Is the Failed Pandemic Response - Ricerca sull'intelligenza artificiale specializzata al MIT

Is the Failed Pandemic Response
a Symptom of a Diseased
Administrative State?

David E. Lewis

The U.S. national government’s poor pandemic response raises unsettling questions
about the overall health of the administrative state: questo è, the agencies, people, E
processes of the executive branch of the federal government. Primo, are the adminis-
trative weaknesses revealed over the last year symptomatic of widespread problems
beyond the public health bureaucracy? Secondo, are the weaknesses attributable to
the Trump administration or do they reveal a deeper malady, something that af-
flicted earlier Democratic and Republican administrations? In summer 2020, my
colleagues and I conducted a survey of thousands of federal executives to help shed
light on these questions. These executives reported a low opinion of the then-current
administration, the White House, and the president’s political appointees. Yet they
also reported long-standing issues of low investment and problems of capacity that
extend back into other Democratic and Republican administrations. Years of ne-
glect have culminated in vulnerabilities manifesting themselves in increasingly regu-
lar and severe administrative failures. These failures put all of us at risk.

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I n the summer of 2020, the number of COVID-19 cases in the United States

surged past six million and deaths approached two hundred thousand souls.
Incalculable human suffering directly related to the virus was compounded by
secondary effects of the pandemic on the nation’s economy and its social fabric:
its schools and volunteer activities, its houses of worship and gatherings of family
and friends. Cases and mortality were on the rise again, particularly in the Sun-
belt and Midwest. Unhappy citizens complained about delays in testing and
lengthy shutdowns. Faced with the largest public health emergency in decades,
the United States seemed to lack the capacity to respond. While other countries
were celebrating a reprieve, if not recovery, the United States showcased an un-
settling breakdown.1 The nation initially ran short on ventilators.2 Shortages in
personal protective equipment persisted for months.3 The federal government
could provide neither sufficient nor timely tests.4 A high school student in Seattle
was collecting and distributing data on COVID-19 infections more reliably than

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the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the ten-thousand-person
federal agency responsible for the job.5 Not only was the administration incapable
or unwilling to provide a unified plan for how to respond to the crisis, it cast doubt
over whether there was a crisis.6

Those commenting on the crisis gave different explanations for the nation’s
pitiful pandemic response. Some blamed poor presidential leadership.7 The pres-
ident’s critics charged him with missing clear warning signs, refusing to use in-
house government expertise and plans, and undercutting efforts to curtail the vi-
rus’s spread. At the end of February, 2020, the president stated, “It’s going to dis-
appear. One day, it’s like a miracle, it will disappear.”8 The president persistently
downplayed the threat and proposed “liberating” states like Michigan from what
he described as illegitimate stay-at-home orders.9 He publicly contradicted CDC
statements on the severity of the crisis and on appropriate preventative measures
like masks and prohibitions on large gatherings. Such actions left governors and
mayors with little political cover for tough choices and encouraged resistance to
public health actions that would slow the spread of the virus.

For all the criticism of the president, other analysts puzzled over the poor per-
formance by the bureaucracy responsible for the pandemic response. At the heart
of complaints about poor bureaucratic performance was the CDC. The president
himself criticized the agency for being ill-prepared for the crisis, tweeting, “For
decades the @CDCgov looked at, and studied, its testing system, but did nothing
about it. It would always be inadequate and slow for a large scale pandemic.”10
The New York Times publicly wondered “What Went Wrong?” in the agency whose
entire purpose is to combat infectious diseases like COVID-19.11 A deep dive into
the public health bureaucracy revealed organizational chaos and resource prob-
lems.12 Why could it not perform basic tasks like delivering reliable tests, collect-
ing data, or even conveying a consistent message?

Both explanations for the breakdown can be true. The president’s choices in
the moment prevented an effective national response, while his earlier decision to
neglect governance had borne bitter fruit in a demoralized and ultimately broken
public health bureaucracy. Critics charged Trump with malign neglect or a pur-
poseful effort to hamstring the administrative state by breaking the bureaucracy.13
Debates about pandemic response raise more general questions about the overall
health of the administrative state: questo è, the agencies, people, and processes of
the executive branch of the federal government. Do the symptoms manifesting in
the public health bureaucracy extend to other parts of the bureaucracy? And are
the symptoms attributable to the actions of the Trump administration or do they
reveal a deeper malady, something that afflicted earlier Democratic and Republi-
can administrations?

Careful observers inside and outside of government had been raising alarm
about the health of the administrative arm of the government well before the

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150 (3) Summer 2021David E. Lewis

Trump presidency.14 Since at least the New Deal, the expansion of government
activity has been the subject of strong political disagreement between the par-
ties. The administrative state has been caught in a partisan struggle over the prop-
er scope of government activity, a debate that has only sharpened since the early
1980s with the increased polarization of the two main political parties. Conflating
the departments and agencies of government with the policies they pursue, many
Republican elected officials have sought to limit government activity by unravel-
ing the machinery of government. Inoltre, both parties have responded favor-
ably to management fads that feed into negative stereotypes about bureaucracy
and have responded accordingly.15 For neither party is effective agency manage-
ment–the hard work of government that no one sees–a regular priority.16

Debates about the response to the coronavirus pandemic raise the larger ques-
tion of the robustness of the administrative state in the United States. Govern-
ment workers keep people safe, provide security and infrastructure for the U.S. fi-
nancial system, enforce laws, and deliver mail. Their health and readiness are not
trifling concerns. If these agencies fail, veterans may die waiting for health care.
Poor kids may go hungry. Criminals may go unchecked and people may not be able
to vote or get prescriptions on time. Government agencies helped rebuild Europe,
win the Cold War, and send astronauts into space. Federal employees invented the
Internet.17 One-quarter of U.S. Nobel Prize winners are federal employees.18 Par-
tisans can reasonably disagree about what the federal government should do, Ma
it is everyone’s job to make sure it is healthy and managed well.

In summer 2020, my colleagues Nolan McCarty, Mark Richardson, and I
joined forces with the Partnership for Public Service to survey thousands of ap-
pointed and career federal executives to get their perceptions about the health of
the administrative state. We asked these individuals about their perceptions of
the federal workforce, investments in the public sector, and management.19 We
have asked some of these questions in the past, which provides some historical
reference.20 This time, to provide a public-private sector comparison, we also in-
cluded some questions that survey researchers ask C-suite private sector execu-
tives.21 The Partnership released the preliminary results in October 2020.22

A survey cannot tell us everything we need to know about the capacity of the
NOI. administrative state, but these results provide important insight into what is
happening inside government agencies. Respondents provided both quantitative
and qualitative data that help illuminate current conditions. Per esempio, one re-
spondent wrote, “Thank you so much for doing this. It is vital that the data get
used to really rebuild the federal government after how much this administration
and its enablers have built on decades of efforts to undermine and destroy the ef-
fectiveness of government.” Another wrote, “Thank you for doing this survey.
It is very important work. I’ve been concerned about a crumbling infrastructure
from within for a long time now.” Some respondents were more pointed in their

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Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & SciencesIs the Failed Pandemic Response a Symptom of a Diseased Administrative State?

critique of the current administration (“I am concerned with the Trump Admin-
istration’s attempts to politicize the civil service”) or of the civil service (“[My
agenzia] is replete with dedicated socialists. The agency should be reformed to cre-
ate greater balance between political views”).

We fielded the survey during the extraordinary circumstances of a worldwide
pandemic and unusual political contestation, and the answers reflect that. Notably,
more than 59 percent of our federal executives reported that their work portfolio
changed during the pandemic.23 For some, the pandemic had a large effect on their
lavoro. While 79 percent reported that their agency “has a sense of urgency for get-
ting things done,” fully 41 percent reported that the services their agency provides
to the public have suffered during the pandemic. Yet respondents generally reported
that the federal government is a good employer in the crisis and 80 percent report-
ed having all the necessary information technology to work effectively from home.
For others, the unusual political environment of their work provided important
context for their responses. Some asked explicitly that we take extra care to ensure
confidentiality of their responses. Others admitted, “I even hesitate to put this in
writing for fear of retaliation.” By contrast, other respondents inferred bias in the
survey, complaining, “The very fact that you are choosing to ask these questions
only now under the Trump Administration demonstrates again clearly . . . how bi-
ased is academia and the media. You are blinded by your ideology.” Relative to ear-
lier surveys, the rawness of the comments, the despair, and the anger is striking. For
many, there is an intense pride in their agency and what they do. This animates ei-
ther a frustration with changes or a defensiveness in assessing agency performance.
The questions on the survey run the gamut from management to politics, from
shutdowns to the pandemic. I focus here on questions targeted at assessing the
health of the federal workforce and the quality of management. Overall, feder-
al executives reported high levels of satisfaction with their work. They reported
some flexibility to innovate, and many reported an environment of trust and the
use of data and evidence in their agencies. Others reported problems with trust,
declining attention to facts and data, and little investment in future administra-
tive capacity. A large and quickly growing proportion of federal executives report-
ed significant problems in their workforces, putting in danger their ability to im-
plement core tasks. These workforce problems stem from resource problems and
lower levels of competence in all types of federal employees.

A mong the most important questions in the survey were those about the

health of the federal workforce. The responses we received are illuminat-
ing, at times reassuring and at others quite concerning. Federal executives
reported high levels of satisfaction with their work and their agencies as places to
lavoro, particularly during a pandemic. Tuttavia, they expressed increasing alarm
about the capacity of the workforce to carry out core agency missions.

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150 (3) Summer 2021David E. Lewis

The public sector workforce does not comprise a random sample of U.S. lavoro-
ers. They tend to be older and better educated than workers in the private sector.
They also tend to rate higher on what public administration scholars call “pub-
lic service motivation,” a character trait related to the desire to help people and
do good for others.24 To get selected for an executive position in the federal gov-
ernment means you have to be talented and find some meaning from doing pub-
lic work, since the pay becomes less competitive the higher you get in public ser-
vice.25 We asked federal executives whether they agreed or disagreed with the
statement “Considering everything, how satisfied are you with your job?” About
80 percent reported being satisfied or very satisfied in their jobs, E 71 per cento
said the same about their agency (“Considering everything, how satisfied are you
con [your agency]?").26

We probed a bit further, asking specifically about the current context and more
general characteristics of their work that might influence satisfaction. We asked
executives whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement “The federal gov-
ernment is a good employer during a crisis.”27 Three-quarters of respondents
agreed or strongly agreed with that statement. Respondents were more likely than
their private sector counterparts to report that promotions in their organization
were based upon a person’s ability (62 percent versus 53 per cento) and recommend
their agency as a good place to work (79 percent versus 76 per cento). They were just
as likely to report that their work environment “supports the development of new
and innovative ideas” (68 percent versus 66 per cento).28

These features of public sector work led more than half of our survey partici-
pants to report that they are able to recruit and retain the best employees. Fifty-
five percent agreed or strongly agreed with the statement “[My agency] is able to
recruit the best employees,” and 57 percent confirmed the statement “[My agen-
cy] is able to retain its best employees.”29 Whether one sees it as good news that
25–27 percent of federal managers cannot recruit or retain the best employees is a
matter of perspective (the remainder neither agreed nor disagreed). The portion
agreeing with these statements is about 10 percentage points higher than in 2014,
however.30 One explanation would relate to changes in federal personnel policy.
Another explanation is that the improvement is due to changes in economic con-
ditions. During periods of high unemployment and economic uncertainty, IL
government becomes a more attractive employer. It is easier to attract new work-
ers and experienced federal employees are less likely to leave because of concerns
about retirement income and fewer outside opportunities.

While most federal executives reported satisfaction in their work and agencies,
they also reported serious and worsening capacity problems related to the quality
and size of the federal workforce. To begin, we asked respondents whether they
agreed or disagreed with the statement “An inadequately skilled workforce is a sig-
nificant obstacle to [my agency] fulfilling its core mission.”31 As Figure 1 reveals,

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Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & SciencesIs the Failed Pandemic Response a Symptom of a Diseased Administrative State?

Figura 1
Federal Executive Perception of Decline in Agency Capacity

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Fonte: Survey on the Future of Government Service, 2020, https://sfgs.princeton.edu.

60 percent of 2020 respondents agreed or strongly agreed with this statement.
Only one-third reported that their workforce was adequate to fulfill its core mis-
sion. It is important to note that the question does not ask executives about com-
mon tasks across agencies like information processing, contract management, hu-
man resources, or legal work. It asks about core tasks, those central to the agency’s
mission. What are these core tasks? They range from providing national defense
to delivering the mail to ensuring nondiscrimination in housing to approving pat-
ent applications. Across the government, federal executives report problems in the
workforce that make fulfilling their core mission difficult.

This number is up from 39 percent in 2014, toward the end of the Obama ad-
ministration. This is a striking change in responses between the two surveys. In
2014, we remarked that it was a serious concern when close to 40 percent of man-
agers report a problem in their workforces. That number is now 60 per cento.

Legal scholars tend to imagine the administrative state as a set of rules and
guidance emanating from delegation of authority, but these formal actions have
no force without persons to bring them to life, to translate law into policy through
the hard work of interpretation and action. Agencies need people to animate law
by conducting inspections, filing charges, managing contracts, negotiating agree-

150 (3) Summer 2021David E. Lewis

menti, and writing reports. Laws assigning core tasks mean little if there is no ro-
bust administrative infrastructure to execute the law.

The evident decline in workforce skills between 2014 E 2020 could be due
to a number of factors. Primo, the quality of the people working in federal agencies
could be declining. Questo è, the people working in the agency could be, on average,
just of lower ability. Per esempio, agencies could be losing excellent experienced
professionals to retirement or work in the private sector. The people who replace
them may not be of the same quality. Secondo, the agency may simply have too few
people. It might be the case that agency personnel are very talented but there just
aren’t enough of them. Third, there may be enough workers, but they might not
have the right skills necessary to meet new challenges. Per esempio, agencies may
lack expertise to keep up with new developments in areas like information tech-
nology, artificial intelligence, data analytics, or contract management.

The survey includes questions that explore all three possibilities. In one set of
questions, we asked respondents to evaluate the competence of the people they
work with. Specifically, we asked, “Now thinking about people, apart from your-
self, who work in [your agency], how competent are the following?” Respondents
evaluated political appointees, senior civil servants, low- to mid-level civil servants,
and contractors on a scale from one–not at all competent–to five–extremely
competent. On scales of this type, we expect the evaluations to be anchored
around the middle–three–because we expect that few people are “not at all com-
petent” and “extremely competent” is a high bar.

The average 2020 risposta, during the Trump administration, is represent-
ed in Figure 2 as the black bar. I include responses to the same question in 2007,
during George W. Bush’s second term, as a comparison (we did not ask this ques-
tion in 2014). In the far-left column, we see how federal executives rate the Trump
administration’s political appointees. On a one-to-five scale, the average rating
È 3.19, significantly lower than the 3.57 that respondents rated Bush administra-
tion appointees in 2007.32 Respondents report that agency appointee leadership,
on average, is middling. Some of the qualitative comments in the survey bolster
Questo. One respondent wrote, “My concern in Department leadership is the lack
of attention given to the qualifications of an individual selected for a political ap-
pointee position. They have no apparent requirement to understand, document
and declare fidelity to agency mission.”

Respondents rate the competence of career professionals higher, with those
most senior rated as the most competent. The high rating for career professionals
might reflect both a higher level of substantive expertise and a respondent bias
in favor of agency specialists relative to appointee generalists. Infatti, appointee
attention to administration goals over agency recommendations can lead respon-
dents to confuse loyalty to the administration for a lack of competence. A number
of qualitative responses suggest frustration with appointees’ lack of commitment

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Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & SciencesIs the Failed Pandemic Response a Symptom of a Diseased Administrative State?

Figura 2
Federal Executive Perception of Agency Competence

David E. Lewis

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Fonte: Survey on the Future of Government Service, 2007, 2020, https://sfgs.princeton.edu;
and Paul A. Volcker, Elizabeth L. Colagiuri, Richard N. Haas, et al., The Changing Nature of Gov-
ernment Service (Princeton, N.J.: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs,
Princeton University, 2009).

to the agency’s mission. One writes, “Most of the political appointees come with
ideas and often have no regard for the mission of the organization.”

Perhaps more notable in Figure 2, Tuttavia, is the decline in the evaluation of all
categories of federal workers: political appointees, senior civil servants, and low-
to mid-level civil servants. Respondents rate the average competence of all class-
es of federal workers lower in 2020 than in 2007. (They rate contract employees
about as competent as they were in 2007.) The biggest drop in the perceived com-
petence of the workforce is in the appointee class, but all categories have declined.
Scholars and journalists have carefully documented the effects of the new ad-
ministration’s approach and policies on departures and retirements among ex-
perienced senior civil servants. The rate of departure among career members of
the Senior Executive Service was dramatically higher immediately after the 2016
election than after previous party change elections.33 Others departed because of

150 (3) Estate 2021

frustration after trying to stick it out. Some of those who remained reported low
morale and marginalization. One who remained wrote,

Before this administration, our agency had problems that make work less efficient,
but it had knowledgeable staff at all levels, people liked the agency and the leadership
worked hard because they believed in the mission. The new leadership has “trans-
formed” the organization (illegally in many ways), pushed highly competent people
out using RIFs (also illegal), hired inappropriately, and ruined trust between senior
leadership and staff.

At least in this agency, choices of agency leadership led to departures and the de-
cline in the competence of the workforce.

Long-standing difficulties recruiting young people into government service
compound the skills problem, as agencies cannot replace departing personnel
with promising new hires. Less than 8 percent of the federal workforce is under
the age of thirty, half the percentage that is over the age of sixty.34 Forty-five per-
cent of executives report difficulties in recruitment, many pointing to bureaucrat-
ic issues and long-standing problems with how long it takes to hire.35 One fed-
eral executive explained, "IL [hiring] system is entirely broken. Executives and
managers spend inordinate amounts of time trying to work around the rules of
the entrenched Personnel Bureaucracy [sic] to successfully recruit qualified appli-
cants. It is exhausting.” Others described the difficulty of recruiting young peo-
ple to work in government because of bipartisan disparagement of government
workers. One respondent is worth quoting at length:

But the previous administration (Obama) was not much better in terms of support-
ing the federal civil service. Both political parties take pleasure and benefit politically
from denigrating “Washington bureaucrats” as over paid [sic], out of touch, incom-
petent, politically biased, and worse. The country believes them. In the court of pub-
lic opinion no one of importance defends the value of the federal civil service (non
talking about military here). So to your questions of whether we can recruit the best
talent? Primo, we can’t hire anyone. Secondo, potential candidates are actively discour-
aged from seeking federal employment by the very people who lead two of the three
branches of the Federal government.

This helpful elaboration highlights two issues: a recruitment problem (“no one
wants to work here”) and a resource problem (“we can’t hire anyone”). One rea-
son for the observed decline in the skill of the workforce may be that people of
lower competence are replacing those departing government. Another may be
that new hiring is not keeping up with departures or agency demand.

A striking feature of the federal government over the last sixty years has been
the great mismatch between the expansion of its activities and administrative re-
sources.36 Figure 3 graphs the change in federal spending in inflation-adjusted dol-

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Figura 3
Growth in Federal Spending and Employment, 1960–2018

David E. Lewis

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Fonte: Federal spending data come from Offi ce of Management and Budget, Historical
Tables, Tavolo 1.1, Summary of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Defi cits: 1789–2025.
Employment data come from Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Employment Statistics:
Federal Government, including U.S. Postal Service, https://www.bls.gov/oes/home.htm.
Federal spending is an estimate from the historical table. Bureau of Labor Statistics employ-
ment data for 2018 are an average, excluding December.

lars and the number of federal employees. While spending has quintupled since
1960, the federal workforce in 2020 is not much bigger than it was at the end of the
Eisenhower administration. There are a number of reasons why federal employ-
ment has lagged behind spending. Primo, the productivity of labor has increased.
Simply put, fewer employees are necessary now to do the same amount of work.
Per esempio, the federal government needs fewer clerks and typists now than in
1960. Secondo, the increase in spending has largely been programmatic, Senso
dollars fl ow more or less directly to recipients (such as through Social Security or
grants to states) rather than to agency offi cials that use budgets and spend mon-
ey. Finalmente, the federal government increasingly implements programs through ar-
rangements with states and local governments or contracts with a web of nongov-
ernment actors. Regardless, the federal government is managing a signifi cantly

150 (3) Estate 2021

larger number of programs and dollars with about the same number of people. As
one respondent wrote, “The administration places new missions without increas-
ing your budget to meet the new demands. Agencies are forced to let civil service
personnel go to make room for contractors to support their communities.” This
places incredible strain on federal management, and the Government Account-
ability Office regularly highlights important skills gaps that reflect the growing
mismatch.37

We asked federal executives a number of questions about resources and man-
aging in the modern era. The survey borrowed from surveys of private sector ex-
ecutives and asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the state-
ment “We have enough employees where I work to do a quality job.” Only 45
percent of federal executives agreed or strongly agreed with this statement.38 By
contrasto, 58 percent of U.S. private sector executives agreed or strongly agreed
with that statement. One distinct feature of the public sector is that managers do
not always control decisions about how many people to hire and how to spend
money. Elected officials, rather than agency managers, control budgets and the
numbers of full-time employees. Trying to fulfill an agency’s core mission with
too few employees may be one reason why federal executives evaluate the skills of
their workforce as they do.

For a robust administrative state, managers need more than people; manag-
ers need the right equipment and the ability to train and develop their workforce.
We asked federal managers their level of agreement with the statement “I feel I
have the right tools and resources to do my job properly (equipment, software,
eccetera.).”39 Here there is no difference between the two sectors. Almost three-quar-
ters of public and private sector managers reported having the right equipment.
Inoltre, two-thirds of federal managers agreed that “[My agency] is able to
provide necessary training for high performance.”40

Collectively, these responses suggest that federal agencies have been unable
to hire and restock departing talent, and this appears to be contributing to a de-
cline in the perceived competence of the workforce. While most federal manag-
ers reported having access to necessary equipment, less than half reported having
enough employees to do a quality job.

F or some observers, the nation’s poor pandemic response had less to do with

a lack of capacity in the workforce. Piuttosto, the nation’s poor pandemic re-
sponse boils down to bad management characterized by a lack of trust be-
tween the administration and civil servants and an unwillingness to rely on data
and science in decision-making. Is that true across the government? Most re-
spondents reported a climate of trust within their agencies and that their agencies
make decisions based on data. Respondents overall had significantly lower trust
in the White House, Tuttavia.

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Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & SciencesIs the Failed Pandemic Response a Symptom of a Diseased Administrative State?

To begin, we asked federal executives their level of agreement with the state-
ment “[My agency] is an effectively managed, well-run organization.”41 As Fig-
ure 4 reveals, among respondents, 56 percent agreed or strongly agreed with that
statement, compared with 60 percent in the private sector. It is a little hard to
make sense of this topline number since respondents are themselves managers,
key figures in the management team of their agency. It was a little like asking fed-
eral executives whether they were doing a good job. Appointees generally hold
more responsibility and are more sanguine about how well agencies are managed.
If we limit responses to career professionals, the percentage of executives agree-
ing that their agency is well run is closer to 55 per cento.

Where federal executives have concerns about management, this often man-
ifests itself in trust, particularly in the public sector. New political leaders have
doubts about the intentions and competence of the organization’s rank-and-file
and vice versa. 42 Infatti, while in office, President Trump referred to civil servants
as the “deep state” and part of the swamp that needs draining.43 Civil servants used
formal dissent channels and other means (such as inspectors general and whistle-
blower offices) to express their concerns about policy decisions and purported ille-
gal activities.44 A number of former officials spoke out against the Trump admin-
istration and its actions.45 To see whether this reported mutual distrust had seeped
down into agencies, we asked executives whether they agreed or disagreed with
the statement “There is a climate of trust in my agency.” Fifty-six percent agreed or
strongly agreed that there was a climate of trust.46 This means that 44 percent did
not agree with that statement. To put these numbers in perspective, the govern-
ment percentage is slightly lower than responses from the private sector (57 per-
cent agree or strongly agree). In the private sector, Tuttavia, there is arguably an
understanding that firms are about profits rather than the public interest.

These differences in trust may help explain differences in management ap-
proaches related to long-term planning. We asked respondents whether they
agreed or disagreed with the statement “My agency is investing now to enable our
future success.”47 Fifty-six percent of federal executives agreed or strongly agreed,
compared with 69 percent in the private sector. There are a number of possible ex-
planations for this difference between the sectors. In the public sector, the break-
down in the federal budget process has meant that agencies are working from
short-term stopgap funding to short-term stopgap funding. This makes it hard
to plan. Elected officials, particularly during election years, also have a hard time
planning for four-to-six years out, when they may no longer be in office. In an era
of insecure majorities, the most important thing is the next election, not investing
in agency capacity to prevent problems that are hard for the public to see or may
never emerge.48 The day-to-day work of good management–catching people do-
ing the right thing, planning ahead for different contingencies, building robust
workforces and processes–is rarely rewarded.

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150 (3) Summer 2021David E. Lewis

Is the Failed Pandemic Response a Symptom of a Diseased Administrative State?

Figura 4
Federal versus Private Sector Management: Quality, Trust, Planning, Data

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Fonte: The fi rm Mercer Sirota provided the private sector benchmarks to the Partnership for
Public Service. Survey on the Future of Government Service, 2020, https://sfgs.princeton.edu.

Among respondents, 59 percent agreed or strongly agreed with the statement
that their agency “makes decisions based on data.”49 When private sector execu-
tives were asked the same question about their companies, 72 percent agreed or
strongly agreed that their company makes decisions based upon data. Public sec-
tor executives report signifi cantly lower use of data in decision-making than their
private sector counterparts. We do not have a comparable survey question from
an earlier period to see whether the Trump administration relied less on data than
its predecessors. There is some anecdotal evidence in the survey to this effect,
Tuttavia. Per esempio, one respondent reported, “Our political leadership do not
rely on facts or data, but on opinions. This is a dramatic change from anything I’ve
experienced in my 30+ year career.”

Given the context of the pandemic, we also included a few questions about
trust and leadership during the crisis. When we asked about the statement “I trust
the senior leadership in [my agency] to respond well in a crisis," 70 percent agreed
or strongly agreed. When we asked about their level of agreement with the state-
ment “I trust the White House to respond well in a crisis,” however, only 19 per-

Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Scienze

cent agreed. Fully 53 percent strongly disagreed with that statement. While federal
executives have comparable levels of trust and confidence in their organizational
leadership, few have confidence in the White House.50

A s summer turned to fall, President Trump’s handling of the COVID pan-

demic loomed over the 2020 election. The president uneasily defended
his leadership role, while his contraction of the virus communicated its
own truth about the crisis. Would another president have thwarted the pandem-
ic? Could lives have been saved? The answer to these questions depends on what
one believes about the distinctiveness of President Trump and his team and the
robustness of the public health bureaucracy. The pandemic revealed breaches in
the wall public health agencies were supposed to build around an emergent pan-
demico. Could any president have plugged them all?

As with other aspects of the Trump presidency, it is difficult to disentangle
the actions of the bureaucracy from the man himself. The callous and ultimate-
ly ineffective response to Hurricane Maria and the hurried and haphazard efforts
to increase immigration enforcement suggest both shortcomings in presidential
leadership and long-standing capacity problems. Properly prepared, President
Trump might have remedied these capacity problems, but he was not the first
to neglect the effective management of the executive.51 The Federal Emergency
Management Agency’s (FEMA) response to Hurricane Katrina under George W.
Bush was woefully inadequate.52 The Department of the Interior had serious and
long-standing problems in the Minerals Management Service prior to the Deep-
water Horizon Gulf oil spill under President Obama.53

The responses of federal executives illuminate both concerns about the cur-
rent administration and long-standing problems. On the one hand, they reported
satisfaction in their work and its importance. D'altra parte, they reported
frustration with choices by elected officials that make it difficult for them to ful-
fill their core mission. One respondent concluded, “I was really confused by this
survey. [sic] what are you trying to learn? Here is what I want you to consider:
the federal government is broken and after years of being abused, dismissed, un-
derappreciated and treated like shit many talented people are going to leave. God
help us.” While there was a keen sense of worry and frustration targeted at the
then-current White House, federal executives’ frustration extended to earlier
Democratic and Republican administrations.

Years of neglect have culminated in vulnerabilities manifesting themselves in
increasingly regular and severe administrative failures. These failures put all of us
at risk.

While the problems are serious, there are a few steps we can take that will go a
long way toward ensuring a healthier administrative state. As with the pandemic,
we can make it easier to diagnose disease and take steps to mitigate the growing

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150 (3) Summer 2021David E. Lewis

risks. One noteworthy feature of our survey was that we conducted it rather than
the federal government. This should give us pause. Why do academics and non-
profits have to collect data on the fundamental health of the administrative state?
Shouldn’t the federal government itself collect these data? Unfortunately, while
the federal government collects voluminous data of various types, it often collects
the wrong kind of data and lacks the analytic capacity to analyze the data it does
collect. Per esempio, the primary data the federal government collects to assess
the health of the administrative state, the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey
(FEVS), have limited value for modern human resources management, so much so
that agencies are opting out: last year, the Department of Veterans Affairs (Quale
employs 18.5 percent of the civilian federal workforce) decided to no longer par-
ticipate.54 The Partnership for Public Service, a Washington, D.C., nonprofit, con-
ducts the primary analysis of the FEVS because the Office of Personnel Manage-
ment does not have the capacity to do that work for itself. Providing improved
data and analytic capacity inside the federal government would help increase the
use of data and evidence in agency decision-making and incentivize elected offi-
cials to be attentive to the health of the bureaucracy.

Another way to ensure greater attention to the long-term health of the depart-
ments and agencies of government is to reduce the number of political appoin-
tees. There are more than 1,300 presidentially appointed executives that run fed-
eral agencies and programs. Many positions are vacant for long periods, particu-
larly at the beginning and end of an administration. President Trump advanced
nominees for only 39 percent of these positions during his first year. President
Obama found candidates for 54 percent in his first year. Given the rancorous Sen-
ate confirmation process, this means that more than one-half of all executive po-
sitions were vacant for the first year of each president’s term. When the president
does fill these positions, executives generally serve for short stints.55 Their focus
naturally is on short-term political objectives rather than long-term agency capac-
ità. This is one reason for the gap in answers between public and private sector ex-
ecutives in the degree of investment in the future. Short-timers, whether the pres-
idential appointees or the temporary careerist fill-ins, cannot do long-term plan-
ning. Straightforward efforts to reduce the number of appointed positions would
increase executive tenure and improve management.56

In addition to improved data to diagnose problems and managerial changes
that would make it easier to implement solutions, direct legislative changes can
improve the federal personnel system. There is bipartisan agreement that the
federal personnel system is broken. The civil service system was created to pre-
vent abuse rather than advance the purposes of the federal government, and both
Republicans and Democrats agree that there are problems with workforce recruit-
ment and development, as well as recourse for dealing with poor performers. UN
number of reasonable proposals exist for comprehensive civil service reform that

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Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & SciencesIs the Failed Pandemic Response a Symptom of a Diseased Administrative State?

strike a middle ground.57 Such reforms would go a long way toward building back
up what has been damaged.

The ongoing political discussion about pandemic response has shed light on
the overall health of the agencies, people, and processes that make up the execu-
tive part of the federal government. Can the administrative state deliver the ser-
vices, protections, and help that voters ask for? Not without careful monitoring
and attention, ideally in advance of a worldwide pandemic.

about the author

David E. Lewis is the Rebecca Webb Wilson University Distinguished Profes-
sor and Professor of Law (by courtesy) at Vanderbilt University. He is the author
of Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design (2003) and The Politics of Presidential Appoint-
menti: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance (2008).

endnotes

1 Jason Douglas, “As Coronavirus Surges in U.S., Some Countries Have Just about Halted
It,” The Wall Street Journal, Luglio 6, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-coronavirus
-surges-in-u-s-some-countries-have-just-about-halted-it-11594037814.

2 Sarah Kliff, Adam Satariano, Jessica Silver-Greenberg, and Nicholas Kulish, “There Aren’t
Enough Ventilators to Cope with the Coronavirus," Il New York Times, Marzo 18, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/18/business/coronavirus-ventilator-shortage.
html.

3 See Andrew Jacobs, Matt Richtel, and Mike Baker, “‘At War with No Ammo’: Doctors Say
Shortage of Protective Gear is Dire," Il New York Times, Marzo 19, 2020, https://www
.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/health/coronavirus-masks-shortage.html; and Andrew Ja-
cobs, “Grave Shortages of Protective Gear Flare Again as Covid Cases Surge,” The New York
Times, Luglio 8, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/health/coronavirus-masks
-ppe-doc.html.

4 Katherine J. Wu, “‘It’s Like Groundhog Day’: Coronavirus Testing Labs Again Lack Key
Supplies," Il New York Times, Luglio 23, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/23/
health/coronavirus-testing-supply-shortage.html.

5 Eric Lipton, Abby Goodnough, Michael D. Shear, et al., “The CDC Waited ‘Its Entire
Existence for This Moment.’ What Went Wrong?" Il New York Times, Giugno 3, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/03/us/cdc-coronavirus.html.

6 Michael D. Shear, Noah Weiland, Eric Lipton, et al., “Push to Pass Off Response to Virus

Deepened a Crisis," Il New York Times, Luglio 19, 2020.

7 Francis Fukuyama threads a fine line, arguing that the United States has “vast potential
state capacity,” thus implying a leadership problem. Francis Fukuyama, “The Pan-

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150 (3) Summer 2021David E. Lewis

demic and Political Order: It Takes a State,” Foreign Affairs 99 (4) (2020), https://www
.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2020-06-09/pandemic-and-political-order.

8 Dan Goldberg, “‘It’s Going to Disappear’: Trump’s Changing Tone on Coronavirus,"
Politico, Marzo 17, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/17/how-trump-shifted
-his-tone-on-coronavirus-134246.

9 John Fritze and David Jackson, “Trump Calls to ‘Liberate’ States Where Protesters Have
Demanded Easing Coronavirus Lockdowns,” USA Today, April 17, 2020, https://www
.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/04/17/coronavirus-trump-calls-liberate
-virginia-michigan-minnesota/5152120002/.

10 For details of internal critics of the CDC, see Shear et al., “Push to Pass Off Response to

Virus Deepened a Crisis.”

11 Lipton et al., “The CDC Waited ‘Its Entire Existence for This Moment.’ What Went

Wrong?"

12 Caroline Chen, Marshall Allen, and Lexi Churchill, “Internal Emails Show How Chaos at
the CDC Slowed the Early Response to Coronavirus,” ProPublica, Marzo 26, 2020, https://
www.propublica.org/article/internal-emails-show-how-chaos-at-the-cdc-slowed
-the-early-response-to-coronavirus.

13 Per esempio, in a February 2017 appearance before the Conservative Political Action
Conferenza, White House Advisor Stephen K. Bannon described the deconstruction of
the administrative state as one of the administration’s three priority goals. See Jon Mi-
chaels, “How Trump is Dismantling a Pillar of the American State,” The Guardian, No-
vember 7, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/07/donald
-trump-dismantling-american-administrative-state; and David French, “Trump Wants
to Deconstruct the Regulatory State? Good. Here’s How You Start,” National Review,
Febbraio 24, 2017, https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/02/administrative-state
-deconstruction-trump-steve-bannon-cpac/.

14 Vedere, Per esempio, John J. Dilulio, Bring Back the Bureaucrats (West Conshohocken, Pa.:
Templeton Press, 2014); Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay (New York:
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2014); National Commission on the Public Service, Leader-
ship for America: Rebuilding the Public Service (Washington, D.C.: Lexington Books, 1989);
National Commission on the Public Service, Urgent Business for America: Revitalizing the
Federal Government for the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press,
2003); and Paul R. Verkuil, Valuing Bureaucracy: The Case for Professional Government (Nuovo
York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

15 See Christopher Hood, “A Public Management for All Seasons?” Public Administration
69 (1) (1991): 3–19; David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the
Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector (New York: Plume, 1992); and Al Gore,
From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government that Works Better and Costs Less (Washington,
D.C.: NOI. Government Printing Office, 1993).

16 David E. Lewis, “Deconstructing the Administrative State,” Journal of Politics 81 (3) (2019):

767–789.

17 Michael Lewis, The Fifth Risk (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2018).
18 See Partnership for Public Service, The Federal Government: A Nobel Profession (Washington,
D.C.: Partnership for Public Service, 2002), https://ourpublicservice.org/wp-content/
uploads/2002/12/193690852dfe6b696a3d8216af41ee89-1414079066.pdf.

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19 We surveyed all political appointees, all career members of the Senior Executive Service,
all career members of the Senior Foreign Service in Washington, and comparable man-
agers in agencies without members of the Senior Executive Service or Senior Foreign
Service. We also surveyed top GS14 and GS15 managers running programs and agencies,
identified by titles. We limited our sample to those with email addresses in the Federal
Yellow Book. At the time of writing (the survey was still in the field), we had 952 responses,
or about 5.5 percent of the sample. We report results weighted by appointment type,
location, and agency.

20 All results reported here are weighted top line results from the survey. N=992. Margin of
error (MoE) is +/−3.3 for the full sample and +/−4.53 to 5.07 for half samples (depending
upon some variation in sample size). For full details of the methods, see Government
Service Survey, sfgs.princeton.edu.

21 The firm Mercer Sirota provided the private sector benchmarks to the Partnership for
Public Service. Mercer Sirota conducts regular surveys of firms, including scores of
questions, on a regular basis.

22 Given the complexity of reaching federal executives working at home during the pan-
demico, we left the survey in the field for several months. Federal executives working at
home are harder to reach with paper letters and phone calls and so we had to rely on
emails and voice mail messages to reach respondents. For details of the initial release,
see Partnership for Public Service, “Partnership for Public Service Releases Preliminary
Federal Executive Survey Data, Announces New Initiative to Renew the Federal Gov-
ernment,” October 14, 2020, https://ourpublicservice.org/publications/partnership
-for-public-service-releases-preliminary-federal-executive-survey-data-announces
-new-initiative-to-renew-the-federal-government/.

23 “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” “My work
portfolio changed as a result of the pandemic.” Strongly disagree (12), Disagree (22),
Neither agree nor disagree (7), Agree (32), Strongly agree (27); MoE +/− 4.53 A 5.07.
“[My agency] has a sense of urgency for getting things done.” Strongly disagree (4),
Disagree (8), Neither agree nor disagree (8), Agree (41), Strongly agree (38); MoE
+/−3.33. “The public services [my agency] provides suffered as a result of the pandem-
ic.” Strongly disagree (17), Disagree (29), Neither agree nor disagree (11), Agree (24),
Strongly agree (18); MoE +/−4.53 to 5.07. “In [my agency] we had the IT tools necessary
to telework effectively during the pandemic.” Strongly disagree (4), Disagree (9), Nei-
ther agree nor disagree (7), Agree (40), Strongly agree (40); MoE +/− 4.53 A 5.07.

24 James L. Perry and Lois R. Wise, “The Motivational Bases of Public Service,” Public Ad-

ministration Review 50 (3) (1990): 367–373.

25 Most developed democracies have pay compression in their public sector workforces,
paying a bit higher in wages and benefits at the low end of the pay scale relative to the
private sector and a bit lower in wages and benefits at the higher end of the pay scale. For
research on wage compression in the public sector, Vedere, Per esempio, George J. Borjas,
“The Wage Structure and Sorting of Workers in the Public Sector,” NBER Working Pa-
per 9313 (Cambridge, Massa.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2002); and Dome-
nico Depalo, Raffaela Giordano, and Evangelia Papapetrou, “Public-Private Wage Dif-
ferentials in Euro-Area Countries: Evidence from Quantile Decomposition Analysis,"
Empirical Economics 49 (3) (2015): 985–1015.

26 “Considering everything, how satisfied are you with your job?” Very dissatisfied (3), Dis-
satisfied (6), Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied (10), Satisfied (43), Very satisfied (37);

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150 (3) Summer 2021David E. Lewis

MoE +/−3.33. “Considering everything, how satisfied are you with [your agency]?"
Very dissatisfied (4), Dissatisfied (11), Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied (14), Satisfied
(43), Very satisfied (28); MoE +/−3.33.

27 “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” “The feder-
al government is a good employer during a crisis.” Strongly disagree (2), Disagree (5),
Neither agree nor disagree (18), Agree (48), Strongly agree (27); MoE +/− 4.53 A 5.07.
28 “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” “Promotions
In [my agency/my company] are based on a person’s ability.” Strongly disagree (6),
Disagree (12), Neither agree nor disagree (19), Agree (43), Strongly agree (19), Don’t
know (1); MoE +/−3.33 (for government responses). “I recommend [my agency/my
company] as a good place to work.” Strongly disagree (3), Disagree (6), Neither agree
nor disagree (12), Agree (42), Strongly agree (37); MoE +/− 4.53 A 5.07 (for government
responses). “The work environment at [my agency] supports the development of new
and innovative ideas.” Strongly disagree (6), Disagree (10), Neither agree nor disagree
(15), Agree (43), Strongly agree (25); MoE +/−4.53 to 5.07 (for government responses).
29 “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” “[My agen-
cy] is able to recruit the best employees.” Strongly disagree (7), Disagree (20), Neither
agree nor disagree (19), Agree (38), Strongly agree (17), Don’t know (*); MoE +/−4.53 to
5.07. “My agency is able to retain its best employees.” Strongly disagree (5), Disagree
(18), Neither agree nor disagree (19), Agree (44), Strongly agree (13), Don’t know (1);
MoE +/− 3.33.

30 IL 2014 results for “[My agency] is able to retain its best employees” are Strongly dis-
agree (5), Disagree (28), Neither agree nor disagree (22), Agree (38), Strongly agree (7);
MoE +/− 1.8.

31 “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” “An inad-
equately skilled workforce is a significant obstacle to [my agency] fulfilling its core
mission.” From 2020: Strongly disagree (12), Disagree (21), Neither agree nor dis-
agree (6), Agree (21), Strongly agree (39), Don’t know (*); MoE +/−4.53 to 5.07. From
2014: Strongly disagree (13), Disagree (31), Neither agree nor disagree (17), Agree (25),
Strongly agree (14); MoE +/−2.6.

32 The standard error of the ratings varies from 0.02 A 0.04.
33 Joe Davidson, “Top Civil Servants Leaving Trump Administration at a Quick Clip,” The
Washington Post, settembre 9, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/09
/10/top-civil-servants-leaving-trump-administration-quick-clip/; and Kathleen Doherty,
David E. Lewis, and Scott Limbocker, “Executive Control and Turnover in the Senior
Executive Service,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 29 (2) (2019): 159–174.
34 Courtney Buble, “The Aging Federal Workforce Needs ‘New Blood,’ Experts Say,” Govern-
ment Executive, agosto 30, 2019, https://www.govexec.com/workforce/2019/08/aging
-federal-workforce-needs-new-blood-experts-say/159585/.

35 “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” “[My agency]
often loses good candidates to other positions because of the time it takes to hire.”
Strongly disagree (1), Disagree (11), Neither agree nor disagree (13), Agree (33), Strong-
ly agree (40), Don’t know (2); MoE +/−4.53 to 5.07. Eighty-two percent of those who
agreed with the statement “An inadequately skilled workforce is a significant obstacle
A [my agency] fulfilling its core mission” identified the long hiring process as a con-
tributor to their difficulty maintaining a skilled workforce. “To what extent do the fol-

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Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & SciencesIs the Failed Pandemic Response a Symptom of a Diseased Administrative State?

lowing factors contribute to the difficulty [your agency] has in maintaining a skilled
workforce? Hiring process takes too long.” Not at all (2), Little (4), Some (11), A good
bit (23), A great deal (59), Don’t know (1).

36 Diulio, Bring Back the Bureaucrats.
37 NOI. Government Accountability Office, “Substantial Efforts Needed to Achieve Greater
Progress in High-Risk Areas,” March 2019, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/697245
.pdf.

38 “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” “We have
enough employees where I work to do a quality job.” Strongly disagree (13), Disagree
(30), Neither agree nor disagree (12), Agree (31), Strongly agree (14); MoE +/− 4.53 A
5.07.

39 “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” “I feel I have the
right tools and resources to do my job properly (equipment, software, eccetera.).” Strongly
disagree (4), Disagree (14), Neither agree nor disagree (10), Agree (46), Strongly agree
(27); MoE +/−3.33.

40 “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” “[My agency]
is able to provide necessary training for high performance.” Strongly disagree (4), Dis-
agree (13), Neither agree nor disagree (14), Agree (44), Strongly agree (23); MoE +/− 3.33.
41 “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” “[My agency/
Company] is an effectively managed, well-run organization.” Strongly disagree (9),
Disagree, (15) Neither agree nor disagree (20), Agree (37), Strongly agree (19); MoE
+/−3.33.

42 William G. Resh, Rethinking the Administrative Presidency: Trust, Intellectual Capital, and Appointee-
Careerist Relations in the George W. Bush Administration (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press, 2015).

43 Evan Osnos, “Trump vs. the ‘Deep State’: How the Administration’s Loyalists Are Qui-
etly Reshaping American Governance,” The New Yorker, May 21, 2018, https://www
.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/05/21/trump-vs-the-deep-state.

44 Juliet Eilperin, Lisa Rein, and Marc Fisher, “Resistance from Within: Federal Workers Push
Back against Trump,” The Washington Post, Gennaio 31, 2017, https://www.washington
post.com/politics/resistance-from-within-federal-workers-push-back-against-trump/
2017/01/31/c65b110e-e7cb-11e6-b82f-687d6e6a3e7c_story.html.

45 Kimberly Dozier, “As Election Day Nears, More of Trump’s Former Officials Are Speak-
ing Out against Him,” Time magazine, settembre 24, 2020, https://time.com/5892948/
trump-former-officials-speak-out/.

46 To put this in perspective, the percentage is slightly but not overwhelmingly higher in
the private sector (57 per cento). “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the fol-
lowing statements?” “There is a climate of trust in my agency/company.” Strongly
disagree (10), Disagree (19), Neither agree nor disagree (15), Agree (37), Strongly agree
(19); MoE +/−3.33 (government responses only).

47 “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” “[My agency/
Company] is investing now to enable our future success.” Strongly disagree (7), Dis-
agree (16), Neither agree nor disagree (19), Agree (34), Strongly agree (22); MoE +/− 3.33
(government responses only).

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48 Frances E. Lee, Insecure Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign (Chicago: Università

della Chicago Press, 2016).

49 “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” “[My agency/
work group] makes decisions based on data.” Strongly disagree (7), Disagree (14),
Neither agree nor disagree (18), Agree (37), Strongly agree (22), Don’t know (2); MoE
+/−3.33 (government responses only).

50 “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” “I trust the
senior leadership in [my agency] to respond well in a crisis.” Strongly disagree (7), Dis-
agree (13), Neither agree nor disagree (9), Agree (35), Strongly agree (35), Don’t know
(*); MoE +/−4.53 to 5.07. “I trust the White House to respond well in a crisis.” Strongly
disagree (53), Disagree (17), Neither agree nor disagree (9), Agree (10), Strongly agree
(9), Don’t know (1); MoE +/−4.53 to 5.07.

51 Paul C. Light, “A Cascade of Failures: Why Government Fails, and How to Stop It”
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Light_Cascade-of-Failures_Why-Govt-Fails.pdf.

52 David E. Lewis, The Politics of Presidential Appointments (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer-

sity Press, 2008).

53 Chris Good, “Head of Minerals Management Service Resigns,” The Atlantic, May 27, 2010,
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/05/head-of-minerals-management
-service-resigns/57344/.

54 Nicole Ogrysko, “VA Drops the FEVS in Favor of Its Own Employee Engagement Survey,"
Federal News Network, Giugno 28, 2018, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/all-news/2018/06
/va-drops-the-fevs-in-favor-of-its-own-employee-engagement-survey/.

55 Matthew Dull and Patrick S. Roberts, “Continuity, Competence, and the Succession of
Senate-Confirmed Agency Appointees, 1989–2009,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 39 (3)
(2009): 432–453; and Anne Joseph O’Connell, “Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top
Agency Positions,” University of Southern California Law Review 82 (5) (2009): 913–1000.
56 David E. Lewis, “How to Solve the Vacancies Problem That Looms over Federal Govern-
ment,” The Hill, Giugno 4, 2020, https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/501101-how-to
-solve-the-vacancies-problem-that-looms-over-federal-government.

57 Vedere, Per esempio, this set of proposals by the Volcker Alliance and the Partnership for Public
Service, “Renewing America’s Civil Service” (New York: Volcker Alliance and the Part-
nership for Public Service, 2017), https://www.volckeralliance.org/sites/default/files/
Renewing-Americas-Civil-Service.pdf; and Partnership for Public Service, A New Civil Ser-
vice Framework (New York: Partnership for Public Service, 2018), https://ourpublicservice
.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Building_the_Enterprise__A_New_Civil_Service
_Framework-2014.04.01.pdf.