Saurabh Lall, Lily Bowles, y ross baird
Bridging the “Pioneer Gap”
The Role of Accelerators in Launching
High-Impact Enterprises
Despite our current age of unprecedented global wealth, billions of people world-
wide still live in poverty. Over the past decade, sin embargo, gobiernos, the non-
profit sector, and the business world have explored the ability of small and grow-
ing businesses (SGBs) to reduce poverty, particularly in emerging markets. El
promise of finding market-based solutions to social problems has generated a good
deal of excitement about impact investing—an investment strategy that seeks
social/environmental returns in addition to financial returns. According to a 2013
study by J. PAG. Morgan and the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN), a total of
$17 billion is expected to be deployed into socially beneficial sectors in 2012-2013.1 Sin embargo, this capital is not yet reaching many of the innovative small and growing businesses that can help to alleviate poverty through the jobs they create and the products and services they provide. While social enterprises continue to emerge— Village Capital alone has seen over 5,000 applications from impact-focused entre- preneurs worldwide over the last three years—many innovative companies in their early stages have had difficulty getting off the ground. They are still not able to access and take advantage this new flow of capital, or the other types of support and resources they need to succeed. A 2012 report from Monitor-Deloitte and the Acumen Fund highlights this paradox: The Pioneer Gap: While there are thousands of early-stage innovators seeking to launch companies that can drive social change worldwide, very few are able to build the teams, find the customer base, or raise the investment necessary to scale.2 The so-called pioneer gap specifically refers to the burden shouldered by enterprises that are pioneering new business models for social change. Monitor and Acumen identify four stages that these firms typically go through, from the Saurabh Lall is Research Director of the Aspen Network of Development Entrepreneurs. Lily Bowles is Global Operations Manager of Village Capital. Ross Baird is Executive Director of Village Capital. This article was completed with the support of Halloran Philanthropies and Potencia Ventures. © 2013 Saurabh Lall, Lily Bowles, and Ross Baird innovations / volumen 8, number 3/4 105 Descargado de http://direct.mit.edu/itgg/article-pdf/8/3-4/105/705086/inov_a_00191.pdf by guest on 07 Septiembre 2023 Saurabh Lall, Lily Bowles, and Ross Baird blueprint stage to validation, preparation, y, finalmente, escala. The pioneer gap occurs in the early stages of an enterprise’s growth, when it is not yet considered investable by many impact investors. The pioneer gap hypothesis is supported by additional research on the social impact sector. In an industry survey conducted by Village Capital in 2012, de más de 300 self-described impact investment funds, fewer than 10 invested, at less than $250,000 per company.3 Additionally, a Monitor study of African impact
investors found that only 6 de 84 invested in companies still in the early stages.4
According to a 2013 GIIN/J. PAG. Morgan report, impact investors cite a “lack of
appropriate capital across the spectrum” and a “lack of investable enterprises” as
the top two barriers to deploying more impact investment, which suggests that the
bottleneck of (a) not enough quality companies in the early stage and (b) no
enough effective support to produce later stage investable companies is thwarting
the growth of this sector.5
THE ROLE OF ACCELERATORS
Over the past several years, actors in the impact investing sector have developed a
growing recognition that early stage support—specifically in the form of business
incubators and accelerators—is a key intervention for addressing the pioneer gap.
Business incubators and accelerators support early stage entrepreneurs by provid-
ing them with (a) business development support (p.ej., consulting, tecnología
asistencia); (b) infrastructure support (p.ej., access to office space, shared back-
office services); (C) network support (p.ej., access to potential customers, investors,
mentors); y (d) financial support (in the form of grants/investments). This study
surveys 52 impact-focused accelerators worldwide in order to understand their
características, operaciones, and performance more fully.6
This research is particularly timely, as the number of accelerators has grown
significantly over the past five years—in fact, 73 percent of accelerators surveyed
are fewer than five years old. While the role accelerators play in entrepreneurship
has been studied to some extent (we review the existing literature in the next sec-
ción), existing studies are largely limited to those focused on technology compa-
nies in developed markets—that is, Estados Unidos. and Europe. There is little research on
accelerator activity in emerging markets and almost none on the role of accelera-
tors focused on impact investment. With over 40 impact-focused accelerators
founded in the last half-decade, we need an accurate assessment of what accelera-
tors are doing and where so that we can eventually understand how well accelera-
tors are doing in addressing market-based solutions to poverty.7
The Aspen Network of Development Entrepreneurs (ANDE) and Village
Capital believe there is a pressing need for a more holistic, evidence-based
approach to leveraging the potential of incubators and accelerators and to under-
standing what makes them successful. This report, which builds on an earlier piece
of research conducted by Village Capital, represents the first data-driven analysis
of the social enterprise accelerator landscape.8 Through a comprehensive survey of
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Bridging the “Pioneer Gap”
accelerator pipelines, services, redes, and outcomes, we expect our findings to
be relevant to accelerators, impact investors, philanthropists, empresarios, y
the broader field of SGB development.
BACKGROUND
Incubators and Accelerators in Traditional Business Sectors
The study of incubators and accelerators that are focused on having a social impact
is in its infancy. Sin embargo, the research on business incubators and accelerators in
developed markets provides solid guidance for this study. The critical work of
investigadores, most prominently VanderStraeten, McMullen, and Sherman, stresses
that any accelerator has a relatively high financial cost for funders when compared
to traditional venture capital as a percentage of funds deployed, and a high time
cost for participants. Thus they emphasize the importance of evaluating an accel-
erator’s performance up front while recognizing that measuring such performance
is often challenging.9
Lalkaka and Bishop state that the performance of a business incubator should
be measured by “the survival and growth of the businesses it incubates.”10 However,
there is little consensus among researchers on the best way to measure enterprise
growth. Various studies suggest using growth in sales, employees, cash flow, y
assets as measures of success.11 Based on a review of the literature on performance
measures for incubators by Vanderstraeten and Matthyssens, we found the follow-
ing two measures of incubator performance the most relevant for our study: el
percentage of graduate enterprises companies that have received a major invest-
mento, or are operating profitably (success rate), and the percentage of graduate
enterprises that are surviving (which includes firms that may not yet be prof-
itable).12
There is some consensus on the key factors that lead to accelerator success:
(cid:2)(cid:1)Organizational resources. Some research suggests that resource dependence, o
the funding structure for accelerators, can have an impact on their performance.
Chandra and Fealey suggest that overreliance on philanthropic support can have
a negative impact on accelerator performance.13
(cid:2)(cid:1) Selection. A number of studies confirm that enterprise selection has a critical
relationship with accelerator performance, and that a rigorous selection process
enables incubators and accelerators to evaluate key enterprise characteristics.
Screening best practices includes evaluating managerial, product, and financial
características, as well as market dynamics.14
(cid:2)(cid:1)Quality of (and access to) services. The same researchers suggest that access to
professional management services, as well as other supporting resources
(administrative support, accounting, marketing, legal support), is considered
important, yet the quality of services and the period of engagement have a
stronger relationship with the success of an accelerator.15
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(cid:2)(cid:1)Networks. Haapasalo and Ekholm argue that the most important factor for incu-
bator success is organized networking, and the most critical service a strong net-
work of experts, potential investors, and business contacts.16
Sin embargo, evidence to date on accelerator performance in traditional business
sectors is mixed. Both Ferguson and Olofsson, and Löfsten and Lindelöf suggest
that startup companies with accelerator intervention have a higher survival rate
and rate of sales growth than similar startup companies without exposure to an
accelerator.17
Sin embargo, the data is inconclusive. Amezcua studied a nationally representative
sample of U.S. firms and found that incubated firms demonstrate short-term
employment and sales growth but in fact fail 10 percent sooner than their non-
incubated counterparts, which suggests that the protective environment of an
incubator may actually inhibit firms from developing resilient routines and com-
petencies.18 In this same vein, in his study of business incubators in Europe, de
Oliveira found that there is often a mismatch between the services that incubators
offer and the needs of participating enterprises.19
Underscoring all these findings is the relative paucity of significant research
conducted on accelerator inputs and enterprise outcomes, which demonstrates the
need for a study on the impact investing/social entrepreneurship landscape.
Incubators and Accelerators in the Impact Investing Sector
According to our findings, the number of accelerators serving impact enterprises
has grown rapidly over the last five years (encima 70 percent of the accelerators sur-
veyed were founded in 2008 or later). Despite this strong growth, there is only lim-
ited research and data-driven analysis of accelerators’ role in the impact invest-
ment ecosystem. This report aims to generate a greater understanding of accelera-
tors in that sector and is part of a broader strategy to analyze, evaluate, benchmark,
and strengthen accelerators. It is not intended to be a comprehensive evaluation of
impact accelerators but an initial assessment of the landscape of these organiza-
ciones
We have divided this report into six sections:
(cid:2)(cid:1)The landscape of accelerators. We present an overview of the data collected from
52 incubators and accelerators between November 2012 and February 2013,
focusing on key descriptors such as organizational structure, finances, geograph-
ic scope, and human capital. This overview presents the landscape of a growing
group of accelerators that are seeking to have an impact beyond financial
returns.
(cid:2)(cid:1)Enterprise pipeline and selection. We discuss key impact areas, the stage of the
enterprises they support, and their recruitment and selection processes.
(cid:2)(cid:1)Services and benefits. We examine the various services that accelerators provide
to their enterprises, the duration of their programs, and the frequency of the
mentoring sessions. We also study the post-program support accelerators pro-
vide.
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Bridging the “Pioneer Gap”
(cid:2)(cid:1)Accelerator networks. We review the various kinds of formal partnerships accel-
erators typically seek, with impact investors, commercial investors, foundations,
gobiernos, and universities. We also present findings from our survey of
investors about their connections with accelerators.
(cid:2)(cid:1)Metrics and evaluation. We discuss accelerators’ efforts to collect financial and
social performance data from their enterprises and identify gaps in current prac-
tices.
(cid:2)(cid:1)Measuring accelerator performance: First steps. Drawing from the literature on
traditional incubators and accelerators, we examine which factors are associated
with improved accelerator performance in terms of organizational age, estructura,
selección, services, and networks. We do not suggest any potential causality but
expect our findings to guide more rigorous future evaluations of the perform-
ance of social enterprise accelerators.
Based on our findings, we highlight common conclusions and trends that we
hope can help funders, investors, and enterprises leverage accelerators most effec-
tively to drive their enterprises’ impact and growth. We conclude by providing a
series of recommendations for these various groups.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Village Capital launched the first phase of this project in spring 2012, gathering
initial data from accelerators in the impact investment sector, and it joined with
ANDE that summer to integrate the initial findings into a broader research strate-
gy on accelerators. En octubre 2012, Village Capital and ANDE shared the findings
from an initial survey of 25 accelerators at the conference of the Society of
Consumer Affairs Professionals in Business, or SOCAP, and other conferences in
a report titled, “Bridging the Gap: The Role of Accelerators in Impact Investing.”
Based on feedback from various stakeholders, including impact investors,
accelerators, foundations, and academics, Village Capital and ANDE revised the
survey in October 2012, sending it in mid-November to approximately 50 addi-
tional accelerators identified through our networks. El 25 original respondents
also received a supplemental survey to enable a comparison of data points from the
first research report. In January 2013, we identified 122 additional incubators and
accelerators through F6S, a website that serves as a bulletin board for upcoming
incubator and accelerator programs for startups. We asked all accelerators sur-
veyed up front for their “impact objectives beyond financial returns,” and allowed
accelerators to state that they “have no impact objective beyond financial returns”
in order to enable a comparison of impact-focused accelerators to non-impact-
focused programs.
Initial feedback from the first report also focused on investors; given that 98
percent of the accelerators surveyed listed “access to investors” as a primary bene-
fit of the program, industry feedback suggested that an appropriate study of the
accelerator landscape should also focus on investors’ engagement with accelera-
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Cifra 1. Geographic scope (norte = 52)
tores. We surveyed 60 impact investors on different variables relative to their rela-
tionship with accelerators.
After significant follow-up via email and phone from December 2012 a
Febrero 2013, we closed the surveys in mid-February with a final response rate of
33 por ciento (65 out of 197 accelerators). We also received a 60 tasa de respuesta porcentual
for the investor survey (36 out of 60 investors surveyed).
We dropped seven incomplete responses due to insufficient data, leaving us
con 58 complete responses. Sin embargo, only six accelerator respondents identified
themselves as having “no impact objectives beyond financial returns,” which was
not a sufficient sample to make a reasonable comparison between impact-focused
and non-impact-focused accelerators. Por lo tanto, we dropped these six observa-
tions and focused on the 52 social impact-focused accelerators in this study.
In presenting our findings, we provide descriptive statistics on key accelerator
characteristics and performance, and also conduct some preliminary analysis of
the factors that may contribute to better performance. We used t-tests to compare
accelerators’ performance in different categories related to organizational structure
and funding, selección, services, and networks. Given the relatively small sample
size and the fact that all the data are self-reported, we are cautious about making
strong inferences at this stage.
Sin embargo, we suggest that these findings will be helpful in pointing the way for
further, more rigorous analysis of incubator and accelerator performance. Somos
currently developing a more extensive analysis on this topic by building a longitu-
dinal dataset of social enterprises—both accelerator and non-accelerator gradu-
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Bridging the “Pioneer Gap”
Cifra 2. Geographic focus (norte = 52)
ates—to find relationships between accelerator interventions and enterprise per-
rendimiento, as well as an evaluative framework to assess accelerator performance.
THE LANDSCAPE OF IMPACT-FOCUSED ACCELERATORS
Geographic Scope
Del 52 accelerators surveyed, 27 percent are open to enterprises across the globe
(p.ej., the Unreasonable Institute and the Global Social Benefit Incubator); 31 por-
cent are open to ventures from specific regions (p.ej., GrowthAfrica is open to ven-
tures from East Africa, Agora Partnerships is open to ventures across Central
America and Mexico); 35 percent operate nationally (p.ej., Artemisia is open to
ventures in Brazil, New Ventures-Mexico operates pan-Mexico), y 8 por ciento
operate in specific cities (p.ej., the SEHub focuses on Singapore-based ventures)
(Cifra 1). The majority of accelerator operations in this study are focused on
África (Cifra 2).
Organizational Structure
As a baseline analysis of accelerators, we first analyzed the founding of organiza-
ciones, as well as their structure and funding sources. As mentioned before, acceler-
ators are relatively new, although though the oldest in our sample was founded in
1996. Perhaps counter-intuitively, impact-focused accelerators seem more focused
on developing revenue streams beyond philanthropic support than traditional
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Human Capital
With the growing awareness of accelerators’ valuable role in impact investment,
these organizations are attracting significant human capital and resources to
their operations. De término medio, accelerators employ about 11 staff members (eight
full-time and three part-time employees).* Older accelerators (those founded
antes 2008) are considerably larger, with an average of 27 employees, than
younger accelerators, with about six employees, suggesting that accelerators have
the potential to scale. As newer accelerators become more established and
strengthen their operations, we expect them to need more human capital.
* We excluded a large accelerator with 280 employees for this estimate. If included, accelerators
in the sample would have an average of 17 employees.
business accelerators. Curiosamente, while research on incubators and accelerators
in traditional business sectors suggests that the majority are structured as nonprof-
es, 38 percent of the accelerators in our sample are set up as for-profits, 44 por ciento
as nonprofits, y 17 percent as hybrids.20
Funding Sources
Accelerators appear to have sufficient resources to operate but they are by no
means self-sustaining. De hecho, 57 percent of the respondents stated their financial
condition was “operating smoothly,” while 16 percent reported operating with a
surplus. Only about a quarter of the respondents said they were “strapped for
cash.”21 Accelerators’ current sources of revenue include, in order, filantrópico
capital, program fees, consulting contracts, program fees, and investment closing
fees (Cifra 3).
(cid:2)(cid:1) Filantropía. Even though almost two-thirds of the accelerators we surveyed
report being structured as for-profits or hybrids, 74 percent of all accelerators
rely on philanthropic support for their operations and 54 percent of the total
capital currently used by accelerators is from philanthropic sources. This finding
suggests that, while many accelerators expect to develop revenue streams in the
future, the majority are also likely to rely on grants to support some portion of
their operations for the foreseeable future.
(cid:2)(cid:1)Entrepreneur fees. About one-third of the accelerators surveyed charge partici-
pants fees, while an additional 17 percent plan to have fees in the future.
Accelerators charge from $120 a $5,000, averaging $1,300 per enterprise, excluding three that charge $10,000 or more.
(cid:2)(cid:1)Consulting contracts. The second-highest source of accelerator budgets is rev-
enue from consulting contracts. Accelerators have the unique position of having
high exposure to a large volume of enterprises and are able to monetize their
expertise in two ways: (a) research on knowledge and insights gained from
enterprise exposure, y (b) direct business development assistance provided to
entrepreneur graduates.
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Cifra 3. Accelerator budgets by funding source (norte = 50)
(cid:2)(cid:1)Returns from investment. Returns from investment represents a small percent-
age of revenue (8.2 por ciento), although nearly half the accelerators surveyed
reported taking some equity in the enterprises that go through their programs.
This is unsurprising, given that the sample of accelerators is relatively young, y
that liquidity events from impact investments are rare and can take several years
to materialize.
(cid:2)(cid:1) “Success fees” from investment. Ninety-eight percent of accelerators promote
access to investors as a valuable service, and many monetize it by charging “suc-
cess fees” for investments that are brokered. While this remains the lowest line
item of all accelerator budgets, cerca de 7.5 percent of all accelerator budgets are
funded by success fees.
ENTERPRISE PIPELINE AND SELECTION
Sector and Impact Objectives
Twenty percent of accelerators focus on entrepreneurs from one particular sector,
40 percent work with entrepreneurs from several specific sectors, y 40 por ciento
are not sector specific. As certain sectors continue to grow, we expect to see more
specialization.
We focused our study specifically on incubators and accelerators that claim to
have at least one impact objective beyond financial returns. Based on our sample,
the types of impact objectives can be put into two broad categories: employment,
and products and services for the underserved. The majority of accelerators sur-
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Cifra 4. Impact objectives (norte = 52)
veyed (Cifra 4) focus on employment generation (56 por ciento) and income and
productivity growth (46 por ciento), and they aim to stimulate socioeconomic devel-
opment by supporting SGBs. Sin embargo, a significant proportion also focus on sup-
porting enterprises working in health care (35 por ciento), clean energy (35 por ciento),
and agriculture (33 por ciento). This finding is consistent with previous data suggest-
ing that these three sectors are the largest and fastest growing in impact investing.22
Enterprise Stage of Development
The accelerators surveyed work with enterprises in a range of developmental
stages, ranging from the idea stage to the growth stage (Cifra 5). To focus on spe-
cific areas where accelerators have intervened in ventures, we clearly defined four
areas of enterprise development and identified the percentage of accelerators that
reported working with ventures in each stage (some accelerators reported involve-
ment in multiple stages):
(cid:2)(cid:1)Idea stage (40 percent of accelerators). The proverbial “idea on paper”; ventures
at this stage do not yet have a working prototype, good/service/product, or cus-
Tomeros.
(cid:2)(cid:1)Prototype stage (75 percent of accelerators). The most common stage for accel-
erator involvement, “prototype stage” is where accelerators have a working “min-
imum viable model” of their good or service but do not yet have revenue.
(cid:2)(cid:1) Post-revenue stage (65 percent of accelerators). Ventures have customers and
typically functioning revenue models; sin embargo, their business model is not yet at
escala, they are not yet cash-flow positive, and they typically have not raised sig-
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Bridging the “Pioneer Gap”
Cifra 5. Enterprise stage of development (norte = 52)
nificant financing outside “friends and family.”
(cid:2)(cid:1)Growth stage (23 percent of accelerators). Ventures are operating business mod-
els at scale; they typically are cash/flow positive and/or have raised significant
outside venture financing.
Of particular note is a less clear distinction between incubators and accelera-
tors in the social enterprise space than in traditional business sectors, where these
roles are more clearly defined. Social enterprise accelerators tend to work across a
fairly wide spectrum of enterprise development stages, perhaps reflecting the rela-
tively limited pipeline of firms.
Enterprise Recruitment and Selection
Accelerators devote significant resources to the recruitment and selection process;
el 52 we surveyed have worked with a total of 20,216 empresarios. Mientras 7 por-
cent of accelerators spend less than a month on recruitment activities, 33 por ciento
spend between three months and one year, but most common are the 60 por ciento
that spend between one and three months recruiting each new cohort.
Accelerators recruit entrepreneurs through a host of different channels. El
most common sources cited include:
1. Referrals from entrepreneurs affiliated with the accelerator
2. Impact investors (individuals and investment funds)
3. Commercial investors (individuals and investment funds that do not self-iden-
tify as impact investors)
4. Entrepreneurial associations (fellowships, scholarships) in the social impact
espacio
5. Entrepreneurial associations that do not identify with social entrepreneurship or
impact investing
6. Universities
7. Industry associations focused on specific sectors
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Tecnología- and Invention-based Enterprises
While accelerators are not necessarily focused on technology/invention, nosotros
studied the degree to which accelerators were actively focused on invention-
based enterprises, which we define as enterprises that have a core technology
that was invented/created by the founding team, who owns or seeks to own core
intellectual property on the invention.
Twenty-five percent of accelerators surveyed focus exclusively on working
with enterprises that have technology and/or an invention at the center of their
enterprises, while another 41 percent have an active focus on technology but still
work with non-technology or invention-focused entrepreneurs. Solo 31 por ciento
have no active focus on tech innovations, and only one accelerator had no tech-
nology-based companies in its program (Cifra 6).
8. Sector-specific conferences (p.ej., agricultura, education)
9. Social entrepreneurship or impact investing conferences
10. Requests from outside program marketing efforts and social media
11. Direct, cold-call recruitment (p.ej., finding and contacting entrepreneurs on the
web, Facebook, LinkedIn)
Not all sources are equally helpful. Accelerators ranked the following sources,
en orden, as most helpful:
1. Referrals from entrepreneurs affiliated with the accelerator (considered “help-
ful” by over 50 percent of the organizations surveyed)
2. Requests from outside program marketing efforts (30 por ciento)
3. Referrals from entrepreneurial associations (19 por ciento)
4. Referrals from upstream impact investors (15 por ciento)
Curiosamente, social entrepreneurship and impact investing conferences were
listed as the least helpful. This finding is somewhat surprising, considering the
prevalence of conferences in the sector that promote themselves as a way to con-
nect with entrepreneurs. Sin embargo, it may be that social enterprise conferences typ-
ically feature more successful and mature enterprises, making them a less useful
source of early stage companies that might apply to participate in accelerators.
Based on our sample, accelerators in the impact investment sector appear to be
less competitive in terms of selection—average acceptance rate, almost 21 por-
cent—than accelerators in the traditional business sector—average acceptance
tasa, acerca de 5 percent.23 The reasons for the lack of selectivity are unclear, but it is
possible that there is simply a much smaller pipeline of socially oriented enterpris-
es or that, due to the high percentage of accelerators earning revenue from entre-
preneur fees, investment returns, and success fees, accelerator managers may
admit these enterprises more readily in order to bring in more revenue.
Philanthropic support may also be linked to the number of entrepreneurs being
apoyado, which would also encourage accelerators to accept a greater percentage
of applicants. But selectivity does matter: below we compare key performance
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Cifra 6. Focus on technology and invention (norte = 50)
characteristics of accelerators that accept 10 percent or fewer of their applicants
with those of less selective accelerators.
SERVICES AND BENEFITS
Program Duration and Frequency
The average duration of the accelerator programs surveyed is six months.24 The fre-
quency of meetings during this period varies widely, ranging from every day (26
por ciento) to once a month (14 por ciento), with many different meeting frequencies in
entre (Cifra 7, following page).
Program Services and Benefits
Eighty-three percent of accelerators describe their support approach as “high-
touch.” In this case, accelerators focused on social impact appear to be similar to
the majority of incubators and accelerators in traditional business sectors that pro-
vide “high-touch,” highly tailored services to a small group of enterprises.
Almost all programs surveyed provide the following benefits: mentorship from
experts (100 por ciento), access to potential investors (98 por ciento), a network of part-
ners and customers (97 por ciento), and business skills development (97 por ciento).
The majority of programs provide direct funding (54 por ciento), while a minority
provide technology training and assistance (33 por ciento) (Cifra 8, following page).
Other self-identified benefits of accelerators include media exposure, brand
recognition, access to a co-working space, referrals to vetted talent and human
capital, exposure to relevant and timely R&D, and membership in an extensive
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Cifra 7. Frequency of program sessions (norte = 47)
Cifra 8. Accelerator services and benefits (norte = 52)
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Bridging the “Pioneer Gap”
alumni network consisting of other like-minded entrepreneurs, service providers,
and investors.
Sin embargo, the existing literature reinforces the fact that when a service is pro-
vided it is not necessarily of high quality. We expect to dive deeper into this issue
through the next phase of our research strategy by collecting enterprise-level data
from ventures that have participated in accelerators, and comparable enterprises
that have not received accelerator support.
Post-Program Support
The majority of accelerators (66 por ciento) offer post-program support to all of their
graduates at no cost; 28 percent provide free post-program services on a case-to-
case basis; 4 percent provide these services for a fee on a case-to-case basis; y 2
percent do not provide post-program support at all, due to a lack of bandwidth or
resources.
Of the accelerators that do provide post-program services to their entrepre-
neurs, 21 percent offer them for between one and six months after an entrepreneur
graduates from their program, y 9 percent offer support for between six and
eight months. The majority (70 por ciento) offer services longer than nine months,
possibly as long as the entrepreneurs’ ventures exist. The types of post-program
services offered include public relations opportunities, connections with investors,
board participation, HR/recruitment support, regional meet-ups, alumni network-
En g, and online communities listing funding and promotion opportunities.
ACCELERATOR NETWORKS
Types of Formal Partnerships
Many accelerators have formal partnerships with other organizations, which we
define as
(cid:2)(cid:1)“pipeline/deal flow partners,” which recommend enterprises for the accelerator
program and attend events/pitchfests, but do not commit financial support to
either the accelerator or the entrepreneurs;
(cid:2)(cid:1)“enterprise support partners,” which pre-commit capital to enterprises but do not
fund the accelerator program’s operations;
(cid:2)(cid:1)“organization support partners,” which fund accelerators’ organizational/opera-
tional expenses but do not fund the underlying enterprises; y
(cid:2)(cid:1)“enterprise and organization support partners,” which commit capital to both the
accelerator’s operations and the underlying enterprises.
Accelerators have partnerships with five main groups: corporations, universi-
corbatas, investors, foundations, and governments (Cifra 9, following page).
Partnerships with Impact Investors
To corroborate our data from the accelerator survey and to understand accelera-
tors’ connections with impact investors more fully, we also collected data from 38
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Cifra 9. Types of organizations with which accelerators have formal
partnerships
Cifra 10. Impact investors that have a formal partnership with an accelerator
impact investment funds. Solo 21 percent of the investors we surveyed had estab-
lished formal partnerships with accelerators (Cifra 10, following page). The fol-
lowing are the most common reasons for not partnering with an accelerator:
(cid:2)(cid:1)Mandate fit. Forty-three percent of investors surveyed view accelerators as valu-
able “feeders” for their pipeline but do not consider it within their mandate to
fund them directly.
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Cifra 11. Impact investors with informal partnerships with accelerators ‘
(cid:2)(cid:1)Not additionally useful. Twenty-three percent of investors state that they were
able to meet their current investment goals without relying on accelerators.
(cid:2)(cid:1) Interested, but no current partnerships. Sixteen percent of the investors state
that they are interested in pursuing formal relationships with accelerators but
have not yet done so.
Despite the lack of formal partnerships and funding from impact investors, 60
percent of the investors in our sample did report having informal partnerships
with accelerators (Cifra 11). In our survey, we defined an informal partnership as
one in which an investor regularly communicates with accelerator staff, attends
events, or stays otherwise informed, with a primary goal of obtaining deal flow, pero
does not fund the accelerator directly.
The range of accelerator/investor engagement is wide across the board. Alguno
accelerators are in sync with impact investors: 32 percent of investors report that
hasta 20 percent of their portfolio was sourced from accelerators. Sin embargo, a plu-
rality of impact investors does not rely on accelerators for “deal flow”; 47 por ciento
report that none of their current portfolio was sourced from accelerators.
Our findings underscore the critical need for philanthropic support for accel-
erators in the near term and also raise important questions about aligning the serv-
ices that accelerators provide with the needs of impact investors. Many impact
investors do not look to accelerators for deal flow, and the majority do not con-
tribute to accelerators’ budgets in any formal and consistent way. We suggest that
accelerators need to calculate the specific value that they add for investors in terms
of lower searching and due diligence costs more accurately, and to design their
pipeline and curriculum in collaboration with experienced investors. ANDE is
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Co-Working Spaces
Many accelerators’ work is made financially viable by their operating out of free
or affordable co-working spaces. De hecho, 61 percent of accelerators surveyed
maintain a formal partnership with a university, organización, or co-working
espacio (p.ej., the Hub) to lower the cost of their operations.
pursuing additional research on developing a framework to analyze the value cre-
ated by accelerators (described in Conclusions and Next Steps).
METRICS AND EVALUATION
Based on our analysis, metrics and evaluation are key target areas for improvement
among impact-focused accelerators. Desafortunadamente, a significant proportion of
organizations that we surveyed do not track financial or social performance data
on an ongoing basis, making it difficult to assess performance and establish bench-
marks for the sector.
Financial and Social Performance Data Collection
We asked accelerators to report on the status of their graduate enterprises. Mientras
the majority of accelerators (96 por ciento) collect financial data from their enterpris-
es, 23 percent do not track the status of their graduate enterprises at all, cual
makes it difficult to evaluate their performance. We noticed the following gaps in
accelerator data analysis:
(cid:2)(cid:1)Lack of any data collection. Of the accelerators we surveyed, 4 percent do not
collect any financial performance data from their enterprises, mientras 28 por ciento
do not collect any social or environmental performance data (Figures 12, 13).
We find this discrepancy surprising, given the impact-oriented focus of these
accelerators. Potential interventions to improve the impact-oriented data collec-
tion with accelerators could be to support the introduction of standardized
reporting frameworks also used by those who invest and provide capital in the
sector, such as IRIS and GIIRS.
(cid:2)(cid:1)Data tracking venture performance over time. Además, 14 por ciento de la
respondents only collect financial data at a single point in time (p.ej., at the begin-
ning or end of their program), y 15 percent only collect social and environ-
datos mentales (n=48) at a single point (Cifra 14, abajo). This makes it difficult to
assess whether there is any change in the social or financial performance of the
enterprises that go through these programs.
(cid:2)(cid:1)Accelerator-driven data collection mandates. Finalmente, 28 percent of respondents
consider reporting by their program participants to be “optional.”25 The majori-
ty of the accelerators that do require reporting expect enterprises to provide data
for at least one year after the end of their programs, and about one-third require
reporting as long as the enterprise is in operation.
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Cifra 12. Frequency of financial performance data collection (norte = 49)
Cifra 13. Frequency of social and environmental performance data collection
(norte = 48)
(cid:2)(cid:1) Data-collection methodologies. The primary method of collecting data also
varies widely, con 64 percent of accelerators collecting data through in-person
interviews or site visits, 52 percent via phone, y 50 percent via email or online
mechanisms. The variety of methods used in data collection also affects how
reliable and unbiased the data are.
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Cifra 14. Data reporting period (norte = 48)
Accelerator Graduate Performance
Acerca de 77 percent of the accelerators in our sample track the status of their gradu-
ate enterprises, though their data-collection methodologies are varied and incom-
plete. We analyzed the performance of ventures that graduated from the accelera-
tors that do collect data (n=40): 31 percent are reported to be profitable and/or
have received major investment, otro 46 percent are still in operation but are
not yet profitable and/or have not yet received major investment, and about 10 por-
cent are no longer operating. There is no data available on 13 percent of the enter-
tomado, even for the accelerators that do track their enterprises (Cifra 15).
MEASURING ACCELERATOR PERFORMANCE: FIRST STEPS
Based on research on incubators and accelerators in developed markets, we ana-
lyzed four key factors among the sample size of this study that typically affect
accelerator success: organizational funding sources, selectivity, services, and net-
obras. We also analyzed the variable “accelerator years in operation” to compare
older accelerators (those that have been in operation over five years) to younger
accelerators. We used the following two self-reported variables as measures of
accelerator success, consistent with the literature on incubators and accelerators.26
(cid:2)(cid:1)Enterprise success rate. Percentage of graduate enterprises operating at a prof-
itable level, and/or having raised major investment ($500,000 or more) (cid:2)(cid:1)Enterprise survival rate. Percentage of graduate enterprises that are operating at a profitable level, and/or have raised major investment ($500,000 or more), o
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Bridging the “Pioneer Gap”
Cifra 15. Status of graduate enterprises (norte = 40)
are still operating, but are not yet profitable and/or have not yet raised necessary
investment (es decir., inclusive of previous category)
We conducted independent sample t-tests to compare average performance
measures across different categories for these factors.27
Accelerator Years in Operation
While many accelerator characteristics can influence their performance, Residencia en
the literature, we hypothesized that older, more established accelerators would per-
form better on average, given their experience and track record.28 In our sample,
we find that older accelerators do perform better in terms of their enterprise suc-
cess rates, with an average of 46 percent as compared to only 25 percent for
younger accelerators, a difference that is statistically significant at the 5 por ciento
nivel. Sin embargo, we do not observe any differences in terms of survival rates, con
older accelerators achieving an 80 percent survival rate, compared to a 76 por ciento
survival rate for younger programs (Mesa 1). A more thorough study could inves-
tigate whether the discrepancy in results is due to graduates of older accelerators
having more time to develop successful business models, thus we are proposing to
conduct an enterprise-level study as a follow-up to this initial study in order to
investigate this hypothesis more thoroughly.
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Mesa 1. Comparing accelerators by age
Mesa 2. Comparing organizational funding sources
Organizational Funding Sources
In our sample, we found that about two-thirds of respondents relied primarily on
grants for their operations, defined as over 50 percent of annual revenue. Sin embargo,
we did not find any significant differences in this study in the enterprise success
rate or the enterprise survival rate (Mesa 2). Accelerators reliant on grants had an
average enterprise success rate of 29 percent and a survival rate of 74 por ciento, mientras
those that were not grant reliant had a success rate of 35 percent and a success rate
de 82 por ciento.
Selectivity
We found that, consistent with general theory on incubators, selectivity is a key
characteristic of successful incubators/accelerators in the social enterprise sector.
In traditional incubator literature, a 5 percent acceptance rate is considered a char-
acteristic of a good program. Incubators in the social enterprise space are still rel-
atively new, so we defined accelerators that accept 10 percent or fewer of their
applicants as “selective” and the rest as “non-selective.”
We were only able to gather data points from 34 accelerators for this part of the
análisis, so it is difficult to draw definitive inferences at this stage. Sin embargo, en
conducting t-tests across selective and nonselective accelerators, we found that
selective accelerators do appear to perform better, with an average enterprise suc-
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Bridging the “Pioneer Gap”
Mesa 3. Comparing selective and nonselective accelerators
cess rate of 39 percent and an average enterprise survival rate of 91 por ciento. En
comparación, nonselective accelerators have an average enterprise success rate of 24
percent and a survival rate of 69 por ciento. The differences are weakly significant, en
el 10 percent level (Mesa 3). Sin embargo, we believe more research is needed to
understand why social enterprise incubators in general are not as selective, y el
extent to which selectivity factors into accelerator performance. We hope to exam-
ine this issue in more detail by encouraging more accelerators to collect data from
their graduate enterprises and by developing a longitudinal dataset of enterprises,
Services
We received data from 52 accelerators globally. We found that the majority of
accelerators provide the same core services: business skills training, mentoring, a
network of partners/customers, and access to potential investors. The only differ-
entiation was whether or not an accelerator provided direct funding to its enter-
prises as part of its program.
Thirty-nine accelerators responded to the question on providing direct fund-
En g. Asombrosamente, we found that accelerators that do not provide direct funding
appear to have higher enterprise survival rates, although the results were not sta-
tistically significant. De término medio, accelerators that did not provide any direct fund-
ing had enterprise survival rates of 84 por ciento, compared to 71 percent among
those that did (Mesa 4, next page).
NETWORKS AND PARTNERSHIPS
As discussed previously, accelerators partner with a wide range of organizations,
including investors (both commercial and impact focused), foundations, universi-
corbatas, corporations, and governments. We found no apparent differences between
accelerators that partnered with the following types of organizations and those that
no lo hizo:
(cid:2)(cid:1)International impact investors
(cid:2)(cid:1)Domestic impact investors
(cid:2)(cid:1)International commercial investors
(cid:2)(cid:1)Foundations
(cid:2)(cid:1)Universities
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Mesa 4. Comparing accelerators that provide direct funding to those that do not
Mesa 5. Comparing accelerators that have partnerships with domestic
commercial investors to those that do not (norte = 40)
(cid:2)(cid:1)Governments
When we compared accelerators that had formal partnerships with “domestic
commercial investors,” such as the local banks, angel investors, and venture capital
funds in their networks, we found differences in the average enterprise success and
enterprise survival rates. In this sample of 40 accelerators, those that had formal
partnerships with these investors had an average 41 percent success rate and 85
percent survival rate. En comparación, accelerators that did not have formal partner-
ships with these types of investors had an average enterprise success rate of 26 por-
cent and an enterprise survival rate of 72 por ciento. The differences in the enterprise
success rate were also weakly significant, en el 10 nivel porcentual (Mesa 5).
It is interesting to note that formal partnerships with impact investors were not
statistically related to enterprise success rates for these acceleration programs, sug-
gesting a potential disconnect between accelerators and investors with similar
impact objectives.
CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS
The number of incubators and accelerators providing tailored support to social
enterprises continues to grow. In many countries, these incubators and accelera-
tors are the first entry point for social enterprises into a broader ecosystem and
impact investing community that can help them grow at a key stage of develop-
mento, creating the opportunity for organizations to play a critical role in bridging
the pioneer gap.
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This study identified several key variables that are related to the success and
failure of accelerators, as well as several key gaps that may be holding back accel-
erator success. We have outlined key findings below and provided recommenda-
tions that reflect these findings.
Partnership with in-country commercial investors matter.
For many impact accelerator graduates, the next step in financing may not be
impact investors—a 2012 Emory-Village Capital study found that fewer than 10
impact investors invested less than $250,000 per enterprise—but traditional com-
mercial investors such as banks, angel networks, and strategically aligned corpora-
tions that find a particular interest in the impact objective of the accelerator. El
form of partnership that generated the greatest difference between enterprise suc-
cess rates was the domestic commercial investor; local investors that were able to
finance ventures but did not necessarily self-identify as impact investors.
Two relevant examples are Nigeria’s Wennovation Hub, which has partnered
with Google Africa in a move to enable all ventures to use Google products to
build their businesses, and Nairobi’s m:Lab, which has partnered with Nokia and
Samsung to help mobile-based entrepreneurs who are developing products to
address needs of the poor. In our own experience, Village Capital is launching a
program with the Pearson Affordable Learning Fund in India to source, accelerate,
and invest in education interventions that support the base of the pyramid.
Selectivity matters.
It stands to reason that the accelerators selecting the best ventures are likely to have
the best results. Various studies on traditional business accelerators suggests that
programs with a lower acceptance rate and more rigorous selection process had a
higher degree of success among their graduate ventures.29 Knowing that most start-
ups fail, accelerators cast a wide net when recruiting ventures. Our research, cual
is consistent with the broader literature on the topic shows that impact accelerators
with a lower percentage acceptance rate have a higher proportion of successful
graduates. This finding provides two actionable steps for accelerators: (1) encima-
resource recruiting so that accelerators are not required, for business model rea-
hijos, to accept substandard ventures; (2) focus on the quality rather than the quan-
tity of entrepreneurs served and develop a rigorous selection process.
Further research could explore the cumulative impact of more selective accel-
erators, as some accelerator programs operate a high-volume, light-touch model
that they believe may lead to less selective cohorts and a higher failure rate, pero
ultimately have a greater impact per dollar invested due to a high volume of grad-
uate ventures.
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Philanthropy is currently necessary for accelerators to survive but is not
statistically related to enterprise success.
Three out of four accelerators rely on philanthropy to survive, y 54 percent of all
accelerator budgets are funded through grants. This finding suggests the following:
(1) impact accelerator business models are not yet proven to the point where they
can develop sustainable revenue streams, and accelerators currently require grants
to fill the gaps they are seeking to address; y (2) most accelerators are providing
resource leverage on philanthropy by complementing grants with sources of
earned revenue. We believe that philanthropy will play a critical role in supporting
impact-focused accelerators in the immediate future. Sin embargo, donors can also
encourage accelerators to explore new revenue streams that will allow them to
become less reliant on grants without compromising their social mission.
Most impact investors are looking to accelerators for investment opportunities
but are not finding them.
Mientras 60 percent of impact investors say they have an informal sourcing partner-
ship with accelerators, 47 percent say they have sourced “zero” portfolio companies
directly from an accelerator. This disconnect reflects a more fundamental chal-
lenge that accelerators face, balancing the business development needs of social
entrepreneurs on the one hand while trying to meet the specific criteria of impact
investors on the other. Investors cite “lack of fit with our investment criteria” as a
primary reason they do not invest in accelerator graduates, suggesting that accel-
erators could do a better job of engaging proactively with investors in the selection
process to develop cohorts that are more ready for follow-on investment.
Accelerators might face a “free rider” problem.
Al mismo tiempo, while the majority of impact investors look to accelerators as a
sourcing mechanism, solo 20 percent help accelerators fund their operations. El
primary reason for this lack of involvement is “mandate fit”—investors do not view
it as their role to support accelerators. In the long run, as cash-strapped accelera-
tor programs try to fund their operations, they may see a “free-rider” problem that
causes a misalignment between accelerators and investors. Accelerators, investors,
and donors need to find a funding model that covers the cost of quality business
acceleration for entrepreneurs, maintains the impact focus, and also generates a
reasonable value proposition for all parties.
We have little systematic data on how accelerators are performing, and many
accelerators are not even collecting data.
These findings are from a sample of 52 accelerators worldwide; sin embargo, nosotros necesitamos
much more data on the effectiveness of incubators and accelerators to assess the
quality of services provided, as well as the importance of selection and networks.
While small for conducting statistical analysis, our sample of accelerators is rela-
tively large, given the current stage and size of the impact investing sector. Nosotros
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Bridging the “Pioneer Gap”
believe that expanding this dataset will allow a more refined, multivariate analysis
of key accelerator success factors.
To assess accelerator performance more fully, we need more and better longi-
tudinal data on the enterprises that receive support, and on those that apply but do
not receive support. Village Capital and ANDE, in collaboration with several key
partners, are currently working with Emory University’s Social Enterprise @
Goizueta to develop a longitudinal database of enterprise performance. This proj-
ect will address the following:
(cid:2)(cid:1)How do entrepreneurs that participate in accelerator programs perform differ-
ently than others?
(cid:2)(cid:1)Are there differences in measurable impact between general/global accelerator
programs and those that focus on specific sectors or regions?
(cid:2)(cid:1)What specific program design choices (related to participant selection, services
provided, and network development) are associated with more positive acceler-
ator impacts?
Over the longer term, this database will allow additional longitudinal analysis
of how various interventions can affect social enterprises at different stages of their
desarrollo.
The majority of accelerators that did not collect data cited a lack of
time/resources for data collection. Most accelerators are startups themselves, y
we recommend that philanthropists or investors who support accelerators also
provide support for data collection/assessment.
Finalmente, ANDE is collaborating with I-Dev International to develop a common
framework to quantify the value created by incubators and accelerators for
investors and enterprises. I-Dev is evaluating and benchmarking six-eight impact
incubators and accelerators, identified through the ANDE-Village Capital survey,
and using this framework to compare the performance of “accelerated” versus “un-
accelerated” SGBs that have received investment. Through this analysis, we hope
to quantify the monetary value created for both SGBs and investors by comparing
the costs associated with deal sourcing, due diligence, investment cycle, advisory
services, and probability of exits.
We believe this broad, multipronged initiative will provide significant value for
the enterprises, incubators, and funders that support accelerator services. Nuestro
work will provide answers to critical questions and thus allow entrepreneurial
firms to make more educated decisions about whether to join an incubator and, si
entonces, which one. It will inform accelerator managers about best practices and provide
mechanisms to improve their performance. Finalmente, foundations, investors, y
development institutions will be able to assess the impact of their investments and
identify strategies to scale or replicate successful incubator models.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on this research, we recommend several actions for various players in this
ecosystem: incubators and accelerators, impact investors, foundations, and aca-
demics.
For Incubators and Accelerators
(cid:2)(cid:1)Invest in platforms and systems to encourage and enable quality data collection
from the enterprises you support,
(cid:2)(cid:1)Collect data from all enterprises that apply to your programs, even those that are
not accepted or do not receive services, to assess performance against a control
group more comprehensively. Simple data-collection processes can be built into
your application form.
(cid:2)(cid:1)Collect data from participating enterprises for at least five years post-graduation
to track progress and growth over the medium to long term. The impact of accel-
erator support can take several years to materialize.
(cid:2)(cid:1)Partner with academic institutions and industry associations to develop stronger
data-collection systems.
(cid:2)(cid:1) Strengthen your processes for searching and sourcing ventures for your pro-
gramos. Being in a position to select the top ventures without compromising qual-
ity matters.
(cid:2)(cid:1)Develop more rigorous, multistage selection processes, drawing from best prac-
tices in other sectors. Engage other ecosystem members, such as investors, foun-
dations, and technical experts, in the selection process so that you are building a
cohort that aligns with the needs of upstream financers.
(cid:2)(cid:1)Build networks with the local financial sector, particularly domestic commercial
investors, which may be able to directly support a plurality or majority of your
graduates more readily than impact investors.
(cid:2)(cid:1)Build networks with corporate supply chains, both domestic and international.
Enterprises need not only investment but access to markets.
(cid:2)(cid:1)Explore other revenue streams such as investment closing fees and direct invest-
mento.
For Impact Investors
(cid:2)(cid:1)Leverage the networks and reach of incubators and accelerators, and collaborate
with them to strengthen your pipeline and explore potential areas for improved
alignment in their activities.
(cid:2)(cid:1) Build formal partnerships with accelerators that are closely aligned with your
investment strategy and that have strong performance records.
(cid:2)(cid:1) Invest in accelerators with either time or money. Accelerators will be more
inclined to deliver you the deal flow you’re asking for as a customer if you help
them do the work they are trying to do.
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Bridging the “Pioneer Gap”
For Foundations
(cid:2)(cid:1) Support the development and continuation of best practices among successful
accelerators and incubators by contributing to their operations, development of
performance management systems, and dissemination of their results.
(cid:2)(cid:1)Emphasize quality of services over quantity of entrepreneurs served when sup-
porting incubator and accelerator grantees.
(cid:2)(cid:1)Build stronger networks between investors and incubators to enhance ecosystem
eficiencia.
(cid:2)(cid:1)Provide support for accelerators to track enterprise performance.
For Academics
(cid:2)(cid:1)Focus on developing methodologies to assess incubator and accelerator perform-
ance more effectively.
(cid:2)(cid:1)Conduct empirical research on key success factors for incubators and accelera-
tores, including an analysis of the quality of services, the relevance of the selection
proceso, and the effects of strong partnerships and network.
APPENDICES
Organization Names (in alphabetical order)
1. Agora Partnerships*
2. Angels Initiatives
3. Artemisia*
4. Betaspring
5. Global Accelerator Network
6. Bethnal Green Ventures
7. BiD Network*
8. Capital Innovators
9. Dasra*
10. Eleven Accelerator Venture Fund
11. Endeavor*
12. Endeavor Global*
13. FATE Foundation*
14. Fledge
15. Global Catalyst Initiative*
16. Global Social Benefit Incubator*
17. Groundwork Labs
18. GrowLab
19. GrowthAfrica/The GrowthHub*
20. Hired By Society
21. HUB Vienna Incubation
22. iAccelerator, Centre for Innovation Incubation and Entrepreneurship, IIM-
Ahmedabad
23. ImpactAmplifier
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24. Incubate
25. Intellecap (Intellectual Capital Advisory Services Pvt. Limitado.)*
26. Invest2Innovate*
27. Investment Ready Program
28. iStarter
29. LGT Venture Philanthropy Foundation*
30. metro:lab East Africa
31. Mara Foundation
32. Mozilla WebFWD
33. National Collegiate Inventors and Innovators Alliance
34. NESsT*
35. New Ventures India*
36. NewME Accelerator
37. Nxtp Labs
38. Panzanzee
39. Sinapis Group
40. StarCube
41. Startupbusiness
42. good.bee
43. Startup Farm
44. StartupYard
45. SURF Incubator
46. Tree Labs
47. UnLtd India
48. Unreasonable Institute
49. Village Capital*
50. Wennovation Hub
51. Villgro*
52. Z80 Labs Technology Incubator
* ANDE Members
Organization Names (in alphabetical order)
1. Accion Venture Lab*
2. Adobe Capital
3. Anavo
4. Angel Ventures Mexico
5. Annona Sustainable Investments BV
6. Bamboo Finance*
7. Creas
8. EcoEnterprises Fund*
9. eVA Fund
10. Ferd Social Entrepreneurs
11. Good Capital
12. Gray Ghost Ventures*
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Bridging the “Pioneer Gap”
13. GroFin *
14. Injaro Agricultural Capital Holdings
15. Insitor Management
16. Inversor Fund *
17. Invested Development
18. Jacana Partners *
19. LGT Venture Philanthropy*
20. Lundin Foundation*
21. ManoCap
22. Oasis500 (Oasis Ventures 1)
23. Oikocredit USA
24. Peery Foundation
25. PhiTrust Partenaires
26. Pomona Impact
27. Renewal2 Investment Fund
28. RSF Social Finance
29. Small Enterprise Assistance Fund (SEAF) *
30. SITAWI-Finance for Good
31. Social Venture Fund
32. TBL Mirror Fund
33. Unitus Impact *
34. Unitus Seed Fund
35. Vox Capital *
36. Voxtra *
37. Willow Impact Investors*
* ANDE Members
1. Y. Saltuk, A. Bouri, A. Mudaliar, and M. Pease, Perspectives on Progress: The Impact Investor
Survey. Nueva York, Nueva York, EE.UU: j. PAG. Morgan and Global Impact Investing Network, 2013.
2. h. Koh, A. Karamchandani, y r. katz, From Blueprint to Scale: The Case for Philanthropy in
Impact Investing. Nueva York, Nueva York, EE.UU: The Monitor Institute and Acumen Fund, 2012.
3. R. Baird, h. Hedinger, and C. Seekins, Bridging the Gap: The Role of Accelerators in Impact
Invertir. Atlanta, Georgia, EE.UU: Village Capital, 2012.
4. METRO. Kubzansky, A. Cooper, and V. Barbary, Promise and Progress, Market Based Solutions to Poverty
in Africa. Cambridge, MAMÁ, EE.UU: Monitor Group, 2011.
5. Y. Saltuk, A. Bouri, A. Mudaliar, and M. Pease, Perspectives on Progress: The Impact Investor
Survey. Nueva York, Nueva York, EE.UU: j. PAG. Morgan and Global Impact Investing Network, 2013.
6. In traditional business sectors, incubators and accelerators generally focus on different stages of
enterprise development. Incubators typically serve earlier stage enterprises (pre-customers and
pre-revenue), while accelerators support enterprises with existing customers and revenue.
Sin embargo, we have found that these differences are less distinct for the impact investing sector. Para
the purposes of this paper, we will use the term “accelerator” to describe an organization that pro-
vides some subset of the support outlined in the previous paragraph.
7. Over the past 30 años, several terms have been used to describe market-based solutions to social
problemas: “social entrepreneurship,” popularized by Bill Drayton, the founder of Ashoka; “impact
investing,” pioneered by the Rockefeller Foundation and GIIN; “bottom of the pyramid” business-
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es, coined by Prahalad and Hart; and several others (p.ej., “triple-bottom-line investing,” “inclusive
business”). Given that accelerators typically aim to serve both enterprises and investors, for this
report we use the terms “impact investing” and “social enterprise” to encompass all business activ-
ity that seeks to use markets to address social problems, as well as investment strategies that proac-
tively seek social/environmental returns in addition to financial returns.
8. R. Baird, h. Hedinger, and C. Seekins, Bridging the Gap: The Role of Accelerators in Impact
Invertir. Atlanta, Georgia, EE.UU: Village Capital, 2012.
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Critical Analysis of Effectiveness Approaches and Performance Measurement Systems,” paper
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in Evaluating Business Incubator
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Chrisman, and K. Vesper, “Some Problems in Using Subjective Measures of Effectiveness to
Evaluate Entrepreneurial Assistance Programs.” Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 26, No. 1
(2001): 37-54.
10. R. Lalkaka and J. obispo, Business Incubators in Economic Development: An Initial Assessment in
Industrializing Countries. Nueva York, Nueva York, EE.UU: United Nations Development Programme,
1996.
11. Hacket, S. METRO. & D.M. Dilts (2008). “Inside the Black Box of Business Incubation: Study B – Scale
Evaluación, Model Refinement, and Incubation Outcomes,” The Journal of Technology Transfer,
33, 439-471.
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Incubators: an Application of the PROMETHEE Outranking Method,” Environment and
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12. Vanderstraeten and Matthyssens “Measuring the Performance of Business Incubators,” op cit.
13. A. Chandra and T. Fealey, “Business Incubation in the United States, China and Brazil: A
Comparison of Role of Government, Incubator Funding and Financial Services.” International
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Aerts, PAG. Matthyssens, and K. Vandenbempt, “Critical Role and Screening Practices of European
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Screening Practices”; Lumpkin and Ireland, “Screening Practices of New Business Incubators.”
16. h. Haapasalo and T. Ekholm, “A Profile of European Incubators: A Framework for
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17. R. Ferguson and C. Olofsson, “Science Parks and the Development of NTBFS: Location, Survival
and Growth.” The Journal of Technology Transfer 29, No. 1 (2004): 5-17; h. Löfsten and P.
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18. A. S. Amezcua, Boon or Boondoggle? Business Incubation as Entrepreneurship Policy. Whitman
School of Management, Syracuse University, 2010.
19. t. F. R. A. de Oliveira Are They Helping? An Examination of Business Incubators’ Impact on
Tenant Firms. Twente, Países Bajos. University of Twente, 2011.
20. Vanderstraeten and Matthyssens, “Measuring the Performance of Business Incubators,” op cit.
21. We received 37 responses for this question (71 percent of the sample).
22. Aspen Network of Development Entrepreneurs, 2012. ANDE 2012 Impact Report. Washington,
corriente continua, EE.UU. The Aspen Institute.
23. Aerts et al., “Critical Role and Screening Practices,” op cit.
24. We excluded two outliers that have 60- and 84-month engagement periods. If we include those
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organizaciones, the average duration would be over nine months.
25. Forty-three accelerators responded to this question (83 por ciento).
26. Vanderstraeten and Matthyssens, “Measuring the Performance of Business Incubators,” op cit.
27. The independent sample t-test is used to compare averages for two groups of cases (p.ej., for-prof-
it/nonprofit), to see if any differences are statistically significant. A result may be significant at
el 10 por ciento, 5 por ciento, o 1 nivel porcentual, which means that you are 90 por ciento, 95 por ciento, o
99 percent sure of a difference between the means in this sample, respectivamente. We provide sam-
ple means for various categories, along with sample sizes in parentheses.
28. t. F. R. A. de Oliveira Are They Helping? An Examination of Business Incubators’ Impact on Tenant
Firms. Twente, Países Bajos. University of Twente, 2011.
D.N. Allen “Business Incubator Life Cycles”, Economic Development Quarterly, 2(1), 19-29 (1988)
29. S. METRO. Hackett & D.M. Dilts, “A Systematic Review of Business Incubation Research," Diario de
Technology Transfer, volumen. 29, No. 1, páginas. 55-82. 2004; Khalid et al., “Investigating the Underlying
Components”; Aerts et al., “Critical Role and Screening Practices”; Lumpkin and Ireland,
“Screening Practices of New Business Incubators,” op cit.
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