introduzione
James S. Fishkin & Jane Mansbridge
Democracy is under siege. Approval ratings for
democratic institutions in most countries around the
world are at near-record lows. The number of rec-
ognized democratic countries in the world is no lon-
ger expanding after the so-called Third Wave of dem-
ocratic transitions.1 Indeed, there is something of a
“democratic recession.”2 Further, some apparently
democratic countries with competitive elections are
undermining elements of liberal democracy: the rights
and liberties that ensure freedom of thought and ex-
pression, protection of the rule of law, and all the pro-
tections for the substructure of civil society that may
be as important for making democracy work as the
electoral process itself.3 The model of party compe-
tition-based democracy–the principal model of de-
mocracy in the modern era–seems under threat.
That model also has competition. What might be
called “meritocratic authoritarianism,” a model in
which regimes with flawed democratic processes nev-
ertheless provide good governance, is attracting at-
tention and some support. Singapore is the only suc-
cessful extant example, although some suggest China
as another nation moving in this direction. Singapore
is not a Western-style party- and competition-based
democracy, but it is well-known for its competent civil
servants schooled in making decisions on a cost-ben-
efit basis to solve public problems, with the goals set
by elite consultation with input from elections rath-
er than by party competition.
© 2017 by James S. Fishkin & Jane Mansbridge
doi:10.1162/DAED_ x_00442
JAMES S. FISHKIN, a Fellow of the
American Academy since 2014, È
Director of the Center for Delib-
erative Democracy, the Janet M.
Peck Chair in International Com-
munication, Professor of Commu-
nication, and Professor of Political
Scienza (by courtesy) at Stanford
Università.
JANE MANSBRIDGE, a Fellow of
the American Academy since 1994,
is the Charles F. Adams Professor
of Political Leadership and Dem-
ocratic Values at the Harvard Ken-
nedy School.
(*See endnotes for complete contributor
biographies.)
6
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Public discontent makes further difficul-
ties for the competitive model. Democra-
cies around the world struggle with the ap-
parent gulf between political elites who are
widely distrusted and mobilized citizens
who fuel populism with the energy of an-
gry voices. Disillusioned citizens turning
against elites have produced unexpected
election results, including the Brexit deci-
sion and the 2016 NOI. presidential election.
The competitive elections and referenda
of most current democracies depend on
mobilizing millions of voters within a con-
text of advertising, social media, and efforts
to manipulate as well as inform public opin-
ion. Competing teams want to win and, In
most cases, are interested in informing vot-
ers only when it is to their advantage. IL
rationale for competitive democracy, most
influentially developed by the late econo-
mist Joseph Schumpeter, held that the same
techniques of advertising used in the com-
mercial sphere to get people to buy prod-
ucts can be expected in the political sphere.
On this view, we should not expect a “gen-
uine” public will, but rather “a manufac-
tured will” that is just a by-product of po-
litical competition.4
Yet the ideal of democracy as the rule of
“the people” is deeply undermined when
the will of the people is in large part manu-
factured. The legitimacy of democracy de-
pends on some real link between the public
will and the public policies and office-hold-
ers who are selected. Although some have
criticized this “folk theory of democracy”
as empirically naive, its very status as a folk
theory reflects how widespread this nor-
mative expectation is.5 To the extent that
leaders manufacture the public will, IL
normative causal arrow goes in the wrong
direction. If current democracies cannot
produce meaningful processes of public
will formation, the legitimacy claims of
meritocratic autocracies or even more
fully autocratic systems become compar-
atively stronger.6
Over the last two decades, another ap-
proach to democracy has become increas-
ingly prominent. Based on greater deliber-
ation among the public and its represen-
tatives, deliberative democracy has the
potential, at least in theory, to respond
to today’s current challenges. If the many
versions of a more deliberative democracy
live up to their aspirations, they could help
revive democratic legitimacy, provide for
more authentic public will formation, pro-
vide a middle ground between widely mis-
trusted elites and the angry voices of pop-
ulism, and help fulfill some of our common
normative expectations about democracy.
Can this potential be realized? In what
ways and to what extent? Deliberative de-
mocracy has created a rich literature in both
theory and practice. This issue of Dædalus
assesses both its prospects and limits. Noi
include advocates as well as critics. As de-
liberative democrats, our aim is to stimu-
late public deliberation about deliberative
democracy, weighing arguments for and
against its application in different contexts
and for different purposes.
How can deliberative democracy, if it
were to work as envisaged by its supporters,
respond to the challenges just sketched?
Primo, if the more-deliberative institutions
that many advocate can be applied to real
decisions in actual ongoing democracies,
arguably they could have a positive effect on
legitimacy and lead to better governance.
They could make a better connection be-
tween the public’s real concerns and how
they are governed. Secondo, these institu-
tions could help fill the gap between dis-
trusted elites and angry populists. Elites
are distrusted in part because they seem
and often are unresponsive to the public’s
concerns, hopes, and values. Forse, IL
suspicion arises, the elites are really out
for themselves. D'altra parte, pop-
ulism stirs up angry, mostly nondelibera-
tive voices that can be mobilized in plebes-
citary campaigns, whether for Brexit or for
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7
146 (3) Summer 2017James S. Fishkin & Jane Mansbridge
elected office. In their contributions to this
issue, both Claus Offe and Hélène Lande-
more explore the crisis of legitimacy in
representative government, including the
clash between status quo–oriented elites
and populism. Deliberative democratic
methods open up the prospect of prescrip-
tions that are both representative of the
entire population and based on sober, evi-
dence-based analysis of the merits of com-
peting arguments. Popular deliberative in-
stitutions are grounded in the public’s val-
ues and concerns, so the voice they magnify
is not the voice of the elites. But that voice
is usually also, after deliberation, more ev-
idence-based and reflective of the merits of
the major policy arguments. Hence these
institutions fill an important gap.
How might popular deliberative democ-
racy, if it were to work as envisaged by its
supporters, fulfill normative expectations
of democracy, thought to be unrealistic
by critics of the “folk theory”? The issue
turns on the empirical possibility that the
public can actually deliberate. Can the peo-
ple weigh the trade-offs? Can they assess
competing arguments? Can they connect
their deliberations with their voting pref-
erences or other expressions of preference
about what should be done? Is the problem
that the people are not competent, or that
they are not in the right institutional con-
text to be effectively motivated to partici-
pate? These are empirical questions, E
the controversies about them are part of
our dialogue.
This issue includes varying definitions,
approcci, and contexts. The root notion
is that deliberation requires “weighing”
competing arguments for policies or candi-
dates in a context of mutually civil and di-
verse discussion in which people can decide
on the merits of arguments with good in-
formation. Is such a thing possible in an era
of fake news, social media, and public dis-
cussions largely among the like-minded?
These are some of the challenges facing
those who might try to make deliberative
democracy practical.
The earliest work on deliberative democ-
racy began by investigating legislatures.7 In
this issue, Cass Sunstein, in contrast, looks
at deliberation among policy-makers with-
in the executive branch. Bernard Manin
looks outside government toward debates
and public forums that can improve the de-
liberative quality of campaigns and discus-
sions among the public at large.
Much of the energy in deliberative de-
mocracy efforts has focused on statisti-
cal microcosms or mini-publics, in which
citizens, usually recruited by random sam-
pling, deliberate in organized settings. In
some settings, relatively small groups of fif-
teen or so deliberate online with an elect-
ed representative.8 In other settings, IL
groups can be given access to balanced
information and briefing materials that
make the best case for and against various
options. They can also be given access to
competing experts who answer their ques-
tions from different points of view. Then,
at the end of the deliberations in these or-
ganized settings, there is some way of har-
vesting their considered judgments. Sever-
al of the essays discuss Deliberative Polling,
which brings together a random sample of
citizens for a weekend of deliberation and
gathers data, as in an opinion poll, from
the random samples both upon recruit-
ment and then again at the end of the de-
liberations. The method also permits qual-
itative data by recording the discussions,
both in moderated small groups and in ple-
nary sessions where questions generated in
the small groups are directed at experts rep-
resenting different points of view. Other
mini-publics, such as “citizens’ juries”
and “consensus conferences,” are usually
smaller (a couple of dozen instead of two or
three hundred people) and arrive at some-
thing like an agreed-upon statement or ver-
dict as a recommendation to the public or
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Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & SciencesIntroduction
to authorized policy-makers. Some ran-
domly selected mini-publics even make
binding decisions.9
The basic rationale for the mini-public
approach is that if the random sample that
is gathered to deliberate is representative
of the population, and if it deliberates un-
der good conditions, then its considered
judgments after deliberation should rep-
resent what the larger population would
think if somehow those citizens could en-
gage in similarly good conditions for con-
sidering the issue. A great deal depends on
the mini-public actually being representa-
tive and on the account of good conditions
to which it is exposed.
Whenever an application of delibera-
tive democracy depends on a randomly se-
lected mini-public, that application raises
the issue of degree of empowerment. Can
or should such mini-publics supplant de-
mocracy by competitive elections? No con-
tributor to this issue makes that argument.
But in several cases, duly appointed admin-
istrators have committed in advance to im-
plementing the recommendations of such a
mini-public and, in some cases, those rec-
ommendations are binding. How much can
randomly selected groups be relied upon for
authoritative public decisions and in what
ways? Cristina Lafont argues against re-
lying solely on such groups for decisions,
but opens the door to discussions of a pos-
sible albeit limited role for them. She use-
fully poses the problem from the perspec-
tive of the vast majority of citizens who will
not be in a mini-public: how do the deliber-
ations connect with them if they have not
deliberated?
The essays are organized roughly in five
groups. To introduce the topic of deliber-
ative democracy, Claus Offe sketches the
conflict between distrusted elites and the
populism of Brexit and other plebiscitary
processes, arguing that deliberation via ran-
dom sampling could help fill the void, con-
necting the people to policy-making. Nicole
Curato, John Dryzek, Selen Ercan, Carolyn
Hendriks, and Simon Niemeyer offer a sys-
tematic overview of what they regard as the
key findings of the deliberative democra-
cy research around the globe. Their find-
ings are optimistic and differ from some of
the critical perspectives presented later in
the issue.
The second group of essays might be la-
beled “new thinking.” Bernard Manin pro-
poses that the core of deliberation is cap-
tured by what he calls the “adversarial
principle,” according to which public dis-
cussions should be organized to allow a
“confrontation of opposing positions.” Im-
plementing this idea is more complex than
first appears and has a history going back to
Ancient Athenian institutions. Manin of-
fers various suggestions, including some for
modern televised debates. Hélène Lande-
more asks whether deliberative democracy
can be saved from the current crisis of rep-
resentative democracy around the world.
Her positive answer depends on an ambi-
tious sketch of an “open democracy,” in
which institutions would be inclusive and
power accessible to ordinary citizens, In-
cluding through representation in delibera-
tive bodies of randomly chosen citizens, cit-
izens’ initiatives, and crowd-sourced law-
making and policy processes.
The next two groups of essays alternate-
ly present and respond to some of the main
criticisms of deliberative democracy. Ar-
thur Lupia and Anne Norton argue in their
elegant phrasing that “inequality is always
in the room.” If the outcome of delibera-
tion is inevitably distorted by the more ad-
vantaged participants dominating the dis-
cussions, the results are not likely to repre-
sent the true views of the rest of the group.
Piuttosto, any such results would reproduce
the inequalities and power relations among
the participants. Inequality among partic-
ipants is one of the major challenges to the
larger idea of implementing deliberative
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9
146 (3) Summer 2017James S. Fishkin & Jane Mansbridge
democracy–a challenge that must be pur-
sued with great seriousness.
Responding to critics of deliberation,
Alice Siu reflects on the role of inequality
using data from Deliberative Polls, both
online and face-to-face, finding far less dis-
tortion than critics expect. She also offers
surprising findings on who takes the most
talking time, who has the greatest influence
on the outcomes, and who offers more “jus-
tified” arguments, supplying reasons for
their positions. But this is an ongoing em-
pirical question. No one has yet systematic-
ally studied the role of inequality under dif-
ferent deliberative designs. More research
with controlled experiments could clarify
this issue further.
Ian Shapiro robustly defends the model
of competitive democracy as the alterna-
tive to deliberative democracy. He believes
that through party competition we can fos-
ter an “argumentative ideal” that has ele-
ments of deliberation, but does not suffer
from either the lack of realism of the delib-
erative model or the potential veto power
of intense minorities that emerges when
consensus is the decision rule or goal. Lui
champions an argumentative version of the
Westminster two-party competition mod-
el in which each side must make its case. Lui
also criticizes the room for deliberation of-
fered in multiparty proportional represen-
tation systems, in an argument that con-
trasts with the position offered by André
Bächtiger and Simon Beste in their contri-
bution to this issue.
Bächtiger and Beste contest the “standard
argument that politicians do not want to de-
liberate and citizens are not able to.” They
draw on extensive empirical work with the
“Discourse Quality Index,” which exam-
ines the reasoning offered by deliberators
in legislatures, especially on the question of
whether they offer justifications for their as-
sertions. They find that, despite the current
cynicism about representative democracy,
room for genuine deliberation appears in
some parliamentary contexts, particularly
those characterized by “coalition settings,
second chambers, secrecy, low party disci-
pline, low issue polarization, and the strong
presence of moderate parties.” Their insti-
tutional prescription for parliament con-
trasts sharply with Shapiro’s. Regarding
public deliberation, they draw on Europolis,
a European-wide Deliberative Poll with a
sample of ordinary citizens, and provide ev-
idence that the citizens were able to reason
in ways comparable to those of the parlia-
mentarians.
In her essay, Cristina Lafont makes a
case against giving any decisional status
to mini-publics. Although she grants that
deliberating mini-publics may make rea-
sonable decisions when the participants
have considered the options in good con-
ditions, to grant them power over decisions
on this basis would be to give “blind defer-
ence” to a “special version of elite concep-
tions of democracy.” On the representative-
ness argument for granting them power, IL
public might think that the participants in
a mini-public “share our interests, val-
ues, and policy objectives,” so their views
will “coincide with what we would have
thought if we had participated.” Yet most
larger mini-publics (including those that
collect post-deliberative opinions in con-
fidential questionnaires) are not designed
to produce consensus. In this respect, Essi
differ from the model of deliberation most
criticized by Shapiro. Hence there is almost
always, at least in the larger mini-publics, UN
majority view and a minority view revealed
in the final confidential questionnaires or
vote. Lafont argues that an individual voter
who has not participated cannot be sure
whether she would have been in the ma-
jority or in the minority after deliberation.
Why should she be bound by the majority
view post-deliberation if she might have
come out with the minority view?
No essay in this issue stands as an explic-
it response to Lafont, as we fortuitously
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Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & SciencesIntroduction
had for the first two critics. So we will try
to respond here by asking: if the citizens in
the broader public believe in democracy,
then why might they not take as serious-
ly the recommendations of deliberating
majorities as they do the decisions of non-
deliberating majorities? In a deliberating
mini-public, the final reported views are
what the people in microcosm concluded
on the basis of in-depth deliberation. If a
decision is taken on the basis of the major-
ity after deliberation, there will certainly
be dissenters, as with any majority decision.
Much depends on what we mean by the
public taking the results seriously. Lafont
argues forcefully against any trust-based
argument that might suggest “blind def-
erence” to the majority in a randomly se-
lected mini-public. Forse, Tuttavia, duly
elected officials might delegate some re-
sponsibility to such a group. How much
decisional status should the recommenda-
tions of a mini-public have? Should these
mini-publics be an official part of a decision
process or only part of the dialogue in the
public sphere? Are there contexts in which
they could bear the full weight of an institu-
tional decision? The question of role poses
a central challenge for deliberations based
on mini-publics.
The final section focuses on applications.
The essays shed light on the questions: who
deliberates, and in what context? As Cass
Sunstein notes, the term deliberative democ-
racy was coined in a study of how delibera-
tion took place in the Senate, in ways that,
to some degree, matched how the Consti-
tution’s framers thought the Senate ought
to act.10 Deliberation is a crucial part of
government in the executive and judicial
branches. Sunstein distills his experience
in government to offer a compelling picture
of deliberation taking place within the pol-
icy teams grappling with interagency issues
and the production of good policy in the ex-
ecutive branch of the U.S. government. His
account seems to satisfy all the criteria for
high-quality deliberation. In questo caso, how-
ever, high-level policy-makers, piuttosto che
the people themselves or their elected rep-
resentatives, are doing the deliberating.
James Fishkin, Roy William Mayega, Lynn
Atuyambe, Nathan Tumuhamye, Julius
Ssentongo, Alice Siu, and William Bazeyo
examine the first Deliberative Polls in Af-
rica. Those skeptical of the capacity of ran-
domly selected bodies to make intelligent
decisions have assumed that if such proce-
dures are viable at all, they must apply only
or primarily in developed countries with
highly educated populations. Can these
methods be applied to populations with
low literacy and very low educational lev-
els? Can the people in such communities
reason usefully about the trade-offs of ma-
jor policy choices affecting their commu-
nities? Can they do so in ways useful for
policy? The difficult issues of disaster re-
lief and population pressure in rural Ugan-
da pose a test case for the question: who
can deliberate? In these first African De-
liberative Polls, random sampling and de-
liberation allowed the people who must live
with development policies to be consulted,
with reasonable results, even in such diffi-
cult conditions.
In the final essay of the issue, Baogang He
and Mark Warren look outside the purview
of competitive democratic systems to ask
whether the practice of deliberative democ-
racy may be feasible within authoritarian
regimes, such as China. They ask: why have
some Chinese authorities embraced and
supported the form of a randomly selected
mini-public for “grass roots experimen-
tation” for local government decisions?
Can deliberating mini-publics be properly
conducted for budget and other local deci-
sions in a society that lacks the civil liber-
ties and individual rights familiar in com-
petitive democracies? What are the effects
and prospects of what they call “delibera-
tive authoritarianism?” Will such experi-
mentation lead to further institutional de-
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11
146 (3) Summer 2017James S. Fishkin & Jane Mansbridge
velopment in line with democratic values
or will it simply serve to legitimate current
power relations and institutions, preclud-
ing long-term reform?
This issue examines a wide range of de-
liberative democratic practices and appli-
cations. It includes competitive democra-
cies, authoritarian regimes, and developed
and developing countries. It opens up de-
bates on how to improve deliberation in
legislatures and other governmental bod-
ies, and on what institutional roles and de-
cision power randomly selected citizens
might have after they have been able to dis-
cuss issues in some depth under good con-
ditions. It asks how we might effectively
reform mass politics and public debate to
avoid not only fake news, but also the in-
creasing pressures of narrow-casting in the
commercial media, self-sorting into infor-
mation bubbles on social media, and geo-
graphic sorting by ideology as people move
to more politically homogeneous commu-
nities. It should leave the reader asking:
What challenges and critiques are most
telling for deliberative democracy? How
serious are the ways in which deliberation
can go awry? Whatever conclusions our
readers reach on these questions, questo è-
sue depicts a vibrant area of democratic ex-
perimentation at a time when many have
lost confidence in the processes of electoral
representative democracy.
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endnotes
* Contributor Biographies: JAMES S. FISHKIN, a Fellow of the American Academy since 2014, È
Director of the Center for Deliberative Democracy, the Janet M. Peck Chair in International Com-
munication, Professor of Communication, and Professor of Political Science (by courtesy) at Stan-
ford University. He is the author of When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consulta-
zione (2009), Deliberation Day (with Bruce Ackerman, 2004), and The Voice of the People: Public Opinion
and Democracy (1995).
JANE MANSBRIDGE, a Fellow of the American Academy since 1994, is the Charles F. Adams
Professor of Political Leadership and Democratic Values at the Harvard Kennedy School. She
is the author of Why We Lost the ERA (1986) and Beyond Adversary Democracy (1983), and coeditor
of Political Negotiation (with Cathie Jo Martin, 2015) and Deliberative Systems (with John Parkin-
figlio, 2012).
1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Oklahoma
Città: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
2 Larry Diamond, “Facing Up to Democratic Recession,” Journal of Democracy 26 (1) (Gennaio
2015): 141–155.
3 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
4 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1942),
263.
5 Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels, Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce
Responsive Government (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2015).
6 For the legitimacy of the distortions from economic inequality, see Martin Gilens, Affluence and
Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 2014).
7 The work began with Joseph Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American
National Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), followed by Amy Gutmann
and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, Massa.: Harvard University
12
Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & SciencesIntroduction
Press, 1996); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004); Jürg Steiner, André Bächtiger, Markus Spörndli, E
Marco R. Steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in Action: Analyzing Parliamentary Discourse (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004); and further work inspired by this Swiss team and others.
8 Vedere, Per esempio, Michael A. Neblo, Kevin M. Esterling, Ryan P. Kennedy, David M. J. Lazer,
and Anand E. Sokhey, “Who Wants to Deliberate–And Why?” American Political Science Review
104 (3) (agosto 2010): 1–18.
9 On citizens’ juries, see the work of Ned Crosby and Peter Dienel. On binding decisions and
other features of a variety of randomly selected mini-publics, see Yves Sintomer, Petite histoire
de l’expérimentation démocratique: Tirage au sort et politique d’Athènes à nos jours (Paris: La Découverte,
2011).
10 Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason.
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146 (3) Summer 2017James S. Fishkin & Jane Mansbridge
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