Philip Auerswald y Jenny Stefanotti
Integrating Technology and
Institutional Change
Toward the Design and Deployment of
21st Century Digital Property Rights Institutions
If you ask any economist what drives the development of human societies over the
long term, you are likely to get one of two answers: technological change and inno-
vación, or institutions, notably those that enable the definition and defense of for-
mal property rights.1 While the individual importance of each of these factors is
largely uncontested, the interaction between the two is almost unstudied.
Granted, human societies existed for millennia before the development of for-
mal property rights—deeds, títulos, and the like. In some societies, the very concept
of private property is still almost alien. Yet in the absence of both robust informal
mechanisms to structure social relationships and formal mechanisms to establish
clear ownership over goods, the incentive to engage in economic exchange is
severely attenuated. Después de todo, how is it possible to engage in exchange if the parties
involved do not know who owns what, or what is implied by a trade? Además,
without property rights, individuals have less of an incentive to engage in produc-
tive activities and invest their assets to create economic value.
Property rights also are crucial to the functioning of credit markets, dónde
individuals and businesses pledge assets as collateral; credit markets in turn are a
key to economy-wide growth.2 For these reasons, wherever societies have grown
and informal mechanisms for tracking reputations have become strained, the def-
inition and enforcement of formal property rights have correspondingly increased
in importance.
Over the past 25 años, economists and policymakers have increasingly recog-
nized the role played by institutions in general, and property rights in particular,
Philip Auerswald is an associate professor of public policy at George Mason
University and an advisor to the Clinton Global Initiative. He is the author most
recently of The Coming Prosperity: How Entrepreneurs are Transforming the
Global Economy. He is the co-founder and co-editor of Innovations.
Jenny Stefanotti is a fellow at Stanford’s d.school. She was formerly at Google and is
a graduate of the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
© 2013 Philip Auerswald y Jenny Stefanotti
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in the process of economic development. The impetus for this new emphasis has
come from both the core and the edge of economic theory. Iconoclastic Peruvian
economist Hernando DeSoto is one of the most prominent advocates of the impor-
tance of property rights in economic development and alleviating poverty. In his
book The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails
Everywhere Else, he states:
Property, entonces, is not mere paper but a mediating device that captures
and stores most of the stuff required to make a market economy run.
Property seeds the system by making people accountable and assets fun-
gible, by tracking transactions, and so providing all the mechanisms
required for the monetary and banking system to work and for invest-
ment to function.3
Although organizations such as DeSoto’s Institute for Liberty and Democracy have
sought to persuade governments around the world to advance development by
reforming their formal property rights institutions, the outcomes for which
DeSoto and his allies have advocated have been slow to materialize, a pesar de
increased appreciation among development professionals of the importance of
property rights. Cumbersome processes persist, making economic “formalization”
more costly than it’s worth for many impoverished households and small-scale
empresarios. Además, enforcement is often lacking, which results in expensive
and time-consuming judicial processes that render formal property rights institu-
tions of little use to individuals and businesses. More to the point is the fact that,
in many places, incumbent elites who advance narrow interests have sought to
obstruct rather than embrace systematic improvements to property rights sys-
tems.4
Why have reform efforts failed to yield more satisfactory outcomes? In this
essay, we consider several of the challenges of formal institutional reform. Nosotros
argue that the current environment of technological possibility provides opportu-
nities for significant improvements to formal property rights institutions. Nosotros
believe that appreciation for the manner in which technology sets the context for
the documentation, validation, and enforcement of property rights has been lack-
En g, both in theory and in practice. In this context, technology not only refers to
the physical hardware required to maintain a formal property rights registry—
paper filing systems, computers, mobile phones, etc.—but also to the specific orga-
nizational routines that enable the hardware to function. Además, we note
that a property rights system has multiple components, each of which may use a
different technology. These include systems to communicate the existence of rights
and to share instructions with potential users; the registry itself; a mechanism or
set of mechanisms for validating claims and resolving disputes over claims; y,
finalmente, a method for enforcing valid claims. Changes in the underlying technolo-
gies and institutional structures used in any of these subsystems can alter the effec-
tiveness of a property rights system in the near term and affect development out-
comes in the longer term.
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Integrating Technology and Institutional Change
Our objective, entonces, is to consider how technology interacts with the evolution
of institutions, in particular those related to property rights. This is not just an aca-
demic question. Today the frontier of technology is reaching the majority of the
world’s population, notably but not exclusively in the form of mobile handsets.
Increased connectivity in even the least developed countries, coupled with the pro-
liferation of mobile phones, presents an opportunity to bring improvements to for-
mal property rights process-
es in the developing world.
This may create exceptional
opportunities to accelerate
institutional evolution and
advance
desarrollo
through the purposive appli-
cation of technological inno-
vación.
A property rights system has
multiple components, each of
which may use a different
tecnología. . . . Changes in the
underlying technologies and
institutional structures used in
any of these subsystems can alter
the effectiveness of a property
rights system in the near term
and affect development
outcomes in the longer term.
In section one we outline
the theoretical relationships
between formal property
rights and social develop-
mento, and between techno-
logical innovation and social
desarrollo, offering select
empirical evidence to sup-
port this conjecture. In sec-
tion two we discuss various
obstacles to realizing the
social benefits that can be
derived from formal proper-
ty rights—in essence, why we have not seen the “property rights dividend” shared
equally around the world. In section three we get to the heart of the discussion,
describing the interaction between technological innovation and property rights
and the importance of that interaction for development. We conclude in section
four by outlining the mechanisms through which the current generation of tech-
nological innovations might accelerate institutional evolution related to property
rights, and thereby yield substantial development dividends.
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND TECHNOLOGY-BASED INNOVATION
AS DRIVERS OF DEVELOPMENT
Property Rights and Development
To the extent that the development of a society is about the ability of people in that
society to meet their aspirations and to live long, healthy lives, a system of proper-
ty rights does not, in and of itself, represent development. Sin embargo, property rights
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enable exchange and encourage entrepreneurial initiative, which in turn advance
substantive, human development.
In a useful survey of the relevant literature, Timothy Besley and Maitreesh
Ghatak define four primary mechanisms through which property rights enable
exchange and encourage entrepreneurial initiative: (1) decreased risk of expropri-
ación; (2) lower cost, due to a reduced need to allocate resources to defend proper-
ty; (3) facilitation of the gains from trade; y (4) the ability to use property to sup-
port other transactions, credit in particular:
(cid:2)(cid:1)Expropriation risk. As the risk of expropriation increases, individuals are less
likely to benefit from the increased output resulting from productive activities or
investments. This in turn reduces the incentive to increase production inputs. Por
reducing the risk of appropriation, established individual property rights can
lead to higher output and productivity. Reducing expropriation risk is particu-
larly important for entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurial opportunity is arguably
greatest where market failures are greatest, but a lack of appropriability of returns
due to weak enforcement of property rights undermines incentives to engage in
entrepreneurial activities.
(cid:2)(cid:1) Defensive labor. When expropriation risk is high due to insecure property
rights, producers may choose to allocate labor to defending property. Este
increases the cost of production and reduces the labor supply for productive
activities.
(cid:2)(cid:1)Trade. Classical economics also emphasizes the notion of specialization, dónde-
in individuals focus their efforts in areas where they have an advantage in the
marketplace. A requisite of this specialization in the marketplace is the presence
of trade, which cannot take place without recognition of changes in ownership
and agreed upon rights over property.
(cid:2)(cid:1) Credit markets. The link between formal property rights and credit markets
presents a particularly compelling narrative for the economic benefits of proper-
ty rights. The logic is as follows: When individuals or businesses have formal title
to their assets, those assets can be pledged as collateral. This in turn eases credit
constraints and lowers interest rates for lenders. Formal titles can interact with
credit markets via other mechanisms as well. Por ejemplo, lenders may be more
likely to extend credit where property rights are strong, because borrowers then
can be expected to have higher future wealth due to a reduced risk of expropri-
ación. Formal titles also may function as a useful signaling device.5
These theoretical links between property rights and economic development
have been the subject of extensive research. With respect to expropriation risk,
Besley, Abhijit Banerjee, Lakshmi Iyer, and others have found evidence of
increased incentive to invest in rural settings.6 Erica Field identifies a causal rela-
tionship between formal property rights and inputs, as well as defensive labor allo-
catión, in urban Peru.7
Although there is some evidence of the link between credit supply and formal
property rights, there is considerable debate about whether the relationship holds
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Integrating Technology and Institutional Change
for impoverished households, due to the modest value of their assets and the small
size of the loans they seek.8 In such contexts, securing loans through collateral may
not be the binding factor in accessing credit. The high transaction costs associated
with verifying ownership, collateral processing, and foreclosure may make it unvi-
able to serve poor households, even in the presence of formal titling. Miguel
Carter and Pedro Olinto have found empirical evidence in Paraguay to support
this claim.9
Besley and Ghatak conjecture that the logic of the link between property rights
and the improved welfare of borrowers hinges on assumptions about the compet-
itiveness of the credit market. To test that conjecture in principle, they built a
model for contracting between borrowers and lenders and analyzed the implica-
tions of varying degrees of competitiveness in the credit market, as well as distri-
bution of wealth within a society. While their model lends general support to the
notion that the creation of collateral through property rights has positive implica-
tions for productivity, their analysis also finds that “in the presence of extreme
poverty and little competition, increasing property rights registration can actually
lead only to greater exploitation in the credit market because lenders can foreclose
on defaulting borrowers more easily.”10 While these arguments are theory-based,
not empirical, they nonetheless suggest that careful consideration is needed when
seeking to address poverty via the effect of improved property rights institutions
on credit markets.
Technology-Based Innovation and Development
On the surface, the relationship between technological change, innovation, y
development is quite direct. Technological change and innovation enable greater
efficiencies in production, which allows for greater savings and investment, and in
turn further technological change and innovation. Through this virtuous cycle, el
aggregate resources available to a society increase and greater prosperity becomes
attainable.11 New products and knowledge created in the course of production only
enhance this process, as consumers have greater options and producers have new
spaces within which to learn.
There is truth to this standard tale. Investment does drive economic growth in
the long term. Technological change and innovation are the primary mechanisms
by which that happens. Sin embargo, there is much more to the story.
To begin with, technological change cannot take place without organizational
and behavioral change, as the two are intrinsically linked. The more disruptive the
cambiar, the greater the loss experienced within existing organizations. Practices
that were effective in an earlier technological environment become ineffective, y
the institutions that derive their power from those practices lose economic legiti-
macy. Como consecuencia, as a general rule, incumbent institutions have a first-order
interest in obstructing technological change and innovation whenever such change
shifts economic power away from them, as will frequently be the case.12
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Because of their fluidity, sin embargo, new ideas are difficult to suppress.
Advantage-seeking individuals will always search for the best tools. If impeded in
one place, ideas and technologies that have the potential to disrupt existing modes
of economic activity will resurface elsewhere. In the long run, it is through this sec-
ond pathway of economic disruption that technology-based innovation has its
greatest impact on development.13
IMPEDIMENTS TO THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
SUCCESSFUL POLICY INNOVATIONS
While there is compelling evidence that formal systems of property rights, coupled
with technology-based innovation, positively impact development, translating that
evidence into policies that accelerate social development is not an easy task. El
complexities of formal institutions operating at scale, weak capacity in developing
countries, and low demand from citizens all hinder the attainment of desired social
benefits.
Formal Institutional Complexity
Many researchers who provide empirical support for the theoretical links between
property rights and economic development conducted their analysis in informal
institutional settings. Por lo tanto, while the studies provide compelling evidence of
the need for formal property rights reform, it is critical to understand the increased
complexity of formal institutional settings.
Informal institutions generally operate on a small scale, typically at the village
nivel. They involve a limited number of individuals who often have direct person-
al relationships. These characteristics have profound implications for the dynam-
ics of the system. Information is passed easily through such informal institutions,
as individuals tend either to hold relevant information themselves or have knowl-
edge of and access to those who do. This keeps the cost of verifying pertinent prop-
erty rights information low. Since most actors know each other, the cost of dishon-
oring contracts is high. An informal setting also lends itself to low enforcements
costos.
Contrast this with formal property rights systems, which typically operate at
the national level. This creates problems of operation at scale that are less present
in informal environments. Organizations are physically distributed, so personal
relationships are unlikely to exist between those who enforce property rights and
the citizens who enjoy their benefits.14 The relevant information for the system is
vast and far beyond what any single individual or set of individuals can know.
Physical distance and the lack of personal relationships increase the cost of gather-
ing and verifying information, which often is held in paper records. Because the
system isn’t dominated by a tight network of social connections, a breach of con-
tract has a lower cost in terms of local reputation but potentially greater negative
impact on the defaulting party if it the breach documented and accessible over an
entire administrative domain. In addition to increasing the operational complexi-
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Integrating Technology and Institutional Change
ty of execution, operating at scale creates additional principal-agent relationships
that invite corruption. Once a culture of corruption takes hold within formal insti-
tutions, it is difficult to revert to an efficiently functioning state.
Low Capacity
The complexities of executing at scale within a formal institutional construct are
further stressed when capacity is limited, as typically is the case in developing
countries. In this context, this system not only faces inherent complexities at scale,
it attempts to execute with far fewer resources and far less human capacity than is
óptimo. Como resultado, service to the end user is weak, and the system opens itself up
to corruption. We see this in developing countries, Por ejemplo, when it takes an
excessive amount of time to register property. In such circumstances, ancillary
services often take hold, where a case can be prioritized for an additional fee.
Low Demand
Despite the existence of formal property rights institutions, many property owners
may choose to remain extralegal. This can be attributed to ignorance about the
benefits of formality or to the costs of formality outweighing the benefits.
Low demand is indeed a significant issue, as evidenced in a recent study of the
urban titling program in Peru. The study reveals that, despite the granting of for-
mal titles, subsequent transactions are rarely registered, which compromises the
benefits of formal property rights. Of the plot transactions studied that involved a
change in ownership, solo 21 percent were registered.15 Molina finds that when
simplified procedures and reduced fees are not in place, the likelihood of register-
ing a transaction falls significantly.16
OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE
FORMAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS
Any formal system of property rights is based on some technology—whether the
technology of paper records and file cabinets or of digital records and computer
almacenamiento. For property rights systems, technology-based innovation has the poten-
tial to improve social outcomes by lowering costs, increasing reliability, y
expanding access.
There are numerous pathways within formal property rights institutions
through which information and communications technologies can achieve these
objetivos. These include improved efficiency of titling and registration processes,
lower enforcement costs, reduced discretion between principals and agents within
the system, and lower transaction costs in credit markets.
Improved Efficiency of Titling and Registration Processes
As demonstrated by Molina’s research in Peru, the cost of the registration process
is strongly and negatively correlated with the probability that property transactions
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Philip Auerswald y Jenny Stefanotti
Mobilizing Property Rights
What could a technology-enabled 21st-century property rights institution look
como? One possibility is a global network of property registries hosted on secure
systems that can be accessed and updated via mobile phone from any village,
town, or city in the world. The creation of a cloud-based platform for the digiti-
zation of national property rights registries could pick up where the institution-
al reform initiatives undertaken by Hernando DeSoto’s Institute for Liberty and
Democracy left off: unlocking investment and entrepreneurial initiative in
places where informal property claims currently are the rule rather than the
exception. In places where governments are interested in economic inclusion,
the availability of such a platform would provide a powerful new inducement to
upgrade existing property rights systems. In places where governments are not
interested in economic inclusion, such systems could provide an extranational
substitute for national, paper-based systems when such systems are unreliable or
corrupt.
Could a network of property rights registries in the cloud really substitute
for national, paper-based systems? The question may be less “if ” than “when.”
Innovations such as Wikipedia, Ushahidi, and OpenStreetMap have demonstrat-
ed the power of open cloud-based systems to generate large-scale, authoritative
bases de datos. The creation and maintenance of such databases is no longer the
exclusive domain of governments and large corporations, nor is it an activity
restricted to rich countries. Thanks to the near ubiquity of mobile phones and
cloud computing, citizen-based creation and validation of large-scale databases
may be on the way to becoming an everyday global reality.
will be registered. Paper-based systems persist in many parts of the developing
world today, resulting in cumbersome and expensive processes; in Senegal, para
ejemplo, registering a property takes an average of six procedures, 122 días, y
costos 20.3 percent of the property’s value.17
The efficiency of titling and registration processes can be greatly improved by
the use of information and communications technologies. Por ejemplo, the infor-
mation required for titling and registration can be stored in a single directory and
accessed easily by the relevant government agencies engaged in the process.
Citizens also can use technology to update records virtually, greatly reducing the
cost of doing so.
The government of Rwanda recently digitized its National Land Centre. Como un
resultado, the number of days it takes to register a property fell from 371 a 55, y el
cost of registration fell from 10 por ciento a 0.4 percent of the property’s value.18
Decreased Cost of Enforcement
The benefits of formal property rights are limited in many places, due to the inabil-
ity of the state to enforce contracts and adjudicate contract disputes. According to
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Integrating Technology and Institutional Change
the World Bank Doing Business Report, which measures contract enforcement
broadly, it takes 1,420 días, 46 procedures, y 39.6 percent of the cost of a claim
to formally enforce a contract in
India.19 Such realities render for-
mal property rights institutions
essentially useless.
Thanks to the near ubiquity
of mobile phones and cloud
computing, citizen-based
creation and validation of
large-scale databases may be
on the way to becoming an
everyday global reality.
As with titling and registra-
tion processes, information and
communications
tecnologías
have the potential to greatly
reduce the cost of enforcing con-
tracts. Por ejemplo, a technical
solution would create the ability
to centralize all relevant property
claim documentation in a single
lugar, making it easier to resolve
disputes. Sophisticated analysis
of claims and supporting data could yield the segmenting of claims, which could
then inform operational efficiency improvements within the courts.
Reduced Discretion
The cumbersome processes for titling, registration, and enforcement that are the
norm in many developing countries also create opportunities for corruption, como
property owners are willing to pay bribes to accelerate what would otherwise be
prohibitively costly processes. Each face-to-face interaction between citizens and
bureaucrats provides an opportunity for public officials to exact payments. The use
of technology can eliminate steps that otherwise would require person-to-person
interactions, such as updating records. Al hacerlo, corruption may be inhibited.
Reduced Transaction Costs in Credit and Other Markets
As some of the empirical evidence summarized above demonstrates, la capacidad de
secure loans via collateral sometimes is not the primary path to credit. This is par-
ticularly true for impoverished rural and urban households, where landholdings
are modest and transactions costs for serving loans are high.
Information and communications technologies lower transaction costs for
lenders. Por ejemplo, a single property rights registry made accessible to third par-
ties would enable banks to verify ownership documentation at a very low cost.
Such technologies could address the high costs of collateral processing, foreclo-
sure, and resale, issues that make lending to the poor unviable. New technological
opportunities could also enable radically low-cost forms of operation, much like
M-PESA in Kenya. Además, any third party could potentially access official
information without needing to interact with a person.
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Philip Auerswald y Jenny Stefanotti
INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION
FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS
We noted at the outset that economists who study economic growth and social
development tend to be divided between those who emphasize institutions20 and
those who emphasize technology.21 As a result, the best studies of long-term devel-
opment by economists end up looking a lot like institutional determinism or tech-
nological determinism. Similarmente, development strategies overwhelming empha-
size either technology-centric “projects” or institution-centric “reforms.” Few stud-
ies or strategies elucidate the complex processes by which technology, institutions,
and societies co-evolve.
Sin embargo, pathways for making progress in development almost inevitably
involve both institution- and technology-based innovation. Absent institutional
ruptura, technology projects are unlikely to effect lasting change. Absent tech-
nological disruption, institutional reform will fall short of its potential. In the long
run, development depends on the regular creation of disruptive, technology-based
institutions.
The design and deployment of 21st-century digital property rights institutions
are well within the boundaries of technical feasibility. The foregoing suggests that
the creation of such institutions would be greatly beneficial, if not transformative,
if and when accomplished on a global scale.
Expresiones de gratitud
We thank Sean Gorman, Bob Litan, and Sean McDonald for the contributions they
made to this essay through multiple conversations.
1. A third answer, prominent in early development and resurrected at the end of the 1990s by Jeffrey
Sachs, asserts that geography is a central determinant of development outcomes. Ver, for exam-
por ejemplo, John Luke Gallup, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Andrew D. Mellinger, “Geography and Economic
Desarrollo,” Harvard Center for International Development working paper no. 1, Marzo 1999.
2. Although classical economists such as Adam Smith recognized the fundamental role of property
rights in a market economy, the welfare theorems that are at the core of neoclassical theory assume
that private property rights are not just well defined but also enforced without cost. That is not to
say that property rights were ignored by 20th-century economists. Coase famously described how
property rights constituted a precondition for efficiency in privately negotiated outcomes, incluir-
ing those involving economic externalities; Ronald H. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,"
Journal of Law and Economics 3 (1960): 1-44. Demsetz went further, exploring the manner in
which a transaction in the marketplace can be interpreted simply through the exchange of bun-
dles of property rights; Harold Demsetz, “Toward a Theory of Property Rights,” The American
Economic Review 57, No. 2 (Puede 1967): 347-359. Other significant contributors to the literature on
property rights and economic development include Steven Cheung and Armen Alchian.
3. Hernando DeSoto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails
Everywhere Else. Nueva York: Libros Básicos, 2000, pag. 63.
4. For the generalization of this point, see Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing
Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships. Nueva York: Libros Básicos, 2000.
5. Timothy Besley and Maitreesh Ghatak, “Property Rights and Economic Development,” LSE
STICERD research paper no. EOPP006, Febrero 2009, pag. 5.
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Integrating Technology and Institutional Change
6. Abhijit Banerjee and Lakshmi Iyer, “History, Instituciones, and Economic Performance: El
Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India,” MIT Department of Economics working paper
No. 02-27 (Junio 2002); Timothy Besley, “Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Teoría y
Evidence from Ghana,” The Journal of Political Economy 103, No. 5 (Octubre 1995): 903-937.
7. Erica Field, “Property Rights and Investment in Urban Slums,” Journal of the European Economic
Asociación 2, No. 3 (2005): 279-290; “Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply
en Perú,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 122, No. 4 (2007): 1561-1602.
8. Ver, Por ejemplo, Erica Field and Maximo Torero, “Do Property Titles Increase Credit Access
among the Urban Poor?” unpublished manuscript, 2006.
9. Michael R. Carter and Pedro Olinto, “Getting Institutions ‘Right’ for Whom? Credit Constraints
and the Impact of Property Rights on the Quality and Composition of Investment,” American
Journal of Agricultural Economics 85, No. 1 (2003): 173-186.
10. Timothy Besley and Maitreesh Ghatak, “The DeSoto Effect,” unpublished manuscript, Abril
2009.
11. The original articulation of this idea is found in Keynes “Economic Possibilities for our
Grandchildren," pag. 30, published in John Maynard Keynes, Essays in Persuasion, Nueva York: W..
W.. norton & Co., 1963, páginas. 358-373. Ramsey presented the first formal model of economic
growth, though it lacked an explicit technological dimension; Frank P. Ramsey, “A Mathematical
Theory of Saving,” The Economic Journal, 38, 152 (1928): páginas. 543-559. Solow and his contempo-
raries were the first to explicitly study the role of technological change in economic growth;
Robert Solow, “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,” Quarterly Journal of
Ciencias económicas 70, No. 1 (1956): 65-94; “Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function,"
Review of Economics and Statistics 39 No. 3 (1957): 312-320.
12. Jose Schumpeter, Capitalismo, Socialismo, y democracia, Nueva York: Harper & Fila, 1942.
13. Philip Auerswald, The Coming Prosperity: How Entrepreneurs Are Transforming the Global
Economy. Nueva York: prensa de la Universidad de Oxford, 2012.
14. This is not to say that personal relationships are not relevant or significant in the functioning of
formal, bureaucratically administered systems. Personal relationships do indeed hold between
administrators within a bureaucracy, but not throughout the entire organization. Civil servants
almost never have connections with constituents outside of transactions related to property
rights.
15. Oswaldo Molina, “Titling without Registration: Quietly Undermining the Property Rights
Reform,” unpublished manuscript, 2012, pag. 3.
16. Molina, “Titling without Registration," pag. 18.
17. Banco mundial, “Registering Property,” June 20, 2012. Disponible en
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/registering-property.
18. IFC, “Rwanda Land Registration,” June 20, 2012. Disponible en
http://www.icfafrica.org/news/1145/rwanda-land-registration/?cid=47.
19. Banco mundial, “Enforcing Contracts,” June 20, 2012. Disponible en
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/enforcing-contracts.
20. Ver, Por ejemplo, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power,
Prosperity, and Poverty. Nueva York: Crown Books, 2012.
21. Paul Romer, “Increasing Returns and Long Run Growth,” Journal of Political Economy 94, No. 5
(Octubre 1986): 1002-1037; “Endogenous Technological Change,” Journal of Political Economy
98, No. 5 (Octubre 1990): S71-102.
innovaciones / volumen 7, number 4
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