The Colombian Paradox: Peace Processes, - IA de Investigación especializada en el MIT

The Colombian Paradox: Procesos de paz,
Divisiones de élite & Plebiscitos populares

Aila M. Matanock & Miguel García-Sánchez

Abstracto: Ending civil conflict is difficult, particularly through political settlements. Conflicts now often
occur in states with elections, and voters have sometimes been directly involved in the process, potencial-
ly in efforts to overcome elite divisions. Todavía, according to evidence from the 2016 popular plebiscite in Co-
lombia, referendums and other tools of direct approval by voters seem to amplify elite divisions and there-
fore are not a useful mechanism to strengthen peace processes in this way. Focusing instead on traditional
elite-led negotiations that seek to satisfy each faction may have a better chance of producing signed settle-
mentos, although the Colombian case also suggests some alternative forms of inclusivity that may help in-
crease the overall legitimacy of the process and improve the odds of implementation.

Ending civil conflict is difficult. While settlements

negotiated between combatants have become the
most common form of termination since the end
of the Cold War–more common than victories by
either side–they are especially hard to secure and
stabilize.1 What will yield peace? Conflicts now of-
ten occur in states with elections, meaning that var-
ious actors may be involved in peace processes that
seek settlements. Settlements can be approved by
empowered elites alone, by institutional mecha-
nisms like congressional votes, or by direct voter
involvement, perhaps as part of an effort to over-
come elite divisions or increase legitimacy. Direct
voter involvement in the approval process may also
be a component of a trend toward greater inclusivi-
ty around all aspects of settlements.2

en colombia, direct voter involvement through a
2016 plebiscite was employed, en parte, in an effort
to offset an elite challenge and add legitimacy to a
settlement. Our analysis of this case, sin embargo, sug-
gests that a referendum may paradoxically provide
an important platform for elites seeking to upend

AILA M. MATANOCK is Assistant
Professor of Political Science at the
Universidad de California, berkeley.

MIGUEL GARCÍA-SÁNCHEZ is As-
sociate Professor of Political Sci-
ence at the Universidad de los An-
des, Colombia.

(*See endnotes for complete contributor
biographies.)

152

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the peace process, and that it may be es-
pecially easy to mobilize voters against
a settlement when components can be
framed as offering concessions to rebels.
Using case evidence, including survey data
de 2004 a 2016, we show that elite op-
position to the peace process, based on di-
vision among elites, could be part of the
explanation of the plebiscite’s rejection in
Colombia.

We posit that referendums and other
tools of direct voter approval can amplify
elite divisions and, por lo tanto, should not be
employed to overcome elite opposition in
order to strengthen peace processes. Focus-
ing on traditional elite-led negotiations–
seeking to satisfy the necessary factions and
using the simplest approval processes avail-
able to provide for the required constitu-
tional changes–may have a higher chance
of producing successful settlements. Semejante
negotiations remain the central compo-
nent of most peace processes, and our re-
sults suggest maintaining that exclusive
structure.3 The Colombian case, sin embargo,
also suggests that other forms of inclusivi-
ty can help increase legitimacy for the pro-
impuesto, potentially improving the odds of im-
plementation, which merits further study.
In our examination of the 2016 Colombi-
an popular plebiscite, which sought direct
voter approval of a peace process, we first
overview the Colombian conflict and how
it compares with other civil conflicts. Próximo,
we describe the elite division. We then pre-
sent survey data on public opinion toward
a settlement prior to the plebiscite and re-
sults from the plebiscite, demonstrating
that support decreases with the elite divi-
sion and suggesting that running such a ref-
erendum may paradoxically provide a plat-
form for elites seeking to upend the peace
proceso. We then show evidence from a sur-
vey experiment that indicates that compo-
nents of peace agreements that are framed
as concessions for rebels are especially un-
popular, making referendums or other di-

rect voter involvement a risky strategy. fi-
finalmente, we address the implications of these
arguments for other states seeking an end
to civil conflict through a settlement.

In many ways, the Colombian case looks

like other civil conflicts, but it also presents
a unique opportunity to account for voter
attitudes in the peace process. For more
than fifty years, Colombia has experienced
a bloody armed conflict between the gov-
gobierno, left-wing guerrilla groups, y
right-wing paramilitary bands. Sobre el
izquierda, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (farc) emerged in 1964, fol-
lowed over the next two decades by other
leftist guerrilla groups, including the Na-
tional Liberation Army (eln), the Popu-
lar Liberation Army (epl), and the 19th of
April Movement (m-19).4 The farc, cómo-
alguna vez, secured a position of strength due to
its expansion strategy, as well as its eventu-
al involvement in drug trafficking.5 On the
bien, organized paramilitaries emerged in
the 1980s, clashing with the leftist gueril-
la groups and, at times, the government.6
This internal confrontation resulted in
thousands of deaths, millions of displaced
los ciudadanos, and tremendous economic and
environmental destruction.

While a complex and important case in
its own right, Colombia is also very simi-
lar to other civil conflicts, despite having
one of the longest-running insurgencies in
el mundo. Colombia is a clear case of asym-
metric conflict–the most common civil
war type–and it has featured varying lev-
els of conflict, including many strong com-
batant groups in the beginning, but fewer
weaker groups more recently, reflecting the
composition of most other wars in the cur-
rent era.7 By the late 1990s, the United States
and Colombia teamed up to fight insurgen-
cy, initially through broader regional pro-
grams and then through the targeted Plan
Colombia. Between the 1990s and 2000s,
most left-wing guerrilla groups signed ne-

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153

146 (4) Fall 2017Aila M. Matanock & Miguel García- Sánchez

gotiated settlements with the state, y
most right-wing paramilitary bands de-
mobilized, but the farc persisted.

Colombia is a most likely case for the use
of direct voter involvement in the approval
of a peace process, and it thereby serves as
a potential example for other similar cas-
es. A long-standing electoral democracy,
Colombia’s regime dates back to 1957, pero
it was further opened in 1991, when a new
constitution reorganized state structures
and promoted a more pluralist and com-
petitive political system.8 Most armed ac-
tors developed a relationship with polit-
ical parties and electoral politics. Incluso
throughout the conflict, Colombia re-
mained one of the most stable Latin Amer-
ican democracies.9 And as we will discuss
más tarde, civil conflict often occurs in states
with elections, making Colombia an ear-
ly but not unique case.

Prior attempts to establish a settlement
between the farc and the government have
failed. In the mid-1980s, the government ne-
gotiated with many of the leftist groups.10
The Belisario Betancur administration and
the farc signed a 1982 agreement to trans-
form the guerrilla group into a political par-
ty and to make the political system more
competitive.11 As a result of this process,
the farc formed the Unión Patriótica (arriba)
party, and the government implemented re-
forms such as the popular election of may-
ors. Sin embargo, over just a few years, thou-
sands of up members were assassinated,
primarily by right-wing paramilitaries but
with plausible government complicity, y
the farc split from the party and continued
fighting.12 However, other left-wing guer-
rilla groups signed settlements and became
political parties in the democracy reshaped
by the constituent assembly that changed
the constitution in 1991.13 These concessions
were tailored to these rebels who, in return,
agreed to demobilize, disarm, and renounce
violence. The agreements, sin embargo, no lo hizo
include the farc.

En cambio, the government launched a ma-
jor offensive against the farc in 1992.14 En
1999, President Andrés Pastrana initiated
a new cycle of peace talks with the farc.
During this period, the organization creat-
ed a new political wing and even held ter-
ritorial control, but the talks failed to pro-
duce a settlement as each side accused the
other of focusing instead on strengthening
itself on the battlefield. En 2002, Presidente
Álvaro Uribe recognized the political sta-
tus of right-wing paramilitary bands and
initiated peace talks with these groups, dis-
assembling most of these organizations.15
Pero, with regard to the farc, the adminis-
tration established an aggressive counterin-
surgency strategy that debilitated, but did
not defeat, the remaining guerrillas.16

A new peace process began in 2012, pero
elite divisions threated to upend it, a pesar de
its reliance on a popular plebiscite for ap-
proval. After decades of failed negotiations,
the farc and the Colombian government
returned to peace talks in 2012. The gov-
ernment announced a “road-map” (Acu-
erdo General para la terminación del conflicto
y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera)
that established six points of negotiation:
rural development policy; political partici-
pation; end of the conflict; solutions to the
problem of illicit drugs; victims; y el
implementación, verification, and refer-
endum to put the deal in place. A negotiat-
ing team representing each side, facilitated
by multilateral mediation, met in Oslo and
then Havana.17 In May 2013, a joint commu-
nique from the team showed agreement on
the first point, y, by November, reports
stated that political participation had been
negotiated: the farc was to be designat-
ed as a legal political movement, a provi-
sion that has facilitated peace in other con-
textos,18 and political representation in terri-
tories most affected by the conflict was to be
expanded, potentially reducing grievanc-
es but also representing farc constituen-
cies.19 Over the next two years, the negoti-

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Dédalo, la Revista de la Academia Estadounidense de las Artes & SciencesThe Colombian Paradox

ating team worked through the remaining
puntos, despite pauses, and the government
and the farc showed their commitment
to the process by declaring ceasefires. Oth-
er actors, including delegations of victims,
were also consulted during the process.20
Even prior to the negotiations, howev-
es, the elites on the government side frac-
tured, led by President Juan Manuel San-
tos against his predecessor President Uribe,
the former ultimately supporting the set-
tlement and the latter opposing it. Before
the Santos administration, the popular,
and populist, Uribe administration held
oficina; Santos had been the defense min-
ster during the Uribe administration, y
he had implemented the hardline security
policies that were part of Plan Colombia.
President Uribe, who was denied a constitu-
tional amendment that would have allowed
him to seek a third term, initially backed
Santos. Santos won with 69 por ciento de la
vote in the 2010 presidential elections.21

Sin embargo, relations soured between San-
tos and Uribe by early 2011. A rift first ap-
peared in 2010, only a few weeks after his
inauguration, when Santos reestablished
diplomatic ties with Venezuela, a decision
that Uribe criticized. As Santos took a more
conciliatory approach, including moving
toward peace negotiations with the farc
and loosening laws used to prosecute mem-
bers of the group, relations between the two
politicians deteriorated.22 Santos’s 2012 un-
nouncement of negotiations with the farc,
sin embargo, triggered a formal rupture with
Uribe, who created an organization (Co-
lombians against Terrorism) and later a
party (Centro Democrático) to oppose San-
tos.23 Uribe called the government insuf-
ficiently patriotic, claimed the settlement
gave too many concessions to the farc,
y, al final, accused Santos of treason
against his legacy.24

Peace talks with the farc progressed,
sin embargo, y, in January 2013, Santos had
proposed a referendum to approve a pro-

spective settlement.25 This proposal stood
in contrast to a constituent assembly that
had been used to make the 1991 cambios
to the Constitution, which the farc pre-
ferred.26 Indeed, when Santos sent legis-
lation on the referendum to Congress in
August of that year, the farc called for a
pause in negotiations to examine it.27 Al-
though the process was meant to be inclu-
sive, especially once the comprehensive
settlement was negotiated, this mecha-
nism for approving that final deal was un-
esperado. Uribe also came out against this
propuesta, suggesting that Santos was using
a referendum on peace as an electoral ploy
(and it was initially set to coincide with the
next elections).28

por el 2014 election, and without a com-
prehensive settlement yet negotiated, san-
tos finished behind Uribe’s new choice,
Óscar Iván Zuluaga, in the first round of
voting; in the runoff, sin embargo, he clinched
a reelection with 50.25 percent of the vote.29
This election merely marked what had be-
come a clear division between a camp unit-
ed behind Uribe’s hardline agenda against
insurgency, and a pro-peace coalition that
included various parties led by President
Santos.30

Despite farc opposition, and Uribe’s
skepticism, Santos succeeded in estab-
lishing a plebiscite, which was approved
by Congress in 2015 and by the Constitu-
tional Court in 2016. During the process,
he referred to Uribe and his supporters as
“enemies of peace,” saying that those op-
posed to the settlement were “trying to de-
monise the process and create fear in the
country,” but that voters would have their
decir, suggesting that voter approval of the
peace process might overcome these elite
divisions.31 A popular plebiscite that suc-
ceeded may indeed have overridden the
Uribe opposition and provided the need-
ed legitimacy to the peace process.

Attitudes toward the peace process shift-
ed as the elites split. Although the 2012–

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155

146 (4) Fall 2017Aila M. Matanock & Miguel García- Sánchez

2016 negotiations between the Santos ad-
ministration and the farc produced an
agreed-on settlement, the plebiscite failed,
reflecting opposition from the Uribe camp.
But to what extent did this division among
elites shape voter attitudes so that a narrow
majority rejected the plebiscite, a mecha-
nism paradoxically designed in part to over-
come these very divisions? And what about
the plebiscite made it so easy for elites to
lead an effective opposition campaign?

The Observatorio de la Democracia of
the Universidad de los Andes and the Latin
American Public Opinion Project (lapop)
of Vanderbilt University collected public
opinion data from twelve national repre-
sentative surveys between 2004 y 2016.32
To assess public attitudes toward a peaceful
solution to the conflict, and thereby probe
the plausibility of elite divisions in pro-
ducing changes in public opinion, we ex-
amined the evolution of two questions that
have been regularly included in the Amer-
icas Barometer survey, before and after the
elite division: the first captures the percent-
age of Colombians who support a negoti-
ated solution to the conflict with guerril-
las, compared with a military solution or
a combination of both strategies; the sec-
ond measures the percentage of individu-
als who think forgiveness and reconcilia-
tion with farc members is possible. Com-
plementing these data is the actual vote in
el 2016 plebiscite.

We expected to see a downward trend
in these attitudes, primarily after the di-
vision between Santos and Uribe, but be-
fore any components of the settlement
were negotiated and made public by polit-
ical camps (Uribe’s camp versus other po-
litical camps). Our expectations build on
previous research showing that the public
is responsive to elites’ opinions and their
cues to voters.33 Referendums and other
mechanisms for direct voter involvement
may be especially afflicted by elite fram-
En g, as we will discuss further.34

The majority of Colombians have sup-
ported a peaceful solution since data collec-
tion began in 2004. Such support was well
arriba 60 percent before the 2011 elite divi-
sión, but then dropped to 55–58 percent,
reaching its low in 2011, before finally rising
otra vez en 2016, after the settlement was actu-
ally signed. Similarmente, attitudes toward for-
giveness and reconciliation with the farc
were initially high, que van desde 58 a 64
percent between 2006 y 2008, before de-
creasing to their lowest at 40 por ciento en 2014
(the surveys in intervening years did not ask
this question, unfortunately), and then in-
creasing slightly in 2016.35

These national averages have shown the
expected downward trends, reaching their
lowest points after the Santos-Uribe divi-
sión (2011 onward). The decreases are ap-
parent before particular components of the
settlement were negotiated and announced
(the first point made public in 2013), sug-
gesting that the elite division rather than
the revelation of the settlement’s specif-
ic policies may account for the changes.
These trends, por supuesto, cannot prove that
Uribe’s opposition was the cause–other
factors such as the visibility of farc mem-
bers and their crimes after the start of the
peace process may have played a role–but
the evidence is suggestive of the public re-
sponding to the cues of a divided elite.

To further probe the plausibility of this
argumento, we map our variables by polit-
ical camp in order to see if there are dif-
ferences in opinions between Uribe sup-
porters and other respondents. Using vote
choice reports for the previous presiden-
tial election, we created a variable for the
political camps of respondents, a dichoto-
mous indicator that takes the value of one
for Uribe supporters and zero otherwise.36
The comparison by political camp dem-
onstrates the expected relationship with
respect to support for a political solution
to the conflict (Cifra 1). The percentage of
those in the Uribe camp with favorable at-

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Dédalo, la Revista de la Academia Estadounidense de las Artes & SciencesThe Colombian Paradox

Cifra 1
Percentage Supporting a Negotiated Peace with Insurgents by Political Camp, 2006–2016

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PAG

81.4%

76.6%

70.4%

69.2%

69.9%

63.8%

63.3%

61.4%

54.1%

64.6%

55.3% 58.5%

54.8%

81.2%

72.8%

53.0%

40.7%

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2014

2016

Año

Other Political Camps

Uribe Camp

95% Con½dence Interval (Design-Effect Based)

Fuente: The authors produced this figure using data from the Americas Barometer survey by lapop/Observa-
torio de la Democracia.

titudes toward a settlement has been great-
er than 50 percent for most of the period,
though it was lower than the percentage
of non-Uribistas supporting this option. En
2011, the two lines converged, perhaps be-
cause of mixed signals from the elites: el
distance between the politicians’ views on
negotiations was not as evident until the
next year, when talks began. Después de eso,
Uribistas’ support drops off, reaching its
lowest level in 2014.

Attitudes toward forgiveness and recon-
ciliation with the farc show a similar pat-
tern (Cifra 2). Between 2006 y 2008,
these attitudes were not significantly dif-
ferent between political camps. Uribe pro-

moted a peace process with the paramilitar-
ies during that period, so part of the conver-
gence may be explained by a contamination
effect across armed actors. Por 2014, cuando
peace talks with the farc were in motion,
the camps had substantially diverged and,
por 2016, when the settlement was signed,
solo 44 percent of those in the Uribe camp
believed forgiveness and reconciliation
with the farc was possible.37

Finalmente, we examined the extent to which
votes in the recent plebiscite also reflect-
ed elite divisions. At the municipal level,
we ran a simple correlation between the
2016 plebiscite results and the outcomes
para el 2014 presidential election.38 The

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146 (4) Fall 2017Aila M. Matanock & Miguel García- Sánchez

Cifra 2
Percentage with Positive Attitudes Toward Forgiveness and Reconciliation with the farc by
Political Camp, 2006–2008 & 2014–2016

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62.0%

53.2%

60.1%

58.5%

62.7%

58.7%

64.9%

60.8%

45.8%

43.6%

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2006

2007

2008

Año

2014

2016

Other Political Camps

Uribe Camp

95% Con½dence Interval (Design-Effect Based)

Fuente: The authors produced this figure using data from the Americas Barometer survey by lapop/Observa-
torio de la Democracia.

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vote share for the Uribista presidential can-
didate, Zuluaga, positively correlates with
the percentage of “no” votes, and Santos’s
vote share with the percentage of the “yes”
(both are statistically significant).39

These attitudes and votes in the popu-
lar plebiscite show evidence of the possi-
ble impact of the Santos-Uribe division on
voters, even though it was meant to over-
come elite divisions.

Other factors contributed to opposition
to the popular plebiscite, but they do not
seem to explain the shifts in camps that
coincide with the division between elites;
bastante, if anything, they further reinforce

the risk of directly involving voters in the
approval process.

While attitudes in the Uribe camp began
dropping, turning against a settlement,
even before specific components were an-
nounced, the support rates dropped to the
point of producing a statistically signifi-
cant difference between the camps only
after some of those specific components
were made public (Por ejemplo, Cifra 1
shows less than 50 percent support in the
Uribe camp in 2014, which was after the
announcement of the first provisions).
All settlements include concessions to the
rebels, wherein de jure power is brought

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Dédalo, la Revista de la Academia Estadounidense de las Artes & SciencesThe Colombian Paradox

more in line with de facto power, haciendo
these settlements easy for elites or other
actors to oppose. Even Colombians who
were generally supportive of a settlement
prior to the plebiscite were less support-
ive of particular provisions that may have
been construed as concessions. For in-
postura, while a majority in both camps typ-
ically supported a settlement as the solu-
tion to civil conflict (Cifra 1), that support
did not extend to creating the conditions
to allow the farc to participate politically
(justo 13 percent of Uribistas and 35 por ciento
of other camps supported this provision,
according to the 2016 ab-lapop survey)
or forming a political party (11 y 23 por-
cent support, respectivamente).

The perception that the government was
making concessions seemed to have shaped
voter attitudes: in a survey experiment
run in areas most affected by the conflict,
Aila M. Matanock and Natalia Garbiras-
Díaz show that support for a proposal to
provide more political representation to
those areas is much lower when it is report-
ed that the farc had endorsed the proposal
(than when the proposal had simply been
hecho).40 Endorsement by the farc pro-
duced a drop in the percentage of respon-
dents supporting the proposal from 44.4
por ciento a 31 percent.41 These results are
even more surprising given that all respon-
dents would have directly benefited from
increased political representation (porque
this sample covers regions set to receive
more seats). En general, the revelation of these
components may have helped solidify vot-
ers’ preferences against the settlement, y
they were framed as concessions by Uribe
during the opposition campaign (framing
the transitional justice as not sufficient, para
ejemplo: “the lack of justice doesn’t pro-
duce a feeling of reconciliation”).42 Pero el
timing of the downturn in attitudes, comenzar-
ning prior to the announcement of the com-
ponents, tentatively suggests that the elite
division played a central role.

Another possible explanation for the
split is that those in Uribe’s camp turned
against the settlement because they pre-
dicted that land reform provisions would
be a component of it, rather than cue off
Uribe’s attacks on aspects of the peace pro-
cess that he labeled “concessions.” Howev-
es, while Uribe and some of his political co-
alition are against land reform, he did not
often attack this component of the settle-
ment–and with good reason, as land re-
form is very popular among Colombians,
receiving approximately 80 percent sup-
port in the 2016 ab-lapop survey. Socio-
economic status and preferences toward re-
distribución (something land reform would
accomplish) also do not correlate with sup-
port for the settlement.43 Land reform was
always likely to be a component of a settle-
ment with the farc, due to its popularity
and the farc’s leftist platform. Attitudes
toward it do not seem to be an omitted vari-
able in our analysis. Likely knowing these
preferences among the population, Uribe’s
attacks focused mainly on the transition-
al justice and farc political participation
provisions.

Despite the fact that the failed plebiscite

was seemingly established in part to over-
come elite divisions, this evidence suggests
that it amplified those divisions instead.
But the Colombian case also provides im-
portant implications for other peace pro-
cesses. Modern civil conflicts often occur
in countries with elections, even in dem-
ocratic countries, so other states may be
tempted to follow Colombia’s lead in using
referendums and other tools of direct ap-
proval by voters. Among ongoing civil con-
flicts that reach a twenty-five battle-death
límite,44 the mean level of democracy
rose six points on a nineteen-point scale
de 1974 (the beginning of the third wave
of democratization) a 2010, and a majori-
ty of countries experiencing such conflict
en 2010 were more democratic than au-

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146 (4) Fall 2017Aila M. Matanock & Miguel García- Sánchez

thoritarian.45 The Arab Spring may have
decreased the relative share of civil con-
flicts in democracies somewhat, but many
fully democratic countries are still fight-
ing their counterinsurgencies, incluido
India, Kenya, and Turkey (as of the latest
democracy data in 2013).46

Hasta ahora, the use of referendums to approve
peace processes has been relatively rare:
fewer than 20 percent of the settlements in
the ucdp Peace Agreement Dataset over
the past four decades.47 Most of these cas-
es are in territorial conflicts wherein vot-
ers later weigh in on succession, como
in South Sudan, rather than an approval
mechanism for the settlement overall.

Other states with elections, sin embargo,
may be tempted to use referendums and
other forms of direct voter participation
in the approval of a peace process, tal vez
especially when elites are divided and the
government is less than popular.

Just as lessons may be drawn from suc-
cessful dimensions of settlements, y-
successful dimensions also hold impor-
tant implications for settlement design in
other cases.48 Specifically, we posit that
this failed popular plebiscite suggests
eso, if elite divisions exist, these mech-
anisms for direct voter approval may am-
plify splits, rather than provide addition-
al legitimacy to and strengthening of the
peace process. While mass action is crucial
in many stages of conflict and postconflict
contexts–for example, during wartime,
when civilians can provide essential infor-
mation and resources to combatants–this
type of inclusivity at the approval stage of a
settlement may not be one of them.49

Focusing instead on traditional, elite-
led negotiations that seek to satisfy nec-
essary factions may be more likely to yield
a signed peace agreement. De hecho, to se-
cure a settlement, leaders on each side of
a conflict must perceive the share of pow-
er they will receive through a settlement
as comparable to what they would receive

from continued fighting.50 Similar to any
negotiated regime transition, elite pacts
will create new state structures, produc-
ing changes that are acceptable to elites
even if they slow the speed of change.51 In
contrast to recent recommendations on in-
clusivity during peace processes, este caso
suggests that focusing on meeting the ex-
pectations of sufficient elite factions–so
either all factions that may wield a veto or
a sufficient number of factions to override
any vetoes–may be the best option to ob-
tain a signed settlement in many cases.

Por último, the Colombia case sought to
follow a similar strategy, although the failed
plebiscite made it more difficult. After the
vote, the government called meetings with
the opposition to discuss their objections
to the agreement. Santos and Uribe finally
met face-to-face to talk about peace. Lat-
es, the two negotiating teams met again in
Havana to renegotiate the agreement. Después
a few weeks, the farc and the Colombian
government announced a new deal that in-
cluded modifications reflecting some points
highlighted by Uribe and the opposition. fi-
finalmente, the new agreement was approved in
Congress at the end of 2016. The opposition,
sin embargo, remained unsatisfied with the set-
tlement and now accuses the government
of betraying the people’s will and democrat-
ic principles. Hay, por supuesto, cases in
which it will be difficult to get necessary
elite factions on board, as it was in Colom-
bia, and having a failed plebiscite certain-
ly does not help. But there remain some in-
clusivity strategies to deal with minor elite
factions that are still opposed.

While many studies of spoiling in peace

procesos (eso es, upending a bargain that
the major factions would otherwise agree
on to end the civil conflict) focus on the
rebel side, the Colombian case makes it
clear that factions on the government side
can also spoil a settlement.52 Again, este
suggests that incorporating the elites of

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as many major factions as possible before
isolating minor ones may be the best path
forward. Other studies have suggested a
similar strategy, arguing that ensuring the
leaders of the major government and rebel
factions can find an option they prefer to
conflict may require exclusivity, en orden
to limit the number of actors who have to
agree and, thereby, to provide those cru-
cial elites with the most possible options
to terminate conflict.53

Many cases, including El Salvador and
South Africa, por ejemplo, match this tem-
plate: both feature a coalition of elites who
accepted negotiations and, al final, a
settlement (and those elites who were re-
calcitrant were neutralized through a wide
pro-peace coalition that included middle-
class segments).54

Beyond the main implication that a fo-
cus on elite factions may be useful in secur-
ing a signed settlement, we draw two im-
portant lessons from the Colombian case
about seeking inclusivity in this step of the
process to help overcome minor elite fac-
tions that remain in opposition to the agree-
mento. Primero, we suggest not using a referen-
dum or other direct vote on approval of the
peace process. These mechanisms generally
may not overcome elite divisions, tal vez
in part because peace processes are complex
asuntos, so voters look for elite cues. Given
the uncertainly in these processes, elites op-
posed to the settlement may have the easiest
time framing terms as concessions and the
status quo as the safest option (factors like
elite popularity seem to play an important
role in these contexts, rather than the issue
sí mismo ).55 Some have noted that referendums
and the like are “risky” strategies.56 When
components of settlement can be framed
as concessions, which are unpopular, como el
Colombian case makes clear, the strategy
may be even riskier.

Segundo, the Colombian case also sug-
gests that some inclusivity may be possi-
ble, even at this stage of the conflict. Oth-

er work has suggested that inclusivity, Alabama-
though not yet common at most stages of
ending a conflict, is useful for increasing
legitimacy and even improving the odds
of implementing (if not securing) a set-
tlement.57 In terms of process, Colombia
suggests that including representatives of
the voters, either through a constituent as-
sembly as in the 1990s or directly through
Congress as after the failed plebiscite, may
be a way to achieve some degree of inclu-
sivity without the same risk of amplifying
elite divisions. This proposition, sin embargo,
would need to be further tested.

In terms of audience, the Colombia
case also suggests that if a referendum is
held, it could be restricted to certain areas
–specifically those areas most affected by
the conflict–to achieve direct voter in-
volvement with less risk of elite cues driv-
ing the outcome. Colombians directly af-
fected by armed conflict, particularly at the
hands of the farc, measured through dis-
placement and attacks in particular areas,
have been among the most supportive of
the peace process.58 Both victims and non-
victims in these areas tend to have more
positive opinions about peace and recon-
ciliation than do those in areas less affect-
ed by political violence. Rural regions that
have most recently been the areas most af-
fected by violence also show strong sup-
port for the peace process.59 More impor-
tante, these regions may be least affect-
ed by elite framing because they live the
conflict and thus are more likely to seek a
deeper understanding of a settlement that
will affect them on a day-to-day basis. Este
would fit with theory on elite framing in
other contexts, which suggests that topics
that voters tend to know less about, como
foreign policy for U.S. voters, is more sus-
ceptible to this type of influence. Colom-
bians living in Bogotá would fit this model,
since they currently experience very little
of the conflict’s violence and have weak-
er incentives to pay close attention to its

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146 (4) Fall 2017Aila M. Matanock & Miguel García- Sánchez

potential solutions. This proposition, también,
should be further tested.

Aside from these potential lessons from
the Colombian case, mediators may be able
to find other ways to increase inclusivity,
perhaps at other stages in the process, incluso
while focusing on elite factions at the stage
of settlement approval.60

The deference to solving elite divisions in
many settlement processes may indeed be
why such settlements are often successful.
The Colombian case suggests that a popu-

lar plebiscite or similar mechanism may not
solve elite divisions but may actually ampli-
fy them. While this essay counters policies
recommending inclusivity at every stage of
a peace process, and instead recommends
focusing on satisfying necessary elite fac-
tions when seeking to approve a settlement,
it nonetheless identifies other mechanisms
by which voters, especially in conflict areas,
can still be included, potentially increasing
the legitimacy and even the chances of suc-
cess of a peace process.61

notas finales
* Contributor Biographies: AILA M. MATANOCK is Assistant Professor of Political Science at
the University of California, berkeley. She is the author of Electing Peace: From Civil Conflict to
Political Participation (2017) and has published articles in such journals as International Security,
Gobernancia, Journal of Peace Research, and Annual Review of Political Science.
MIGUEL GARCÍA-SÁNCHEZ is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Universidad de
los Andes, Colombia. He is the author of Los estados del país: Instituciones municipales y realidades
locales (with Mauricio García Villegas, Juan Carlos Rodríguez Raga, Javier Eduardo Revelo Re-
bolledo, and José Rafael Espinosa Restrepo, 2011) and has published articles in such journals
as Latin American Politics and Society, Política y Gobierno, and Revista de Ciencia Política.

1 Joakim Kreutz, “How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the ucdp Conflict Ter-
mination Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 47 (2) (2010): 243–250; James D. Fearon, “Civil
Guerra & the Current International System,Dédalo 146 (4) (Caer 2017); Paul Collier, V. l. El-
liott, Håvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis, Breaking the
Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, World Bank Policy Research Report (Lavado-
tonelada, CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003); Barbara F. walter, “Does Con-
flict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research 41 (3) (2004):
371–388; and Monica Duffy Toft, Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars (Príncipe-
tonelada, NUEVA JERSEY.: Prensa de la Universidad de Princeton, 2009).

2 See Desirée Nilsson, “Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in Peace Accords and Dura-

ble Peace,” International Interactions 38 (2) (2012): 243–266.

3 Catherine Barnes, Owning the Process: Mechanisms for Political Participation of the Public in Peacemaking
(Londres: Conciliation Resources, 2002); David E. Cunningham, “Responding to Multi-Party
Guerras civiles: Designing Peace Processes That Make Peace More Likely,” paper presented at the
American Political Science Association’s Annual Meeting, chicago, Illinois, August 30–Sep-
tember 2, 2007; and Anthony Wanis-St. John and Darren Kew, “Civil Society and Peace Ne-
gotiations: Confronting Exclusion,” International Negotiation 13 (1) (2008): 11–36.

4 Lawrence Boudon, “Colombia’s M-19 Democratic Alliance: A Case Study in New-Party Self-

Destruction,” Latin American Perspectives 28 (2001): 73–92.

5 Juan G. Ferro and Graciela U. Ramón, El orden de la guerra: las FARC-EP, entre la organización y la
política (Bogotá: ceja, Centro Editorial Javeriano, 2002); and Vanda Felab-Brown, “Orga-
nized Crime, Economías ilícitas, Violencia civil & Orden Internacional: More Complex Than
You Think,Dédalo 146 (4) (Caer 2017).

6 Mauricio Romero, Paramilitaries y autodefensas, 1982–2003 (Bogotá: Editorial Planeta Colom-

biana, 2002).

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7 David E. Cunningham, “Veto Players and Civil War Duration,” American Journal of Political Sci-

ence 50 (4) (2006): 875–892.

8 Daniel L. Nielson and Matthew S. Shugart, “Constitutional Change in Colombia: Policy Ad-
justment through Institutional Reform,” Comparative Political Studies 32 (3) (1999): 313–341;
and Erika Moreno, “Whither the Colombian Two-Party System? An Assessment of Political
Reforms and Their Limits,” Electoral Studies 24 (3) (2005): 485–509.

9 Jonathan Hartlyn and Arturo Valenzuela, “La democracia en América Latina desde 1930,” in
Historia de América Latina: política y sociedad desde 1930, volumen. 12, ed. Leslie Bethell (Barcelona: Crítica,
1997).

10 Elizabeth J. Bilyeu, Guerrilla Groups in Colombia: Prospects for the Future (Leavenworth, Kentucky.: A NOSOTROS.
Army Command and General Staff College, 1995); and Boudon, “Colombia’s m-19 Demo-
cratic Alliance.”

11 Steven S. Dudley, Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia (Nueva York: Routledge,
2004); and author interview with Alberto Rojas Puyo, Bogotá, Colombia, December 3, 2009.

12 Dudley, Walking Ghosts.
13 Jaime Zuluaga Nieto, “De guerrillas a movimientos políticos (Análisis de la experiencia colom-
biana: el caso del m-19),” in De las armas a la política, ed. Ricardo Peñaranda and Javier Guer-
rero (Bogotá: tm Editores, 1999); author interview with Enrique Flórez, Bogotá, Colombia,
Marzo 16, 2010; and Boudon, “Colombia’s m-19 Democratic Alliance.”

14 Lawrence Boudon, “Guerrillas and the State: The Role of the State in the Colombian Peace

Process,” Journal of Latin American Studies 28 (1996): 279–297.

15 Enzo Nussio and Kimberly Howe, “When Protection Collapses: Post-Demobilization Trajec-

tories of Violence,” Terrorism and Political Violence 28 (5) (2016): 848–867.

16 The government was attempting a defeat like the one in Sri Lanka. See Sumit Ganguly, “End-

ing the Sri Lankan Civil War,Dédalo 147 (1) (Invierno 2018).

17 Richard Gowan and Stephen John Stedman, “The International Regime for Treating Civil

Guerra, 1988–2017,” Dædalus 147 (1) (Invierno 2018).

18 Aila M. Matanock, “Bullets for Ballots: Electoral Participation Provisions in Peace Agreements
and Conflict Recurrence,” Seguridad Internacional 41 (4) (2017): 93–132; Aila M. Matanock, Electing
Peace: From Civil Conflict to Political Participation (Cambridge: Prensa de la Universidad de Cambridge, 2017);
and Aila M. Matanock, International Insurance: Why Militant Groups and Governments Compete with Bal-
lots Instead of Bullets (Doctor. Diss., Universidad Stanford, 2012).

19 Juanita León, “El Acuerdo de participación política: lo acordado, lo aplazado y lo ganado,"
La Silla Vacía, Noviembre 6, 2013, http://lasillavacia.com/historia/el-acuerdo-de-participacion
-politica-lo-acordado-lo-aplazado-y-lo-ganado-46035.

20 Ver, Por ejemplo, Luis Fernando Arias and José Antequera Guzmán, “Peace Proposals from
Victims of Colombia’s Armed Conflict,” presentation for the Colombia Peace Forum, United
States Institute of Peace, Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA., Julio 29, 2014.

21 Mónica Pachón and Gary Hoskin, “Colombia 2010: análisis de las elecciones presidenciales

y legislativas,” Colombia Internacional 74 (2011): 9–26.

22 “Santos v Uribe,” The Economist, Abril 7, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21552204.
23 Margarita Batlle and Gustavo Duncan, “Colombia: un panorama menos confuso,” Revista de

Ciencia Política 33 (1) (2013): 101–116.

24 Stathis N. Kalyvás, “Rebeldes yihadistas en la guerra civil,Dédalo 147 (1) (Invierno 2018); and “Uribe
acusa a Santos de traición y mentira,” El Espectador, Noviembre 18, 2014, http://www.el
espectador.com/noticias/politica/uribe-acusa-santos-de-traicion-y-mentira-articulo-528107.
The division was primarily between Juan Manuel Santos and Álvaro Uribe, but they were
backed by various political, económico, and social leaders. The “yes” campaign in the plebi-

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146 (4) Fall 2017Aila M. Matanock & Miguel García- Sánchez

scite was ultimately supported by most political parties in Congress (the progovernment co-
alition), many local politicians, the business elite, the unions, indigenous organizations, y
various news outlets. The “no” coalition included Uribe’s party (Centro Democrático) and sev-
eral civic groups linked to the right, including the Public Prosecutor, the Association of Cat-
tlemen, various evangelical leaders, and one tv station (rcn). Civic groups arose on both
sides to promote the campaigns. Victims’ groups, veterans, the Catholic Church, and the Con-
servative Party were divided between the yes and no vote. See “Estos son los activos del No
y del Sí en la recta final del plebiscito,” La Silla Vacía, Septiembre 28, 2016, http://lasillavacia
.com/historia/estos-son-los-activos-del-no-y-del-si-en-la-recta-final-del-plebiscito-58128.
25 “Santos propone ‘refrendar popularmente’ acuerdos con las Farc,” El Tiempo, Enero 16, 2013,

http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-12520841.

26 Ver, Por ejemplo, Moreno, “Whither the Colombian Two-Party System?"
27 Simon Romero, “Rebels Delay Peace Talks in Colombia,"El New York Times, Agosto 23, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/world/americas/colombian-rebels-put-talks-with
-government-on-pause.html.

28 Edulfo Peña and Daniel Valero, “¿Qué más hay detrás del referendo sobre paz impulsado por
el Gobierno?” El Tiempo, Agosto 22, 2013, http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/
CMS-13009187.

29 Felipe Botero, “The Legislative and Executive Elections in Colombia, 2014,” Electoral Studies

36 (2014): 225–229.

30 The coalition included the Liberal Party, Cambio Radical, the u Party, the Greens, segments of

the Conservative Party and the left, and some social movements.

31 “Colombia Santos: farc ‘to Keep Weapons until Referendum,’” bbc, Septiembre 7, 2013,

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-23998567.

32 Samples are representative of citizens of voting age. Information was gathered using strati-
fied probability samples, with regions, municipality size, and urbanization as the main stra-
frente a. Clusters were defined as house blocks (manzanas) for urban areas and hamlets (veredas) para
rural areas. They were selected randomly in each municipality. In each cluster, six partici-
pants (three male, three female, divided into three age groups) were randomly selected by
the enumerators. All samples consisted of approximately 1,500 face-to-face interviews.

33 Por ejemplo, on foreign policy, which may be removed from voters in a similar way to the
conflict for many in Colombia (since it has been largely confined to rural regions in recent
años), see John Zaller, “Elite Leadership of Mass Opinion: New Evidence from the Gulf War,"
in Taken by Storm: The Media, Opinión pública, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War, ed. W.. Lance
Bennett and David L. Paletz (chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 186–209; John
Gray Geer, From Tea Leaves to Opinion Polls: A Theory of Democratic Leadership (Nueva York: Colum-
bia University Press, 1996); Adam J. Berinsky, “Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites,
and American Public Support for Military Conflict,” The Journal of Politics 69 (4) (2007): 975–
997; y Mateo A.. Baum and Philip B. k. Potter, “The Relationships between Mass Me-
es, Opinión pública, and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis,” Annual Review of
Political Science 11 (2008): 39–65.

34 Ver, Por ejemplo, Amanda Taub and Max Fisher, “Why Referendums Aren’t as Democratic
as They Seem,"El New York Times, Octubre 4, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/05/
world/americas/colombia-brexit-referendum-farc-cameron-santos.html.

35 See figures a1 and a2 in the authors’ online appendix at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/data

verse/matanock.

36 The lagged measure of choice means that we reduce any risk of seeing differences between
groups driven by sorting into different camps once the division becomes clear. Camps are
held constant until the next election, making Uribe’s potential camp more than his actual
camp, cual, if anything, should reduce the size of our effects. There is no consistent ideol-
ogy question that is applicable to Colombia that we could use instead. Esto es, por lo tanto, el

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Dédalo, la Revista de la Academia Estadounidense de las Artes & SciencesThe Colombian Paradox

best political camp measure. Individuals interviewed between 2006 y 2010 were coded as
in his camp if they voted for Uribe in the previous presidential election (2002 y 2006). Para
el 2011 y 2013 surveys, the Uribe camp consists of those who voted for Santos in 2010.
Para el 2014 y 2016 estudios, the Uribe camp consists of those who intended to vote for Zu-
luaga. El 2013 survey was excluded from the analysis because the question on previous vote
choice was not included in that year.

37 Using support for a settlement as the dependent variable, we also more rigorously examined
these patterns through logistic regression analysis (see the authors’ online appendix for com-
plete results and predicted probabilities). The interaction between two crucial independent
variables, “political camp” (a binary indicator coded one for Uribe camp and zero otherwise)
and “breakup 2011” (a binary indicator coded one for interviews conducted after the split in
2011 and zero otherwise), we found that after 2011 and among the Uribe camp, the predicted
probability of supporting a peaceful solution with the farc reached its lowest point: acerca de
five out of every ten supporters of the former president agree with a negotiated peace. Nosotros
control for being a resident of an urban area, years of education, edad, y género (masculino) en
estos modelos.

38 Electoral results, at the municipal level, para el 2014 presidential elections and the 2016 pleb-
iscite vote were obtained from the website of the National Registry Office (Registraduría Na-
cional del Estado Civil).

39 Respectively, the correlations are 0.77 (pag < 0.00) and 0.61 (p < 0.00). 40 Aila M. Matanock and Natalia Garbiras-Díaz, “Running Candidates after Using Violence? A Survey Experiment on the Colombian Peace Process,” working paper at the University of California, Berkeley, 2016. 41 See Figure a4 in the authors’ online appendix. 42 “El plebiscito en las frases de Santos y Uribe,” La Nación, October 2, 2016, http://www.lanacion .com.co/index.php/actualidad-lanacion/item/277462-el-plebiscito-en-las-frases-de-santos-y-uribe. 43 Nicolás Galvis Ramírez, Omar David Baracaldo Orjuela, Miguel García Sánchez, and Cata- lina Barragán Lizarazo, Barómetro de las Américas Colombia: Paz, Posconflicto y Reconciliación, 2016 (Bogotá: Observatorio de la Democracia, Universidad de los Andes, Colombia, and usaid, 2017). However, there are certain regions where opposition to land reform was concentrated and that voted at high rates against the plebiscite; see Juan Tellez and Kyle Beardsley, “San- tos’ Gambit and the Shadow of Domestic Politics in Peace Processes,” Political Violence @ a Glance, November 9, 2016, https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2016/11/09/santos-gambit -and-the-shadow-of-domestic-politics-in-peace-processes/. 44 Kreutz, “How and When Armed Conflicts End.” 45 Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jaggers, and Ted R. Gurr, “Polity iv Project: Political Regime Char- acteristics and Transitions, 1800–2004” (College Park: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2006). 46 Democracy, or audience costs more broadly, seems to have surprisingly little effect on the termination type of civil conflicts, although some have hypothesized that settlements may be less likely, including because citizens in democracies may see concessions as undesirable. See Joakim Kreutz, “Why Can’t Democracies Settle Civil Wars?” Political Violence @ a Glance, May 20, 2014, https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2014/05/20/why-cant-democracies-settle -civil-wars/. Initial evidence, however, counters this proposition: we examined whether de- mocracies were less likely to have a settlement that provides for concessions (the closest mea- sure to our question of interest in available data). See Jason Lyall, “Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents? Reassessing Democracy’s Impact on War Outcomes and Dura- tion,” International Organization 64 (1) (2010): 167–192. We found no difference compared with other regime types (see Table 1 in the authors’ online appendix). 47 Natalia Garbiras-Díaz and Aila M. Matanock, “Elite Cues and Endorsement Experiments in Conflict Contexts,” working paper at the University of California, Berkeley, 2017. l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / d i r e c t . m i t . / e d u d a e d a r t i c e - p d / l f / / / / 1 4 6 4 1 5 2 1 8 3 1 1 2 8 d a e d _ a _ 0 0 4 6 6 p d . / f b y g u e s t t o n 0 8 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 165 146 (4) Fall 2017Aila M. Matanock & Miguel García- Sánchez 48 On Colombia, see, for example, Javier Ciurlizza, “Post-Conflict in Colombia: The International Potential of Peace,” Open Democracy, March 9, 2016, https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin -america-caribbean/andes/colombia/post-conflict-colombia-international-potential-peace; and “Colombia Creates Peace before Ending a War,” The Christian Science Monitor, June 22, 2016, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/the-monitors-view/2016/0622/Colombia-creates -peace-before-ending-a-war. 49 Eli Berman and Aila M. Matanock, “The Empiricists’ Insurgency,” Annual Review of Political Science 18 (2015): 443–464. 50 See Matthew Soberg Shugart, “Guerrillas and Elections: An Institutionalist Perspective on the Costs of Conflict and Competition,” International Studies Quarterly 36 (2) (1992): 121–151. 51 See, for example, Terry L. Karl, “Democracy by Design: The Christian Democratic Party in El Salvador,” in The Central American Impasse, ed. Giuseppe DiPalma and Laurence Whitehead (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 195–217; Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins University Press, 1986); and Barry R. Weingast, “The Political Founda- tions of Democracy and the Rule of Law,” The American Political Science Review 91 (2) (1997). 52 Stephen J. Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security 22 (2) (1997): 5–53; and Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International Security 31 (1) (2006): 49–80. 53 Wanis-St. John and Kew, “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations”; and Cunningham, “Re- sponding to Multi-Party Civil Wars.” 54 Elizabeth J. Wood, Forging Democracy from Below: Insurgent Transitions in South Africa and El Salva- dor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 55 Arthur Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Lawrence LeDuc, “Refer- endums and Deliberative Democracy,” Electoral Studies 38 (2015): 139–148. 56 See, for example, Taub and Fisher, “Why Referendums Aren’t as Democratic as They Seem.” 57 See Nilsson, “Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in Peace Accords and Durable Peace”; and Barnes, Owning the Process. 58 Miguel García-Sánchez, Jorge Daniel Montalvo, and Mitchell A. Seligson, Cultura política de la democracia en Colombia, 2015: Actitudes democráticas en zonas de consolidación territorial (Bogotá: Unit- ed States Agency for International Development, 2015); Ana Arjona, “War Dynamics and the ‘No’ Vote in the Colombian Referendum,” Political Violence @ a Glance, October 20, 2016, http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2016/10/20/war-dynamics-and-the-no-vote-in-the -colombian-referendum/; and Michael Weintraub, “¿Qué Pasó?” Foco Económico, October 4, 2016, http://focoeconomico.org/2016/10/04/que-paso-colombia/. 59 Nicolas Liendo and Jessica Maves Braithwaite, “Un paso hacia la paz? Determinants of Co- lombian Attitudes toward the Peace Process,” working paper at the University of Arizona, 2016; and Weintraub, “¿Qué Pasó?” Liendo and Braithewaite also find that political prefer- ence overwhelmingly predicts support; beyond that dominant predictor, they find some sup- port for education and religion. 60 See, for example, Thania Paffenholz, “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: Beyond the In- clusion–Exclusion Dichotomy,” Negotiation Journal 30 (1) (2014): 69–91. 61 Indeed, since peace agreements under democratic regimes cannot escape from the popular vote, even if a plebiscite is not used, general elections may easily turn into a referendum on the settlement, and such inclusivity may help shape attitudes when they do arise. 166 l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / d i r e c t . m i t . / e d u d a e d a r t i c e - p d / l f / / / / 1 4 6 4 1 5 2 1 8 3 1 1 2 8 d a e d _ a _ 0 0 4 6 6 p d . / f b y g u e s t t o n 0 8 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & SciencesThe Colombian Paradox
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