NOI. Policy Choices in the South China Sea

How Much Risk
Should the United
States Run in the
South China Sea?

M. Taylor Fravel and
Charles L. Glaser

China’s assertiveness
in the South China Sea poses an especially vexing set of policy choices for the
stati Uniti. For decades, the South China Sea disputes appeared to be lim-
ited to small islets, rocks, and reefs claimed by several countries. These small
bits of land were a source of international concern because they fueled a num-
ber of limited conºicts, but they were themselves of little material value or
strategic importance.

Now, Tuttavia, China appears to want to control a vast body of water in a
critical region of the world. Around 2008, China started adopting more asser-
tive policies in the South China Sea. Since then, it has seized control of
Scarborough Shoal, built artiªcial islands in the Spratly Islands and con-
structed large military bases on three of them, and rejected an interna-
tional tribunal ruling that invalidated Chinese claims to historic rights within
the “nine-dash line.” More recently, China has harassed and intimidated
Vietnamese and Malaysian vessels within their Exclusive Economic Zones
(EEZs). Taken together, China’s actions suggest that it is intent on dominating
the South China Sea.

China’s behavior in the South China Sea has played a central role in trans-
forming U.S. assessments of China’s ambitions. Whereas a decade ago the
United States believed that its relationship with China could be primarily co-
operative,1 the U.S. 2022 Indo-Paciªc Strategy, Per esempio, states that China
“pursues a sphere of inºuence in the Indo-Paciªc and seeks to become the
world’s most inºuential power. The PRC’s [People’s Republic of China] coer-

M. Taylor Fravel is the Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science and the Director of the Security
Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Charles L. Glaser is Professor of Political
Science and International Affairs and Co-Director of the Institute for Security and Conºict Studies at the
George Washington University.

For valuable comments on earlier drafts, the authors thank Stephen Brooks, Avery Goldstein, Eric
Heginbotham, Michael McDevitt, Evan Medeiros, Richard Samuels, participants in the MIT Secu-
rity Studies Program’s Asian Security Working Group, and the anonymous reviewers. For excel-
lent research assistance the authors thank Shahryar Pasandideh. This research was supported by a
grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

1. Barack Obama, National Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: White House, May 2010), P. 43,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/ªles/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy
.pdf.

International Security, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Autunno 2022), pag. 88–134, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00443
© 2022 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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NOI. Policy Choices in the South China Sea 89

cion and aggression spans the globe, but it is most acute in the Indo-Paciªc.”2
The shift in ofªcial U.S. assessments largely mirrors a signiªcant negative shift
across the U.S. foreign policy community.

Many experts place great importance on the South China Sea. Per esempio,
In 2017, Ely Ratner, who is now a senior ofªcial at the U.S. Department of
Defense focusing on the Indo-Paciªc, held that China “is now poised to seize
control of the sea. Should it succeed, it would deal a devastating blow to the
United States’ inºuence in the region, tilting the balance of power across Asia
in China’s favor.”3

The South China Sea is now considered an increasingly likely locus of
conºict between the United States and China. Although a large conventional
war is most likely to occur over Taiwan, analysts have explored incentives for
escalation that could push a crisis in the South China Sea into a large conven-
tional war, and even a nuclear war.4

This article analyzes how strenuously, and at what risk, the United States
should resist China’s efforts to dominate the South China Sea. In the broadest
terms, China’s rise requires the United States to reevaluate all its commitments
and decide whether to adopt more competitive or less competitive strategies
for defending them. Where U.S. interests are relatively small and China’s rise
signiªcantly increases the risks of protecting them, the United States may need
to trim its commitments. In contrasto, when its interests are large, the United
States may need to deepen its commitments and compete intensively to pro-
tect them, even if the dangers posed by China’s rise are substantial. In princi-
ple, the spectrum of options for dealing with a rising power runs from full

2. Joe Biden, Indo-Paciªc Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: White House, Febbraio
2022), P. 5, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Paciªc-Strategy
.pdf. For the Donald Trump administration’s characterization, see Donald J. Trump, National Secu-
rity Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: Dicembre 2017), P. 25.
3. Ely Ratner, “Course Correction: How to Stop China’s Maritime Advance,” Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 96, No. 4 (July/August 2017), P. 64, https://www.jstor.org/stable/44823892. See also Patrick
M. Cronin and Ryan Neuhard, Total Competition: China’s Challenge in the South China Sea
(Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, Gennaio 2020), P. 1; and Hal Brands and
Zack Cooper, “Getting Serious about Strategy in the South China Sea,” Naval War College Re-
view, Vol. 71, No. 1 (Inverno 2018), P. 16, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/
iss1/3.
4. Avery Goldstein, “First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Re-
lations,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Primavera 2013), pag. 49–89, https://doi.org/10.1162/
ISEC_a_00114; and Caitlin Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese
Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States,” International Security, Vol. 41,
No. 4 (Primavera 2017), pag. 50–92, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00274.

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International Security 47:2 90

retrenchment, to intensiªed competition to protect the status quo, to preven-
tive war.5

We bound our analysis by assuming that the United States retains its current
grand strategy, which holds that the United States’ East Asian treaty allies—
including Japan, Korea, and the Philippines—underpin vital U.S. security in-
terests. Although there is substantial debate over U.S. grand strategy, Questo
restriction allows us to focus on U.S. interests in the South China Sea, IL
threat China poses to these interests, and the range of relevant policy options
available to the United States.

Our analysis addresses three options along a continuum: from increased re-
sistance to China’s assertive policies on one end to a partial South China Sea
retrenchment on the other, with current U.S. policy in the middle. Primo, more
intense military resistance could include explicitly committing to use force to
prevent China from gaining control of additional South China Sea features, In-
terfering with trade and resource extraction, or infringing on the United States’
ability to conduct military surveillance and exercises, as well as to use force if
China pursues any of these actions.

Secondo, under a policy of partial South China Sea retrenchment, the United
States would not use force to protect regional states’ claims in the South
China Sea, including their territorial claims and maritime rights, even though
it has the capability to do so. China would have the ability to militarily domi-
nate the other regional states that border the South China Sea. Importantly, IL
United States would continue to give priority to preserving and defending its
allies in East Asia and would maintain its capability to deny China the ability
to operate in the South China Sea during war. The United States would also
likely continue to send naval ships through the South China Sea during peace-
time, including to conduct freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs), and it
would use economic and diplomatic means, including sanctions and shaming,
to demonstrate that it continues to ªnd China’s actions to be illegitimate. Questo
policy of partial retrenchment would acccept a limited Chinese sphere of inºu-
ence over the South China Sea, while maintaining the U.S. ability to ªght a ma-
jor war in East Asia. Critically, partial retrenchment would not allow China
to achieve regional hegemony—the United States would remain committed to

5. On retrenchment, see Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, Twilight of the Titans: Great
Power Decline and Retrenchment (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2018). On the range of op-
zioni, see Randall L. Schweller, “Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory,” in
Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging
Energia (New York: Routledge, 1999).

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NOI. Policy Choices in the South China Sea 91

protecting its key interests in East Asia and to maintaining the military capa-
bility required to do so.

Current U.S. policy falls between these two positions. The United States has
not taken sides on sovereignty disputes over South China Sea islands and
reefs, nor has it speciªed how it would respond to China’s seizure of addi-
tional features. It has not employed force to protect countries’ resource rights,
although it did signal its willingness to use force if China attempted to reclaim
land at Scarborough Shoal. The United States has aligned its policy with the
2016 tribunal that rejected the legality of China’s claims to historic rights, In-
cluding by conducting FONOPs to uphold its interpretation of navigational
rights under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Inoltre, the United States has increased its air and naval presence in
these waters and sanctioned ªrms involved in enhancing China’s South China
Sea presence to indicate its opposition to some of China’s intimidation of litto-
ral states.

We conclude that current U.S. policy is preferable to both increased military
resistance and partial South China Sea retrenchment. Because U.S. security in-
terests are quite limited, a signiªcantly ªrmer policy, which would generate an
increased risk of a high-intensity war with China, is unwarranted. Especially
with the growing consensus for competing more intensively against China, IL
United States will require a clear understanding that its interests are very lim-
ited to avoid increasing its military resistance. In comparison, given the cau-
tion that China has demonstrated, the risks of current U.S. policy appear to be
relatively small and consistent with the United States’ interests, the most im-
portant of which is to preserve its credibility in the region. Consequently, at
least for the time being, the United States should maintain its current level
of resistance.

The United States must continue to assess China’s determination to domi-
nate the South China Sea. If China’s future actions indicate that it is willing to
pay a much higher price to control these waters, the United States should shift
to a policy of partial South China Sea retrenchment. Given quite limited U.S.
security interests, China’s growing military capabilities, and this greater deter-
mination, the risks of an armed conºict or even a war would not be warranted.
The United States would end its military opposition to China’s effort to control
the South China Sea, while likely continuing to assert freedom of navigation
and emphatically reassuring allies that it is prepared to defend their security
but not their claims to small amounts of disputed territory. The United States
would have to redouble other efforts to preserve its credibility with both China

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International Security 47:2 92

and its allies. A partial Chinese sphere of inºuence in the South China Sea may
be a natural outcome of China’s rise.6

We begin our analysis in the ªrst and second sections by reviewing China’s
claims and behavior in the South China Sea over the past decade. The third
section explores the factors that motivate China’s policies in the South China
Sea, because they can influence the proper degree of U.S. military resistance to
these policies. The fourth section reviews U.S. interests in the South China Sea,
given our assumption about U.S. grand strategy. The ªfth section addresses
threats that China’s South China Sea policies pose to U.S. interests. Contrary to
many expert claims, we ªnd that China’s actions in the South China Sea pose
little direct threat to U.S. security and peacetime economic interests. The con-
cluding sections assess current and future U.S. policy options to determine the
proper degree of U.S. military resistance in the South China Sea, both now and
in futuro.

Conºicting Claims in the South China Sea

The South China Sea disputes involve competing claims to territorial sover-
eignty and maritime jurisdiction.7 China claims sovereignty over three differ-
ent groups of islands in these waters. The ªrst is the Paracel (Xisha) Islands,
which Vietnam and Taiwan also claim. After a clash in 1974, China has since
controlled all the Paracels, which previously were divided between China and
Vietnam.8 The second is Macclesªeld Bank (Zhongsha), most of which is sub-
merged and thus not subject to claims to territorial sovereignty. Tuttavia,
Scarborough Shoal, a large reef that has several rocks that are permanently
above high tide, is contested by China and the Philippines. The third and larg-
est group of islands in the South China Sea is the Spratly (Nansha) Islands,
which consists of roughly 230 caratteristiche, including small islands, islets, E
coral reefs, only some of which are permanently above the waterline. China,

6. On spheres of inºuence see Lindsey O’Rourke and Joshua Shifrinson, “Squaring the Circle on
Spheres of Inºuence: The Overlooked Beneªts,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 2 (2022),
pag. 105–124; Van Jackson, “Understanding Spheres of Inºuence in International Politics,” European
Journal of International Security, Vol. 5, No. 3 (ottobre 2020), pag. 255–273, https://doi.org/10.1017/
eis.2019.21; and Graham Allison, “The New Spheres of Inºuence: Sharing the Globe with Other
Great Powers,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 99, No. 2 (March/April 2020), pag. 30–40.
7. Ronald O’Rourke, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and
Issues for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Marzo 18, 2021 [updated
2022]), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42784/.
8. M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conºict in China’s Territorial Dis-
putes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008), pag. 272–287.

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NOI. Policy Choices in the South China Sea 93

Taiwan, and Vietnam claim sovereignty over all the Spratly Islands, while the
Philippines and Malaysia each claim some features (ªfty-three and twelve, Rif-
spectively).9 Vietnam currently occupies twenty-one features, the Philippines
occupies nine features, China seven, Malaysia ªve, and Taiwan one.10 Al-
though China has not fought another country since 1988 to acquire control of
contested features in the South China Sea, it did seize Mischief Reef in 1994
and gain effective control of Scarborough Shoal in 2012. China is believed
to have been deterred from beginning land reclamation there in 2016 after
President Barack Obama signaled to China that this would violate a red line
that could lead to military escalation.11

The second component of the South China Sea disputes is conºicting
claims to maritime jurisdiction. UNCLOS, which was signed in 1982 and came
into force in 1994, delineates different kinds of maritime rights or entitlements
that states may claim in zones that are adjacent to their coastlines or other land
caratteristiche, such as islands.

The ªrst of these is the territorial sea, which extends 12 nautical miles sea-
ward from a state’s baselines. Within the territorial sea, states enjoy full sover-
eignty over the water, seabed, and airspace. Nevertheless, coastal states must
allow the “innocent passage” of foreign ships transiting through these waters,
including both military and commercial vessels.

A second maritime right is the EEZ, which extends seaward 200 nautical miles
from a state’s coast. Within the EEZ, coastal states enjoy the exclusive right to
the resources in the water column and the seabed, as well as jurisdiction over
other activities, such as marine scientiªc research. Other states enjoy “high-
seas freedoms” in the EEZ, deªned as freedoms of navigation and overºight.
None of the claimants to the Spratly Islands have issued baselines—usually, IL
low-water line—around any of the claimed land features and thus have not
delineated the scope of any territorial sea or EEZ claims.

In 2016, China clariªed that its maritime claims in the South China Sea in-
cluded a territorial sea, EEZ, and continental shelf from all island groups.
China also asserted “historic rights in the South China Sea”12 but did not

9. Greg Austin, China’s Ocean Frontier: International Law, Military Force, and National Development
(Canberra: Allen and Unwin, 1998), pag. 153–154.
10. Greg Poling, On Dangerous Ground: America’s Century in the South China Sea (Oxford: Oxford
Stampa universitaria, 2022), P. 170.
11. Demetri Sevastopulo, Geoff Dyer, and Tom Mitchell, “Obama Forced Xi to Back Down over
South China Sea Dispute,” Financial Times, Luglio 12, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/c63264a4-
47f1-11e6-8d68-72e9211e86ab.
12. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Statement of the Government

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Figura 1. Exclusive Economic Zones in the South China Sea and China’s Nine-Dash Line

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Map by Andrew Rhodes.

SOURCE: EEZs were drawn using data from Flanders Marine Institute, Maritime Boundaries
Geodatabase, version 11 (2019), https://doi.org/10.14284/382. The map does not show EEZ
claims from disputed territory such as the Paracel Islands. When the breadth between two
states is less than 400 nautical miles, the map shows either the maritime boundary deter-
mined by a treaty or agreement between the two states or a notional median line. China’s
claimed EEZ would include the entirety of Taiwan’s EEZ as shown on the map.

NOI. Policy Choices in the South China Sea 95

deªne their scope or content. Most analysts view this as a claim to rights
within the nine-dash line that appears on Chinese maps.13 An authoritative
Chinese scholar describes historic rights as rights to ªshing, resource develop-
ment, and navigation.14 The 2016 tribunal, Tuttavia, rejected broad claims to
historic rights and found that none of the land features that China (or any
other claimant) controls in the Spratly Islands are an “island,” which means
that they are not entitled to EEZs.

As shown in ªgure 1, China’s claims to maritime jurisdiction overlap with
those of the littoral states in the South China Sea, especially where China’s
nine-dash line overlaps with their coastal EEZs. China’s claims to maritime ju-
risdiction also create conºicts with non-claimant states, especially the United
States, which exercises various high-seas freedoms in the South China Sea.
Primo, China requires foreign military ships to receive prior permission to tran-
sit through its territorial sea—that is, for innocent passage—a position that the
United States rejects. Since 2015, molti Stati Uniti. FONOPs have challenged this
Chinese position. Secondo, China has opposed some military activities within
its EEZ, especially those that are linked with surveillance and intelli-
gence gathering near China’s coast, which China claims are a form of marine
scientiªc research that falls under coastal state jurisdiction. Unofªcial Chinese
legal commentaries also underscore how U.S. military surveillance is inconsis-
tent with peaceful use and the idea of “due regard” for coastal state interests.

Third, the United States opposes China’s use of straight baselines, Quale
create internal waters on their landward side. In the Paracels, China has used
straight baselines to create a large body of internal waters over which it could
deny entry of foreign vessels. Quasi-ofªcial sources indicate that China will
also treat the Spratly Islands as an “integral whole,”15 which would create not
only a large area of internal waters over which China could deny foreign ves-
sels entry but also much larger territorial seas and EEZs.

Finalmente, uncertainty remains over the scope and content of the historic rights

of the People’s Republic of China on China’s Territorial Sovereignty and Maritime Rights and In-
terests in the South China Sea,” July 12, 2016, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/
2649_665393/201607/t20160712_679472.html.
13. On the origins of the nine-dash line, see Chris P. C. Chung, “Drawing the U-Shaped Line:
China’s Claim in the South China Sea, 1946–1974,” Modern China, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2016), pag. 38–72,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0097700415598538.
14. Hong Nong, “Interpreting the U-Shape Line in the South China Sea,” China-US Focus, May 15,
2012, https://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/interpreting-the-u-shape-line-in-the-south-
china-sea.
15. Chinese Society of International Law, “The South China Sea Arbitration Awards: A Critical
Study,” Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 (Giugno 2018), pag. 207–748, https://doi.org/
10.1093/chinesejil/jmy012.

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International Security 47:2 96

that China claims within the nine-dash line, especially regarding naviga-
zione. This is potentially the most signiªcant disagreement between the two
countries, because U.S. naval vessels transit and exercise in the South China
Sea for a variety of purposes.

China’s Behavior in the South China Sea

In addition to reviewing China’s behavior in the South China Sea,16 this sec-
tion considers actions that China has not taken.

growing maritime presence

China has greatly expanded its maritime presence in the South China Sea,
which gives it the hard power to assert its claims. Since the late 1990s, China has
pursued an ambitious effort to modernize its military, especially its air and na-
val forces. The major surface combatants in the South Sea Fleet of the People’s
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) include destroyers, frigates, and corvettes, along
with China’s ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and nuclear and diesel attack
submarines.17 All destroyers would be classiªed as “modern” in terms of their
capabilities, and most have been commissioned within the last ten years.18
Some of these naval forces are part of China’s growing anti-access/area denial
(A2/AD) capability in the region, which we discuss below.19

The China Coast Guard (CCG) has over two hundred vessels, making it the
largest coast guard in Asia and probably the world. The CCG has played a
prominent role in asserting China’s rights and claims, from escorting seismic
survey vessels in contested waters and enforcing ªshing bans, to blockading

16. On changes in China’s behavior, see Andrew Chubb, “PRC Assertiveness in the South China
Sea: Measuring Continuity and Change, 1970–2015,” International Security, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Inverno
2020/21), pag. 79–121, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00400; and Ketian Zhang, “Cautious Bully:
Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing’s Use of Coercion in the South China Sea,” International Security,
Vol. 44, No. 1 (Estate 2019), pag. 117–159, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00354.
17. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2020 (London: Routledge,
2020), P. 266.
18. Michael A. McDevitt, China as a Twenty-First-Century Naval Power: Theory, Practice, and Implica-
zioni (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2020).
19. On China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, see U.S. Department of Defense,
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020, Annual Report to
Congress (Washington, D.C.: Ofªce of the Secretary of Defense, 2020), esp. pag. 72–76; and Stephen
Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Paciªc: Chinese Antiacess/Area Denial,
NOI. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia,” International Security, Vol. 41,
No. 1 (Estate 2016), pag. 7–48, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00249.

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NOI. Policy Choices in the South China Sea 97

land features held by other claimants and escorting Chinese ªshing ºeets in
disputed waters.20

The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia complements PLAN and CCG
forces. These units are composed mostly of ªshermen, some of whom receive
training from the PLAN and are then activated on demand. Militia forces have
been involved in many efforts by China to assert its maritime claims, including
IL 2009 harassment of the U.S. Navy’s USS Impeccable and China’s presence
since 2018 around Philippine-held Thitu Island.21

A ªnal component of China’s maritime presence is the seven military instal-
lations atop the reefs that it controls in the Spratly Islands. As part of a large-
scale land reclamation in the Spratly Islands, China transformed Fiery Cross,
Mischief, and Subi reefs into forward operating bases with runways, hardened
hangers for ªghter aircraft, hardened shelters for antiair and anti-ship missiles,
radars, communications equipment, and large harbors. We discuss the war-
time utility of these bases later in this article. The peacetime utility, Tuttavia,
is signiªcant—these bases can be used to sustain a forward presence of
CCG, maritime militia, and ªshing vessels in the southern half of the South
China Sea.

assertion of rights to resources

A key way that China has pursued dominance in the South China Sea has been
by asserting its rights to resources. China often describes itself as reacting to
the actions of other states that challenge or do not defer to China’s sovereignty
claims. Even if reactive, Tuttavia, China’s responses are often disproportionate
in scope and scale, and have contributed to escalating tensions in the past dec-
ade.22 First, China has asserted its right to develop resources within other
countries’ EEZs when they overlap with the nine-dash line. Since the ªrst dec-
ade of the 2000s, China has threatened that foreign oil companies exploring in
Vietnam’s waters would lose access to China’s market. It also opened blocks
for exploration that appeared to be within Vietnam’s EEZ.23 In 2014, China de-
ployed a drilling rig between two Vietnamese blocks. Vietnam’s attempt to

20. Ryan D. Martinson, Echelon Defense: The Role of Sea Power in Chinese Maritime Dispute Strategy
(Newport, R.I.: China Maritime Studies Institute, NOI. Naval War College, 2018).
21. Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, China’s Third Sea Force, The People’s Armed Forces
Maritime Militia: Tethered to the PLA, China Maritime Report No. 1 (Newport, R.I.: NOI. Naval War
Università, 2017).
22. You Ji, Deciphering Beijing’s Maritime Security Policy and Strategy in Managing Sovereignty Dis-
putes in the China Seas (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2013).
23. M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea,” Contemporary Southeast Asia,

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International Security 47:2 98

prevent the rig from drilling sparked battles between coast guard vessels from
both sides.24

Secondo, China has harassed or interfered with the hydrocarbon explora-
tion and development activities of other states within their respective EEZs.
Since 2010, Per esempio, Chinese government vessels have interfered with
Vietnamese exploration activities within Hanoi’s EEZ, “expelled” a Philippine
seismic survey vessel that was within the Philippines’ EEZ, challenged
Malaysia’s exploration activities within its EEZ and continental shelf, E
challenged Indonesia drilling within its EEZ.25 In one instance, Chinese pres-
sure, including military threats, led Vietnam to suspend exploration and drill-
ing activities by a Spanish company in its EEZ.26

Third, China has asserted its rights to ªshing within the coastal EEZs of
other states. Since 1999, China has instituted a unilateral ªshing ban in the
South China Sea above 12 degrees north, which includes traditional ªshing
grounds of littoral states. Since 2016, China and Indonesia have repeatedly
clashed over the presence of Chinese ªshing vessels inside Indonesia’s EEZ
near the Natuna Islands, where it overlaps with the nine-dash line.27

brute force, coercion, and intimidation

China has also used its growing maritime power to coerce claimants and other
stati. Perhaps the most noteworthy instance occurred over Scarborough
Shoal. After the Philippines attempted to arrest Chinese ªshermen within the
reef in 2012, a multi-month standoff evolved into a contest for control of
the entrance to the reef and its surrounding waters. After reneging on an

Vol. 33, No. 3 (Dicembre 2011), P. 301, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41446232; and M. Taylor
Fravel, “The South China Sea Oil Card,” Diplomat, Giugno 27, 2012.
24. Michael Green et al., Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia: The Theory and Practice of Gray Zone
Deterrence (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], 2017), pag. 202–
223.
25. Michael D. Swaine and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Assertive Behavior—Part Two: IL
Maritime Periphery,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 35 (Estate 2011), https://www.hoover
.org/research/chinas-assertive-behavior-part-two-maritime-periphery; “China and Malaysia in
Another Staredown over Offshore Drilling,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, CSIS,
novembre 25, 2020, https://amti.csis.org/china-and-malaysia-in-another-staredown-over-off-
shore-drilling/; and “Nervous Energy: China Targets New Indonesian, Malaysian Drilling,” Asia
Maritime Transparency Initiative, CSIS, novembre 12, 2021, https://amti.csis.org/nervous-
energy-china-targets-new-indonesian-malaysian-drilling/.
26. Bill Hayton, “South China Sea: Vietnam ‘Scraps New Oil Project,’” BBC News, Marzo 23, 2018,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43507448.
27. Leo Suryadinata, “Recent Chinese Moves in the Natunas Riles Indonesia,” Perspective, ISEAS
Yusof Ishak Institute, Febbraio 19, 2020.

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NOI. Policy Choices in the South China Sea 99

agreement to enact a mutual withdrawal, China gained effective control of
the shoal.28

Elsewhere, China has used its CCG and maritime militia to harass and in-
timidate other claimants, often by maintaining an overwatch position. Starting
In 2013, Per esempio, China has maintained a near-continuous presence near
two shoals: the Philippine-held Second Thomas Shoal (sometimes preventing
the Philippines from resupplying the few marines stationed atop the shoal);29
and the South Luconia Shoals, within Malaysia’s EEZ (including harassing
Malaysian oil and gas operations in that location).30 Allo stesso modo, since 2018,
Chinese vessels have swarmed Thitu Island, the largest Spratly Islands feature
held by the Philippines, to monitor infrastructure upgrades.31 These Chinese
actions seek to bolster Chinese claims and to deter other claimants from
strengthening their own claims or positions.

China has also sought to intimidate U.S. naval and air forces. Disagreement
over military surveillance operations in China’s EEZ has led to most of the in-
cidents between U.S. and Chinese ships and aircraft.32 In 2009, China used
PLAN, law enforcement, and maritime militia vessels to interfere with naviga-
tion of the USS Impeccable, which was conducting a survey off the coast of
Hainan Island, inside China’s EEZ. The purpose was to object to what China
viewed as an increase in U.S. “close-in” military surveillance along its coast.33
The United States has also reported occasional “unsafe” maneuvers by
Chinese aircraft when they have intercepted U.S. surveillance aircraft.34 Al-
though China shadows U.S. vessels conducting FONOPs, it generally does not
interfere with them. The one exception occurred in 2018, when a PLAN de-
stroyer sailed on a vector to collide with a U.S. destroyer, forcing it to change
course to avoid a collision.35

28. Green et al., Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia, pag. 95–123.
29. Ibid., pag. 169–201.
30. “Malaysia Picks a Three-Way Fight in the South China Sea,” Asia Maritime Transparency Ini-
tiative, CSIS, Febbraio 21, 2020, https://amti.csis.org/malaysia-picks-a-three-way-ªght-in-the-
south-china-sea/.
31. “The Long Patrol: Staredown at Thitu Island Enters Its Sixteenth Month,” Asia Maritime
Transparency Initiative, CSIS, Marzo 5, 2020, https://amti.csis.org/the-long-patrol-staredown-at-
thitu-island-enters-its-sixteenth-month/.
32. O’Rourke, U.S.-China Strategic Competition, pag. 47–52.
33. Green et al., Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia, pag. 52–65.
34. From 2016 A 2018, the U.S. Paciªc Fleet reported eighteen “unsafe and/or unprofessional in-
teractions with China.” See Ryan Browne, “U.S. Navy Has Had 18 Unsafe or Unprofessional En-
counters with China since 2016,” CNN, novembre 3, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/03/
politics/navy-unsafe-encounters-china/index.html.
35. “U.S. Says Chinese Destroyer Came Dangerously Close to U.S. Ship,” Associated Press, Octo-

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International Security 47:2 100

diplomacy

Although China continues to call for negotiations on the South China Sea, its
diplomacy reºects its desire to stall in order to increase control in these waters.
Primo, China has sought to inºuence ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian
Nations) and its statements regarding the South China Sea. In 2012, for exam-
ple, it leaned on Cambodia to block ASEAN foreign ministers from issuing a
joint communiqué to prevent any mention of Scarborough Shoal, which China
had seized earlier in the year. China was trying to legitimate its efforts to in-
crease control over the shoal and to preempt public criticism of its seizure. In
2016, Cambodia, likely acting on China’s behalf, blocked an ASEAN joint
statement from mentioning the arbitral tribunal’s ruling.

Secondo, China has engaged in a protracted negotiation with ASEAN over a
code of conduct for the South China Sea, building on a 2002 declaration. When
a draft negotiating text was prepared in 2018, China proposed language that
reºected a desire to exclude external states from the region. Speciªcally, China
proposed that the signatories must provide consent for “joint military exer-
cises with countries from outside the region”;36 this language would have al-
lowed China to veto U.S. military exercises with ASEAN states in the South
China Sea. Other Chinese proposed language stipulated that oil and gas devel-
opment “shall not be conducted in cooperation with companies from countries
outside the region.”37 Although ASEAN and China are still negotiating the
text of the code, neither proposal is likely to be part of the ªnal agreement, given
opposition from Vietnam and other claimants. Nevertheless, these phrases re-
veal China’s preference to limit the role of non–South China Sea states.

actions that china has not (yet) taken

Although China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea remains persistent,
the actions that China has not yet taken suggest that its pursuit of South China
Sea dominance has been calibrated to avoid major escalation or severe blow-
back. China has not sought to seize those Spratly Islands’ features currently
held by other claimants, though its acquisition of Scarborough Shoal is a par-
tial exception. China has not sought to prevent the U.S. military from navigat-
ing in or above the South China Sea, especially beyond the 12-nautical-mile

ber 2, 2018, https://apnews.com/d3d9c8cc8f2e4d16ad54ea240725dbaa/US-says-Chinese-destroyer-
came-dangerously-close-to-US-ship.
36. Single Draft Code of Conduct (CoC) in the South China Sea Negotiating Text, ottobre 25,
2018. Copy in author’s possession.
37. Ibid.

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NOI. Policy Choices in the South China Sea 101

territorial sea, nor has it declared an air defense identiªcation zone in the
South China Sea. China has primarily limited its efforts to contesting close-in
surveillance along the Chinese coast in the far northern reaches of the South
China Sea. China has not sought to interfere in or prevent military exercises in-
volving the United States and other countries in the South China Sea. China
has not garrisoned the forward operating bases at Fiery Cross, Mischief, E
Subi reefs with power projection forces such as ªghter squadrons. China has
not drawn straight baselines around the Spratly Islands, although it has indi-
cated that it will. China has not used its economic and other sources of lever-
age to try to terminate the U.S.-Philippine alliance or to deny U.S. forces access
to other South China Sea states. Finalmente, China has not tried to interrupt or
block seaborne commerce.

To pursue its claims in ways that avoid armed conºict, China has employed
“gray zone” actors, such as the CCG and maritime militia. When U.S. resis-
tance to China’s actions in the South China Sea has increased—including after
IL 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum and after China completed land reclamation
at the end of 2015—China has paused. China’s caution matters for our analysis
because it indicates that China has been unwilling to generate a large risk of
conºict while it asserts its claims and pursues increased control.

Factors That May Motivate China’s Behavior

Understanding China’s motives for its desire to increase its dominance in the
South China Sea provides insight into the feasibility and risks of various
NOI. South China Sea policy options. Below, we assess the security, resource,
national identity, and status motives for China’s behavior.

security

China’s security goals include protecting its mainland, increasing its military
capabilities against Taiwan, preserving access to trade, and securely basing its
SSBNs. The core of China’s efforts to achieve these security goals is its ongoing
military modernization, not its actions in the South China Sea that we describe
in the previous section. Inoltre, China has security interests related to its
territorial claims and maritime rights in the South China Sea.

Primo, China would like to create a maritime buffer for its wealthy coastal
provinces that abut the South China Sea. To protect these regions, China
would endeavor to create a layered defense at sea in order to prevent an ad-
versary from easily striking the mainland. China’s emphasis in its naval strat-

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International Security 47:2 102

egy on “island chains,” which include the South China Sea as a critical part
of the ªrst island chain, reºect this desire to create a maritime buffer.38

The second security motive concerns Taiwan. The People’s Liberation
Army’s (PLA) current approach for an amphibious assault of the island envi-
sions two landing zones: one in the central part of the island’s west coast, E
the other near the island’s southern tip.39 Defending an assault of Taiwan’s
southern tip would require sea control
including the
northern reaches of the South China Sea, especially if U.S. forces were based in
the Philippines.

in adjacent areas,

A third security motive is to secure the sea lines of communication (SLOCs)
that pass through the South China Sea and terminate at various Chinese ports.
Although many countries, including Japan and South Korea, rely on trade that
transits through the South China Sea, the majority terminates in China.40
China wants to be able to defend these SLOCs because it fears that the United
States could interrupt trade through them to gain leverage during a conºict
over Taiwan.

China’s fourth security motivation concerns the sea leg of its evolving nu-
clear deterrent. As of 2022, China has based its SSBNs on Hainan Island. China
is currently developing a third-generation SSBN that will carry submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) capable of reaching the West Coast of the
United States from the South China Sea. Control of the South China Sea would
facilitate “ºushing” China’s SSBNs into the western Paciªc through deep wa-
ter in the northern half of the South China Sea. When its next-generation
SLBMs become operational, China may use the South China Sea itself as a bas-
tion from which it can strike the United States because its current SSBNs are
relatively noisy, which likely renders them vulnerable to U.S. anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) capabilities in the open ocean.41

Finalmente, China has security interests in the South China Sea itself, gener-

38. Andrew S. Erickson and Joel Wuthnow, “Barriers, Springboards, and Benchmarks: China Con-
ceptualizes the Paciªc ‘Island Chains,’” China Quarterly, Vol. 225 (Marzo 2016), pag. 1–22, https://
doi.org/10.1017/S0305741016000011.
39. Keoni Everington, “Leaked Map Shows China Plans to Invade S. Taiwan after Taking Kinmen,
Penghu,” Taiwan News, Gennaio 20, 2020, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3861097.
40. “How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?” China Power Project, CSIS, agosto 2, 2017,
updated January 25, 2021, https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/.
41. On potential uses of China’s ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in the South China Sea, Vedere
Tong Zhao, Tides of Change: China’s Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines and Strategic Stability
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018); and Wu Riqiang, “Surviv-
ability of China’s Sea-Based Nuclear Forces,” Science & Global Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2011), pag. 91–
120, https://doi.org/10.1080/08929882.2011.586312.

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NOI. Policy Choices in the South China Sea 103

ated by its claims to all the land features as well as to maritime rights related
to these features and the nine-dash line. Although arguably much less im-
portant than its other security concerns, China has occasionally described
the South China Sea as involving its core interests, suggesting that China un-
derstands its South China Sea claims as part of its national territory and mari-
time jurisdiction.

resources

Resources, speciªcally hydrocarbons, are frequently mentioned as a key
Chinese interest in the South China Sea. Even though China’s efforts to assert
its claims have stressed resource-related issues, the need for access to resources
themselves does not appear to be an important driver.42 Hydrocarbon esti-
mates for this vast body of water vary widely.43 One standard for evaluating
natural resources as a driver is the extent to which they can greatly reduce or
eliminate China’s import dependence.

Chinese control of the South China Sea would not signiªcantly reduce
China’s dependence on oil imports. Although the South China Sea is estimated
to have 11.5 billion barrels of proven/probable reserves, the U.S. government
estimates that the waters around the Spratly Islands have “virtually no proved
or probable reserves.”44 Instead, most oil deposits lie on the continental
shelves of Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam, a good portion of which lies outside
even the nine-dash line. Given that China consumed around 5.3 billion barrels
In 2019, two-thirds of which was imported, control of all the proven and prob-
able South China Sea reserves would do little to reduce China’s dependence
on imports, especially because its oil consumption continues to grow.45 Simi-
larly, of the estimated 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves,46 only
100 billion cubic feet are located in the waters around the Spratly Islands.

42. Because ªsh stocks have already been rapidly depleted, we do not discuss them in this article.
U. Rashid Sumaila and William W. l. Cheung, Boom or Bust: The Future of Fish in the South China Sea
(Hong Kong: Ocean Recovery Alliance, 2015).
43. South China Sea Analysis Brief (Washington, D.C.: NOI. Energy Information Administration, NOI.
Department of Energy, Febbraio 2013), https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/regions-of-
interest/South_China_Sea.
44. Ibid.
45. “China’s Crude Oil Imports Surpassed 10 Million Barrels Per Day in 2019” (Washington, D.C.:
NOI. Energy Information Administration, NOI. Department of Energy), Marzo 23, 2020, https://
www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id(cid:2)43216. Assuming that only one-quarter of proven or
probable oil reserves lie inside the nine-dash line, a twenty-ªve-year development time frame, E
no growth in China’s oil consumption, these reserves would constitute about 2 percent of China’s
oil consumption per year over twenty-ªve years.
46. South China Sea Analysis Brief.

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International Security 47:2 104

Much of the remainder lies in the northern half of the South China Sea, within
China’s EEZ. As China now consumes more than 11 trillion cubic feet per year,
which may double by 2040, these reserves around the Spratly Islands would
have only a modest impact on China’s natural gas imports.47

Looking ahead, new exploration of the waters in the South China Sea might
identify new potential reserves. For now, Tuttavia, China’s pursuit of these re-
sources reºects concerns about its international status and its resolve to defend
its claims. Below we discuss how China has used claims to resource rights as a
way to assert its dominance by trying to compel other regional states to acqui-
esce to its position on historic rights in these waters and to accept joint devel-
opment of these resources, even in the EEZs of coastal states where they
overlap with the nine-dash line.

national identity

A country’s motives for wanting to control territory need not be determined
entirely by material considerations. Nationalist beliefs about “the territory
that the nation-state ought to occupy”48 can also inºuence this assessment.
Once this identity is established, the state has a security interest in acquiring or
protecting this territory.

China’s modern national identity is frequently characterized in terms of two
deªning strands—historical glory and a century of humiliation—which support
its drive for national rejuvenation. Recovering certain territory that was lost
when the Qing dynasty collapsed is central to this goal. Although uniªcation of
Taiwan is China’s paramount territorial goal,49 gaining control of other territory
claimed by the PRC as part of China is also part of this identity narrative.

China’s claims to the islands in the South China Sea have been an estab-
lished component of the PRC’s national identity since 1949. In 1951, during
the Treaty of San Francisco peace negotiations, Premier Zhou Enlai declared
that the islands had “always been Chinese territory.”50 Chinese statements
since the mid-1950s have used strong language of “indisputable sovereignty”
(wuke zhengyi zhuquan) over the Spratly and Paracel islands to characterize

47. Using assumptions similar to those in our oil estimate in footnote 45, these reserves would
make up about 18 percent of China’s current gas consumption per year.
48. Ernst B. Haas, “What Is Nationalism and Why Should We Study It?” International Organization,
Vol. 40, No. 3 (Estate 1986), pag. 727–728, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027326.
49. Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign
Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), esp. pag. 129–133.
50. Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation.

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NOI. Policy Choices in the South China Sea 105

China’s claims. By contrast, China has never used such absolutist language to
describe the more numerous territorial disputes on its land borders. Recent re-
search highlights the “political-symbolic signiªcance” of China’s claims to ex-
plain China’s refusal to compromise.51

At the end of the Hu Jintao era, China began to change the language that it
used to describe its claims. In 2010, China reportedly informed the United
States that the South China Sea touched on China’s core interests, implying a
greater willingness to ªght over its South China Sea claims and a reduced will-
ingness to compromise. Subsequent research indicated that China had not yet
made such a clear-cut declaration, especially in contrast to its declarations over
areas such as Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang that are now routinely described spe-
ciªcally as core interests.52

After becoming the Chinese Communist Party’s general secretary, Xi Jinping
began to use much more strident language to describe China’s general posi-
tion on sovereignty. In 2013, at the end of a Politburo study session on becom-
ing a maritime power, Xi remarked that “it is necessary to resolve disputes
peacefully and through negotiations . . . in the South and East China Seas, [Ma]
. . . we must not give up our legitimate rights and interests, let alone sacriªce
our national core interests.”53 In 2018, Xi underscored that “we cannot lose one
inch of the territory left behind by our forefathers.”54

These leadership statements may, Tuttavia, mask a more nuanced debate
among China’s policy elites. Studies show that Chinese elites have not
achieved a consensus on the South China Sea. Some consider it a core interest,
others do not; some are prepared to generate signiªcant international opposi-
tion to China’s rise to achieve gains in the South China Sea, while others prior-
itize maintaining support for its rise.55 Thus, although China has moved

51. Andrew Chubb, “Chinese Popular Nationalism and the PRC Policy in the South China Sea,"
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Western Australia, 2016, pag. 52–55.
52. Michael D. Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behavior—Part One: On ‘Core Interests,’” China Leader-
ship Monitor, No. 34 (2010), P. 10.
53. Xi Jinping, “Xi Jinping guanyu jianshe haiyang qiangguo de lunshu” [Xi Jinping’s remarks on
constructing a maritime great power], Taipingyang xuebao [Paciªc Journal], Luglio 30, 2013, http://
www.paciªcjournal.com.cn/CN/news/news263.shtml. See also Xi Jinping, “Xi Jinping: Genghao
tongchou guonei guoji liangge daju, hangshi zuo heping fazhan daolu de jichu” [Xi Jinping: Better
manage the two overall situations at home and abroad, consolidate the foundation of the road to
peaceful development], Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], Gennaio 30, 2013, http://cpc.people
.com.cn/n/2013/0130/c64094-20368861.html.
54. “Xi Jinping huijian Meiguo guofang buzhang Madisi” [Xi Jinping meets with U.S. Defense Sec-
retary Mattis], Xinhua News Agency, Giugno 30, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/
2018-06/27/c_1123046180.htm.
55. Nie Wenjuan, “China’s Domestic Strategic Debate and Confusion over the South China Sea Is-

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International Security 47:2 106

toward increasing the standing of the South China Sea in its national identity,
its long-term position on the South China Sea appears not to be fully resolved.
Unlike national identity, popular nationalism does not appear to greatly
inºuence China’s South China Sea policy. The public’s awareness of these dis-
putes and the general importance of sovereignty raise the costs for the Chinese
leaders to pursue genuine compromises. But the hardening of China’s position
does not appear to be a response to public opinion. Per esempio, Chinese po-
lice prevented domestic protests during the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff
as well as in the 2014 oil rig confrontation with Vietnam.56

In sum, although the South China Sea has become increasingly important
to China, its territorial claims are long-standing and have not expanded in
scope. China is not in the process of creating a new national identity that
includes claims that reach beyond those that it established when the PRC was
founded. Ovviamente, countries can change their national identities over time.
Ma, overall, the news is good—nothing in this dimension of China’s state-
ments and narrative suggests that dominance of the South China Sea is the
ªrst step toward further territorial expansion. Allo stesso tempo, Anche se,
the South China Sea’s increasing importance in China’s national identity does
suggest that policies that depend on China compromising on its South China
Sea claims are less likely to succeed.

status

A ªnal driver of China’s behavior in the South China Sea could be China’s
desire for both regional and global status. Status requires recognition by other
states that it belongs to a group or holds a certain ranking within a group.57
Status desires can inºuence a state’s expectations about the rights and defer-
ence that it should receive from others. Rising powers have tended to believe

sue,” Paciªc Review, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2018), pag. 188–204, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2017
.1370608; and Feng Zhang, “Chinese Thinking on the South China Sea and the Future of Regional
Sicurezza,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 132, No. 3 (2017), pag. 435–466, https://doi.org/10.1002/
polq.12658.
56. Jessica Chen Weiss, “Here’s What China’s People Really Think about the South China Sea,"
Washington Post,
Luglio 14, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/
2016/07/14/heres-what-chinas-people-really-think-about-the-south-china-sea/. See also Andrew
Chubb, “Assessing Public Opinion’s Inºuence on Foreign Policy: The Case of China’s Assertive
Maritime Behavior,” Asian Security, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2019), pag. 159–179, https://doi.org/10.1080/
14799855.2018.1437723.
57. On various deªnitions, see Deborah Welch Larson, T. V. Paul, and William C. Wohlforth, “In-
troduction: Status and World Order,” in T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C.
Wohlforth, eds., Status in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pag. 7–13.

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NOI. Policy Choices in the South China Sea 107

that they have not achieved changes in the political, economic, geographic, O
institutional status quo that are commensurate with their power. As a re-
sult, the rising power may want a sphere of inºuence and the military capabili-
ties and weapons systems that are associated with greater status. Although a
great power could desire these changes simply for material or identity reasons,
it could also desire them because they would provide the status associated
with being recognized as a major power, the regionally dominant power, O
a superpower.58

Scholars of China have explored the importance of status to China’s leaders
and its population. Among their key ªndings are that by the late 1990s “na-
tional dignity, face, and respect from other countries, have become equally im-
portant or even more important than China’s material interests such as trade,
security, and territory,”59 that the “psychological feeling [of needing to regain
lost status] results in the Chinese being continuously dissatisªed with their
economic achievements until China resumes its superpower status,”60 and that
China expects deference from not only major powers but also the smaller
states in the South China Sea.61

In addition to these broad ªndings, Chinese statements hint at the role of
status in driving its South China Sea ambitions. Per esempio, at the 2010
meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, the United States rallied many coun-
tries, including some claimants, to express concerns about recent Chinese be-
havior in the South China Sea. Staring at his Singaporean counterpart, PRC
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said that “China is a big country and other coun-
tries are small countries, and that’s just a fact.”62 Similarly, In 2014, Straniero
Minister Wang Yi stressed, in the context of territorial disputes, that “we will
never accept smaller countries who make trouble [qunao],” implying that
China expects deference from other claimants.63

58. Steven Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2017); and Michelle Murray, The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations: Status,
Revisionism, and Rising Powers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).
59. Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, P. 135. In this context, “face” combines ideas of re-
spectability and deference, as in “to lose face.”
60. Yan Xuetong, “The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 10,
No. 26 (2001), P. 34, https://doi.org/10.1080/10670560123407. See also David Shambaugh, China
Goes Global: The Partial Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pag. 53–54.
61. Alex Yu-Ting Lin, “Challenges from Below: The Origins of Status Competition in World Poli-
tic,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California, 2021.
62. John Pomfret, “U.S. Takes a Tougher Tone with China,” Washington Post, Luglio 30, 2010, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/29/AR2010072906416.html.
63. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Waijiaobu buzhang Wang Yi jiu

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International Security 47:2 108

Given the limited material value of the South China Sea islands and reefs
themselves and the large international costs that China has incurred for its as-
sertive policies, status may help to explain China’s policies. By the time China
decided to establish a physical presence in the Spratly Islands in the mid-
1980S, the most desirable land features were already held by other claimants.
In less than a year, from 2014 A 2015, China’s land reclamation reversed this
situation. China’s physical presence now matches the standing that it expects
as the most powerful state in the region and in the South China Sea disputes in
particular. As a Chinese scholar remarked to one of the authors after land rec-
lamation, “we are the big brother now” in the South China Sea.64

Concerns about status may also help to explain China’s focus on asserting
rights to oil and gas resources, given the limited value of the resources. Such
assertions are a way for China to demonstrate its desire for dominance and in-
sist upon deference. We argue that China cares less about the resources and
more about whether the other claimants will concede to China’s demands for
joint development in those parts of their EEZs that overlap with the nine-dash
line and thus recognize China’s historic rights in the South China Sea.

NOI. Interests in the South China Sea

We should not simply assume that the United States has large interests in the
South China Sea. Whether it does depends on causal links between the South
China Sea and fundamental U.S. interests of security and prosperity. As a start-
ing point, we bound our analysis by assuming that the United States retains its
current grand strategy,65 which identiªes the following derivative interests in
East Asia: NOI. security via the security of its allies in the region; and U.S. pros-
perity via the region’s open trade, investment, and prosperity.66

The question then becomes how the South China Sea inºuences these deriv-

Zhongguo waijiao zhengce he duiwai guanxi huida Zhongwai jizhe tiwen” [Foreign Minister
Wang Yi responds to questions from Chinese and foreign journalists on China’s foreign policy
and external relations], Marzo 8, 2014, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn//pds/wjb/wjbz/xghd/
t1135388.shtml.
64. Conversation with Chinese scholar, Beijing, Luglio 2015.
65. There is, Tuttavia, substantial debate over U.S. grand strategy; see Paul C. Avey, Jonathan N.
Markowitz, and Robert J. Reardon, “Disentangling Grand Strategy: International Relations Theory
and U.S. Grand Strategy,” Texas National Security Review, Vol. 2, No. 1 (novembre 2018), pag. 29–51,
http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/869.
66. On derivative interests, see Charles L. Glaser, “Rational Analysis of Grand Strategy,” in
Thierry Balzacq and Ronald R. Krebs, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Grand Strategy (Oxford: Oxford
Stampa universitaria, 2021), pag. 107–122.

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NOI. Policy Choices in the South China Sea 109

ative interests. This section identiªes the most prominent links between
the South China Sea and (1) the security of U.S. treaty allies and partners;
(2) the regional rules-based order; E (3) the military bases that China has
built on South China Sea islands.

security of allies and partners in east asia

The United States’ commitments to East Asia reºect ªrst and foremost its judg-
ment that the security of U.S. allies is important for U.S. security and prosper-
ità. Most importantly, this judgment is manifest in U.S. treaty commitments to
Japan and South Korea and, to a lesser extent, the Philippines. Inoltre,
although the United States has not made an ofªcial commitment to de-
fend Taiwan, the broad expectation is that it would do so in the case of an un-
provoked attack.67 There is less agreement about whether Taiwan is a U.S.
security interest. Whereas some analysts ªnd it to be a primarily political-
ideological interest,68 others believe that protecting Taiwan is necessary to pre-
serve U.S. credibility in the region,69 or that Chinese control of Taiwan would
undermine necessary U.S. military capabilities.70

The importance of the South China Sea to U.S. wartime capabilities varies by
country. The United States does not need to pass through or ªght from the
South China Sea to protect Japan and South Korea; NOI. forces would approach
from other directions. In contrasto, the U.S. ability to protect Taiwan and
the Philippines does depend on its access to the South China Sea, although
this dependence could be reduced by the growing U.S. arsenal of long-range
standoff missiles, which can attack targets from a distance.

In addition to its military capabilities, the U.S. ability to deter attacks on its
allies will depend on preserving its credibility, which in turn depends on not
only preserving its military capabilities but also establishing policies that com-
municate its willingness to ªght to protect them. Consequently, in the follow-

67. Richard C. Bush, The United States Security Partnership with Taiwan (Washington, D.C.: Brook-
ings Institution Press, Luglio 13, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-united-states-
security-partnership-with-taiwan/.
68. Charles L. Glaser, “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competi-
tion and Accommodation,” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Primavera 2015), pag. 49–90, https://
doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00199; Glaser also rejects the credibility argument.
69. Vedere, Per esempio, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker and Bonnie Glaser, “Should the United States Aban-
don Taiwan?” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Autunno 2011), pag. 23–37.
70. On Taiwan’s security value, see Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Caitlin Talmadge, “Then
Che cosa? Assessing the Military Implications of Chinese Control of Taiwan,” International Security,
Vol. 47, No. 1 (Estate 2022), pag. 7–45, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00437.

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International Security 47:2 110

ing section we explore whether China’s increasing ability to control these
waters and U.S. responses would put U.S. credibility at risk.

rules-based order in east asia

The United States is frequently said to have an interest in preserving the re-
gional order or the rules-based order in East Asia, including most importantly
UNCLOS.71 Some analysts also include the principle of not using force to settle
international disputes, which has been a “key element of the U.S.-led interna-
tional order that has operated since World War II.”72

Part of UNCLOS addresses activities that the United States engages in to in-
crease its ability to protect its allies and to support maritime norms globally,
including rights to the freedom of navigation and overºight. In peacetime,
NOI. military access to the South China Sea is valuable for exercising its naval
and air capabilities, training with allies and partners, gathering intelligence,
transiting to other theaters, and demonstrating its commitment to the region.
Open access to these waters, and the commitment to keeping them open, also
underpins the region’s prosperity, which relies heavily on seaborne transport,
including both trade among Southeast Asian states and trade between South-
east Asia and U.S. allies in Northeast Asia.

The value of these rules, and thus the extent of U.S. interest in the rules-
based order, depends on their concrete implications. Primo, their value depends
on whether the United States would actually ªght from the South China Sea.
As China’s A2/AD improves, the ability of the United States to operate surface
ships and aircraft in the South China Sea in a large war with China will be-
come unacceptably risky (especially in its northern portion),73 which would
reduce the military value of conducting exercises there. Secondo, the value of
military exercises and other activities depends on the availability of alternative
activities that provide similar value. Per esempio, among other purposes, NOI.
military presence is intended to signal its commitment to the region. Especially
if the United States would ªght primarily from east of the South China Sea, In
the Philippine Sea, exercising from there should demonstrate its commitment.

71. On orders as means, not ends, see Charles L. Glaser, “A Flawed Framework: Why the Liberal
International Order Concept Is Misguided,” International Security, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Primavera 2019),
pag. 57–58, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00343.
72. O’Rourke, U.S-China Strategic Competition, pag. 3–5.
73. Biddle and Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Paciªc”; and Eugene Gholz, Benjamin
Friedman, and Enea Gjoza, “Defensive Defense: A Better Way to Protect U.S. Allies in Asia,"
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 4 (2019), pag. 171–189, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2019
.1693103.

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NOI. Policy Choices in the South China Sea 111

Ovviamente, whether it actually would demonstrate such a commitment de-
pends on the vagaries of states’ assessments of credibility.

In addition to protecting rights, states’ acceptance of rules can reduce
the probability of unintended confrontations by coordinating expectations.
UNCLOS serves these functions by granting speciªc rights regarding activities
in maritime spaces and access to resources. During peacetime, shared under-
standings of these rights can reduce military accidents, avoid generating polit-
ical tensions when the United States operates naval vessels in the South China
Sea, and reduce crises between China and other claimants, all of which reduce
the probability of the United States getting drawn into conºict. When these
understandings are not shared, Tuttavia, the rules can cause friction or con-
ºict, as they now do in the South China Sea.

south china sea islands and military bases

Although the features of the Spratly Islands are themselves of little value to
the United States, having access to the resources of the South China Sea
(per esempio., ªsh and petroleum) is valuable to U.S. allies and partners, particolarmente
those with growing energy demands and large domestic ªshing industries,
such as Vietnam and the Philippines.

Whether the United States has an interest in China not having military bases
on South China Sea islands depends on whether China’s Spratly bases reduce
the United States’ ability to protect its allies and partners. Our assessment
of their military value, in the following section, ªnds that these bases pose lit-
tle threat to U.S. military capabilities.

Chinese Military Threats to U.S. Interests

Given U.S. interests, how large a threat does China’s effort to dominate the
South China Sea pose to the United States? The key military challenges that
the United States faces reºect China’s overall military expansion and modern-
ization, including regional power projection capabilities. Although not typi-
cally the focus of U.S. South China Sea debates, China’s improving A2/AD
capabilities are signiªcantly reducing the U.S. ability to ªght a large war close
to China’s coast, including in the northern half of the South China Sea, così
limiting U.S. access to Northeast Asia via the South China Sea. The extent of
the threat that these new capabilities pose to U.S. interests is the subject of sub-
stantial debate. Expert analysis ªnds that because of limits on the reach of
China’s improving military capabilities, they will not undermine the U.S. abil-

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International Security 47:2 112

ity to defend its allies in Northeast Asia (cioè., South Korea and Japan)74—but
they will increase the challenge.75 In contrast, China’s military modernization
has already greatly reduced U.S. capabilities in a conºict over Taiwan.76 More-
Sopra, China’s naval expansion has begun to increase China’s ability to project
power and has signiªcantly increased its ability to maintain a permanent pres-
ence in the South China Sea.

The impact of China’s new bases in the South China Sea deserves especially
careful analysis because it has played a deªning role in apprehensions about
China’s South China Sea policies and its goals more broadly. These new bases
should be assessed in the context of China’s improving power projection capa-
bilities, not in isolation.

We consider four possible scenarios that would engage U.S. interests: inter-
ruption of trade, a war over Taiwan, a war between China and the United
States over a Spratly feature, and a conºict that the United States does not join
between China and a regional state. We also consider the impact on China’s
ability to protect a bastion for its SSBNs in the South China Sea. Our analysis
shows that, unlike China’s A2/AD capabilities, China’s militarization of the
Spratly Islands has contributed little or nothing to the increased challenges
that the United States faces in defending its Northeast Asian allies.

interruption of trade

Many commentators have argued that China’s growing military capabilities
threaten the extensive trade that ºows through the South China Sea.77 U.S.
prosperity and the prosperity of countries across the globe depend on these
major trade routes. The danger posed by China’s military capabilities is, how-
ever, greatly exaggerated.

74. Biddle and Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Paciªc.” For dissenting views, see Andrew
S. Erickson et al., “Correspondence: How Good Are China’s Antiaccess/Area-Denial Capabil-
ities?” International Security, Vo. 41, No. 4 (Primavera 2017), pag. 202–213, https://doi.org/10.1162/
ISEC_c_00278. Analysts have explored changes in U.S. and allied military doctrine that can im-
prove these countries’ abilities to offset China’s A2/AD capabilities; Vedere, Per esempio, Eric Hegin-
botham and Richard J. Samuels, “Active Denial: Redesigning Japan’s Response to China’s Military
Challenge,” International Security, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Primavera 2018), pag. 128–169, https://doi.org/
10.1162/isec_a_00313.
75. The increased challenge will be especially large for defending South Korea; see Eric Hegin-
botham and Richard J. Samuels, “Vulnerable U.S. Alliances in Northeast Asia: The Nuclear Impli-
cations,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2021), pag. 157–175, https://doi.org/10.1080/
0163660X.2021.1894709.
76. Biddle and Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Paciªc.”
77. See for example, Brands and Cooper, “Getting Serious about Strategy in the South China Sea,"
P. 16.

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NOI. Policy Choices in the South China Sea 113

To start with, because a blockade during peacetime would likely be viewed
as an act of war, China would probably refrain from such a provocation unless
it were already or imminently involved in a war with the United States or its
allies. Così, despite China’s growing military capabilities, there is not a sig-
niªcant threat to the region’s trade and prosperity during peacetime.78

Inoltre, most shipping could take alternative routes around the South
China Sea. During a war, shipping from the Strait of Malacca to South Korea,
Japan, and Taiwan could go through the archipelagic waters of Indonesia and
the Philippines, which would take between one and two days longer than if it
traveled through the South China Sea.79 Although not insigniªcant, these ship-
ping delays pale in importance when compared with an action as provocative
as blocking international trade in the South China Sea, let alone ªghting a ma-
jor war. In contrasto, China, which itself depends on seaborne trade through
these waters more than any other state, does not have any alternative wartime
routes. This largely explains why China has long worried about the vulnerabil-
ity of its Southeast Asian SLOCs.80

Finalmente, whatever additional capabilities the Spratly bases provide are
largely redundant for the interruption of trade. China’s overall military mod-
ernization already provides this capability for at least the northern reaches of
the South China Sea.81 It is true that these bases increase the ease and speed
with which China could interrupt trade in the southern South China Sea and
contribute to China’s ability to intimidate South China Sea states. But if China
cares enough, it does not need these bases to interrupt trade.

taiwan war involving the united states

At the other end of the conºict spectrum, we examine how militarization of
the Spratly Islands could contribute to China’s capability in a large regional
war involving the United States. A conºict over Taiwan is the most likely and
important scenario in this category. It is widely accepted that China’s military

78. This lack of a peacetime threat may be somewhat overstated because it does not address the
possibility of China blockading Southeast Asian states that are not U.S. allies.
79. Benjamin Herscovitch, A Balanced Threat Assessment of China’s South China Sea Policy, Policy
Analysis No. 820 (Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, agosto 28, 2017), pag. 7–12.
80. On China’s focus on the vulnerability of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), see McDevitt,
China as a Twenty-First-Century Naval Power; and Zha Daojiong, “China’s Energy Security: Domes-
tic and International Issues,” Survival, Vol. 48, No. 1 (2006), pag. 179–190, https://doi.org/10.1080/
00396330600594322.
81. On China’s anti-surface capabilities, see Eric Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China Military Score-
card: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND,
2015), pag. 153–200. See also Biddle and Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Paciªc.”

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International Security 47:2 114

modernization has greatly reduced the U.S. ability to defend Taiwan, con un
blockade likely posing the largest threat.

Whether China’s Spratly bases add much to China’s military capabilities in
a war over Taiwan is a different question altogether. Some experts have con-
cluded that these bases (as well as China’s Woody Island base in the Paracels)
will contribute signiªcantly to China’s overall capabilities.82 For a variety of
reasons, Tuttavia, China’s bases in the Spratly Islands are likely to be of little
consequence. Primo, and most important, the United States would not need to
move naval forces through the South China Sea to support its operations in the
Taiwan theater. NOI. forces would likely be coming from Japan, Guam, Hawaii,
and the continental United States. If the United States needed to bring forces
from the Middle East, these forces could bypass the South China Sea by going
east of the Philippines after passing through the Strait of Malacca.83

Secondo, the Spratly bases are roughly 1,400 A 1,600 kilometers from Taiwan,
which would put the majority of China’s ballistic missiles and its unrefueled
bombers, if deployed on these islands, largely or entirely out of reach of the
center of battle over Taiwan. Third, most forces that China would employ in a
Taiwan scenario are much closer to Taiwan, which further reduces the mar-
ginal value of Chinese forces deployed in the Spratly Islands. Per esempio, In
2017, China had thirty-nine air bases within 800 kilometers of Taiwan.84

Finalmente, even if these Spratly bases were militarily valuable, a modest, albeit
not insigniªcant, diversion of U.S. forces would be sufªcient to destroy them.
Per esempio, rough estimates suggest that initial attacks against Spratly air
bases (plus Woody Island in the Paracels) designed to destroy air defenses, dis-
able runways, and damage aircraft would require about 5 percent of the rap-
idly growing U.S. force of air-launched standoff missiles. The United States
has procured over 3,000 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM)—long-
range, stealthy cruise missiles—and has plans to acquire up to 10,000, includ-
ing increasingly capable variants. If necessary early in a conºict, the United
States has a variety of platforms that would be available to attack these bases.85

82. Gregory Poling, “The Conventional Wisdom on China’s Island Bases Is Dangerously Wrong,"
War on the Rocks,
Gennaio 10, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/the-conventional-
wisdom-on-chinas-island-bases-is-dangerously-wrong/.
83. Rachel Esplin Odell, “Assessing the Effect of China’s Expanded Presence in the South China
Sea on the U.S.-China Military Balance,” working draft, Dicembre 2016, pag. 27–28. Even if the
South China Sea features were not militarized, the United States would likely avoid the South
China Sea because of submarine and surface ship threats.
84. Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard, P. 139.
85. On the bases’ vulnerability, see Odell, “Assessing the Effect of China’s Expanded Presence in

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NOI. Policy Choices in the South China Sea 115

u.s.-china spratly scenario

In this scenario, the United States and China ªght over control of one or more
of the Spratly Islands. IL 2015 RAND U.S.-China Military Scorecard posits an
illustrative scenario: a dispute over oil and gas resources leads China to oc-
cupy an island, and the United States decides to push Chinese forces off the is-
land.86 The most politically salient contingency in which the United States and
China ªght over a Spratly Islands feature would involve islands held by the
United States’ ally, the Philippines.

We can envision two versions of this scenario: one in which China relies
only on forces deployed in the Spratly Islands, and another in which China
employs forces based on the mainland as well. As noted above, the United
States could destroy the forces deployed on China’s bases in the Spratly
Islands with a medium-sized attack. Although the United States would pre-
vail, this would not be a small conºict. The U.S. attack would kill some num-
ber of Chinese military personnel deployed on these islands and possibly on
Chinese surface ships. To reduce the risks of escalation, the United States could
target only those Chinese forces used in the attack, while withholding strikes
against the Spratly bases.

There are several ways that a conºict of wider scope, involving Chinese
mainland-based forces, could develop. China could employ these forces as the
United States was defeating its Spratly-based forces or could include mainland
forces in its initial operations. Alternatively, the United States could escalate to
attacks against mainland bases in anticipation of China’s escalation.

As with the narrower conºict, the United States should also prevail in this
one, at least given currently deployed forces. According to the RAND Scorecard
(which did not factor in the Spratly bases because their construction had just
begun at the time of the study), the United States maintains an overall advan-
tage in this scenario even though China has signiªcantly improved its capa-
bilities. A key difference between the Taiwan scenario—in which China could

the South China Sea on the U.S.-China Military Balance,” pp. 31–35. On the availability of U.S.
forces, see Olli Pekka Suorsa, “The Conventional Wisdom Still Stands: America Can Deal with
China’s Artiªcial Island Bases,” War on the Rocks, Febbraio 6, 2020, https://warontherocks
.com 2020/02/the-conventional-wisdom-still-stands-america-can-deal-with-chinas-artiªcial-island-
bases/. On their limited military value, see Shahryar Pasandideh, “Do China’s New Islands Allow
It to Militarily Dominate the South China Sea?” Asian Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2021), pag. 1–24,
https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2020.1749598. On joint
standoff missiles
(JASSMs), see Sara Sirota, “Air Force, Lockheed Martin Finalize $818 Million JASSM-ER Con- tract,” Inside Defense, April 1, 2020, https://insidedefense.com/insider/air-force-lockheed-martin- ªnalize-818-million-jassm-er-contract. 86. Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard, P. 14. air-to-surface l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / d i r e c t . m i t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – p d l f / / / / 4 7 2 8 8 2 0 5 5 5 3 7 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 4 4 3 p d . f b y g u e s t t o n 0 8 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 International Security 47:2 116 possibly defeat U.S. forces—and the Spratly scenario is geography. Com- pared with Taiwan, the Spratly Islands are much farther from Chinese main- land bases and proportionally farther from the relevant U.S. bases in Northeast Asia. Consequently, putting aside China’s South China Sea bases, NOI. pros- pects in a Spratly scenario would be both much better than in a Taiwan scenario and reasonably promising. Although the PLAN surface ºeet has been substantially modernized and expanded, the U.S. Navy is planning to purchase more than 1,600 anti-ship missiles by 2025 (per esempio., the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, the Naval Strike Missile, and the SM-6 missile) and upgrad- ing all its Tomahawks with an anti-ship capability.87 Nevertheless, if China continues to invest in its mainland-based forces, by around 2030 “PLA forces could gain local or temporary air and naval supe- riority during initial battles.” Although the United States would still prevail in such a scenario, “U.S. success might entail sustained combat and signiª- cant losses.”88 In short, for the next decade or so, the United States would prevail in a con- ºict over a Spratly feature. But China’s overall military modernization will continue to increase the military cost of this ªght, including the risks to U.S. soldiers and the risks of escalation to a broader conºict. The United States would face a deteriorating military environment even if China had not milita- rized its Spratly feature. This militarization contributes to China’s capabili- ties, but it is unlikely to be decisive in determining the outcome of this Spratly scenario. china versus a regional state The ªnal set of scenarios involves cases in which China challenges a U.S. ally or partner and the United States does not participate. There are three types of scenarios: China uses force to gain control of a Spratly feature or resources; China attacks a U.S. ally or partner to compel concessions; and China uses its Spratly bases to harass and interfere with a state’s resource extraction. These three scenarios would not directly threaten the United States but 87. On anti-ship missiles, see David B. Larter, “As China Expands Navy, US Begins Stockpiling Ship-Killing Missiles,” DefenseNews, Febbraio 11, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/ 2020/02/11/as-china-continues-rapid-naval-expansion-the-us-navy-begins-stockpiling-ship-kill- ing-missiles/. On Tomahawk upgrades, see David B. Larter, “US Navy Set to Receive Latest Ver- sion of the Tomahawk Missile,” DefenseNews, Marzo 17, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/ naval/2021/03/17/us-navy-set-to-take-delivery-of-the-latest-version-of-its-tomahawk-missile/. 88. Heginbotham et al, The U.S.-China Military Scorecard, P. 342. See also pp. 338–342. l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / d i r e c t . m i t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – p d l f / / / / 4 7 2 8 8 2 0 5 5 5 3 7 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 4 4 3 p d . f b y g u e s t t o n 0 8 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 NOI. Policy Choices in the South China Sea 117 could threaten a U.S. alleato, the Philippines, as well as principles that the United States seeks to uphold, and could be linked to regional assessments of U.S. credibility. China’s Spratly bases enhance its capability in each of the scenarios but would not be decisive in any—China increasingly can succeed in these scenarios from its mainland bases and infrastructure. China’s mainland-based capability to ªght the United States in the Spratly Islands has increased signiªcantly and is expected to continue to improve. The increase in China’s ability to launch at- tacks against regional states—including the Philippines and Vietnam—has been even larger. Allo stesso tempo, because aircraft based on the mainland would be close to their range limits in some of these scenarios, especially in the southern portion of the South China Sea, the option to deploy aircraft to airªelds on its Spratly bases increases China’s capabilities in some instances. Some experts conclude that China’s new bases are designed primarily to co- erce Southeast Asia states, forcing them to forgo their resource and maritime claims, and providing China dominance of the South China Sea.89 China, how- ever, can accomplish these activities without relying on its Spratly bases. China’s expanded and modernized coast guard can operate effectively across the entire South China Sea, with some ships able to reach beyond it. Neverthe- less, China’s Spratly bases do enable it to increase the tempo of these opera- tions and to sustain a permanent presence in the southern half of the South China Sea, which likely does intimidate the much smaller claimants and, with sufªcient numbers of ships, could increase China’s ability to control the waters that these claimants might contest.90 a bastion for ballistic missile submarines China may deploy its SSBNs in a bastion in the South China Sea, which China would defend with its conventional forces. To enhance its ability to ªnd U.S. nuclear attack submarines that are hunting for its SSBNs, China is deploying ASW aircraft. Flying these aircraft from its Spratly bases could increase their operational tempo in the central and southern portions of the South China Sea.91 Once a conºict starts, China’s regional power projection capabilities 89. Poling, “The Conventional Wisdom on China’s Island Bases Is Dangerously Wrong.” 90. Joshua Hickey, Andrew S. Erickson, and Henry Holst, “China Maritime Law Enforcement Sur- face Platforms: Order of Battle, Capabilities, and Trends,” in Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson, eds., China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations (Annapolis, Md.: China Maritime Studies Institute, Naval Institute Press, 2019), P. 129. 91. Lyle J. Goldstein, “China Girds for Undersea Battle in the South China Sea,” National Interest, l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / d i r e c t . m i t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – p d l f / / / / 4 7 2 8 8 2 0 5 5 5 3 7 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 4 4 3 p d . f b y g u e s t t o n 0 8 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 International Security 47:2 118 would help protect its bastion by preventing U.S. surface ships and ASW air- craft from operating freely in the region. Whether China’s ASW capabilities would be signiªcantly increased by ºying from Spratly bases is unknown, but the United States would be able to destroy these bases early in a war. How large a threat China’s ability to protect its SSBNs poses to U.S. security depends on the feasibility and value of undermining China’s pursuit of an as- sured destruction capability. If the value is low, and possibly even negative (as one of us has argued elsewhere),92 then even if the Spratly bases en- hance the survivability of China’s SSBNs, they do not threaten U.S. security. Allo stesso tempo, China views the current U.S. strategy as seeking to deny China a secure second-strike capability, which increases the value of SSBNs and a bastion strategy for using them.93 Thus, an effective bastion would increase China’s security without reducing U.S. security. Chinese Threats to UNCLOS and Credibility threats to U.S. This section assesses additional interests—China’s chal- lenges to the rules and institutions designed to guide behavior in East Asia (cioè., UNCLOS), to U.S. credibility with China, and to U.S. credibility with its East Asia allies. We ªnd that the most signiªcant danger is that reduced U.S. military resistance to China’s effort to dominate the South China Sea could reduce U.S. credibility with both China and U.S. allies. Although the United States retains options that, in principle, should enable it to maintain its credibility—including deepening its alliance commitments—such actions may not be completely successful. china’s interpretations of unclos The threat posed by China’s interpretation of UNCLOS depends not only on its current interpretations, but future ones as well. China’s present interpreta- tion requires that foreign military vessels request permission from China be- fore transiting through its territorial waters. This interpretation challenges the December 11, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-girds-undersea-battle-south-china- sea-38452. 92. Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward China,” International Security, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Estate 2016), pag. 49–98, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00248. 93. Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Autunno 2015), pag. 7– 50, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00215. l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / d i r e c t . m i t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – p d l f / / / / 4 7 2 8 8 2 0 5 5 5 3 7 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 4 4 3 p d . f b y g u e s t t o n 0 8 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 NOI. Policy Choices in the South China Sea 119 principle of freedom of navigation that the United States seeks to uphold not just in the South China Sea but also globally.94 China also rejects the legitimacy of U.S. surveillance and intelligence gathering within its EEZ as a form of ma- rine scientiªc research over which coastal states enjoy the exclusive right to conduct. The United States and China also disagree over the ruling of the 2016 tribunal. China has not aggressively imposed its interpretation of UNCLOS on the United States. China’s opposition to U.S. surveillance is as much political as it is legal—China views these acts as hostile regardless of their legality. Never- theless, China has not sought to prevent the United States from navigating in the South China Sea, with notable exceptions in 2009 E 2018. Chinese ves- sels shadow but rarely interfere with or prevent the U.S. naval activities that China opposes, especially FONOPs. Così, the main danger is the risk of an ac- cident during a shadowing operation or an aerial intercept, which would be small scale and unlikely to escalate. In the future, China could change either its interpretation of UNCLOS or its determination to impose its current interpretation. It also could pressure the United States to halt its surveillance or FONOPs, and it could expand the scope of the area covered by its current interpretation, most importantly by drawing straight baselines around the Spratly Islands. Inoltre, China could expand the list of activities that it would use force to prevent within its EEZ, most notably military exercises.95 It is also possible, Tuttavia, that China will change its position on freedom of navigation to reºect the PLAN’s increasing ability to conduct surveillance operations near distant countries. This would bring China’s position into closer alignment with the U.S. position and reduce friction over this issue. In short, although a source of military and political friction, China’s diver- gent interpretation of and associated actions related to UNCLOS pose a rela- tively small security threat to the United States. Perhaps more important is China’s insistence on its interpretation, and especially its rejection of the tribu- nal’s ruling in 2016: China demonstrated its willingness to ignore international 94. If enough other countries adopt China’s interpretations, then the perceived legitimacy of U.S. operations and activities could be weakened around the globe. 95. China has been largely consistent in its positions on innocent transit, surveillance in its Exclu- sive Economic Zone (EEZ), and military exercises in EEZs, which suggests signiªcant change is less likely. On China’s positions, see Rachel Esplin Odell, “Mare Interpretatum: Continuity and Evo- lution in States’ Interpretations of the Law of the Sea,” Ph.D. dissertation, Istituto di Tecnologia del Massachussetts, 2020, pag. 237–288. l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / d i r e c t . m i t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – p d l f / / / / 4 7 2 8 8 2 0 5 5 5 3 7 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 4 4 3 p d . f b y g u e s t t o n 0 8 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 International Security 47:2 120 law and incur the ensuing substantial reputational costs. This stance suggests that China may be more willing than previously believed to pursue domi- nance of the South China Sea, even when facing extensive international objec- zioni, and possibly that it is more likely to pursue regional hegemony. u.s. credibility with china China’s assertive policies in the South China Sea pose a potential challenge to U.S. security interests by creating conditions that require the United States to respond to preserve its credibility. If the United States does not push back, especially if it stops militarily resisting China’s efforts to control the South China Sea, China might conclude that the United States is less resolved to pro- tect its other interests in East Asia. Per esempio, China might conclude that the United States is less determined to protect allies and partners in the South China Sea region; less willing to ªght to protect Taiwan; E, most worrisome, more likely to terminate its East Asian alliances and withdraw from the region. China might then adopt a variety of more assertive foreign policies and an intensiªed military buildup designed to achieve regional hegemony. These potential changes follow directly from the connectedness of credibil- ity logic: when a state makes a concession on one set of issues, an adversary may infer that the state will be less likely to uphold its other commitments.96 Two mechanisms can yield this result. The ªrst depends on China seeing simi- larities across dimensions of the issues on which the United States reduced its commitments and others on which it retained its commitments—including ge- ography, the nature and extent of the U.S. interests, and the type of commit- if China sees similarities between not protecting an ment. Speciªcally, ally’s maritime claim and not protecting the ally’s homeland, not protecting Taiwan, or not preserving U.S. alliances, then that U.S. interest could be in greater jeopardy. The second mechanism comes into play if China believes that a change 96. There is a large, divided literature on the credibility of commitments. Our arguments are broadly consistent with those that ªnd conditional connectedness, including Iain D. Henry, “What Allies Want: Reconsidering Loyalty, Reliability, and Alliance Interdependence,” International Secu- rity, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Primavera 2020), pag. 45–83, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00375; Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 69, No. 2 (Primavera 2015), pag. 473–495, https://doi.org/10.1017/ S0020818314000393; and Robert Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Gennaio 1979), pag. 319–322, https://doi.org/10.2307/2009945. Prominent skeptics include Jona- than Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); and Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Uni- versity Press, 2005). l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / d i r e c t . m i t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – p d l f / / / / 4 7 2 8 8 2 0 5 5 5 3 7 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 4 4 3 p d . f b y g u e s t t o n 0 8 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 NOI. Policy Choices in the South China Sea 121 in the U.S. position in the South China Sea reºects a change in a factor that also affects U.S. decisions on these other issues. The broad change that is most rele- vant is the shifting balance of power, speciªcally increasing Chinese military capabilities in East Asia. If China’s leaders believed that its growing mili- tary capabilities caused the United States to reduce its commitments in the South China Sea, they would also reasonably expect a reduction in U.S. credi- bility for protecting its other interests. Although being concerned about U.S. credibility is reasonable, reducing U.S. resistance to China’s efforts to dominate the South China Sea—at least in theory—need not signiªcantly reduce U.S. credibility. The United States should be able to sever this key credibility link between South China Sea claims and its allies because the extent of U.S. interests in East Asia varies greatly. As a ªrst step, Perciò, if it decides to decrease its military resistance to China’s pursuit of South China Sea control, the United States should make clear to both China and its allies that it cares orders of magnitude more about protecting its allies (and preventing China’s regional hegemony) than about protecting states’ territorial claims to small features in the South China Sea or even preventing China’s control of the South China Sea. Words are cheap, Tuttavia. If the United States decides not to risk much to contest Chinese pursuit of South China Sea dominance, it should take costly actions to reinforce its commitments to allies in Northeast Asia, including maintaining and increasing U.S. military capabilities dedicated to protecting its allies. Inoltre, the United States can continue to further integrate plan- ning, exercises, and intelligence sharing with its key allies, which should both reassure them and demonstrate resolve to China. Further, the development of new security pacts such as the 2021 trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (called “AUKUS”) can demon- strate that the United States’ commitment to defend its key interests in East Asia is increasing, not decreasing. Even though these policies should theoretically preserve U.S. credibility, many regional experts worry that in practice they will fail. States frequently misinterpret actions and signals.97 In addition, China tends to exaggerate its own successes, and so it might emphasize U.S. concessions and discount U.S. signals of commitment. Per esempio, China was too quick to conclude that the 2008 global ªnancial crisis—in which it fared better than the United States— 97. Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Balti- more, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / d i r e c t . m i t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – p d l f / / / / 4 7 2 8 8 2 0 5 5 5 3 7 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 4 4 3 p d . f b y g u e s t t o n 0 8 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 International Security 47:2 122 was a telling indicator of reduced U.S. prosperity, capabilities, and inºuence.98 Thus, although the conditional connectedness of credibility logic is strong, NOI. efforts to preserve its credibility might not fully succeed. Therefore, even if the United States pursues policies that should prevent reductions of its credibility, it will be running some risk. The magnitude of this risk depends on the importance that China places on achieving regional hegemony in East Asia. Over the past two decades, high- level Chinese leadership statements have indicated that China opposes U.S.- led alliances in the region and thus, by implication, that it desires regional hegemony. China began in the late 1990s to propose an alternative to U.S.-led alliances in the region with its introduction of a “new security concept,” which held that “the old security concept based on military alliances and build-up of armaments will not help ensure global security.”99 In 2002, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin declared that Asia should rely on itself rather than other powers for security.100 A 2003 PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs position paper identiªed the new security concept as part of an effort to “discard the mentality of the Cold War,” with the aim to “rise above one-sided security and seek common security through mutually bene- ªcial cooperation.”101 Discussions of Asian security with no role for U.S. alliances accelerated un- der Xi Jinping. In a 2014 speech, Xi built on Jiang’s idea to introduce a “new Asian security concept for new progress in security cooperation,”102 stat- 98. Xiaoyu Pu and Chengli Wang, “Rethinking China’s Rise: Chinese Scholars Debate Strategic Overstretch,” International Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 5 (settembre 2018), pag. 1019–1035, https://doi.org/ 10.1093/ia/iiy140. 99. Jiang Zemin, “Jiang Zemin’s Speech at the Conference on Disarmament (26 Marzo 1999, Geneva),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Marzo 26, 1999, https:// www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceno//eng/wjzc/cjjk/jhwx/t110973.htm. For an excellent overview of China’s views of alliances, see Adam P. Liff, “China and the US Alliance System,” China Quarterly, Vol. 233 (Marzo 2018), pag. 137–165, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741017000601. 100. “Statement by H.E. Mr. Jiang Zemin, President of the People’s Republic of China,” Confer- ence on Interaction and Conªdence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), Internet Archive, last modiªed May 12, 2020, https://web.archive.org/web/20201205112855/https://www.s-cica.org/ page/china/. These views were restated by Dai Bingguo, head of the Chinese Communist Party’s foreign affairs ofªce in 2010. “Statement by H.E. Mr. Dai Bingguo State Councilor of the People’s Republic of China,” CICA, Internet Archive, last modiªed April 12, 2020, https://web .archive.org/web/20201205055930/https://www.s-cica.org/page/china10/. 101. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Position Paper on the New Security Concept,” July 2002, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/xw/t27742.htm. 102. “New Asian Security Concept for New Progress in Security Cooperation,” remarks at the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Conªdence Building Measures in l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / d i r e c t . m i t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – p d l f / / / / 4 7 2 8 8 2 0 5 5 5 3 7 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 4 4 3 p d . f b y g u e s t t o n 0 8 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 NOI. Policy Choices in the South China Sea 123 ing that “to beef up and entrench a military alliance targeted at a third party is not conducive to maintaining common security”103 and that “it is for the peo- ple of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia.”104 At around the same time, China introduced the slogan “community of common destiny,” which envisions alliances as a source of insecurity.105 What remains uncertain, Tuttavia, is how much China values achieving re- gional hegemony, or what costs it would be willing to bear to achieve this goal. The same statements and documents that openly oppose alliances do not call for the removal or withdrawal of the United States even though that is a clear implication of China’s opposition. UN 2017 white paper explicitly accepted the need to work with “military alliances formed in history.”106 Moreover, China’s military strategy remains focused on prevailing in a conºict over Taiwan, and not on pushing the United States from the region or even preventing the United States from operating in countries such as Singapore or Malaysia that are not formal treaty allies. As Adam Liff concludes, despite China’s “frustra- tion” and “even outright opposition to US alliances,” “it is not clear that Beijing possesses the will, much less the ability, to actively seek to fundamen- tally undermine the alliance system.”107 The possibility, even the likelihood, that China does not place great value on achieving regional hegemony in the short to medium term has important im- plications for U.S. policy. It reduces the risks of a policy that might be viewed as decreasing U.S. credibility for preserving its security commitments to its treaty allies and its capabilities to protect them. If in the future China comes to place great value on achieving regional hegemony—that is, becomes willing to ªght a major war to achieve it—the United States will have had plenty of time to restore any lost credibility. Così, a policy of partial South China Asia, Shanghai Expo Center, May 21, 2014, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cenz//eng/ztbd/yxhfh/ t1159951.htm. 103. Ibid. 104. Ibid. 105. Xi Jinping, “Working Together to Forge a New Partnership of Win-Win Cooperation and Cre- ate a Community of Shared Future for Mankind,” United Nations, settembre 28, 2015, https:// gadebate.un.org/sites/default/ªles/gastatements/70/70_ZH_en.pdf. 106. “Full Text: China’s Policies on Asia-Paciªc Security Cooperation,” State Council, People’s Republic of China, last modiªed January 11, 2017, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white _paper/2017/01/11/content_281475539078636.htm. 107. Liff, “China and the US Alliance System,” pp. 157–158. l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / d i r e c t . m i t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – p d l f / / / / 4 7 2 8 8 2 0 5 5 5 3 7 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 4 4 3 p d . f b y g u e s t t o n 0 8 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 International Security 47:2 124 Sea retrenchment—which should preserve U.S. credibility but perhaps not completely—could be acceptably risky. u.s. credibility with allies If the United States does not help to protect its allies’ territorial claims and maritime rights in the South China Sea, they may lose them. The United States, Tuttavia, would not suffer any direct loses. The potential cost to the United States is that its allies and partners might question U.S. credibility for protect- ing their truly vital interests—their homelands and economies—if it fails to protect their sovereignty and economic interests in the South China Sea. This could weaken or even destroy these relationships, which would in turn dam- age U.S. security. The Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia all face extensive challenges from China. NOI. decisions not to help resist these challenges could create doubts among both other countries that have South China Sea claims or interests and U.S. allies outside Southeast Asia, especially Japan. The connectedness of credibility logic provides the link between U.S. South China Sea policies and its credibility with allies and partners. The same basic arguments discussed above for preserving U.S. credibility apply here as well: the United States can pursue a variety of military, economic, and diplomatic policies that should sufªciently demonstrate its commitments to its allies. Inoltre, the United States is by far the best security option available to these countries, which should signiªcantly increase U.S. prospects for preserving its alliances.108 All this said, NOI. allies in Northeast Asia have complicated domestic poli- tics that could undermine U.S. efforts to maintain its credibility, especially as China’s economic inºuence grows in the region. There is thus a risk that not resisting China’s drive for South China Sea dominance would strain the United States’ East Asian alliances.109 The United States would face still greater credibility challenges in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia is a diverse region in which countries’ inclinations to lean toward or against the United States vary quite substantially.110 Preserving 108. On a declining power’s ability to preserve its alliances, see Jasen J. Castillo and Alexander B. Downes, “Loyalty, Hedging, or Exit: How Weaker Alliance Partners Respond to the Rise of New Threats,” Journal of Strategic Studies, published online July 30, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 01402390.2020.1797690. 109. On general concerns about U.S. credibility, see Hiroyuki Akita, “Time for Asia to Rethink Its Deep Dependence on US for Security,” Nikkei Asia, Marzo 3, 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spot- light/Comment/Time-for-Asia-to-rethink-its-deep-dependence-on-US-for-security. 110. David Shambaugh, “U.S.-China Rivalry in Southeast Asia: Power Shift or Competitive Coex- l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / d i r e c t . m i t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – p d l f / / / / 4 7 2 8 8 2 0 5 5 5 3 7 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 4 4 3 p d . f b y g u e s t t o n 0 8 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 NOI. Policy Choices in the South China Sea 125 credibility with the Philippines may be the most difªcult because it has urged the United States to clarify that the Philippines’ South China Sea claims are covered by the mutual defense treaty.111 In addition, for decades the United States’ inconsistent attention to the region has generated doubts about the ex- tent of its interests and commitments, which has increased the opportunities available to China.112 China has gained regional inºuence by developing deep economic ties with many Southeast Asian countries—ASEAN is now China’s largest trading partner, surpassing the United States and the European Union—which it has used both to demand acquiescence to its interests and to dampen the political costs of its bullying.113 In part, the United States’ incon- sistent prioritization of the region reºects its belief that Southeast Asia plays a limited role in U.S. security. How Hard Should the United States Resist China? Although U.S. policy toward the South China Sea will include a variety of ele- menti, in broad terms the choice facing the United States is how hard to resist China’s efforts to control the South China Sea. This requires the United States to weigh the risks and beneªts of different levels of resistance to China’s ef- forts. The key risk is the probability of escalation to armed conºict, which de- pends on not only U.S. policies but also China’s willingness to ªght. Inoltre, increased U.S. resistance could further worsen U.S.-China relations. The key beneªt is U.S. credibility with China and with U.S. allies, which can be increased by intensiªed U.S. resistance. We conclude that, at least for the time being, the United States should main- tain roughly its current level of resistance to China’s assertive policies in the South China Sea. Within this range of current policies, Tuttavia, the United States should lean toward less competitive actions. Per esempio, it should consider planning not to respond militarily in the most dangerous scenario— istence?” International Security, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Primavera 2018), pag. 85–127, https://doi.org/10.1162/ isec_a_00314. 111. Gregory Poling and Eric Sayers, “Time to Make Good on the U.S.-Philippine Alliance,” War on the Rocks, Gennaio 21, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/time-to-make-good-on- the-u-s-philippine-alliance/. 112. Joseph Chinyong Liow, Ambivalent Engagement: The United States and Regional Security in Southeast Asia after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2017). 113. Feng Zhang, “Is Southeast Asia Really Balancing against China?” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 3 (2018), pag. 191–204, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2018.1520573. l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / d i r e c t . m i t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – p d l f / / / / 4 7 2 8 8 2 0 5 5 5 3 7 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 4 4 3 p d . f b y g u e s t t o n 0 8 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 International Security 47:2 126 China’s military seizure of additional South China Sea features. As we explore below, blufªng may sometimes be the United States’ best option. A key reason for retaining the current level of resistance is that China can likely be deterred, which means the risks of the U.S. policy are relatively small. Before its increased assertiveness in the past decade, China pursued a slow and steady approach to increasing its control in the South China Sea. Even by 2022, Tuttavia, China has not moved to take the roughly forty-ªve islets and rocks currently controlled by other countries. China has also not moved to limit or restrict foreign military vessels from transiting, patrolling, or exercis- ing in these waters, nor has it attempted to coerce littoral states to stop hosting U.S. forces that operate in the South China Sea. Inoltre, China has sought to increase its control of the South China Sea by relying primarily on its coast guard and maritime militia forces, while depending on the PLAN to back them up only if necessary, which suggests that China is reluctant to provoke a major armed conºict. China’s caution suggests that it can likely be deterred. Nevertheless, because the United States has quite limited interests in the South China Sea, the risks of increased military resistance would be unwar- ranted. Increased commitments and red lines could appear to directly chal- lenge China’s territorial sovereignty claims and its status goals, leading to more forceful Chinese behavior. They could also further strain U.S.-China rela- zioni, creating additional incentives for China to strive to push the United States out of East Asia. Firmer commitments could also create expectations within the U.S. government and public that the United States should respond to Chinese provocations. The United States should continue to update its assessments of China’s determination to dominate the South China Sea, which would be reºected in a shift toward even more assertive policies. These could include seeking to reclaim land at Scarborough Shoal and build a ªfth base in these waters, at- tacking and seizing features held by other claimants or coercing them to relin- quish them, or coercing littoral states to stop hosting U.S. forces (especially the Philippines, which signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement in 2014).114 If China’s future actions indicate that it is much more determined than it is today and, Perciò, that U.S. deterrent policies are more likely to fail, then the 114. Carl Thayer, “Analyzing the US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement,” Diplomat, May 2, 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/05/analyzing-the-us-philippines-enhanced- defense-cooperation-agreement/. l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / d i r e c t . m i t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – p d l f / / / / 4 7 2 8 8 2 0 5 5 5 3 7 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 4 4 3 p d . f b y g u e s t t o n 0 8 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 NOI. Policy Choices in the South China Sea 127 United States should shift to a policy of partial South China Sea retrenchment. Shifting to a less competitive policy in the face of more assertive Chinese be- havior may appear counterintuitive. But given the increased risk posed by China, this is the logical conclusion. Under a policy of partial retrenchment, China would be able to militarily dominate the countries of Southeast Asia along their South China Sea periph- ery. The United States would indicate its unwillingness to use force to protect their territorial or maritime claims. There would be an exception for treaty allies—speciªcally the Philippines—for which the United States would protect access to trade in addition to the security of Philippine homeland territory. Critically, the United States would maintain its ability to deny China the abil- ity to operate in the South China Sea during war. It would also likely continue to send naval ships through the South China Sea during peacetime, includ- ing to conduct FONOPs, among other reasons to help preserve the credibility of its commitments to its allies. But the United States would not extend such operations to breaking a Chinese blockade of a Southeast Asian country that is not a U.S. alleato. This policy of partial retrenchment would, in effect, accept a Chinese limited sphere of inºuence over the South China Sea, while maintain- ing the U.S. ability to ªght a major war in East Asia. The United States would continue to use nonmilitary means—including sanctions and shaming—to in- dicate its opposition to China’s assertiveness. The following subsections consider the components of a U.S. policy that continues to resist China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea (such as the seizure of features, intimidation, further militarization of features, and denial of navigational rights to U.S. naval vessels). NOI. decisions about these compo- nents would determine the speciªcs of its overall policy and the extent of the risks that each generates. Within the current policy of resisting China’s control, we tend toward the less competitive variants of the following policies. We focus on those policy options that bear directly on increasing or decreas- ing the risk of crises and war because they most signiªcantly inºuence the risks of resisting China in the South China Sea. Allo stesso tempo, although we do not consider them below, the United States should continue to pursue other policies that do not signiªcantly alter the risk of armed conºict between the United States and China in the South China Sea. These include increasing the capability of littoral states to monitor, patrol, and defend their waters— through maritime domain awareness and naval and law enforcement capacity- building—and continuing to support the ruling of the 2016 tribunal regarding maritime claims and the legitimacy of coastal states’ rights in their own EEZs. l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / d i r e c t . m i t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – p d l f / / / / 4 7 2 8 8 2 0 5 5 5 3 7 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 4 4 3 p d . f b y g u e s t t o n 0 8 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 International Security 47:2 128 deterring and responding to china’s seizure of features So long as the United States continues to militarily resist Chinese South China Sea dominance, its most consequential policy choice will be whether and how to prevent China from expanding its control over South China Sea land features held by other claimants. These scenarios are the most dangerous because they could involve direct and possibly large-scale conºict between U.S. and Chinese forces. The United States has a range of options for trying to deter China from seiz- ing a large number of the islands and reefs held by others. The United States could intensify its resistance, which we oppose, by explicitly committing itself to use force to defend an ally’s or partner’s South China Sea interests. The United States could establish red lines for territorial claims and abandon its current policy of neutrality regarding the underlying claims to sovereignty over the islets and rocks in the South China Sea. The United States has shifted in this direction by partially clarifying the reach of its treaty commitments to the Philippines. In 2019, it included attacks against “Philippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South China Sea” as falling under the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty.115 The United States only partially clariªed this U.S. commitment because it did not speciªcally reference the Spratly features con- trolled or claimed by the Philippines. Così, the United States could go further and include these features in the treaty with the Philippines and extend similar protections to Vietnam, Malaysia, and Taiwan. To prevent allies and partners from taking advantage of the U.S. guarantee to pursue more assertive policies, the United States could adopt a policy of dual deterrence—promising pro- tection only when China’s actions were not provoked by the ally’s overtly as- sertive action. Alternatively, instead of clarifying its commitment to respond to China’s forceful expansion, the United States could maintain its more ambiguous posi- zione, which we conclude is more appropriate given the risks that the United States needs to balance. To achieve this, the United States would not further clarify its commitment under the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, nor would it extend explicit protection to other countries’ forces or South China Sea claims. This ambiguity is advantageous because it gives U.S. leaders greater leeway to make decisions that factor in the nuances of speciªc situ- 115. Michael R. Pompeo, “Remarks with Philippines Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin, Jr. at a Press Availability,” U.S. Department of State, Marzo 1, 2019, https://2017-2021.state.gov/remarks- with-philippine-foreign-secretary-teodoro-locsin-jr/index.html. l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / d i r e c t . m i t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – p d l f / / / / 4 7 2 8 8 2 0 5 5 5 3 7 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 4 4 3 p d . f b y g u e s t t o n 0 8 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 NOI. Policy Choices in the South China Sea 129 ations or crises, and it avoids provoking China. The downside, Tuttavia, is that the ambiguity option could contribute less to deterrence. Under either of these policies, the United States could knowingly bluff or threaten to respond to Chinese aggression but plan not to. Blufªng could deter Chinese expansion and avoid ªghting if deterrence fails, and it retains U.S. credibility with its allies. A policy of blufªng might be harder to implement if the United States makes explicit deterrence commitments because U.S. leaders might feel greater pressure from both the public and within the government to meet such commitments,116 and they might be less likely to critically question the risks and beneªts of ªghting. Best of all would be if China is deterred, conºict is avoided, and U.S. credibility is preserved. But if China decides to ex- pand, conºict is still avoided, although U.S. credibility would likely be dam- aged by blufªng. If deterrence fails and China seizes features held by other claimants, the U.S. response should be inºuenced by the extent of China’s expansion. If China seizes many features simultaneously, the United States could launch military operations to retake those features from China and then to defend them against counterattacks. Such a response would likely result in a much wider conºict with China, which could extend beyond the South China Sea. We be- lieve that the risks would be too large and oppose ªghting to retake these fea- tures. Inoltre, China would have demonstrated signiªcantly increased resolve to dominate the South China Sea, which would support a U.S. shift to- ward partial South China Sea retrenchment. Reducing U.S. military resistance in response to extensive Chinese expan- sion would not entail tacit approval of China’s actions. In this scenario, the United States should intensify military cooperation with its allies and partners, enact substantial economic sanctions,117 and pursue shaming measures to make clear that China’s assertive policies violate widely accepted international norms and agreements. Especially in combination, these policies might deter China from seizing more features in the South China Sea. Even if they do not, these measures would highlight U.S. disapproval of China’s actions, which would contribute to preserving U.S. alliances against China. 116. There is, Tuttavia, extensive debate on audience costs. Vedere, Per esempio, Jayme R. Schlesinger and Jack S. Levy, “Politics, Audience Costs, and Signaling: Britain and the 1863–4 Schleswig- Holstein Crisis,” European Journal of International Security, Vol. 6, No. 3 (agosto 2021), pag. 338–357, https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2021.7. 117. Michael O’Hanlon develops the case for relying on sanctions in these low-value, high-risk sit- uations. Michael E. O’Hanlon, The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War over Small Stakes (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2019). l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / d i r e c t . m i t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – p d l f / / / / 4 7 2 8 8 2 0 5 5 5 3 7 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 4 4 3 p d . f b y g u e s t t o n 0 8 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 International Security 47:2 130 The U.S. calculus should be different if China seizes only a single feature, such as the Philippine-held Second Thomas Shoal. In questo caso, China’s action would not signal signiªcantly greater determination to control the South China Sea, and the risks of continuing U.S. resistance would not have in- creased; consequently, the U.S. decision is more complicated. To preserve its ability to deter further Chinese expansion, the United States might need to take actions to demonstrate its continuing commitment. Although we would not favor using force to retake the feature, other less risky actions could be appropriate. These could include imposing economic sanctions, further clari- fying the scope of the treaty with the Philippines, and temporarily or perma- nently deploying surface and air forces near other features that China may threaten.118 Although such responses to very limited expansion would bolster U.S. credibility with allies and China, deepening the U.S. commitment (except for sanctions) could also increase the probability of direct conºict because de- terrence of subsequent expansion might nevertheless fail. deterring and responding to china’s intimidation China has frequently violated the resource rights of Southeast Asian states and used force to intimidate them. The United States has not used force to prevent China from violating states’ rights within their EEZs. One reason why the U.S. Navy has increased its general presence in the South China Sea is to counter Chinese intimidation of Malaysian and Vietnamese oil exploration within their respective EEZs.119 These presence operations implicitly suggest that the United States would respond to Chinese efforts to disrupt a country’s activi- ties, thereby hoping to reduce the fear that China intends to generate. The United States could extend this type of counter-intimidation to all Southeast Asian countries; it could also extend its scope to include harassment and interruption of ªshing. The United States could state clear guidelines for when it will engage in counter-intimidation operations or leave its policy rather ad hoc. An explicit policy would deepen the U.S. commitment to the Philippines and to non-allied claimant states, contribute more to U.S. credibil- ity for protecting allies’ and partners’ interests, and increase the salience of 118. See O’Hanlon, The Senkaku Paradox. 119. Niharika Mandhana, “U.S. Warships Support Malaysia against China Pressure in South China Sea," Giornale di Wall Street, May 13, 2020; and Drake Long, “China’s Coast Guard Shows Up at Vanguard Bank Again,” Radio Free Asia, Luglio 7, 2020, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/ vietnam-southchinasea-07072020183440.html. l D o w n o a d e d f r o m h t t p : / / d i r e c t . m i t . e d u / i s e c / a r t i c e – p d l f / / / / 4 7 2 8 8 2 0 5 5 5 3 7 / i s e c _ a _ 0 0 4 4 3 p d . f b y g u e s t t o n 0 8 S e p e m b e r 2 0 2 3 NOI. Policy Choices in the South China Sea 131 China’s transgressions. Ovviamente, the United States should only do so if de- sired by these states, which still must manage their own relations with China. This type of counter-intimidation policy would generally be less risky than policies that commit the United States to deter and defeat China’s forcible ac- quisition of islands and reefs. In counter-intimidation operations, the United States is unlikely to engage in ªghting. If actual ªghting were to occur, either intentionally or accidentally, the prospects for keeping the conºict from esca- lating should be reasonably good given its limited size and stakes. For exam- ple, if a U.S. naval ship engages in a skirmish with a Chinese naval ship while trying to counter Chinese intimidation of a South China Sea state that is exploring oil reserves, there is a high probability that this incident would not escalate to a large war. The credibility beneªts of counter-intimidation operations could accumulate rather quickly because China’s encroachments have occurred relatively frequently. Yet the frequency of China’s encroach- ments means that there would be more events that could escalate to the use of force if China chose to use its naval ships to escort its commercial vessels. An alternative variant that avoids the increased probability of military con- ºict would be to respond to Chinese intimidation by imposing economic sanctions instead of employing military threats. Per esempio, the United States could sanction Chinese individuals or ªrms that seek to extract resources from within the EEZs of Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Another option would be for the United States to provide public guarantees to protect U.S. ªrms that are involved in projects or operating in the EEZs of these states. responding to china’s militarization of features Whatever level of resistance to China’s assertiveness the United States chooses, it must ensure that China understands that its South China Sea bases do not signiªcantly reduce the U.S. ability to defend its allies in a large war. The United States should therefore deploy any additional forces (per esempio., air- launched standoff missiles)120 that might be required to conªdently defeat China’s buildup in the Spratly Islands and make clear that it will continue to offset improvements to these Chinese bases. This policy should put to rest con- cerns that China’s South China Sea bases are weakening U.S. capabilities by re- quiring it to divert forces that would otherwise be committed to essential 120. Infatti, the United States is already doing this. Sirota, “Air Force, Lockheed Martin Finalize $818 Million JASSM-ER Contract”; Larter, “As China Expands Navy, US Begins Stockpiling Ship-
Killing Missiles”; and Larter, “US Navy Set to Receive Latest Version of the Tomahawk Missile.”

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International Security 47:2 132

missions in other parts of the East Asia theater. Because the additional forces
would be small relative to the overall U.S. force, this acquisition would not un-
duly burden the U.S. defense budget.

The United States should not, Tuttavia, place great political signiªcance, COME
opposed to military signiªcance, on China’s Spratly bases, given that China al-
ready occupies them.121 Instead, it should view this military buildup as an-
other component of China’s ongoing military modernization and enlargement,
and plan to offset it.

protecting the navigational rights of u.s. naval vessels

The United States will need to preserve its military capabilities for ªghting a
large war in East Asia even if it decides to reduce its opposition to China’s ef-
forts to dominate the South China Sea. Whether this requires continuing to ex-
ercise its naval forces and to gather intelligence in the South China Sea will
depend on the evolution of China’s regional military capabilities. As long as
the United States plans to ªght from the South China Sea, it should continue to
exercise the full range of high-seas freedoms, including transiting through
these waters (and airspace), operating in these waters (including surveys and
surveillance), and conducting exercises in these waters with littoral states or
other states. Given China’s current positions on UNCLOS, surveillance is the
only source of explicit friction in China’s EEZ. If, Tuttavia, China clariªes
its position on the nine-dash line to include denying high-sea freedoms, ex-
panding its restriction on military operations in its EEZ, or issuing base-
lines around the Spratly Islands (and thus formally claiming a much greater
area of jurisdiction under UNCLOS), then the U.S.-China mismatch will grow
much larger.

The United States should continue to occasionally conduct FONOPs. Such
operations are part of exercising high-seas freedoms but are arguably less im-
portant than the simple practice of navigation and presence in these waters.
Unlike the military exercises discussed above, which are designed to en-
hance U.S. military capabilities, FONOPs demonstrate that the United States is
unwilling to accept China’s interpretation of UNCLOS and any effort to limit
navigation in the South China Sea. There is likely little material value in
transiting through territorial waters, but failing to exercise this right might
mislead China into believing that the United States will accept more problem-

121. For an opposing view, see Ratner, “Course Correction,” pp. 69–70.

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NOI. Policy Choices in the South China Sea 133

atic Chinese claims about its historic rights in the South China Sea and straight
baselines in the Spratly Islands. Given this purpose, the United States should
reduce if not eliminate the publicity of individual FONOPs because it incites
Chinese nationalist reactions without doing much to advance their relatively
narrow purpose of asserting the U.S. interpretation of UNCLOS.

The United States should consider possibilities for reducing clashes and fric-
zione, while preserving its military capabilities and credibility. Per esempio, IL
United States might be able to reduce somewhat the scope and tempo of sur-
veillance activities, especially if other means can be used to gather the same
intelligence, even though China’s continued modernization may increase
the demand for such operations. Allo stesso modo, the United States should main-
tain the reduced frequency of FONOPs when compared with 2019 E
2020. The United States should keep in mind that China’s key positions on
UNCLOS—including on innocent passage and surveillance within EEZs—are
long-standing, dating back to the early discussions of the convention and re-
stated when China accepted the overall package encompassed by the treaty.
Therefore, China’s opposition to FONOPs does not fundamentally change
China’s position.122

Conclusione

This article has analyzed the challenges that China’s more assertive policies in
the South China Sea pose to U.S. interests. We summarized China’s policies,
examined U.S. interests, and identiªed three broad U.S. options—increased re-
sistance, current U.S. policy, and partial retrenchment.

We concluded that the United States’ best option is to maintain its current
level of resistance to China’s efforts to dominate the South China Sea. Questo
policy brings dangers—the possibility that U.S. deterrent policies would fail
and that a conºict would escalate to a larger war—but these escalatory risks
currently appear to be limited and in line with U.S. interests. Intensiªed U.S.
resistance will tend to generate still greater risks, which would exceed
NOI. interests.

If China becomes much more assertive in the South China Sea and more
willing to ªght to achieve its objectives, the risks of the current U.S. policy

122. Odell, “Mare Interpretatum,” p. 261. See also Ronald O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclu-
sive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congres-
sional Research Service, Marzo 24, 2018), pag. 8–9.

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International Security 47:2 134

would no longer be warranted. The United States should then shift to partial
retrenchment. As we have stressed, the cost of reducing U.S. resistance and
shifting to partial retrenchment would be small if the United States could re-
tain its credibility with its allies and China. Questo, Tuttavia, might not be easy.
Given uncertainty about the future, the United States should take steps now
to deepen its credibility, which could include enhancing its regional force
structure, selling military and maritime awareness equipment to allies and
partners, increasing joint exercises with South China Sea claimants, sharing in-
formation, furthering integration across alliance partners, and consistently
prioritizing East Asia. Although U.S. policies will likely appear somewhat
threatening to China, this risk is warranted in light of our increased estimate of
China’s regional ambitions.

Infatti, we argue that these efforts are warranted even if the United States
maintains its current South China Sea policy because they will deepen U.S. al-
liances. The United States has already undertaken a variety of such measures,
including the 2021 AUKUS security pact.123 Moreover, if China’s policy be-
comes more assertive, NOI. allies and partners are likely to seek intensiªed
security cooperation with the United States. Chinese behavior that increases
states’ insecurity will encourage intensiªed balancing with the United States—
allies are likely to become more open to basing U.S. forces on their respective
territories and sharing defense responsibilities with the United States. The re-
sult would be a decrease in the risk of partial South China Sea retrenchment.

In closing, we emphasize again that while maintaining its current level of
military resistance to Chinese South China Sea control, the United States must
keep the stakes in mind. Although China’s assertive policies in the South
China Sea are worrying, there is very little of material value at stake for the
stati Uniti. Exaggerating the value of the South China Sea could under-
mine U.S. policy by fueling overly competitive policies; to avoid this pitfall,
the United States must be vigilant in critically assessing its interests in the
South China Sea.

123. Other U.S. security efforts in the region include the Paciªc Defense Initiative and the En-
hanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.

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