Once upon a Time I was - IA de Investigación especializada en el MIT

Érase una vez yo era
a Nuclear Physicist.
What the Politics of
Sustainability can Learn
from the Nuclear
Laboratory

Gert Goeminne
Vrije Universiteit Brussel

This paper keeps pace with my personal history as a researcher: starting from
the eagerness for knowledge of the nuclear physics PhD student I once was,
continuing with my search for social relevance in policy-preparatory research
I subsequently performed as a sustainability scholar, it ªnally leads to the
topics of interest for the hybrid philosophy-sociology researcher I am today.
Following these traces, I ªrst of all rethink my life as a physicist in terms of
science as a necessarily situated and engaged practice before laying bare the
baleful scientisation of politics in sustainability discourse. Finalmente, I sketch
the contours of a genuine politics of sustainability by repositioning the enigma
of scientiªc production at the heart of its practice.

Preamble
“Once upon a time I was a nuclear physicist”; it reads like the beginning
of a fairy-tale and at the moment I started my PhD in experimental nu-
clear physics at Ghent University (Bélgica) en 1997 it also felt like a
dream that came true. Since I was a high school student I had been fasci-
nated by physics and more particularly by the idea that physics would lead
me to a fundamental understanding of “Life.” Indeed, I wanted to under-
stand what the world is made of and why the world is as it is. Or to put it
in Heidegger’s words, taken over from Leibniz, I wanted to understand
“why there is something rather than nothing” (Heidegger 1949). At that
tiempo, physics seemed to me the most obvious and profound way to pursue

It is a pleasure to dedicate this paper to Don Ihde. I owe a great deal to his early encourage-
ment in pursuing my own way. I am also grateful to Filip Kolen who is an invaluable
source of topical criticism to my work and in particular to this article. I thank Robert
Scharff for his insightful comments on an earlier version of this paper and the anonymous
referees for their remarks and suggestions. This work was supported by a postdoctoral fel-
lowship of the Research Foundation—Flanders (FWO).

Perspectives on Science 2011, volumen. 19, No. 1
©2011 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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Once upon a Time I was a Nuclear Physicist

such a quest. Starting a PhD in nuclear physics, in those days still consid-
ered the queen of sciences, with the prospect of doing experiments in
the world’s leading experimental facility, CERN, felt like entering God’s
fábrica: at last I would get to understand what the world is made of. Él
turned out slightly different. As I see it now, and as I will explain in more
detail further on, I ended up, not in God’s factory, but in a human factory
of facts. Very unsettling for me was that my fundamental questions did
not seem to matter in this factory. Together with more reºexive questions
on the scientiªc practice, my questions about the nature of the facts we
produced were deemed irrelevant: the facts were the facts. So, after ªve
years of producing and publishing scientiªc facts (p.ej., Goeminne et al
2000 and Goeminne et al 2002), I set out looking for a research position
with “social relevance.” That is how I left the evident path of an academic
career in nuclear physics and got engaged in policy-oriented research at
the Centre for Sustainable Development of Ghent University, where soci-
etal issues are addressed in a multidisciplinary approach integrating both
environmental and social perspectives (p.ej., Gerlo et al 2003; Paredis et al
2009). I worked for ªve years on the interface between science and policy:
based on scientiªc facts, produced in some human factory of facts, I now
produced policy relevant knowledge, often summarized in the form of
concrete policy recommendations. Throughout these ªve years of so-called
“boundary work” (Jasanoff 1990), I was confronted with a problematic as-
pect of the science-policy interface in sustainability issues: scientiªc facts
were regarded as untouchable and absolute in environmental disputes,
leaving no room for any non-scientiªc arguments. Here again, the facts
were the facts. At that point, things started to fall into place. I saw that
the reºexive questions I had posed about the epistemological and ontolog-
ical status of scientiªc knowledge when I was producing facts in the nu-
clear laboratory are of crucial importance and relevance when looking at
the role of scientiªc knowledge in the political organization of society. I
got convinced that, as Latour phrases it, “the enigma of scientiªc produc-
tion must be repositioned at the very core of political ecology” (Latour
2004a, pag. 4).

In this paper I want to follow up on Latour’s call through a meticulous
unraveling of the research questions that have guided my personal “reposi-
tioning trajectory.” In this respect, I will not so much treat my nuclear
physics history as a (laboratory) case study.1 Rather, I will draw on my per-
sonal history in order to show how an enduring interest in the questions of
ciencia, rather than in the answers it provides, brings the inherent politi-
cal dimension of “science in the making” to the fore. So, in the ªrst part I

1. Although this would certainly be interesting in its own respect. See further.

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Perspectives on Science

present three types of fundamental questions I had about the experimental
practice in the nuclear laboratory and elaborate how these questions give
rise to my account of knowledge production as a necessarily situated and
engaged activity. In the second part I will try to show how this “engaged
knowledge” view gives rise to reframing the science-policy interface be-
yond the fact-value dichotomy. What seem worlds apart should be re-
garded as two of a kind. Although it repudiates its inherent normative
personaje, science is through and through political in the way knowledge
production enables and constrains human choice. Analogously, politics ig-
nores its objectifying nature although its attempts to order society in-
struct a worldview that enables and constrains possible orderings of na-
tura. To conclude this introduction I want to mention that in a very
particular but important sense, I do not see another way to present my
current research topics than in such a historically structured approach. En
line with the account of engaged knowledge I will elaborate in this paper,
they are the non-neutral results of my historical engagement: interests,
such as research topics, do not ºoat free in a vacuum; they are always con-
nected to a contingent history that, ex-post, gets the status of a necessary
historia. In my view, this autobiographical trajectory adds weight to the
paper’s central argument: how could I argue for a questioning of science’s
questions without questioning my own?

1. Engaged Knowledge in the Nuclear Laboratory: Upon Entering God’s
Factory and Finding a Human Factory of Facts
Como se ha mencionado más arriba, in the autumn of 1997 I entered what I thought was
the gate to God’s factory, the world of nuclear physics. Aquí, ªnally, I
would discover the fundamental laws and entities that make up the world.
Noteworthy (and I will come back to this later), the world of nuclear
physics is a world ªlled with not only human beings but also technologi-
cal artefacts such as particle accelerators, nuclear reactors, particle detec-
tores, electronics, and computers. In a ªrst step however, I will brieºy ex-
plain what I did during my stay in this world in a naïve realistic way,
taking for granted the meaning and interpretation that nuclear scientists
give to the phenomena encountered there, without questioning the way
human beings make sense of the phenomena in the nuclear laboratory, y
how this sense-making is possible after all. Or to put it in Kuhnian terms,
I will be taking for granted the paradigm of experimental nuclear physics.
Tal como, it will be a realistic account in terms of neutrons, protons, alfa
particles and atomic nuclei interacting with each other as if billiard balls
were colliding in front of my eyes. This paradigmatic, non-critical account
will not only set the stage for further reºections, it also gives a feel for the

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Once upon a Time I was a Nuclear Physicist

obvious character, the taken-for-grantedness of the absolute perspective
científicos, or at least part of them, believe to hold.

1a. What Happens in the Nuclear Laboratory? An Account from
Within the World of Nuclear Physics
The title of my PhD dissertation reads as follows: “Investigation of the
(norte,pag) y (norte,(cid:2)) reactions on 36Cl, 37Ar and 39Ar and their astrophysical rele-
vance” (Goeminne 2001). Starting from this title, I will try to explain
what I did during my PhD, beginning with the term “astrophysical rele-
vance.” Is there any astrophysical relevance for nuclear physics, one might
ask? En efecto, it is now commonly believed that all elements occurring in
naturaleza, es decir. those to be found in Mendeljev’s Periodic Table, have been pro-
duced through nuclear reactions either early on during the Big Bang or
later on in stars and the interstellar medium. “We are all stardust” is a
much-quoted sentence that phrases the idea that all the chemical elements
that make up our bodies, p.ej. carbon, iron, etc.. . . were created billions of
years ago in the hot interiors of remote and long-vanished stars. Nuclear
astrophysics, at the interface of nuclear physics and astrophysics, es el
branch of nuclear physics that deals with explaining the formation, via nu-
clear reactions, of all the naturally occurring chemical elements in the
universe. In this naïve realistic interpretation, one can say that nuclear
astrophysics—quite literally—tries to understand what the world is made
of and indeed deals with the fundamental questions that led me to physics
in the ªrst place (see Preamble). I will come back to this point later, cuando
speaking of topical truth (see 1.c.3. On topical truth and co-constitution)
Stellar nucleosynthesis theory, es decir. the theory that aims at explaining
the natural abundance (prevalence) of the chemical elements and their dif-
ferent isotopes2 is on a ªrm basis now. Big Bang and stellar models indeed
show how, starting from a certain amount of Hydrogen created during the
Big Bang, all elements, going from Helium to Uranium, can be produced
through nuclear reactions.3 However, a few “problematic elements” re-
principal; es decir. elements for which the production mechanisms, es decir. the nuclear
reactions, are not fully understood. One of these problematic elements nu-

2. An element or atom, which is deªned by the number of protons in its nucleus, poder
have different stable isotopes, differing in the number of neutrons contained in its nucleus.
This is made clear by mentioning the number of neutrons as an upper index. S (sulphur)
contiene 16 protons and has four different stable isotopes. The isotope containing 36 neu-
trons in its nucleus is thus symbolized by 36S. This isotope has a natural abundance of
0,02% of the total S abundance.

3. For an encompassing overview of nucleosynthesis theory, the reader is referred to the
classic volume of Rolfs and Rodney entitled Cauldrons in the Cosmos, the title indeed sug-
gesting the idea of a theory of origins (Rolfs et al 1988).

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Perspectives on Science

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Cifra 1. The nucleosynthesis network in the region between Silicium and Cal-
cium. Shown is the myriad of possible nuclear reactions taking place in stellar in-
teriors and transforming one isotope into another. (taken from Goeminne 2001)

clear astrophysics fails to reproduce in its stellar model calculations is the
neutron rich sulphur isotope 36S. This isotope took centre stage in my PhD
research where I tried to solve the puzzle of the origin of the 36S isotope by
investigating some missing elements in explaining its production mecha-
nism.

En figura 1 one can see a schematic picture of the model we used in re-
producing the 36S abundance in nucleosynthesis theory. As an illustration
of how to “read” such a “nucleosynthesis network” one can see for instance,
following the arrows that lead to 36S in Figure 1, that 36S is directly pro-
duced through three different neutron induced reactions,4 es decir. 35S(norte,(cid:3))36S,
36Cl(norte,pag)36S and 39Ar(norte,(cid:2))36S. Por supuesto, the ªnal abundance of 36S will—to
a certain extent—be dependent on all the possible reactions in this net-
work as all of them, either directly as illustrated above, or indirectly
inºuence the abundance of this isotope. So, if one wants to calculate the

4. Writing down a nuclear reaction where a projectile i interacts with a target nucleus
X producing a product nucleus Y and an ejectile e, is commonly done as follows: X(i,mi)Y.
39Ar(norte,(cid:2)) 36S should thus be read as the nuclear reaction of a neutron interacting with a
39Ar nucleus producing a 36S nucleus and an alpha particle.

Once upon a Time I was a Nuclear Physicist

ªnal abundance of 36S that is reproduced through this model one basically
needs the following input data:

• The probabilities of all the nuclear reactions involved as a func-

tion of the stellar temperature

• Stellar parameters such as stellar temperature and neutron den-

sity

• The abundance of the so-called “seed nuclei,” i.e. nuclei already
present in the star at the moment that the myriad of reactions
depicted in the model starts to take place

As mentioned before, the abundance of 36S has not been reproduced ad-
equately through this model, which basically leaves the following options:

• The stellar parameters are wrong
• The abundances of the seed nuclei are wrong
• The probability of the nuclear reactions involved are wrong
• The model is wrong which would put stellar nucleosynthesis

theory in question

The ªrst two types of data, es decir. stellar parameters and seed nuclei abun-
dances, are well known from stellar observations.5 So, within the paradig-
matic contours of nucleosynthesis theory, es decir. leaving stellar nucleosynthe-
sis theory unquestioned, one is left with the hypothesis that the reaction
probabilities are not correct. As a few of them had never been experimen-
tally determined before and for which up to then theoretical estimates had
been used, we decided to experimentally measure the probabilities of a few
reactions of the nucleosynthesis network which play an important role in
the production of 36S: 36Cl(norte,(cid:2))33PAG, 36Cl(norte,pag)36S, 37Ar(norte,(cid:2))34S, 37Ar(norte,pag)37Cl
and 39Ar(norte,(cid:2))36S. In brief, we tried to reproduce these nuclear reactions in
the laboratory in order to study its properties. En particular, we wanted to
obtain the reaction probability as a function of the energy or, traducido
back into astrophysical terms, how likely it is that a certain nuclear reac-
tion will take place at a certain stellar temperature.

How this was done in the laboratory is schematically depicted in Fig-
ura 2 showing the experimental setup. A beam of neutrons, produced in a
linear accelerator (LINAC), is aimed at a target (respectively 36Cl, 37Ar or
39Ar) that is contained in a detector. The latter is a so-called Frisch-grid
Ionization Chamber (FIC), the inside of which is shown in Figure 3.

5. In a terminology that will be further elaborated, one could say that these are “stable”
scientiªc facts. Fundamental questions may be posed concerning “stellar observations” in
the same line of the questions I will pose regarding “nuclear physics observations.” How-
alguna vez, I will not elaborate further on this point here, as it is not relevant for my story, de este modo
taking for granted the “correctness” of these types of data.

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Perspectives on Science

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Cifra 2. A schematic picture of the general experimental setup used through-
out my PhD research. (taken from Goeminne 2001)

When a neutron hits e.g. the 37Ar target, and the 37Ar(norte,(cid:2))34S reaction
takes place, un (cid:2)(cid:4)particle is emitted out of the target foil (contained in
the cathode (C)) into the ionization chamber where it deposes its energy
and comes to rest. Through this ionization process, the proton energy is
transformed into electric signals on both the anode (A) and cathode (C),
which are further given shape by a lot of electronics (pre-ampliªers (Pensilvania),
ampliªers (A), time-coder (TC), analog-to-digital-convertor (CAD)) ser-
fore being fed into a computer-based Data Acquisition System (DAC).
This results in so-called energy spectra for both the interacting neutrons
and the ejected alpha particles.

En figura 4 one can see such an energy spectrum for the emitted alpha
particles from the 37Ar(norte,(cid:2))34S reaction studied in Goeminne et al (2000).
From such a spectrum the amount of reactions that took place can be
deduced by selecting the “relevant events,” events being represented by
the dots in the spectrum. In this case the rectangular bump in the upper
right corner represents the relevant 37Ar(norte,(cid:2))34S reactions whereas the
bumps in the lower and upper left corner are due to irrelevant alpha parti-
cles and protons resulting from neutrons interacting with so-called “con-

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Once upon a Time I was a Nuclear Physicist

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Cifra 3. Picture of the inside of a Frisch-grid Ionization Chamber (FIC). De
bottom to top, one can identify respectively the aluminum entrance window, el
cathode containing the target, the Frisch Grid and the anode. (taken from
Goeminne 2001)

taminations” present in the detector. The singular points spread out all
over the spectrum are attributed to non-differentiable, irrelevant back-
ground events. Accounting for the non-relevant contamination and
background events then ªnally allows calculating the reaction rate for
this reaction. This data gathering process has to be averaged over several
days or even weeks in order to get statistically relevant, reliable results.
Throughout the experiment, the external conditions (pressure in the ionis-
ation chamber, working parameters of the accelerator, etc.) are constantly
monitored and kept stable. The same procedure, with some slight adjust-
mentos, was followed for all ªve reactions under study. The reaction rate
data so obtained were then fed back into the stellar nucleosynthesis model.
The new data changed the value of the “produced” 36S abundance slightly,
but the model reproduced still only 2% of the natural abundance. Este
leaves the quest for the origin of 36S open. Either new nuclear reaction data
are needed or otherwise another production model for 36S has to be looked
para. The latter would change our understanding of how 36S is produced in a
star and thus also our understanding of what a star is and how it works.

To conclude this report on my experimental life it is noteworthy that at
that time, the kind of pseudo-scientiªc language I have been using here

Perspectives on Science

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the 37Ar(norte,(cid:2))34S reaction studied in
Cifra 4. The energy spectrum for
Goeminne et al. 2000. The abscissa and ordinate respectively depict the cathode
signal pulse height (VC) and the anode signal pulse height (Virginia). (taken from
Goeminne 2001)

was almost my natural language within the laboratory. It was indeed com-
pletely normal to talk in terms of neutrons hitting protons as if we were
talking about billiard balls hitting each other on a billiard table in front of
our eyes. This was how we made sense of what we did. Ahora, alguno 10 años
más tarde, I have a hard time adopting this language once more. Using this lan-
guage now, I can no longer make sense of what I did then. So, from now
en, I am changing to a discourse in which I think I can make sense of it.

1b. Questioning Laboratory Practice: Cómo, What and Why?
Once entered in God’s factory, I progressively became aware that the fun-
damental questions I had been posing to myself and which had led me to
the study of physics in the ªrst place would never ªnd an adequate re-
sponse there. También, more reºexive questions regarding the practice of nu-
clear physics were typically deemed as irrelevant or non-scientiªc.
Looking back, I now see that my questions from that time can be ordered
under three typologies: How-questions related to the practice of experi-

Once upon a Time I was a Nuclear Physicist

mental nuclear physics, es decir. “How does nuclear physics work?"; Qué-
questions related to the metaphysics of experimental physics, es decir. “What is
it that nuclear physics is about?” and Why-questions related to the rele-
vance of nuclear physics, es decir. “Why should we engage in nuclear physics?"
Abajo, I expand on these three categories of questions, adding some typi-
cal autobiographical examples.

• How-questions
This category contains questions about the social and technological con-
texto, es decir. the experimental community and its machinery and its role in
the production of scientiªc knowledge: “(cómo) do we interfere in an exper-
mento?,” “are we neutral observers?,” “what does it mean to be neutral?,"
or “(cómo) do the technological instruments play a role in the scientiªc
práctica?” Such questions were put aside, taking for granted the non-
interestedness, the neutrality, es decir. the objectivity of scientists and techno-
logical artefacts: “we do not interfere in the experiment.” More speciªc
questions often dealt with the experimental practice such as: “how do you
know when an experiment is running well?” or “how do you know that a
certain electronic signal is not relevant?” The typical reasoning in tackling
this sort of question went as follows. As long as the experiment is not sta-
bilised, the electronics is said to produce “jitter” or even “rubbish” and
viceversa. Calling a phenomenon jitter or rubbish is equivalent to saying
that it is not worth considering it as a fact. An experiment that is not sta-
ble is not reproducible and can thus not deliver facts: the general require-
ment of objectivity in science seems to boil down to one of reproducibility
in experimental (nuclear) física.

• What-questions
This type of question deals with the content of the observations made and
more speciªcally with the reality of the scientiªc facts, p.ej., “what is it
that we observe when we look at an energy spectrum?” and “are neutrons
real?” Questions like these were easily put aside. A veces, in a wave of
open-mindedness, it was argued that these kind of questions might be in-
teresting for philosophers but not for physicists. More often a more defen-
sive stance was taken using an argument as “what are we doing here if you
doubt that neutrons are real?” And once in a while, you got a rather offen-
sive reply saying: “Would you like to put your head into a neutron beam
to see if they are real?"

• Why-questions
Aquí, questions regarding the (social) relevance of nuclear physics are at
stake, p.ej., “Why are we doing this?,” “Why is this interesting?” The clas-

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Perspectives on Science

sical answer here goes as follows: “You should not bother about such ques-
ciones; the fact that we do not bother about the social relevance of our work
is a precondition to perform fundamental physics work; we can only be in-
terested by the truth, eso es, by the objective facts we discover. It is ex-
actly our non-interestedness that guarantees good science and objective
knowledge that, though this is not our business, eventually, in one way or
otro, will deliver for society.” In that respect, I have always found it re-
markable and even funny that almost every scientiªc paper contains a
párrafo, often entitled “motivation,” in which it is explained why the
research reported on is interesting (Ver, p.ej., Goeminne 2000). Estos
kinds of motivations lack any reference to the lifeworld and generally
evolve along the following pattern: “this nuclear physics research is inter-
esting because it delivers fundamental nuclear physics knowledge” or,
more in line with my own PhD project “because it is of importance for a
better understanding of nucleosynthesis theory.” In my present view this
boils down to saying “physics is interesting for physics.” There may be
nothing wrong with an interest in scientiªc knowledge just for its own
beneficio, but then I do not understand why physicists, who proclaim that
non-interestedness is a necessary condition for good scientiªc work, do feel
the necessity to torture themselves by writing such a motivation. In my
present view (see following section 1.c.: The co-constitution of objectivity
and subjectivity: knowledge production as a necessarily situated and en-
gaged activity), this claim for non-interestedness as a necessary quality for
good scientiªc work should rather be interpreted as an interest in itself, como
a particularly interested and “engaged” way of looking at the world.

The latter point is also what ties my own how-, qué- y por qué-
questions together. At a certain point during my PhD, neutrons no longer
existed for me (what-question) in the sense that the way the neutrons were
supposed to reveal their existence (how-question) no longer made sense to
a mí. As I see it now, this was precisely because I no longer had an answer
to the why-question; I no longer saw the sense in studying the world
from this “non-interestedness” perspective. And vice versa: as electrons
no longer revealed their existence to me through the experimental proce-
dure, I could no longer see the interest in studying nature the way we
did. In searching for a way out of this impasse and for an answer to
my how-, qué- and why-questions, I progressively became aware of
other ªelds of research where these kinds of questions are not deemed
as irrelevant or non scientiªc, in particular in philosophy of science and
tecnología, and in science and technology studies. Engaging with Don
Ihde’s Instrumental Realism (1991), which situates itself on the interface
between philosophy of science and philosophy of technology, was a rev-
elation to me: I realized that my questions did matter and were interest-

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Once upon a Time I was a Nuclear Physicist

ing.6 This encounter set me off on my journey away from the world of do-
ing science into the world of thinking about science. This journey has now
come to a point where my original questions have grown into an account
of science as the necessarily situated and engaged activity I will elaborate
on below.

1C. The Co-Constitution of Objectivity and Subjectivity: Knowledge
Production as a Necessarily Situated and Engaged Activity

1.c.1. On Technological Mediation and Co-Constitution In classical philoso-
phy of science, science does open the gate to God’s factory: scientiªc theo-
ries are indeed considered as straightforward representations of nature,
with experiments providing “empirical data” to verify or falsify those the-
ories. Sin embargo, as I mentioned before, the world of experimental nuclear
physics is above all a world ªlled with human beings and modern, special-
ised technological artefacts such as particle accelerators and detectors: es
a human factory of facts. With the work of Kuhn, a substantial criticism
on the neutrality of scientiªc practice was formulated (Kuhn 1962). En
Kuhn’s analysis, social factors can play an important role in the decision
process between alternative paradigms. Post-Kuhnian thinking, in partic-
ular social constructivism, has concentrated on the social context of
scientiªc knowledge. Such a one-sided social-contextual approach of scien-
tiªc practice however, does not allow for a symmetrical, critical analysis of
the social constitutive elements of science (Latour 2005). In the con-
structivist approach, social aspects such as values, interests and concerns
are treated as a priori’s, black-boxed and as such excluded from further
análisis. In the same line, social constructivism has mostly neglected the
essential role that scientiªc artefacts (particle detectors, accelerators, etc.)
play in delivering the facts; it has always reduced this technological di-
mension, in its alleged neutrality, to human agency and thus to the social
contexto. Philosophy of technology of recent decades however offers some
important insights that fundamentally question the neutrality of technol-
ogy in its relation to individual human beings and society as a whole.

6. This work of Ihde not only opened the gate to his whole oeuvre, but also to a broader
development in philosophy of science that Ihde himself has called “instrumental realism”
(Ihde 1991). Ian Hacking, Bruno Latour, Andrew Pickering and Peter Galison are amongst
the scholars Ihde mentions in this context: all of them have taken seriously the role of
scientiªc instrumentation in the constitution of knowledge. In the following it may be
clear that my own account of knowledge production in the nuclear laboratory inscribes it-
self in this development. In this respect, a detailed laboratory study of my own nuclear
physics experience could be of great interest, providing for instance an opportunity to con-
trast Ihde’s postphenomenology and Latour’s Actor-Network-Theory. As already men-
cionado, sin embargo, this lies beyond the scope this paper.

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Perspectives on Science

Since the “empirical turn,” the totalitarian approach viewing technology
as an autonomous system has been challenged by a more differentiated
view focussing on the role speciªc technological artefacts play in human
actions and experiences (Achterhuis 2001). In Ihde’s philosophy of “tech-
nological mediation,” technological artefacts co-constitute reality (Ihde
1990, páginas. 72–123). Por un lado, they mediate how human beings are
present in their world, by shaping their actions and existence; and on the
otro, they mediate how the world is present to human beings, by shaping
human experiences and interpretations of reality (Verbeek 2005). In my
vista, this is perfectly applicable to the nuclear laboratory. The whole ex-
perimental setup, ranging from the particle accelerator over the ionization
chamber detector to the data acquisition system, can indeed be interpreted
as one big imaging technology producing spectra that need to be inter-
preted before anything relevant can be said about the world. Adopting
Verbeek’s terminology, one can discern the “hermeneutic dimension” of
technological mediation here: the experimental setup mediates the way
the world is experienced and interpreted in the laboratory (Verbeek 2005).
O, switching again to Ihde’s words: the experimental set-up acts as a
“hermeneutic device” (Ihde, 1999). But more can be said when we shift
our focus away from a “stable” and “interpretable” experiment to the prac-
tice of setting up an experiment. Aquí, technological artefacts are always
involved in a typical cyclic process of designing-testing-adjusting-testing.
Pickering refers to this process in terms of “resistance and accommoda-
tion” (Pickering 1995): you set up an experiment based on an existing
theory, o, in the case of a revolutionary phase of science, a preliminary, hy-
pothetical theory. But an experiment never works from the ªrst time: ya-
ture resists, por así decirlo. So, in a next step, you adjust your experimental
setup, es decir., your technological apparatus and, in the case of a revolutionary
phase of science, you may also want to change your theory: You try to ac-
commodate the resistance of nature by adapting your experimental setup
both in its instrumental embodiment as in its theoretical, hermeneutic in-
terpretation. And then you test again and so on and so on. Eventualmente, este
results in a stable, reproducible state in which valid observations can be
performed. At this point of stability, of reproducibility, everything falls
into place: the technological artefact takes its ªnal, “stable” shape: él
“works” and the scientiªc knowledge takes its ªnal, stable shape: es
“valid”; it is “objective.” From this description of how reproducibility
comes into being it should become clear that I interpret this particular ob-
jectivity, es decir. reproducibility, as the crystallisation, the sedimentation, de un
situated stabilization process. In this respect, the objective reality of phys-
circuitos integrados, p.ej. neutrons, is constituted in a situated scientiªc activity: neutrons
are the crystals which grew out of a complex stabilization process in which

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Once upon a Time I was a Nuclear Physicist

situated humans, máquinas, and objects continuously constitute each
otro. In the next paragraph, building on the Kuhnian paradigm concept,
I want to elaborate on how the constitution process of an objectivity, is in-
trinsically coupled to the constitution of a subjectivity.

1.c.2. On Kuhnian Paradigms and Co-Constitution In Kuhn’s interpreta-
ción, a paradigm is mainly responsible for the theory-laden character of
observación (Kuhn 1962). The content of observation is co-determined by
the theoretical presuppositions; theory gives “mere” facts an interpretation
and meaning. I would like to take this one step further and regard a para-
digm as a necessary condition of possibility for observing facts. In my
vista, a paradigm is what makes it possible to “see” facts; it co-constitutes
the facts and as such it shapes the content of the resulting scientiªc
conocimiento. This interpretation of Kuhn’s paradigm is in line with Hus-
serl’s notion of perspective (Husserl 1970). According to Husserl’s view,
el (subjetivo) perspective is truly constitutive for objectivity: the objec-
tive world is not given as such, but is the result of a process of transcen-
dental constitution. Whereas Husserl’s constitution process is however
still bound to an absolute ego-pole, I am adhering to a more dynamical va-
riety which is in line with a postphenomenological account, developed by
Ihde and further elaborated by Verbeek in a technological context (Ihde
1995; Verbeek 2005). Aquí, objectivity is no longer seen as originating
from the autonomous activity of an a priori given subjectivity. Bastante,
both subjectivity, es decir., the paradigm and its accompanying objectivity, son
mutually co-constituted in the process that “discriminates” them.7 Obvi-
iosamente, I am talking about “ªrst,” “revolutionary” experiments: una vez
“ªrst” experiment stabilizes, both the paradigmatic rules and their accom-
panying objectivity are institutionalized. En este sentido, objectivity is not
something external, something to be found “out there”; it is constituted
in the situated genesis of a paradigm and crystallises out at the point of
stability. From then on, a new member of this particular paradigmatic sci-
ence should ªrst adopt this paradigm before he can “see” its accompanying
objects. One has to become engaged—just as I had to adopt the experi-
mental neutron physics paradigm before I could “see” alpha particles and
protons in the bumps in an energy spectrum (Cifra 4). When I was ªrst
confronted with such a spectrum, there was no way I could make any sense
de ello. Someone, es decir., an experienced scientist, had to make clear what

7. In this respect, there is a certain sense in which Ihde, although restraining from any-
thing like a Husserlian transcendental ego, can be thought of as having developed a more
radical version of Husserl’s constitution account. For Ihde, not only the objective world but
also the pole of subjectivity has to be “bracketed” or “suspended.”

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Perspectives on Science

counts as relevant or not: “look, estos (pointing at the bump in the upper
right corner) are the alpha’s we are looking for and maybe here (apuntando
at the smaller bumps in the lower left corner) are some protons, but it may
also be alpha’s from a 10B(norte,(cid:2)) contamination which is always present in
our detection system although we don’t know where it comes from.” This
“becoming aware” of what counts as relevant or not within the nuclear
physics perspective is what I would call “becoming engaged.” It took
months and even years to grasp the whole chain of technological media-
tions and hermeneutic interpretations that precedes the interpretation of
an energy spectrum in terms of relevance. But once you get engaged and
have adopted the paradigm, it becomes natural and it even becomes dif-
ªcult to imagine another possible way of interpreting these spectra: allá
is no other way than to view a particular bump as “consisting” of, p.ej., Alabama-
pha particles. So, I needed to adopt the paradigm of experimental nuclear
physics in order to make sense of what happened in the laboratory. Es
important to mention here that these energy spectra are already processed
data and have thus already been touched by the paradigm of experimental
nuclear physics. I could have gone one step further back and show images
of the electric signals on the oscilloscope. What I can however not do is go
back to “pure” observed phenomena, as I argue that such things do not ex-
ist: you cannot make sense of the world without some kind of a paradigm.
Taking back the original “how, what and why” typology of questions I
developed earlier regarding my life as a nuclear physicist, it may be clear
that up till now I have elaborated on an account of science as a situated
practice which takes the intertwinement of the how and what questions as
a central feature. There is no priority between practice and knowledge. I
see technologically embodied science, such as experimental nuclear phys-
circuitos integrados, as a stabilization process of which both the scientiªc objects and the
technological artefacts are crystallisation products. In elaborating on this
account of experimental physics as a situated activity, it has increasingly
become clear that it is also necessarily wound up with questions of rele-
vance and engagement, with questions of the why-type that deal with the
normative dimensions of scientiªc activity. In the following paragraph I
want to elaborate on this normative dimension, guided by the concept of
topical truth.

1.c.3. On Topical Truth and Co-Constitution In elaborating on the astro-
physical relevance of my PhD research, I referred to the challenge for the
discipline of nuclear astrophysics to gain a complete understanding of how
the chemical elements were formed through nuclear reactions in stellar in-
teriors. If you reºect on the way I described above how nuclear astrophys-
ics tries to do this, you see that what is actually being done is an attempt

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Once upon a Time I was a Nuclear Physicist

to reproduce the abundances of these elements, es decir. numbers, a través de
model calculations. The issue of the origin of the elements is “framed” in
nuclear astrophysics terms: if one claims to understand the origin of a par-
ticular element in nuclear astrophysics, it means that he can “reproduce”
the natural abundance of this element in a model. I do not claim that this
explanation is not valid or incorrect. Bastante, I want to focus on what is be-
ing explained; that is on the “topic” that is being addressed. In the ensu-
ing discussion on paradigmatic “topics” I will build on the concept of top-
ical truth the German phenomenologist Rudolf Boehm has elaborated and
which he has often illustrated by performing a “live” experiment dropping
a book and a sheet of paper simultaneously (Boehm 2002; see also François
et al 2004). When Aristotle, alguno 2400 years ago, looked at falling ob-
jects, he tried to explain why heavy bodies fall faster than light ones. El
Aristotelian theory of gravity states that all bodies move towards their
natural place, which causes heavier bodies that contain more of the ele-
ment of earth, to fall faster towards the earth than lighter ones. Whereas
Aristotle tried to explain why bodies fall the way they do on earth in
terms of the nature of their substance, Galileo, the founding father of
modern experimental science, tried to describe the way bodies fall in
terms of mathematical equations. Based on experiments, alguno 400 años
ago Galileo formulated a mathematical universal law for falling bodies:
s (cid:5) ¤gt2, which says that the distance covered (s) by a free-falling object
is proportional to the elapsed time (t) squared, the proportionality given
by one half of the gravitational constant (gramo). On the basis of this law, Gali-
leo claimed that all bodies, whatever their weight or their substance, caer
equally fast. The point I want to make here is that Aristotle and Galileo,
adhering to different paradigms, were differently engaged in the world,
revealing the world in different ways to them. Whereas Aristotle saw bod-
ies moving towards their natural place according to the nature of their
substance, Galileo saw objects obeying a universal law. Aristotle’s topic
was the movement of naturally falling objects in our daily lifeworld
whereas Galileo was looking for falling objects in artiªcial experimental
conditions in order to reveal a mathematical law. Ahora, according to Aris-
totle, heavier bodies fall faster than light ones, whereas Galileo claims that
all bodies, whatever their weight, fall equally fast. The obvious question
here seems to be: who is right, Aristotle or Galileo? Well, one can do a
small experiment and simultaneously drop a sheet of paper and a book.
Apparently, Aristotle is right. Galileo would however object and say: “My
law concerns free-falling bodies: it is a precise mathematical description of
the trajectory falling bodies follow in the absence of our particular earthly
circumstances.” “Wonderful such a law!” Aristotle would probably reply,
“but what can I do with it as no single object in our lifeworld will ever

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Perspectives on Science

make such a free fall.” So, once again, who was right: Aristotle or Galileo?
Apparently, both were right depending on what question science is sup-
posed to answer: the question about falling bodies on earth or about fall-
ing bodies in an artiªcial, experimental environment. The crucial question
that imposes itself here is not a question of logical truth, es decir., “Who is
bien?” but a question of so-called “topical truth.” The topical question
does not question the truth of the answer to a question; it rather questions
the truth of the question that is posed. It is the question of which objects
are interesting to be known, es decir., “What issue is at stake?” or “What way
of questioning is more adequate?” The point I want to make here is that
the choice between the paradigms of Aristotle and Galileo cannot be de-
cided in terms of logical truth, but only in terms of relevance and ade-
quacy, that is of topical truth. So, rather than questioning the validity of a
scientiªc answer or theory I want to question the scientiªc question itself:
“Is it interesting to reproduce the abundances of the natural elements in
model calculations and if so, why?” or, in terms of topical truth, “What is
the topical truth of nucleosynthesis theory?"

1.c.4. resumiendo: The Carpenter and His Hammer or the Physicist and His
Neutrons
En resumen, the three topics addressed above (technological
mediation, Kuhnian paradigms and topical truth) sketch the contours of
my account of knowledge as a situated and engaged activity. The crucial
point to see is that the normative dimension, es decir., the engagedness of sci-
ence, is already embedded in the situatedness of a particular (scientiªc)
paradigma. Our paradigmatic perspective or “point of view” is the possibil-
ity of our “viewing” and at the same time its constraint: it is what enables
us to see something standing out; at the same time it necessarily con-
strains our sight. If we were not directed by a point of view, if we were not
bound by a paradigm, we would be embedded in one big undifferentiated
ºux where nothing could stand out. All this adds up to a relational ac-
count of our human “being,” i.e., the world is always already revealed to
us through our relations with the world, the human-world relation (o
paradigma) preceding the related entities. This relational ontology also in-
structs an interrelational conception of fact and value as always already re-
vealed through a paradigm, through a particular human-world relation. Él
is for instance useless to talk about the intrinsic value of a hammer, como el
latter depends on the human-hammer relation a particular hammer is in-
volved in. Using a hammer when constructing a house, the world is re-
vealed to me through what could be called a “carpenter paradigm.” Being
involved in the practice of constructing a house, the hammer is revealed to
me as a construction device to ªx planks to a wall. Sin embargo, in a moment
of anger, engrossed in rage, the hammer may be revealed to me as a killing

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Once upon a Time I was a Nuclear Physicist

device. The value of a hammer as a useful construction tool thus depends
on the human-hammer relation or the “carpenter paradigm,” which pre-
cedes both the constitution of the human as carpenter and the hammer as
construction device. Just as the instrumental value of a hammer as a con-
struction device is already contained in the “carpenter paradigm” in the
sense that the latter reveals to a carpenter-in-practice what is relevant
(planks, nails, etc.) and what not (concreto, screws, etc.), so is the “rele-
vance” of the bumps in the energy spectrum as alpha-particles or protons
already contained in the experimental nuclear physics paradigm that al-
lows us to identify “relevant” objects at the cost of ignoring, p.ej., all of the
“background” events which fall out of view of its technologically embod-
ied perspective. The normativity embedded in a particular paradigm is
here thematised by the concept of topical truth. Thematising the topics of
ciencia, rather than its answers, now opens up a space of thought that may
prove enriching in differing contexts. A thorough discussion of the “topi-
cal truth” of the questions of science could for instance constitute a genu-
ine task for a “science critics” Don Ihde has been pleading for (Ihde 1997).
In framing this kind of “topical questioning” the way I do here regarding
my own research topics, I try to make clear how such a “science critics”
should go beyond a one-sided negative debunking and deconstruction ex-
ercise, which merely results in an undermining of the validity of the
scientiªc answers in question. Bastante, it should be understood more posi-
activamente, along the lines of literary criticism: questioning the strength,
belleza, interés, adequacy, etc.. of the scientiªc questions. Además,
turning to the crux of this paper, I will argue in the following part that
the concept of topical truth is capable of opening up a scientiªc-political
acting space in which fact and value no longer have to be seen as mutually
exclusive in addressing sustainability issues.

2. Engaged Participation in a Science-Policy Agora: Repositioning the
Enigma of Scientiªc Production at the Core of a Genuine Politics of
Sustainability
I want to pick up on my personal history here at the point where I decided
to quit the world of nuclear physics. During the course of my PhD, I got
increasingly frustrated with my life as a producer of scientiªc facts. El
story always ended when the experiment got stable and could be repro-
duced. At that point the facts were observed, the data were processed and,
with the aid of stellar model calculations, interpreted in terms of abun-
dances of the natural elements. Eventually all this was concisely reported
in the scientiªc literature. What had fascinated me ten years ago, es decir.,
knowledge for the pleasure of knowledge, started to frustrate me. Or to
state it in line with my account of engaged knowledge: I was no longer

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Perspectives on Science

convinced of the topical truth of nuclear physics and in particular its en-
gagement of non-interestedness in the lifeworld could no longer hold my
interés. Concerned about environmental and social issues, I was particu-
larly bothered by the apparent lack of any social relevance in my work. I
no longer felt at home in a world where non-interestedness in the life-
world and its problems seemed to be a precondition to function well. Eso
is how I set out looking for a job with social relevance: the lifeworld
should come at the centre of my attention. And so it went that I left the
evident path of an academic career in nuclear physics and engaged myself
in policy-oriented research at the Centre for Sustainable Development of
Ghent University where societal “sustainability” issues are addressed in a
multidisciplinary environment.8 Here, research is project-based and char-
acterized by a focus on “policy relevance.” This not only drastically
changed the subject and focus of my research, but also the very way of do-
ing research itself. Whereas in the nuclear laboratory I was guided by the
paradigmatic contours of what counts as valid knowledge, I now found
myself in a world where facts and values are highly intermeshed and where
it is no longer clear what counts as valid knowledge to capture the issue at
stake. I conducted the research line on resource consumption and material
ºows resulting in numerous reports and presentations for local, regional
and national institutions and authorities. This required a continuous ne-
gotiation not only of what has to be researched but also of what kind of
shape this knowledge should have for policy-makers. Throughout these
personal experiences with the intermeshedness of fact and value in my re-
search practice, I increasingly struggled with the reigning ideal of “ratio-
nal decision-making” present in this kind of policy-preparatory work. No
only did I become fully aware of the mere impossibility of separating facts
from values, I further came to experience this ideal as a non-workable,
counterproductive straitjacket. In this kind of work, I was typically sup-
posed to come up with policy recommendations, cual, following the
rational-decision making ideal, had to be—or at least presented as if
being—the inevitable outcome of objective, value-free research. A pesar de
convinced of their relevance and quality, I found it very hard to defend
such policy recommendations for the reason that I had to behave as if these
recommendations were disconnected from the person who produced them.
I felt the need to stand up for these conclusions but was not allowed to do
entonces.

Throughout these ªve years (2002–2007) of “boundary work” at the
science-policy interface, I came to think of this reigning ideal of rational

8. For an overview of the research activities the Centre for Sustainable Development is

involved in, see their website: http://www.cdo.ugent.be

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Once upon a Time I was a Nuclear Physicist

decision-making as one of the main reasons, if not the crux, of the impasse
of the normative project of sustainable development. En el siguiente, I
will ªrst of all elaborate on the roots of this problematic scientisation of
sustainability politics. En segundo lugar, I link this analysis up with my concept of
topical truth in an attempt to get beyond simplistic demarcations be-
tween science and politics. This will allow me to elaborate on what can
only be the ªrst delineations of a politics of sustainability repositioned
around the enigma of scientiªc production.

2a. The Sustainability Impasse Called Rational Decision-Making
For more than 20 años, sustainable development has been advocated as a
way of tackling deeply intertwined global environmental problems and
human development issues such as climate change and poverty. Mientras que la
broad goals have been widely embraced and sustainable development is
now a much quoted policy objective, its implementation seems further
away than ever: the cooperative global environmental governance regime
envisioned at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio is still in its infancy while
neo-liberal economic globalization has become fully operational with en-
vironmental degradation and global poverty still burgeoning. As already
mentioned, it is my view that the crux of this impasse lies in sustainability
politics ªnding itself stuck with its self-proclaimed ideal of rational deci-
sion-making. Aquí, science is regarded as mirroring reality and handing
over the “natural” criteria for sustainability. Environmental problems, de-
ten generated by the products of science, are indifferently framed in
techno-scientiªc terms (CO2 concentrations, temperature rise, etc.) cual
inevitably gives rise to a quest for techno-scientiªc solutions (carbon tax,
CO2 efªcient cars, etc.). Como consecuencia, technology is seen as a neutral
instrument, a “ªx,” which can be employed to solve—scientiªcally
framed—sustainability problems. This approach typically argues for an
eco-efªciency strategy in which a technology push boosts efªciency levels
of natural resource use by a factor 10 y más (Von Weiszäcker et al
1997). Such an expert-focused technological determinism, embedded in a
discourse of ecological modernisation, now acts to marginalise the issues
of human choice involved in putting sustainability into effect and to
downplay deliberation over the socio-cultural practices, behaviours, y
structures such choice involves. As a result of this techno-scientiªc focus,
the need for accordant social change is removed from view, which makes
sustainability all the less likely to occur in practice. This is convincingly
illustrated by the current impasse on climate change that has been created
and maintained by making political action subordinate to a scientiªc
framing of what is in essence a societal problem. The narrow scientiªc fo-
cus on global climate change addresses itself to an undifferentiated global

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Perspectives on Science

“we” and relies exclusively on the authority of science to create a sense of
urgency for structural change (Demeritt 2001, pag. 329). In the absence of
some other basis of appeal, “we” are likely to act as uninvolved spectators
rather than participants in the shaping of our future, making responsible,
sustainable change all the more improbable to occur.

In my view, this problematic is deeply rooted in the metaphysical and
ontological basis our Western society is built on and which also underlies
the naïve realistic interpretation of science that resided in my nuclear lab-
oratory (mira la sección 1): a frame of thought, in which subjectivity and ob-
jectivity are seen as mutually exclusive. Objectivity, Por un lado, es
what science strives for; it is the realm in which truth is to be situated. Ei-
ther our knowledge accurately represents reality—and it is true—or it
does not, and is thus rejected. Subjectivity, por otro lado, relates to
mere personal opinions (preferences, valores, interests) and can never yield
reliable knowledge. It is this strict ontological division between the non-
human object and the human subject and its corresponding epistemology
of represented facts and values (representationalism) that Latour has called
the “Modern Constitution” (Latour 1993, páginas. 13-15). The political order
of the Modern Constitution now takes the form of an arena with two ad-
versaries: the ªrst one, called “science” and armed with powerful, but un-
concerned facts taking all of the important decisions, and the other, called
“politics,” left with nothing but values, full of concern but quite power-
menos (Latour 1998, pag. 104). The ideal of rational decision-making boils
down to an ideal of irresponsibility: science dismisses politics of taking
decisiones. Science cuts politics short.

Attempts to counter this objectivistic dogmatism in epistemological as
well as in political thinking have always reasoned from within this mutu-
ally exclusive fact-value framework of the Modern Constitution. As one of
the most prominent critics of this “objectivism” in the representational
epistemology of the Modern Constitution, social constructivism has con-
centrated on the sociological history of scientiªc knowledge production.
As already argued however, any effort to thematise the subjective embed-
dedness of objectivity comes too late once the dissociation of subjectivity
and objectivity has been (conceptually) established (see 1.c.1. On techno-
logical mediation and co-constitution). Any a posteriori conceptualization
of subjective perspectives or social contexts inevitably leads to a threaten-
ing of the objectivity at stake, and gives rise to relativism. A similar evo-
lution can be observed in political thinking, especially in the context of
sustainability. Starting from the idea that sustainability governance is
emerging as an increasingly scientised and technocratic domain, increased
citizen deliberation and participation in the scientiªc realm have been
proposed to reverse these technocratic features. A call for increased citizen

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Once upon a Time I was a Nuclear Physicist

participation was also strongly voiced at the 2002 Earth Summit in Jo-
hannesburg. Recognizing uncertainty and value-ladenness as elementary
characteristics of sustainability problems, new forms of developing sus-
tainability policies through broadened public participation have been pro-
planteado. Post-normal science (Funtowicz et al 1993) and sustainability sci-
ence (Kates et al 2001) son, besides others, terms used to indicate a
transition towards a new method for dealing with increased uncertainty in
complex sustainability issues by “re-injecting” norms and values into sci-
entiªc practice. Thinking from within the Modern Constitution however,
making room for subjectivity by promoting public inºuence on conven-
tional rational decision-making processes can only be thought of as a
threatening of the objectivity at stake. Just as the reduction of the
situatedness of scientiªc activity to contextual aspects such as values, en-
terests, and concerns does not do right to the truly constitutive and nor-
mative aspect of a scientiªc paradigm, so do participatory approaches
attempting to bring values “back into science” easily lead to a marginali-
sation of lay perspectives (Wynne 1996). At best, this “re-injection” of
norms and values into scientiªc practice results in a negotiated sorting out
of competing interests with scientiªc truth as ultimate executioner. Aquí
participation merely serves to secure the legitimacy and acceptability of
the decisions taken.

In the foregoing, I have tried to make clear that neither fact-centred
technocratic nor value-centred participatory approaches yield the space for
engaged decisions and responsible action towards more sustainable socie-
corbatas. Además, any approach that thinks from within the Modern Consti-
tution is bound to end up as a symptomatic afªrmation of science’s he-
gemony. A crucial point in getting beyond the fact-value dichotomy of
the Modern Constitution is to see how this one-dimensional discussion
leaves the scientiªc questions, es decir., the way science frames environmental
problems and solutions, unquestioned. In the next paragraph, I revert to
my concept of topical truth, introduced in the context of nuclear physics
práctica, to open up a space of thought where the questions of science,
rather than its answers, can be questioned and where science and politics
no longer have to be seen as mutually exclusive.

2b. Topical Truth and the Politics of Engaged Knowledge
Extending the idea of co-constitution and its related conception of science
as a necessarily situated and engaged activity beyond the boundaries of the
nuclear laboratory now opens up a conceptual space where simplistic de-
marcations between science and politics, facts and values, knowledge and
power can be critically assessed and challenged. By introducing the con-
cept of topical truth, I aim to lighten up the normative entanglement be-

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Perspectives on Science

tween the sedimentations of co-constitution, rather than always already
falling back to either of both sides. As the world and its problems do not
present themselves in scientiªc facts, an important starting point is to see
how matters of concern are—through science—always already framed into
matters of fact.9 According to the co-constitution view, scientiªc matters
of fact such as CO2-concentrations or viruses are the objective sedimenta-
tions of a subjective (es decir., scientiªc) engagement, while subjectivity (p.ej.,
the scientiªc norms and preferences) comes into being only as the engage-
ment of that sedimentation. As illustrated by my experience in the nuclear
laboratory, this co-constitution process involves, of necessity, implicit
matters of judgment, priority, choice, and interpretation as the necessary
conditions of the objective sedimentation, the latter often embodied in ex-
plicit paradigmatic scientiªc procedures of abstraction and standardiza-
ción. This scientiªc framing results in a model of the system of interest
couched in terms of “matters of fact.” In the Modern Constitution, este
model is disconnected from its genesis and its validity gets a universal
estado: it is regarded as a true representation of the problem at stake and
serves as the only valid basis possible for policy-making. This disconnec-
ción, sin embargo, blinds us for the inherent normative, es decir., topical, dimen-
sion of scientiªc practice. Considered in the context of its construction, a
model aims to fulªl a certain function, and the choice of function depends
on what kind of knowledge is aimed at and what the model is supposed to
account for and to take into account: a problem is not chosen or given, es
formulated, framed, given shape (Peschard 2007). Latour provides us with
the notion of “circulating reference” to emphasize the aspects of reduction
and ampliªcation involved in such a scientiªc framing process: el representante-
sentational view of the world conveyed by such models renounces many of
the key attributes of the original context, such as materiality, particularity
and locality (reducción), while at the same time amplifying key attributes
of “matters of fact” such as compatibility, standardization and text (Latour
1999, páginas. 24–79).

Rather than conceiving of knowledge in terms of representations of the

9. In contrasting “matters of concern” with “matters of fact,” I gratefully borrow from
Latour’s terminology (Latour 2004b). As I have mentioned in the Preamble, this paper
tries to follow up on Latour’s plea for repositioning the enigma of scientiªc production at
the core of political ecology. In this respect, Latour himself claims that “matters of fact”
should become “matters of concern” again. The other way around, I try to argue here that
“matters of concern” are—in our scientiªc culture—always already framed in “matters of
fact.” Through the concept of topical truth I aim to lay bare the non-neutral, “political”
ways in which this framing takes place, cual, Sucesivamente, opens up the possibility of reform-
ing this political dimension of “knowledge in the making.” I thus try to ªnd a way in
which “matters of concern,” although never given as such, can be adequately framed as
semejante, es decir., as “matters of concern.”

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Once upon a Time I was a Nuclear Physicist

(social or material) world, the co-constitution perspective and its concept
of engaged knowledge now emphasizes the socio-material practices from
and within which these representations arise.10 Such a view then also
changes the way we think about ourselves and our place in the world in
fundamental ways: the world now becomes something that we are embed-
ded in and part of rather than being detached from and merely observers
de, as representationalism suggests. Whereas the latter tends to paint the
“natural world” as an enduring material backdrop to and constraint on our
activities, the concept of engaged knowledge, recognizing the complex
ways in which our practices shape the world, reveals the many potential
conªgurations it may take, dependent on our topical choices and the prac-
tices to which these give rise. An epistemology of engaged knowledge, de-
veloped along the lines sketched above, thus makes convincingly clear
how the practice of producing and applying knowledge has an inherent
political dimension or how, as Jasanoff phrases it, “natural and social order
are co-produced” (Jasanoff 2004). It lays bare for instance how the scien-
tiªc calculations that allow us to shortcut politics are done at the cost of
ignoring all of the externalities that fall out of view of the scientiªc para-
digm (Goeminne and et al forthcoming) or how, the other way around, a
new framing of an issue may reconnect certain externalities that were
shortcut in a former analysis. The latter is illustrated by three subsequent
contributions on resource consumption I co-authored for the annual peer-
reviewed Environmental Report for Flanders, an important basic docu-
ment for Flemish environmental policy (De Ridder et al 2002; Gerlo et al
2003; Gerlo et al 2004). Aquí, we shifted focus away from a classical, local
“end-of-pipe” scope on environmental problems (acidiªcation, erosion,
etc.) to a more integrated assessment in terms of material ºows calling at-
tention to burden shifting and adding an international equity dimension
to national environmental policy. It is here that my current research hy-
pothesis on knowledge production as having an inherent political dimen-
sion initially took shape: the way our approach framed environmental

10. With respect to my reliance on Ihde and his “praxis philosophy” in understanding
the practice of experimental physics (Ihde 1991), Joseph Rouse’s work on practice theory
constitutes an important reference in further elaborating on the normative dimension of
“science in the making” (See Rouse 2002 and Rouse 1996). In developing a “normative”
conception of (scientiªc) practices as constituted by the mutual accountability of their per-
formances (Rouse, 2007), Rouse understands normativity in terms of accountability to
what is at issue and at stake in a practice. Although I touch upon this connection with
Rouse further on, I elaborate in more detail in Goeminne (próximo) on the parallels
that can be drawn between the concept of topical truth and Rouse’s conception of
normativity.

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Perspectives on Science

issues in terms of equity and burden shifting was decisive for the possibili-
ties that were opened up in terms of policy-making.

A crucial step now, which I can only begin to explore here, consists in
employing the insights derived from the non-representational account of
engaged knowledge in the elaboration of the institutional contours to fa-
cilitate social change for sustainability. A full appreciation of how knowl-
edge acts to shape the world in ways that both enable and constrain choice
over the futures available gives us two inherently related starting points:
one related to the issue of participation, the other related to the concept of
topical truth and its concern with the questions of science. En primer lugar, Tiene
already been argued how the Modern Constitution acts to obscure how
collaborations between scientists and non-scientists, by categorising the
latter’s practical and behavioural insights as mere preferences or values,
might put lay insights at work in adequately addressing sustainability is-
sues. Por lo tanto, if sustainability is to be about human choice, y por lo tanto
about the different practices and behaviours such choices embody rather
than about speciªc technological options and trajectories, then engaging
lay people in these terms in addressing the problem at stake is an impera-
tivo (Healy 2004, 200). The second starting point builds on the insight
that the major concern of representationalism, its vain attempts to in-
crease citizen participation in the scientiªc realm, and is focused on the
justiªcation of the answers science provides, eso es, on the efªcacy of
whichever material or social factors are regarded as legitimating the repre-
sentation of concern. Of primary concern to the practice-focused account
of engaged knowledge provided here, sin embargo, is rather an enduring con-
cern with the questions science poses and with matters of adequacy and
relevance. Inspired by the concept of topical truth, true political questions
now take centre stage: What is at issue? To whom and to what does it
asunto? and How can it appropriately and adequately be described?
(Goemine and François 2010, páginas. 119–123).

Building on these two starting points, I suggest the term “engaged
participation” to denote this form of participation that on the one hand fa-
cilitates collective understandings, embodying a diversity of insights, y
por otro lado, is reºexively occupied with the topical question. In my
account of objectivity, lay knowledge is genuinely integrated, not by cate-
gorizing it as mere values or preferences and in this way paralyzing them,
but by focusing on their role in the “in-between” of the constitution of
objetividad. Analogously, expert knowledge is no longer paralyzed as mat-
ters of fact by granting them an absolute status. Both expert and lay
knowledge are allowed to participate in addressing relevant issues and
what connects them is an enduring concern with the topical question.

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Once upon a Time I was a Nuclear Physicist

Aquí, participation gets a different—“engaged”—status. Engaged knowl-
edge practitioners, lay and expert, participate in the same practice in that
what they do or say is accountable to a measure constituted from within,
in the dynamics of practice, in response to what they recognize as what is
at issue in the practice. As opposed to the image of the arena, as the politi-
cal order of the Modern Constitution where paralyzed facts ªght and win
over paralyzed values due to the superiority of the former in our scientiªc
cultura, I propose the image of the agora as the political order of the co-
constitution ontology. In its broadest sense, an agora, referring to the cen-
tral place in ancient Greek cities where genuine discussion took place, de-
notes a “working space” where engaged participation is made possible: el
agora is constituted as the place where lay and expert knowledge are on
equal footing through their common accountability to the measure of top-
ical truth.

As an illustration of what form such a science-policy agora may take, I
want to refer to a highly unconventional research project I have been in-
volved in at the Centre for Sustainable Development and which has
inspired me in conceiving of “engaged participation.” Funded by the 2003
Policy Preparation Research Programme of the Flemish Interuniversity
Council this project aimed at clarifying the concept of “ecological debt”
and studying its relevance and applicability in Belgian and international
policy.11 Application should be understood here as an attempt at formulat-
ing policy guidelines to address ecological debt nationally and in an inter-
national context of UN negotiations, as well as an attempt at quantifying
part of Belgium’s ecological debt for the energy/climate theme and the ag-
riculture/food supply theme. With respect to other sustainability concepts
such as “ecological footprint” (ver, p.ej., Wackernagel et al 1996) and “en-
vironmental utilisation space” (ver, p.ej., Opschoor et al 1994) cual tiene
been developed in a scientiªc context, ecological debt is quite unique in
the sense that it is a grassroots concept, mainly developed in a campaign-
ing context by NGO’s in ‘developing’ and ‘less developed’ countries.
Within the research project, we tried to stay as close as possible to the
original meanings and interpretations of ecological debt, such as had been
developed in the campaigns. Por lo tanto, we combined a truly multidisci-
plinary team of legal, agricultural, economic and political experts with a
participative approach engaging Southern NGO representatives in discus-
sion and exchange moments. In this way, it became clear to us that ecolog-
ical debt, rather than being a scientiªc concept, should be regarded as a

11. For an extensive report on this research project, the reader is referred to Paredis et al

2009.

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Perspectives on Science

lens through which international relations and sustainable development
policies are seen in a new light, namely from a Southern peoples’ point of
vista. Through ecological debt, the interpretation of sustainable develop-
ment is enriched with typical environmental justice characteristics: un
analysis of power relations and patterns that reproduce existing inequali-
ties is added, with questions such as “who gets what, how much and
why?"; a rights discourse is added, where the right to a clean and safe en-
vironment is deªned as a human right; and a grassroots perspective is
added with a shift in perspective away from abstract sustainable develop-
ment policies to the lives and problems of “real people in real places.”
Most of the scientiªc articles elaborating on ecological debt so far how-
alguna vez, are qualiªed by an attempt to narrow down the concept of ecological
debt, with its richness of non-scientiªc perspectives mentioned above,
into a merely scientiªc one. In the best of scientiªc traditions, thrusting
aside a reºexive conceptual discussion, these elaborations rush forward to
objectiªcation: ecological debt is provided with a uniform deªnition that
allows for a uniform calculation and valuation method. A clear example of
this can be found in a recent paper on ecological debt where the latter is
straightforwardly deªned in quantitative terms as “the environmental
costs of human activities over 1961–2000 in six major categories” (Srini-
vasan et al 2007, 1768). In this way, the paradigm of ecological debt, o-
ganically grown from and intertwined with the lives and problems of “real
people in real places” is irreºexively appropriated by a scientiªc-economic
paradigm ruining the enriching ethical-political perspectives the concept
has to offer. Moreover such an approach inscribes itself in a deterministic
process of rational decision-making cutting politics short at the cost of ig-
noring all of the externalities that are brought to the forefront in the origi-
nal enriching ecological debt discourse. Eventualmente, this short-circuiting
leaves no room for real political, es decir., topical choices towards structural
cambiar.

Although we did also focus on quantifying aspects of ecological debt, él
was precisely what can retrospectively be viewed as an “engaged participa-
tion” approach that guaranteed we did not slide off in a straightforward
quantiªcation effort. In our search for a working deªnition, por ejemplo,
we would come up with a preliminary version, which typically provoked
some resistance from the NGO-voices involved in the project. From this,
we tried to accommodate their concerns and reactions and would come up
with a revised deªnition. And this went back and forth a few times. En
this way we were constantly forced to rethink our own approach, guaran-
teeing a more reºexive way of framing the issue at stake. In this way, nuestro
research distilled two core elements in the meaning of ecological debt, es decir.,

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Once upon a Time I was a Nuclear Physicist

“causing ecological damage elsewhere” and “using ecosystem goods and
services at the expense of equitable rights of others” which formed the ba-
sis for our working deªnition. Aquí, the broadly interpretable term “equi-
table” was purposively used instead of an already objectiªed interpretation
of what equitable should mean (p.ej., igual). In using the term equitable
we tried to accommodate different concerns voiced in the original ecologi-
cal debt approaches such as those about indigenous knowledge and subsis-
tence rights. In this way, we deliberately did not shortcut politics by set-
tling the ecological debt issue once and for all by reducing it to a mere
number.12 Rather, we kept the ecological debt concept where it originated
and where it belongs: in the scientiªc-political agora, on the interface be-
tween science and politics, neither reduced to a factual nor to a value dis-
curso. I thus suggest topical truth as a conceptual instrument to avoid
the taken-for-granted scientiªc shortcutting of politics. In deliberating
policy decisions, the accent then no longer lies on a negotiated sorting out
of competing interests with scientiªc truth as ultimate executioner; bastante
the topical foundation of a decision has to be questioned.

Concluding Remarks
This paper is highly ambitious, but necessarily so. Conceived as the his-
tory of my topics of interest in the politics of sustainability, it bridges the
worlds of science and sustainability beyond the taken for granted but bale-
ful policy ideal of rational decision-making. This paper does not pretend
to be a full-blown theoretical framework for a politics of sustainability,
nor is it a fully-ºedged epistemology of scientiªc practice. Bastante, es
main value is to be found in the strength of the argument for reposition-
ing the enigma of scientiªc production at the core of a genuine politics of
sustainability as Latour has pleaded for. Aquí, this argumentation has been
developed on two highly intertwined levels. First of all, on the level of my
personal history, I have shown how the reºexive questions I had posed
about the epistemological and ontological status of scientiªc knowledge
when I was producing facts in the nuclear laboratory are of crucial impor-
tance and relevance when investigating the role of scientiªc knowledge in
the political organization of society. En segundo lugar, on a more general and
conceptual level, I have sketched how a politics of sustainability, devel-
oped around the concept of “engaged participation,” might instruct a
more fruitful approach beyond the fact-value dichotomy of the Modern
Constitution.

12. For a more detailed, reºexive discussion of the unconventional aspects of this re-
search project in relation to the concept of topical truth, the reader is referred to Goeminne
et al forthcoming.

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Perspectives on Science

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