in a complex sector like energy
is not either/or—both the induced and pipeline models are required.
Let’s examine a concrete and current policy example for this balance. To induce
an energy transformation, Congress has focused on a cap-and-trade approach
intended to send pricing signals that increase demand for new energy technologies
and efficiencies. It has preferred this approach to a carbon tax or to higher gas or
other sector-specific taxes, which it considers to be more politically onerous. On
Junio 26, 2009, the House of Representatives passed by a narrow margin a cap-and-
trade bill, HR. 2454. As a result of political compromises with affected industries
and interests, the economic pressures to reduce greenhouse gasses in the early years
of the bill will be limited, because the “cap” tightens only gradually and the auc-
tions scale up only over time. The House bill is also limited in its application of the
pipeline model—i.e., on the technology-supply side—in that it provides only a
marginal increase in energy R&D and includes provisions for technology imple-
mentation that back only a limited range of technologies—namely, those sought
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by politically powerful industries: coal, oil refinery, and automobile. The approach
in the House bill, entonces, is tilted toward a gradually phased-in induced model; es
not balanced with a strong technology supply model.
Where complex technology
sectors like energy are involved,
we need to have Congress
legislate standard packages of
incentives and support across
common technology launch
areas, so that some technology
neutrality is preserved and the
optimal emerging technology
has a chance to prevail.
The third element in the trio of models of the innovation process must now be
introducido: the organizational model. The third step of our analysis, entonces, is to
survey existing institutional
and organizational mecha-
nisms for the support of inno-
vación,
to determine what
kinds of innovations (as classi-
fied by the likely bottlenecks in
their launch paths) do not
receive federal support at criti-
cal stages of the innovation
proceso, and what kind of sup-
port mechanisms are needed
to fill these gaps. This could be
described as an institutional
gap analysis. In energy, para
ejemplo, we do not have the
capacity
translate our
research into innovation, a
finance the scale-up of promis-
ing technologies, and to form
an overall collaborative strate-
gy between the public and private sectors to roadmap the details involved in devel-
oping and deploying the new technologies at scale.
a
The fourth step in our analysis is to recommend new institutions and organi-
zational mechanisms to fill these technology gaps identified in the third step, por
providing translational research, technology financing and roadmapping.
To summarize, the first of these four steps draws on pipeline theory, sugerir-
ing that support from the government pipeline will be important to creating,
launching, and enhancing a range of technology options. But since the technology
streams will need to land in the private sector at a huge scale, the second step relies
on induced innovation theory. It concentrates on the policy or demand signals that
will induce the private sector to take up, modify, and implement the technology
advances that originate from the innovation pipeline. Whether these come from a
demand pricing system like the cap-and-trade scheme proposed for carbon-based
energía, from technology incentives, or from regulatory requirements, they will
need to be coordinated and, to the extent possible, will need to be technology neu-
tral. The third and fourth steps draw on the innovation organization theory we
advanced here: that the gaps in the innovation system will need to be filled for the
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handoff to occur between pipeline and induced models, especially at the points
where technology supply push meets market demand pull.
This proposed new integrated framework has implications beyond policy the-
ory; it also leads to a different logic for the practical design of technology legisla-
ción. In effect, our discussion of steps one and two implies that the current legisla-
tive process for technology innovation in energy is exactly backwards. The incen-
tive structure should be legislated first in a way that will preserve the fundamental
technology neutrality needed in this complex technology area, rather than the
present practice of legislating separately for each technology first, with a different
incentive structure for each one. This unfortunate process has become a standard
model for innovation legislation, Por ejemplo, in the major energy acts of 2005 y
2007.19
In contrast, where complex technology sectors like energy are involved, nosotros
need to have Congress legislate standard packages of incentives and support across
common technology launch areas, so that some technology neutrality is preserved
and the optimal emerging technology has a chance to prevail. Particular technolo-
gies can then qualify for these packages based on their launch requirements. Es
important to get away from the current legislative approach of unique policy
designs for each technology, often based on the legislative clout behind that partic-
ular technology.
APPLYING INTEGRATED INNOVATION ANALYSIS TO COMPLEX SECTORS
The American economy would be well served if it developed a capacity to move
technological innovation more efficiently into established, complex economic sec-
tors like energy. Our traditional model for innovation relies on launching innova-
tion into open fields; we could improve our innovation-based growth rate if we
learned how to drive our technology-laden covered wagons into old frontiers as
well as new. This requires a new innovation framework, which integrates the three
separate models for innovation we have articulated: the pipeline and induced
modelos, and the model for institutional organization of innovations that backs
them up. This framework requires a new focus on the moment of technology
launch, as well as on the traditional focus of innovation policy on the “valley of
death.”
But even if we equip ourselves with a new model for innovation policy in com-
plex established sectors like energy or health care delivery—for taking our technol-
ogy covered wagons east—we should not underestimate the difficulty of the
process for introducing new technology at the massive scale demanded. In energy,
this process has eluded us for the last four decades. These complexities underscore
the need for a comprehensive new theoretical approach.
1. Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History (Nueva York; Henry Holt and Co. 1921),
Chapt. 1
paper in 1893 to the American Historical Association.)
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Guillermo B.. Bonvillen y Charles Weiss
2. Roberto M.. solow, Growth Theory, An Exposition (Oxford Univ. Prensa, Nueva York, Oxford, 2nd edi-
1987)
ción
Lecture,
ix-xxvi
(Nobel
2000),
Prize
Dec.
páginas.
8,
3. Christopher Freeman, “Innovation and Long Cycles of Economic Development” (paper,
Economics Dept., Univ. of Campinas, Sao Paulo, Brazil Aug. 25-27, 1982)
Capital (Cheltenham, REINO UNIDO.: Edward Elgar 2002), páginas. 3-46; Robert D. Atkinson, The Past and
Future of America’s Economy—Long Waves of Innovation that Power Cycles of Growth (Cheltenham,
REINO UNIDO.: Edward Elgar 2004), páginas. 3-40.
4. The concept of a well defended status quo setting in after a freewheeling period without rules is
developed in Debora L. Spar, Ruling the Waves: Cycles of Discovery, Chaos, and Wealth, de
Compass to the Internet (Nueva York : Harcourt, 2001).
5. Robert W. Rycroft and Don E. Kash, “Innovation Policy for Complex Technologies”, Issues in
Science and Technology, (Wash., CORRIENTE CONTINUA., Caer 1999)
6. Christopher Freeman, Innovation and Long Cycles of Economic Development, op cit; Christopher
Hombre libre, John Clark and Luc Soete, Unemployment and Technical Innovation (Londres: Pinter
1982).
7. William J. Abernathy and James M. Utterback, “Patterns of Innovation in Technology,” Technology
Revisar, volumen. 80, No. 7 (Cambridge, MA., CON 1978) páginas. 40-47.
8. Raymond Vernon, International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle, El
Revista trimestral de economía, volumen. 81 (Cambridge, MA.: CON prensa 1966).
9. Vannevar Bush, Ciencia: The Endless Frontier (Wash., CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: Government Printing Office, 1945)
10. Donald E.. alimenta, Pasteur’s Quadrant: Basic Science and Technological Innovation (Wash., CORRIENTE CONTINUA.:
Brookings Univ. Prensa 1997) páginas. 1-25, 45-89.
11. Robert Buderi, The Invention that Changed the World (Sloan Technology Series) (Nueva York:
Simon and Schuster—Touchstone 1997).
12. National Research Council, Science and Telecommunications Board, Funding a Revolution:
Government Support for Computing Research (Lavar. CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: National Academy Press, 1999) páginas.
85-157; Chapt. 4, Chapt. 5; Mitchell Waldrop, The Dream Machine: J.C.R. Licklider and the
Revolution that Made Computing Personal (Sloan Foundation Technology Series)(Nuevo
york:Viking 2001).
13. Vernon W. Ruttan, Technology Growth and Development: An Induced Innovation Perspective
(Oxford, REINO UNIDO. and New York: Oxford Univ. Prensa 2001).
14. William B. Bonvillian, “The Connected Science Model for Innovation”, National Research
Council, 21st Century Innovation Systems for the U.S. y japon (Wash., CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: National Academy
Prensa 2009) páginas. 206-237; Charles Weiss and William B. Bonvillian, Structuring an Energy
Technology Revolution (Cambridge, MAMÁ: CON prensa 2009), páginas. 13-36, detailed explication of this
discussion.
15. Although Vernon Ruttan was a leading theorist of the induced model, in his last book he turned
to an exploration of the pipeline model. Vernon W. Ruttan, Is War Necessary for Economic
Growth: Military Procurement and Technology Development (Oxford, REINO UNIDO. and New York: Oxford
Univ. Prensa 2006).
16. The steps described in this section are elaborated on in, Charles Weiss and William B. Bonvillian,
Structuring an Energy Technology Revolution, nota 14.
17. Lewis Branscomb and Philip Auerswald. “Between Invention and Innovation: An Analysis of
Funding for Early-State Technology Development,” Report No. NIST GCR 02-841 (Wash., CORRIENTE CONTINUA.:
National Institute of Standards and Technology/ATP, Noviembre 2002).
18. The concept is discussed in Clayton Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New
Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail (Bostón: Harvard Business School Pub. 1997).
19. Public Law 109-058, Energy Policy Act of 2005, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (Julio 29, 2005); Public Law
110-140, The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (signed Dec.
19, 2007).
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