Seven Steps to Control of Corruption: - Ricerca sull'intelligenza artificiale specializzata al MIT

Seven Steps to Control of Corruption:
The Road Map

Alina Mungiu-Pippidi

Astratto: After a comprehensive test of today’s anticorruption toolkit, it seems that the few tools that do
work are effective only in contexts where domestic agency exists. Therefore, the time has come to draft a
comprehensive road map to inform evidence-based anticorruption efforts. This essay recommends that in-
ternational donors join domestic civil societies in pursuing a common long-term strategy and action plan
to build national public integrity and ethical universalism. In other words, this essay proposes that coordi-
nation among donors should be added as a specific precondition for improving governance in the WHO’s
Millennium Development Goals. This essay offers a basic tool for diagnosing the rule governing alloca-
tion of public resources in a given country, recommends some fact-based change indicators to follow, E
outlines a plan to identify the human agency with a vested interest in changing the status quo. In the end,
the essay argues that anticorruption interventions must be designed to empower such agency on the ba-
sis of a joint strategy to reduce opportunities for and increase constraints on corruption, and recommends
that experts exclude entirely the tools that do not work in a given national context.

The last two decades of unprecedented anticorrup-

tion activity–including the adoption of an interna-
tional legal framework, the emergence of an anti-
corruption civil society, the introduction of gover-
nance-related aid conditionality, and the rise of a
veritable anticorruption industry–have been marred
by stagnation in the evolution of good governance,
ratings of which have remained flat for most of the
countries in the world.

The World Bank’s 2017 Control of Corruption ag-
gregate rating showed that twenty-two countries
progressed significantly in the past twenty years and
twenty-five regressed. Of the countries showing prog-
ress on corruption, nineteen were rated as either
“free” or “partly free” by Freedom House (a democ-
racy watchdog that measures governance via politi-
cal rights and civil liberties); only seven were judged
“not free.”1 Our governance measures are too new to

alina mungiu-pippidi is Pro-
fessor of Democracy Studies at the
Hertie School of Governance in
Berlin. She chairs the European Re-
search Centre for Anti-Corruption
and State-Building (ercas), Dove
she managed the fp7 research
project anticorrp. She is the
author of The Quest for Good Gover-
nance: How Societies Develop Control of
Corruption (2015) and A Tale of Two
Villages: Coerced Modernization in the
East European Countryside (2010).

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allow us to look further into the past; still,
it seems that governance change has much
in common with climate change: it occurs
only slowly, and the role that humans play
involuntarily seems always to matter more
than what they do with intent.

External aid and its attached conditional-
ity are considered an essential component
of efforts to enable developing countries to
deliver decent public services on the princi-
ple of ethical universalism (in which every-
one is treated equally and fairly). Tuttavia,
a panel data set (collected from 110 devel-
oping countries that received aid from the
European Union and its member states be-
tween 2002 E 2014) shows little evolution
of fair service delivery in countries receiv-
ing conditional aid. Bilateral aid from the
largest European donors does not have sig-
nificant impact on governance in recipient
countries, while multilateral financial assis-
tance from eu institutions such as the Of-
fice of Development Assistance (which pro-
vides aid conditional on good governance)
produces only a small improvement in the
governance indicators of the net recipients.
Dedicated aid to good-governance and cor-
ruption initiatives within multilateral aid
packages has no sizable effect, whether on
public-sector functionality or anticorrup-
tion.2 Countries like Georgia, Vanuatu,
Rwanda, Macedonia, Bhutan, and Uru-
guay, which have managed to evolve more
than one point on a one-to-ten scale from
2002 A 2014, are outliers. In other words,
they evolved disproportionately given the
eu aid per capita that they received, while
countries that received the most aid (come
as Turkey, Egypt, and Ukraine) had rather
disappointing results.

So how, if at all, can an external actor
such as a donor agency influence the transi-
tion of a society from corruption as a governance
norm, wherein public resource distribution
is systematically biased in favor of authori-
ty holders and those connected with them,
to corruption as an exception, a state that is

largely independent from private interest
and that allocates public resources based
on ethical universalism? Can such a pro-
cess be engineered? How do the current
anticorruption tools promoted by the in-
ternational community perform in deliv-
ering this result?

Looking at the governance progress in-
dicators outlined above, one might won-
der whether efforts to change the quali-
ty of government in other countries are
doomed from the outset. The incapaci-
ty of international donors to help push
any country above the threshold of good
governance during the past twenty years
of the global crusade against corruption
seems over- rather than under-explained.
For one, corrupt countries are generally
run by corrupt people with little interest
in killing their own rents, although they
may find it convenient to adopt interna-
tional treaties or domestic legislation that
are nominally dedicated to anticorruption
efforts. Inoltre, countries in which
informal institutions have long been sub-
stituted for formal ones have a tradition
of surviving untouched by formal legal
changes that may be forced upon them.
One popular saying from the post-Sovi-
et world expresses the view that “the in-
adequacy of the laws is corrected by their
non-observance.”3

Explicit attempts of donor countries
and international organizations to change
governance across borders might appear a
novel phenomenon, but are they actually
so very different from older endeavors to
“modernize” and “civilize” poorer coun-
tries and change their domestic institutions
to replicate allegedly superior, “universal”
ones? Describing similar attempts by the
ancient Greeks–and also their rather poor
impact–historian Arnaldo Momig liano
writes: “The Greeks were seldom in a po-
sition to check what natives told them: Essi
did not know the languages. The natives,
on the other hand, being bilingual, had a

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147 (3) Summer 2018Alina Mungiu- Pippidi

shrewd idea of what the Greeks wanted to
hear and spoke accordingly. This recipro-
cal position did not make for sincerity and
real understanding.”4

Many factors speak against the odds of
success of international donors’ efforts to
change governance practices, particolarmente
government-funded ones. One such fac-
tor is the incentives facing donor countries
themselves: they want first and foremost
to care for national companies investing
abroad and their business opportunities;
reduce immigration from poor countries;
and generate jobs for their development in-
dustry. Even if donor countries would pre-
fer that poor countries govern better, Rif-
duce corruption, and adopt Western values,
they also have to play their cards realisti-
cally. Così, donor countries often end up
avoiding the root of the problem: when the
choice is between their own economic in-
terests and more idealistic commitments
to better governance, the former usually
wins out.

The first question a policy analyst should

ask, Perciò, is not how to go about alter-
ing governance in developing countries,
but whether the promotion of good gover-
nance and anticorruption is worth doing
at all, self-serving reasons aside. I have ad-
dressed these questions in greater detail
elsewhere; this essay assumes a donor has
already made the decision to intervene.5
The evidence on the basis of which such
decisions are made is often poor, but real-
istically, due to the other policy objectives
mentioned above (such as the exigencies
of participation in the global economy),
international donors will continue to give
aid systematically to corrupt countries. As
long as one thinks a country is worth grant-
ing assistance to, preventing aid money
from feeding corruption in the recipient
country becomes an obligation to one’s
own taxpayers. For the sake of the recipi-
ent country, pure, ensuring that such mon-

ey is used to do good, rather than actual-
ly to funnel more resources into local in-
formal institutions and predatory elites,
seems more of an obligation than a choice.
While our knowledge of how to estab-
lish a norm of ethical universalism is still
far from sufficient, I will outline a road
map toward making corruption the excep-
tion rather than the rule in recipient coun-
tries. To do so, I draw on one of the largest
social-science research projects undertak-
en by the European Union, anticorrp,
which was conducted between 2013 E
2017 and was dedicated to systematical-
ly assessing the impact of public anticor-
ruption tools and the contexts that enable
them. I follow the consequences of the evi-
dence to suggest a methodology for the de-
sign of an anticorruption strategy for ex-
ternal donors and their counterparts in do-
mestic civil societies.6

Many anticorruption policies and pro-
grams have been declared successful, Ma
no country has yet achieved control of cor-
ruption through the prescriptions attached
to international assistance.7 To proceed, we
must also clarify what constitutes “success”
in anticorruption reforms. Success can
only mean a consolidated dominant norm
of ethical universalism and public integri-
ty. Exceptions, in the form of corrupt acts,
will always remain, but if they are numer-
ous enough to be the rule, a country can-
not be called an achiever. A successful trans-
formation requires both a dominant norm
of public integrity (wherein the majority
of acts and public officials are noncorrupt)
and the sustainability of that norm across
at least two or three electoral cycles.

Quite a few developing countries pres-

ently seem to be struggling in a borderline
area in which old and new norms confront
one another. This is why popular demand
for leadership integrity has been loudly pro-
claimed in headlines from countries such
as South Korea, India, Brasile, Bulgaria, E

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Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & SciencesSeven Steps to Control of Corruption

Romania, but substantially better qual-
ity of governance has yet to be achieved
there. While the solutions for each and ev-
ery country will ultimately come from the
country itself–and not from some univer-
sal toolkit–recent research can contribute
to a road map for more evidence-based cor-
ruption control.

The first step is to understand that with
the exception of the developed world, con-
trol of corruption has to be built from the
ground up, not “restored.” Most anticor-
ruption approaches are built on the con-
cept that public integrity and ethical uni-
versalism are already global norms of gov-
ernance. This is wrong on two counts, E
leads to policy failure. Primo, at the present
moment, most countries are more corrupt
than noncorrupt. A histogram of corrup-
tion control shows that developing coun-
tries range between two and six on a one-
to-ten scale, with some borderline cases in
between (Guarda la figura 1). Countries scoring
in the upper third are a minority, so a de-
velopment agency is more likely than not
to be dealing with a situation in which cor-
ruption is not only a norm but an institu-
tionalized practice. Development agencies
need to understand corruption as a social
practice or institution, not just as a sum of
individual corrupt acts. Further, presum-
ing that ethical universalism is the default
is wrong from a developmental perspec-
tive, since even countries in which ethical
universalism is the governance norm were
not always this way: from sales of offices
to class privileges and electoral corruption,
the histories of even the cleanest countries
show that good governance is the prod-
uct of evolution, and modernity a long and
frequently incomplete endeavor to develop
state autonomy in the face of private group
interests.

Institutionalized corruption is based on
the informal institution of particularism
(treating individuals differently according
to their status), which is prevalent in col-

lectivistic and status-based societies. Par-
ticularism frequently results in patrimo-
nialism (the use of public office for private
profit), turning public office into a perpet-
ual source of spoils.8 Public corruption
thrives on power inequality and the inca-
pacity of the weak to prevent the strong
from appropriating the state and spoiling
public resources. Particularism encom-
passes a variety of interpersonal and per-
sonal-state transaction types, such as cli-
entelism, bribery, patronage, nepotism,
and other favoritisms, all of which imply
some degree of patrimonialism when an
authority-holder is concerned. Particular-
ism not only defines the relations between
a government and its subjects, but also be-
tween individuals in a society; it explains
why advancement in a given society might
be based on status or connections with in-
fluential people rather than on merit.

The outcome associated with the prev-
alence of particularism–a regular pattern
of preferential distribution of public goods
toward those who hold more power –has
been termed “limited-access order” by
economists Douglass North, John Wal-
lis, and Barry Weingast; “extractive in-
stitutions” by economist Daron Acemog-
lu and political scientist James Robinson;
and “patrimonialism” by political scien-
tist Francis Fukuyama.9 Essentially, Anche se,
all these categories overlap and all the au-
thors acknowledge that particularism rath-
er than ethical universalism is closer to the
state of nature (or the default social orga-
nization), and that its opposite, a norm of
open and equal access or public integrity, È
by no means guaranteed by political evolu-
tion and indeed has only ever been achieved
in a few cases thus far. The first countries
to achieve good control of corruption–
among them Britain, the Netherlands, Swit-
zerland, and Prussia–were also the first to
modernize and, in Max Weber’s term, A
“rationalize.” This implies an evolution
from brutal material interests (espoused,

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147 (3) Summer 2018Alina Mungiu- Pippidi

Figura 1
Particularism versus Ethical Universalism:
Distribution of Countries on the Control of Corruption Continuum

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Control of Corruption (Values from 1 A 10)

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Particularism

Universalism

Fonte: The World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators, Control of Corruption, http://info.worldbank.org/
governance/wgi/#home distribution. Distribution recoded 1–10 (with Denmark 10). The number of countries
for each score is noted on each column.

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for instance, by Spanish conquistadors who
appropriated the gold and silver of the New
World) to a more rationalistic and capitalis-
tic channeling of economic surplus, under-
pinned by an ideology of personal austeri-
ty and achievement. The market and cap-
italism, despite their obvious limitations,
gradually emerged in these cases as the
main ways of allocating resources, replac-
ing the previous system of discretionary
allocation by means of more or less orga-
nized violence. The past century and a half
has seen a multitude of attempts around
the world to replicate these few advanced
cases of Western modernization. How-
ever, a reduction in the arbitrariness and
power discretion of rulers, as occurred in

the West and some Western Anglo-Saxon
colonies, has not taken place in many other
countries, regardless of whether said rulers
were monopolists or won power through
contested elections. Despite adopting most
of the formal institutions associated with
Western modernity–such as constitutions,
political parties, elections, bureaucracies,
free markets, and courts–many countries
never managed to achieve a similar ratio-
nalization of both the state and the broad-
er society.10 Many modern institutions ex-
ist only in form, substituted by informal
institutions that are anything but modern.
That is why treating corruption as deviation
is problematic in developing countries: Esso
leads to investing in norm-enforcing instru-

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Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & SciencesSeven Steps to Control of Corruption

menti, when the norm-building instruments
that are in fact needed are quite different.
Strangely enough, developed countries dis-
play extraordinary resistance to addressing
corruption as a development-related rather
than moral problem. This is why our West-
ern anticorruption techniques look much
like an invasion of the temperance league
in a pub on Friday night: a lot of noise with
no consequence. Scholars contribute to
the inefficacy of interventions by perpet-
uating theoretical distinctions that are of
poor relevance even in the developed world
(such as “bureaucratic versus political” or
“grand versus petty” corruption), Quale
inform us only of the opportunities that
somebody has to be corrupt. As those op-
portunities simply vary according to one’s
station in life (a minister exhorting an en-
ergy company for a contract is simply us-
ing his grand station in a perfectly simi-
lar way to a petty doctor who required a
gift to operate or a policeman requiring a
bribe not to give a fine), such distinctions
are not helpful or conceptually meaning-
ful. In countries where the practice of par-
ticularism is dominant, disentangling po-
litical from bureaucratic corruption also
does not work, since rulers appoint “bu-
reaucrats” on the basis of personal or par-
ty allegiance and the two collude in extract-
ing resources. Even distinguishing victims
from perpetrators is not easy in a context of
institutionalized corruption. In a develop-
ing country, an electricity distribution com-
pany, for instance, might be heavily indebt-
ed to the state but still provide rents (come
as well-paid jobs) to people in government
and their cronies and eventually contribute
funds to their electoral campaigns. For their
part, consumers defend themselves by not
paying bills and actually stealing massively
from the grid, and controllers take moder-
ate bribes to leave the situation as it is. IL
result is constant electricity shortages and
a situation to which everybody (or nearly
everybody) contributes, and which has to

be understood and addressed holistically
and not artificially separated into types of
corruption.

The second step is diagnosing the norm.
If we conceive governance as a set of for-
mal rules and informal practices determin-
ing who gets which public resources, we can
then place any country on a continuum with
full particularism at one end and full ethi-
cal universalism at the other. There are two
main questions that we have to answer.
What is the dominant norm (and prac-
tice) for social allocation: merit and work,
or status and connections to authority?
And how does this compare to the formal
norm–such as the United Nations Conven-
tion against Corruption (uncac), or the
country’s own regulation–and to the gen-
eral degree of modernity in the society? For
instance, merit-based advancement in civil
service may not work as the default norm,
but it may in the broader society, for in-
stance in universities and private business-
es. The tools to begin this assessment are the
Worldwide Governance Indicator Control
of Corruption, an aggregate of all percep-
tion scores (Figura 1); and the composite,
mostly fact-based Index for Public Integri-
ty that I developed with my team (che è
highly correlated with perception indica-
tori). Any available public-opinion poll on
governance can complete the picture (one
standard measure is the Global Corruption
Barometer, which is organized by Transpar-
ency International). Simply put, the major-
ity of respondents in countries in the upper
tercile of the Control of Corruption indica-
tors feel that no personal ties are needed to
access a public service, while those in the
lower two-thirds will in all likelihood indi-
cate that personal connections or materi-
al inducement are necessary (albeit in dif-
ferent proportions). Within the developed
European Union, only in Northern Europe
does a majority of citizens believe that the
state and markets work impartially. IL
stati Uniti, developed Commonwealth

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147 (3) Summer 2018Alina Mungiu- Pippidi

countries, and Japan round out the top ter-
cile. The next set of countries, around six
and seven on the scale, already exhibit far
more divided public opinion, showing that
the two norms coexist and possibly com-
pete.11 In countries where the norm of par-
ticularism is dominant and access is limited,
surveys show majorities opining that gov-
ernment only works in the favor of the few;
that people are not equal in the eyes of the
law; and that connections, not merit, drive
success in both the public and private sec-
tori. Bribery often emerges as a substitute
for or a complement to a privileged con-
nection; when administration discretion
is high, favoritism is the rule of the game,
so bribes may be needed to gain access,
even for those with some preexisting priv-
ilege. A thorough analysis needs to deter-
mine whether favoritism is dominant and
how material and status-based favoritism
relate to one another in order to weigh use-
ful policy answers. Are they complementa-
ry, compensatory, or competitive? When
the dominant norm is particularistic, col-
lusive practices are widespread, including
not only a fusion of interests between ap-
pointed and elected office holders and civ-
il servants more generally, but also the cap-
ture of law enforcement agencies.

The second step, diagnosis, needs to be
completed by fact-based indicators that al-
low us to trace prevalence and change. For-
tunately for the analyst (but unfortunately
for everyone else), since corrupt societies
are, in Max Weber’s words, status societies,
where wealth is only a vehicle to obtain
greater status, we do not need Panama-
Papers revelations to see corruption. Sys-
tematic corrupt practices are noticeable
both directly and through their outcomes:
lavish houses of poorly paid officials, great
fortunes made of public contracts, and the
poor quality of public works. Particularism
results in privilege to some (favoritism)
and discrimination to others, outcomes
that can both be measured.12

Tavolo 1 illustrates how these two con-
texts–corruption as norm and corruption
as exception–differ essentially, and shows
that different measures must be taken to de-
fine, assess, and respond to corruption in
either case. An individual is corrupt when
engaging in a corrupt act, regardless of
whether he or she is a public or private ac-
tor. The dominant analytic framework of
the literature on corruption is the principal-
agent paradigm, wherein agents (for ex-
ample government officials) are individu-
als authorized to act on behalf of a principal
(for example a government). To diagnose
an organization or a country as “corrupt,"
we have to establish that corruption is the
norm: in other words, that corrupt trans-
actions are prevalent. When such practices
are the exception, the corrupt agent is sim-
ply a deviant and can be sanctioned by the
principal if identified. When such practic-
es are the norm, corruption occurs on an
organized scale, extracting resources dis-
proportionately in favor of the most pow-
erful group. Telling the principal from the
agent can be quite impossible in these cas-
es due to generalized collusion (the orga-
nization is by privileged status groups, pa-
tron-client pyramids, or networks of extor-
zione) and fighting corruption means solving
social dilemmas and issues around discre-
tionary use of power. Most people oper-
ate by conformity, and conformity always
works in favor of the status quo: if ethical
universalism is already the norm in a soci-
ety, conformity helps to enforce public in-
tegrity; if favoritism and clientelism are
the norm, few people will dissent. The dif-
ference between corruption as a rule and
corruption as a norm shows in observable,
measurable phenomena. In contexts with
clearer public-private separation, it is more
difficult to discover corrupt acts, requiring
whistleblowers or some time for a conflict
of interest to unfold (as with revolving
doors, through which the official collects
benefits from his favor by getting a cushy

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Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & SciencesSeven Steps to Control of Corruption

Tavolo 1
Corruption as Governance Context

Corruption as Exception

Corruption as Norm

Definition

Individual abuses public
authority to gain undue
private profit.

Visibility

Corruption unobservable;
whistleblowing needed.

Social practice in which particularism (as op-
posed to ethical universalism) informs the ma-
jority of government transactions, resulting in
widespread favoritism and discrimination.

Corruption is observable as overt behaviors and
flawed processes, as well as through outcomes/
consequences; monitoring and curbing
impunity needed.

Enshrined. Access is permit-
ted via lobby, and exchanges
between the sides are con-
sequent in time (revolving
doors).

Micro and qualitative (for
esempio, lobby studies).

Public-Private
Separation

Preferred
Observation
Level

Permeable border, with patrimonialism and con-
flict of interest ubiquitous. Exchanges between
the sides are synchronous (one person belongs
to both sides at the same time).

Macro (how many bills are driven by special in-
terest, how many contracts awarded by favorit-
ism, how many officials are corrupt, and so on).

job later with a private company). In cont-
texts where patrimonialism is widespread,
there is no need for whistleblowers: offi-
cials grant state contracts to themselves or
their families, use their public car and driver
to take their mother-in-law shopping, E
so forth–all in publicly observable displays
(Vedi la tabella 1).

Efforts to measure corruption should
aim at gauging the prevalence of favorit-
ism, measuring how many transactions
are impersonal and by-the-book, and how
many are not. Observations for measure-
ment can be drawn from all the transac-
tions that a government agency, sector, O
entire state engages in, from regulation to
spending. The results of these observations
allow us to monitor change over time in a
country’s capacity to control corruption.
Even anecdotal evidence can be a good way
to gauge changes to corruption over long
periods: twenty years ago, Per esempio, Esso
was customary even in some developed
countries for companies bidding for pub-
lic contracts to consult among themselves;

today this is widely understood to be a col-
lusive practice and has been made illegal in
many countries. These indicators signal es-
sential changes of context that we need to
trace in developing countries and indeed
to use to create our good governance tar-
gets. If in a given country it is presently cus-
tomary to pay a bribe to have a telephone
line installed, the target is to make this ex-
ceptional.

In my previous work, I have given ex-
amples of such indicators of corruption
norms, including the particularistic distri-
bution of funds for natural disasters, com-
parisons of turnout and profit for govern-
ment-connected companies versus uncon-
nected companies, the changing fortunes
of market leaders after elections, and the
replacement of the original group of mar-
ket leaders (those connected to the losing
political clique) by another well-defined
group of market leaders (those connected
with election winners). The data sources for
such measurements are the distribution of
public contracts, subsidies, tax breaks, gov-

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147 (3) Summer 2018Alina Mungiu- Pippidi

ernment subnational transfers; in short, ba-
sically any allocation of public resources,
including through legislation (laws are ide-
al instruments to trade favors for person-
al profit). If such data exist in a digital for-
mat, which is increasingly the case in East-
ern Europe, Latin America, and even China,
it becomes feasible to monitor, Per esempio,
how many public contracts go to companies
belonging to officials or how many people
put their relatives on public payrolls. In-
suring that data sources like these are made
open and universally accessible by public
or semipublic entities (such as government
and Register of Commerce data) is itself a
valid and worthy target for donors. IL
method works even when data are not dig-
itized: through simple requests for infor-
mazione, as most countries in the world have
freedom of information acts. Inaccessibili-
ty of public data opens an entire avenue for
donor action unto itself: supporting free-
dom-of-information legislation also sup-
ports anticorruption efforts, since lack of
transparency and corruption are correlated.

Now that targets have been established,

the fourth step is solving the problem of do-
mestic agency. By and large, countries can
achieve control of corruption in two ways.
The first is surreptitious: policy-makers
and politicians change institutions incre-
mentally until open access, free competi-
zione, and meritocracy become dominant,
even though that may not have been a main
collective goal. This has worked for many
developed countries in the past. The sec-
ond method is to make a concerted effort
to foster collective agency and investment
in anticorruption efforts specifically, even-
tually leading to the rule of law and control
of corruption delivered as public goods.
This can occur after sustained anticorrup-
tion campaigns in a country where partic-
ularism is engrained. Both paths require
human agency. In the former, the role of
agency is small. Reforms slip by with little

opposizione, since they are not perceived as
being truly dangerous to anybody’s rents,
and do not therefore need great heroism
to be pushed through; just common sense,
professionalism, and a public demand for
government performance. The latter sce-
nario, Tuttavia, requires considerable ef-
fort and alignment of both interests favor-
ing change and an ideology of ethical uni-
versalism. Identifying the human agency
that can deliver the change therefore be-
comes essential to selecting a well-func-
tioning anticorruption strategy.

Changing governance across borders is a
difficult task even under military occupa-
zione. Leaving external actors aside, a coun-
try’s governance can push corruption from
norm to exception either through the ac-
tions of an enlightened despot (the king
of Denmark model beginning in the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries), an en-
lightened elite (as in the British and Amer-
ican cases), or by an enlightened mass of
citizens (the famous “middle class” of po-
litical modernization theory). Enlightened
despots do appear periodically (the king-
dom of Bhutan is the current example of
shining governance reforms, after the clas-
sic example of Botswana, where the chief of
the largest tribe became a democratically
elected president). Enlightened elites can
perhaps be engineered (this is what George
Soros and the Open Society Foundation
have tried to do, with one of the results be-
ing a great mobilization against elites in less
democratic countries), and countries that
have them (like Estonia, Georgia, Chile, E
Uruguay) have evolved further than their
neighbors. Enlightened and organized citi-
zens must reach a critical mass; and regard-
less how strong a demand for good gover-
nance they put up, they cannot do much
without an alternative and autonomous
elite that is able to take over from the cor-
rupt one. As the recent South Korean case
has proved, entrusting power at the top to
former elites leads to an immediate return

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Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & SciencesSeven Steps to Control of Corruption

to former practices; Tuttavia, in that case,
the society had sufficiently evolved in the
interval to defend itself.

In principle, donors can work with en-
lightened despots, attempt to socialize en-
lightened elites to some extent, and help
civil society and “enlightened” citizens.
Ma, in practice, this does not go so well.
Donors seem by default to treat every cor-
rupt government as though it were run by
an enlightened despot, entrusting it with
the ownership of anticorruption programs.
These, Ovviamente, will never take off, non
only because they are more often than not
the wrong programs, but because imple-
menting them would run counter to the
main interests of these principals. Addi-
tionally, this approach is not sustainable:
pro-Western elites are so scarce these days
that checking their anticorruption cre-
dentials often becomes problematic. Take
the tiny post-Soviet republic of Moldova,
which could never afford to punish anyone
from the Russian-organized crime syndi-
cates that control part of its economy and
even a breakaway province thriving on
weapons smuggling. Due to international
anticorruption efforts, a prime minister
was jailed for eight years for “abuse of func-
tion”–actually for failing to prevent cyber-
crime–despite the fact that he held pro-eu
policy goals. The better and less repressive
approach–designing anticorruption inter-
ventions that include society actors as main
stakeholders by default, not just working
with governments–is rather exceptional,
although such an approach might greatly
enhance the effectiveness of aid programs
in general.

The remaining option, building a crit-
ical mass from bottom up, is not easy ei-
ther, as it basically means competing with
patronage and client networks that have a
lot to offer the average citizen. “Incentiv-
izing,” another anticorruption-industry
buzzword, is really a practical joke. No an-
ticorruption incentive can compete with a

diamond mine, a country’s oil income, O,
Infatti, its whole budget, including assis-
tance funds. Despoilers generally control
those rents and distribute them wisely to
stay in control. Anticorruption is not a win-
win game, it is a game played by societies
against their despoilers, and when build-
ing accountability, not everybody wins. Ma
if in contemporary times countries like Es-
tonia, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Taiwan, Chile,
Slovenia, Botswana, and even Georgia are
edging over the threshold of good gover-
nance through their own agency, we must
maintain hope that others can follow.

We see all around the world that demand

for good governance and participation in
anticorruption protests have increased–
just not sufficiently to change governance.
Perhaps there was not enough middle-class
growth in the last two decades for that: IL
Pew Research Center found that between
2001 E 2011, nearly seven hundred mil-
lion people escaped poverty but did not
travel far up enough to be labeled middle-
class.13 Fortunately, the development of
smartphones with Internet access provides
a great shortcut to fostering individual au-
tonomy and achieving enlightened partici-
pation.

Any assistance in increasing the percent-
age of “enlightened citizens” armed with
smartphones is helpful in creating grass-
roots demand for government transpar-
ency; this is why both Internet access and
ownership of smartphones are strongly as-
sociated with control of corruption.14 But
for our transition strategy we need more:
careful stakeholder analysis and coalition
building. Brokers of corrupt acts and prac-
titioners of favoritism are not hidden in cor-
rupt societies. Losers are more difficult to
find; today’s losers may be tomorrow’s cli-
ents. As a ground rule, Tuttavia, whoever
wishes to engage in fair, competitive prac-
tices–whether in business or politics–
stands to lose in a particularistic society.

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147 (3) Summer 2018Alina Mungiu- Pippidi

He or she faces two options: to desert for a
more meritocratic realm (hence the close
correlation between corruption and brain
drain) or to fight. These are our recruit-
ment grounds. It is essential to understand
who is invested in challenging the rules of
the game and who is invested in defending
them; in other words, who are the status
quo losers and winners? Who, among the
winners, would stay a winner even if more
merit-based competition were allowed?
Who among the losers would gain? These
are the groups that must come together to
empower merit and fair competition.

By now, enough evidence should exist to
support a theory of change, which in turn
informs our strategy. To understand when
the status quo will change, we need a theory
of why it would change, who would push for
the desired evolution, and how donors can
assist them to steer the country to a virtu-
ous circle. The main theories informing in-
tervention presently are very general: mod-
ernization theory (the theory that increases
in education and economic development
bring better governance) and state modern-
ization (the belief that building state capaci-
ty will also resolve integrity problems). Ma
as there is a very close negative correlation
between rule of law and control of corrup-
zione, it is the case more often than not that
rule of law is absent where corruption is
high, so legal approaches to anticorruption
(like anticorruption agencies or strong pu-
nitive campaigns) can hardly be expected to
deliver.15 The same goes for civil-service ca-
pacity building in countries where bureau-
cracy has never gained its autonomy from
rulers. Good governance requires autono-
mous classes of magistrates and of bureau-
crats. These cannot be delivered by capacity-
building in the absence of domestic politi-
cal agency or some major loss of power of
ruling elites that could empower bureau-
crats.16 This is why the accountability tools
that work in our statistical assessments are
those associated with civil-society agency.

Voluntary implementation of accountabil-
ity tools by interested groups (imprese
who lose public tenders, for instance, O
journalists seeking an audience) works bet-
ter than implementation by government,
which is always found wanting by donors.
In our recent work, my colleagues and I
tested a broad panel of anticorruption tools
and good governance policies from the
World Bank’s Public Accountability Mech-
anism database. The panel includes nearly
all instruments that are either frequently
used in practice or specified in the uncac:
anticorruption agencies, ombudsmen, free-
dom of information laws (fois), immuni-
ty protection limitations, conflict of inter-
est legislation, financial disclosures, audit
infrastructure improvements, budgetary
transparency, party finance restrictions,
whistleblower protections, and dedicated
legislation.17 The evidence so far shows that
countries that adopt autonomous anticor-
ruption agencies, restrictive party finance
legislation, or whistleblower protection
acts make no more progress on corruption
than countries that do not.18 The compre-
hensiveness of anticorruption regulation
does not seem to matter either: Infatti, IL
cleanest countries have moderate regula-
tion and excessive regulation is actually as-
sociated with more corruption; what mat-
ters are the legal arrangements used to gen-
erate privileges and rents. In other words, Esso
may well be that a country’s specific anti-
corruption legislation matters far less in en-
suring good control of corruption than its
overall “regulatory quality,” which might
result precisely from a long process of con-
trolled rent creation and profiteering.19

Actually, as I have already argued, the em-
pirical evidence suggests corruption control
is best described as an equilibrium between
opportunities (or resources) for corruption,
such as natural resources, unconditional
aid, lack of government transparency, ad-
ministrative discretion, and obstacles to
trade, and constraints on corruption, whether

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Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & SciencesSeven Steps to Control of Corruption

legal (an autonomous judiciary and audit)
or normative (by the media and civil soci-
ety).20 Not only is each element highly in-
fluential on corruption, but statistical re-
lationships between resources and con-
straints are highly significant. Esempi
include the inverse relationship between
red tape and the independence of the judi-
ciary and between transparency in any form
(fiscal transparency, existence of an foi, O
financial disclosures) and the direct rela-
tionship between civil society activism and
press freedom. Using this model, my col-
leagues and I designed an elegant compos-
ite index for public integrity for 109 coun-
tries based on policy determinants of con-
trol of corruption (which should be seen as
the starting point of any diagnosis, since it
shows at a first glance where the balance be-
tween opportunities and constraints goes
wrong). While even evidence-based com-
parative measures can be criticized for ig-
noring cross-border corrupt behavior (like
hiding corrupt income offshore), from a
policy perspective, it still makes the most
sense to keep national jurisdiction as the
main comparison unit. Basically every an-
ticorruption measure that would limit in-
ternational resources for corruption is in
the power of some national government.

Let’s take the well-known example of
Tunisia, whose revolution was catalyzed
in late 2010 by an unlicensed street vendor
who immolated himself to protest against
harassment by local police. Corruption–
as inequity of social allocation induced and
perpetuated by the government–was one
of the main causes of protests. Has the fall
of President Ben Ali and his cronies made
Tunisians happy? No, because there are as
many unemployed youths as before, equal-
ly lacking in jobs and hope, and the maze
of obstructive regulation and rent seekers
who profit by it are the same. If we check
Tunisia against countries in its region and
income group on the Index of Public In-
tegrity, we see that the revolution has only

brought significant progress on press free-
dom and trade openness. On items such as
administrative burden, fiscal transparency,
and quality of regulation, the country still
has much to do to bring the economy out
of the shadows and restore a social contract
between society and the state (Vedi la tabella 2).
To get there, policies are needed both to
bring the street vendors into the licensed,
tax-paying world and to reduce the discre-
tion of policemen.

Examples of specific, successful legis-
lative initiatives exist in the handful of
achievers we identified through our mea-
surement index: Uruguay and Georgia,
for instance, which have implemented
soft formalization policies, tax simplifica-
zione, and police reform. This is the correct
path to follow to control corruption suc-
cessfully. In a context of generalized law-
breaking fostered by unrealistic legisla-
zione, selective enforcement becomes inev-
itable, and then even anticorruption laws
can generate new rents and protect exist-
ing ones, reproducing rather than chang-
ing the rules of the game. One cannot ex-
pect isolated anticorruption measures to
work unless opportunities and constraints
are brought into balance. For instance, one
cannot ask Nigeria to create a register for
foreign-owned businesses in order to trace
beneficial ownership (as is the standard
procedure for anticorruption consultants)
without formalizing and registering (hope-
fully electronically) all property in Nigeria,
a long-standing development goal with im-
portant implications for corruption. È
quite important, Perciò, that we under-
stand and act on both sides of this balance.
Working on just one side only creates more
distance between formal and informal in-
stitutions, which is already a serious prob-
lem in corrupt countries.

The sixth step on the road map is for in-
ternational donors to get together to im-
plement a strategy to fix this imbalance.
In the same way the Millennium Devel-

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147 (3) Summer 2018Alina Mungiu- Pippidi

Seven Steps
to Control of
Corruption

Figura 2
Control of Corruption as Interaction between Resources and Constraints

Constraints

Internet users
Broadband subscriptions
Facebook users

Resources

Time and procedures
to start a business
Time and procedures
to pay taxes

E-Citizenship

Administrative
Burden

Freedom of the
press score

Freedom of
the Press

Budget
Transparency

Public access to the
central government’s
budget proposal

Judicial
Independence

Trade
Openness

Assessment of the
independence of the
judiciary from influences of
government, citizens, or firms

Time and number
of procedures to
import/export

Structural Factors
(level of development, geography, war and violence, past regimes, eccetera.)

Fonte: Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Ramin Dadasov, “Measuring Control of Corruption by a New Index of Public
Integrity,” European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 22 (3) (2016).

Tavolo 2
Tunisia’s Public Integrity Framework

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Component Score

World Rank
(Di 109)

Regional Rank
(Di 8)

Income Group
Rank (Di 28)

Judicial
Independence

Administrative
Burden

Trade Openness

Budget
Transparency
E-Citizenship

Freedom of the
Press

5.34

8.77

7.1

6.79

5.22

5.16

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Note: On the Index of Public Integrity, Tunisia scores 6.40 on a scale of 1 A 10, con 10 as the best, and ranks 59th
out of 109 countries. Fonte: Index of Public Integrity, 2015, http://www.integrity-index.org.

Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Scienze

opment goals required coordination and
multiyear planning, making the majority
of transactions clean rather than corrupt
requires long-term strategic planning. IL
goals are not just to reduce corruption with
isolated interventions, but to build public
integrity in many countries–a clear devel-
opment goal–and to refrain from punish-
ing deviation. The joint planners of such
efforts should begin by sponsoring a diag-
nostic effort using objective indicators and
subsequently launch coordinated efforts to
reduce resources and increase constraints.
This collaboration-based approach also
allows donors to diversify their efforts, COME
some may have strengths in building civil
society, others in market development re-
forme, and others still in increasing Inter-
net access. Freedom of the press receives
insufficient support, and seldom the kind it
needs (what media needs in corrupt coun-
tries is clean media investment, not train-
ing for investigative journalists).

Finalmente, international donors must set the
esempio. They should publicize what they
fund and how they structure the process
of aid allocation itself. Those at the apex of
the donor-coordination strategy ought to

agree upon aid-related good-governance
conditions and enforce them across the
board. Aid recipients–including particu-
lar governments, subnational government
units or agencies, and aid intermediaries–
should qualify for receiving aid transfers
only if they publish in advance all their calls
for tenders and their awards, which would
allow monitoring the percentage of trans-
parent and competitive bids out of the to-
tal procurement budget. Why not make
the full transparency of all recipients the
main condition for selection? Such indi-
cators could also be useful to trace evolu-
zione (or lack thereof ) from one year to an-
other. On top of this, using social account-
ability more decisively, for instance by
involving pro-change local groups in plan-
ning and audits of aid projects, would also
empower these groups and set an example
for how local stakeholders should monitor
public spending. These gestures of trans-
parency and inclusiveness toward the so-
cieties that donors claim to help–and not
just their rulers–would bring real benefits
for both sides and enhance the reputation
of development aid.

endnotes
1 Count based on the Worldwide Governance Indicator Control of Corruption recoded on a scale

Di 1 A 10, with the best performer rated 10.

2 Ramin Dadasov, “European Aid and Governance: Does the Source Matter?” The European Jour-

nal of Development Research 29 (2) (2017): 269–288.

3 Cited in Alena V. Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices that Shaped Post-Soviet

Politics and Business (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006).

4 Arnaldo Momigliano, Alien Wisdom: The Limits of Hellenization (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-

sity Press, 1975), 8.

5 See Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, A Quest for Good Governance: How Societies Develop Control of Corruption

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

6 See Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Ramin Dadasov, “When Do Anticorruption Laws Matter? IL
Evidence on Public Integrity,” Crime, Legge, and Social Change 68 (4) (2017): 1–16. I am grate-
ful to Sweden’s Expert Group for Aid Studies (eba) for funding this research and for helpful
comments on an earlier version of this article. See Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Seven Steps to Evidence-
Based Anticorruption: A Roadmap (Stockholm: Swedish Expert Group for Aid Studies, 2017),
http://eba.se/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/2017_10_final-webb.pdf.

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147 (3) Summer 2018Alina Mungiu- Pippidi

7 An ampler discussion of this issue can be found in Robert Klitgaard, Addressing Corruption Together
(Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2015), https://www
.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/publications/FINAL%20Addressing%20corruption
%20together.pdf.

8 For the intellectual genealogy of these terms, see Mungiu-Pippidi, A Quest for Good Governance,
chap. 1–2; and Talcott Parsons, Introduction to Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic
Organization (New York: The Free Press, 1997), 80–82.

9 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Pov-
erty (New York: Crown Business, 2012); Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay:
From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Gir-
oux, 2014); and Douglass C. North, John J. Wallis, and Barry Weingast, Violence and Social Orders:
A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2009).

10 A fuller argument roughly compatible with mine appears in North, Wallis, and Weingast,

Violence and Social Orders.

11 For evidence, see Mungiu-Pippidi, A Quest for Good Governance, chap. 2; and Mungiu-Pippidi and

Dadasov, “When Do Anticorruption Laws Matter?"

12 For a more extensive argument, see Robert Rotberg, “Good Governance Means Performance
and Results,” Governance 27 (3) (2014): 511–518; and Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, “For a New Gen-
eration of Objective Indicators in Governance and Corruption Studies,” European Journal on
Criminal Policy and Research 22 (3) (2016): 363–367.

13 Rakesh Kochhar, A Global Middle Class Is More Promise than Reality (Washington, D.C.: Pew Re-
search Center, 2015), http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/07/08/a-global-middle-class-is-more
-promise-than-reality/.

14 See Niklas Kossow and Roberto M. B. Kukutschka, “Civil Society and Online Connectivity:

Controlling Corruption on the Net?” Crime, Law and Social Change 68 (4) (2017): 1–18.

15 Lant Pritchett and Michael Woolcock, “Solutions when the Solution is the Problem: Arraying

the Disarray in Development,” World Development 32 (2) (2004): 191–212.

16 Robert Rotberg makes a similar point in “Good Governance Means Performance and Results.”
17 See Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadasov, “When Do Anticorruption Laws Matter?"
18 Ibid.
19 See updated evidence in Mihaly Fazekas, “Red Tape, Bribery and Government Favouritism:

Evidence from Europe,” Crime, Legge & Social Change 68 (4) (2017): 403–429.

20 For the full models, see Mungiu-Pippidi, A Quest for Good Governance, chap. 4; and Alina Mungiu-
Pippidi and Ramin Dadasov, “Measuring Control of Corruption by a New Index of Public In-
tegrity,” European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 22 (3) (2016): 415–438.

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