Trust without Shared Belief: - IA de Investigación especializada en el MIT

Trust without Shared Belief:
Pluralist Realism and Polar
Bear Conservation

Jennifer Jill Fellows
Douglas College

Trust-building has implicitly been characterized in epistemology as necessitat-
ing the adoption of shared belief. If this is so, such models of trust-building
appear at odds with a metaphysical commitment to pluralist realism. En esto
article I offer the ﬁrst steps in modeling how a pluralist realist might under-
stand trust building. I argue that entertaining pluralist realism as a possi-
bility may actually be more fruitful for trust building than a monist
conception because each side is given an important concession: la posibilidad
that their knowledge claims might be correct. The case of polar bear conserva-
tion in the Canadian arctic illustrates that trust-building without shared
belief is possible. I wish the members of these round-table discussions success
in the future.

Palabras clave: Social Epistemology, Pluralist Realism, Indigenous Knowledge,
Confianza, Environment, Inuit, Polar Bear Longino, hombre de oro, Harding, Grasswick,
Scheman

Introducción

1.
Trust in an epistemic context is often understood in terms of shared beliefs.
Eso es, if I trust you with regards to the knowledge claims you are making,
then I accept and believe your knowledge claims as true. This model of trust
building appears problematic for those who hold pluralist realism1 to be a
conceptual possibility because the strength of pluralist accounts is often
thought to be in the divergence of opinion, not the convergence on a shared

1. See Helen Longino (2002) The Fate of Knowledge. This use of the term will be discussed

in greater detail in section 3.

Perspectives on Science 2017, volumen. 25, No. 1
©2017 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology

doi:10.1162/POSC_a_00234

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Perspectives on Science

belief. De este modo, if pluralist realism is a possibility, there may be cases where,
much as trust is needed, it may be unwise or impossible for knowledge claims
to be shared. Fortunately, as I will demonstrate with reference to polar bear
conservation in the Canadian arctic, trust need not require shared belief.

In the following essay, I will outline the ways in which trust has been
dealt with by social epistemologists in the past, illustrating that trust has
usually been explicitly or implicitly connected with the acceptance of
another’s knowledge claims. I will argue that the situation facing the Inuit
and the southern Canadian scientists is one in which trust is demanded in
order for both groups’ epistemic projects to succeed, and yet the concep-
tual possibility of pluralist realism raises the problem of how to gain or
give trust precisely because (among other things) neither group is likely to
accept the knowledge claims of the other as true, and it isn’t clear that they
should do so. Having set up the problem, I will argue that the Inuit and
southern Canadian scientists were able to ﬁnd a compromise because they
were able to employ a concept of trust that does not require shared belief.
I further speculate that, accepting pluralist realism as a conceptual possibility
might allow both sides to strengthen this trust-building going forward.

2. Epistemology and Trust
Kyle Powys Whyte and Robert P. Crease give a deﬁnition of trust in their
2010 article “Trust, Expertise and Philosophy of Science” which can serve
as a place from which to begin an investigation into the nature of trust.
They claim that “trust means deferring with comfort and conﬁdence to
others about something beyond our knowledge or power, in a way that
can potentially hurt us” (Whyte and Crease 2010, pag. 412). Key to this
understanding is the asymmetrical relationship that holds between the
trustor and the trustee. The trustee is an expert, with knowledge that
exceeds that of the trustor. De este modo, the trustor puts him or her self at risk in
trusting the expert, and does so with conﬁdence. The knowledge is held by the
trustee. The burden of the risk is taken on by the trustor.

But this conﬁdence itself needs to be explored. Para, as Annette Baier

pointed out in 1986, there is a difference between trust and reliance.
We all depend on one anothers’ psychology in countless ways, pero
this is not yet to trust them. The trusting can be betrayed, or at least
let down, and not just disappointed. Kant’s neighbors who counted
on his regular habits as a clock for their own less automatically
regular ones might be disappointed with him if he slept in one day,
but not let down by him, let alone had their trust betrayed. Cuando yo
trust another, I depend on her good will toward me. (Baier 1986, páginas. 234–35
énfasis añadido)

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Trust without Shared Belief

Relying on another may be as simple as assuming that you know them and
can predict their actions. Trusting another is something deeper. If I predict
your actions wrongly, I am not betrayed by you. But if I think you bear a
good will towards me and this is wrong, I will feel betrayed. I trust you
because I believe I know that your attitude towards me is one of good will.
This is what allows me to put myself at risk with confidence, cual
Whyte and Crease highlight as a hallmark of trust. Es, entonces, not enough
for me to identify you as an expert. I must also identify you as an expert
who bears me a good will.

But on what basis do I form this belief regarding another’s will? Alvin
Goldman examines how a “novice” or “lay” (non-expert) person could attempt
to adjudicate the claims of experts in order to determine whether the experts
are trustworthy. He lists four ways, but it is the two ways he considers to be
the most dominant that are of interest to me. He claims the novice can use
1) “Evidence of the expert’s interests and biases vis-a-vis the question at
issue,” and 2) “Evidence of the ‘expert’s’ past ‘track-record’” (hombre de oro
2001, pag. 93). The reason for relying on these two sources of evidence appears
to be the same: bias and track-record will likely indicate something about the
expert’s will towards the novice. Si, in the past, the expert has tried to
persuade the novice to take actions that were harmful towards her, or if
she suspects that the expert has a good reason to want to see her fail in this
caso, then the novice has good reason to doubt the expert’s good will towards
her. If Goldman is correct, then using someone’s past track-record, or their
potential biases, are both rationally justiﬁed ways of adjudicating whether or
not to trust them.

Naomi Scheman argues that often marginalized lay communities are
fully justiﬁed in their distrust of scientists when the workings of the sci-
entiﬁc institutions are “demonstrably unjust” even if the injustices do not
affect the validity of the knowledge claims being made (Scheman 2011,
páginas. 146–7). She backs up this claim with reference to the same kinds of
avenues for judging trust-worthiness that Goldman listed above. Scheman’s
example is of the African American community’s distrust of current med-
ical research as a result of an institutional history that includes the Tuskegee
experimentos (Scheman 2011, pag. 223). In judging this distrust as rational,
one must ask the following question: “Is the lay public responsible for
learning the scientiﬁc practices that would allow them to judge the validity
of scientiﬁc knowledge claims”? And the answer is surely ‘no’. It is unreal-
istic to expect members of the lay public to be responsible for judging the
technical claims of scientist, since they lack the expertise to do so. En el
absence of this expertise, Scheman argues that it is reasonable to judge current
scientists based on their institution’s track-record (Scheman 2011, páginas. 50–1).
Since scientiﬁc institutions are expected to police scientists and ensure that

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Perspectives on Science

they have the expertise they claim to have, it seems reasonable to judge cur-
rent scientiﬁc claims based on the track record of the institutions that support
those claims. Notice that the argument Scheman gives demands an extension
of Goldman’s original account of how trustworthiness is judged. Ahora, un
individual’s trustworthiness can be measured with reference to the track-
record and biases of the institution to which the individual belongs, par-
ticularly since institutions are often the policing agents who ensure that
proper procedures and methods are being observed by individuals working
within them. Por ejemplo, if I know that an institution has a history of racism
or sexism, then I have good reason to think, prima facie that an individual
member of this institution will not be prevented from operating on racist
or sexist assumptions herself. Notice that trust seems, aquí, to be tied to
belief; African Americans do not trust medical researchers and therefore do
not believe the researchers’ knowledge claims.

En efecto, there is another case that supports the idea that trust is tied to
acceptance of an expert’s knowledge claims. Goldman calls this the “novice-
2expert problem.” It is a case in which the novice faces two different experts
who are each offering differing expert opinions. The problem is whether,
y cómo, a novice may judge which of the two experts to trust in a given
situation because Goldman states that the novice cannot trust both experts
at once (hombre de oro 2001, pag. 92). This seems to be, de nuevo, because trust is
tied to belief. So a novice who trusts both experts would need to believe two
contradictory claims at once, which is epistemically problematic to say the
el menos. The way in which Goldman proposes that a novice determine which
expert is trustworthy is similar to the way in which a novice chooses whether
to trust an expert at all; by considering whether there is evidence that the
expert holds a bias against the novice.

If N[ovice] has excellent evidence for such bias in one expert and no
evidence for such bias in her rival, and if N has no other basis for
preferential trust, then N is justiﬁed in placing greater trust in the
unbiased expert. This proposal comes directly from common sense
and experience. If two people give contradictory reports, and exactly
one of them has a reason to lie, the relative credibility of the latter is
seriously compromised. (hombre de oro 2001, pag. 102)

So, de nuevo, the novice can still rely on past track record and potential bias in
order to adjudicate between the two experts and determine which one is
telling the truth.2

2. Goldman offers a few other ways in which the novice can adjudicate between two
different experts, but those ways won’t factor into this discussion. (See Goldman 2001).

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Trust without Shared Belief

The assumption in all of these accounts of trust and trustworthiness
seems to be that an expert who bears a good will towards one will also
be an expert who will tell the truth, and therefore will be an expert worthy
of trusting. En efecto, Heidi Grasswick’s work advocates that scientists make
sure to do two things in addition to telling the truth in order to rebuild
confianza: 1) determine who needs to know (who is most impacted by the sci-
entists’ research) y 2) ensure that they do know (share scientiﬁc knowl-
edge with those at risk of signiﬁcant harm).

Knowledge must be shared with those at risk of signiﬁcant harm. Él
is important to note that this claim is much stronger than the more
common demand that scientiﬁc results be public—that is available
for perusal by those who seek them out, or sharable in principle.
(Grasswick 2010, pag. 399)

Grasswick, in offering this suggestion, continues the implicit connection
found between trustworthiness, belief, and accuracy of knowledge claims.
Sharing accurate claims with those who are affected is a way of appearing
trustworthy. One knows one has been recognized as trustworthy when
one’s knowledge claims are believed by others. And I think there is
something correct about this connection. It makes sense that those who
have a good will towards me (and are thus trustworthy) would likely be
more inclined to tell me an accurate claim, insofar as knowing accurate
models tends to be a better overall survival strategy.3

But there is also something that has been overlooked in this implicit
connection between trust and shared belief. Cada vez más, those working
in philosophy of science (one of the biggest areas wherein issues of trust
are cashed out) are entertaining the possibility of pluralist realism. Longino,
Por ejemplo, considers pluralist realism a conceptual possibility (Longino
2002, 2006, 2013), as does Scheman (2011) and Harding (2015). The need
for pluralist realism is often cashed out in moral or political and epistemic
terms. The arguments given are of two related varieties: 1) that reality is
pluralistic, and so we need a plurality of theories developed from different
perspectives, y 2) that issues of marginalization will be easier to overcome if
pluralist realism is endorsed, since it ensures space for members of marginal-
ized communities to speak. It should be noted that these types of arguments
are not referring to only marginalized scientiﬁc communities. En efecto, a menudo
the claim seems to be one of including members of marginalized social

3. There have been debates in both virtue epistemology and philosophy of science over
whether it matters that our knowledge claims be accurate or truthful. Sin embargo, para el
purposes of this essay, I will assume that, all other things being equal, it is better to believe
truths than falsehoods.

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Perspectives on Science

communities (visible minorities, indigenous communities, LGBT com-
munities, Por ejemplo) into mainstream scientiﬁc communities. (Ver, para
ejemplo, Grasswick 2010). So, pluralist realism is often marshaled to deal
with just the sort of problems explored in situations of lost trust. By illustrat-
ing that the novice/lay person has good reason to distrust, one is granting
rationality and authority to the novice to judge how things stand from her
perspectiva. De este modo, standpoint theory is often seen as a friend to pluralist
realism, y viceversa (Harding 2015). The problem is that pluralist realism,
if seriously entertained as a conceptual possibility, seems to complicate, y
perhaps preclude, any efforts at trust-building between communities with
different knowledge claims. Para, if pluralist realism is endorsed as at least a
conceptual possibility, then it seems we open ourselves up to a plurality of
knowledge claims, in addition to a plurality of perspectives. This is one of
the main objections to pluralist realism; it seems to result in perspectivalism,
relativism and (potentially) nihilism (Harding 2015). Eso es, it results in an
erosion of the concept of a single knowledge claim as better, more accurate, o
truer than others. In a world where multiple knowledge claims may accu-
rately describe the phenomena observed, it becomes unclear why someone
should defer with comfort or conﬁdence to another. And worse still, es
very unclear how anyone could be expected to adjudicate between two
divergent opinions.

3. Pluralist Realism
In order to understand why pluralist realism might appear to be a problem
for epistemic trust-building the ﬁrst thing to do is to understand what
pluralist realism entails. And to understand that, I will begin with a
slightly different account: scientiﬁc pluralism. En 2006 Stephen H. Kellert,
Helen E. Longino and C. Kenneth Waters edited an anthology entitled
Scientiﬁc Pluralism. In the introduction to this anthology, they claimed that
pluralist realism captured a general idea:

The general idea is that some natural phenomena cannot be fully
explained by a single theory or fully investigated using a single
acercarse. Como consecuencia, multiple approaches are required for the
explanation and investigation of such phenomena. (Kellert, Longino,
and Waters 2006, pag. vii)

Scientific pluralism, entonces, suggests that the plurality of scientific disci-
plines and investigations are potentially beneficial, because it is theoretically
possible that reality itself cannot be captured under a monist model. So,
scientific pluralism depends on the possibility of pluralist realism for its
intelligibility. The reason it might be necessary to have multiple scientific
disciplines is because reality itself might be pluralistic. De este modo, it might be not

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Trust without Shared Belief

only possible, but necessary to approach a given phenomenon from multiple
perspectives.

The scientiﬁc pluralism that the editors have in mind is more than
merely ways of representing phenomena, entonces. It is a metaphysical com-
mitment, or rather, a refusal to make a metaphysical commitment. El
editors argue that it is theoretically possible that pluralist realism is true.
They don’t necessarily commit themselves to the idea that reality itself
is so complex as to defy any one encapsulating explanation. But they do
argue that there are no good reasons to deny that pluralist realism is a pos-
sibility, and hence that scientiﬁc pluralism is a possibility. “We believe it is
metaphysical prejudice to deny this possibility [the possibility of scientiﬁc
pluralism], and we fail to see what is to be gained by this denial” (Kellert,
Longino, and Waters 2006, pag. xii). Scientiﬁc Pluralism looks at pluralism
in a strictly scientiﬁc setting, as the title suggests. It examines whether or
not we should think, Por ejemplo, that psychology must reduce to biology.
It argues that there are good reasons for thinking the two may not ever be
able to reduce to one complete science. Pero, if one is committed to plu-
ralist realism, then this surely can have ramiﬁcations beyond science, a fact
that Longino acknowledges.

Context is key to Longino’s understanding of pluralist realism. pero lo es
also a problem when it comes to adjudicating between different knowledge
claims, and this can have consequences well beyond the sciences as tra-
ditionally understood. On Longino’s model, a theory or hypothesis is
adopted if it is found acceptable in the epistemic context and by the com-
munity for whom it arises. If it makes sense to them (given their epistemic
and ontological background beliefs), fulﬁlls their intellectual needs, y
survives criticism from multiple points of view, then prima facie, the hypoth-
esis gains the status of objective knowledge (Longino 1990, pag. 214).4 Este,
por supuesto, leaves open the possibility that several theories could be reliable
at the same time in different contexts. Y, furthermore, that these theo-
ries might well appear inconsistent with each other.

4. Longino expands on this discussion of the process of theory acceptance both in 1990
and again in 2002 by developing four norms that scientiﬁc communities must adhere to:
1) There need to be recognized avenues for criticisms, such as peer-reviewed journals.
2) There need to be shared standards among the members of the scientiﬁc community.
Criticisms that are offered must be relevant in some way. 3) The community must respond
to the criticisms offered. This doesn’t necessarily mean recanting a theory that is criticized,
but it does mean defending against the criticism. 4) There needs to be equality of intel-
lectual authority (or as Longino calls it, “tempered equality”). Everyone, regardless of their
carrera, social status, género, etc.. must be able to enter the epistemic discourse. No one can be
kept out based on political or religious reasons alone (Longino 1990, páginas. 76–9; Longino
2002, páginas. 128–31).

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Perspectives on Science

[t]he constrained elasticity of conformation and epistemic
acceptability means that more than one account of a phenomenon
can be correct, even though those accounts, if detached from their
contextos, are irreconcilable (Longino 2002, pag. 211; énfasis añadido).
So, it may well be unclear how to integrate one’s own knowledge claims
from those that arise in a markedly different context. And this, as Longino
acknowledges, extends beyond the domain of scientific pluralism. Ella
addresses different forms of epistemic investigation, other than Western
ciencia, explicitly, accepting those knowledge claims as ones that could be
in conflict with Western science, but nevertheless be accepted knowledge
claims for the indigenous communities (Longino 2002 pag. 211). Sin embargo,
she notes that “[t]he efforts to identify indigenous scientiﬁc traditions and
to link those with contemporary practices are fraught with controversy,
both political and intellectual” (Longino 2002, pag. 211). One reason for
the intellectual controversy is surely the complications that arise from
the role contextualism plays in pluralist realism, and the seeming inability
to reconcile knowledge claims that arise in vastly different contexts. Cómo-
alguna vez, while Longino touches on this, she does not investigate the possibil-
ity of widening the concept of pluralist realism beyond strictly scientiﬁc
pluralism. That project lies beyond the scope of her research.

Sin embargo, works like Sandra Harding’s “Must The Advancement of
Science Advance Global Inequality?” make it difﬁcult to see how a plural-
ist could draw a line at scientiﬁc pluralism alone, particularly if what they
mean by “science” is what is identiﬁed in European and North American
culture as science. Harding argues that the only way to demarcate science
from non-science in this way is to assume a form of ethnocentrism.

[t]he conventional histories of WMST [Western Modern Science and
Tecnología] that we all learned, and that still are assumed by most
historians and philosophers of science today, are Euro-centric in two
respects. Primero, they conﬂate Western scientiﬁc traditions with all
possible scientiﬁc activity, o, to put the issue another way, ellos
restrict “real science” to WMS [Western Modern Science]. Yet every
culture does science for every culture must ask questions about its particular
location in nature’s heterogeneous order, and will bring culturally distinctive
discursive resources (metaphors, modelos, narratives) to this task. (Harding
2002, pag. 97; énfasis añadido)

Harding argues, entonces, that each culture will have its own form of scientific
investigación. If this is correct, a scientific pluralist may well have to
acknowledge a wider form of ontological pluralism as at least a conceptual
possibility, since to do otherwise is to invoke a form of Euro-centrism as

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Trust without Shared Belief

justification for the demarcation of Western Science from other forms of
knowledge-making. With these arguments in mind, I argue that pluralist
realism can be conceived to be much broader than the scientific pluralism
suggested by Longino, Kellert, and Waters. Epistemologies that have
traditionally been viewed as unscientific may not in fact be unscientific in
any sense other than an ethnocentric one. Además, drawing a sharp
boundary between scientific and non-scientific ways of knowing may be
imprecise and impractical, as Harding herself points out (Harding 2002,
pag. 102). All of this leads me to entertain pluralist realism as at least a con-
ceptual possibility, and to resist the move to only allow epistemic pluralism
within the Western European disciplines historically labeled as scientiﬁc.
This move to a wider pluralist realism, lifting the restraints that allowed
epistemic pluralism only within the domain of Western European science,
raises one of the strongest concerns against pluralist realism: that pluralism
leads to epistemic relativism (ver, Por ejemplo, Freedman 2009; Harding
2015). I will not be taking up this question here. There has already been
enough work done to demonstrate that different forms of pluralism need
not lead to relativism, and indeed may actually represent a more robust
attitude towards realism than monism.5 But I think there is another puzzle
or concern related to this fear of relativism. The fear seems to be that if
we cannot converge on one singular account or model, it will become prac-
tically impossible to get anything done. As Harding notes, one reason
monists cling to monism is that it provides the illusion of there being of a
reliable way to settle disagreements. Monists fear that pluralism, por el contrario
“eliminates reliable standards for settling conﬂicting knowledge claims”
(Harding 2015, pag. 110). Aquí, the issue is not relativism itself, but the abil-
ity to make practical decisions. If we think reality cannot be captured by
singular ontological claims and commitments then how will we decide
which knowledge claims that arise from these differing epistemic practices
to act upon? The fear is that the metaphysical commitment to pluralist real-
ism and the epistemic pluralism that arises from this metaphysical com-
mitment result in what I will call a “practical paralysis.” Of course, uno
should readily admit that it may not be the case, even for pluralists, eso
all epistemic practices are treated equally. Longino tells us in The Fate of
Knowledge that our ontological categories are likely not undetermined but

5. For a discussion of how pluralism does not necessarily lead to relativism, see Naomi
Scheman Shifting Ground, (2011); Helen Longino The Fate of Knowledge (2002) particularly
capítulo 8; Donald Davidson’s account of triangulation in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective,
(2001); Nancy Cartwright’s Dappled World, (1999), and John Dupre’s The Disorder of Things
(1993) to name a few. Each author listed here argues that pluralism does not lead to rel-
ativism, though they do so in various ways.

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Perspectives on Science

are rather under-determined. (Longino 2002, páginas. 40–1) But whether there
are an inﬁnite number of ontological categories for reality or not, el
problem remains: as long as there is more than one, and they are equally
acceptable or are so divergent that comparison is practically impossible,
how do we choose? Este, I think, is often the worry behind the charge of
relativism. On Longino’s story, a community chooses with reference to
the four norms of critical contextual empiricism, and their own cognitive
necesidades (Longino 1990, páginas. 76–9; Longino 2002, páginas. 128–31). En otra
palabras, they choose on both pragmatic and epistemic grounds. But things
become less clear when multiple communities are involved, who may well
have different cognitive goals, and may have interpreted the four norms in
different ways. Each community may well be justiﬁed in choosing different
ontological categories, and different epistemic theories, based on different
cognitive needs. When a practical need requires these communities to work
together, it is far from clear which community’s theory should be adopted,
or even if divergent knowledge claims could be understood by the members
of other communities, much less integrated into a workable solution.6 That
es, this worry is not motivated by intra-community epistemic decisions, pero
by inter-community epistemic decisions. I will speak more of this in the
penultimate section of this paper.

Además, for theorists working on trust-building, particularly with
regards to communities with differing belief-systems, the concern might
well seem to be even greater. It might seem that it is impossible to entertain
pluralist realism as a conceptual possibility if one is engaged in research on
epistemic trust, precisely because epistemic trust has typically been charac-
terized as coinciding with shared beliefs or knowledge claims. Sin embargo,
pluralist realism gives us some reason to think that a single shared knowl-
edge claim is actually a potential epistemic loss, since it is a loss of different
ways of capturing, modeling and explaining a reality that may be too com-
plex to be explained by just one theory. Eso es, we should not lose or dis-
card reliable models of reality for the sake of building trusting relationships.
If community X subscribes to model a and community Y subscribes to
model b, and each model is working for its respective community, entonces
pluralist realism seems to suggest both models should continue to be
adopted. Pero, if X continues to believe a, and Y, b, then how can they share

6. En efecto, Longino herself suggests that, when divergent epistemic communities engage
with each other’s research practice, the result is a strengthening of each community’s under-
standing of itself, of the ways in which it interprets questions differently, and of its cognitive
goals that are different. Eso es, engagement with other communities does not necessarily
produce collaboration, but rather seems likely to strengthen differences (Longino 2006;
Longino 2013).

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Trust without Shared Belief

knowledge claims? De este modo, the adoption of pluralist realism as a conceptual
possibility seems to complicate or impede our ability to build trust through
knowledge sharing in inter-community settings.

In what follows, I intend to show that trust building is still possible
under such conditions. En efecto, I think the co-management of the polar
bears in the Canadian Arctic serves as a model illustrating how such trust
building can be done under these conditions. Además, I argue that an
acknowledgment and acceptance of pluralist realism as a conceptual pos-
sibility among those participating in co-management discussion may actu-
ally serve to facilitate trust-building, not impede it.

4. Pluralism and Polar Bear Conservation
The issue of polar bear conservation in the Canadian arctic is one that throws
the problems of trust-building between divergent communities into sharp
relief. The polar bears of Nunavut, in the Canadian arctic are currently man-
aged through a co-management system that involves representatives elected
or appointed from the residents of Nunavut, the Government of Canada, y
the Government of Nunavut. Juntos, these individuals make up the
Nunavut Wildlife Management Board (NWMB) and include a mixture of
Inuit hunters and elders, científicos, and government policy-makers. Mientras
the NWMB’s role is, strictly speaking, only advisory, in most situations
their decisions are the ones adopted (Lokken 2015).

Co-management throughout the world is the most successful when
mutual trust is established. En efecto, as several researchers have found,
the importance of trust between those involved in co-management cannot
be overstressed as a requirement of the success of a co-management practice
(Dowsley 2009; Stenseke 2009; Zulu 2013). Geographer Martha Dowsley
reports that those with indigenous knowledge and scientists “can only
work effectively together when both forms of knowledge are reported
honestly and when both sides trust each other” (Dowsley 2009, pag. 55).
The consistent observation is that co-management works best when the
individuals involved trust both their partners in management, y el
system that has been designed for setting policy. If they do not have trust
in their partners to follow the system, and in the system being fair, entonces
they are unlikely to adopt the policy decisions made at round-table dis-
cussions. And if those living in the areas where these management policies
are implemented do not adopt the policies, then the policies will prove to
be unsuccessful at reaching the goals laid out by the co-management team
(Lundquist and Granek 2005). De este modo, trust-building is crucial to the suc-
cess of polar bear conservation efforts.

Actualmente, in many countries around the world, including the USA,
polar bears are an endangered species. This is not the case in Canada,

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Perspectives on Science

though they are a species of concern (Grasswick 2010, pag. 405). The ice
ﬂows get thinner every year, and the Northwest Passage is now navigable
through much of the summer in a way that was unprecedented even a few
years ago. Many ecologists and environmental scientists speculate that this
is having and will have a profoundly negative impact on the polar bear
population in the Canadian arctic. Polar bears hunt by crouching at
breathing holes in the ice and waiting for seals to resurface for air (clark
et al. 2008, pag. 349). The conclusion is simple and hard for many of us to
avoid drawing: less ice = fewer breathing holes = fewer hunting grounds
for polar bears. But this is not the only conclusion to be drawn. There is a
debate that is political, ethical and epistemic in nature on whether the
polar bears populations are dwindling, with experts (though of very dif-
ferent natures) on both sides. One of the points of disagreement in this
debate, as Dowsley notes, is that while scientists claim polar bear popula-
tions are on the decline, some Inuit communities in Nunavut and else-
where report increased bear sightings in and around human settlements.

The reason for increased Inuit sightings of bears and bear signs when
scientiﬁc studies indicate a declining population in Bafﬁn Bay is
unknown. Possible explanations for this phenomenon include 1.
Immigration from abundant adjacent populations (Lancaster Sound)
has increased numbers in the northern area, 2. Scientiﬁc studies
underestimated the population, y 3. Climate change induced
changes in bear [comportamiento] have increased densities along the coast.
This question cannot be resolved with the information available at
present. (Dowsley 2007, pag. 53)

The debate, at least in Baffin Bay, centers on polar bear sightings. With Inuit
hunters and other members of three Baffin Bay communities (Pond Inlet,
Clyde River and Qikiqtarjuaq) noting an increased number of polar bears in
and around the community—93% of those interviewed reported seeing more
damage in their respective communities caused by bears today than in the
pasado (Dowsley 2007, pag. 69)—the credibility of scientists is drawn into
pregunta. What the scientists report does not seem to match up with the
visible evidence available to the local population. Además, hunters are
experts themselves, claiming a vast amount of knowledge about polar bears
and their movements. This makes the situation different from Goldman’s
“novice-to-2expert” problem discussed in section 2. This might be more
properly characterized as a simple “2expert” problem. Scientists and hunters
are also trying to ﬁnd a way to work together and recognize and respect one
another’s expertise. Thus this is an inter-community problem.

It should be noted that not all communities viewed the increased visibility
of polar bears in human settlements as necessarily challenging the scientists’

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Trust without Shared Belief

claims that polar bear populations are on the decline. In Qikiqtarjuaq, a
town located on southern Bafﬁn Island, solo 60% of respondents drew the
conclusion that the bear population had increased in the past 10–15 years.
In the other two more northern towns (Pond Inlet and Clyde River) encima
90% of respondents claimed the bear population was increasing (Dowsley
2007, pag. 69). But the situation is more complicated than just scientiﬁc
knowledge claims potentially conﬂicting with interpretations of observable
evidencia.

Grasswick discusses the polar-bear situation brieﬂy as an example of a
context in which trust has broken down. Since it is well established that
trust is necessary for a co-management strategy to work, the break down of
trust is concerning. Grasswick notes that

[b]ecause of marginalization, the existing community’s belief system may
not be well-integrated with that of the scientiﬁc community, Resultando en
increased conﬂicts between the claims of the two communities. Este
difﬁculty can be illustrated in the current relations between Canadian
Inuit communities and southern-based scientiﬁc communities.
Although Inuit have incorporated many technologies into their daily
lives (such as mechanized snowmobiles and satellite television), ellos
lead lives quite far removed in culture and lifestyle from those of
southern Canadians. They live in settled communities and participate
in the cash economy, though they still hunt (both for themselves and as
guides with trophy hunters from the south) and spend a signiﬁcant
amount of time on the land. Inuit have also experienced a long history of
mismanagement and injustice in their relations with government ofﬁcials and
policy makers that has resulted in high levels of distrust. (Grasswick 2010,
pag. 405; énfasis añadido)

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Grasswick outlines two reasons why Inuit communities might have diffi-
culty trusting southern Canadian scientists: 1) because both communities
have differing belief-systems that do not seem to integrate sufficiently with
each other and 2) because Inuit communities view southern based policy
decisions with distrust due to a history that includes things like the
residential schools.7 Thus, the Inuit and the southern Canadian scientists
have differing belief-systems, and the Inuit view scientists as belonging to

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7. The residential school program was a program set up and run from 1857 until 1947.
Inuit children were taken from their families and removed from their communities, y
sent to school in southern Canada. They were not permitted to speak their own languages,
and were dressed as Europeans. The schools, de este modo, mark a disturbingly successful effort on
the part of the Canadian government to remove a generation of Inuit children from their
own culture, history and language. There is a long history of physical and sexual abuse

Perspectives on Science

a community and working with other institutions that have a history of
injustice towards Inuit communities.8

Reason #2 is one that is likely quite familiar to most social epistemol-
ogists working in the areas of trust and trust-building. It is similar to the
reason that Scheman cites to explain why African Americans distrust of
medical research is rational, and it is also a reason sanctioned by Goldman
in detailing the two most common strategies used by the novice/lay person
in trying to adjudicate whether an expert is trustworthy. En este caso, I
think that we can extrapolate further and argue that, before trust is given,
it also makes sense to consider the ways in which institutions will use the
knowledge claims being made. De este modo, it makes good sense for the Inuit to
consider the past track record and history of their relationship with gov-
ernment ofﬁcials and policy-makers since these are the institutions most
likely to act on the claims being made by the expert scientists. And the
reason it makes good sense traces its origin to Baier’s 1986 claim that trust
is fundamentally about judging whether or not this other person, group of
persons, institución, or group of institutions bears one good will. If what is
necessary here is for the Inuit not simply to rely on the claims being made
by the scientists, but to trust them, then it is reasonable (more than rea-
sonable) that they consider whether or not these claims come from a posi-
tion of good will and mutual respect. It is also reasonable that they
consider the ways in which policy makers will use these scientiﬁc claims. En
a recent exchange on Hypatia’s website regarding her article, “Climate Change
Science and Responsible Trust; A Situated Approach” Heidi Grasswick argues
that “[i]n cases of severe marginalization … it is possible for distrust to
reasonably travel from its target from one scientiﬁc community to the next”
(Grasswick 2014).9 Desde, as Grasswick notes, trust and distrust travel, es
possible that one’s distrust of a community may well damage one’s rela-
tionship with those individuals viewed as experts within that community.
This means that, even were an individual scientist to be considered trust-
worthy, were he or she to work with policy makers who are not considered

attached to these schools, as well as a long list of missing children from these schools
(A History of Residential Schools, CBC [Canadian Broadcasting Company] 2008).

8. Trust seems hard to gain on both sides since the scientists come from a cultural
background with a history of exploiting the Inuit and the environment, and the Inuit re-
cently have found that polar bears are also economically important. In the 1970’s polar bear
skins became extremely popular, making them economically valuable to the Inuit commu-
nity. Además, the rise in interest of sport hunting has further increased the cash value of
polar bears (Grasswick 2010). De este modo, the Inuk also looks far from unbiased to the southern
Canadian scientists.

9. Grasswick has conﬁrmed this position in discussions with me on several occasions,

most recently at CSWIP (Canadian Society for Women in Philosophy) 2012.

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Trust without Shared Belief

trustworthy, his or her own trustworthiness may rightfully diminish.10 But
this is all likely familiar ground. And Goldman, Scheman, and Grasswick
among others have developed tools to help work out when an expert should
be trusted, and what actions an expert must take in order to be trustworthy.
Reason #1 might be less familiar, and is where my own focus will be.
What exactly does it mean to say that the Inuit have belief systems that
“may not be well-integrated with that of the scientiﬁc community”? Este
is where pluralist realism as a conceptual possibility comes in. Jeremy J.
Schmidt and Martha Dowsley argue that scientists are working with one set
of ontological commitments, but that the Inuit are working with another.

Modern resource management has inherited a peculiar ontology. Its
tradition is based on dualisms, such as passive/active and subject/object,
which provide base distinctions for Western understanding of the
human-environment relationship (Schmidt and Dowsley 2010, pag. 377).

Schmidt and Dowsley argue that this ontology affects the ways in which
southern resource managers approach and design the study and manage-
ment of polar bears. They must track the polar bears, count how many
bears come inland in a given season, and extrapolate from this whether or
not the polar bear is an endangered species. This comes from an ontology
that divides the world into two types of things: people and resources.
(Schmidt and Dowsley 2010, pag. 377)

Sin embargo, many indigenous cultures view animals and other aspects
of the natural world (such as plants, mountains and rocks) as non-
human persons who are sentient, spiritually powerful and also active,
causative agents. (Schmidt and Dowsley 2010, pag. 377)

De este modo, according to Schmidt and Dowsley the Inuit,
like many other
indigenous cultures, view the world in terms of relationships and interactions
with others. De este modo, their interactions with polar bears are ones in which both
the human and the bear can be manipulated and changed by their mutual
encounter (Schmidt and Dowsley 2010, pag. 380). “[A]nimals are not passive
resources; they are active participants” (Schmidt and Dowsley 2010, pag. 381).

10. In a recent survey for the provincial government of Nunavut, Moshi Kotierk found
that residents of the province were more likely to trust scientists than to trust government
and policy-makers. So the problem scientists face is not so much their own trustworthiness
as scientists but the company they keep. Nunavut residents placed their greatest trust in
community elders. (“Public and Inuit Interests, Western Hudson Bay Polar Bears and
Wildlife Management: Results of a Public Opinion Poll in Western Hudson Bay Com-
munities,” np social science research for the Department of the Environment, Nunavut
Government. Puede 2012). http://www.gov.nu.ca/environment/documents/public-and-
inuit-interests-western-hudson-bay-polar-bears-and-wildlife (accedido 28 Agosto 2016).

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Perspectives on Science

The Inuit community’s background assumptions are markedly different
from those of southern Canadian scientists. This makes communication
of knowledge claims between communities exceedingly difﬁcult. But even
more worrying is that scientists are often not aware of this ontological com-
mitment when sharing their ﬁndings with the Inuit.

Problematically, este [dualistic] bias is often unquestioned in
explanations of the management of natural resources that are held in
common by groups of people whose worldviews do not countenance
such claims. (Schmidt and Dowsley 2010, pag. 377)

Because the Inuit do not share the scientists’ ontological assumptions
regarding what kind of thing a polar bear is, they are often unlikely to
accept the scientists’ knowledge claims. Take the claim at issue: how to
explain the increase in polar bear sightings in towns on Bafﬁn Island.
Southern Canadian scientists tend to explain this by claiming that the
bears are driven inland in search of food, since their preferred hunting
grounds are melting earlier every year (Dowsley and Wenzel 2008, pag. 182).
But many Inuit are wary of this claim. “Many Inuit express the belief that
polar bears are sentient and, En realidad, have superior mental powers to humans
in that they are psychic and can read human thoughts and intentions”
(Schmidt and Dowsley 2010, pag. 381). Tal como, many Inuit explain polar-bear
aggression by noting that those who fail to show respect to the bears will have
their property damaged by the bears (Schmidt and Dowsley 2010, pag. 381). En
hecho, sometimes the scientiﬁc treatment of the bears as objects is blamed for
the increased visibility of bears in human settlements. “[METRO]any Inuit are
uncomfortable with the modern management system because it denies
personhood to bears and conﬂicts with their worldview” (Schmidt and
Dowsley 2010, pag. 383).

The Inuit then not only have good reason to distrust whether or not
southern Canadian scientists bear them a good will (based on biases and
past track record of southern Canadian institutions with regard to the
Inuit) but they also have good reason to dismiss the southern Canadian
scientists’ claims as genuine knowledge based on their own perspectives
and the knowledge claims of experts within their own communities.
The scientists’ treatment of the polar bears and their proposed methods
of studying the bears simply don’t make sense from within an Inuit belief
system.11 Here, we have a pluralistic environment. There are two sets of

11. As Shari Gearheard and Jamal Shirley report in their 2007 article “Challenges in
Community-Research Relationships: Learning from Natural Science in Nunavut” there are
some places in the arctic where “local Inuit refer to researchers as “siksiks”—“ground squirrels”

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Trust without Shared Belief

ontological categories, and two different knowledge claims arising out of
those categories. If we follow Longino and entertain pluralist realism as a
conceptual possibility, and follow Harding in refusing to draw a sharp
ethnocentric boundary around what counts as scientiﬁc knowledge, nosotros
cannot make the move to dismiss one group’s knowledge claims as un-
scientiﬁc. Además, if we heed Longino, Kellert, and Waters’ warnings,
and avoid metaphysical prejudice, then we perhaps should not dismiss either
afirmar. It remains to be seen whether either set of knowledge claims will be
found to be inaccurate, but at present both sets successfully explain the
observed phenomena to their respective communities. Pero entonces, if we accept
pluralist realism as a possibility, it is hard to see how trust can be built here
precisely because it is hard to see how these divergent beliefs can be shared.
The importance of a need for shared knowledge claims in order to build
trust appears to be reinforced in Inuit self-reports of why they do not trust the
Canadian Government’s management of polar bears in the arctic. Actualmente,
Inuit from various parts of Nunavut express distrust of the co-management
process because they do not perceive that Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit (IQ, un
Inuit word to refer to Inuit knowledge)12 is being taken seriously by scien-
tists and policy makers (Lokken 2015). Y, to some degree, they are cor-
recto. Nadasdy notes that there are often political pressures on ecologists to
back up their policy recommendations with scientiﬁc evidence rather than
indigenous knowledge claims (Nadasdy 2003, pag. 376). Nadasdy goes on to
observe that the integration of traditional indigenous knowledge claims
with Western Scientiﬁc knowledge claims is difﬁcult to say the least. Allá
is a legitimate fear that as Western Scientists attempt to understand what
indigenous communities are saying, they will distort the traditional knowl-
edge claims badly, perhaps resulting in profound misunderstandings (Nadasdy
2003, pag. 369). This harkens back to Longino’s observation that contextuali-
zation is key to understanding knowledge claims. When one examines a
knowledge claim from a context deeply divergent from one’s own, it can
be difﬁcult to tell what is being said, let alone whether what is being said
is inconsistent with one’s own beliefs. En efecto, Dale and Armitage note that
while marginalization of IQ is happening, it may not be intentionally dis-
missive. En cambio, it is possible that scientiﬁc researchers simply do not

in Inuktitut” (Gearhead and Shirley 2007, pag. 63). They compare scientists to ground squirrels
because the scientists only pop up in the summer months “scurry around on the tundra doing
who-knows-what, and then disappear just as quickly” (Gearhead and Shirley 2007, pag. 63).
De este modo, the Inuit appear to have additional reasons to distrust southern Canadian scientists
because the scientists are not in the arctic for long periods of time, and do not communicate
their activities and objectives clearly to the locals.

12. Dale and Armitage deﬁne IQ as “a holistic blend of knowledge, valores, practicas

and beliefs” (Dale and Armitage 2011, pag. 445).

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Perspectives on Science

know how to include IQ into their policy recommendations (Dale and
Armitage 2010). And the problem likely goes both ways. Inuit may also
not know how to include scientiﬁc knowledge claims into their own under-
standing of the world.13 But, if trust is required for successful co-management,
and trust itself requires shared belief, then it seems that successful co-
management may not be a possibility in this case. And entertaining pluralist
realism as a conceptual possibility might seem to exacerbate this problem, como
pluralist realism entails that both knowledge claims, arising as they do from
divergent contexts, might be reliable representations of reality. Yet each claim
might well be one that those from outside the context in which it was
generated cannot reconcile with their own worldviews. Fortunately, as I will
illustrate, pluralist realism is not the problem here. En cambio, it may well be
the solution.

Trust in the Case of the Polar Bears

5.
Prior to the 2005 round table policy discussion on the management of the
polar bears, a ﬁxed quota system was in place whereby Inuit hunters were
allowed to harvest a set number of bears every year. En 2005, southern
Canadian scientists proposed extending this ﬁxed quota system to counter-
act their observations of declining polar bear populations. This ﬁxed quota
system would have strictly dictated how many bears could be harvested
in a given area in a given season. It was initially rejected by the Inuit
in Nunavut (Schmidt and Dowsley 2010, pag. 383). Pero, though it was
rejected, the round table discussion did eventually lead to a workable, si
imperfect, solución, and did begin the work of building trust between
these two groups. In order to understand how and why, one must further
examine the differences between Inuit and southern scientiﬁc ontology.

Schmidt and Dowsley report that an Inuk14 hunter must not only show
respect to other hunters and communities who use the land he hunts on,
but must also show respect for the animals using the land.

For Inuit, hunting responsibilities include a prohibition against
taking more than is needed, as well as restrictions on behavior
toward, and thoughts regarding, animals … Animals, as sentient
beings, are believed to be aware of the proper rules for thinking
acerca de, hunting, and using and distributing animal products.

13. It should be noted that there are past instances where IQ was found to be more
reliable than scientiﬁc knowledge claims. (Ver, Por ejemplo, Dowsley 2009). Dowsley notes
that in 1996 Inuit hunters and elders reported that polar bear populations were on the
decline and called for a lowering of the quota. This was not corroborated by scientists until
their survey in 2001, when they found the Inuit were correct (Dowsley 2009, pag. 50).

14. Inuk is the singular form of Inuit.

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Trust without Shared Belief

Por lo tanto, it is not only humans who actually hunt that are involved
in the relationship with animals. Bastante, the relationship includes
the interactions between the individual hunter (or hunting party)
and one animal and also the interactions between the human
community and the animal community. Además, it assigns
to animals the ability to know and respond to human thoughts,
intentions and actions (Schmidt and Dowsley 2010, pag. 381).

As Schmidt and Dowsley report, this respect that must be shown is
heightened again for polar bears, who are thought to be able not only to
react to human thoughts and actions, but also to understand speech and to
make plans. De este modo, polar bears can plan retaliations against humans should
they wrong them, which makes polar bears significantly more dangerous
than other animals. Because animals are subjects in their own right,
participating in a relationship with the Inuit, even a failed hunt (failed in
the sense that no food was acquired) can be successful (successful in the
sense that the hunter followed proper procedure and thus strengthened his
relationship with the animals). Hunting, entonces, is not only a means of
acquiring food. It is a way of strengthening a relationship with another
grupo (the polar bears themselves). Though many of the traditions
regarding polar bears are no longer practiced, the Inuit do still treat polar
bears differently from other animals (Schmidt and Dowsley 2010, pag. 381).
Dowsley reports that in 2005, while gathering data on interactions be-
tween Inuit and polar bears, she was warned not to be hopeful about seeing
a bear. “Hoping to see a bear was considered disrespectful to bears, OMS
appear when they wish, rather than when humans want them” (Schmidt
and Dowsley 2010, pag. 381). Being hopeful might goad a bear into fulﬁlling
your wish by causing you or someone close to you harm.

All this supports Schmidt and Dowsley’s report that the Inuit tradition-
ally view animals in general and polar bears in particular as partners in a
relationship, not as objects, and that this tradition still inﬂuences the way
they think of and categorize bears today. Desde esta perspectiva, it makes
sense that the Inuit would resist wildlife managers from the south trying
to implement quota systems. It is understandable that the Inuit would
reject scientiﬁc results that are based on a treatment of the polar bears
as objects, given that the Inuit do not categorize the polar bears as such.
They may further interpret scientiﬁc investigations as harming their own
relationships with the bears, insofar as scientists may fail to say the right
palabras, take the right actions, or think the right thoughts. Finalmente, banning
hunting altogether is banning a practice that the Inuit view as integral
to maintaining a good working relationship with the bears. Remember
that even when a hunter returns with no game, the hunt can be viewed as

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Perspectives on Science

successful. If we accept the conceptual possibility of pluralist realism, entonces
we must be open to the possibility that both groups have experts who are
articulating accurate representations of reality.15 Thus, these Inuit concerns,
no matter how much they may conﬂict with a southern Canadian scientiﬁc
perspectiva, must be taken into consideration.

En este caso, the Inuit and southern Canadian scientists were able to
successfully begin to build a trusting relationship without insisting that
either group defer to the other as experts. En 2005, members of various
Inuit communities participated in discussions with scientists, gobierno
ofﬁcials and NGO’s in order to come up with a solution (Grasswick 2010,
pag. 405). The scientists advocated for an extension of the existing straight
year-by-year quota system detailing how many bears can be harvested in a
given year, but such a system was not feasible from the Inuit hunters’ point
of view. As Schmidt and Dowsley report “[F]rom the Inuit perspective, el
best the quota system may do is cover the human side of the hunter-bear
relationship and, as constructed by Western managers, on the physical
(es decir., consumptive) aspects of that relationship” (Schmidt and Dowsley
2010, pag. 383). Todavía, even so, one quarter of the Inuit elders did think that
the quota system was good for the bears. It was simply incomplete
(Schmidt and Dowsley 2010, pag. 383). So, after the round table discussions
in Nunavut, the following quota system was implemented:

In Nunavut Territory, a ﬂexible quota system has been introduced
which meets the conservation objective of controlling the number of
animals harvested, but which differs in both spatial and temporal
restrictions from conventional quotas … The ﬂexible system is
based on the total allowable harvest from an ecologically deﬁned
population of polar bears over a given time period… The system
allows communities to bank unused hunting tags and gives some
ﬂexibility in over-hunting the quota by allowing communities to
“borrow” unused tags from neighboring communities in the same
polar bear population area … This system encourages hunters to stay
within the quota for the polar bear population areas over the medium
term (a 15 year cycle) but allows Inuit hunters to follow their belief
systems in day-to-day practice, such as the need to harvest a bear

15. Además, in this case and in others like it, there may simply be no time to
gather the data needed in order to falsify one of the two knowledge claims. Eso es, si
the scientists are right, then waiting while they collect the data needed to falsify the Inuit
hunters’ claims is only wasting more time where the bear populations continue to dwindle.
Y, if the Inuit are right, in the time it would take to demonstrate this, their relationship
with the bears may well be irreparably damaged.

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Trust without Shared Belief

that presents itself regardless of how many tags were assigned for that
community for that year. (Schmidt and Dowsley 2010, pag. 384)

The system combines the quota-system recommended by a scientific
viewpoint, with the Inuit view of polar bears as subjects participating in
a reciprocal relationship with the hunters. There is a cap on the number
of bears that can be harvested over a 15 year period. But the system is
also flexible, allowing for the reciprocity required in context-dependent
encounters with the bears that hunters might have. This system has been
in place since 2005. It can hardly be called a consensus, aunque. At best, él
is a compromise, and it is imperfect. Many Inuit perceptions are still that the
polar bear population is stable or is increasing. Southern Canadian scientists
still perceive the opposite, and fear that the population is in decline.

I do not claim that this ﬂexible quota system illustrates that the Inuit of
Nunavut and southern Canadian scientists have formed a solid, trusting
relationship. Evidence from recent interviews conducted in various parts
of the Nunavut region suggest the Inuit still mistrust the scientists and
policy makers, and still dislike the way in which polar bears are being
managed (Lokken 2015). Pero, I argue that this ﬂexible quota system
has two virtues: 1) It allows for two differing knowledge claims from
two differing ontological positions to be integrated into a plan of action,
thus ﬁnding a workable temporary solution, y 2) It allows for a contin-
ued conversation and continued efforts at trust-building between southern
Canadian scientists and policy makers, and Inuit communities. el primero
virtue ensures that practical paralysis has been avoided, and the second virtue
helps safeguard the avoidance of paralysis in the future. While scientists
may claim that the changes being made aren’t happening fast enough
(Clark et al. 2008, pag. 349) this solution must be preferable to doing nothing
en absoluto.

The example of polar-bear conservation in the Canadian arctic illus-
trates that entertaining pluralist realism as a conceptual possibility, y
thus allowing for multiple representations of reality to be acknowledged
and respected in a plan of action, need not result in practical paralysis. El
Inuit and the southern Canadian scientists were able to come to a workable
plan that was agreed upon by both parties. Scientists view this solution as a
temporary one, and it has been and will be revisited in subsequent round
table discussion every few years (Lokken 2015). Scientists are hopeful that
eventually consensus can be reached, in which both sides have shared beliefs
and knowledge claims (Dowsley and Wenzel 2008, pag. 186). Pero, en el
meantime they are not waiting for that consensus before acting. Action has
been taken without shared beliefs by integrating divergent beliefs into a
shared policy.

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Perspectives on Science

Although this is compromise, not consensus, I argue that it still dem-
onstrates some measure of trust. In order to ﬁnd any kind of compromise at
todo, the southern Canadian scientists and the Inuit had to agree to sit down
together and listen to what each had to say. Además, they had to believe
that their opinions would be heard and taken into consideration. En efecto
Douglas Clark et al. argue that the most important aspect of polar bear
conservation is to build a strong relationship of mutual respect and trust
between the Inuit and the southern Canadian scientists (Clark et al. 2008,
pag. 348). They argue that what is needed is a “more constructive, less di-
visive dialog about polar bear conservation” (Clark et al. 2008, pag. 348).
Clark et al. report that this call for dialog based on mutual respect and
dignity was also made by Inuit activist Sheila Watt-Cloutier in her
2007 Op-Ed piece for the Nunavut Times (Clark et. Alabama. 2008, pag. 348).

And in a released statement in 2011, the Inuit Tapriit Kanatami (ITK,
Canada’s national Inuit organization)16 reported on a workshop they held
on the need to apply traditional aboriginal knowledge to the management
of the polar bears: “[a]n important area of focus of the discussions centered
on the need to improve relations, communications, and levels of mutual
respect and trust between aboriginal knowledge-holders and scientiﬁc re-
searchers when it comes to polar bear research and management processes”
(ITK October 2011).

This suggests to me that scientists and members of the Nunavut Inuit
community recognize the importance of trust to this endeavor, y eso
they cash this understanding of trust out in terms of mutual respect and
good will. They have successfully avoided practical paralysis, but if they
hope to continue to avoid it in the future, they need to take measures
to continue to build a trusting relationship. Dowsley and Wenzel suggest
that the scientists view this trusting relationship as most naturally arising
out of a convergence of belief. “Continued monitoring, using both large-
scale scientiﬁc studies and smaller-scale local observations, will likely result
in a consensus over time if communication and cooperation between the
two sets of observers are maintained or improved” (Dowsley and Wenzel
2008, pag. 186). I want to suggest a different, pluralistic, option.

In what follows, I will begin the work of modeling trust-building while
entertaining the possibility of pluralist realism. What I offer is not a com-
plete theory of trust-building, but it is a start.17 I offer a way of engaging

16. An organization that represents and promotes the voice of various Inuit communities
on matters concerning the environment, and other social and political issues the Inuit face
(www.itk.ca).

17. Notably missing from this account will be any discussion of power and power im-
balance. It is clear that an analysis of power relations with regards to trust-building with

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Trust without Shared Belief

in dialogue and coming to a consensus on practice while continuing to
diverge in terms of ontological and epistemic commitments. I argue that the
relationship between trust and the acceptance of knowledge claims is con-
ditional, but it is not biconditional.

Trust Without Shared Belief

6.
The cooperation cited above between the Inuit and the southern Canadian
scientists is, currently, imperfect. I do not claim that it can ever be ideal. I
suspect that, where divergent ontologies and epistemologies are present,
neither group will ever feel that the ideal has been reached because neither
group will ever feel that their own beliefs are being fully represented and
Reconocido. Neither group can feel entirely excluded from the discussion,
either, and that I think is one of the virtues of entertaining pluralist real-
ism as a possibility. Each side gets an important part of what they want
aquí: the acknowledgment that their views may be correct. De este modo, aunque
pluralist realism appears to complicate trust-building, I believe it can
facilitate it as well.

I offer a few suggestions for how trust-building can continue in the
interaction between southern Canadian scientists and the Inuit without
maintaining that either must accept the knowledge claims of the other
as a condition of trust. Perhaps neither can, as they are too divergent to
compare. And perhaps—if pluralist realism is indeed correct—neither
debería, as each claim may capture something correct about the phenome-
non that escapes the other. If pluralist realism is correct, there may be
advantages to be found in working with multiple knowledge claims that
are lost when we demand consensus. What follows are suggestions only.
I do not offer a fully developed theory of trust without shared belief,
but only a more modest outline of how such a theory might be developed
and what some of the elements of the theory might be.

Trust with shared belief is certainly one kind of trust available. pero lo es
not the only kind. I argue that the example of the Inuit of Nunavut and
the southern Canadian scientists illustrates that the relationship of trust to
belief is conditional, not biconditional. It seems true to say that If I believe
tú, then I trust you (at least with respect to the knowledge claim you are
haciendo). It seems true to say that If I don’t trust you, then I don’t believe you.
But it does not follow from this that if I trust you then I do believe you. yo discuto
that we could also come to trust another without believing her knowledge

and without shared belief is important to understanding how trust works, but such an
analysis demands a paper of its own and is unfortunately too large to be tackled in this
preliminary work.

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claims. En cambio, we must develop at least three beliefs of our own in adju-
dicating the trust worthiness of another:

Perspectives on Science

1) That this other individual—and by extension the community she

represents—bears us a good will,

2) That this other individual—and the community she represents—is
telling us what from her or their perspective is an honest knowledge
afirmar.

3) That this other individual is an expert—and that this expertise is
acknowledged and supported by the community she represents
(thus granting her the license to speak for the community).

I will discuss each of these claims in turn.

6.1. Good Will
The ﬁrst claim is more complicated than it might, at ﬁrst appear, especialmente-
cially once pluralist realism is included. There are numerous cases of mar-
ginalized groups facing an individual in a position of power who, from his
own perspective, bears the member of the marginalized group a good will,
but ends up doing harm. So, the ﬁrst claim should be understood in the
following manner: I understand that you, from your perspective, bear me a good
will and that it is this good will that is, en parte, driving you to share your knowl-
edge claims with me. This harkens back to Heidi Grasswick’s argument that
scientists must share their claims with the individuals most at risk of sig-
niﬁcant harm (Grasswick 2010). To do so is to illustrate that they bear
those individuals a good will. Pero, furthermore, I understand from my own
perspective that the knowledge claims you are sharing with me, and the course of
action you propose, do not do me harm. This second caveat helps to side step
issues where the expert is genuine, but mistaken about what will cause
harm. I must both accept that you bear me a good will and that the claims
you are making seem to me to not be harmful. This is still imperfect, y yo
may make a mistake regarding either the expert’s good will towards me, o
their ability to avoid inadvertently causing me harm. But trusting is risky,
as stated earlier. When I trust someone, I bear the burden of that risk,
because I place myself in a vulnerable position.

Scientists are making the knowledge claim that the polar bear popula-
tion is decreasing. In sharing this claim with the Inuit directly, they hope
to send the message to those at risk of signiﬁcant harm (the Inuit) that an
animal with huge symbolic, cultural, economic and social signiﬁcance may
be in danger. Sin embargo, if the scientists also pressed the need for a straight-
forward traditional quota system instead of the ﬂexible quota system in
place currently in Nunavut, they would not be fulﬁlling the second caveat
of the ﬁrst part of demonstrating trust-worthiness: They would not be

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Trust without Shared Belief

proposing a plan of action that, from an Inuk’s own perspective did not cause
harm. A straightforward quota system would be viewed as harmful to the
relationship between the Inuit and the polar bears. A ﬂexible quota system
does not seem to be met with the same reaction. But the ﬂexible quota
system could not have been devised unless scientists and policy makers
did more than simply share their own knowledge claims. They also had
to listen to the Inuit of Nunavut. De este modo, we can determine that part of what
it means to bear me a “good will” is to “show respect for my beliefs.” How-
alguna vez, respect need not entail adoption. You can listen to me and consider
what I have to say without agreeing with me. Still, your willingness to
modify a course of action to my satisfaction, such that I judge that it does
not do me harm, illustrates this respect, this good will, because it grants
me agency.

6.2. Honest Knowledge Claim
The second point related to trust-building aims to capture our intuitions
that trust-building has something to do with reliable knowledge claims.
But it aims to do so in a way that respects and allows for pluralist realism.
As stated above, if we accept pluralist realism, then we also must accept
that there are (or could be) multiple knowledge claims that accurately
capture reality (or parts of reality) because of the complexity of reality
sí mismo. But there is still something intuitively correct about the claim that
“If I bear you a good will I will tell you the truth.” Of course there are
cases in which I might think a lie is better for you. In those cases, it doesn’t
seem prima facie that I bear you a good will. Instead it seems that I wish my
own will to override yours. I deceive you in order to protect you, cual es
another way of controlling you. As Kant would say, if I lie to you, then I
do not show you respect because I do not grant you agency (Kant, 1993).
Deceiving is a manipulation (however well-intentioned) and shows a lack
of respect. One who is being lied to, even if the lie is for one’s own good,
has prima facie good reason not to trust the deceiver.

But in the case of pluralist realism, it may well be that I tell you some-
thing that I accept as true but that you regard, nonetheless, as false,
cuestionable, or unintelligible. In these cases, I am not lying to you, o
attempting to deceive you. I simply see the world differently. So, yo discuto
that another way to build trust in the case of pluralist realism is to tell one’s
interlocutor what one believes to be the case. Pero, you need not accept my knowl-
edge claim as your own in order to believe that I am speaking truthfully
from my perspective. Por lo tanto, you need not believe what I believe in
order to trust me. If you believe that I bear you a good will, that the plan
of action I suggest is one I think will beneﬁt you (and you think will not
do you harm), that I have devised this plan of action based on what I

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Perspectives on Science

believe to be the case, and that I am recognized as an expert on such
matters by my community, then you can trust me without accepting my
knowledge claim.

The case of polar-bear conservation in the Canadian Arctic illustrates this
point as well. Neither side accepts the ontological structures of the other.
De este modo, neither side accepts the other’s knowledge claims about what kind
of entity a polar bear is. Finalmente, neither side accepts the knowledge claims
made by the other with reference to whether the polar bears are thriving
or are in decline. De nuevo, these claims are supported by investigations/
observations done with reference to background beliefs about what kind of
entities polar bears are. De este modo, divergent ontologies lead to divergent inves-
tigations and divergent knowledge claims. But—this is the important part—
neither group has to accept the knowledge claims of the other in order to
accept that the other really does believe what they are saying and really
does think that the course of action they are proposing is the best one. Una vez
this acceptance is reached, a compromise can be found.

6.3. Expertise
Finalmente, there is the issue of expertise. In choosing whether to trust you,
while I may not be choosing whether or not to believe you, surely I care
about whether your own community believes you, and whether you are
an expert in your ﬁeld. Eso es, in matters of epistemic trust, even when
entertaining pluralist realism as a possibility, expertise still matters. Es
not enough that the person before you bears you a good will and is honest;
the person must be recognized by their own community as someone who is
knowledgeable. While the southern Canadian scientists may not accept the
knowledge claims of the Inuit elders and hunters, they need assurance that
the elders and hunters do speak with the authority of the community they
representar, and that they are trusted as experts within this community. Este
is to say, the scientists should not simply pick and choose who to listen to
in Nunavut. Trust building would not be possible if the experts were
not engaged with directly. Por supuesto, in adjudicating whether or not
someone is an expert in their community, I may also wish to consider
whether the community itself—the body of individuals who adjudicated
what is required in order to be an expert, and has recognized the person
before me as meeting those requirements—is trustworthy. This harkens
back to Scheman’s point with regards to the Tuskegee experiments.

One might object that trust-building has no place in an examination of
inter-community policy making. It might seem that a procedural account
of social knowledge like Longino’s account is more appropriate here pre-
cisely because such a procedural account removes the need to build trust.
De este modo, such an account, it might be hoped, removes biases, Resultando en

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Trust without Shared Belief

objective knowledge claims that we can build policy on without having to
worry about whether or not the holders of such knowledge claims, or the
communities in which such knowledge claims arise, are trustworthy. So,
one might object to my whole project as being one that is better modeled
by social accounts of knowledge, rather than by accounts of epistemic
confianza.

Pero, I maintain that trust-building is vitally important to these co-
management projects, because of their inter-community collaborative nature.
Longino’s four norms of Critical Contextual Empiricism (Longino 1990,
páginas. 76–9; 2002, páginas. 128–131) dealt mainly with knowledge production
within a community of scientists who share many background assumptions
and methodologies. It is worth noting that Longino’s 2013 libro, which seeks
to examine inter-community interactions between different groups of scien-
tists studying behavior, makes no mention of the Four Norms of Critical
Contextual Empiricism as operating between these different communities of
científicos. Y, en efecto, it is not clear how those four norms would help
the various scientiﬁc disciplines she studies arrive at a consensus regarding
either aggression or sexual orientation. Además, given the possibility
of pluralist realism, it is not clear that consensus is desirable in these cases.
De este modo, nothing I have said here should be viewed as a challenge to Longino’s
original theory of science as social knowledge. The original theory, complete
with the Four Norms, applies in an intra-community setting. It is not clear
that it applies, nor that it is desirable that it should apply, in an inter-
community setting. De este modo, I argue that it is models of trust, rather than pro-
cedural models of knowledge production, that are best equipped to examine
cases like the co-management of polar bear conservation. The legitimacy of
the use of models of trust to examine these policy discussions is further
strengthened by the insistence, noted above, from both the Inuit and the
scientists that trust and mutual respect are fundamental to the success of this
proyecto, and the research illustrating the importance of trust to successful co-
management strategies in general. Finalmente, it is worth noting that proce-
dural accounts of knowledge production no doubt have something to say
about designing and facilitating successful round table discussions. Cómo-
alguna vez, even here, the participants involved must trust that the procedures
are fair, and that all present will abide by them.

I argue that adopting pluralist realism as a conceptual possibility could
facilitate the continued building of this trust between the members of the
round-table discussions, precisely because it does away with the need for
anyone to defer to another’s knowledge claims while disallowing anyone
to be dismissive of another’s knowledge claims. It does so in three ways:
1) because all the knowledge claims presented might be correct, none can
be dismissed outright, 2) because all knowledge claims might be correct

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Perspectives on Science

simultaneously, no one should be required to defer to someone else on the
grounds that a claim is unscientiﬁc, y 3) because it can be difﬁcult, o
perhaps impossible, to integrate divergent knowledge claims from ontol-
ogies different from one’s own, and doing so risks eroding or misunderstand-
ing the original claim that was made, such integration is not a requirement.
Pluralist realism allows us to make sense of how these three statements could
be possible in a way a monist realist position does not. De este modo, it frees us to
listen to each other without needing to be on the defensive regarding our own
beliefs.18 Instead of attempting to integrate the knowledge claims themselves,
el 2005 round table discussion found a way to build a policy that respects
both sets of knowledge claims to some degree. The policy, en otras palabras, es
supported by both claims about what type of entity a polar bear is, incluso
though each claim may well be divergent, or even inconsistent, desde el
otro. This is the direction I suggest co-management round table discussions
llevar. It is the best model for trust-building in an epistemic context because
each party is granted what they want: for their knowledge claims to be lis-
tened to, respected, and integrated into the policy. De este modo, each party’s beliefs
are shown respect, and each party is granted agency. En otras palabras, pluralist
realism opens space to demonstrate that one bears one’s interlocutor a good
will. Finalmente, while one must adopt the policy, one need not adopt all the
knowledge claims that informed the policy. Thus it is possible to build trust
without shared belief.

7. Conclusión
In this article I have examined whether it is possible to build a model of
epistemic trust while entertaining pluralist realism as a possibility. I have
argued that it is possible to build trust without endorsing and accepting
the knowledge claims of the trusted individual or group. The relationship
between trust and belief is a conditional one. It is not a biconditional one.
En cambio, I argue that trust entails believing a trusted individual or group
bears one a good will, is honestly sharing their beliefs, and is an expert in
their respective community. While this may sometimes entail also believ-
ing the knowledge claims given by those we trust, we can also simply be-
lieve that the knowledge claims given are accepted as accurate by them and
their community (though not by us) and that they intend us no harm (y
that we believe their plan of action will do us no harm). De este modo, I conclude
eso, even if pluralist realism is endorsed, it is still possible to build trust

18. This is not to say one should not be critical of the knowledge claims presented by
one’s interlocutors. As discussed above, one needs to be sure that one’s interlocutor is rec-
ognized as an expert by their community, and that the institution that confers expertise is
one that is unbiased.

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Trust without Shared Belief

between communities with differing ontological commitments. En efecto, I
think pluralist realism may actually be an asset for trust-building. el caso
of polar bear conservation in the Canadian arctic illustrates two groups
who have successfully begun this delicate process of trust building. I be-
lieve that, by mindfully endorsing pluralist realism as a conceptual possi-
habilidad, this process could be facilitated even more. And I wish them success
in the future.

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