How Do Right-Wing Populist Parties
Influence Climate and Renewable Energy
Policies? Evidence from OECD Countries
(cid:129)
Ben Lockwood and Matthew Lockwood*
Astratto
There is increasing evidence that right-wing populist parties (RWPPs) and their supporters
are hostile to climate and low-carbon energy policies. In questo articolo, we provide a quanti-
tative analysis of the effects of RWPP representation in the legislature and executive on
climate and renewable energy policy for a number of countries in the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development over the period 2007–2018. After controlling
for other political, economic, and environmental factors, we find evidence for a significant
and large negative effect of RWPPs in power on climate policy. Importantly, we also show
that these negative effects vary with the proportionality of the electoral system and Euro-
pean Union membership. Both of these factors significantly moderate the negative influ-
ence of RWPPs. In countries with majoritarian electoral systems, the effects of RWPPs on
climate policy work through both indirect legislative and direct executive routes. In cont-
trast to climate policy, there is no overall significant relationship with renewable policy.
Announcing the repeal of his predecessor’s Clean Power Plan at a rally in
settembre 2017, President Trump declared, “Did you see what I did to that?
Boom, gone!”1 This move exemplified what many climate policy advocates
feared: a populist politician and declared climate skeptic reversing policies
brought in under a previous administration.
But how widespread is such action? Does the rise of authoritarian nation-
alist populists (sometimes labeled “right-wing” populists) and their entry into
government always have a negative effect on climate and low-carbon energy
policies? If there are differences in how far populists getting into power affects
* We are grateful to Germanwatch and to the World Bank RISE team for making their data on
climate and renewable energy policy available; to Paul Taggart for advice on the coding of pop-
ulist parties; and to Matto Mildenberger, Robert Huber, Andrew Oswald, and three anonymous
reviewers for comments on earlier versions. The usual disclaimers apply. We also thank Maria
Belen Caceres and Ainhoa Arias for excellent research assistance, including data collection and
management.
1. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/trump-administration-is-repealing-obamas-clean
-power-plan/, last accessed February 23, 2022.
Global Environmental Politics 22:3, agosto 2022, https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00659
© 2022 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
12
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Ben Lockwood and Matthew Lockwood
(cid:129) 13
such policies, what factors can explain the variation? These questions matter not
just because of the direct effects on domestic outcomes but also because of their
influence on the policies and emissions of other countries via the erosion of
international cooperation (Sælen et al. 2020).
Interest in the links between populism and climate change has emerged in
the last few years (for a recent review, see Forchtner 2019). Within this literature
are a number of recent studies looking specifically at how right-wing populist
parties (RWPPs) might actually affect climate and sustainable energy policies
and outcomes once elected to legislatures and governments (Böhmelt 2021;
Ćetković and Hagemann 2020; Huber et al. 2021; Jahn 2021). These studies
show some influence of RWPPs, but with variation across countries and policy
areas.
This article adds to the literature by taking a quantitative approach to mea-
suring policy effects and widening the focus beyond European countries, SU
which much of the literature so far has focused. We assess the impact of RWPPs
on climate and renewable energy policy in thirty-one OECD countries over the
period from 2007 A 2018, combining data on the quality of policies with estab-
lished data sets on right-wing populism and on parliaments and governments.
This scope means we cover a group of postindustrial countries with a shared
social and political context for the emergence of authoritarian populism, while
at the same time going beyond the European focus of existing studies, allowing
us to assess the role of electoral systems and European Union (EU) member-
ship. We capture both the direct effects of RWPPs as part of governing cabinets
and leadership and indirect effects through their representation in legislatures
on other parties in government. Our key findings, which are robust to a set of
other political, economic and environmental controls, are, first, that RWPPs do
have a significant negative impact on climate policy, but not on renewable
energy policy; second, that the impact of RWPPs on climate policy is mitigated
by proportional representation (PR) and by membership of the EU; and third,
that climate policy effects of RWPPs in majoritarian countries work via both
executive and legislative channels.
Our results are broadly in line with, and provide independent verification
Di, findings in the wider literature. The muted effects of right-wing populism on
climate policy in countries with PR and coalition government is consonant with
Ćetković and Hagemann (2020), and the stronger effects on climate policy than
on renewables policy is similar to Huber et al. (2021). Quantitative studies of
the effects of populism have so far looked at outcomes rather than policies, E
our research helps clarify intermediating mechanisms. Our results suggest that
climate policy change can explain at least some of the links found between
right-wing populism and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions ( Jahn 2021) E
between populist leadership and per capita carbon dioxide emissions (Böhmelt
2021).
Our study has some limits. Unlike some recent studies (per esempio., Huber et al.
2021), we do not include consideration of left-wing populist parties. We also do
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14 (cid:129) How Do Right-Wing Populist Parties Influence Climate and Renewable Energy Policies?
not attempt to differentiate between different types of RWPPs (Zulianello
2020), mainly because of the nature of the data set on party characteristics on
which we draw.
In section 2, we review the existing literature on right-wing populism and
climate and renewable energy policy. Sezione 3 describes our data and method-
ological approach. In section 4, we present the findings of the analysis. Sezione 5
concludes with a discussion of the wider implications of the analysis.
Conceptualizing the Influence of Right-Wing Populist Parties on
Climate and Renewable Energy Policies
There is a long-standing literature examining the determinants of climate policy,
including local air pollution, high-carbon interests, knowledge of climate
change, levels of education, and the left–right positions of governments (Dolšak
2009; Fankhauser et al. 2015; Karapin 2016; Steves and Teytelboym 2013).
There is also an established literature on the determinants of renewable energy
policy suggesting positive roles for energy security concerns, EU membership,
and renewable resources but a negative role for the strength of high-carbon
interests (Cheon and Urpelainen 2013; Jenner et al. 2012; Marques et al.
2010). Schaffer and Bernauer (2014) find that PR electoral rules and federalism
are positively associated with more ambitious renewable energy policy.
By comparison, the study of the relationships between populism, on one
hand, and attitudes to climate and renewable energy policy, on the other, is rel-
atively recent (Forchtner 2019). There is, Ovviamente, a large literature on popu-
lism, which is often taken to involve a basic cleavage in society between the
“people” and a corrupt “elite,” and a belief that politics should be an expression
of the will of the people (Mudde 2004, 2007). Tuttavia, populism is also usu-
ally understood as a “thin” ideology that always comes combined with values
from other political ideologies, including on questions of distributive conflicts,
social values, and identity (per esempio., Canovan 2001). These elements do not neces-
sarily combine in ways that are consistent with those other ideologies; for exam-
ple, what is labeled “right-wing populism” or “radical right populism” typically
includes positions on state intervention in the economy that would be seen as
left wing on conventional measures, but often combined with nativism and
social authoritarianism.
Fraune and Knodt (2018) and Lockwood (2018) draw attention to a gen-
eral tendency for RWPPs and individuals supporting them to express greater cli-
mate skepticism and, in some cases, hostility to policies supporting renewable
energy, while also favoring the use of fossil fuels. Lockwood (2018) explores
two potential reasons for these positions: that supporters of RWPPs tend to
be those “left behind” by globalization and technical change and resentful at
paying for climate policy through forms of environmental taxation and that
right-wing populists have an ideological hostility to climate policy as an essen-
tially cosmopolitan agenda. Much subsequent research has focused on the
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Ben Lockwood and Matthew Lockwood
(cid:129) 15
connection between support for RWPPs and climate skepticism at the level of
the individual citizen (per esempio., Huber 2020; Jylhä et al. 2020; Huber et al. 2021;
Kulin et al. 2021; Lachapelle and Kiss 2019) and on populist party policy plat-
forms on, and wider rhetoric toward, climate change (Forchtner et al. 2018;
Hess and Renner 2019; Huber et al. 2020; Żuk and Szulecki 2020).
Tuttavia, there has been less focus on the effects of populism on climate
and energy policies and outcomes. Ćetković and Hagemann (2020) examine six
Western European countries over the period from 2008 A 2018, using a case
study approach. Among these countries, they find only limited effects of the rise
of RWPPs, for a number of reasons. One is that such parties entered govern-
ments in only relatively few cases. A second is that even where RWPPs were
in cabinets, in only one case (Norway) did they directly control the energy
and climate ministry, reflecting the fact that climate change is often not the
main concern of RWPPs (Lockwood 2018). Third, when RWPPs had electoral
success as measured by seats in legislatures, this tended to push larger parties
to form coalition governments with other parties that had progressive energy
and climate platforms, leading to an improvement in policies. Finalmente, they find
that the potential effects of RWPPs were conditional on the absence of a strong
international climate regime and overwhelmed by the influence of major events
like the Paris Agreement.
Huber et al. (2021) also adopt a case study approach to assess the role of
populists in power in six European countries, specifically the actions of RWPPs
in government in Austria and Poland. They find clearer opposition to climate
commitments than to renewable energy policy, in line with Lockwood’s
(2018) suggestion that RWPPs in some countries may be more ambivalent
about the latter. One reason for RWPPs embracing renewables may be because
a nationalist ideology heightens concerns about energy security, and in coun-
tries without domestic fossil fuel reserves, renewable energy provides a route
to security. Some RWPPs also support some forms of renewable energy while
rejecting others, such as France’s Rassemblement national, which endorses solar
PV but is opposed to wind, which may be related to populist right ideas about
the national landscape (Forchtner and Kølvraa 2015).
Finalmente, Jahn (2021) (looking at the EU28) and Böhmelt (2021) (looking
at a wider sample of sixty-six countries) adopt a quantitative approach to asses-
sing the effects of populism not on policies but on GHG emissions as outcomes,
finding that these are significantly higher where RWPPs are in government.
In questo articolo, we explore the influence of RWPPs on climate and renew-
able energy policies using a quantitative approach rather than the case study one
used in the literature so far. Like much of the literature, we are mainly concerned
with the effects of populist parties on climate and renewable energy policies, COME
opposed to leaders, as in Böhmelt (2021). This is principally because populist
parties may have an effect on policies even if they do not lead governments,
either through representation in parliament, representing an electoral threat
to other parties, or as partners in coalition governments.
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16 (cid:129) How Do Right-Wing Populist Parties Influence Climate and Renewable Energy Policies?
For climate policy, our sample includes thirty-one Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries for the period
2007–2018, while that for renewable energy policy includes twenty-five OECD
countries for 2010–2018. Because our data allow us to expand the frame
beyond Western Europe and compare countries with different electoral systems,
our main focus is on assessing whether the influence of RWPPs on policy shows
systematic variation across these dimensions. Allo stesso tempo, unlike Böhmelt
(2021), we focus on a set of OECD countries that share a common context for
the rise of right-wing populism, questo è, industrial decline and the emergence
of new political cleavages (Iversen and Soskice 2019; Kriesi et al. 2006; Oesch
2015).
Drawing on this discussion of the literature, we propose the following
basic hypotheses:
H1: The stronger the influence of RWPPs through party share in legislature, cabinet
membership, or leadership is, the weaker is climate policy.
H2: The effect of RWPPs through party share in legislature, cabinet membership or
leadership on renewable energy policy is weaker than that on climate policy.
The existence of climate and renewable energy targets at the supranational
level for EU member states implies that we might see the influence of RWPPs
muted in EU countries compared with non-EU countries. While RWPPs in
theory have some influence on these targets through co-decision mechanisms
involving the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, in practice,
these institutions are still dominated by representatives from mainstream, non-
populist parties, and this is reflected in the broad pro-climate action orientation
of the EU. This observation leads to our next hypothesis:
H3: The influence of RWPPs on climate and renewables policy is weaker in EU
member states than in non-EU countries.
We also expect differences across countries with PR and majoritarian elec-
toral systems. In countries with PR systems, the representation of right-wing
populist voters is likely to happen directly through the formation of RWPPs;
such parties have a greater chance of entering legislatures, and so the incentive
to form and vote for such parties is greater. This in turn suggests that where
RWPPs enter government, they will do so as (typically junior) coalition part-
ners. Tuttavia, as Lockwood (2018) and Ćetković and Hagemann (2020) sug-
gested, we expect that climate policy and renewable energy portfolios will not
be a priority for RWPPs entering cabinets, and so again the policy influence rela-
tionship will be more muted.
By contrast, in countries with plurality and majoritarian electoral systems,
which tend to lead to a few (often two) large parties and majority governments,
we expect right-wing populists to enter government via an internal capture of
the existing center-right party, in what Snow and Moffitt (2012) call
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Ben Lockwood and Matthew Lockwood
(cid:129) 17
“mainstream populism.” While such cases may be rare, when they do occur, we
expect them to have a greater effect on all policy areas, including climate and
renewables policy, since populists effectively capture the whole of government.
The recent Trump presidency and Republican administration provide an easily
recognizable example.2 This yields a further hypothesis:
H4: The influence of RWPPs on climate and renewables policy is weaker in coun-
tries with PR electoral systems than it is in those with majoritarian systems.
Finalmente, we consider how different channels of influence might operate. UN
general expectation might be that RWPPs have more influence when they have
representation in the executive rather than just in the legislature. Tuttavia,
Ćetković and Hagemann’s (2020) findings suggest that both routes of influence
are possibly weaker in countries with PR electoral systems that have a tendency
toward coalition governments.3 As earlier, we expect that in majoritarian
countries, it is rarer for populists to gain representation at the executive level,
but when they do so, they have control over the whole of government and so
can be expected to have more of an effect on policy. So, our final hypothesis
is as follows:
H5: The influence of RWPPs on climate and renewables policy is stronger through
the executive route than through the legislative (seat share) route, particularly in
countries with majoritarian systems.
Data and Methodology
This study adopts a quantitative approach to assessing the influence of RWPPs
on climate and renewables policies, using multiple regression analysis on two
panel data sets.
To assess the strength of climate policy, we draw on the Climate Change
Performance Index (CCPI)4 published annually by Germanwatch, the New
Climate Institute, and the Climate Action Network, also used by Ćetković and
Hagemann (2020). For this study, we have data from 2007 A 2018 on thirty-
one OECD countries. The CCPI is constructed from scores across four categories:
2. Parties in majoritarian systems are internal coalitions (Bawn and Rosenbluth 2003), E
median voter theory might suggest that even where a mainstream party is captured by a populist
faction, other elements in the party would resist any radical shifts in policy. We think that this
effect will in practice be relatively weak, for three reasons. The first is the strength and nature of
populist ideology, Quale, in taking a “religious” view of politics (Margalit 2010), is fundamen-
tally opposed to the compromises of business-as-usual politics. The second is the fact that non-
populist groups within mainstream right-wing parties are already likely to be skeptical of strong
interventions on climate policy (per esempio., Fankhauser et al. 2015). The third is the fact that in some
majoritarian countries, climate change is not a valence issue.
3. In PR systems, minority governments relying on support from parties outside of coalitions are
not uncommon. Tuttavia, a limitation of the ParlGov data set is that it does not distinguish
between majority and minority governments.
4. https://www.climate-change-performance-index.org/, last accessed February 23, 2022.
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18 (cid:129) How Do Right-Wing Populist Parties Influence Climate and Renewable Energy Policies?
GHG emissions, energy use, renewable energy, and climate policy. Here we
focus on the climate policy score (CPS).
The CPS is based on an annual rating of domestic and international cli-
mate policy commitments and performance by “climate and energy policy
experts from non-governmental organizations, universities and think tanks
within the countries that are evaluated.”5 This data source has the limitation
that it is based on a set of subjective assessments of policy, albeit from a number
of experts. Comparability over time is also affected by the fact that the expert
pool providing the data has been extended and altered over time. Tuttavia, for
the countries in our sample, there are multiple experts, which should improve
the accuracy of the overall assessments. Inoltre, if personal biases in expert
assessments are not time varying at the country level, they will be captured by
our use of fixed effects in our estimation.6
We do not draw on the CCPI for renewable energy because its indicator is
largely a measure of growth in renewable energy capacity rather than of policy.
Invece, we use a renewable energy policy score (RES) from the World Bank Reg-
ulatory Indicators for Sustainable Energy (RISE) database, which provides data
from 2010 onward.7 The RISE database includes twenty-five countries out of the
thirty-one in our sample covered by the CCPI, those excluded being the smaller
states of Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, and Slovenia. The RES
is based on expert assessments of seven dimensions of renewable energy policy
and regulation.8 So, the remarks made earlier about data based on expert eval-
uations for the CPS indicator also apply here. For comparability of results, we
have rescaled both CPS and RES to lie between 0 E 10, with a higher score
indicating a more pro-climate or pro–renewable energy policy, rispettivamente.
Data on party representation among leaders, cabinets, and legislatures (IL
lower houses of representatives or parliaments in bicameral systems) is taken
from the Parliaments and Governments Database.9 To identify which political
parties can be counted as right-wing and populist (cioè., as RWPPs), we rely on
5. https://ccpi.org/download/climate-change-performance-index-2022-background-and
-methodology, last accessed February 27, 2022.
6. As further explained later, we use an estimator where the relationship in levels between explan-
atory and dependent variables, which includes country fixed effects, is first-differenced, così
eliminating fixed effects.
7. The IRENA database of the IEA also has information about renewables projects for member
countries, and this database has been used by Anderson et al. (2017) to investigate the effect
of public opinion on the number of projects per year. We prefer to use the RES index, as it is an
expert assessment of the quality of renewables policy rather than a count variable, and this
comparable to the CPS index. Tuttavia, the authors of that study have kindly provided their
count variable to us, and regressions exactly of the form of Table 3 show that when controls are
included, political variables of any kind have no effect on the renewables count. These results
are available on request.
8. For details on the elements, see https://rise.worldbank.org/scoring-system, last accessed Febru-
ary 23, 2022; for details of the contributing experts, see https://rise.worldbank.org/contributor,
last accessed February 23, 2022.
9. https://www.parlgov.org/, last accessed February 23, 2022.
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Ben Lockwood and Matthew Lockwood
(cid:129) 19
two sources. For Europe, we use the PopuList project,10 established by leading
experts on populism and the radical right. As PopuList does not cover non-
European countries, for these, we have adopted our own coding scheme based
on published studies of the nature of parties and governments in these coun-
tries, as detailed in the appendix.11
There is a timing issue involved in combining the political data with the
policy scores and other data. New cabinets and legislatures are formed by elec-
tions that fall somewhere within a particular year, and reflecting this, the Parlia-
ments and Governments Database is organized by cabinet, not year. The rest of
our data, including from the CPS and RES, are annual. Specifically, the CPS for a
particular year is generated by assessments of experts collected in the latter part
of that year (September to November), while the RES indicator is produced in
December of each year. Our approach to matching data is to allocate the start
and end years of governments and legislatures in the following way: if an elec-
tion falls in the first half of a calendar year (per esempio., May 2014), then we count the
government and legislature as starting from that year (cioè., 2014), but if it falls in
the second half of the calendar year (per esempio., settembre 2014), then we count these
as starting from the next calendar year (cioè., 2015). This is because the CPS and
RES scores will tend to reflect the effects of political circumstances over the first
part of the year, in part because it often takes a little time for new governments
to change policies.
For the direct route of potential influence, we construct two variables,
rwp_pm and rwp_cabinet, using the Parliaments and Governments Database.
The first is 1 if the leader (cioè., prime minister or president) of government comes
from a RWPP, E 0 otherwise. The second is defined as the number of RWPPs
that hold cabinet posts divided by the total number of parties that hold cabinet
posts.12 In the analysis, we use the average of these two variables, which we call
rwp_exec, as a measure of RWPP control of the executive. This variable takes on
values between 0 E 1. The indirect route of potential influence is measured
by rwp_leg, the share of seats in the legislature taken by RWPPs. In the initial
analysis, we use the simple average of rwp_pm, rwp_cabinet, and rwp_leg which
we call rwp, as an overall measure of the political influence of RWPPs.13
Inoltre, we adopt a number of controls, which we classify as political,
economic, and environmental. It is first important to control for the conventional
left–right position of the government (Fankhauser et al. 2015; Lutz 2019). For
consistency, we again use data from the Parliaments and Government Database,
10. https://popu-list.org/, last accessed February 23, 2022.
11. The other possible source here is the Global Populism database (https://populism.byu.edu/,
last accessed February 23, 2022). Tuttavia, this database has the disadvantage from our point
of view that it only codes the populist content of speeches by leaders and therefore does not
allow us to classify any party other than the party of the leader as populist or not.
12. The more obvious measure, the fraction of total cabinet posts held by RWPPs, is not available
from the Parliaments and Governments Database.
13. We also experimented with the first principal component of these three variables; the results are
similar.
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20 (cid:129) How Do Right-Wing Populist Parties Influence Climate and Renewable Energy Policies?
which scores parties on a 0 A 10 scala, from left to right. We define parties with a
score of 4 or less as left wing and parties with between 4 E 6 as center, Quale
ensures that roughly equal numbers of parties are in each of the three categories.
Then we create variables left_pm, left_cabinet, left_leg, centre_pm, centre_cabinet, E
centre_leg in exactly the same way as for RWPPs; Per esempio, left_pm is 1 if the
head of government is from a left-wing party. We again define left and centre to
be the averages of the three variables; these capture the potential influence of
left-wing and center parties, rispettivamente. All political effects, by definition, will
thus be measured relative to the baseline of non-populist right-wing parties.
Secondo, we include a dummy for EU membership and a measure of how the
majoritarian the electoral rules of the country are. The measure of majoritarian-
ism is constructed from the World Bank’s widely used Database of Political Insti-
tutions.14 Specifically, following Muttakin et al. (2021), we define our measure
maj = 1 − Proportional representation + Plurality + Housesys, where Proportional repre-
sentation is an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 if some candidates are
elected based on a percentage of votes received by their party, E 0 otherwise;
Plurality is an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 if legislators are elected
through a majoritarian rule, E 0 otherwise; and Housesys takes a value 1 if most
seats in the legislature are filled via plurality rule, E 0 if most are filled via
proportional rule. Overall, maj can take on integer values between 0 E 3.
For economic controls, we include gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita (gdp pc) and the unemployment rate (tu). These variables are completely
standard: the role of the unemployment rate is to pick up any effects of the eco-
nomic cycle.
Finalmente, we include a number of environmental controls, selected on the
basis of the existing literature on determinants of climate and renewable energy
policy cited in section 2. We have a relatively short time dimension to the panel
because our CPS and RES variables are not available before 2007, so we focus
on controls that do not require us to drop observations.
For the analysis of climate policy, we use an index of local air pollution
per capita (the sum of NOx and SOx emissions per capita, denoted lap pc), Quale
captures possible demand for environmental improvements;15 carbon dioxide
emissions per unit of GDP, denoted CO2 gdp, as an indicator of the strength of
high-carbon interests, along with fuel exports as a percentage of total merchan-
dise exports, denoted fuel exports; and finally, the proportion of twenty-five- A
thirty-four-year-olds with tertiary education, denoted tertiary ed, because aware-
ness of and support for climate policy have been shown to be associated with
higher levels of education.
14. https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/wps2283-database-political-institutions, last
accessed February 23, 2022.
15. Local air pollution is a proxy for environmental concern. We adopt a proxy rather than a direct
measure because for the country sample in the study, the main source for such a measure, Quello
È, the World Values Survey, has relatively few data points (cioè., at most four waves across our
period).
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Ben Lockwood and Matthew Lockwood
(cid:129) 21
For the analysis of renewable energy policy, we include: tu, gdp pc, tertiary ed
and a measure of the share of fossil fuels in electricity generation, fossil elec, as an
indicator of the strength of high-carbon interests in the electricity sector. Sources
for all these data are given in the appendix.
Results
A First Look at the Data
Summary statistics for all variables and details on their units of measurement
are reported in Table 1. Out of 372 observations for the CPS sample, each rep-
resenting a country and a year, RWPPs were in cabinets in 65. In twenty-seven
cases, national political leaders were from RWPPs.
Figures 1 E 2 show the evolution of mean CPS and RES scores for all
countries in our data set over the period, rispettivamente. The CPS mean shows no
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Tavolo 1
Summary Statistics
Variable
Obs.
Mean
CPS
RES
Rwp
rwp exec
rwp_leg
Centre
Left
Maj
EU membership
u rate
gdp pc
lap pc
CO2 gdp
fuel exports
fossil elec
tertiary ed
371
225
371
371
371
371
371
371
371
371
371
370
371
370
371
371
4.993
6.611
0.092
0.083
0.112
0.17
0.271
0.938
0.744
7.967
42.76
46.293
0.312
9.804
50.987
40.271
SD
2.084
1.489
0.205
0.236
0.17
0.237
0.274
1.047
0.437
4.419
15.67
57.607
0.123
12.702
28.883
9.292
Min.
0
2.7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2.2
19.644
7.667
0.097
0.078
0.011
15.472
Max.
10
9.5
0.867
1
0.719
0.882
0.896
3
1
27.5
107.766
344.79
0.731
69.999
99.081
61.754
gdp_pc is in US$ 1,000, lap_pc is in metric tons per capita, CO2 gdp is in metric tons per unit of GDP,
fuel exports are fuel exports as a percentage of the value of merchandise exports, fossil elec is the
percentage of gross electricity consumption from fossil fuels, and tertiary ed is the percentage of
twenty-five- to thirty-four-year-olds with tertiary education.
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22 (cid:129) How Do Right-Wing Populist Parties Influence Climate and Renewable Energy Policies?
Figura 1
Climate Policy Score
The solid blue line shows the median value and the red dotted lines show the inter-quartile range.
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Figura 2
Renewable Energy Score
The solid blue line shows the median value and the red dotted lines show the inter-quartile range.
particular trend, but that of the RES shows clear upward movement throughout
the period. A standard test for stationarity shows that for both CPS and RES, we
can reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in favor of stationarity.16 However,
there is evidence of considerable persistence in both variables, a point to which
we return later.
16. The appropriate test for the type of sample used here is the Levin–Lin–Chu test. Adjusted
t-statistics and p-values (in parentheses) were for CPS, −14.33 (0.000) and for RES, −2.602
(0.005).
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Ben Lockwood and Matthew Lockwood
(cid:129) 23
Figura 3
Correlations Between rwp and CPS and RES
Figura 3 shows the basic relationship between CPS and rwp and between
RES and rwp, rispettivamente. Figure 3a suggests a possible negative relationship
between CPS and rwp. We show that this relationship becomes much clearer
when we control for country fixed effects and other political, economic, E
environmental factors. From Figure 3b, the picture for RES is less clear.
As a next step, we look graphically at how the strength of the relationship
between CPS and RES, on one hand, and rwp, on the other, is mediated by how
majoritarian the electoral system is and whether the country is an EU member.
To do this, using a simple regression, we first calculate the marginal effect
of rwp on CPS for different values of maj and eu. In the regression, we lag rwp by
one year because, as explained earlier, there are lags in the formation of policy.
We also use this lag specification in the more detailed regressions we discuss
Dopo. The plots in Figures 4 E 5 show marginal effects plus their confidence
intervals. Figure 4a shows a clear relationship between maj and the marginal
effect of lagged rwp on CPS; for values of maj greater than 1, the impact of
maj is significantly negative. This is suggestive evidence for H4, that RWPPs have
Figura 4
Effects of rwp on CPS, Interacted with maj and EU Membership
Red bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.
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24 (cid:129) How Do Right-Wing Populist Parties Influence Climate and Renewable Energy Policies?
Figura 5
Effects of rwp on RES, Interacted with maj and EU Membership
Red bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.
more impact on climate change policy in majoritarian electoral systems. UN
somewhat weaker positive effect of EU membership on the relationship
between lagged rwp and CPS is shown in Figure 4b.
Figura 5 repeats this exercise for RES. Figure 5a shows that there is a rela-
tionship between the effect of lagged rwp on RES and the degree of majoritari-
anism of the electoral system. The effect is nonmonotonic, but it does suggest
that in pure majoritarian systems (cioè., maj = 3), rwp has a negative impact on
RES. Figure 5b shows that there is possibly a weak negative relationship between
the effect of lagged rwp on RES and EU membership.
Regression Results for CPS
As already noted, the unit root tests indicate considerable persistence in both
CPS and RES, so any regression that omits a lagged dependent variable will
be misspecified. Invece, a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator
should be used. Tuttavia, it is also known that in data with a small cross sec-
zione, as we have here, GMM estimators can be severely biased and imprecise
(Bruno 2005). We therefore use an estimator to deal with this problem that
has been developed by Bruno and can be implemented in Stata (xtlsdvc). A
the first stage, this estimator implements the Arellano–Bond estimator, Quale
first-differences the regression to eliminate country fixed effects, and then instru-
ments the lagged change in the dependent variable with further lags. At a second
stage, xtlsdvc corrects the bias in the Arellano–Bond estimator.17
The main regression results for the CPS indicator are shown in Table 2. As
already noted, all political variables are lagged by one year to allow for the
policy-making process. Specification 1 (reported in column 1) is the basic
regression with just the three political variables. Column 1 shows, as we might
17. For this estimator, the options chosen are that standard errors are bootstrapped using fifty rep-
etitions, and the bias is set to be of order 1/NT = 1/(31 * 12) = 0.0027, where N and T is the
dimension of the cross section and time series, rispettivamente.
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Ben Lockwood and Matthew Lockwood
(cid:129) 25
Tavolo 2
Results for CPS
Variable
rwp
centre
left
rwp_maj
rwp_eu
tu
gdp pc
lap pc
CO2 gdp
Fuel exports
tertiary ed
lagged CPS
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
−1.211
0.186
−2.558
−2.206
−1.278
0.151
−2.578
[0.045]**
[0.780]
[0.005]***
[0.006]***
[0.061]*
[0.833]
[0.008]***
1.111
0.913
0.912
1.390
1.187
0.987
0.998
[0.004]***
[0.022]**
[0.021]**
[0.025]**
[0.004]***
[0.022]**
[0.019]**
0.779
0.924
0.865
0.389
0.731
0.891
0.834
[0.035]**
[0.010]**
[0.017]**
[0.577]
[0.057]*
[0.016]**
[0.026]**
−2.857
[0.007]***
2.647
[0.014]**
−2.888
[0.008]***
2.617
[0.018]**
−0.117
−0.037
−0.033
−0.029
[0.024]**
[0.320]
[0.375]
[0.427]
−0.005
−0.029
−0.025
−0.023
[0.741]
[0.559]
[0.619]
[0.641]
0.005
0.014
0.014
0.013
[0.005]***
[0.103]
[0.101]
[0.108]
−7.244
−0.591
−0.079
0.098
[0.002]***
[0.887]
[0.985]
[0.981]
0.030
−0.011
−0.003
−0.010
[0.003]***
[0.779]
[0.940]
[0.793]
−0.040
0.016
0.015
0.016
[0.250]
[0.619]
[0.639]
[0.616]
0.562
0.555
0.557
0.544
0.534
0.537
[0.000]***
[0.000]***
[0.000]***
[0.000]***
[0.000]***
[0.000]***
Observations
340
340
340
338
338
338
338
The dependent variable is CPS; p-values are in brackets. The dynamic estimator xtlsdvc does not report the R2. For
column 4, the R2 is 0.319.
*P < 0.1. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01.
expect, that both center and left parties have a positive effect on the CPS score
relative to the right-wing baseline. To interpret the coefficients, note first that the
mean CPS score is approximately 5, so the effect of center (left-of-center) parties
is to increase the CPS score by about 22 percent (16 percent) relative to the
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26 (cid:129) How Do Right-Wing Populist Parties Influence Climate and Renewable Energy Policies?
mean. The coefficient on rwp is negative and significant, consistent with H1, that
RWPPs have a negative effect on climate policy. It indicates that a RWPP implies
an approximate 24 percent reduction in the CPS index relative to the mean,
which is comparable in magnitude, though opposite in sign, to the effect of cen-
ter and left parties.
Specification 2 allows for the effect of right-wing populism on CPS to vary
by electoral system. To do this, we create an interaction term rwp_maj, which is
equal to rwp multiplied by maj when maj is greater than 1, and zero otherwise.
The reason for this specification of the interaction term is that, as can be seen
in Figure 4a, the marginal effect of maj on the relationship with rwp_exec is signif-
icant only when maj is greater than 1. The interaction term rwp_maj is signifi-
cantly negative, consistent with H4. The effect is also large; in strongly majoritarian
systems when both the head of government and all the cabinet posts are held by
RWPPs, the CPS score falls by 58 percent of the mean.
On the other hand, for countries that score 0 or 1 on maj, the effect of rwp
is insignificant. This latter finding is consistent with our hypothesis that in coun-
tries with PR, where RWPPs enter government, they will do so typically as junior
coalition partners with limited numbers of cabinet seats. In such circumstances,
we can expect them to prioritize portfolios other than climate and renewable
energy policy, given the greater salience to date of issues like immigration for
such parties. Supporting evidence for this interpretation comes from data on
cabinet portfolios for European countries going back to 1993 from the Party
Systems and Governance Observatory.18 This shows that of the forty-three cab-
inets containing RWPPs for which data are available, RWPP representatives held
the environment portfolio in only nine cases, five of which were from Poland,
where the RWPP Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) has been the largest single party.
Specification 3 allows for the effect of right-wing populism on CPS to vary
by EU membership, reflecting the potential constraints of EU policy. The coef-
ficient on the interaction of rwp and EU membership, variable rwp_eu, is signif-
icantly positive, consistent with H3. Inspection of the coefficients on rwp and
rwp_eu suggests that the two effects more or less offset each other, and in fact,
in both regressions 3 and 7, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the sum of the
two coefficients is zero at a 5 percent significance level. The implication is that
while RWPPs outside the EU have a strong negative effect on climate policy,
RWPPs within the EU have no significant effect. Finally, in both regressions 2
and 3, center and left-wing governments have a clear positive impact on CPS, as
might be expected.
We then introduce controls, which are generally insignificant in specifica-
tions 5, 6, and 7; this is probably because they do not add much to the explan-
atory power of country fixed effects. To check this, specification 4 runs a static
18. https://whogoverns.eu/cabinets/, last accessed February 23, 2022.
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Ben Lockwood and Matthew Lockwood
(cid:129) 27
version of specification 5 with all economic and environmental controls added,
but with country fixed effects and the lagged dependent variable omitted.
Several controls then become significant, and the signs are mostly in line with
the existing literature. For example, unemployment reduces the quality of climate
policy, as other policy priorities become more important during recessions; local
air pollution—measuring a citizen demand for environmental improvement—
has a positive impact; and finally, CO2 per unit of GDP, measuring producer
resistance to decarbonization, has a negative effect. However, per capita GDP
and tertiary education have no significant effect, and fuel exports are significant,
but the sign is positive rather than the expected negative effect. Finally, the main
results from columns 1–3 concerning the effects of political variables are robust
to the introduction of controls in columns 5–7; in fact, the coefficients hardly
change in size or significance level.
Regression Results for RES
The main regression results for the RES indicator are shown in Table 3. The
regression specifications 1–9 are the same as for CPS. A first observation is that
RES is highly persistent, with a coefficient on the lagged dependent variable of
over 0.9. Looking across specifications 1–3, we see first that all political vari-
ables, including rwp, are insignificant, except left, which has a positive sign. As
the mean value of RES is approximately 6.6, the coefficient of approximately
0.47 on left implies that left-wing parties increase the RES score by approxi-
mately 7 percent on average, which is about half the effect of left on the mean
value of the CPS score. Overall, these results are thus consistent with H2—in
particular, we find no effect of right-wing populism on renewables policy.
As in Table 2, specification 4 is a static regression without fixed effects or
lagged dependent variable; surprisingly, our control variables, which are standard,
are not significant here, so variables like GDP per capita do not appear to explain
cross-country variation in RES. This finding may reflect the fact that renewable
energy policy has converged across countries more in recent years, compared with
data used in earlier studies. In specifications 5–7, which repeat specifications 1–3
with the addition of controls, only left remains highly significant.
Executive Versus Legislative Channels of Influence
So far, we have considered the aggregate influence of RWPPs on policy; we now
examine if the executive or legislative channel is more important, addressing
H5. Although one might assume the executive channel may be more important,
it is not immediately obvious which one dominates. For example, the executive
channel may be weak if RWPPs are given cabinet portfolios unrelated to the
environment, and the legislative channel may be important if the seat share
reflects high levels of populist support that push mainstream parties toward
adopting populist policies.
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28 (cid:129) How Do Right-Wing Populist Parties Influence Climate and Renewable Energy Policies?
Table 3
Results for RES
Variable
rwp
centre
left
rwp_maj
rwp_eu
u
gdp pc
fossil elec
tertiary ed
lagged RES
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
0.404
0.379
0.456
−0.107
0.423
0.399
0.409
[0.104]
[0.324]
[0.201]
[0.893]
[0.146]
[0.385]
[0.239]
0.290
0.295
0.339
−1.283
0.357
0.360
0.353
[0.190]
[0.222]
[0.220]
[0.097]*
[0.173]
[0.186]
[0.195]
0.468
0.468
0.458
0.813
0.434
0.433
0.434
[0.000]***
[0.000]***
[0.002]***
[0.287]
[0.004]***
[0.005]***
[0.004]***
0.040
[0.936]
−0.217
[0.701]
0.038
[0.944]
0.042
[0.940]
0.026
0.053
0.052
0.053
[0.358]
[0.061]*
[0.067]*
[0.068]*
0.015
0.024
0.024
0.024
[0.562]
[0.205]
[0.209]
[0.210]
−0.001
0.010
0.011
0.011
[0.860]
[0.204]
[0.205]
[0.202]
0.002
0.031
0.031
0.031
[0.947]
[0.117]
[0.117]
[0.115]
0.930
0.931
0.953
0.916
0.916
0.916
[0.000]***
[0.000]***
[0.000]***
[0.000]***
[0.000]***
[0.000]***
Observations
243
243
200
225
200
200
200
The dependent variable is RES; p-values are in brackets. The dynamic estimator xtlsdvc does not report the R2. For
column 4, the R2 is 0.105.
*p < 0.1. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01.
Tables 4 and 5 show the results for the CPS and RES indexes, respectively.
In each table, we look at the effects of the two different variables rwp_exec and
rwp_leg separately, both in levels and via the interactions with maj and eu. We do
not enter both variables in a “two-horse race,” as they are highly correlated; the
correlation coefficient between rwp_exec and rwp_leg is 0.78. The resulting
co-linearity leads to political variables being insignificant in such regressions.
Also, in each regression, we include left and centre but omit the controls, since
the signs and significance of the political variables of interest do not change if
we add the controls.
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(cid:129) 29
Table 4
Influence of RWPPs on CPS via Executive and Legislative Channels
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Variable
centre
left
rwp_exec
rwp_exec_maj
rwp_exec_eu
rwp_leg
rwp_leg_maj
rwp_leg_eu
lagged CPS
1.137
0.909
0.915
1.091
0.946
0.962
[0.003]***
[0.022]**
[0.019]**
[0.007]***
[0.018]**
[0.017]**
0.787
0.940
0.857
0.863
0.879
0.915
[0.035]**
[0.009]***
[0.019]**
[0.015]**
[0.012]**
[0.009]***
−0.878
0.178
−2.099
[0.060]*
[0.708]
[0.007]***
−2.448
[0.005]***
2.182
[0.013]**
−2.416
−0.114
−3.947
[0.024]**
[0.942]
[0.003]***
−3.871
[0.049]**
3.910
[0.038]**
0.564
0.554
0.557
0.547
0.555
0.555
[0.000]***
[0.000]***
[0.000]***
[0.000]***
[0.000]***
[0.000]***
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340
340
340
340
340
340
The dependent variable is CPS; p-values are in brackets. The dynamic estimator xtlsdvc does not report the R2.
*p < 0.1. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01.
For CPS, the overall effects of RWPPs on policy appear to be stronger
through the legislative than the executive route; that is, the coefficient on
rwp_exec in specification 1 is only significant at 10 percent, whereas the coeffi-
cient on rwp_leg in column 4 is significant at 5 percent and is three times as
large. If we look at the interactions between these two channels and maj, we
see that the effect of RWPPs in both legislatures and executives is stronger in
majoritarian countries, but the relative effect via the executive is certainly no
bigger. So, overall, we do not find any evidence in favor of H5 for climate pol-
icy. Finally, for renewables, we would expect from Table 3 that RWPPs do not
affect RES either though the executive or the legislative channel, and the results
in Table 5 confirm this.
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30 (cid:129) How Do Right-Wing Populist Parties Influence Climate and Renewable Energy Policies?
Table 5
Influence of RWPPs on RES via Executive and Legislative Channels
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Variable
centre
left
rwp_exec
rwp_exec_maj
rwp_exec_eu
rwp_leg
rwp_leg_maj
rwp_leg_eu
lagged RES
0.284
0.294
0.334
0.27
0.287
[0.194]
[0.224]
[0.227]
[0.233]
[0.240]
0.471
0.471
0.461
0.446
0.451
0.334
[0.214]
0.437
[0.000]***
[0.000]***
[0.002]***
[0.000]***
[0.000]***
[0.002]***
0.325
0.293
[0.099]*
[0.307]
0.369
[0.223]
0.058
[0.885]
−0.169
[0.699]
0.586
0.390
[0.172]
[0.615]
0.749
[0.154]
0.275
[0.761]
0.930
0.931
0.953
0.930
0.932
−0.641
[0.573]
0.955
[0.000]***
[0.000]***
[0.000]***
[0.000]***
[0.000]***
[0.000]***
Observations
243
243
200
243
243
200
The dependent variable is CPS; p-values are in brackets. The dynamic estimator xtlsdvc does not report the R2.
*p < 0.1. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01.
Discussion and Conclusions
In this article, we have investigated whether there is a systematic tendency for
RWPPs to have a negative impact on climate and renewable energy policies
across OECD countries. Specifically, we have assessed what happens to these
variables when representatives of RWPPs are elected to legislatures, enter gov-
ernment, or become leaders.
Our analysis shows that there is a robustly significant negative relationship
between the strength of RWPP representation in both in the legislature and exec-
utive and climate policy. However, we also find that this relationship is mitigated
by EU membership and that the negative effect of RWPPs on climate policy is
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Ben Lockwood and Matthew Lockwood
(cid:129) 31
far more pronounced in countries with strongly majoritarian electoral systems,
relative to that in countries with more proportionately representative systems.
These findings are consistent with our hypothesis that in countries with
PR, where RWPPs enter government, they will do so as typically junior coalition
partners with limited numbers of cabinet seats and a tendency not to prioritize
portfolios relevant to climate policy. By contrast, in countries with majoritarian
electoral systems, when RWPPs get into government, our finding is that they
have a much greater influence on climate policy. However, these situations
are relatively unusual; in our sample, only a few countries have strongly major-
itarian systems, and the episodes in which right-wing populists were in power in
these countries are few and far between.
In contrast to the finding of a robust relationship between RWPP represen-
tation and climate policy, there is no strong and significant overall relationship
with renewable energy policy. Consistent with other studies, this would seem to
suggest that RWPPs are more ambivalent about renewable energy than they are
about climate policy or that they have limited influence over renewables policy,
especially in countries with more PR-based electoral systems.
Our analysis has various implications. First, when right-wing populists
come into power, they can be expected to be disruptive of climate policy. This
finding applies not only at the domestic level but also at the international level,
since our measure of climate policy comprises international effort as well as
national policy (an obvious example is Donald Trump withdrawing the United
States from the Paris Agreement in 2017).
Second, it is in countries with majoritarian politics outside Europe that
climate policy can be the most vulnerable to the influence of right-wing “main-
stream” populists coming to power. However, unlike the case in PR systems,
where permanently populist parties tend to form, mainstream populism has
itself been a more unstable phenomenon, so the challenge to climate policy
from such cases may be episodic.
The third implication relates mainly to European countries with PR and
coalition governments. Many of these countries have seen a long-term rise in
RWPP representation, but in most cases, such parties are still in a minority posi-
tion. If the fortunes of RWPPs continue to rise, it is possible that the mitigating
effect of PR electoral systems on the relationship with climate policy will
weaken or disappear. Larger, stronger RWPPs in governments can affect more
policy areas; this is clear from countries like Poland. At the same time, it is
far from clear that RWPPs in Europe have reached their high-water mark.
A fourth implication arises from the often-made observation that popu-
lism is a reactive ideology (Canovan 1999) that focuses on perceived crises
(Taggart 2000). Thus far, the main focus of European RWPPs has been immi-
gration (and in the United Kingdom, Brexit), but as mainstream and left-wing
parties focus increasingly on climate change, this focus may shift, leading
RWPPs to put greater effort into trying to control environmental portfolios
and shaping climate policy where they get into coalition governments.
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32 (cid:129) How Do Right-Wing Populist Parties Influence Climate and Renewable Energy Policies?
Finally, a fifth implication follows from the absence of a strong and sig-
nificant effect of right-wing populism on renewable energy policy. This offers
the prospect that despite hostility to a broad climate agenda, right-wing popu-
lists in power may still support some technologies that reduce emissions, help-
ing in turn to lower the costs of mitigation.
Ben Lockwood is a professor of economics at the University of Warwick. His
main interests are in political economy and public finance, and he has pub-
lished work in a number of journals, including the Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Review of Economic Studies, the American Economic Journal: Policy, Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, and the Economic Journal. He has also worked for IMF,
the European Commission, and the UK government. He holds a PhD from
the University of Warwick.
Matthew Lockwood is a senior lecturer in energy policy in the Science Policy
Research Unit (SPRU) at the University of Sussex. He was previously a senior
research fellow at the Energy Policy Group in the University of Exeter. His main
interests are in the politics of energy and climate policy in the United Kingdom
and comparatively, and he has published work in a number of journals, includ-
ing Science, Global Environmental Change, Climate Policy, Energy Policy, Environ-
mental Politics, and the Political Quarterly. He has also worked for the think tank
the Institute for Public Policy Research and for the UK government. He holds a
DPhil from the University of Oxford.
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36 (cid:129) How Do Right-Wing Populist Parties Influence Climate and Renewable Energy Policies?
Appendix
Data Sources
Sources for data not given in the text are as follows:
gdp_pc, u_rate from https://data.oecd.org/, last accessed February 23, 2022;
lap pc, CO2 gdp from https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=AIR
_EMISSIONS, last accessed February 23, 2022;
fuel exports from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator, last accessed February
23, 2022;
fossil share elec from https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/energy/data/iea
-electricity-information-statistics_elect-data-en, last accessed February
23, 2022;
tertiary ed share from https://data.oecd.org/eduatt, last accessed February
23, 2022.
Non-European Coding Scheme
Most of the countries outside Europe in this study have majoritarian or plurality
electoral systems that tend to work against the formation of separate significant
RWPPs. Instead, these countries tend to see periods of “mainstream populism”
(Snow and Moffitt 2012), during which populist factions and leaders within
traditionally center-right parties gain control. The paradigmatic case of this is
in the United States, with the rise of the Tea Party movement within the
Republican Party over the 2010s and the emergence of Trump as a leader in
2017. For the purposes of the analysis here, we have adopted a coding scheme
as in Table A.1, which is based on the following accounts of the nature of
political parties in the relevant countries and periods:
(cid:129) United States (Oliver and Rahn 2016)
(cid:129) Australia (Snow and Moffitt 2012)
(cid:129) New Zealand (Donovan 2020; Vowles and Curtin 2020)
(cid:129) Canada (Snow and Moffitt 2012)
(cid:129) Japan (Lind 2018; Warren 2019)
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Ben Lockwood and Matthew Lockwood
(cid:129) 37
Table A.1
Coding for RWP Governments, Non-European Countries
Administration
Leader
United
States
Australia
New
Zealand
2007–2009
2009–2012
2013–2016
2017–2019
2007
2008–2010
2010–2013
2014–2015
2016–2018
2007–2008
2009–2017
George W. Bush
Barack Obama
Barack Obama
Donald Trump
Party
Rep
Dem
Dem
Rep
John Howard
Lib (coalition)
Kevin Rudd
Julia Gilliard/
Kevin Rudd
Lab
Lab
Tony Abbott
Lib (Coalition)
Malcolm Turnbull
Lib (Coalition)
Helen Clark
John Key/
Bill English
2018–2019
Jacinda Ahern
Canada
Japan
2007–2015
2015–2019
2007–2008
2009–2012
Stephen Harper
Justin Trudeau
Shinzo Abe/
Yasuo Fukuda/
Taro Aso
Yukio Hatoyama/
Naoto Kan/
Yoshihika Noda
2013–2014
Shinzo Abe
2015–2017
Shinzo Abe
2018–2019
Shinzo Abe
Lab
National
Lab/Green/NZ
First coalition
Con
Lib
LDP
DJP-SDP-PNP
coalition
LDP-NKP
Coalition
LDP-NKP
Coalition
LDP-NKP
Coalition
RWPP
Cabinet?
Leader?
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
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/
2
2
3
1
2
2
0
3
6
0
9
9
g
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_
a
_
0
0
6
5
9
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0
2
3
