Towards a Genealogy of
Thomas Kuhn’s Semantics
Pablo Melogno
University of the Republic, Uruguay
Leandro Giri
National University of Tres de Febrero /
National Scientific and Technical
Research Council, Argentina
This paper explores Thomas Kuhn’s intellectual history by examining sources
that have been understudied so far: the Lowell Lectures of 1951 (The Quest
for Physical Theory) and the hitherto unpublished Notre Dame Lectures of
1980. The analysis of these texts aims to reconstruct Kuhn’s development of a
semantics that can account for scientific progress. This analysis will show that
the alleged “linguistic turn” attributed to the author is actually a renewed
interest in problems that existed well before publishing The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions.
introduzione
1.
Beyond the perennial success of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn
1962, henceforth SSR), the criticisms of the incommensurability thesis and
the image of theoretical change presented therein motivated Kuhn to find
a characterization of meaning that adapted to the dynamics of scientific
revolutions. This led to a linguistic turn that characterizes the last stage
of Kuhnian philosophy. In SSR, Kuhn tacitly adopts some premises of
descriptivist theories of meaning and formulates the thesis of incommen-
surability without offering a clear notion of meaning or a precise distinc-
tion between change of meaning and change of reference. The search for an
alternative semantic basis led him to delve deeper into the problems of the
Sadly, Dr. Pablo Melogno (1979–2023) died while this article was in press. We will
remember him not only for the quality of his academic output but also for his human
qualities. His dedication to the creation and consolidation of collaborative networks has
made our academic community a better place.
Perspectives on Science 2023, vol. 31, NO. 4
© 2023 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology
https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00591
385
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Genealogy of Thomas Kuhn’s Semantics
change of meaning and how classification criteria operate in the delimita-
tion of natural kinds.
This paper attempts to reconstruct Thomas Kuhn’s intellectual process
in search of a semantics compatible with his philosophical and historical
ideas on scientific change. This reconstruction is inspired by two works
that have been understudied because of their unpublished nature. The first
is The Quest for Physical Theory, a series of eight lectures that Kuhn delivered
In 1951 at the Lowell Institute in Boston. The Lowell Lectures is the first
extensive piece of writing in which Kuhn sought to organize his ideas on
scientific language and change. They remained unpublished until a few
months ago, when they saw the light of day thanks to George Reisch’s
edition (2021). Our examination focuses on lectures six, “Coherence and
Scientific Vision”; seven, “The Role of Formalism”; and eight, “Canons
of Constructive Research” as primary references.
As Hufbauer (2012) and Mayoral (2017) have pointed out, the Lowell
Lectures includes elements that anticipate the SSR theses and others that
represent Kuhn’s earlier thought that is later modified. An essential feature
of the text is that Kuhn explicitly discusses several problems linked to the
meaning of scientific concepts, around which he traces well-defined circuits
of debate and philosophical interlocution. In this respect, Reisch (2019)
states that Kuhn defined his semantic interests by reading W. V. O. Quine,
Bertrand Russell, Stuart Chase, and Benjamin Lee Whorf. As we shall see,
this dismantles the idea that Kuhn wrote SSR without adequate philosoph-
ical training. It also shows that concerns about the change of meaning were
already present in Kuhn’s thought before SSR, even if they did not appear
explicitly in his main work.
Secondo, we deal with The Natures of Conceptual Change, a series of lectures
that Kuhn delivered between November 17 E 21, 1980, at the Univer-
sity of Notre Dame, Indiana. The text of the lectures is in the Special
Collections Department of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Library and remains unpublished until now.1 It is divided into three
lectures: “What are Scientific Revolutions,” “Linguistic Concomitants of
Revolutionary Change,” and “Language, Causal Theory and Necessary
Truth.” Kuhn included material from these lectures in subsequently pub-
lished works (1987, 1989). He also planned to do so in Plurality of Worlds:
An Evolutionary Theory of Scientific Development, the unfinished book he was
writing at the time of his death.
This paper focuses on the second lecture. We show that Kuhn reacti-
vates some of the semantic concerns of the Lowell Lectures, appealing to
1. The pagination we use for bibliographic citations refers to the unpublished text
found in the Kuhn Archives at MIT.
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Perspectives on Science
387
cluster-concept theory as the basis of scientific change. We also show that
the Lowell and the Notre Dame Lectures respond to the same agenda of
semantic concerns and problems linked to the change of meaning in sci-
entific revolutions, an agenda that Kuhn set aside in SSR and then reacti-
vated to address some of the issues raised in his main work. We also show
that addressing these issues led Kuhn to introduce the notion of “taxon-
omy” and outline the basis of the linguistic turn that characterizes the final
phase of his work.
It may be questionable to attempt the intertextual comparison of two
texts written thirty years apart. Nevertheless, the multiple connections
between the two texts, the continuity of approach and discussion strategy,
and how they shed light on Kuhn’s intellectual development justify the
comparison despite their temporal distance.
Sezione 2 analyzes the semantic proposal Kuhn presented in the Lowell
Lectures, which prefigures an alternative to the linguistic foundations of
logical positivism and Percy Bridgman’s operationalism. Sezione 3 stati
that Kuhn takes up this program adhering to a version of the cluster the-
ory in the second Notre Dame Lecture and extends it with nuances until
the Thalheimer Lectures of 1984. Sezione 4 shows that as part of this pro-
gram, taxonomies appear in the second Notre Dame Lecture as a unit of
analysis of theoretical change for the first time, thus initiating the linguis-
tic orientation that characterizes the late Kuhn. We conclude that the
introduction of taxonomic incommensurability and the linguistic frame
of the late Kuhn results from abandoning cluster theory and the need to
understand scientific change in a new semantic context. Therefore, noi professionisti-
pose that Kuhn’s linguistic turn in his late work should be understood as
renewing an interest that existed before SSR was published and not as
venturing into an unexplored field.
In Search of the Roots of Kuhnian Semantics
2.
Attempting to construct a genealogy of Kuhnian semantics implies chal-
lenging the idea that Kuhn underwent a linguistic turn in his maturity. In
agreement with Reisch, it implies asserting that such a milestone in
Kuhn’s intellectual development entails a return to his philosophical roots,
which can be found in his Lowell Lectures:
It is sometimes remarked that in the wake of Structure Kuhn’s
thinking took a “linguistic turn” toward semantics and away from
the sociological and psychological themes within Structure. In light
of Quest, Tuttavia, this development appears more as a linguistic
return to early theorizing about the semantics of “meaning systems”
that Kuhn debuted here. (Reisch 2021, pag. ix–xx)
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Genealogy of Thomas Kuhn’s Semantics
The idea we challenge arises because Kuhn’s semantic intuitions are
insufficiently developed in SSR, as is well known. This led several critics
(per esempio., Shapere 1964; Scheffler 1967; Davidson 1973; Sankey 1994; Bird
2000) to claim that Kuhn’s concerns with semantic problems only arise
from the repercussions of his major work. In these terms, SSR would have
been written without a systematic framework on the issues of meaning, UN
framework that Kuhn only began to develop because of the subsequent
difficulties. Tuttavia, we argue that this diagnosis is incorrect since
examination of the Lowell Lectures reveals that several debates about the
meaning of scientific terms were part of Kuhn’s working horizon well
before SSR.
SSR does not provide a systematic notion of meaning and meaning
change. As we point out below, Kuhn’s concerns about the meaning of
scientific terms in the Lowell Lectures and Notre Dame Lectures are much
more explicit and systematic than in his main work. Tuttavia, this does
not imply that semantic considerations are utterly absent from SSR2. Questo
section provides an overview of the lectures, emphasizing some features in
favor of this reading. In The Quest for Physical Theory, the seed that gave rise
to SSR can be glimpsed since the young Kuhn overturns a series of ideas
and intuitions that will follow him for the rest of his career. Tuttavia,
Kuhn’s intellectual process during the 1950s modified some conceptions
and postponed his addressing others. Inoltre, the lectures were aimed at
an educated audience—the Boston elite—but they did not necessarily have
a background in the philosophy of science.
A significant point of interest is the presence of certain semantic intuitions
that are taken up again in “Second Thoughts on Paradigms” (Kuhn 1974)
and are not fully developed until the Notre Dame Lectures. Such intuitions
primarily encouraged Kuhn’s reactive attitude towards the idea of a purified
language of the logical positivists and Percy William Bridgman’s opera-
tionalism. Both were contaminated with a descriptivist theory of meaning
that Kuhn categorically rejected.
Roughly speaking, operationalism is a doctrine that establishes the need
to operate with scientific terms unequivocally associated with the
2. In chapter V, Kuhn discusses learning the basic terms of Newton’s physics, antici-
pating the holistic view of meaning he adopts in later writings (1974, 1983UN, 1987). More-
Sopra, chapter IX includes a lengthy attempt to elucidate the change in the meaning of
terms like “mass” in the transition from Newton to Einstein. It would be of great interest
to clarify the connections between the somewhat latent semantic framework of SSR and the
more systematic developments found in the Lowell Lectures and the Notre Dame Lecture.
We have decided to clarify the connections between these two lectures and defer their con-
nections to SSR for future analysis.
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Perspectives on Science
389
corresponding result of an experimental measurement. Così, the very def-
inition of terms is proposed as a function of a measurement procedure.
Generalmente, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of
operations; the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of
operations. If the concept is physical, as of length, the operations are
actual physical operations, namely, those by which length is
measured; or if the concept is mental, as of mathematical continuity,
the operations are mental operations, namely those by which we
determine whether a given aggregate of magnitudes is continuous.
(Bridgman [1927] 1958, P. 5)
The compatibility of this view with neopositivist physicalism is evident. In
Kuhn’s notes, he states that he became acquainted with Bridgman’s work
on the French front during World War II. Although some elements
included in his later thought seem to have been inspired by Bridgman
(cf. Mayoral 2017), Kuhn criticizes the operationalist doctrine in virtue of
two difficulties.
Primo, Kuhn argues that it is impossible to capture the complexity of
scientific language through formal mechanisms. The pragmatic commit-
ment of language is inalienable. And despite their potential usefulness
on certain occasions, the formalist reconstructions of the logical empiricists
or operational analysis à la Bridgman do not capture this commitment.
Confidence in the fertility of the formal examination of scientific concepts
was a premise shared by Bridgman and the logical empiricists, and it went
well with downplaying the historical and sociological components of sci-
ence. Under James B. Conant’s aegis, Kuhn’s reluctance to operationalism
reaffirms the distance between the formal reconstructions of philosophers
and the actual workings of science:
No existing body of scientific knowledge has as yet been reduced to
a formalism paralleling in its completeness or abstractness the
formalism to which we have reduced most of mathematics.
Nevertheless, it appears likely in principle that such formalization
can be achieved. But whether the meaning system for such a
formalism could be adequately described is less clear. The modern
philosophy of science known as operationalism bases much of its
program upon the supposition that it can be. But no adequate
illustrations of such a scientific meaning system have yet been
provided. (Kuhn [1951] 2021, P. 132)
Secondo, Kuhn attributes an idealized description of scientific activity to
operationalism: in practice, no one uses the terms with the rigidity of the
definitional conception. Even if realized, the consequence would be that
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Genealogy of Thomas Kuhn’s Semantics
several synonymous terms would be taken as distinct and dependent on the
measurement experience. In operationalism, the distance measured with an
instrument x cannot be defined as equivalent to the distance measured
with an instrument y, regardless of whether the measured values coincide
numerically or whether both instruments were calibrated with the same
standard:
The failure to prescribe some such unique operation for the
determination of distance makes synonyms of various different
operations used to define the single term distance. And this is
equivalent to making certain sorts of synonymy depend upon
previous scientific experience which is surely not a satisfactory
characteristic of a meaning system. But the alternative provided
by the unique definition is too narrow for practical application.
Certainly our texts do not even attempt to approximate such
an ideal. ([1951] 2021, P. 133)
In the young Kuhn’s view, scientists are educated in a mode of work
that involves a language that makes up their world. The scientific world
is an “orientation” of the ordinary behavioral world. In it, language is
much more specific than in regular speech, although such specification
“… should not be carried to the extreme of completely eliminating the
pragmatic background of its application” (Mayoral 2017, P. 274).
Although some of these pragmatic application criteria violate the dictum
of providing explicit definitions of the components of the theoretical
vocabulary, they ultimately facilitate a common framework of communica-
tion that, according to Kuhn, would enhance the virtues of theory. Among
such virtues, it facilitates
… the degree to which a theory is confirmed, although its particular
application depends on the orientation to the unified vision that
the theory, based on this orientation, communicates about the
phenomena, which is reflected in its explanatory capacity; and we
must not forget, the manageability of the theory, the fact that its
theoretical and conceptual structure is sufficiently clear so that
there is a generalized practice on the same problems. ([1951] 2021,
P. 275)
These orientations (or points of view) are related to the paradigms of
SSR, the disciplinary matrices of the “Postscript” (1970B), and the lexicons
of Kuhn’s mature work. Although the unit of analysis in the first case is
cognitive, in SSR, it is predominantly sociological and in the later Kuhn,
linguistico. Nevertheless, a common intuition survives in these different for-
mulations: scientists have shared commitments that make their practice
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Perspectives on Science
391
possible. In the Lowell Lectures, this premise gives rise to a particular con-
sideration of scientific language, for although it is more precise than ordi-
nary language, it is not radically different from it. The use of language
does not depend on rigid and organized rules but on consistent learning
that allows individuals to communicate and adapt to the environment. È
not true that individuals learn through strict memorized definitions;
instead, we do so because violating some rules is an adaptive risk. Questo
does not mean that it is useless to formalize certain parts of scientific lan-
guage, but formalizing everything can be counterproductive because
its results would be to freeze scientific attention upon just those
aspects of nature which are embraced by contemporary science. It
would provide a place in its meaning system for aspects of nature
now considered technically relevant and no place for others. As a
result it would not be a language adequate to embrace new
conceptual developments in science. ([1951] 2021, P. 134)
Kuhn understands that we need a language broader than the language
of science to contemplate aspects that could be relevant tomorrow even if
they are not relevant today. Since our perceptions fluctuate constantly, UN
formal language that can account for novelties would have to know future
possibilities in advance, which is impossible. The linguistic aspects of sci-
ence are advantageous for its study because they are publicly accessible,
while the orientations, qua psychological structures are not, which seri-
ously hinders their study. Kuhn gradually eliminates any psychologistic
component from his post-SSR work (including the appeals to Gestalt
psicologia) but not the semantic intuitions about the need to discard
the projects of analysis of scientific theories based on definitions of neces-
sary and sufficient conditions. When explaining the limitations of this
position, Kuhn provides the following example:
Certainly if we want to know whether a given entity should be called
a dog, we do not look first to see whether the claws are retractile
[like in cats]. We are far more likely to look first at certain of the
characteristics predicated of dogs by our general laws. Roughly we
may describe our concept according to the following diagram. At its
center is what we may call our hard core of meaning, the attributes of
which we are relatively certain. Dogs bark, they bite, they have four
legs and nonretractile claws. In a ring outside of this center come the
attributes of which we are relatively certain: dogs are fur-bearing for
the most part, dogs are normally tameable. You notice that I include
here as part of the meaning of dog “fur-bearing,” which I know is
occasionally violated. But it is still usually a useful way of judging
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Genealogy of Thomas Kuhn’s Semantics
whether what I see is a dog. I simply must be prepared to be
mistaken in using this criterion alone, and I won’t use it alone. In
still a third and larger circle we include a number of attributes about
which we are even less certain. Per esempio, our expectations that
dogs are actually tame, that they can be trained, that they have a
name to which they will respond. ([1951] 2021, P. 143)
A descriptivist position would try to set a clear definition of “dog” that
avoids the vagueness raised by the concentric scheme of proposed features
(a strategy that will later constitute the notion of feature space; see Kuhn
[1984] 2017). Tuttavia, such a “clear” definition does not capture that
different dogs have different characteristics. Then, a definition that only
includes the common attributes of all that is called “dog” will necessarily
be conceptually poor and therefore useless:
(…) in our discussion of the precise definition of a word like “dog.”
in making it precise we emasculated it. We deprived it of those
components of its meaning which determined our reactions toward
the entities with respect to which we employ it. These former
components of meaning then had to reappear as generalizations
about the entity dog now precisely defined, and as soon as we tried to
state these generalizations, the vagueness which had formerly been
inherent in the meaning of the word appeared in our generalization.
We had therefore gained nothing by making our definition precise.
To get rid of this vagueness, we should have had to reject all the
generalizations except those about which we were absolutely certain.
But to reject these somewhat uncertain generalizations would have
been to deprive ourselves of a set of heuristic rules which, Tuttavia
inadequate they may be, do determine our activities ([1951] 2021,
P. 146).
This way of schematizing the methodology for defining the entity
“dog” through concentric spheres of characteristics shares many features
with the cluster theory of meaning.3 Such a theory has been popularized
mainly by Wittgenstein’s ([1953] 1986) proposal of language games. IL
core of Wittgenstein’s view is that proper language analysis involves
observing the current ways in which language is used. People (and scien-
tists are people) communicate using terms that do not require dictionary
definitions but only the context and a few formal rules that are mostly
implicit. The emblematic example is that of “game,” a cumulative concept
3. Developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein, P. F. Strawson, and John Searle, among others.
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Perspectives on Science
393
that includes—by extension—multiple activities that bear only a family
resemblance. Nevertheless, when two people communicate and use such
a concept, they quickly understand what the other speaker refers to within
a given language game. As we saw in Kuhn’s example, “dog” is an unprob-
lematic term in everyday language games. Though the various dogs we
know of bear only a family resemblance to each other, the concept itself
ends up “emasculated” if we try to use such a term through definitions
based on necessary and sufficient conditions. Including prominent dog fea-
tures in such a definition (like having fur or even a tail) will necessarily
leave out many actual dogs. We shall see in the next section the analogy
between this scheme and the presentation of Johnny’s fable that Kuhn
includes in the second Notre Dame Lecture.
Although Kuhn did not take up these problems again in SSR, a look at
The Quest for Physical Theory ([1951] 2021) reveals that Kuhn’s semantic
concerns are the same, despite the change of approach that crosses his intel-
lectual path. The roots of Kuhnian semantics manifest here for the first
time. As Kuhn himself pointed out, he put some of these intuitions aside
during the pre-SSR4 era, and as we shall see in the next section, Essi
returned in the Notre Dame Lectures. We then proceed to the second
Notre Dame Lecture: the nodal point where Kuhn consolidates his linguis-
tic analysis of science.
The Semantics of the Second Notre Dame Lecture
3.
In the second Notre Dame lecture, Kuhn dwells on the problems of mean-
ing change that had been dragging since SSR. He points out that the very
notion of “meaning” became problematic after Quine’s (1951) critique of
the analytic/synthetic distinction and takes up the critique of traditional
conceptions of meaning in a very similar structure to the one he had
developed in the Lowell Lectures. According to the traditional view,
knowing the meaning of a word implies knowing its definition (Hempel
1964). A definition consists of a set of necessary and sufficient character-
istics for applying a term so that whoever knows these characteristics is
in a position to apply the term correctly. But this is problematic if we con-
sider the limited role that definitional features play in language use: “One
4. Regarding the period after the Lowell lectures, Kuhn stated that “… the primary
result of that venture was to convince me that I did not yet know either enough history or
enough about my ideas to proceed toward publication. For a period that I expected to be
short but that lasted seven years, I set my more philosophical interests aside and worked
straightforwardly at history. Only in the late 50’s, after finishing a book on the Copernican
Revolution and receiving a tenure university appointment, did I consciously return to
them” (Kuhn 1977, P. xvi). For a detailed review of this process, cf. Hufbauer (2012).
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Genealogy of Thomas Kuhn’s Semantics
obvious argument against this view is that many of us use lots and lots
of words unproblematically—without hesitation or communication
problems—even though we are totally unable to provide a list of their
defining features” (Kuhn 1980, P. 23).
One possible response is that we have learned the defining characteris-
tics of the terms we use correctly, even if we cannot enumerate them con-
sciously. Kuhn combats this idea through the statement “all swans are
white.” We suppose that a subject has obtained the statement by general-
izing, and he finds an apparent black swan. The problem arises here
whether or not whiteness counts as a defining characteristic of the concept
“swan.” If it does, the black bird is not a swan, and the initial statement
holds; if not, it is a swan, and “swans are white” no longer holds. Questo
disjunction reveals a second problematic aspect of the traditional concep-
tion linked to learning the characteristics that define a term:
e)
So in this case, access to the list of defining features—whether con-
scious or unconscious—affects behavior, determines how one reacts
when brought to Australia.
io) E, in practice, in circumstances like this people tend to disagree,
which suggests that nothing quite like a shared list of defining
features is acquired when learning the language. (1980, P. 23)
Kuhn understands that these limitations merit the search for a substitute, UN
notion of meaning that is not committed to necessary features. According to
Questo, Kuhn takes up the Lowell line and activates his adherence to the cluster
theory. This conception makes it possible to preserve the idea that we acquire
meaning through a set of features, but without assuming them as necessary.
Concepts are applied using familiar or prevalent characteristics that make it
possible to establish the membership relations of a kind, depending on
whether or not the new specimens have sufficient features of the cluster that
defines the kind. Kuhn draws a balance of the advantages of this position:
People clearly do have access to the required lists.
io)
ii) Anyone who can make normal use of the word swan can tell you a
iii)
lot of features that most of them share.
Problems would arise if one still had to pick the defining features
from this list, and one is no longer required to do anything of that
sort. (1980, P. 24)
Despite these advantages, the cluster theory still presents the problem
of specifying which characteristics are sufficient to introduce a specimen
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Perspectives on Science
395
within the field of application of a concept. This problem places the pro-
posal at a point similar to the traditional conception:
F)
If you try to answer those questions, you will encounter exactly the
same problems that were encountered before in trying to decide
whether a particular feature belonged to an object by definition
or by empirical law.
io)
ii)
It’s not hard to imagine cases in which the answer to this ques-
tion ought to influence behavior—is that fowl a swan or not?
But there’s no reason to suppose that uniform evidence about
how-much-is-enough can be found, that knowing a language
includes knowing an answer to the question “how much?".
iii) Apparently, we’re back where we started. (1980, P. 25)
Tuttavia, Kuhn finds this difficulty salvageable. It is inspired by an
erroneous conception of the relation between language and the world
under which it is justified to ask how many characteristics are sufficient.
Kuhn’s strategy does not consist in providing an answer to this question
but in questioning the conditions that allow its formulation:
B)
The answer, I think, is that we expect language to be neutral,
applicable in all possible worlds.
io) We suppose that a person who has learned the term “swan”
will know, under all conceivable circumstances, whether it
applies or not.
ii) Or, to put the point another way, we suppose that, if only we
knew what the word “swan” meant, we would be able to say of
any creature, imagined or real, that it was or was not a swan.
C)
Ma, why should we be able to do anything of the sort?
io) Why should a language that has evolved from experience in
dealing with a particular environment function unproblema-
tically when transferred to another one? (1980, P. 25)
It is not surprising that the search for a semantic basis for his theory of
science led Kuhn to reject this way of understanding the nature of meaning.
For Kuhn, language is a product of the knowledge practices and strategies
that each community of speakers develop when interacting with the envi-
ronment. Hence, we must pose the question of how kind relations and
meaning criteria operate regarding the actual practices of the speakers of
a language, not logically possible conditions. It is possible to preserve the
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Genealogy of Thomas Kuhn’s Semantics
fundamental intuitions of cluster theory if we conceive the nature of
language as follows:
UN)
That in learning a language one acquires knowledge of nature that
is prior to and independent of descriptive generalizations couched
in that language.
io)
If anything of that sort is the case, Tuttavia, then one may begin
to see how cluster concepts might function even in the absence of
any answer to the question how much is enough? (1980, P. 26)
To strengthen this view, Kuhn points to a second assumption of the dis-
cussions of meaning, namely the idea that meanings are learned and fixed
one by one, independently of the linguistic networks to which they belong.
io) We have, questo è, ordinarily supposed that meanings are learned
ii)
piecemeal, one-by-one;
That if we know what the word “swan” means, then we must
know what the meaning of “swan” is;
iii) Where the meaning of “swan” is something that characterizes the
word by itself, independent of the meaning of terms like “duck”
and “goose.” (1980, P. 27)
To counter this assumption, Kuhn develops a holistic position, according
to which the distinction of the kind “swan,” “goose,” and “duck” conforms to
the notion of local holism in that each of the three terms cannot be learned
without reference to the other two. Likewise, any change in the relevant char-
acteristics of one of the species affects its relationships with the others:
ii)
iii)
io) One need only suppose that the list of features shared by swans is
enlarged to include those useful in distinguishing swans from
ducks and geese.
In the space whose dimensions are provided by that expanded list of
caratteristiche, ducks, and geese and swans will form separate clusters.
And the condition that the only creatures like swans must be
swans can then be replaced by the condition that all creatures
lie significantly nearer to some of the three clusters than to either
of the other two. (1980, P. 27)
The change of language that is characteristic of scientific revolutions
implies that different languages entail different modes of cognitive access
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Perspectives on Science
397
to nature. This means that learning the meaning of words cannot be sep-
arated from identifying the objects that populate the world and their divi-
sion into kinds:
iii)
In this way of learning, by ostension, by pointing and uttering or,
more generally, by learning words and phrases there is no taking
the two components apart.
iv) One simply cannot separate the process of learning words from
the process of learning about the objects and activities to which
the words refer.
v) Without recourse to a single generalization like “All swans are
white” knowledge-of-nature is acquired together with language.
(1980, P. 32)
This image of the language-world relation leads Kuhn to affirm that learning
names is simultaneous to acquiring clusters of features, allowing individuals to
be grouped as members of a kind based on certain common traits. In terms of
the cluster theory, these traits have different weights in establishing kind
relations, although none is necessary for kind membership.
The Notre Dame Lectures are a landmark in the evolution of Kuhn’s
ideas on the meaning of scientific terms and in the project of providing
a semantic basis for the incommensurability thesis. Kuhn recovered some
of the coordinates that he had outlined in the Lowell Lectures and left aside
in SSR: the critique of traditional conceptions of meaning and the consti-
tutive role of language for knowledge.
The comparison between Johnny’s fable as presented in the Notre Dame
Lectures and the Lowell Lectures reveals that Kuhn’s understanding of mean-
ing is essentially the same at both points in his life. In 1980 he had a name
(cluster theory) for such a theory of meaning and used it explicitly. Neverthe-
less, it is clear that how Johnny assimilates the meaning of “swan” is analogous
to how the young Kuhn analyzed the meaning of “dog.” The conception of
the nature of language that underlies both sets of lectures is thus similar. Some
features of this basic conception are the importance of pragmatic components
in determining meaning, the limitation of attempts to formalize language,
and the dynamic and evolutionary character of scientific language.
The history of cluster theory after the Notre Dame Lectures sheds fur-
ther light on this question. Kuhn returns to these problems in later texts
(1983UN, 1984, 1987), but he does not adhere to cluster theory, which does
not play any relevant role after 1980. It is last mentioned in the third
Thalheimer lecture (1984, P. 107), where he expressly states that he has
already abandoned this conception. Much of what the second Notre Dame
lecture offers is a roadmap that Kuhn did not follow, probably because the
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Genealogy of Thomas Kuhn’s Semantics
inadequacies of the cluster theory made it unattractive to account for the
change of language effected in a scientific revolution. As we shall see
below, the notion of “taxonomy” became a substitute for cluster theory,
providing a new basis for the problems Kuhn addressed.
The Irruption of Taxonomic Incommensurability
4.
The notion of a taxonomy appears in the Notre Dame Lectures when Kuhn
attempts to specify the type of linguistic change during a scientific revo-
lution, bringing up the possibility of an anomalous case in the classifica-
tion geese-ducks-swans. Kuhn reviews three possible anomaly outcomes,
the first two corresponding to regular change and the third to revolutionary
change.
Primo, we may assume the appearance of an apparent goose with duck-
like features, but close examination may show that it was a duck and not a
goose. In that case, the anomaly is absorbed by adjustments in the classi-
fication criteria that remove the initial ambiguity but do not require
changes in kind divisions. A second examination may show that the
new creature is neither a duck nor a goose but a new bird. Here, pure,
modifying the classification requires introducing a new type of bird, Ma
again the old divisions remain unaltered.
A third and more problematic scenario occurs with a creature that
shares some characteristics with geese and others with ducks so that its
recognition requires an alteration of the previous classification:
ii)
iii)
The new creature may turn out to be a goose—it may, questo è, resem-
ble geese far more than it does ducks when closely examined.
But it turns out to resemble only some of the geese, E, Quando
the required adjustment of feature space has been completed, IL
rest of the geese have been moved out of the goose cluster entirely
and have joined up with the swans.
iv) Now things which were geese before are geese no longer.
v)
Some of the ones that move will be creatures from which we
learned the term goose.
Language itself will therefore be violated by the change. (1980,
P. 35)
vi)
This passage offers the most remote antecedent of the no-overlap prin-
ciple that Kuhn developed in later texts (1987, 1991), which is one of the
main concepts of his late period. The idea that scientific revolutions
involve a change in the categorization systems is central to the image of
taxonomic change that Kuhn offers in the last years of his work. Questo
change is caused by the appearance of a specimen that belongs to two
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Perspectives on Science
399
kinds that do not have a genus-species relationship at the same time. Questo
passage allows us to establish that the notion of taxonomic change and the
no-overlap principle are inspired by intuitions that Kuhn had already
formulated in the Notre Dame Lectures.
It is worth inquiring further into what led Kuhn to this point. He states
that in the botanical taxonomy of the nineteenth century, the plants dis-
covered in the Pacific Ocean did not fit the two criteria—opposition and
alternation—used to classify the distribution of leaves on a stem until
Poi. The difficulties in assimilating the new specimens into the available
taxonomies were such that the classification criteria had to be modified,
causing morphological traits to displace functional characteristics as a
criterion for kind membership:
D)
That change grew out of pressure from New Pacific specimens, Ma
the result was significant cross-category switching in the higher
levels of classification of European and American plants.
io)
As that switch occurred, furthermore—as morphological fea-
tures supplanted functional ones in determining likeness—a
quasi-evolutionary metaphor began occasionally to appear in
botanical writing. (1980, P. 36)
This allows Kuhn to introduce an explicit formulation of the taxonomic
structure of scientific language for the first time:
C)
Every scientific theory presupposes a taxonomy, whether the one
that groups the falling stone with the growing oak, or the one that
groups an atom with a solar system for the purpose or writing an
appropriate Schrödinger equation.
io)
Traditionally it has been supposed that all these taxonomies
could be reduced to single, neutro, observational base—simple
ideas, a sense-datum language, or something else in the sort.
ii) Now, Tuttavia, most philosophers would concede that no such
iii)
neutral taxonomic base exists.
Its place is taken by whatever language, both everyday and
specialized, is in fact acquired and used unproblematically by
the scientific community under study.
iv) What philosophers use to call the observation vocabulary of a
science—the firm foundation on which its theoretical con-
structs were erected—is now increasingly seen to be the sim-
ply antecedently available vocabulary—antecedent, questo è, A
the invention or assimilation of some particular theory with its
accompanying vocabulary and concepts. (1980, P. 38)
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Genealogy of Thomas Kuhn’s Semantics
Kuhn had used the notion of taxonomy in earlier texts (1970UN, 1971,
1974, 1976), but he had used the term in a non-philosophical sense,
linked to the work of naturalists and other developers of animal and plant
taxonomies. We should not underestimate the heuristic value of these
forays, which played a fundamental role in identifying taxonomies as a unit
of analysis of scientific change. This is the exact moment when Kuhn
begins to use the notion of taxonomy with systematic philosophical pre-
tensions, marking the emergence of an orientation well known in later
texts (1983UN, 1987, 1991). We have enough textual evidence to mark
the Notre Dame lectures as the birthplace of taxonomies as a unit of anal-
ysis in Kuhn’s thought and a conception based on the no-overlap principle
and taxonomic incommensurability. These and other associated concepts
marked the main orientations of the last decade of Kuhnian philosophy.
We must dwell on the subsequent fate of the notion of taxonomy to
specify how Kuhn assembled the new elements of his stance. In Commen-
surability, Comparability, Communicability (1983UN), he argues that taxonomic
categories provide criteria for establishing relations of similarity and dis-
similarity between the members of a kind. He introduces this thesis within
a discussion of the role of metaphor in science, which suggests that by
defining taxonomy as a unit of analysis of scientific change, Kuhn rewrote
part of his ideas about a revolutionary change in taxonomic terms. Ratio-
nality and Theory Choice (1983B) reaffirms this direction by connecting the
process of categorization operated by taxonomic categories with the locally
holistic learning of kind terms.
A year later, the second Thalheimer lecture, “Breaking into the Past,"
reworks the point by placing the notions of “lexicon” and “taxonomy” as
the basis for postulating that language learning is simultaneous with the
recognition of the objects that make up the world.5 At that lecture, Kuhn
claims that relations of similarity and dissimilarity are organized into
taxonomies. Later, in What Are Scientific Revolutions (1987), he argues that
taxonomies organize the relations of similarity/dissimilarity and that these
are transformed as a result of the change of metaphors that accompanies a
scientific revolution.
As the 1980s progressed, Kuhn organized his ideas on language learn-
ing and the meaning of scientific terms around the notion of taxonomy
5. “To acquire a lexicon is thus to acquire a taxonomy, a knowledge of the sorts of
objects and situations that do and do not populate the corresponding world. Inoltre,
it is to acquire knowledge of features (not all of them, nor the same ones for all learners)
that permit the members of the various categories to be distinguished and identified. Mem-
bers of a single category must be like each other and unlike those of other categories.”
([1984] 2017, P. 77)
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Perspectives on Science
401
while leaving behind the cluster theory and the concept of feature space. In
short, we can claim that Kuhn took up again, in the 1980s, a significant
trend of the Lowell Lectures seeking answers to questions made explicit by
the provocative theses of SSR. The development of this proposal led first to
adopt the cluster theory and then abandon it, paving the way for the intro-
duction of taxonomies. Tuttavia, all these tools are increasingly refined
approaches to a set of philosophical problems that were already budding
in young Kuhn’s thinking.
Final Remarks
5.
We have analyzed Kuhn’s intellectual process, taking as reference two cru-
cial moments in Kuhn’s thought that have been insufficiently explored.
Our tour shows that in the Lowell Lectures of 1951, Kuhn addresses a
fairly definite set of problems concerning the nature of language and the
determination of meaning. This program was left aside in SSR, leaving a
gap in semantic issues that critics of the Kuhnian proposal quickly pointed
fuori. To remedy this difficulty, Kuhn reactivated his semantic interests in
the Notre Dame Lectures, seeking to assemble the cluster theory with the
image of science derived from SSR. This project does not crystallize, E
the inadequacies of the cluster theories give rise in the Notre Dame
Lectures to the introduction of the notion of “taxonomy,” the pillar of the
linguistic approach that characterizes the last stage of Kuhnian thought.
These findings show that the linguistic turn in Kuhn’s mature work did
not arise spontaneously in the 1980s. Nor, as Shan (2020) asserts, can it be
established that it was the consequence of a strategy resulting from artic-
ulating the thesis of incommensurability focusing only on semantic aspects
(such an aprioristic turn being the infamous “wrong turn” proclaimed by
Bird 2002). The semantic focus has its genesis in Kuhn’s youthful efforts
to offer an alternative to logical positivism and Bridgman‘s operationalism.
These intuitions do not appear in SSR but remain dormant until their
recovery in the second Notre Dame lecture. In that sense, the “wrong turn”
should perhaps be renamed “wrong return.”
This lecture is a historic milestone: the moment when Kuhn takes up
his semantic concerns and where taxonomy appears for the first time as a
unit of analysis of theoretical change. Such a unit would soon become the
locus of Kuhn’s philosophical and historical investigations, as the Witt-
gensteinian cluster theory is abandoned in the 1984 Thalheimer Lectures.
From this and other recent findings in unpublished materials, we under-
stand that it is necessary to revise the predominant periodizations of
Kuhn’s intellectual evolution, as well as the very image of “the late Kuhn.”
The examination of the unpublished writings—still in progress—shows
that a good part of the proposals and formulations of the so-called “last
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Genealogy of Thomas Kuhn’s Semantics
Kuhn” do not take shape in the last years of his work but date back to the
early 1980s. There would be no such thing as a “linguistic turn” but a
return to the semantic roots.
This tour allows us to see the Lowell and Notre Dame Lectures as
expressions of the same philosophical agenda, which Kuhn dealt with in
diverse ways in 1951 E 1980, but which maintains shared references
both in the spectrum of problems he posed and in the theoretical tools
he used to solve them. For reasons we cannot establish here, but which
are gradually being explored (Hufbauer 2012; Melogno and Courtoisie
2019), in SSR, Kuhn set aside this agenda of problems about the nature
of meaning, the language-world relation, and the learning of kind terms.
Beyond this, connections between the Lowell and Notre Dame Lectures
show that the concerns about meaning were not an unforeseen consequence
with which Kuhn began to grapple after 1962. Conversely, they are part of
a research program that took shape in the earliest stages of his intellectual
journey.
We hope to have shed light on the genealogy of Kuhnian semantics as it
appears in his more mature works by examining two insufficiently studied
lectures. The effort of reviewing and publishing Kuhn’s unpublished texts
is still fruitful and relevant for a community nourished by his intellectual
journey as much as ours. This work aims to be another example of this.
Riferimenti
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