Melinda Kimble
It’s Not About Ethanol,
It’s About Sugarcane
Discusión de casos de innovación:
The Brazilian Experience with Biofuels
Brazil’s decision to integrate sugar production with its energy system makes an
interesting case study in optimization and economic flexibility. Dr. Goldemberg’s
first-hand experience with Brazil’s policy of incorporating ethanol into the trans-
port fuel mix offers important insights into the steps Brazil took to change fuel
blends and encourage consumers’ adoption of them. Dr. Goldemberg argues that
an ethanol export industry could power development in other countries. Mientras
ethanol is part of an important Brazilian story, export-led development was not
the driver. Bastante, in finding multiple uses for sugarcane and its by-products,
Brazil systemically transformed its energy mix. This success in optimizing
resources offers a rare example of low carbon growth.
Can other countries replicate Brazil’s experience with low carbon growth
and/or become ethanol exporters? The answer is not yet clear. To illustrate the
challenges, this commentary briefly explores the experiences that Brazil and the
A NOSOTROS. have had with ethanol as a transport fuel, the choices made by industry and
policy makers and the economic and political forces that shaped decisions.
BRAZIL’S ETHANOL EXPERIENCE
Domestic economic policy was the original impetus behind the ethanol experi-
ment in Brazil. When the military assumed political control in Brazil in 1964, él
Melinda Kimble is a senior vice president at the United Nations Foundation, dónde
she oversees the International Bioenergy and Sustainability Initiative and serves as a
senior policy advisor on energy, clima, and global governance issues. Before joining
the U.N. Base, EM. Kimble held several policy-level positions in the
Department of State, including in the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, encima-
seeing multilateral development issues and debt policy; in the Bureau of Oceans,
International Environment and Scientific Affairs (OES), leading environmental nego-
tiations (p.ej., Climate Change Conference, Kioto, Japón, 1997); and in the Bureau of
International Organizations. Her assignments abroad included Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt,
and Tunisia.
© 2009 Melinda Kimble
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Melinda Kimble
energía,
sought to expand the productivity of Brazil’s major export products—coffee, sugar
,and citrus—and to protect the development of a modern industrial sector. Two of
these markets, coffee and sugar, were highly distorted and Brazil was vulnerable to
volatile prices. The success of the command-and-control economy was illustrated
por 10 percent annual growth rates in the early years of the military regime, backed
by high tariffs and domestic programs that supported the development of a new
industrial sector that produced steel, autos, cement, and other products; significar-
mientras, agroindustry developed and the middle class expanded. Like most emerging
markets of the mid-sixties, Brazil fueled much of its post-war expansion with
primarily
cheap
to the
imported petroleum,
extent that by 1974 fue
importing 85 percent of its pri-
mary energy supply. En 1973-
74, sin embargo, two events coin-
cided to refocus the attention of
Brazil’s ruling elite on the
potential of ethanol: (1) oil
prices jumped sharply with the
Arab oil embargo of 1973; y
(2) sugar prices fell,
leaving
Brazilian producers with grow-
ing supplies and few markets.
In finding multiple uses for
sugarcane and its byproducts,
Brazil systemically transformed
its energy mix. This success in
optimizing resources offers a
rare example of low carbon
growth. Can other countries
replicate Brazil’s experience
with low carbon growth and/or
become ethanol exporters? El
answer is not yet clear.
En 1974, Brazil’s oil import
costs jumped from $769 mil- lion to $2.8 billion; the large oil
import bill threatened the con-
tinued expansion of the econo-
my.1 Brazil had a long history,
starting before World War II, de
blending ethanol with gasoline
as a thrift measure. Now sugar producers needed a new market, and the military
dictatorship was concerned about the balance of payments and energy security.
They seized an opportunity to expand blending requirements and stimulate a new
domestic industry at the same time. One of the more ambitious features of this
program was a decision to promote the manufacture of alcohol-only cars, un
option few other sugar-producing countries had, or now have.
The government actually bought cars and retooled the engines to prove that
100 percent alcohol engines would work. They also established price parity with
gasoline to ensure that ethanol would remain competitive as petroleum prices fluc-
tuated. This approach enabled policymakers to adjust the ethanol price to offset
the petroleum producers’ economies of scale when gasoline prices were low, y para
provide a smaller subsidy when gasoline prices were higher. The Brazilian govern-
ment was responsible for the price mechanism and for establishing blending
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It’s Not About Ethanol, It’s About Sugarcane
ratios, while Petrobras, Brazil’s national oil company, played, and continues to play,
a central role in blending and distributing both gasoline and ethanol. These early
decisiones, made under a program known as Pro-Alcool, were consistent with the
“Brazil first” philosophy of the ruling junta, which involved direct government
intervention and large subsidies. Within five years, ethanol was an accepted con-
sumer product; sales of alcohol-only cars grew through the late 1980s, especially in
the State of São Paulo.
With the restoration of democracy in the mid-eighties, Brazil began the
painful process of liberalizing a highly protected economy. Foreign and domestic
debt incurred by the military regime weighed heavily on the economy. Domestic
subsidies, including those for ethanol production and blending requirements, eran
eliminated. Initially, this shift posed only minor problems for sugar producers,
who were selling sugar in more profitable international markets; still, ethanol was
an important option given the long-range volatility in sugar prices.
In the 1990s, sugar producers, ethanol processors, and Brazil’s new economic
team began to reassess whether it would make economic sense to maintain an
ethanol option in the domestic market. This review prompted consultations with
Brazil’s auto industry, which had virtually stopped producing alcohol-only cars by
early 1992, due to a sharp decrease in the domestic ethanol supply and the conse-
quent decline in consumers’ confidence in the availability of fuel for their vehicles.
Además, as the international prices of oil eroded and the price parity with
ethanol was eliminated, consumer preference shifted quickly toward gasoline vehi-
cles because of their higher engine performance and lower costs. Still, la experiencia-
ence of producing alcohol-only vehicles had paid off in expertise about ethanol
engines. Volkswagen Brazil engineers offered a simple solution when the govern-
ment asked them if they could develop a low-cost engine modification that would
permit the use of any combination of ethanol and gasoline. The flex-fuel modifi-
cation proved commercially viable, and most Brazilian manufacturers began
adopting it. The Brazilian government helped offset manufacturing costs through
consumer incentives, which gradually declined over time and encouraged con-
sumers to opt for flex-fuel vehicles. Dr. Goldemberg has noted the success of this
estrategia, which has resulted in flex-fuel vehicles now comprising more than a third
of the current fleet.
This policy secured the ethanol market, but sugar producers, who no longer
had price supports for ethanol, realized that efficient processing systems would be
essential to their long-term competitiveness, no matter the product. They had
already started using bagasse, a waste product of sugar extraction, to fuel the pro-
cessing plants. The next step they took was to cogenerate electricity. Entonces, the pub-
lic utilities arranged to feed spare power into the grid. This systemic innovation
created a win-win formula for sugar producers and Brazil’s power sector, cual
gained a new domestic source of electricity. The contribution to power generation
tipped the economic scale in favor of ethanol production (ver figura 1).
Whether by chance or design, Brazil’s sugar industry has become a “strategic
optimizer,” and this market flexibility has encouraged a continuous search to
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Cifra 1. Brazil Energy Mix, by Percentage, 1941-2007.
Fuente: Ministry of Mines and Energy, Brasil, Balanco Energetico Nacional, 2008.
increase efficiency, productivity, and profits. This process of improving productiv-
ity through public-private research partnerships and systematic review of agricul-
tural practices has extended to Brazil’s other major agriculture crops, including cit-
rus and coffee.
A NOSOTROS. ETHANOL POLICY
As in Brazil, the U.S. experience with ethanol has been shaped exclusively by
domestic agricultural production and energy consumption. While the U.S. does
export vast quantities of agricultural goods, ethanol was always envisioned as a
domestic market, driven by domestic interests.
As the auto industry developed in the U.S. at the beginning of the 20th centu-
ry, Henry Ford thought the most reasonable fuel would be grain alcohol. But that
calculation changed as petroleum was discovered and John D. Rockefeller consol-
idated the petroleum industry. Rockefeller recognized that he needed a variety of
markets for this new product, as the initial use for lighting was insufficient to sus-
tain the investment required to exploit this resource. The new markets for electric-
ity and personal mobility were ideally suited to creating demand for petroleum,
and the control Rockefeller exercised over supply made it possible to establish
prices that many could afford and still remain competitive with alternative fuel
opciones. By about 1920 the fortunes of the oil and automotive industries were
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It’s Not About Ethanol, It’s About Sugarcane
firmly linked. As the U.S. was the largest producer of petroleum until after World
Segunda Guerra, its actions suggested a lack of concern about long-term energy supply.
This calculation prompted U.S. policymakers to ignore any potential renew-
able and alternative fuels, even though gasoline rationing had been imposed dur-
ing WWII. After the war, importante EE.UU.. oil companies discovered far more oil in the
Middle East, reinforcing the belief that supplies would be abundant and cheap.
A NOSOTROS. policy continued to reflect these early assumptions until the 1973 Arab oil
embargo led to a rapid jump in global oil prices to levels far above the historical
trend, and touched off a global recession.
In response to new energy concerns, the Carter administration launched a
variety of programs to improve domestic energy supply, including a corn ethanol
programa. It put in place both a processing subsidy and a tariff on ethanol imports
that remains in effect today. As with sugarcane, ethanol served as an outlet for an
oversupply of corn. While the costs of producing corn ethanol were similar to
Brazil’s during its early efforts, they were much higher than for the recently opti-
mized Brazilian sugar-based ethanol. And U.S. ethanol, suffering from high pro-
duction costs and lower energy density, could not compete with inexpensive gaso-
line in the 1981-2000 período. Unlike Brazil, Estados Unidos. made no significant attempt
to retool vehicle engines for ethanol.
Oil producers contended that oil was plentiful and would continue to be avail-
capaz, even though U.S. oil companies were producing much of the oil in the sensi-
tive Middle East. Por 1979, state-owned oil companies had control of reserves and
supply in Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, with international oil companies
reduced to production contracts. Despite warnings that the U.S. or U.S. oil com-
panies would have less and less control over international petroleum reserves,
Congress found it too difficult to build a consensus on an energy policy that would
promote conservation, eficiencia, and alternative fuels.
En 1987, Ronald Reagan joined Margaret Thatcher in establishing the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to examine the environmen-
tal implications of growing fossil fuel use and its impacts; still, few policymakers
were convinced that a shift from conventional fossil fuel was either necessary or
posible. These attitudes were generally reinforced in the 1990s, as oil prices hit a
low point for most of the decade. Even with the expertise of Vice President Al Gore
on emerging environmental issues like climate change, the Clinton administration
was unable to build a legislative consensus to revamp domestic energy policy sig-
nificantly (ver figura 2, next page).2
En 1997, the President’s Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology
(PCAST) made the energy security case again. It estimated that by 2015, 70 por-
cent of internationally traded oil would come from the Persian Gulf region, y eso
argued that U.S. access would not necessarily be assured, especially given the rising
consumption of gasoline.3 In that report, the PCAST experts argued that an
aggressive program using cellulosic biofuels from perennial crops could replace 2.5
million barrels of oil a day by 2030 (38 billion gallons of oil a year). The panel also
cautioned against a continued focus on corn ethanol as too costly and inefficient.
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Cifra 2. A NOSOTROS. Energy Mix, by percentage, 1949-2008.
Fuente: Energy Information Administration (EIA) Annual Energy Review, 2008.
En 1999, recognizing the need to understand how alternative fuels might affect
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, Michael Wang of the Argonne Laboratory pub-
lished his work on the Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy Use in
Transportation (GREET) fuel model, estimating the GHG balance for several
fuels.4 He demonstrated that ethanol produced from various feedstocks was less
carbon intensive than gasoline and had a lower lifecycle GHG balance. In these
evaluaciones, cellulosic and sugarcane ethanol produced the greatest reductions in
GHG emissions, and corn ethanol had a 20 percent lower carbon profile than gaso-
line, keeping it within a viable range for an incremental low-carbon transforma-
tion of the U.S. energy mix. These research results set a useful benchmark, pero el
study had limited impact until the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks again
raised the specter of dependence on Middle Eastern oil and reignited the ethanol
discussion (ver figura 3).
En 2002, two bipartisan coalitions formed to examine energy, environmental
and energy security issues. Uno, the Energy Future Coalition, published an article
in Foreign Affairs arguing that revamping U.S. energy use would transform long-
term energy access in the U.S., strengthen the U.S. economy by accelerating and
diffusing new technology, and speed international efforts to address the impacts of
climate change.5 This report was reinforced by the National Commission on
Política energética, which called for a cap-and-trade system to price carbon emissions
throughout the economy and use market forces to advance the transformation to
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It’s Not About Ethanol, It’s About Sugarcane
Cifra 3. Lifecycle GHG Emissions Associated with Different Fuels, compared to
Gasoline.
Fuente: John Ferrell, A NOSOTROS. Departamento de Energía, 2008.
cleaner energy sources. The stage was set to revisit ethanol alternatives when yet
another unexpected driver emerged.
Studies showed that MTBE (methyl tertiary butyl ether), a common fuel oxy-
genator widely used in the U.S., was contaminating soils and groundwater,
prompting a number of U.S. states to ban MTBE from their fuel supply, beginning
en 2004. Federal regulations required that gasoline be oxygenated for air quality
reasons and ethanol replaced MTBE in a variety of gasoline blends in order to meet
these standards. Individual states adopted different fuel blends within the larger
federal air quality framework, using more or less ethanol depending on local cir-
cumstances. Por ejemplo, California was concerned about nitrogen oxides (NOx)
emissions and unsuccessfully sought to eliminate MTBE without substituting
ethanol. Despite this patchwork approach, MTBE bans did increase the use of
ethanol nationally. While a federal ban on MTBE stumbled, Congress refused to
provide MTBE distributors with liability protection against pollution damage
suits, prompting the remaining distributors to switch to ethanol voluntarily in
2005 in order to limit their risk.
En 2005, driven primarily by concerns about energy security, Congress estab-
lished the first federal renewable fuel standard, requiring that 2.78 por ciento de la
A NOSOTROS. fuel supply come from renewable sources (two decades after Brazil had start-
ed its effort). Lacking second-generation fuels made from cellulosic feedstocks,
these mandates depended universally on corn ethanol and demanded increasing
portions of the U.S. harvest. These moves led farm organizations to see ethanol as
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Cifra 4. A NOSOTROS. Corn Supply and Ethanol Demand, 1995-2009.
Fuente: Feed Grains Database, Economic Research Service/USDA.
a new opportunity to restore prosperity in rural areas. They strongly backed efforts
to create a market for renewable fuels. Despite the earlier recommendations of
PCAST, corn ethanol production in the U.S. climbed to five billion gallons by 2006,
arriba 20 percent from 2005.6 A NOSOTROS. corn farmers responded to the new demand by
planting significantly more corn (ver figura 4).
En 1998, with little fanfare, A NOSOTROS. automakers had begun selling flex-fuel vehicles
that could run on gasoline or a mixture of gasoline and up to 85 percent ethanol.7
Up to 2006, they mainly promoted these vehicles in markets like Iowa, where state
policy had encouraged the use of higher ethanol blends. Recognizing a new mar-
keting opportunity, Ford and GM quickly expanded their marketing of flex-fuel
carros, stressing first and foremost the opportunity for energy independence, y
secondarily, the technology. Response proved limited, sin embargo, especially as U.S.
gasoline refiners and distributors were not prepared to offer higher blends of
ethanol on a national scale. En 2006, despite the very rapid growth, ethanol still
only represented 3.5 percent of motor vehicle gasoline supplies in the U.S..8 As in
Brasil, Estados Unidos. focus was strictly domestic and the country retained its duties on
imports and subsidies to processors.
The rapid increase in production of both corn and ethanol drew renewed
attention to questions of sustainability. Environmentalists contended that the
rapid increase in U.S. corn production had negative domestic impacts: increased
use of both fertilizers and water for irrigation, pollution of water with both nitro-
gen and phosphorus, and significant reductions in the acreage of conservation
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It’s Not About Ethanol, It’s About Sugarcane
Cifra 5. Ethanol, Corn, and Retail Gasoline Prices, 2003 through Present.
Fuente: EIA, Government of Nebraska, and USDA.
reserves.9 However, the key charge was that corn ethanol had no GHG advantage if
lifecycle analyses included indirect land use changes. In studies published in
Ciencia, researchers argued that using ethanol as a transport fuel would have no
GHG benefits as long as deforestation in Brazil and other countries was driven by
the diversion of U.S. corn acreage for ethanol.10 This argument is often summa-
rized simply: “U.S. corn production drove Brazilian soy producers to expand the
agricultural frontier into the Amazon.”
One of these researchers, Timothy Searchinger, estimated that, including direct
and indirect land use changes amortized over 30 años, corn ethanol would pro-
duce 93 percent more GHG emissions than gasoline. He also challenged the posi-
tive assessment of sugarcane ethanol, by arguing that the expansion of sugarcane
had displaced livestock producers, who also pushed into the Amazon. Este
research remains controversial, and Dr. Goldemberg addresses its results from the
Brazilian perspective, arguing that sugarcane expansion occurs so far from the
Amazon that it is impossible to assume it has indirect impacts on deforestation.
Searchinger’s work, sin embargo, raised serious doubts in policymakers’ minds about
whether GHG reductions could be achieved with liquid biofuels, tempering the
early enthusiasm.
But the environmental debate was quickly overshadowed by the economic
debate. In mid-2007, global grain prices rose sharply and much of the increase was
immediately blamed on biofuels, despite clear evidence that much of the increase
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in food prices resulted from a combination of factors, including Australia’s
drought, increased global demand for meat, and controls on grain exports. The ris-
ing commodity prices made grain feedstocks, especially corn and wheat, más
costly for ethanol producers and ate into their already slim margins. Humanitarian
experts, nongovernmental organizations, and environmentalists called for a mora-
torium on biofuel mandates in the E.U. and the U.S. to relieve pressure on grain
supplies.
As regulatory mandates became less certain, investment in the corn ethanol
industry started to slow. The increase in production costs and decline in invest-
ments was just the beginning: petroleum prices declined in the second half of
2008, further eroding the economics of corn ethanol, and the financial crisis fur-
ther constrained investment and credit. Over the winter of 2008, many U.S. plants
were idled and some large producers went bankrupt. Mientras tanto, sugarcane
ethanol retained its market position in Brazil. Sugar prices spiked only briefly and
cane-based ethanol remained competitive, even at lower oil prices (ver figura 5).
DEVELOPING COUNTRY PRODUCERS
Dr. Goldemberg highlights the ethanol export potential for developing economies
based on legislative mandates in the U.S. and the European Union, particularly
given the U.S. plan to expand renewable fuel use to 36 billion gallons annually by
2022. Sin embargo, the size of the U.S. market for imported ethanol is constrained,
particularly by a Congressional preference to protect corn ethanol production.
Other nations may find opportunities to enter this market if blending mandates
outstrip domestic production, but past practice suggests that Congress would
adjust the mandate rather than open the market to imports. Brazil will likely dom-
inate any opportunities to supply the U.S. market, as it remains the high-volume,
low-cost producer. Under the current trade regime, Caribbean and Central
American producers are importing Brazilian ethanol and re-exporting it to the
A NOSOTROS. These countries can supply up to 7 percent of U.S. ethanol consumption and
remain exempt from import duties under the Central America and Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA)11 regime. Considering its fleet structure, the European mar-
ket is primarily focused on biodiesel and is less likely to present major opportuni-
ties for ethanol exporters.
One cannot underestimate the scale of Brazil’s investment to build the mod-
ern, highly efficient, and flexible sugar and ethanol industry it has today. Few other
developing countries have the finance, infrastructure, agricultural expertise, auto
industria, or strong central government required to duplicate Brazil’s experience.
Sin embargo, each country can center its innovation and low-carbon growth around
its own assets and unique national circumstances. Sugarcane ethanol for domestic
or export markets may or may not be the best opportunity; Por ejemplo, palm oil
may be a much more important feedstock in Africa, given the preference for diesel
in Europe, Africa’s traditional export market.
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It’s Not About Ethanol, It’s About Sugarcane
Ethanol may be part of the solution for countries with major gasoline require-
mentos, large distances to cover, urban areas with traffic congestion, and appropri-
ate resources. But ethanol is far from a perfect substitute for gasoline. It supplies
less energy by volume and takes on water from the atmosphere, so it requires high-
quality blending and careful storage. Processing must be done close to feedstock
sources, and sugarcane, En particular, must be processed within a few hours after it
is harvested. Creating an efficient ethanol production system demands careful
placement of multiple local processing facilities. Most importantly, ethanol is
highly volatile and its transport requires careful handling.
One option for developing
countries, particularly smaller
productores, may be to create
regional markets for a single
ethanol-gasoline blend
y
establish policies to support
these initiatives. Por ejemplo,
they might require gasoline
refiners and distributors to meet
a common fuel standard. A
Central American and Caribbean
regional policy could combine
the elimination of subsidized
petroleum and expand the use of
domestic ethanol. That would
encourage national sugar indus-
tries to become more efficient,
generate local employment, and reduce dependence on imported oil. A regional
market in southern Africa could take advantage of South Africa’s refining capacity
and market and the agricultural potential of its neighboring countries.
Ethanol may be part of the
solution for countries with
major gasoline requirements,
large distances to cover, urban
areas with traffic congestion,
and appropriate resources.
But ethanol is far from a
perfect substitute for gasoline.
Given the complexities of using ethanol as a transport fuel, it may not be the
optimal energy investment choice for countries where less than half of the popu-
lation has adequate access to modern energy services (energy services include
lighting, cooking, heating and cooling, water pumping, refrigeration, transporta-
ción, and communications). En cambio, investments in renewable energy, incluido
modern biomass fuel options, and in alternative energy technologies (solar, wind),
are much more likely to expand energy access at the village level and to have
greater impacts on livelihoods and on sustainable low-carbon growth. Para examen-
por ejemplo, in West Africa, más que 70 percent of the population has no access to elec-
tricity; their primary energy source is unrefined biomass, which is both inefficient
and unsustainable.12
African countries could assess the potential to cogenerate electricity at sugar
production facilities, sending it either to local communities or the national grid.
They may also see opportunities to process some of the sugar wastes as high-pro-
tein animal feed, a practice that is common in Brazil. In the African context,
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Indirect Land Use Change (iLUC)
Heated exchanges on indirect land use change (iLUC) have occurred in the U.S.
as the Environmental Protection Agency has undertaken life-cycle analyses of
biofuels in compliance with the 2007 Renewable Fuel Standard. The California
Air Resources Board has also recently published its analysis of fuels under
California’s low carbon fuel standard. Brazilian producers of sugarcane ethanol
may have been frustrated to see analysts attribute Amazonian deforestation to
their expansion, but U.S. corn growers were furious when they saw Amazonian
deforestation via changes in soybean production attributed to their corn
ethanol. The debate about how to accurately attribute indirect land use changes
to particular biofuel feedstocks is somewhat intractable at this stage, critical
though it might be to meeting the larger challenge of climate change mitigation
in the transport sector. Data are scarce, methodologies diverse, and results are
considered highly political. Pending the widespread availability of economically
viable second-generation or cellulosic biofuels (and potentially even after their
arrival, given global limitations on biomass production), the debate will contin-
ue to rage on how to best account for the full GHG impact of biofuel feedstocks.
To address findings about emissions from iLUC, Brazilian ethanol produc-
ers and academics have collaborated on their own research into this issue. Ellos
report that sugarcane production is so efficient that it limits the amount of new
land that must be brought into use. Además, they find that meat produc-
tion is becoming more efficient on a per-hectare basis, reducing its encroach-
ment on forests. Finalmente, the rate of annual deforestation is now slowing, com-
pared to the recent past. These analyses, while important, would be significant-
ly buttressed by a full national accounting of greenhouse gas (GHG) producción.
A national accounting system, includings sinks and sources, would eliminate
the need to track or estimate the indirect impacts of the decisions by farmers or
policymakers in the U.S., E.U., or elsewhere. As Michael Obersteiner and others
have argued, a full carbon accounting that covered all carbon-related compo-
nents of terrestrial ecosystems would mirror “what the atmosphere sees.”13 In
this model, international annual or bi-annual reports would track the flow of
GHGs, both into sinks and out of sources. If Brazil were already producing a full
carbon accounting on a regular basis, it would be significantly less open to accu-
sations of rogue emissions. Brazil has fulfilled its commitments under the U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change, producing a single National
Communication with emissions data from agriculture, forestry and land use
change up to 1994. A second National Communication is underway. This lack of
firm data creates the opportunity for wide-ranging estimates of emissions and
emission trends and attribution to a diverse set of drivers.
As sustainability criteria are established for biofuels, through regulatory or
voluntary processes, Brazil and other larger producers would find that increased
transparency is in their own interest, protecting both the larger biofuels market
and their own reputations within it.
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It’s Not About Ethanol, It’s About Sugarcane
ethanol gel cooking stoves are an attractive replacement for unsustainably harvest-
ed wood and charcoal. Many African countries could find it useful to adopt
Brazilian agricultural practices, not just for sugarcane, but for a variety of crops.
Optimizing the management of biomass to improve productivity and sustainable
production and use could make the transition to modern energy services a foun-
dation for the rest of the economy.
CONCLUSIÓN
Dr. Goldemberg has advised developing countries to examine their current devel-
opment and energy paradigm in light of potential opportunities and Brazil’s his-
torical experience. That experience is clearly relevant to any sugar-producing
country. But the more important lesson is Brazil’s overall investment in its agricul-
ture sector, which is among the most efficient in the world. While Brazil remains a
major exporter of agricultural commodities, it continues to expand its value-
added processing systems. Much like the U.S. in the 1960s, Brazil is not only a
major agricultural producer, but also an industrial powerhouse. Few countries,
sin embargo, have a domestic market that can support initiatives like Pro-Alcool, y
the start-up costs would likely be prohibitive.
Estados Unidos. had many opportunities and the scientific research base to use vari-
ous “oil shocks” to drive changes in its energy mix, but the status quo politics
proved too powerful for such a shift to occur. This underscores how difficult the
transition to lower carbon alternatives will be without resources and policies to
underpin it.
Still, Dr. Goldemberg’s examination of the role ethanol played in Brazil’s eco-
nomic course is important as it highlights the necessity of making new energy
choices in this century. As the world moves from fossil energy to more sustainable
and less carbon-intensive options, there are a range of choices. It is easy for sugar
producers to also produce ethanol, but it may not optimize potential benefits
unless other factors are in place, including a domestic market and refining capac-
idad. It is vital that countries be able to analyze the options rather than pursue a sin-
gle course of action. There are many lessons to be learned from Brazil’s experience,
but they are centrally about market flexibility and resource optimization rather
than ethanol alone.
Endnotes
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3. The potential for politically-driven supply disruptions is even greater today, given an IEA World
Energy Outlook 2008 Reference Scenario suggesting that 80% of total oil and gas production
entre 2007 y 2030 will be state-owned. OECD/IEA, World Energy Outlook 2008, París:
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4 Michael Wang, “GREET 1.5–Transportation Fuel-Cycle Model, Volumen 1: Metodología,
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National Laboratory, Argonne, IL, Agosto, 1999.
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República, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The agreement eliminated all tar-
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