An Ounce of Prevention—A Pound - Ricerca sull'intelligenza artificiale specializzata al MIT

An Ounce of Prevention—A Pound
of Cure?

The Reagan Administration’s Nonproliferation
Policy and the Osirak Raid

✣ Giordana Pulcini and Or Rabinowitz

“I swear I believe Armageddon is near,” wrote a shaken Ronald Reagan after
learning about the Israeli raid against the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq.1 The
Giugno 1981 raid was the ﬁrst successful attack conducted by one state against
an enemy state’s nuclear reactor.2 The raid has received much attention in
academic and political debate on the usefulness of strikes against hostile nu-
clear programs, especially in the Iranian context. Yet surprisingly, and despite
Reagan’s emotional diary entry, some important questions have been left
unanswered. How did the raid affect the initial formation of Reagan’s non-
proliferation policy, and how was the raid perceived by relevant administration
ofﬁcials? How did the administration design its political strategy of response
to the raid, and how did this strategy play out at the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA)? What does this episode tell us about Reagan’s foreign
policy priorities? This article addresses these questions by exploring recently
declassiﬁed documents from numerous archives.3

1. Ronald Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, ed. by Douglas Brinkley (New York: HarperCollins, 2007),
P. 24.

2. Bennett Ramberg, “The Preemption Paradox,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 62, No. 4
(2006), pag. 48–56.

3. We conducted research for this article at numerous repositories, including the Ronald Reagan Presi-
dential Library (RRL) in Simi Valley, CA; the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library (JCL) in Atlanta; IL
Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (DDEL) in Abilene, KS; the Hoover Institution Archives
(HIA) at Stanford University; the U.S. Library of Congress (LC); the Israeli National Archive (INA)
in Jerusalem; The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNAUK) in Kew Garden; the National
Archives of India (NAI) in New Delhi; the IAEA’s ofﬁcial archive in Vienna; the Archivio Centrale
dello Stato (ACS) in Rome; the Achille Albonetti Archive, at Roma Tre University (Rome); the Archive
of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, in Pretoria; the Woodrow Wilson Cen-
ter Digital Archive (WCDA); the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA); and additional online
archives and databases.

Journal of Cold War Studies
Vol. 23, No. 2, Primavera 2021, pag. 4–40, https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_01007
© 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology

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The Reagan Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy and the Osirak Raid

The article focuses on several critical aspects. To place the discussion of
Reagan’s policy in context, we begin by exploring the evolution of President
Jimmy Carter’s nonproliferation policy and his administration’s approach to
the Pakistani and Iraqi nuclear programs in the second half of his term. Noi
describe the growing skepticism among Carter administration ofﬁcials about
the original policy of universal nuclear denial and outline the administration’s
increasingly severe assessments of the Iraqi nuclear program and the rising
concern over the possibility of an Israeli strike against it.

Following this, we examine the period between Reagan’s election in
novembre 1980 and the raid, outlining how Reagan administration ofﬁcials,
during both the transition period and their ﬁrst months in ofﬁce, contem-
plated and designed the administration’s proposed nonproliferation policy.
Despite harsh rhetoric leveled against the policy of the outgoing administra-
zione, crucial elements of the new policy represented a continuation of Carter’s
policy, not a departure from it, including several key themes that were dis-
cussed during Carter’s ﬁnal year in ofﬁce.

The raid was consequential for the development of Reagan’s initial
nonproliferation policy, as presented in National Security Decision Directive
(NSDD) 6, issued on 16 Luglio 1981.4 Before the raid took place, the Reagan
administration was considering revising the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Act (NNPA), legislation that included harsh limitations on nuclear exports.
After the Israeli strike, confronting Congress with a major shift in U.S. nu-
clear exports policy became untenable, as the raid exposed the fragile balance
of the nonproliferation regime. As a consequence, the initial policy, contained
in NSDD 6, did not include any revision of the NNPA.

We detail the responses of the relevant ofﬁces of the Reagan administra-
tion to the raid itself. We explore why and how the administration was caught
off guard when the raid took place, and we assess the so-called gap in the
administration’s “institutional memory” regarding prior knowledge of Israel’s
intent to attack Osirak. This lack of awareness stemmed from two major fail-
ures. The ﬁrst, already established in the literature, was a failure to transfer
knowledge properly during the transition period. The second, hitherto un-
explored, is a major failure relating to the meeting between Alexander Haig
and Menachem Begin on 5 April 1981. Begin’s expressed concern regarding
the Iraqi nuclear program was not properly contextualized by Haig, and we

4. “United States Nonproliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Policy,” Unclassiﬁed, NSDD-6,
Extract, Excised Copy, 16 Luglio 1981, in DNSA. This and other documents cited in the DNSA are
available at https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/digital-national-security-archive.

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Pulcini and Rabinowitz

outline several explanations of this event. One of the “lessons learned” from
the Osirak raid is the need to ensure a smooth handover of intelligence and
assessments regarding time-sensitive issues.

Following this, we explore the construction of Reagan’s “political strat-
egy,” a term used by the administration in responding to the raid. The debate
surrounding the raid and a gap in “institutional memory” contributed to the
decision to adopt a milder political strategy than initially considered. Questo era
exempliﬁed by the administration’s decision to suspend the delivery of F-16
jets to Israel and then to proceed with the delivery.

Finalmente, we explore how the administration’s political strategy of response
to the raid tested its relationship with the IAEA in the following years, Quando
the agency became a venue for diplomatic battles over Israel’s status. The ad-
ministration was dismayed by the IAEA’s harsh response to Israel and even-
tually withdrew the United States from the agency in September 1982. IL
short-lived withdrawal proved to the administration that, despite the IAEA’s
shortcomings, no viable alternative existed that could serve U.S. interests.

Placing the Research in Context:
Academic Literature

The “Osirak” literature, both historical and contemporary, has focused on the
raid’s implications for the development of the Iraqi nuclear program and has
explored its outcome as a strike aimed at curtailing proliferation. Tuttavia, IL
NOI. reaction to the strike has remained largely unexplored.5 With the aim of
addressing that gap, this article engages with three distinct strands of litera-
ture. The ﬁrst strand is the literature on Reagan’s nuclear policy. Some aspects
of Reagan’s approach to nuclear weapons have been widely discussed in the lit-
erature, particularly his arms control efforts during the Cold War’s ﬁnal years,
but Reagan’s nonproliferation policy vis-à-vis aspiring and new proliferators
has received little attention to date.6 The traditionally accepted view is that the
administration, preoccupied by strategic competition with the Soviet Union,

5. One of the few exceptions is Shai Feldman, “The Bombing of Osiraq—Revisited,” International
Sicurezza, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Autunno 1982), pag. 114–142.

6. Vedere, Per esempio, Beth A. Fisher, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War
(Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1997); Martin and Annelise Anderson, Reagan’s Secret
War: The Untold Story of His Fight to Save the World from Nuclear Weapons (New York: Three Rivers
Press, 2009); and Paul Lettow, Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (New York:
Random House, 2005).

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The Reagan Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy and the Osirak Raid

chose to sacriﬁce its nonproliferation goals in favor of competing strategic
interests.7 Recent research, Tuttavia, has produced a more nuanced assess-
ment.8 Our analysis here contributes to the emerging literature by mapping
the initial construction of Reagan’s nonproliferation policy and its internal
logic.

The second strand of literature involves research on counterproliferation
strikes and their usefulness as policy instruments. After the U.S. invasion of
Iraq in 2003, a new stream of Iraqi sources has been fueling the academic de-
bate on the usefulness of strikes. Surprisingly, Osirak features as an example in
both of the opposing camps. Some researchers cite the raid as an example of
successful long-term intervention, stressing its effectiveness in “buying time”
for further interruptions and interventions and its role in a larger interruption
campaign.9 A competing camp places an emphasis on the raid’s negative pro-
liferation impact, arguing it was counterproductive because it both motivated
Saddam Hussein to accelerate his nuclear efforts and convinced him to drive
it underground.10 In the United States the Osirak raid has also featured in

7. Walton L. Brown, “Presidential Leadership and U.S. Nonproliferation Policy,” Presidential Studies
Trimestrale, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Estate 1994), pag. 563–575; Richard Rhodes, The Twilight of the Bombs:
Recent Challenges, New Dangers, and The Prospects for a World without Nuclear Weapons (New York: Al-
fred A. Knopf, 2010); Shane J. Maddock, Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy
from World War II to the Present (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010); and John
Arquilla, The Reagan Imprint: Ideas in American Foreign Policy from the Collapse of Communism to the
War on Terror (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006).

8. Francis J. Gavin, “Strategy of Inhibition: NOI. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Non-
proliferation,” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Estate 2015), pag. 9–46; and Or Rabinowitz
and Nicholas L. Mugnaio, “Keeping the Bombs in the Basement: NOI. Nonproliferation Policy toward
Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan,” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Estate 2015), pag. 47–86.

9. For studies framing the raid as a successful operation, see Hal Brands and David Palkki, “Saddam,
Israel, and the Bomb: Nuclear Alarmism Justiﬁed?,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Estate
2011), pag. 133–166; Sarah E. Kreps and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing
Nuclear Facilities Affect Proliferation?” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 34, No. 2 (2011) pag. 161–187;
Uri Sadot, “Osirak and the Counter-proliferation Puzzle,” Security Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2016),
pag. 646–676; Jeremy Tamsett, “The Israeli Bombing of Osirak Reconsidered: Successful Counterpro-
liferation,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2004), pag. 70–85; Barry Rubin, “Foreword to
the Second Edition,” in Uri Bar-Joseph, Michael Handel, and Amos Perlmutter, eds., Two Minutes
over Baghdad, 2nd ed. (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2003), P. xvi; and Shlomo Nakdimon, Tammuz
Belehavot (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Aharonot & Hemed Publishing, 2007).

10. Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, “Revisiting Osirak: Preventive Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation
Risks,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Estate 2011), pag. 101–132; Malfrid Braut-
Hegghammer, Unclear Physics: Why Iraq and Libya Failed to Build Nuclear Weapons (Ithaca, NY: Cor-
nell University Press, 2016); Jacques E. C. Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians,
and Proliferation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Richard K. Betts, “The Osirak
Fallacy,” The National Interest, No. 83 (2006), pag. 22–25; and Sammy Salama and Karen Ruster, "UN
Preemptive Attack on Iran’s Nuclear Facilities: Possible Consequences,” CNS Research Story, Center
for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, CA, agosto 2004.

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Pulcini and Rabinowitz

policy debates on whether, and under what conditions, Washington should
consider a ﬁrst strike against Iranian nuclear facilities.11

Contemporary accounts from 1981 correctly portrayed the raid as an
act that met with wide reproach in the United States. IL 1991 Gulf War,
Tuttavia, prompted a reevaluation of the episode by former Reagan admin-
istration ofﬁcials and by well-established nonproliferation experts. Gerard C.
Smith, President Carter’s special representative for nonproliferation, who in
1981 testiﬁed before Congress “critically on the Israeli attack,” reconsidered
his position in 1993, candidly admitting that he “was wrong” and now favored
“military actions” against possible proliferators.12

After the Gulf War ended, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney tacitly em-
braced the Osirak raid, praising the Israeli air force for having destroyed
Osirak and thanking it for making the “job much easier in Desert Storm.”13
This reevaluation grew stronger after the 2003 NOI. invasion of Iraq and, In
some cases, evolved into a revisionist narrative. Richard Perle, a former Rea-
gan administration ofﬁcial and former adviser to the Bush administration,
repeatedly cited the raid as an exemplary operation and claimed that the 1981
condemnation was not genuine. Perle maintained that “the State Department
of course got out the obligatory condemnation of Israel’s unilateral action,"
but in fact “the president [actually] thought it was a terriﬁc piece of bomb-
ing.”14 We now know, Tuttavia, that Perle’s account, suggesting that the raid
was partly condoned, is inaccurate.

The third strand of literature deals with U.S.-Israeli bilateral relations.
Existing accounts are consistent in describing how, much to the surprise of
both governments, Giugno 1981 found U.S.-Israeli relations on shaky grounds
as the congenial working relationship the two sides expected did not ma-
terialize.15 Israel’s raid on Osirak proved to be the ﬁrst of several clashes

11. Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conﬂict between Iran and America (New York: Ran-
dom House, 2005), pag. 391–395; and Whitney Raas and Austin Long, “Osirak Redux? Assessing Is-
raeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities,” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Primavera
2007), pag. 7–33.

12. Gerard Smith to David Hambourg, 27 Gennaio 1993, P. 3, in Box 13, Gerard C. Smith Papers,
DDEL.

13. Joseph Cirincione, “Bombs Won’t ‘Solve’ Iran,” The Washington Post, 11 May 2005, P. A17.

14. Richard Perle, “Should Iraq Be Next,” San Diego Union-Tribune, 16 Dicembre 2001; Richard
Perle, “The United States Must Strike at Saddam Hussein," Il New York Times, 28 Dicembre 2002,
P. A19; and Rodger Claire, Raid on the Sun: Inside Israel’s Secret Campaign That Denied Saddam the
Bomb (New York: Broadway Books, 2004), P. 221.

15. Abraham Ben-Zvi, Mitruman Ve’ad Obama (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth, 2011), pag. 168–191.
Other important sources on U.S.-Israel relations during the Reagan administration include Steven
l. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conﬂict (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); William B.

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The Reagan Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy and the Osirak Raid

during Reagan’s ﬁrst term, and the president found himself repeatedly using
“the sanction whip” against Israel.16 The impact of the raid itself on bilateral
relations, especially in the context of the U.S. withdrawal from the IAEA, ha
received limited scholarly attention.

The Evolution of Carter’s Nonproliferation Policy

In the ﬁrst half of Carter’s term, his administration emphasized efforts to pre-
vent the spread of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technology and highlighted the
importance of establishing a credible and functioning international regime by
“universally” denying nuclear supplies to clients that did not meet certain stan-
dards.17 This policy led to stricter regulations on nuclear exports, as contained
in the 1978 NNPA, and increased congressional oversight of executive-branch
compliance.18

Tuttavia, several nuclear-related developments highlighted the policy’s
shortcomings. The administration was alarmed by the nuclear programs of
Brasile, Argentina, Taiwan, and South Korea and was especially concerned
about the Pakistani nuclear program.19 In bilateral talks held in February 1977
with the United States, the Israelis tied the Iraqi and Pakistani programs to-
gether, though the Iraqi program was not yet a U.S. concern.20

The major worry for the Carter administration regarding Pakistan
was that, even after U.S. ofﬁcials convinced the French not to export

Quandt, ed., The Middle East: Ten Years after Camp David (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution,
1988); and Mattia Toaldo, The Origins of U.S. War on Terror: Lebanon, Libya, and American Interven-
tion in the Middle East (London: Routledge, 2013). Other studies on the bilateral relations include
Douglas Little, “The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and Israel, 1957–68,” In-
ternational Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (1993), pag. 563–585; Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov,
“The United States and Israel since 1948: A ‘Special Relationship’?,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 22, No.
2 (Primavera 1998), pag. 231–262; Galen Jackson, “The Showdown That Was Not,” International Secu-
rity, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Primavera 2015), pag. 130–169; and George Ball and Douglas Ball, The Passionate
Attachment: America’s Involvement with Israel, 1947 to the Present (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992).

16. Ben-Zvi, Mitruman Ve’ad Obama, pag. 170–173.

17. Presidential Review Memorandum/National Security Council (NSC) 15, “Non-Proliferation,
Safeguards, and International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation," 21 Gennaio 1977, in U.S. Depart-
ment of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Vol. XXVI, (hereinafter referred to as
FRUS, with appropriate year and volume numbers), pag. 782–783.

18. J. Michael Martinez, “The Carter Administration and the Evolution of American Nuclear Non-
proliferation Policy, 1977–1981,” Journal of Policy History, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2002), pag. 261–292.

19. Peter A. Clausen, Nonproliferation and the National Interest (New York: HarperCollins, 1993),
pag. 135–137.

20. Memorandum of Conversation, Jerusalem, 16 Febbraio 1977, in FRUS, 1977–1980, Vol. VIII,
Doc. 6, P. 26.

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Pulcini and Rabinowitz

plutonium reprocessing plants to Pakistan, the Pakistanis were still “deter-
mined to have at least a nuclear option.”21 A growing U.S. concern was the
possibility of a Pakistani nuclear test.22 In December 1979, with the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, the geostrategic picture changed. National Security
Council (NSC) staffers now proposed resuming aid to Pakistan without ﬁrst
obtaining concessions on the nuclear program.23 Carter attempted unsuc-
cessfully in 1980 to reshape relations with Pakistan, but he reached no new
strategic bargains with Pakistan’s leader, General Zia ul-Haq. Ancora, the admin-
istration continued its efforts to limit sensitive exports to Pakistan through a
policy of démarches, an approach that continued under Reagan.24

Iraq’s nuclear program gradually began to present a major challenge to
Carter’s nonproliferation policy in the second half of his term. As late as De-
cember 1978, the Iraqi program still did not present a serious concern to
Washington and, unlike Pakistan, India, and South Korea, was not listed as
a matter of nonproliferation concern.25 But the picture gradually changed in
1979. In the second half of the 1970s the French insisted on exporting two
nuclear reactors to Iraq, one relatively large, coupled with highly enriched ura-
nium (HEU). French exports were matched by Italian supplies. The Italian
authorities agreed to export numerous facilities to Iraq, including “hot cells,"
in return for Iraqi oil. France’s and Italy’s agreements to supply Iraq with “ma-
jor nuclear components” were described in a June 1979 National Intelligence
Estimate as having “obvious implications for U.S. nuclear nonproliferation
policy.”26

21. Or Rabinowitz and Jayita Sarkar, “‘It Isn’t Over until the Fuel Cell Sings’: A Reassessment of the
NOI. and French Pledges of Nuclear Assistance in the 1970s,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 41, No.
1–2 (2018), pag. 275–300; and Assessment by Stansﬁeld Turner, NSC Memorandum, secret/sensitive,
Policy Review Committee Meeting, “Subject: Minutes: Policy Review Committee (PRC) Meeting on
Pakistan," 9 Marzo 1979, in National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 73, JCL.

22. Or Rabinowitz, Bargaining on Nuclear Tests: Washington and Its Cold War Deals (Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press, 2014), pag. 137–167; Secret memorandum for the president, from Cyrus
Vance, attached to a draft letter from President Carter to President Zia, 20 Giugno 1979, in National
Security Affairs, Staff Material, Thomas Thornton’s Subject File, RAC Project Number NLC 98-4-3-
0, JCL; and Secret memorandum for Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, from Peter Tarnoff, 27 agosto 1979,
in Ofﬁce Files Zbigniew Brzezinski Material, RAC Project Number NLC-37-5-19-0, JCL.

23. Secret/sensitive NSC memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski, from Thomas Thornton and Mar-
shall Brement, “Subject: PRC on West Asia," 27 Dicembre 1979, in National Security Affairs, Staff
Material, North/South, Thomas Thornton’s Country File, Box 102, JCL.

24. Rabinowitz, Bargaining on Nuclear Tests, pag. 137–167.

25. Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, n.d., in FRUS, 1977–1980,
Vol. IO, Doc. 107, pag. 516–526.

26. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 36.2-1-76, “Iraq’s Role in the Middle East," 21 Giugno 1979,
in FRUS, 1977–1980, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 137, pag. 435–438.

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The Reagan Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy and the Osirak Raid

In July 1979, NOI. diplomats told their Italian counterparts that it was an
“American strong belief ” that Iraq was pursuing a nuclear capability, and they
asked the Italian government to provide information on the nature of the
“nuclear supplies” to Iraq. The Italians dutifully complied but rebuffed any
further pressure from Washington as inappropriate.27 In October, the intelli-
gence community concluded that although Iraq was not likely to attempt to
produce nuclear weapons before the late 1980s, it would “probably persist in
acquiring all that it needs for this purpose under the guise of peaceful nuclear
activities.”28 Still, in the wake of the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan, the Carter administration did not rule out a rapprochement
with Saddam Hussein’s regime.29 In September 1980 the assessment of Iraqi
nuclear capabilities grew bleaker, and NSC staffer Jerry Oplinger contended
that “a crude Iraqi bomb could conceivably be just two years away,” adding
that a “summary of recent intelligence indicates that the Israelis have very
good reason to be concerned.”30

The reference to the Israeli “concerns” came against the backdrop of on-
going talks with Israel on the subject. Under Prime Minister Begin, the Israeli
government had become increasingly wary of Iraq’s nuclear program.31 Israel
had three main concerns, which were all reﬂected in the talks held with the
French in the year before the raid. Primo, the Israelis worried that Iraq would
be supplied with enough HEU to enable it to produce a uranium bomb.32
Secondo, they were concerned that Iraq would be allowed to modify its reactor,

27. Appunto, Ministero degli Affari Esteri [Ministry of External Affairs], 13 Luglio 1979, in Fascicolo
22 “Iraq,” Fondo Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Consigliere Diplomatico, II Versamento,
Busta 21, ACS. We thank Leopoldo Nuti for sharing this document with us. See also Memorandum
from CNEN to Ministry of External Affairs, “Iraq-Fornitura di attrezzature nucleari – Informazioni
all’Ambasciata USA” [Iraq – Nuclear Supplies – Information for US Embassy], 14 settembre 1979, In
Achille Albonetti’s personal papers, Box 43, Roma Tre University.

28. Memorandum, from Stansﬁeld Turner, Director of Central Intelligence, to the President, 22 Oc-
tober 1979, in File: Iraq, 1-77-3-80, Collection: Zbigniew Brzezinski Material—Country Files (NSA
6), Box 34, JCL.

29. Telegram from the United States Interests Section in Baghdad to the Department of State, 26
Giugno 1980, in FRUS, 1977–1980, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 142, pag. 449–450. See also Hal Brands, “Saddam
Hussein, the United States, and the Invasion of Iran: Was There a Green Light?” Cold War History,
Vol. 12, No. 2 (2012), P. 223.

30. NSC memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski, from Jerry Oplinger, “Subject: Iraqi Nuclear Pro-
gram," 25 settembre 1980, in File: Iran/Iraq, 9/80, Zbigniew Brzezinski Material—Country Files
(NSA 6), Box 34, JCL.

31. Nakdimon, Tammuz Belehavot, pag. 87–109.

32. Top secret telegram, 7203, from the Ambassador, Paris, to the Foreign Ofﬁce, “Subject: Iraq," 17
Luglio 1980, in Prime Minister Menachem Begin—France, Physical identiﬁer א – 4321/10, INA.

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Pulcini and Rabinowitz

enabling it to produce, reprocess, and accumulate plutonium.33 Finally, Israel
was concerned that Iraq would unilaterally withdraw from existing safeguard
arrangements or from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), leaving it with
the relevant capabilities to produce nuclear weapons—but free of any treaty
obligations not to do so.34 From 1978 A 1980 Israel tried to undermine the
Iraqi program with a mixture of tools, including diplomatic pressure on the
stati Uniti, France, and Italy and clandestine operations in Europe.35 When
President Reagan was sworn in, the Iraqis were progressing at full speed.

The possibility of an Israeli strike alarmed the Carter administration.
Oplinger warned that Israel was “not about to wait” for hostile nuclear pro-
grams like Iraq’s “to mature before responding.”36 He added that “the threat
of an Israeli response is now also an objective factor,” concluding that the
“only alternative” was to “play hardball with France.”37 In a meeting on 25
Luglio 1980, NOI. diplomat Thomas Pickering unambiguously warned Israeli
Ambassador to Washington Ephraim Evron against a strike, cautioning that
“any precipitous [sic] acts would carry grave risks and should be avoided.”38
The exchanges rang the administration’s alarm bells. An internal memoran-
dum from National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski stipulated that “it
is important for U.S. to decide quickly on follow-up actions,” adding that “in
view of the urgency,” the recommendations for “further approaches” should
be prepared within the week.39

33. Top secret telegram, 1116, from the Foreign Ofﬁce, to the Paris embassy, “France-Iraq Nuclear
Co’," 28 Luglio 1980, in Prime Minister Menachem Begin—France, Physical identiﬁer א – 4321/10,
ISA.

34. Classiﬁed telegram, 7250, to the Foreign Ofﬁce, “Subject: Fon Min Talk with French Fon Min,"
27 settembre 1980, in Prime Minister Menachem Begin—France, Physical identiﬁer א – 4321/10,
ISA.

35. Sadot, “Osirak and the Counter-proliferation Puzzle,” pp. 656–659.

36. NSC memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski and David Aaron, from Jerry Oplinger, “Subject:
Begin’s Appeal on the French/Iraqi Nuclear Issue," 23 Luglio 1980, in File: Iran/Iraq, 9/80, Zbigniew
Brzezinski Material—Country Files (NSA 6), Box 34, JCL.

37. Ibid. For pressure on Italy, see Sensitive memorandum for Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, 21 novembre
1980, in Folder 1, Staff Material—Middle East, RAC Project Number NLC-47-1-13-8, JCL.

38. Draft of talking points [in cable format, with handwritten revisions by Robert Hunter and Jerry
Oplinger], “Subject: Begin’s Appeal to President Carter Concerning French Enriched Uranium to
Iraq," 23 Luglio 1980, in File: Iran/Iraq, 9/80, Zbigniew Brzezinski Material—Country Files (NSA
6), Box 34, JCL; and Thomas Pickering, phone interview, 18 Gennaio 2018. (Pickering is a former
assistant secretary of state for oceans and international environmental and scientiﬁc affairs.) See also
Nakdimon, Tammuz Belehavot, P. 142.

39. Memorandum for the secretary of state, from Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Subject: French and Ital-
ian Nuclear Cooperation with Iraq," 28 Luglio 1980, in File: Iran/Iraq, 9/80, Zbigniew Brzezinski
Material—Country Files (NSA 6), Box 34, JCL.

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The Reagan Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy and the Osirak Raid

This sense of urgency was underlined in September when the Israelis con-
ﬁrmed to U.S. ofﬁcials that they were, Infatti, considering a strike. This con-
ﬁrmation was received on 29 settembre 1980, just as the Iranian air force
was attacking targets in Baghdad, including an unsuccessful attack against
the Osirak site. Recently retired Defense Minister Ezer Weizman told U.S.
Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis that “the Israeli Defense Ministry was se-
riously considering the possibility of carrying out an air strike against Iraq’s
nuclear facility under cover of the current Iranian air attacks in Baghdad.”40
On 17 Dicembre 1980 Lewis met with Begin and told him, as instructed, Quello
“the United States shares Israel’s serious concern” and that the Iraqi installa-
tions “are intended to give that country’s government the option of developing
nuclear explosives in the future.”41

By 1980, the failure to curb the Pakistani and Iraqi nuclear programs
had caused some administration ofﬁcials to doubt the effectiveness of the ex-
isting policy. In June 1980, Gerard Smith proposed to engage Washington’s
European allies in a discussion of a revised approach: the United States would
assume a more ﬂexible line on plutonium reprocessing by allies in Europe and
Japan in return for “improved cooperation in dealing with countries of prolif-
eration concern, including concrete steps to strengthen restraints on exports
of sensitive technology and material to such countries.”42 Carter supported
Smith’s proposal against Brzezinski’s advice but asked Smith to keep the talks
at an exploratory, noncommittal stage.43

Yet despite being dissatisﬁed with the policy, Carter never made a for-
mal decision to change it, in part because he knew that doing so would meet
strong objections both domestically and internationally. In December 1980
the time came to evaluate the policy and prepare for the handover to the in-
coming Reagan administration. Oplinger argued: “On balance, and judged by

In
40. Top secret—sensitive memorandum, “Situation Room Checklist," 29 settembre 1980,
9.21.80–9.30.80, Zbigniew Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily Report File (NSA 1), Box 17, JCL.
Weizman served as Begin’s defense minister from 1977 to May 1980. He earlier served as the com-
mander of the Israeli air force from 1958 A 1966 and then as deputy chief of the general staff of the
Israeli Defense Forces.

41. Immediate cable, 7592, to Sec-State, from Tel-Aviv embassy, 9 Giugno 1981, in Iraq (Israel Strike on
Iraqi Nuclear Facility, 6/8/81) [1 Di 6], Executive Secretariat, Country File: Iran-Iraq, Box 37 (Box
68), RRL. These exchanges were also discussed in Nakdimon, Tammuz Belehavot, P. 142.

42. Draft Telegram to USIAEA, for Ambassador Smith, from secretary, attached to Memorandum
from the president’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter, “Subject:
Post-INFCE Explorations by Gerry Smith," 17 Giugno 1980, in FRUS, 1977–1980, Vol. XXVI, Doc.
383, pag. 977–978.

43. Memorandum from the president’s assistant for national security affairs (Brzezinski) to President
Carter, “Subject: Post-INFCE Explorations by Gerry Smith," 17 Giugno 1980, in FRUS, 1977–1980,
Vol. XXVI, Doc. 383, pag. 974–975.

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Pulcini and Rabinowitz

its stated objectives, the Carter nonproliferation policy has to be considered
a failure.”44 Smith in his ﬁnal report also expressed discontent, criticizing the
rigidity of the administration’s approach.45 He pointed to the “serious con-
cern” arising from Pakistan’s nuclear program and the “acquisition of sensitive
facilities by Iraq, Argentina and Brazil.”46 Signiﬁcantly, he proposed to in-
crease the policy’s ﬂexibility by “eliminating certain sanction provisions in the
NNPA and the Foreign Assistance Act.”47 Carter was unsure how to pose the
different options to Reagan’s transition team, writing in the upper right-hand
corner of the ﬁrst page of Smith’s memorandum, “Zbig. How best to present
alternatives to next administration?”48

The Inception of Reagan’s Nonproliferation Policy

After Reagan’s election in November 1980, the transition team in charge of
nuclear matters called for a clean break from the policies of the outgoing
Carter administration. An Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)
transition team headed by Eugene Rostow was placed in charge of develop-
ing the recommendations for the new nonproliferation policy.49 In December
1980, these were submitted to James Malone, chairman of the Nonprolifera-
tion Coordinating Committee.50

The recommendations called for treating nonproliferation policy “in the
context of overall U.S. international security requirements,” adding that the
United States “should make every effort to restore its credibility and reliability
as a nuclear supplier and to enhance its role in international nuclear commerce

44. Memorandum from Jerry Oplinger of the NSC staff to the president’s assistant for national security
affairs (Brzezinski), 23 Dicembre 1980, in FRUS, 1977–1980, Vol. XXVI, Doc. 396, pag. 1012–1014.

45. Memorandum from the president’s assistant for national security affairs (Brzezinski) to Presi-
dent Carter, “Subject: Nonproliferation Policy—Report of Gerry Smith” [includes tabs A, B, C], 24
novembre 1980, in Folder 11, Staff Material—Global Issues Files (NSA 28), Box 52, JCL.

46. Ibid., Tab B.

47. Ibid., Tab B.

48. See Memorandum from the president’s assistant for national security affairs (Brzezinski) to Presi-
dent Carter, 24 novembre 1980, in FRUS, 1977–1980, Vol. XXVI, Doc. 395 P. 1,004n.1.

49. For an account of the origins of Rostow’s foreign policy views, see John Rosenberg. “The Quest
Against Détente: Eugene Rostow, the October War, and the Origins of the Anti-détente Movement,
1969–1976,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2015), pag. 720–744.

50. Memorandum from James L. Malone to Frank Shakespeare, 18 Dicembre 1980, in Folder 5,
Eugene V. Rostow Ofﬁce Files, 1976–1992, Internal Documents, Committee on the Present Danger
(CPD) Records, Box 71, HIA. Malone was conﬁrmed in June 1981 as assistant secretary of state
for oceans and international environmental and scientiﬁc affairs, E, during the ﬁrst year of the
administration, he acted as the coordinator of the administration’s nonproliferation policy.

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The Reagan Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy and the Osirak Raid

as a mean of strengthening its ability to achieve nonproliferation objectives.”51
The transition team’s working assumption was that Carter’s nonproliferation
policy, especially the adoption of the NNPA, had caused a sharp decline in
the status and reputation of the United States as a reliable nuclear supplier
and must be promptly revised.52 In a memorandum from 18 Dicembre 1980,
Malone stated that the NNPA “should be revised as soon as possible,” echoing
Smith’s proposal.53

Despite the explicit criticism of Carter’s policies, the recommendations
reﬂected a striking level of continuity with the thinking that had evolved dur-
ing the second half of the Carter administration. The Reagan administration’s
proposed new policy drew heavily from the adjustments considered during
Carter’s last year in ofﬁce. To address the loss of U.S. leadership in the inter-
national nuclear market and the alienation of allies, the new policy proposed
the adoption of a case-by-case approach instead of universal measures, and of-
ﬁcials suggested that the “policy of denial” of nuclear supplies be applied only
to countries “posing a threat to U.S. international security interests.”54

In the following months, administration ofﬁcials sought to convert the
transition team’s proposals into an ofﬁcial policy. In April 1981 an interagency
study involving the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff was completed.55 The study maintained that the
best way to address nuclear proliferation was by focusing on bilateral relations
and on the security motivations behind proliferation.56

On 7 Giugno 1981, the day of the Osirak raid, a policy paper prepared
by the Senior Interagency Group on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear
Cooperation (SIG) was submitted to the NSC.57 The discussion paper char-
acterized the administration’s nonproliferation efforts as a “key foreign policy

51. “ACDA Transition Final Report,” n.d., P. 4, in Folder 5, Eugene V. Rostow Ofﬁce Files, 1976–
1992, Internal Documents, CPD Records, Box 71, HIA.

52. Ibid., P. 15.

53. Memorandum from James L. Malone, Chairman, Non-Proliferation Coordinating Committee, A
James Edwards, NOI. Secretary of Energy Designate, 18 Dicembre 1980, in “Recommendations for
the Reagan administration Non-Proliferation Policy,” File 137/10/02, Vol. 9, Doc. 8/27/5/1 (Pretoria,
Department of Foreign Affairs), also available online at https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org.

54. Ibid.

55. Memorandum from Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence (NPI), National For-
eign Assessment Center (NFAC), CIA, to resource management staff, Ofﬁce of Program Assessment
et al., “Request for Review of Draft Paper on the Security Dimension of Nonproliferation," 9 April
1981, published in Nuclear Proliferation International History Project—NPIHP Research Update, No.
6, WCDA.

56. Ibid.

57. “Full Paper of the Senior Interagency Group on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Coopera-
zione,” attached to Memorandum 8117659 for Mr. Richard V. Allen, from L. Paul Bremer III, 7 Giugno

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Pulcini and Rabinowitz

objective” and as “vital to U.S. and international security” and repeated the
criticism that the Carter administration had damaged U.S. export reliability.
The paper also suggested revising the NNPA.58

The SIG document, endorsing one of the themes discussed in Carter’s
last year in ofﬁce, maintained that the United States “must recognize and deal
with the security and other motivations which lead nations to acquire nu-
clear explosives” and that these would be affected by “our readiness to exercise
power in the interest of ourselves and our friends.”59

Addressing the conceptual difference between policies aimed at prevent-
ing proliferation by nuclear hopefuls and policies aimed at dealing with states
that had already crossed the nuclear threshold, the memorandum made the
following important distinction: “Our efforts will also have to deal increas-
ingly with controlling the results of proliferation in addition to preventing
it.”60 The “control” of the “results of proliferation” was to be accomplished by
“direct[ing] our efforts toward preventing or delaying testing, weaponizing or
perhaps even the use of nuclear explosives by proliferating states.”61

As for relations with the IAEA, a vital component of the policy, IL
ACDA paper argued that the United States could achieve its nonproliferation
goals by using the agency as an agent. The IAEA and the NPT were to be “fur-
ther strengthened and given greater U.S. support.” To reinforce U.S. inﬂuence
over the agency, the paper recommended that “support to the IAEA in the
form of ﬁnancial contribution, manpower and technical advice should be in-
creased signiﬁcantly.”62 This view, Tuttavia, was not unanimous, and an inter-
nal debate addressed the agency’s merits. The transition team’s report stressed
that the United States should focus its efforts on attempting to “reverse the
trend” of increased politicization within the IAEA, and it recommended deal-
ing with the issue by acquiring a greater political and economic role inside the
agency and by inﬂuencing the selection of its next director general.63

The SIG report underscored the latent skepticism toward the IAEA. UN
footnote in the document indicated that the Department of Defense (DoD)

1981, in “NSC00014, 12 June 1981,” Executive Secretariat: Meeting Files, Box NSC 11-20 (Box
91282), RRL.

58. Ibid., pag. 5–14.

59. Ibid., P. 3.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. “Recommendation for the Reagan Administration Nonproliferation Policy,” n.d., pag. 2, 10, In
Rostow/ACDA, CPD Papers, Box 175, HIA.

63. Ibid.

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The Reagan Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy and the Osirak Raid

had expressed “reservations about the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards, IL
weakness of the IAEA as an international institution, its susceptibility to Third
World and East Bloc, its lack of an intelligence capability, and the limits of
its scope and jurisdiction” and warned against undue reliance on it.64 Rostow
shared this opinion.65 The ofﬁcial formulation of Reagan’s proposed nonpro-
liferation policy was then accomplished with the adoption of NSDD 6, issued
SU 16 Luglio 1981 and coupled with a public presidential statement—only four
weeks after the Osirak raid.66

The Reagan Administration’s Awareness
of “Osirak” Prior to the Raid

How did Carter administration ofﬁcials brief the incoming Reagan admin-
istration on Osirak, and was the issue ﬂagged? The answers remain murky.
The issue was not given emphasis in the months preceding the raid, leading
to a sense of surprise when it ﬁnally took place. Information about Osirak
was conﬁned to the State Department, and the highest ofﬁcials who came in
with Reagan were not made aware of it. When asked by Israeli writer Shlomo
Nakdimon about how the incoming administration was briefed on the issue,
Carter replied, “Reagan chose his secretary of state and his secretary of defense
only in the last minute,” a blurry answer that failed to explain how (or even
whether) these ofﬁcials were briefed.67

Robert Hunter, director of Middle East affairs in the Carter administra-
zione, recalls personally brieﬁng his successor at the NSC, Geoffrey Kemp, SU
the issue and warning that “if the United States didn’t do something soon
Di [Osirak], Israel would likely bomb it.”68 How this brieﬁng was received
is unclear. Available records and personal accounts reveal an absence of discus-
sion on the topic; there are no available documents indicating that Reagan or
his NSC team discussed the issue prior to the raid or were made aware of it.69

64. “Full Paper of the Senior Interagency Group on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Coopera-
zione,” p. 10.

65. Memorandum from Eugene Rostow to the vice president et al., 1 Giugno 1981, in “NSC00014, 12
June 1981,” Executive Secretariat: Meeting Files, Box NSC 11-20 (Box 91282), RRL.

66. “United States Nonproliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Policy.”

67. Nakdimon, Tammuz Belehavot, P. 286.

68. Robert Hunter, email interview, 27 Dicembre 2017.

69. Douglas J. Feith, phone interview, 30 Gennaio 2018. Feith was an NSC staffer at the time of the
raid.

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RAND researcher Warren Bass interviewed Lewis on this matter in 2012.
Lewis, who was apprehensive about a ﬂawed handover of the issue, told Bass
he had “made a series of secure phone calls back to Washington” during the
transition to make sure the new administration was “provided with a history”
of the contacts between the United States and Israel on the Osirak reactor.
Lewis said he “was assured” that the issue was included in a key transition
document, but “the document was subsequently slapped with an extremely
high level of classiﬁcation, leaving it in a compartment into which very few
incoming ofﬁcials had been read.” Apparently, Secretary of State Haig and
other senior ofﬁcials never saw it. “It got so over-classiﬁed that it stayed in a
compartment and got lost in the shufﬂe,” Lewis told Bass.70

Other issues—the Iran-Iraq War, the Israel-Egypt peace process, and the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—dominated Washington’s Mideast agenda at
the time.71 At the operational level, Israel’s technical-military capability to
conduct a successful long-range, high-precision bombing raid against the re-
actor was not examined. Because the Israeli press did not discuss the Iraqi
nuclear program in the months leading up to the raid, NOI. analysts observ-
ing the region did not ﬂag the issue.72 The diplomatic corps largely assumed
that Israel would consult or inform the United States prior to any raid.73 In
April 1981, the possibility of an Israeli attack was brieﬂy mentioned in a non-
proliferation report but was not framed as an immediate threat.74 Nicholas A.
Veliotes, assistant secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, recalled
that he spent none of his time “considering the possibility of an Israeli attack
on the Iraqi reactor.”75

A further unresolved issue surrounding the degree of U.S. awareness
of Israel’s intentions before the raid relates to Haig’s visit to Israel and his

70. Warren Bass, A Surprise out of Zion? Case Studies in Israel’s Decisions on Whether to Alert the United
States to Preemptive and Preventive Strikes, from Suez to the Syrian Nuclear Reactor (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2015), pag. 29–30.

71. Nicholas A. Veliotes, email interview, 28 Dicembre 2018; and Wayne White, email and phone
interview, 23 Dicembre 2018. Veliotes served as assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South
Asian affairs from 1981 A 1984. White is a former intelligence analyst with the State Department’s
Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

72. White, interview; and Feith, interview. White notes that this Israeli strategy was labeled as “denial
and deception.”

73. Pickering, interview.

74. Special assistant for NPI, NFAC, CIA, to Resource Management Staff, Ofﬁce of Program Assess-
ment et al., “Request for Review of Draft Paper on the Security Dimension of Nonproliferation,"
P. 2.

75. Veliotes, interview.

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The Reagan Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy and the Osirak Raid

private meeting with Begin on 5 April 1981.76 As secretary of state, Haig
would have been briefed on the State Department assessments on Osirak be-
fore his trip, and Begin and Haig did discuss the Iraqi nuclear program during
their meeting.77 Begin asked Haig, “What did the U.S. do in light of Israel’s
incessant requests to halt Iraqi nuclear development.” Haig replied, “We in-
tervened with Italy and France, but to no avail.”78 Veliotes, who accompanied
Haig to Israel, was not informed by the secretary of any mention of the Iraqi
reactor, and the issue was not probed further.

Is it therefore plausible, as Haig later wrote in his memoirs, that the Rea-
gan administration did not become fully aware of Israeli concerns and inten-
tions until after the raid, even though Haid had explicitly discussed Osirak
with Begin?79 Available accounts show that Haig seemed genuinely surprised
by the raid. Why did he ignore the concern Begin expressed on 5 April? Ac-
cording to Veliotes, Haig might have discounted Begin’s apprehension and
attributed it instead to Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, who had voiced deep
trepidation about Osirak. During the visit, Sharon “was quite obnoxious and
bombastic, verging on insulting in meetings with Haig,” conceivably causing
Haig to underestimate his anxiety.80 Another possibility, noted by Douglas J.
Feith, an NSC staffer at the time, is that Haig did not realize that by giv-
ing Begin a discouraging report about diplomatic progress with the French
and the Italians, “he was in fact making Israeli military action more likely.”81
Alternatively, perhaps Haig did note Begin’s concern but, believing that an
Israeli raid would not be harmful to U.S. regional interests, decided to turn a
blind eye.

Contemporary accounts demonstrate the existence of a complex mixture
di elementi, including a lack of interest and experience, poor ﬂow of infor-
mazione, prejudice, and conﬂicts within the incoming administration. These
factors produced a confused and incoherent interpretation of the episode’s

76. “‘Israel: Begin, Haig make Statements after Meeting,’ Jerusalem, Domestic Television Service in
Hebrew," 5 April 1981, in “Alexander Haig, Department of State Day ﬁle, 5 April,” Papers of Alexan-
der Haig, Box 147, LC.

77. The memorandum of conversation from the meeting is still classiﬁed in both U.S. and Israeli
archives. Luckily, Israeli journalist Shlomo Nakdimon had access to the Israeli memorandum. Lui
included it in his book and also read out the note verbatim at a conference. See Nakdimon, Tammuz
Belehavot, P. 203; and Shlomo Nakdimon, speech (presented at the “Menachem Begin’s Heritage”
conference, Tel Aviv, 21 Marzo 2002, P. 53.

78. Nakdimon, speech.

79. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: Scribner, 1984),
P. 183.

80. Veliotes, interview.

81. Feith, interview.

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Pulcini and Rabinowitz

background. Polarized attitudes toward Israel further complicated the ﬂow of
information and opinions within the administration and prevented a deep
understanding of the situation.

The Administration’s Initial Reaction—Shock
and Condemnation

On 7 Giugno 1981, the Israelis conducted the raid against the Osirak nuclear
reactor with F-16 jets purchased from the United States under a 1952 bi-
lateral agreement. That agreement prohibited Israel from using U.S.-bought
weapons to attack its neighbors unless doing so was an act of “legitimate self-
defense.”82 The raid also represented a potential legal challenge in light of the
Arms Export Control Act (AECA) Di 1976. The ensuing legal debate within
the White House and on Capitol Hill focused on whether the raid violated
the AECA, which prohibited the use of U.S.-supplied weapons except in self-
defense.83

The administration was profoundly surprised by the raid—Reagan him-
self was “astounded”—especially given the “absence of any prior consultation”
by Israel.84 Still, Reagan’s national security adviser, Richard V. Allen, recalled
that after Reagan was briefed about the raid he commented, “boys will be
boys.”85 Despite the surprise of the attack, the president sympathized with the
Israelis. A startled Haig was also directly briefed by the Israeli ambassador to
Washington.86

The international community’s reaction was critical of the Israelis, who
were condemned by friends and foes alike.87 Arab media speculated about

82. NSC memorandum 3494, for Richard V. Allen, from Robert M. Kimmit [NSC staffer], “Subject:
Israeli Strike—Legal Aspects," 11 Giugno 1981, in Iraq (Israel Strike on Iraqi Nuclear Facility, 6/8/81)
[1 Di 6], Executive Secretariat—Country File: Iran-Iraq, Box 37 (Box 68), RRL.

83. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Public Law 94-329, 30 Giugno
1976, 94th Cong.; and Ghassan Bishara, “The Political Repercussions of the Israeli Raid on the Iraqi
Nuclear Reactor,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Primavera 1982), pag. 58–76.

84. Samuel Lewis, NOI. ambassador to Israel from 1977 A 1985, published this description. Vedere
Samuel W. Lewis, “The United States and Israel: Constancy and Change,” in Quandt, ed., The Middle
East, P. 230; Veliotes, interview; Feith, interview; and Pickering, interview; and White, interview.

85. Richard V. Allen, “Reagan’s Secure Line," Il New York Times, 7 Giugno 2010, P. A23.

86. Top secret telegram, 6667, from Washington embassy to the Foreign Ofﬁce, “Subject: Iraqi Reac-
tor,” Foreign Minister—eyes only, 7 Giugno 1981, in File 4341/3-א, INA.
87. Memorandum for Richard Allen, from the Situation Room, 10 Giugno 1981, in Iraq (Israel Strike on
Iraqi Nuclear Facility, 6/8/81) [4 Di 6], Executive Secretariat—Country File: Iran-Iraq, Box 37 (Box
68), RRL.

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The Reagan Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy and the Osirak Raid

NOI. involvement in the attack, and the Egyptians warned Washington that,
unless the administration stood “strongly against” the Israeli action, the Arab
world “would believe the U.S. was behind it.”88

Reagan’s national security team dedicated the morning after the attack, 8
Giugno, to the raid.89 The “Haig-Weinberger split,” which separated advocates
of closer strategic ties with Israel, such as Haig, from those who supported
a closer afﬁliation with the Arab world, led by Secretary of Defense Casper
Weinberger, was not evident in the Monday morning meeting.90 Reagan’s of-
ﬁcials shared similar negative views of the raid, and Weinberger called for
sanctions against Israel and for a suspension of deliveries of Israeli-bought
F-16 jets.91

According to notes describing the exchange between Haig and Israeli
diplomats, Weinberger also proposed a hard stance against Israel at the United
Nations (UN), targeting Israel’s nuclear program. Israel’s Dimona nuclear re-
actor, which started operating in 1963, was never put under IAEA inspections
because of Israel’s policy of nuclear ambiguity, which was an extremely sensi-
tive issue in U.S.-Israeli relations.92 According to Haig, Weinberger expressed
support for a UN resolution demanding that Israel open Dimona for inspec-
tion and calling on Israel to join the NPT.93 When news of the raid had broken
the previous day, Weinberger had told his interlocutor that Begin “must have

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88. Memorandum for Richard Allen, from the Situation Room, 9 Giugno 1981, P. 2, in Iraq (Israel Strike
on Iraqi Nuclear Facility, 6/8/81) [4 Di 6], Executive Secretariat—Country File: Iran-Iraq, Box 37
(Box 68), RRL; and “Situation Room Checklist," 12 Giugno 1981, Israel / Iraq Book II (3), Executive
Secretariat—Country File: Iran-Iraq, Box 37 (Box 68), RRL.

89. Allen, “Reagan’s Secure Line.”

90. This term was coined by Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conﬂict, P. 404. See also Toaldo, IL
Origins of U.S. War on Terror.

91. Weinberger had consistently rejected closer ties with Israel, stressing the importance of address-
ing “the needs of the Israelis without damaging [U.S.] relations with moderate Arab states.” Later, he
openly conveyed his dismay to Israeli leaders, expressing support for the opposition. See Memorandum
for the president, 8 Gennaio 1982, in Secretary Weinberger’s Weekly Report (1/9/1982–2/20/1982),
RAC Box 7, Executive Secretariat: Agency File, RRL; and Memorandum for the president, 13 Au-
gust 1982, in Secretary Weinberger’s Weekly Report (8/5/1982–8/27/1982), RAC Box 7, Executive
Secretariat: Agency File, RRL.

92. Austin G. Long and Joshua R. Shifrinson, “How Long until Midnight? Intelligence-Policy Rela-
tions and the United States Response to the Israeli Nuclear Program, 1959–1985,” Journal of Strategic
Studi, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2019), 55–90; Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1998); and Avner Cohen, The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel’s Bargain with the Bomb (Nuovo
York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

93. Top secret telegram, 5682, from the Israeli embassy in Washington to the Foreign Ofﬁce, 10 Giugno
1981, in ﬁle 4341/3-א, INA; and Top secret telegram, 5714, from the Israeli embassy in Washington
to the Foreign Ofﬁce, 10 Giugno 1981, in File 4341/3-א, INA.

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Pulcini and Rabinowitz

taken leave of his senses.”94 At the meeting, Vice President George Bush and
his chief of staff, James Baker, both concurred with Weinberger.95 Even Haig,
a supporter of close ties with Israel, called the raid “reckless.”96 The secretary of
state was “less vocal” than usual at the meeting and chose to support “ofﬁcial
American criticism of Israel.”97

The State Department announced that the administration “condemned”
Israel for the bombing, stressing the raid’s “unprecedented character.”98 Be-
hind the scenes, Haig told the Israeli ambassador that the Israeli “action in
Baghdad [had] caused a serious complication for the U.S., and President Rea-
gan thinks the same.”99 Administration ofﬁcials feared that Washington would
be blamed for the raid because of its close association with Israel.100 This
fear was compounded by the extreme precision of the attack, which indi-
cated to expert observers around the world that Israel must have had access to
“extremely precise targeting information to complete the operation without
refueling”; questo è, it must have had access to images from the U.S. KH-11
reconnaissance satellites.101 Many defense ofﬁcials, including Weinberger and
CIA Deputy Director Robert R. Inman, thought the raid, by exposing Wash-
ington to accusations of collusion, had severely undermined U.S. regional
interests.102

On 10 Giugno, much to the surprise of the Israelis, Haig declared the ad-
ministration’s decision to suspend the delivery of four F-16 jets to Israel. No
time frame was given for when the suspension might be lifted.103 Haig briefed

94. Azriel Bermant, Margaret Thatcher and the Middle East (Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University
Press, 2016), P. 61.

95. Top secret telegram, 4882, from the Israeli embassy in Washington to the Foreign Ofﬁce, 8 Giugno
1981, in File 4341/3-א, INA. See also Allen, “Reagan’s Secure Line.”
96. Claire, Raid on the Sun, pag. 219–220.

97. Allen, “Reagan’s Secure Line.”

98. Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. Says Air Strike May Violate Accord," Il New York Times, 9 Giugno
1981, P. A1.

99. Top secret telegram, 5083, from Washington Embassy to Foreign Ofﬁce, “Subject: Administration
Response," 9 Giugno 1981, in File 4341/3-א, INA.
100. Telegram, from Washington embassy to New Delhi, 12 Giugno 1981, in U.S.–West Asia Relations
(Middle East), WII/104/6/81, NAI, P. 2.

101. Israel had previously been given access to U.S. satellite images up to 200 miles from its borders,
clearly within the range needed for the raid. This practice, combined with bureaucratic inertia, had
allowed Israel to circumvent the agreed limits, according to Inman. Admiral Robert R. Inman, NOI.
Navy (Ret.), interview, Austin, TX, 27 Gennaio 2017.

102. Ibid.

103. Top secret telegram, 5682.

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The Reagan Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy and the Osirak Raid

the Israeli ambassador, telling him that Weinberger had demanded the sus-
pension of all military aid to Israel but that when Haig and Allen strongly
obiettato, the administration had decided the suspension would apply only
to the delivery of the four F-16 jets.104 Publicly, Haig conﬁrmed that the
raid potentially represented “a substantial violation” of the 1952 U.S.-Israeli
arms pact and that the administration was “conducting a review of the entire
matter.”105

Why were the Israelis surprised by the suspension of the F-16 deliveries?
Following the 5 April 1981 talk with Haig, Begin incorrectly believed that
Israel at the time of the raid was operating with Washington’s support—or its
partial support at least. According to Major General (ret.) David Ivry, com-
mander of the Israeli air force at the time of the raid, Begin construed Haig’s
statement

as if he had received a green light from the Americans . . . this was not the
American intention. . . . The Americans did not object to the attack because
they were never asked for their opinion and we never discussed it with them.106

Begin’s cabinet secretary, Arye Naor, concurs and explains that “the interpreta-
tion of the meeting in Israel was not identical to the interpretation in Reagan’s
circle, and this is the reason for his [Reagan’s] sense of insult and anger” by
the surprise of the raid.107

In the ﬁrst 72 hours after the raid, only a minority of Israel’s ﬁrmest
supporters, such as State Department Director of Policy Planning Paul Wol-
fowitz, openly expressed their satisfaction with it.108 At the Pentagon, Perle,
who was then assistant secretary of defense, stated that the raid was “a great
act of anti-proliferation.”109 Perle, together with Richard Burt, director of the
State Department’s Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, told British Ambas-
sador Nicholas Henderson that the raid was “a blow on behalf of nonprolifer-
ation,” irrespective of ofﬁcial public statements.110

104. Ibid.

105. NSC memorandum 3494, for Richard V. Allen from Robert M. Kimmit.

106. Major General (ret.) David Ivry, interview, Tel-Aviv, 6 Dicembre 2016.

107. Arye Naor, interview, Jerusalem, 29 Gennaio 2017. Nakdimon, who interviewed Begin, reached
the same conclusion. See Nakdimon, speech.

108. White, interview; and Feith, interview. White recalls Wolfowitz “giggling” at the brieﬁng.

109. Claire, Raid on the Sun, pag. 219–220.

110. Bermant, Margaret Thatcher and the Middle East, P. 61.

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Discovering the “Gap in Memory” and Lowering
the “Anti-Israeli Rhetoric in Town”

Even as the administration devised its response to the raid, NOI. ofﬁcials came
face to face with what Ambassador Lewis called a “gap” in the administration’s
“institutional memory.”111
In a detailed cable, Lewis described the
entire Carter-era dialogue, which left him “with no doubt that before the
Iraqi reactor became operational, the Israeli forces would destroy it.”112 Over
the following days, it became clear to top ofﬁcials that the highest leaders were
not fully informed on the issue.

Lewis’s cable took a few days to percolate to the top. Reagan’s diaries make
clear that as late as 9 Giugno, two days after the raid, he had not yet been ﬁlled
in on the history of the talks. With regard to Begin, he wrote, “He should
have told U.S. & the French, we could have done something to remove the
threat.”113 By contrast, Allen’s memorandum to Reagan on 15 June stressed
that “during the last months of the Carter administration, the State Depart-
ment knew of Jerusalem’s thinking on Iraq’s nuclear program, including the
determination to resort to force if diplomacy failed to eliminate the Iraqi nu-
clear threat.”114 On 16 Giugno, Reagan mentioned that “Israel & the previous
Admin. did communicate about Iraq & the nuclear threat & the U.S. agreed
it was a threat.”115 According to Kemp, Lewis’s memorandum “sobered us up”
and consequently “lowered the anti-Israeli rhetoric in town.”116

Lewis’s cable coincided with the Israeli effort to mitigate the potential
for a harsh U.S. reaction. In response to the relatively punitive backlash, Israel
launched an intensive public relations campaign in the press, in Congress, E
in the White House, justifying the decision to attack by divulging sensitive
intelligence on Iraq’s nuclear activities.117 Haig reported to Reagan that inside

111. Immediate cable, 7592, to SecState, from Tel-Aviv embassy, 9 Giugno 1981.

112. Ibid.

113. Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, P. 24.

114. Memorandum, 3547, for the president from Richard V. Allen, “Subject; Diplomatic Background
to Israeli Raid on Iraq’s Nuclear Reactor," 15 Giugno 1981, in Israel/Iraq—Book II (4/5), Executive
Secretariat—Country File: Israel-Iraq, Box 37 (Box 69), RRL.

115. Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, P. 25.

116. Geoff Kemp, email communication, 6 Gennaio 2018.

117. A document explaining Israel’s decision to attack was handed by Israeli ofﬁcials to their American
counterparts. See Memorandum, for Richard V. Allen, from Gene Rostow, ACDA, “Subject: Diplo-
matic and Nonproliferation Fall-Out from the Israeli Raid on Iraq," 19 Giugno 1981, in Israel/Iraq—
Book I (1), Executive Secretariat—Country File: Iran-Iraq, Box 37 (Box 69), RRL.

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The Reagan Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy and the Osirak Raid

Congress the “reaction spanned the full range, from open support to questions
of possible violations of U.S. arms sales legislation” and that Israel had begun
an intensive campaign to convince its supporters.118 Most of the diplomatic
“heavy lifting” was conducted by the ambassador and his staff, who briefed
members of Congress and White House ofﬁcials on Israel’s stance.119 The
Israelis also asked former President Richard Nixon to intervene and mediate
in the crisis.120

The effort was also supported by the American Israel Public Affairs Com-
mittee (AIPAC), which held brieﬁngs for senators to emphasize that the raid
was in Israel’s self-defense.121 From Israel’s perspective, the public relations
campaign seemed to have an almost immediate effect. On 12 Giugno, Israeli
diplomats reported to Jerusalem a mitigation of tone.122 Indian diplomats
based in Washington noted that, in “conﬁdential brieﬁngs, some ofﬁcials
voiced their understanding and even support” for Israel.123 A more careful
approach was, Infatti, forming in Washington. The discovery of the “gap” in
memory and the Israeli campaign contributed to this shift.

Constructing a Milder “Political Strategy”
of Response

The adoption of a more restrained, sober approach toward Israel is revealed
by the way the administration constructed its “political strategy for respond-
ing to Israeli attack.”124 Of all the executive ofﬁces, NSC staffers supported
the mildest response, though they stopped short of overt support of the raid.

118. Memorandum for the President from Alexander M. Haig, “Subject: Secretary Haig’s Evening
Report," 9 Giugno 1981, in Secretary Haig’s Evening Report (6/6/1981-7/2/1981), Executive Secretariat:
Agency File, RAC Box 6, RRL.

119. Telegram, 282, from Washington embassy to Foreign Ofﬁce, 16 Giugno 1981, in File: Prime Min-
ister Menachem Begin, USA, physical indicator: 4341/3-א, INA; and Secret telegram, 5172, to the
Washington ambassador, from Foreign Ofﬁce, “Subject: Iraqi Reactor," 9 Giugno 1981, in File 4341/3-
א, INA.
120. Nakdimon, Tammuz Belehavot, pag. 285–286.
121. Thomas A. Dine and Douglas M. Bloomﬁeld to Senator Charles Percy, n.d., in File 4341/3-א,
INA. Dine at the time was executive director of AIPAC, and Bloomﬁeld was legislative director.

122. Secret telegram, 6547, from Washington embassy to Foreign Ofﬁce, “Subject: ‘Israel-US Rela-
tions Following the Action against the Reactor," 12 Giugno 1981, in File 4341/3-א, INA.
123. Telegram, from Washington Embassy to New Delhi, 12 Giugno 1981, in Israel-Iraq Conﬂict, Min-
istry of External Affairs (MEA), WII/104/32/81, NAI, P. 1.

124. Memorandum for the president, from Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., acting [Secretary of State], “Sub-
ject: Political Strategy for Responding to Israeli Attack," 15 Giugno 1981, in Israel/Iraq—Book II (4/5),
Executive Secretariat—Country File: Israel-Iraq, Box 37 (Box 69), RRL.

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Raymond Tanter, Per esempio, recommended a “middle course of action,” one
that would distance the United States from the strike “while avoiding extreme
measures designed to punish Israel.”125 Douglas J. Feith took the debate a step
further by stating that “no rebuke of Israel’s raid against Iraq should be issued
without an equally emphatic rebuke of Iraq.”126

One clearly pro-Israeli voice belonged to Rostow. For him, the raid was
framed by the Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union, and he contended
that the administration should “lead great coalitions” to “restore the policy
of containment” and reinstate “world public order.”127 He stressed that Israel
should basically be given an exemption from the NPT on the grounds that
“no one can ask or expect nations facing destruction to adhere to the NPT or
accept IAEA inspection in good faith.”128

Haig also departed from Weinberger’s critical line by introducing a third,
intermediate approach to the issue, plotting a path between Weinberger and
the NSC.129 His suggested political strategy, approved by Reagan on 12 Giugno,
also took a milder course compared to the initial condemnation of 8 June.130
The policy was constructed around the notion of red lines. Rather than the
line proposed by the NSC, the United States would harshly condemn Israel
but would also “draw the line on punishment,” making clear that “if Israel is
expelled from the UN General Assembly, or any other UN body, NOI. partici-
pation would be jeopardized.”131

On 16 June Reagan publicly addressed the raid. Adopting the proposed
“mirrored rebuke,” he stated that “Israel had reason for concern” because of

125. NSC memorandum 3360, for Richard V. Allen, from Raymond Tanter, “Subject: Israel’s Air
Strike on Iraq’s Nuclear Facility," 9 Giugno 1981, in Iraq (Israel Strike on Iraqi Nuclear Facility, 6/8/81)
[4 Di 6], Executive Secretariat—Country File: Iran-Iraq, Box 37 (Box 68), RRL.

126. Feith’s argument was based on the fact that Iraq had continually refused to acknowledge Israel’s
existence and was ofﬁcially at war with it. See NSC memorandum 3368, for Richard V. Allen, from
Douglas J. Feith, “Subject: Israeli Raid on Iraqi Nuclear Facility," 9 Giugno 1981, in Iraq (Israel Strike on
Iraqi Nuclear Facility, 6/8/81) [4 Di 6], Executive Secretariat—Country File: Iran-Iraq, Box 37 (Box
68), RRL.

127. Secret memorandum from ACDA Director-Designate Eugene Rostow to all participants in the
NSC meeting, “Subject: Additional Comment on NSC Discussion Paper: Nuclear Nonproliferation
and Nuclear Cooperation," 11 Giugno 1981, in “NSC00014, 12 June 1981,” Executive Secretariat:
Meeting Files, Box NSC 11-20 (Box 91282), RRL.

128. Ibid.

129. In addition to the “Haig-Weinberger split,” National Security Adviser Allen continually clashed
with Haig. See Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conﬂict, P. 403.

130. Conﬁdential, memorandum for the President, from Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., “Subject: NOI. Strat-
egy for UN Security Council Meeting on the Israeli Raid on the Iraqi Nuclear Facility," 12 Giugno
1981, in Israel/Iraq-Book I (1), Executive Secretariat—Country File: Israel-Iraq, Box 37 (Box 69),
RRL.

131. Ibid.; emphasis added.

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The Reagan Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy and the Osirak Raid

Iraq’s history and that “Israel might have sincerely believed that [the attack]
was a defensive move.”132 Haig’s deputy, Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., repeated these
points to the Senate and admitted that the United States had “long been con-
cerned about the Iraqi nuclear facility.”133

Assessing the Legality of the Raid and Lifting
the Suspension

Another aspect of the U.S. response to the Israeli raid was the suspension of
the F-16 deliveries. The suspension prompts several questions: Was the raid
a legitimate, legal act within a “self-defense” framework? Or was it an illegal,
unprovoked attack in violation of the arms agreement? The Iraqi installation
era, after all, an IAEA-safeguarded nuclear facility, established by an NPT
member-state, attacked by a non-member-state. Reagan, like other observers,
expected an ofﬁcial ﬁnding on the raid’s legality. Showing his positive senti-
ments for Israel, he conﬁded in his diary on 10 June that, if Congress found
that Israel had indeed violated the agreement, “I’ll grant a Presidential waiver.
Iraq is technically still at war with Israel & I believe they were preparing to
build an atom bomb.”134

Tuttavia, no presidential waiver proved to be necessary. The new discov-
ery regarding the so-called “gap” in institutional memory, Quale, given Haig’s
discussion with Begin in April, was not a “gap” but more of a bungle, changed
the tone in the White House. A week after the raid— unbeknownst to the Is-
raelis, who were still extremely concerned and disappointed about losing the
jets—the suspension of the F-16 deliveries was approaching its end.135 The
administration was backing away from its declared intention to conduct a le-
gal review of the raid. Allen informed Reagan that the administration was “not
required to make a legal determination on whether Israel violated U.S. law”
and commented that the issue of the raid was “to be treated as a political rather

132. Ronald Reagan: “The President’s News Conference," 16 Giugno 1981, in The American Presidency
Project, available online at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/index.php.

133. “Statement by Walter J. Stoessel before the Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and
International Security and Scientiﬁc Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee," 17 Giugno 1981,
in Iraq (Israel Strike on Iraqi Nuclear Facility, 6/8/81) [3 Di 6], Executive Secretariat—Country File:
Iran-Iraq, Box 37 (Box 68), RRL; and “Statement by Walter J. Stoessel before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee," 18 Giugno 1981, in Gerard Smith Personal Papers, Box 33, DDEL, P. 2.

134. Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, P. 24.

135. Top secret telegram, 6191, from Washington embassy to Foreign Ofﬁce, “Subject: Evron—The
President," 11 Giugno 1981, in File 4341/3-א, INA.

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Pulcini and Rabinowitz

than a legal question.”136 Stoessel agreed: “We will try to avoid an extended
congressional review which could interfere with our decision to resume F-16
deliveries when we deem that step desirable.”137 Although the White House
and Congress debated the legal implications of the raid, no ofﬁcial determi-
nation was ever made. Political concerns prevailed over legal matters, and the
suspension was ofﬁcially lifted on 17 agosto 1981.138 Whether the Israelis
were informed about U.S. intentions prior to this date is unclear.

Rostow, a former law professor, offered a legal interpretation of the raid
that was not ofﬁcially endorsed. He stated, “The Israeli move parallels our
own behavior in the Cuban Missile Crisis, and represents a similar combina-
tion of circumstances. . . . [Both] come within the inherent right of a state
to defend itself under article 51 del [UN] Charter.”139 Arthur J. Goldberg,
former associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States and a for-
mer permanent representative of the United States to the UN, sent a letter
to Begin offering his own legal analysis, which concluded that the raid was
indeed legal.140

Indian diplomats speculated at the time that the ﬁghter jet suspension
may have been a U.S. gesture of goodwill toward Egyptian President Anwar
el-Sadat, aimed at appeasing him and keeping the embryonic peace process
with Israel alive.141 A memorandum from Haig reinforces this view, stating
that the Israelis were dismayed at the “Egyptian intervention in this impor-
tant bilateral U.S.-Israeli matter.”142 The lifting of the suspension might have
been coordinated with Sadat, who, according to Haig, had asked for “day-
light” between his visit to Washington and the announcement of resumed
deliveries.143 Further research is required to determine the depth of Sadat’s

136. Memorandum 3553, for the President, from Richard V. Allen, “Subject: Political Strategy for
Responding to Israeli Attack,” n.d., attached to Stoessel memorandum from 15 Giugno 1981, In
Israel/Iraq—Book II (4/5), Executive Secretariat—Country File: Israel-Iraq, Box 37 (Box 69), RRL;
emphasis in original.

137. Memorandum for the president, from Stoessel, Jr., “Subject: Political Strategy for Responding to
Israeli Attack," 15 Giugno 1981.

138. Richard F. Grimmett, “U.S. Defense Articles and Services Supplied to Foreign Recipients: Re-
strictions on Their Use," 14 Marzo 2005, Congressional Research Service, P. 6.

139. Secret memorandum from ACDA Director-Designate Eugene Rostow, 11 Giugno 1981.

140. Telegram, 288, from Yossi Gal, Washington embassy, to PM’s ofﬁce, 16 Giugno 1981, in File
8470/12, INA.

141. Cable from Embassy Baghdad to Foreign Ministry in Delhi, 11 Giugno 1981, in U.S.-West Asia
Relations (Middle East), MEA, WII/104/6/81, NAI.

142. Memorandum for the president from Alexander M. Haig, “Subject: Secretary Haig’s Evening
Report," 13 agosto 1981, Secretary Haig’s Evening Report (7/30/1981–8/17/1981), Executive Secre-
tariat: Agency File, RAC Box 6, RRL.

143. Ibid.

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The Reagan Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy and the Osirak Raid

involvement and whether the administration would have lifted the suspen-
sion earlier, had it not been for Sadat’s request (or later in the absence of
Israel’s efforts to get the deliveries resumed).144

Domestic and International Implications for the
Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy

Following the logic of the “red lines,” the U.S. government endorsed the in-
ternational condemnation of the Israeli raid at the UN. With the support of
the U.S. delegation, SU 19 June the UN Security Council (UNSC) unani-
mously adopted Resolution 487.145 The resolution “strongly” condemned the
attack and stated, in opposition to Rostow’s legal analysis, that it was “in clear
violation” of the UN Charter.146 The resolution also stated that the attack was
a serious threat to the “entire safeguards regime” of the IAEA and stressed
that Israel should “urgently place its nuclear facilities under safeguards,” also
specifying that Iraq was entitled to redress.147

On Capitol Hill, congressional debate moved from considering the raid
itself to scrutinizing the administration’s intentions regarding its emerging
nonproliferation policy. This review transpired weeks before the release of
NSDD 6 and before the White House had the opportunity to introduce
its new proposed policy to Congress and the public. In the wake of the
Israeli attack, the NNPA “was pulled off the congressional shelf, dusted off
and read carefully” by congressional members who had a newfound interest in
nonproliferation.148

Administration ofﬁcials addressing the raid were asked to comment on
the administration’s stance toward the nuclear programs of Pakistan and India
and on Reagan’s nonproliferation agenda.149 Almost unanimously, congres-
sional representatives stated the importance of preserving and reinforcing the
existing domestic and international rules and legislation on proliferation when

144. The authors are grateful to the journal’s anonymous reviewers for this comment.

145. For the original text of the resolution, see UNSC Resolution 487, adopted 19 Giugno 1981, Ofﬁcial
Document System of the United Nations, https://documents.un.org/prod/ods.nsf/home.xsp.

146. Ibid., Article 1.

147. Ibid., Articles 1, 5, E 6.

148. “The Mood of Congress after the Israeli Bombing of the Iraqi Reactor,” Nucleonics Week, Vol. 22,
No. 24 (1981), P. 4.

149. “Testimony of Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, James
Buckley, NOI. Senate Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Government Processes,
Hearing," 24 Giugno 1981, in Gerard Smith Personal Papers, Box 33, DDEL.

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Pulcini and Rabinowitz

discussing the Osirak raid. On 18 Giugno, Stoessel sought to deﬂect congres-
sional criticism by testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
that the administration’s “nonproliferation policy guidelines” were soon to be
released. Toning down the emphasis on change and ﬂexibility that had dom-
inated the internal debate in the previous months, he now stressed the need
for strict control and highlighted U.S. support for “global adherence [A], E
respect for, the most stringent safeguards.”150

The same cautious approach was evident in testimony given by other
administration ofﬁcials.151 The White House had no chance to win a con-
frontation on the NNPA revision without causing a major clash in Congress,
and the issue was simply dropped. Not surprisingly, NSDD 6 did not contain
any speciﬁc reference to revision of existing U.S. nonproliferation legislation,
nor did Reagan’s ofﬁcial statement of 16 Luglio.

The IAEA’s safeguard system was another recurrent item of discussion
during the congressional debate on the raid. Its credibility was questioned,
especially after Roger Richter, a former IAEA inspector, gave controversial
testimony.152

The U.S. government was aware of the negative impact the Israeli bomb-
ing could have on the IAEA and on the credibility of the international
nonproliferation regime. An interagency intelligence assessment from July
warned of the raid’s damaging impact on “the Nonproliferation Treaty and
the IAEA safeguard system” and argued that it might enhance Third World
sympathies for an Arab nuclear deterrent.153 U.S. ofﬁcials also feared that India
might decide to attack Pakistani nuclear facilities in a similar fashion, thus es-
tablishing a pattern that could disrupt the existing nonproliferation regime.154

150. “Statement by Walter Stoessel before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” pp. 2–3.

151. “Hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Government Pro-
cesses, Committee on Governmental Affairs," 24 Giugno 1981, in Gerard Smith Personal Papers, Box
33, DDEL.

152. Roger Richter, “Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee," 19 Giugno 1981, In
Gerard Smith Personal Papers, Box 33, DDEL, pag. 2–3; UN. O. Sulzberger Jr., “Ex-Inspector Asserts
Iraq Planned to Use Reactor to Build A-Bombs," Il New York Times, 20 Giugno 1981, sec. 1, P. 1;
Eliot Marshall, “Fallout of the Raid on Iraq,” Science, Vol. 213, No. 4503 (1981), pag. 116–120; E
“Hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Government Processes,
Committee on Governmental Affairs,” pp. 14–15.

153. “Implications of Israel Attack on Iraq,” Interagency Intelligence Assessment, 1 Luglio 1981, pag. 2–
3, Document Number (FOIA)/ESDN (CREST): 0000211961, in CIA, FOIA Electronic Reading
Room (ERR), https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/.

154. “India’s Reaction to Nuclear Developments in Pakistan,” Special NIE, 1 settembre 1981, In
CIA, FOIA ERR.

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The Reagan Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy and the Osirak Raid

The September 1982 Decision to Withdraw
from the IAEA

The international community was critical of the raid, and diplomatic bat-
tles over Israel’s status began to play out in the IAEA and its General Con-
ference (GC) in the months that followed. For the Reagan administration,
the two policy questions stemming from the raid converged: how to han-
dle the diplomatic fallout, and how to keep the IAEA from being hopelessly
politicized.

After the raid, some administration ofﬁcials revisited their views of the
role of the IAEA and the NPT. Rostow, Per esempio, stressed that “the princi-
ples of the NPT and the IAEA should be the lodestars of our policy,” adding
that the IAEA is “is the only mechanism there is.”155 Later he added that
expulsion of Israel from the agency would “gravely weaken the IAEA as an
institution and endanger our nonproliferation objectives in the Middle East.”
He went so far as to warn that expulsion could lead Israel to reconsider its
policy of nuclear ambiguity.156

The second casualty of the raid, in addition to Iraq’s reactor, era, there-
fore, the IAEA’s credibility.157 In 1982, the administration raised “questions
concerning the credibility and reliability of IAEA safeguards,” and both the
Senate and the House held special hearings on the “technical and institutional
shortcomings” of the agency.158 Richard T. Kennedy, Reagan’s representative
to the IAEA, raised similar concerns, stressing the “uneven” nature of the or-
ganization’s safeguard system.159

settembre 1981 found the atmosphere at the IAEA’s annual GC meeting
ripe for conﬂict. The U.S. delegation was instructed by Haig to address the
anticipated “severe attack” against Israel. Building on Haig’s “red lines strat-
egy” employed at the UN Security Council, the delegation was told to “go

155. Secret memorandum from ACDA Director-Designate Eugene Rostow, 11 Giugno 1981.

156. Memorandum for the president, from Eugene Rostow, “Subject: Arms Control Issues Affecting
the Middle East, Middle East Nuclear-Free Zone," 5 novembre 1981, Guhin Michael Files, Box 1
(RAC Box 2,3,4,6,), RRL.

157. IAEA ofﬁcials staged their own counter-campaign. See Sigvard Eklund, “Attack on the Iraqi
Nuclear Research Center," 7 Giugno 1981, in Achille Albonetti’s personal papers, Box 200, Roma Tre
Università; and Hans Gruemm, “Safeguards and Tamuz: Setting the Record Straight,” IAEA Bulletin,
Vol. 23, No. 4 (1981), pag. 10–14.

158. United States Executive Ofﬁce of the President, “Report to the Congress Pursuant to Section
601 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978: For the Year Ending December 31, 1981," 1982,
pag. 23–24, in DNSA.

159. Ibid., pag. 24–25.

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along regretfully with a condemnation but object vigorously [A] suspension
of technical aid.”160

Haig informed Reagan that the U.S. delegation would “condemn exclu-
sion of Israel” but would not walk out; Tuttavia, if Israel’s IAEA membership
was suspended, the U.S. delegation “would immediately withdraw from the
meeting,” and the United States would reassess “participation in the IAEA.”161
The difference between the two paths, exclusion and suspension, is impor-
tant. Suspension would have amounted to the ofﬁcial expulsion of Israel, UN
harsh move requiring a two-thirds majority vote. D'altra parte, the mo-
tion to reject the credentials of the Israeli delegation would qualify as a “slap
on the wrist”; Israel would still ofﬁcially be a member of the IAEA, but its
delegation to the meeting would not be ofﬁcially recognized. Consequently,
it would be barred from participating in the remainder of that speciﬁc GC
meeting.162

On 26 settembre 1981, the GC adopted Resolution 381, which called
for the IAEA to consider suspending Israel if it failed to comply with UN
Security Council Resolution 487; questo è, if it refused to open the Dimona
site for inspection.163 Conﬁrming an earlier decision by the agency’s board,
the GC immediately suspended any aid to Israel under the IAEA assistance
program.

Because no one expected that Israel would reconsider its policy of nu-
clear ambiguity and open its Dimona installation for inspections, GC Res-
olution 381 effectively called for Israel’s suspension from the IAEA, paving
the way to a second showdown in September 1982. A July 1982 NOI. Na-
tional Intelligence Estimate on proliferation trends noted a “global accumu-
lation of information damaging to the IAEA.”164 It also predicted “a major

160. Memorandum for the president from Alexander M. Haig, “Subject: Secretary Haig’s Evening
Report," 15 settembre 1981, in Secretary Haig’s Evening Report (9/5/1981–10/11/1981), Executive
Secretariat: Agency File, RAC Box 6, RRL.

161. Ibid.; emphasis added.

162. A similar vote was used to reject the credentials of the South African delegation to the IAEA
In 1979. See “Negotiating Global Nuclearities: Apartheid, Decolonization, and the Cold War in the
Making of the IAEA,” in John Krige and Kai-Henrik Barth, eds., “Global Power Knowledge: Scienza,
Tecnologia, and International Affairs,” Osiris, Vol. 21 (2006), pag. 25–48.

163. See IAEA, “Military Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Research Centre and Its Implications for
the Agency,” resolution adopted during the 237th Plenary Meeting on 26 settembre 1981,
GC(XXV)/RES/381, available online at https://www.iaea.org/. For a treatment of Israel’s policy of
nuclear ambiguity and its unsafeguarded nuclear site at Dimona, see Cohen, Israel and the Bomb; E
Rabinowitz, Bargaining on Nuclear Tests.

164. NIE-4-82, “Nuclear Proliferation Trends through 1987,” July 1982, published in NPIHP Re-
search Update, No. 1, WCDA and available online at https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org.

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The Reagan Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy and the Osirak Raid

indictment of IAEA effectiveness,” causing a detrimental impact on the entire
international regime if the agency’s political and technical deﬁciencies were
not remedied.165

The summer of 1982 saw several diplomatic moves against Israel at UN
agencies, most of them motivated by Israel’s invasion of Lebanon.166 Israel’s
IAEA status at the September 1982 GC meeting was of particular concern,
prompting Kennedy to warn a British diplomat that attempts to “score a
few cheap political points” by undermining the UN principle of universal-
ity would induce the administration to reconsider “whether those institutions
were any longer able to serve their purpose.”167

Prior to the GC meeting, some British diplomats wondered whether the
replacement of the pro-Israeli Haig with the more moderate George P. Shultz
could “lead the U.S. to adopt a slightly less pro-Israel position.”168 They were
informed that, with Haig’s departure, “the attitude of Washington to the sus-
pension of Israel had hardened.”169 Days before the GC meeting convened,
the Europeans already understood that the U.S. delegation would likely “walk
out of the conference and review its policy towards the agency” if Israel lost
the suspension vote. The Europeans were unsure what action they ought to
take, and in the end they “all decided to abstain” from the vote.170

Eventually, the harsher vote on Israel’s suspension was defeated, and the
milder vote to reject its credentials was adopted.171 In a departure from Haig’s

165. Ibid.

166. These included consideration of a proposal to deny Israel’s UN credentials, discussed in June
1982 in Havana by members of the Non-Aligned Movement, in addition to three anti-Israeli
resolutions passed by the UN General Assembly in August 1982 with European abstention. Vedere
Memorandum for the president, from Alexander M. Haig, “Subject: Secretary Haig’s Evening Report,"
1 Giugno 1982, Secretary Haig’s Evening Report (5/21/1982–6/9/1982), Executive Secretariat: Agency
File, Box 91376, RRL; and Memorandum for the president, from George P. Shultz, “Subject: Secre-
tary of State Evening Report," 19 agosto 1982, Secretary of State Evening Report (8/8/82–9/1/82),
Executive Secretariat: Agency File, Box 91376, RRL.

167. D. M. D. Thomas, British embassy in Washington, to W. J. Adams, FCO, “Suspension of Israel
from the IAEA," 22 Luglio 1982, in FCO 58/2894, Israel and the IAEA, TNAUK.

168. Memorandum, “Subject: Suspension of Israel from the IAEA,” from I. R Kenyon to Gilmore,
attached to Gossling’s letter of 8 Luglio 1982, in FCO 58/2894, Israel and the IAEA, TNAUK.

169. Gossling to K. Haskell, NED FCO, 16 Luglio 1982, in FCO 58/2894, Israel and the IAEA,
TNAUK.

170. Memorandum for the president from Alexander M. Haig, “Subject: Secretary Haig’s Evening Re-
port," 26 settembre 1981, Secretary Haig’s Evening Report (9/5/1981–10/11/1981), Executive Sec-
retariat: Agency File, RAC Box 6, RRL; and N. C. R. Williams to Haskell, “Israel/IAEA," 9 settembre
1982, in FCO 58/2894, Israel and the IAEA, TNAUK.

171. As for the ﬁrst attempt, regarding the “Consideration of the Suspension of Israel,” the vote took
place on 23 settembre 1982; 43 members voted in favor, 27 voted against, E 16 abstained. Così
the required two thirds majority of 47 votes was not reached, and the proposal was defeated. After the

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1981 policy, two hours before the vote the U.S. delegation received new in-
structions requiring a walkout if the meeting rejected Israel’s credentials.172
For the agency, NOI. withdrawal meant the suspension of Washington’s ﬁnan-
cial contributions, which could lead to “severe program cuts” and jeopardize
IAEA activities.173 Of the agency’s proposed 1983 budget of $82 million, the U.S. contribution was expected to cover 25 percent.174 The “safeguards” com- ponent of that budget amounted to $52 million.175

A State Department source told the press that the U.S. government hoped
the walkout would discourage “similar challenges to Israel” at the UN.176 Soon
after, Shultz informed Reagan that the State Department was studying “the
legal implications of withdrawing from the UNGA [UN General Assembly]
including options for deferring, reducing or stopping our ﬁnancial contribu-
tions.”177 Congress supported the administration, passing a resolution in early
December that called for the government to withhold contributions to any
other UN agency that expelled Israel.178

But the withdrawal was surprisingly short-lived. It was followed by the
establishment of an interagency group to conduct a three-month policy re-
assessment. Although a State Department source told the press that the
reassessment “must be a very serious one,” in reality it was non-existent.179
Before it was concluded, the administration had already decided to resume

ﬁrst vote failed to reach a majority, resulting in a tie of 40 in favor, 40 against, E 6 abstentions, IL
representative from Madagascar, who was not in the room for the original vote, asked to record his vote
despite his abstention. Therefore, an amended result was accepted, and the resolution passed, con 41
votes for and 40 against. See “Record of the 26th Plenary Meeting of the IAEA General Conference,"
24 settembre 1982, in GC (XXVI)/OR.246, May 1983, IAEA Archive, Vienna, pag. 7–11.

172. Roger Kirk, “The Suspension of U.S. Participation in the IAEA: 1982–1983,” in International
Atomic Energy Agency: Personal Reﬂections (Vienna: IAEA, 1997), P. 98.

173. Ibid., P. 100.

174. “Scale of Assessment of Members’ Contribution for 1983,” IAEA GC, 26th Regular Session,
Item 11 of the Provisional Agenda, GC XXVI/671, 11 agosto 1982, in IAEA Archive.

175. “Appendix: Members’ Contribution to the Agency’s Regular Budget for 1983,” attached to “Scale
of Assessment of Members’ Contribution for 1983,” 11 agosto 1982, IAEA GC, 26th Regular Session,
Item 11 of the Provisional Agenda, GC XXVI/671, 11 agosto 1982, in IAEA Archive.

176. Judith Miller, “U.S. Walks Out as Atom Parley Bars the Israelis," Il New York Times, 25 Septem-
ber 1982, P. 1.

177. Memorandum, 53800, for the President, from George P. Shultz, “Subject: Arab Threat to Israeli
Credentials at 37th General Assembly," 12 ottobre 1982, in Israel 1982, 10/15/1982–10/19/1982,
Box 3, Geoffrey Kemp Collection, RRL.

178. H.Con.Res. 322, 97th Cong., “A Concurrent Resolution Regarding Membership in the United
Nations General Assembly," 1982.

179. Mugnaio, “U.S. Walks Out as Atom Parley Bars the Israelis.”

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The Reagan Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy and the Osirak Raid

full participation in the IAEA. This transpired in February 1983, once the
IAEA’s Board of Governors had clariﬁed Israel’s status.180

In a report to Congress, the administration explained that it had with-
drawn from the agency because of “the seriously disturbing trend by some
IAEA member states to introduce extraneous and divisive political issues” into
the agency’s deliberations.181 However, the administration explained, given the
unique tasks of the IAEA, its critical role, and the lack of alternatives for its
safeguards system, the United States would resume participation.182 The ad-
ministration clariﬁed that the decision was also based on commitments given
by key member-states to support U.S. efforts “to reduce extraneous political
controversy” in the agency.183

The U.S. withdrawal was thus successful in convincing the Europeans
to cooperate with the United States in subsequent GC votes. In the October
1983 meeting, a fresh attempt by the Iraqis to expel the Israelis was defeated
by a ﬁrm U.S.-European front.184 The 1985 ACDA report to the Congress,
an extensive account aimed at presenting the administration’s arms control
and nonproliferation achievements, conﬁrmed Washington’s lingering doubts
surrounding the agency. Most of the discussion of the IAEA focused on its
politicization and the impact that this political malfunction had on its overall
technical credibility.185 Although Israel’s position within the agency remained
ﬁrm throughout Reagan’s presidency, the conﬂict over Israel’s IAEA status re-
mained a bone of contention, and technical assistance to Israel was not re-
stored until 1994.186

180. Kirk, “The Suspension of U.S. Participation in the IAEA,” pp. 101–103.

181. Report to the Congress Pursuant to Section 601 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978:
For the Year Ending December 31, 1982,” n.d. [Gennaio 1983], P. 5, in DNSA.

182. Ibid.

183. Ibid., V-2. (In the original report the chapters are assigned Roman numerals and paginated sepa-
rately, V-2 is thus page 46 Di 91.)

184. “Record of the Two Hundred and Fifty-Sixth Plenary Meeting of the IAEA General Conference,"
14 ottobre 1983, pag. 3–5; and “Examination of Delegates’ Credentials—Report to the General Com-
mittee," 14 ottobre 1983, both available online at https://www.iaea.org/.

185. “U.S. ACDA 1985 Annual Report,” March 1986, pag. 85–88, in Gerard Smith Personal Papers,
Box 43, DDEL.

186. The Israeli government interpreted the restoration as an acknowledgement by the Agency that
IL 1981 strike was justiﬁed. Vedere: “Restoration of Technical Assistance to Israel,” A Statement made
by the president, Endorsed by General Conference on 23 settembre 1994, GC(XXXVIII)/DEC/19,
available online at https://www.iaea.org/. See also “Record of the 268 Plenary Meeting of the IAEA
General Conference," 28 settembre 1984, and “Provisional Record of the 284 Plenary Meeting of the
IAEA General Conference," 27 settembre 1985, both available online at https://www.iaea.org/.

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The Osirak Raid and the Perception of the Iraqi
Nuclear Effort during the Reagan Years

After the raid, and during the rest of Reagan’s presidency, the Iraqi nuclear
program was not considered a serious threat. Available assessments show that
different intelligence evaluations deemphasized the immediate danger of the
Iraqi nuclear program, though a minority still believed that Saddam Hussein
might be tempted to pursue one covertly.187

An interagency dispute in 1985 on the export of dual-use items to Bagh-
dad demonstrates the clash between State Department ofﬁcials, who adopted
a tolerant view of Iraq’s program, and Pentagon ofﬁcials like Perle, who sup-
ported a stricter, more suspicious view and urged Weinberger to delay the
shipment.188 Commenting on the episode, a State Department internal mem-
orandum stated that “DoD differed radically” from all other agencies (IL
Dipartimento di Stato, the CIA, and the Department of Energy) in its assessment
of the Iraqi nuclear threat.189 According to the document, the majority of
voices inside the administration believed that Iraq did “not have the resources
for a weapon-program development and will not have in a foreseeable fu-
ture.”190 (That assumption was proven to be incorrect in 1991.)191 ACDA
concurred with the assessment, and its 1985 annual report to the Congress
did not list Iraq as an existing proliferation threat.192

The Reagan administration was interested in establishing better relations
with Saddam Hussein, and this led to the resumption of diplomatic ties in
1984.193 From Washington’s perspective, the destruction of Osirak had re-
moved a diplomatic obstacle and a source of friction. The reactor’s absence

187. For one such assessment, see U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Estimative Brief: Prospects
for Iraq, 25 settembre 1984, P. 3, in DNSA.

188. For the view of the State Department, see U.S. Department of State, Ofﬁce of the Assistant
Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, “Letter to Secretary Weinberger on U.S.-Iraqi
Relations and Advanced Technology Exports to Iraq [Letter from George Shultz to Caspar Weinberger
Attached]," 29 April 1985, in DNSA. For Perle’s view, see U.S. Department of Defense, Ofﬁce of the
Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy, “High Technology Dual-Use Export to Iraq,"
[Letter from George P. Shultz to Caspar W. Weinberger, 30 April 1985, Attached], 1 Luglio 1985, In
DNSA.

189. NOI. Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, “Computers for Iraq:
DOD’s Proliferation Concerns," 3 April 1986, P. 1, in DNSA.

190. Ibid.

191. Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Unclear Physics, pag. 169–195.

192. NOI. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Annual Report, 1985, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
Washington DC, Marzo 1986, pag. 85–88.

193. Iraq had severed diplomatic relations with the United States during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
Ties were restored in November 1984 after a visit of the president’s special envoy Donald Rumsfeld

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The Reagan Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy and the Osirak Raid

thus allowed for a rapprochement with Baghdad, something the United States
had been seeking since the late 1970s.

The Aftermath of the Episode

For the Reagan administration, the Osirak raid presented a nonproliferation
dilemma. Was it an act that undermined U.S. nonproliferation efforts by
subverting the NPT, the IAEA, and the nonproliferation regime in general,
institutions the administration supported? Or was it an “anti-proliferation op-
eration” that complemented the U.S. strategy to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons in the Middle East?194 After all, strikes against hostile nuclear pro-
grams had not been considered illegitimate in principle by former presidents.
Plans to launch a ﬁrst strike against an imminent Soviet threat were considered
as early as the 1950s by U.S. war planners, and attacks were also considered
against China and Pakistan by Reagan’s predecessors.195

The administration was also truly surprised by Osirak. Absorbed by more
urgent matters in the region, the administration underestimated Israeli con-
cerns and intentions toward the reactor. A bad ﬂow of communication and
continual internal friction over U.S. policy in the Middle East further pre-
vented a clear understanding of the threat posed by the Iraqi program, even
though it was thoroughly deliberated during Carter’s ﬁnal year in ofﬁce.

The raid, once it took place, raised questions about U.S. nonprolifer-
ation policy, U.S.-Israeli relations, NOI. geostrategic interests in the Middle
East, and broader Cold War considerations. It also revealed an intricate inter-
nal power struggle that inﬂuenced the U.S. response throughout the episode
and separated the supporters of closer ties with Israel from those who opposed
the raid. The different approaches often produced conﬂicting policies, as ex-
empliﬁed by the F-16 suspension.

in December 1983. Rumsfeld and members of the Iraqi government discussed the improvement of
the U.S.-Iraq relationship. Vedere, Per esempio, Cable, United States Embassy, Italy, “Rumsfeld’s Larger
Meeting with Iraqi Deputy PM and FM Tariz [Tariq] Aziz, December 19,” 20 Dicembre 1983, In
DNSA (date of meeting and date of cable are different).

194. For media reference to the attack as an “anti-proliferation” act, see Ernst Conine, “Nuclear Non-
proliferation: Israel Had to Do the Job by Itself,” Los Angeles Times, 15 Giugno 1981, quoted in Feldman,
“The Bombing of Osiraq—Revisited,” pp. 130–131 n. 40.

195. David Alan Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy,
1945–1960,” International Security, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Primavera 1983), pag. 3–71; William Burr and Jef-
frey Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle’: The United States and the Chinese
Nuclear Program, 1960–64,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000–2001), pag. 54–99;
and Or Rabinowitz, Bargaining on Nuclear Tests, pag. 143–144. A decade later, the Clinton administra-
tion also considered an attack against North Korea. See Jamie McIntyre, “Washington Was on Brink
of War with North Korea 5 Years Ago,” CNN, 4 ottobre 1999.

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Pulcini and Rabinowitz

These contradictory inputs resulted in an uneven response that attempted
to achieve several conﬂicting goals. On the one hand, the NNPA was not re-
vised during Reagan’s presidency because a public endorsement of a more re-
laxed nonproliferation policy became difﬁcult to support. D'altra parte,
the administration adopted a blasé approach to Iraq’s nuclear program after
the raid, failing to notice Saddam Hussein’s covert nuclear effort.196

The “gap” of “institutional memory” also showed an initial lack of atten-
tion to, or even interest in, halting nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.
The interagency intelligence assessments of July and September 1981 evalu-
ated the impact of the raid, including the potentially harmful and destabi-
lizing consequences. Allo stesso modo, the resumption of full IAEA participation just
ﬁve months after the initial withdrawal and the decision to avoid any sub-
stantial reassessment of the agency’s role demonstrate that the withdrawal was
mainly a statement in support of Israel’s status inside international agencies
and was used as a bargaining chip vis-à-vis Washington’s European allies.

Some U.S. government ofﬁcials did view the IAEA with suspicion, E
this skepticism contributed to the withdrawal. But in the end, the more mod-
erate view, which saw the IAEA as a crucial element of the nonproliferation
regime, prevailed. The episode contributed to the growing sense of mistrust
toward the agency and its political neutrality. The subsequent debate on Capi-
tol Hill, coupled with assessments of the role of the IAEA, proved that the
United States during the Reagan years considered the agency the weak link
of the international nonproliferation regime. For some Pentagon ofﬁcials, IL
Osirak episode left a long-lasting impression that Iraq’s program was still sus-
picious and that the IAEA was not a reliable instrument for safeguarding it.

As for the consequences for U.S.-Israeli relations, the fact that the ad-
ministration supported a relatively tough approach against Israel in the UN
Security Council is notable. The discussion of political strategy exempliﬁed
by the adoption of Resolution 487 tested the limits of U.S. support for Israel
and delineated the administration’s support for the existing nonproliferation
regime and, by extension, the U.S. government’s commitment to the IAEA
and the NPT. But even though the administration was willing to join a harsh,
unanimous condemnation of Israel, the line was drawn at Israel’s expulsion or
other severe sanctions.

This policy primarily stemmed from a preoccupation with U.S. objec-
tives in the Middle East. Prominent members of the administration feared
that the raid could hamper the peace process between Israel and Egypt and

196. Braut-Hegghammer, Unclear Physics, pag. 71–79.

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The Reagan Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy and the Osirak Raid

upset moderate Arab countries, jeopardizing U.S. regional standing. One of
the administration’s primary objectives, Perciò, was to avoid any allegation
of U.S. technical assistance for the raid. This relatively tough approach against
Israel at the UN Security Council was also designed to prevent more severe
consequences, like the expulsion of Israel from other branches of the UN, E
to avoid the creation of an estranged European front inside the international
organization. With the same objectives in mind, the September 1982 decision
to withdraw from the IAEA was mostly aimed at containment by inhibiting
further moves to expel Israel from other UN agencies.

Following the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 487, IL
United States launched a campaign to prevent such expulsions. Preventing
Israel’s expulsion from the IAEA had not been motivated by a U.S. desire to
undermine the agency; instead, it was part of a “red-line” tactic aimed at pre-
venting further expulsions—including those motivated by concerns beyond
the Osirak raid, such as the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the dynamics of
the Arab-Israeli conﬂict.

The U.S. strategy vis-à-vis Israel was tied to a “bigger picture” strategy of
containing the Soviet Union, one of the Reagan administration’s top priorities.
The administration feared the emergence of a “hostile Third World bloc” that
would act as a proxy for the Soviet Union in repeatedly trying to hamper
Israel’s participation in international agencies. Therefore, such initiatives had
to be rebuffed. In this context, nonproliferation goals were clearly not the
administration’s ﬁrst concern, but neither were they ignored or overlooked.

The U.S. reaction to Osirak showcases the hierarchy of the Reagan ad-
ministration’s foreign policy priorities. Allo stesso modo, it underscores the role played
da noi. nonproliferation policy during the late Cold War. At ﬁrst glance, IL
ambiguity of the U.S. response to the raid could be interpreted as a conse-
quence of the conﬂicting positions on Israel. A deeper analysis reveals U.S.
attempts to achieve policy goals that, from time to time, were incompatible
with one another. Not surprisingly, the administration had to set priorities:
preserving its credibility in the Middle East by ﬁrmly denying any involve-
ment in the raid, sending warning signals to Israel while addressing the irrita-
tion of moderate Arab governments, and drawing ﬁrm “red lines” to prevent
damage to Israel’s international status by containing Soviet efforts to radicalize
UN agencies.

Nonproliferation concerns had a shaky but steady position among U.S.
priorities, and the Reagan administration adopted an improvised, cautious
approach rather than a well-ordered strategy. The administration aimed to
preserve the existing nonproliferation regime, seen as the only credible op-
tion at hand. Contrary to a later narrative, and with the exception of a few

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Pulcini and Rabinowitz

voices, the administration did not condone the raid and even supported harsh
condemnation by the UNSC. As for the IAEA, the United States conﬁrmed
its intention to enforce the “red lines” by ceasing U.S. participation when
Israel’s status was in danger. Departing from its early intentions and declara-
tory policy, the administration embraced a quiet “damage limitation” stance
that sought to reconcile its primary foreign policy goals with nonproliferation
concerns.

Ringraziamenti

The authors contributed equally to this article, and are grateful to all the
people involved in the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project for
their support and contribution to this research throughout the years.

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