Active and Sharp Measures

Active and Sharp Measures

Cooperation between the Soviet KGB
and Bulgarian State Security

✣ Christopher Nehring

introduzione

After the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR the topic of
Soviet State Security Committee (KGB) intelligence activities in the West fell
out of fashion. Under Russian President Vladimir Putin, Tuttavia, the Fed-
eral’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (FSB), Sluzhba Vneshnoj Razvedki (SVR),
and Glavnoe Upravlenie (GU; formerly known as Glavnoe Razuzvedyvatel-
noe Upravlenie, GRU) have become key pillars of the Russian state. They first
gained public attention in internal political battles (as in the case of the most
prominent oligarch to oppose Putin’s regime, Mikhail Khodorkovsky), Quando
used against defectors (per esempio., former KGB and FSB officer Aleksandr Litvi-
nenko, who defected to England after accusing the Putin regime of having
ordered murders), and through participation in military conflicts (in Chech-
nya, Georgia, Syria, Libya, and Ukraine). Today, a good deal of scholarship on
and research into the Russian secret services focuses on the topics of “hybrid
warfare,” which consists of two parts: military warfare and special disinfor-
mation campaigns about the causes, actions, actors, and course of the conflict
(so-called information warfare).1

The Russian secret service’s manipulation of information, Tuttavia, is by
no means a recent development. It was widely used by the KGB during the
Cold War as well—known under the terminus technicus “active measures.”
Rolf Wagenbreth, the long-time head of the disinformation unit (Division X
of the Foreign Intelligence Division, Hauptverwaltung A, Chief Directorate

1. On “hybrid warfare” and “information warfare,” see Ofer Fridman, Russian “Hybrid Warfare” Resur-
gence and Politicisation (London: Hurst, 2018); Margaret S. Bond, Hybrid War: A New Paradigm for
Stability Operations in Failing States (Carlisle Barracks, PAPÀ: USAWC Strategy Research Project, NOI.
Army War College, 2008); Gregory J. Rattray, Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2001); and Daniel Ventre, Cyberwar and Information Warfare (London: Wiley, 2013).

Journal of Cold War Studies
Vol. 23, No. 4, Autunno 2021, pag. 3–33, https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_01038
© 2021 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology

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Nehring

UN, HVA) of the East German Ministry for State Security (MfS or Stasi), once
declared in a lecture to his staff: “Our friends in Moscow call it dezinformat-
siya, our enemies in Washington call it active measures and I, my dear friends,
call it my favorite pastime.”2

The question of what Soviet-bloc intelligence services meant by “active
measures” (aktivniye meropriyatiya) remains open. No precise or literal equiva-
lent of this term exists in the world of Western intelligence. The closest West-
ern equivalent is “(covert) psychological warfare” or what today is often called
“strategic communication.”3 It is useful to contrast the terms “active mea-
sures” and “passive measures.” During the Cold War the latter referred to the
passive gathering of information, the former to the active use and applica-
tion of information in disinformation operations or propaganda campaigns.
The aim of such operations was to influence the behavior of individuals, so-
cial groups, political institutions, or key decision-makers to favor Communist
goals and outcomes. Generalmente, “active measures” sought to increase support
among Western politicians and the public for Soviet foreign policy goals by
advocating issues through open, semi-covert or clandestine actors. These nu-
ances were referred to as “black,” “gray,” and “white propaganda.”4 In contrast
to “white,” official propaganda,” active measures were mostly clandestine and
illegal intelligence operations meant to disrupt, discredit, and influence intelli-
gence targets. Their approach to “active measures” was subtle, blending truths,
half-truths, and untruths. The KGB and DS employed agents to ensure that
their forgeries would not be uncovered. Active measures were therefore a field
of work unique to Soviet-bloc intelligence services.

By the 1950s, the Soviet state security organs had developed a separate
department for disinformation and active measures: Service “A” of the First
Main Directorate (Pervoe glavnoe upravlenie, or PGU) of the KGB. Subse-
quently, the KGB encouraged its “fraternal organs” in the Eastern bloc to
engage in similar operations.5 The archives of these former Warsaw Pact coun-
tries (which are today all members of the European Union) provide crucial

2. Günter Bohnsack and Herbert Brehmer, Auftrag Irreführung: Wie die Stasi im Westen Politik machte
(Hamburg: Carlsen, 1992), P. 19.

3. See Denis Kux, “Soviet Active Measures: Overview and Assessment,” Parameters: Journal of the US
Army War College, Vol. 15, No. 4 (1985), pag. 19–28.

4. See Richard Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy (Washington,
DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1984), pag. 1–16.

5. On cooperation between Bulgarian, East German, and Soviet foreign intelligence, see Christopher
Nehring, Die Zusammenarbeit der DDR-Auslandsaufklärung mit der Aufklärung der Volksrepublik Bul-
garien: Regionalfilialen des KGB? (Konrad-Adenauer Foundation Bulgaria, 2016), available online at
http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_21492-1442-1-30.pdf?170124145839.

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Cooperation between the Soviet KGB and Bulgarian State Security

information on KGB cooperation with other Warsaw Pact services in cam-
paigns of disinformation and active measures. Recent studies on the KGB’s
wide-ranging disinformation campaign regarding the origins of acquired im-
mune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) have demonstrated the value of using ma-
terials of the East European foreign intelligence archives to shed light on the
KGB overseers in Moscow.6

Bulgaria, one of the smallest Soviet satellite states in Europe, serves as
a perfect example. Even though the intelligence work of the Bulgarian State
Sicurezza (Durzhavna Sigurnost, or DS) service was “of little interest” to the
KGB, the DS was one of Moscow’s closest allies.7 In contrast, Per esempio, A
the notorious State Security (Stasi) organs of the German Democratic Repub-
lic (GDR), which thought of themselves as a partner to the Soviet KGB, IL
DS’s self-image was that of a “regional branch of the KGB.”8 Not only did the
Soviet Union build the entire Bulgarian security apparatus, it also lent massive
theoretical, practical, and technical support and helped to operate the Bulgar-
ian DS. Così, Soviet-Bulgarian cooperation, particularly in the field of active
measures, can serve as a prism through which to scrutinize Soviet intelligence
lavoro.

The analysis here provides historical context for contemporary debates
about the Russian security services and their strategic use of disinformation
and active measures. The article begins by describing the general history of
intelligence cooperation between the Soviet Union and Communist Bulgaria
to highlight the structures and procedures for planning and carrying out “ac-
tive measures.” The article then looks at specific instances of cooperation
on active measures and disinformation, using several case studies to bring
out the general division of labor, the methods, and the operations’ goals. In
some of the East European intelligence services, such as Czechoslovakia and
Bulgaria, “sharp operative measures” (ostroye opertivnoe meropriyatiya) ad esempio

6. Vedere, Per esempio, Christopher Nehring and Douglas Selvage, Die AIDS-Verschwörung: Das Min-
isterium für Staatssicherheit und die AIDS Desinformationskampagne des KGB (Berlin: BStU, 2014);
Douglas Selvage, “Operation ‘Denver’: The East German Ministry for State Security and the KGB’s
AIDS Disinformation Campaign, 1985-1986 (Part 1),” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 21, No. 4
(Autunno 2019), pag. 71-123; Douglas Selvage, “Operation ‘Denver’: The East German Ministry for State
Security and the KGB’s AIDS Disinformation Campaign, 1986–1989 (Part 2),” Journal of Cold War
Studi, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Estate 2021), pag. 4-80; and Christopher Nehring and Douglas Selvage,
“Operation ‘Denver’: KGB and Stasi Disinformation Regarding AIDS,” Sources and Methods: A Blog
of the History and Public Policy Program, Woodrow Wilson Center, 2019, available online at https:
//www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/operation-denver-kgb-and-stasi-disinformation-regarding-aids.

7. Oleg Kalugin, Spymaster: My Thirty-Two Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West (Nuovo
York: Basic Books, 2007), P. 176.

8. See Christopher Nehring, “Bulgaria—The 16th Soviet Republic?” Journal of Cold War Studies, forth-
coming.

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Nehring

assassinations and abductions were, in the early 1960s at least, organized by
the departments in charge of active measures. Hence, this sensitive field of
intelligence work can serve as an indicator of Soviet-Bulgarian intelligence
cooperation. The article also analyzes the reactions of Western intelligence
agencies and governments to Soviet and Bulgarian active measures and as-
sesses the effectiveness of the operations.

Bulgaria: The “16th Soviet Republic” with a
“Regional Branch” of the KGB

Bulgaria was so close to the Soviet Union during the Cold War that some
Bulgarians dubbed it the “16th Soviet republic” behind closed doors. Dopo
the collapse of Communism, Bulgarian archives revealed that public opinion
on the issue was not far from the truth. At least three times, the leader of
the Bulgarian Communist Party (BKP), Todor Zhivkov, proposed to Soviet
leaders that Bulgaria officially join the Soviet Union. Although each proposal
was motivated by his own personal goals and political calculations, he ensured
ongoing Soviet support by demonstrating his complete loyalty to Moscow.9

Zhivkov’s strategy of ensuring Moscow’s support through complete sub-
ordination was also mirrored at other levels of the Bulgarian state. Questo era
especially the case for the Communist regime’s secret police. As in the other
countries of Eastern Europe, the founding and development of the vast appa-
ratus of Bulgarian state security after the Second World War was heavily in-
fluenced and guided by the Soviet “liberators”—notably, the KGB (the name
used for the Soviet state security apparatus from 1954 SU).10 Zhivkov then
pushed things to the extreme. In November 1969, after the security crisis in
the Warsaw Pact prompted by the Prague Spring in 1968, Zhivkov personally
assured Yuri Andropov, then head of the KGB, that the DS was a “branch of
the KGB.”11 Zhivkov used submissive and exaggerated language to assure the
Soviet Union of his loyalty and remain in Moscow’s good graces.

During the DS’s formative period in the 1950s and 1960s, the agency
routinely received direct “orders” from Moscow and the KGB advisers in Sofia

9. Ibid.

10. See Jordan Baev, KGB v Bulgariya (Sofia: Voenno izdatelstvo, 2009), pag. 25–60.

11. See “Information Nr. 724 of Bulgarian State Security regarding talks with the Soviet delegation
headed by Comrade Yu. Andropov from 24.12.1969,” in Tatyana Kirakova et al., eds., KGB i DS: DS-
KGB: Vryski i Zavisimost: Dokumentalen Sbornik na Komisiyata za razkrivane na dokumenti i obyavya-
vane na prinadlezhnost na bulgarski grazhdani kym durzhavna Sigurnost i razuznavatelni sluzhbi na
Bulgarskata Narodna Armiya (Sofia: COMDOS, 2009), Doc. 68, pag. 417–424, esp. 418, scanned
online version at http://comdos.bg/Æ0H8B5%208740=8O/ds-i-kgb.

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Cooperation between the Soviet KGB and Bulgarian State Security

on how to build a Soviet-type secret service. Tuttavia, in the early 1970s,
a shift took place. Instead of waiting for “orders,” the DS practiced its own
kind of anticipatory obedience—for example, by sending every directive to
Moscow for approval before it was signed.12 The same applied to every speech
given by the head of Bulgarian foreign intelligence at multilateral meetings
of the Soviet-bloc intelligence agencies, which began in 1970.13The shift to
anticipatory obedience marked the end of the formative years of the DS and
found expression in two key documents. Primo, In 1972, the BKP Politburo
ordered the DS to draft a new basic statute (osnovno polozhenie) for its work.
All drafts of this document were sent to Moscow and edited to comply with
Soviet ideas.14 The statute codified all formal regulations that guided the work
of the DS until its collapse in 1989–1990, thus providing the overall frame
for its existence. Secondo, SU 8 April 1972, the first formal written agreement
between the KGB and one of its “fraternal organs” was signed with the DS in
Sofia.15 The document clarified the principles guiding and regulating coopera-
tion between the KGB and the DS. The significance of the document was not
its seven pages of content but the fact that the KGB signed such an agreement
with the Bulgarians first among all the Soviet-bloc security services. Joint work
plans for cooperation in foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and military
counterintelligence soon followed. The agreements between the sections in
charge of monitoring every sphere of society at home (secret police) and the
information and analysis departments were of much greater significance in-
sofar as they set the frame for joint operational work in the following years.
Following Zhivkov’s line, the long-time Minister of Internal Affairs Dimitur
Stoyanov went even further in 1975 by welcoming the “direct transfer [pryako
prilagane] of Soviet experience in intelligence work” to the DS and the “full
integration” (pulna integratsiya) of the DS into the KGB.16

12. See Baev, KGB v Bulgariya, pag. 94–96.

13. See “Letter from the head of PGU-DS to Minister of Internal Affairs A.Solakov and his deputy
M.Spasov concerning the draft for the lecture, to be delivered at the meeting of the heads of the
foreign intelligence services of the Warsaw Pact in Budapest,” 7–11 November 1970, in Archive of
the Commission for the Disclosure of Documents and for Announcing the Affiliation of Bulgarian
Citizens with State Security and the Intelligence Services of the Bulgarian People’s Army (COMDOS
archive), Fond (F.) 9, Opis’ (Op.) 2, a.e. 780, pag. 134–137.

14. Baev, KGB v Bulgariya, P. 95.

15. “Agreement on cooperation between the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the PRB and the KGB
under the USSR Council of Ministers," 4 agosto 1972, in Kiryakova et al., eds., KGB i DS, Doc. 75,
pag. 476–484, and Doc. 76, pag. 485–493; and Baev, KGB v Bulgariya, pag. 94–97.

16. See the Bulgarian Minister of Internal Affairs D. Stoyanov at the “Consultation concerning the
common work plan of the Bulgarian foreign intelligence with the KGB,” June 1975, in COMDOS
archive, F. 9, Op. 2, a.e. 838, P. 15: “In execution of the orders of Comrade Todor Zhivkov the

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Nehring

This “full integration” of Bulgarian foreign intelligence into the KGB had
several day-to-day implications. What was true for all high-ranking norma-
tive documents concerning the DS—for example, that they were passed on
to Moscow, discussed at annual meetings, and produced in coordination with
the KGB adviser in Sofia—also held for each operational division. All annual
work plans for Departments I (Turkey) and II (Greece and Cyprus) of Bul-
garian foreign intelligence were coordinated with the KGB before they were
approved. Inoltre, each plan contained special sections on common op-
erational measures that were not only negotiated beforehand but also carried
out jointly.17 Hence, the KGB knew in advance where, how, and when the
Bulgarians were trying to gather information about neighboring countries in
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Even though KGB General
Oleg Kalugin later claimed that Bulgaria’s contributions were of little interest,
evidence in the DS archive suggests otherwise.18

All operational departments of Bulgarian foreign intelligence stuck to this
pattern and, when they recruited an important source they sometimes went
ulteriore. When, Per esempio, Department VII (Economic and Industrial Es-
pionage) recruited agent “DELON,” a Bulgarian working in Switzerland and
Austria who was in possession of information on the U.S. Department of
Defense, it immediately informed the KGB, passed on all his information,
and asked its KGB colleagues for advice on how to use him. Before long the
KGB and Bulgarian foreign intelligence had switched roles. Having trained
“DELON” as a spy, the Bulgarians turned him over to be run directly by the
KGB. The KGB, in turn, promised to pass on his information to the DS.19

coordination and cooperation between the DS and the KGB will rise to such a level that they function
as one unified system, that the DS works as a branch of the KGB.” See also “Talks with the PGU-
KGB concerning the plan for cooperation from 1972 to 1975,” 2-5 Giugno 1975, in Kiryakova et al.,
eds., KGB i DS, Doc. 99, pag. 664–686. For the matching statements of the KGB delegation, Vedere
“Stenographic minutes of the information of Comrade Andropov—head of the KGB under the USSR
Council of Ministers—which he made at the plenary meeting of the two delegations on 14 novembre
1974,” in Kiryakova et al., eds., KGB i DS, Doc. 94, pag. 618–629.

17. “Plan for common active measures of the foreign intelligence services of the PRB and the USSR,"
4 Giugno 1975, in Kiryakova et al., eds., KGB i DS, Doc. 101, pag. 687–697; “Information Nr. 503
on the plan for common active measures for 1977,” in Kiryakova et al., eds., KGB i DS, Doc. 110,
pag. 725–729; and “Information concerning the work meeting in Sofia with Colonel Vadim Petrovich
Ivanov, head of Service ‘A’ of the PGU-KGB," 4 settembre 1977, in Kiryakova et al., eds., KGB i DS,
Doc. 119, pag. 748–752.

18. On Soviet-Bulgarian cooperation, see Kalugin, Spymaster, pag. 176–182.

19. “Information on the condition of the cooperation between dep. VII PGU-DS and the Adminis-
tration STI of PGU-KGB for the period 1/1/1976 until 20/10/1977,” in Kiryakova et al., eds., KGB
i DS, Doc. 118, pag. 743–747; “Annual Account of Dep. VII for 1984,” in COMDOS, Durzhavna
sigurnost i nauchno-tekhnichesko razuznavane (Sofia: COMDOS, 2012), Doc. 90, pag. 579–590; E
“Information concerning the work of Department VII PGU-DS in execution of the action plan on

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Cooperation between the Soviet KGB and Bulgarian State Security

The KGB also played a key role in conducting surveillance on foreign em-
bassies in the Bulgarian capital of Sofia. Because Germany had traditionally
been the most important European trade partner for Bulgaria, the West Ger-
man trade mission (1963), which was subsequently upgraded to an embassy
In 1973, was a major intelligence target. Contrary to what one might expect,
Tuttavia, the East German Stasi did little work with the Bulgarians in this field
until the mid-1970s. The KGB, in contrast, was involved in all major plans
on how to monitor the trade mission and its personnel from the beginning. UN
key objective was to break into the mission and install surveillance equipment
that would track all diplomatic communications with Bonn. These operations
were carried out jointly by DS and KGB personnel. The information the Bul-
garians gathered by reading West German telegrams was regularly transferred
by the Bulgarian internal affairs minister to the chairman of the KGB.20

Allo stesso modo, all agents the Bulgarians succeeded in recruiting among the
West German diplomatic staff were run jointly with the KGB. The KGB and
the DS would, Per esempio, organize a trip of a West German secretary with
her Romeo agent to the Soviet Union.21 The KGB advised the Bulgarians
on how to run sources. If the contacts proved promising, the KGB would
take them over. One of the best examples was a West German diplomat co-
dename “RAVEN.” The Bulgarians had used the Romeo strategy to get to
his wife, who passed on occasional pieces of information. The Stasi’s for-
eign intelligence branch, the Hauptverwaltung A (HVA), was also working
on “RAVEN” and consulted the DS on the case. In the end, the KGB took
charge of “RAVEN” because he was a promising diplomat with a special focus
on Eastern Europe.22

Another prominent case was agent “PIKADILI,” who was suspected of
having killed the Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov in London. After a large
blank spot in his agent file around the year of the murder, “PIKADILI” as-
sumed tasks of minor importance. At the beginning of the 1980s he was
handed over to the KGB, for whom he tried (and failed) to seduce a secre-
tary at NATO headquarters in Brussels. He was then sent to Africa, where he
established contacts with Western diplomats.23

the cooperation of the PGU-DS with the PGU-KGB in STI for 1973,” in Kiryakova et al., eds., KGB
i DS, Doc. 89, pag. 587–590.

20. See Nehring, Die Zusammenarbeit, pag. 124–147.

21. Ibid., pag. 138–140.

22. Ibid., pag. 135–138.

23. See Khristo Khristov, Dvoiniyat zhivot na agent “PIKADILI”: Dosieto na edinstveniya agent, za-
podozriyan v ubiistvoto na pisatelya, i klyuchoviya arkhiv na purvo glavno upravleniya (Sofia: Ikonome-
dia, 2008), pag. 107–115.

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Nehring

For the Bulgarian intelligence service, being a branch of the KGB meant
opening up internal secrets, disclosing nearly all of its operational work, E
hardly ever running an operation abroad without first consulting on every de-
tail with Moscow. Questo, Tuttavia, was a two-way street. By opening up com-
pletely, the Bulgarians induced the KGB to become more deeply engaged in
Bulgarian operational matters and to assist them on a daily basis. Each of the
aforementioned cases proves the point. The KGB either provided the Bulgar-
ians with know-how and technology (which the DS could not have obtained
on its own) or took the overall lead in joint operations. The murder of Markov
serves as only one example of how this principle worked to Bulgaria’s advan-
tage. Not only did the Bulgarians engage in espionage for the KGB abroad,
but the KGB became engaged in Bulgarian affairs in which they had hardly
any interest.

As these examples show, the working level on an everyday operational
basis was very important for an understanding of the DS as a “branch of
the KGB,” working in “full integration.” Other than in the political sphere,
nearly all “operational goods”—that is, all details, ranging from the number
and names of agents to the staff, planning, and results of operations in all de-
partments of the DS—were known by and accessible to the KGB.24 Some of
this work was carried out by the KGB’s advisers in the Bulgarian Ministry of
Internal Affairs. According to the long-time head of KGB counterespionage,
Kalugin, the Soviet advisers played a large supervisory role vis-à-vis the DS.25
All details of the operational work of the Bulgarians were shared during the
various meetings with both sides. The KGB was given charge of some sources
recruited by the DS, and in other cases the KGB received nearly all the infor-
mation the DS acquired. The “need-to-know-principle,” on which all intelli-
gence work is based, was unilaterally suspended.26 However, as recent findings
in the archives of the KGB defector Vasilii Mitrokhin have shown, the de-
votedness of the Bulgarians to Moscow did not prevent the KGB from gath-
ering intelligence inside Bulgaria as well. In May 1973, the KGB installed a

24. See Nehring, Zusammenarbeit, pag. 492–496.

25. See Kalugin, Spymaster, pag. 176–177.

26. On intelligence cooperation, see James Walsh, The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Jennifer Sims, “Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Dev-
ils, Deals, and Details,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 19, No. 2
(2006), pag. 195–217; Chris Clough, “Quid pro Quo: The Challenges of International Strategic In-
telligence Cooperation,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 17, No. 4
(2004), pag. 601–613; Martin Alexander, ed., Knowing Your Friends: Intelligence inside the Alliances and
Coalitions from 1914 to the Cold War (London: Routledge, 1998); and Jeffrey Richelson and Desmond
Ball, The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the UKUSA Countries (Cambridge, UK:
Allen & Unwin, 1985).

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Cooperation between the Soviet KGB and Bulgarian State Security

station chief (rezidentura) in the Soviet embassy in Sofia who was responsi-
ble for gathering information on Bulgarian domestic and foreign policy, along
with developments in the BKP Politburo and other party organizations and
the inner circle of power around Zhivkov.27 Initially, the Soviet rezidentura had
three operatives. The KGB even went so as far as to recruit so-called trusted
connections (doveritel’nye svyazi) in the BKP Central Committee, including a
deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and the head of human resources
and accounting.28

An unusual element of cooperation between the DS and the KGB was
that most of Bulgaria’s foreign intelligence operatives and all of the DS’s high-
est officers were trained at the KGB academy in Moscow.29 Special training
was obligatory for every Bulgarian intelligence officer working in one of the
Bulgarian residencies abroad. Hence, working at the “Bulgarian branch of the
KGB” was more than a political decision. It was part of the self-image of the
Bulgarian DS, and these developments rested on the direct approval of BKP
leaders, most of all Zhivkov.

Cooperation with the KGB: Active Measures

Having developed under the strong influence of the KGB in the 1960s, IL
departments for active measures in the foreign intelligence services of the War-
saw Pact shared a common structure, used common methods, pursued com-
mon goals, and fought a common “enemy.” A division of labor arose in which
each country had its own regional focus and targets. Common active mea-
sures between the KGB and the DS were carried out almost exclusively in
countries in which the two countries’ “regions of interest” overlapped. By the
end of the 1970s, the DS had developed into a serious partner of the KGB,
although the scope of its activities was still limited geographically. As the inter-
national contest of political systems broadened, the KGB urged its “fraternal
organs” (per esempio., at the multilateral conferences of the heads of the socialist intel-
ligence services) to concentrate more on the “main enemy” (cioè., the United
States), multilateral operations, and a general broadening and deepening of

27. See the notes by Vasilii Mitrokhin, transcribed in Vasilii Mitrokhin Papers, MITN 19-2, pag. 10
12, in Churchill College Archives, Cambridge University, UK.

28. Ibid.

29. See Baev, KGB v Bulgariya, pag. 248–252; and Momchil Metodiev, Mashina za legitimnost (Sofia:
Siela, 2008), P. 146.

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Nehring

cooperation in the field of active measures.30 A shared goal was to “unmask
the imperialistic policy of the West” and to advocate the international and
domestic policy line of the USSR. The KGB also established common joint
operations to which its allies’ divisions for active measures were expected to
contribute.

The beginnings of cooperation in the field of active measures between
the KGB and the DS can be traced to the early 1960s.31 By the late 1960s,
as a document of the Bulgarian foreign intelligence service titled “Informa-
tion on the cooperation with Service ‘A’ of the KGB 1965–1968” suggests,
the DS had already established formal, annual cooperation with the KGB in
the field of active measures.32 By 1968, Bulgaria’s Department VIII had begun
to translate, as standard practice, its annual work plans into Russian and to
send them to Moscow for comments and approval. Inoltre, input from
Soviet advisers in Sofia was sought and given during the preparation of annual
work plans. Also, as the DS explicitly stated, “the initiative for the realization
of common active measures derived mainly from the KGB.”33 The head of
Bulgarian foreign intelligence from 1968 A 1972, Dimitur K’osev, confessed
to his East German colleague Markus Wolf: “Normally, we affiliate ourselves
with operations of the KGB. We do not have secrets from the [East] German
comrades, [Ma] our possibilities are small.”34 The DS informed the KGB of
every active measure that it undertook. Sometimes, Tuttavia, the Bulgarians
offered proposals that went beyond what the KGB considered possible or de-
sirable. Per esempio, K’osev’s suggestion to the Soviet adviser in Sofia to create
“a group of agents in Moscow, who organize common and multilateral active
measures” was never implemented.35

The work of Department VIII of Bulgarian foreign intelligence, Quale
cooperated with Service “A” of the KGB, consisted mainly of translations—
usually into Greek and Turkish—of manuscripts and materials to be used

30. For the 1970 conference in Budapest, see “Speech of A. Sakharovskii given at the Warsaw confer-
ence,” 7–11 November 1970, in COMDOS Archive, F. 9 Op. 2, a.e. 782, pag. 20–48. For Warsaw
1974, see COMDOS Archive, F. 9, Op. 2, a.e. 792, pag. 40–82. For Prague 1978, see COMDOS
Archive, F. 9, Op. 3, a.e. 414, pag. 16–67. For Moscow 1982, see COMDOS Archive, F. 9, Op. 4UN,
a.e. 19, pag. 2–38.

31. “Assessment of the common work between administration I KDS and PGU-KGB after 1965,” in
Kiryakova et al., eds., KGB i DS, Doc. 54, pag. 343–353.

32. Ibid.

33. “Information on the meeting of the head of the PGU-DS with the head of department AM of
the intelligence administration of the MSS of the GDR and his deputy, 11/2/1971,” in COMDOS
Archive, F. 9, Op. 2, a.e. 539, P. 63.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., pag. 66–73.

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Cooperation between the Soviet KGB and Bulgarian State Security

in active measures. The department also passed along such materials when
created by Service “A” of the KGB. The DS’s regional expertise was confined
to the eastern Mediterranean (Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus) and the Middle
East. The division of labor between the KGB and the DS was clear: the KGB
dominated the conception and planning of common active measures, and the
DS contributed its regional expertise.

The organization of active measures within the Bulgarian intelligence ser-
vice followed a more or less strict scheme. Primo, the basic guidelines and aims
were fixed in five-year “perspective plans.” Annual work plans for Department
VIII were drafted with both Bulgarian and Soviet interests in mind, checked
against available Bulgarian resources, and then sent to Moscow for comments.
The KGB would then review and amend the plan. The changes made by the
KGB explain why the second significant document for Department VIII, IL
annual work plan for joint active measures with the KGB, overlapped almost
completely with Department VIII’s annual work plan. Both plans were sub-
sequently approved by the head of the department, the head of foreign intel-
ligence, and the deputy minister of internal affairs.

The end of the 1970s saw a deepening of cooperation between the KGB
and the DS on joint active measures. Per esempio, IL 1975 plan listed twelve
joint operations targeting Turkey, eleven targeting Greece, and one targeting
Albania.36 The draft work plan for 1978 listed 27 operations targeting four
countries:, Turkey (six operations), Greece (five), Cyprus (seven), and Albania
(six addressing “Maoism”).37 With Turkey and Greece the basic goals were
to weaken conservative or “reactionary” forces inside the country, to support
“progressive-democratic” forces, and to disrupt both countries’ relations with
the United States and with each other.38 The DS tended to focus on domestic
affairs and the KGB on foreign policy.

In the mid-1970s, targets of the joint active measures expanded to include
the Cyprus question, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
(CSCE), and the “Maoist threat.” Around the same time, the DS gained some
good “positions” in Iran and the Middle East, all of which were coordinated
and shared with the KGB.

The work plans of the Bulgarian DS suggest that the active measures can

be divided into three categories:

36. “Information Nr. 503 on the plan for common active measures for 1977,” pp. 725–729.

37. “Information concerning the work meeting in Sofia with Colonel Vadim Petrovich Ivanov, head
of Service ‘A’ of the PGU-KGB,” pp. 748–752.

38. “Information Nr. 503 on the plan for common active measures for 1977,” pp. 725–729.

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1. Active measures executed by one service alone. In the case of the DS
these operations had a regional concentration on neighboring West-
ern countries (such as Greece and Turkey) or were focused on a na-
tional problem (per esempio., so-called “hostile émigrés” from Bulgaria).
2. Active measures planned on a bilateral basis. The KGB some-
times drew on the regional expertise or “channels” of the DS and
other times provided assistance. The DS-KGB work plan for 1975,
Per esempio, includes roughly equal numbers of the two kinds of
operations.39

3. Active measures either planned as or that developed into multilateral
operations. More often than not, these were inspired and conceived
by the KGB on a bilateral basis and subsequently expanded to other
regions, persons, or organizations.

The third category of active measures, which were largely ad hoc in the 1960s
(to the extent they existed at all) but by the end of the 1970s had become
an important element in Warsaw Pact intelligence operations. In the 1980s,
most of the active measures planned by the DS were carried out jointly with
the KGB and often with the East German HVA. At the regular multilateral
conferences of the heads of the Soviet-bloc intelligence services in 1978 E
1982 and at a special conference on active measures in 1986, the KGB called
for broader multilateral cooperation in the field of active measures.

Over the years, the KGB urged its “fraternal organs” to concentrate all
means available on the “main enemy” (cioè., the United States and NATO), E
this focus dominated the orientation of common operations. For the Bulgar-
ian DS, active measures with the KGB were focused on the “southern flank”
of NATO. The Bulgarians did not have the resources or capacity to engage in
large-scale operations against the United States. Therefore, they reinterpreted
their own regional work as an attack against U.S. allies or institutions in those
countries. The available evidence supports the claim that the era of détente
fostered closer cooperation in the field of active measures both bilaterally and
multilaterally. The increased importance of active measures as a counterweight
to the West’s “ideological subversion” was also noted by the head of Soviet in-
telligence at the 1970 conference of the heads of socialist intelligence services
in Warsaw.40 The Bulgarian foreign intelligence service became so heavily de-
pendent on and affiliated with Soviet active measures during the 1980s that

39. “Plan for common active measures of the foreign intelligence services of the PRB and the USSR,
6/4/1975,” pp. 687–697.

40. “Speech of A. Sakharovskii given at the Warsaw conference,” pp. 20–48.

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it hardly ever conducted operations in the field on its own without the KGB
or the HVA, its second-closest partner. Department VIII of the PGU-DS,
following the lines of Minister of Internal Affairs Stoyanov, characterized this
status as a “level of full integration.”41

The KGB did more than suggest specific operations and oversee their exe-
cution. It also critically analyzed the methodology and type of active measures
to be used. In 1978 E 1979, the KGB criticized the Bulgarians’ annual work
plans because they consisted almost exclusively of operations with forged doc-
uments. The KGB frequently provided its Bulgarian counterpart with blank
blueprints for documents, ready-to-use forgeries, and information for con-
ducting such operations. Fearing that the forgeries might be traced back to
the USSR, the KGB demanded a halt to such operations.42

A major concern of the KGB in the 1980s was the overall strategic and
methodological improvement of active measures. Increased Western and es-
pecially U.S. countermeasures had begun to hamper the success of the KGB’s
operations in the West. In response, a multilateral, bloc-wide meeting of all
departments for active measures was convened in 1986 in Budapest. For the
first time, all heads of the respective departments working in this field came to-
gether to discuss methodological and strategic issues. As the KGB stressed, IL
main focus of the gathering was to improve the effectiveness of active measures
all over the world.43 The conference did not, Tuttavia, suggest a change to the
types of active measures being planned. The concluding document merely
harkened back to the regular multilateral meetings of all intelligence service
chiefs in Moscow in 1982. All major efforts should continue to focus on “sup-
port for the peace policy of the USSR,” an end to the nuclear arms race, IL
“unmasking of the adventurism and aggression” of U.S. foreign policy, sup-
port for the “peace movement” in Western Europe, and exposure of the “state
terrorism of the imperialists in the Third World.”44 Bulgarian active mea-
sures, as described by the head of DS Department VIII, Dimo Stankov, would

41. “Account of common active measures with the KGB for the period 1981–1985,” in Kiryakova
et al., eds., KGB i DS, Doc. 241, P. 1577.

42. See “Assessment of the annual work plan for 1977 of department VIII PGU-DS by Service ‘A’
PGU-KGB,” in Kiryakova et al., eds., KGB i DS, Doc. 110, pag. 725–729; and “Assessment of the
annual work plan for 1979 of department VIII PGU-DS by Service ‘A’ PGU-KGB,” in Kiryakova
et al., eds., KGB i DS, Doc. 131, pag. 788–790.

43. See letter of invitation for the Bulgarian Minister of Internal Affairs, in COMDOS Archive, F. 9,
Op. 4, a.e. 671, pag. 1–5.

44. See “Final document of the summit of the heads of the foreign intelligence services of the Socialist
camp," 1986, in COMDOS Archive, F. 9, Op. 4, a.e. 671, pag. 51–63.

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Nehring

continue to focus on disrupting the southern flank of NATO and combatting
the “anti-Bulgarian campaigns” of the West.45

The speech by the head of Service “A” of the KGB, Vladimir Petrovich
Ivanov, to the meeting regarding the methods that should be employed in
the planning and conduct of active measures reveals much about the oper-
ational environment of the time. He linked the success of active measures
in the 1980s to the political context in which they were executed, and he
lamented that Western countermeasures had become a grave threat to the
outcome of disinformation operations. All the conference participants agreed
that growing Western cooperation in implementing countermeasures could
be best countered with increased cooperation among the Soviet-bloc security
services.46 Ivanov emphasized the importance of “conversations to influence”
(besedy dlia vliyaniya), forged documents, and greater use of unknowing indi-
viduals (so-called “useful idiots”). He outlined three major goals. Primo, these
methods would make it harder for Western agencies to trace active measures
back to their origins in the KGB or other Warsaw Pact intelligence services.
Secondo, direct political influence on persons and groups should be given pri-
ority over the earlier objective of “abstract ideological influence.”47 Third, IL
structure and composition of each operation should be made more complex,
with preference given to operations in which several actions were taken in
succession rather than operations consisting of a single action. The KGB offi-
cial explained that the best way to achieve a cumulative effect was to conduct
coordinated measures within a short period of time. Doing so would also en-
sure the simultaneous spread of disinformation at several different places, così
making it harder to trace the source of the disinformation.

The multilateral meeting of 1986 was by no means the only initiative
the KGB undertook to address the perceived decline in effectiveness of active
measures around the world. In 1985, Ivanov, head of Service “A,” transmitted
a written lecture on “the art of planning, conceiving and executing active mea-
sures” to be presented to officers of the Bulgarian intelligence service.48 Likely,
the same lecture was sent to the heads of all the active-measures divisions of

45. “Speech of D. Stankov at the multilateral meeting in Budapest,” in COMDOS Archive, F. 9,
Op. 4, a.e. 671, pag. 10–42.

46. Ibid., pag. 35–40.

47. “Consultations between the head of Service ‘A’ V. P. Ivanov and the PGU-DS about the use of
agents of influence: forms and methods of their work. Use of agents of influence (talk with V. P.
Ivanov, 25 April 1979),” in Kiryakova et al., eds., KGB i DS, Doc. 133, pag. 801–807.

48. See the lecture notes in Kiryakova et al., eds., KGB i DS, Doc. 233, pag. 1520–1525.

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the Soviet-bloc intelligence services.49 Ivanov had already spoken many times
with DS officials about such methodological issues, but these earlier talks had
always been conducted on a need-to-know basis with the head and deputy
head of Department VIII. The goal in 1986 was to make all departments of
Bulgarian foreign intelligence more aware of the requirements for active mea-
sures and their importance. The lecture explained how active measures worked
and their goals: a “sharp political weapon of an intelligence service designed
to exert influence abroad,” citing the authority of the Bolsheviks’ founding
leader, V. IO. Lenin. The effectiveness of active measures, Ivanov noted, Di-
pended on a correct assessment of the political context in which they were to
be conducted, the fashioning of the right content at the right moment, E
the distribution of this content via the right channels at the right time. For
esempio, if the goal was to obtain a harsh reaction in the short term, he rec-
ommended “emotional” topics and environments. Therefore, any officer who
worked on such measures should be familiar with the international political
situation and possess several agents and “trusted connections,” including gov-
ernment and parliamentary officials, journalists, publishers, and the heads of
party and societal organizations. The ideal intelligence officer for work in the
field was described as especially creative, politically aware, sly, and of quick
wit. Both the lectures of 1985–1986 and the multilateral conference of 1986
were apparent efforts initiated by the KGB to increase the effectiveness of
active measures and overcome Western countermeasures.

Case Studies in Cooperation: “AKROPOLIS,"
“SHIWA,” and a Multilateral Conference

Another common aspect of the KGB’s cooperation on active measures with
its “fraternal organs” was a system of double accounting. Service “A” urged all
services to engage in global disinformation and propaganda operations despite
their limited resources. The East European agencies tended to include the
same operations in multiple plans with different partners or to complain about
their lack of resources until the KGB itself engaged in the operation.

One example was Operation AKROPOLIS. As early as the 1960s the
KGB had urged the Bulgarians to expand their active measures in the Balkans
with the aim of disrupting relations among NATO members. Perché il

49. The quotation from Rolf Wagenbreth’s lecture to Stasi officers in 1986 mentioned in the intro-
duction of this article was taken from his version of Ivanov’s lecture.

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main economic and political European force at that time was the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG), FRG-Greek and FRG-Turkish relations were
a major target for these measures. “AKROPOLIS” was the codename for an
active measure that included the fabrication of a letter by the head of the con-
servative Christian Social Union (Christlich-Soziale Union, or CSU), former
minister and later prime minister of Bavaria Franz Josef Strauss, to former
members of the Greek junta in which he called for a military coup. The Bul-
garians provided background material on the political situation in Greece, IL
HVA forged the letter and transferred it back to the DS, and the Bulgarians
then sent it to one of their contacts at the Greek embassy in Vienna.50

The DS employed a system of double accounting for active measure.
From 1971 SU, Department VIII did not undertake any active measure
with FRG-related content without consulting East German Stasi colleagues.51
Hence, in response to the KGB’s message urging actions to disrupt West
German–Greek relations, the Bulgarians listed Operation AKROPOLIS two
times, once in their annual work plan for common active measures with the
KGB and once in their plan with the East German HVA.52 Even though the
Bulgarians had informed the East Germans at the beginning of their coopera-
tion that each of their active measures was coordinated with the KGB, nobody
explicitly acknowledged this system. Di conseguenza, the Bulgarians listed an oper-
ation they carried out with the HVA as one of their common operations with
the KGB.

The KGB’s disinformation campaign regarding AIDS in the 1980s
unfolded in a similar manner. Operation DETRICK/PANDEM was an
active measure devised as early as 1983 to spread the rumor that the then-
unknown AIDS virus was the result of U.S. military experiments with biolog-
ical weapons.53 After press articles were planted in India but did not attract
much attention, the KGB in 1985 took steps to boost the operation, not least
because the disease by then had grown into a worldwide epidemic. Nel
summer of 1985, all the Warsaw Pact intelligence agencies received a cable
from Moscow urging them to include active measures in their agenda and

50. “Draft of the plan for common and coordinated active measures for 1977,” in COMDOS Archive,
F. 9, Op. 3, a.e. 210, pag. 7–11.

51. Untitled note by Colonel D. Stankov, 26 April1972, in COMDOS Archive, F. 9, Op. 2, a.e. 539,
P. 93UN.

52. See “Plan for common active measures of the foreign intelligence of the USSR and the PRB for
1975,” pp. 687–697; and “Draft of the plan for common and coordinated active measures for 1977,”
pag. 7–11.

53. Vedere, Per esempio, Nehring and Selvage, Die AIDS-Verschwörung; and Nehring and Selvage, “Op-
eration ‘Denver.’”

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Cooperation between the Soviet KGB and Bulgarian State Security

come up with new ideas for how and where to promote the AIDS conspiracy
theory. As Douglas Selvage has shown at length in two recent articles in the
JCWS, the HVA soon took over the lead in this operation, which was origi-
nally devised by the KGB to attack the United States all around the globe.54
Bulgarian foreign intelligence contributed little to the operation, in part be-
cause no Bulgarian scholar was willing to support the theory. Even so, IL
DS from the mid-1980s on listed the operation in every annual plan both
with the KGB and with the HVA. In the autumn of 1989, only weeks before
the Berlin Wall was opened, the DS finally proposed to have its own agent
“SHIWA” in India publish the HVA material.

Agent “SHIWA” was, according to Bulgarian documents, the head of the
International Institute for Non-Aligned Studies in New Delhi and had been,
since 1983, an agent for the Bulgarian foreign intelligence service.55 He was
listed as an agent of influence on Operation NAPRED (Forward), the co-
dename for all influence operations targeting the Non-Aligned Movement.
In 1989, Department VIII of the PGU-DS wanted “SHIWA” to publish
an HVA-financed documentary on the supposedly artificial, NOI. origin of
AIDS. Questo, Tuttavia, was the last item in a long list of materials the Bul-
garians gave to “SHIWA,” whose role in this venture perfectly demonstrates
how the Bulgarians tackled worldwide active measures. After recruiting him,
the Bulgarians immediately informed the KGB and asked for materials to
pass on to him for publication. Department VIII’s documents on “SHIWA”
leave the impression that the Bulgarians provided him with hardly any in-
formation on their own, relying instead on Moscow or East Berlin for doc-
uments. (They did, Tuttavia, support “SHIWA” financially, and Stankov of

54. Selvage, “Operation ‘Denver,’” Part 1; and Selvage, “Operation ‘Denver,’” Part 2 (see note 6 supra).
55. On agent “SHIWA,” see “Letter from the HVA/X” 1 April 1986, in ABS, UN. ˇC. 81282/117, P. 308;
and “Note of department 36 (Disinformation) of the First Main Administration of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs concerning the transfer to the head of the HVA/X Rolf Wagenbreth," 22 Luglio 1986,
in ABS, UN. ˇC. 81282/117, P. 304. See also “Kpt. Meisner, IO. Správa SNB, Odbor 36, Telefonát z
NDR—Seznam," 18 agosto 1986, in ABS, UN. ˇC. 81282/117, P. 307; and “Questions of department
VIII PGU-DS prior to the work meeting between HVA/X and department VIII PGU-DS,” 26–29
settembre 1989, in COMDOS Archive, F. 9, Op. 4, a.e. 691, P. 207. Further “Information con-
cerning talks with the Service for AM PGU-KGB in Moscow," 28 novembre 1988, in Kiryakova
et al., eds., KGB i DS, Doc. 283, pag. 1870–1903; “List of the materials hand over by the East Ger-
man comrades 1988,” in COMDOS Archive, F. 9, Op., 4 a.e. 691, P. 163; and “Information on
the official trip of Colonel D. Stankov to Moscow to meet with AG ‘SHIWA’ and an assessment
of the work with ‘FROID,’” 24 novembre 1987, in Kiryakova et al., eds., KGB i DS, Doc. 270,
pag. 1792–1798. On agent “GOVDA,” see the agent materials in Archivní Protokol A1592–A4974,
11.11.1986, P. 71, Reg. Nr. A2738, http://www.abscr.cz/data/pdf//knihy/APIS/APIS_10.pdf; E
Protokol registrace osobních svazk˚u tajných spolupracovník˚u I. Správy SNB, S. 96, Reg. Nr. 48637,
http://www.abscr.cz/data/pdf/knihy/IS4/IS4_6.pdf. On the work of the HVA at the Harare-summit,
see Nehring and Selvage, AIDS-Verschwoerung, pag. 58–61.

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Department VIII met with him at least once in Moscow.) One of the doc-
uments supplied by the East Germans was the 88-page “Conspiracy against
Non-Alignment.” In 1988, Department X of the East German HVA handed
over the document to the Bulgarians, who enlisted “SHIWA” to publish it
in India (codename “VORWÄRTS-IV/NAPRED-IV”).56 Tuttavia, the HVA
forgot to tell the Bulgarians that it had passed the same material to the
Czechoslovak disinformation department two years earlier. The Czechoslo-
vaks had already seen the brochure published in India and then distributed
at the 1986 Non-Aligned summit in Harare, Zimbabwe. That operation was
unknown to the Bulgarians, who learned about it later and were not amused.
The Bulgarians were especially irritated to discover that the Czechoslovak
State Security (StB) agent “GOVDA” who published the material in India,
and the Bulgarian agent “SHIWA” were one and the same. Stankov and his
colleagues realized from this fiasco that “SHIWA” was using several intelli-
gence services to support his institute. Stankov pressed both the HVA and
the StB to give him a list of materials they had transferred to “SHIWA.” Per-
haps most surprisingly of all, the KGB knew all about the double role played
by “SHIWA/GOVDA” but apparently saw no need to take any measures to
coordinate his activities.

Così, even though the KGB routinely exerted control over and directed
the East European intelligence operations, it did not always do so completely.
Given limited resources, the Bulgarians did try to rely on external support.
Much of the work fell back on the KGB and HVA. In this division of labor,
the KGB or HVA provided the content for Bulgarian operations and reused
materials they had used in other operations. The adoption of Soviet-planned
global active measures, which caused a massive increase in the PGU-DS work-
load, spurred the Bulgarians to compensate for their lack of resources by hand-
ing part of the work back to the KGB or the HVA. The DS, like all other East
European intelligence agencies, included support of the USSR’s “peace pol-
icy” as a main goal in its annual work plans. All plans for joint work between
Department X of the HVA and Department VIII of the DS First Main Direc-
torate contained a preamble-like statement that fixed the general orientation
of their cooperation as being “in support of the foreign and peace policy of the
USSR” and against the imperialistic policy of the United States, NATO, E
the FRG, and the hostile policy of the People’s Republic of China.57 These

56. This publication is still available on the homepage of the institute: http://iins.org/publications/.

57. In 1975, Per esempio, this plan listed six basic orientations, stored in COMDOS Archive, F. 9,
Op. 2, a.e. 540, pag. 175–180.

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Cooperation between the Soviet KGB and Bulgarian State Security

plans and mechanisms demonstrate the many levels at which the KGB influ-
enced the active measures of the other intelligence services and their coopera-
tion with one another. In the Bulgarian case, the KGB’s influence concerned
not only the overall framework and priorities of active measures but also the
methodological execution of operations.

The “Bulgarian Umbrella” and the Pope: A “Special
Relationship” for “Sharp Measures”

“Sharp measures” (ostrye meropriyatii, OM) started as a special field within
active measures. According to Soviet-bloc defectors such as Ladislav Bittman
and Jan Šejna, “sharp measures” in the late 1950s and 1960s were a specialized
realm in certain East-bloc intelligence services such as those of Czechoslovakia
and Bulgaria.58 Available archival documents indicate that Department (otdel)
XVI of the Bulgarian foreign intelligence service was in charge of such mea-
sures.59 From 1963 A 1968, Department XVI existed separately before it was
first renamed Department XII and then in 1969 merged into Department
VIII (active measures). In 1973, “sharp measures” found their final organiza-
tional home being transferred to Department IV (foreign counterespionage).60
In 1974, after fierce criticism from the BKP leadership, the DS’s work against
the “hostile émigré community” (vrazheska emigratsiya), as political dissidents
abroad where labeled, was restructured.61 DS resources, agents, and work were
fiercely criticized not only by the BKP Politburo and the heads of Bulgarian
intelligence but also by the chief KGB adviser in Sofia, Ivan Savchenko. One
measure intended to bolster the DS’s effectiveness against the Bulgarian op-
position abroad was the “Statute for the Work of the Foreign Intelligence De-
partment,” which was approved by Internal Affairs Minister Stoyanov and the
BKP Politburo and subsequently affirmed by the KGB in 1973. The statute
reads: “The intelligence service plans, prepares and executes sharp measures
on the territory of capitalist and developing countries against objects of the
enemy and persons who engage in active hostile activities or have committed

58. See Ladislav Bittman, Geheimwaffe D (Bern: Verlag Schweizerisches Ost-Institut, 1973), pag. 13
33; and Jan Šejna, We Will Bury You:The Soviet Plan for the Subversion of the West (London: Sidgwick
& Jackson, 1982).

59. “Report on the condition and perspective of the work concerning special and sharp measures at
department VIII PGU,” in COMDOS Archive, F. 9, Op. 2, a.e. 522, pag. 12–23.

60. Ibid.

61. Khristov, Dvoiniyat zhivot na agent “PIKADILI,” pp. 74–75.

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Nehring

crimes against the PRB [People’s Republic of Bulgaria].”62 The term “sharp
measures” was not defined in the statute. But as former high-ranking Bulgar-
ian intelligence officers explained, “in operational language, sharp measures
mean killings, abductions and sabotage actions. This term is part of the intel-
ligence dictionary . . . and there are no sharper measures than killings.”63

The party thus formally gave the PGU-DS carte blanche to abduct, In-
jure, or kill anybody who was deemed an enemy of the BKP regime. Various
Communist Party organs (per esempio., the BKP Politburo’s “Security” Department)
as well as Zhivkov and the prime minister nevertheless reserved the right to
review prospective “sharp measures.”

As a brief internal report on the development of the branch for “sharp
measures” stated in 1970, the section started in 1963 with only four offi-
cers, increasing to seven in 1966. Department XVI had recruited its entire
staff from special army forces who were ordered to train and prepare special
agents in partisan warfare, wartime reconnaissance, and acts of sabotage.64
These partisans were meant to work mainly in Greece and Turkey, Bulgaria’s
neighboring NATO countries. Two years after Department XVI was formed,
its four officers o demanded and received support from the Soviet KGB for
basic organization of their work and tasks. In 1967, Tuttavia, at the behest of
the BKP Politburo, Department XVI’s work with guerrillas and partisans was
stopped completely, and new tasks were defined. From then on, the depart-
ment focused exclusively on countering “traitors of the nation” (izmenici na
rodinata), a collective term invented by the DS and the BKP to criminalize
refugees, political exiles, dissidents, defectors, and anyone else who “illegally”
left or opposed the country, state, or party. In 1970 E 1971, the only years
for which the annual work plans of this department could be found in the
archives, up to seven (1970) and nine (1971) “target persons” were named, Tutto
of whom were former DS officers, former Bulgarian National Army personnel,
or political émigrés. Until 1973, “sharp measures” were not strictly defined,
but Department XVI’s plans left little to the imagination: the contemplated
end for every person on the target list was either abduction or liquidation.
These were the “peacetime measures” that Department XVI was restructured
to carry out in 1967. The department’s plans, Tuttavia, proved to be more
ambitious than realistic. The eight officers in the department not only lacked

62. See the statute in Tsentralen durzhaven arkhiv (Central State Archive, CDA), F. 1, Op. 64, a.e.
427, P. 5.

63. Khristov, Dvoiniyat zhivot na agent “PIKADILI,” p. 76.

64. Ibid.

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experience but also insufficient resources to carry out missions. In 1971 De-
partment XVI had sixteen agents, most of whom had been transferred from
other departments, and none of whom was capable of kidnapping or killing
anyone (even though the agent codenamed “PIKADILI,” who later became
the most probable suspect in the Markov murder, was listed among them).
Several years passed before the agents even started to collect information about
the direct surroundings of their “target persons,” and by then they were not
poised to act on the information. Hence, the department sought help from
the KGB, which readily supplied it. KGB experts provided the DS with spe-
cial training—both theoretical and practical—in explosives, mines, incendiary
devices, and narcotics.65

The next year the Bulgarians planned to ask the Stasi for help with these
matters, pure. The DS department for “sharp measures” lacked sufficient tech-
nology and could not legally obtain necessary equipment. In 1972, Depart-
ment IV of Bulgarian intelligence, in charge of working against the “hostile
émigré community,” planned to ask the HVA for a variety of items:

We are currently working against certain objects, for which we need to conduct
sharp measures. A tal fine, we need some operational technology. Can the
comrades provide us with:

1. Miniature pistols with silencer (Western models)
2. Quick-working poisons
3. Some gadgets (instruments) for the sudden injection of poison into the

body of an object (Western origin)

4. A system/gadget for delayed explosive actions
5. Do they possess information about so-called letter bombs or magnetic

mines, which have been spoken about in Europe?66

Not only does this document give an account of the plans and methods of
Bulgarian intelligence, but it is telling in at least three other ways. Primo, Esso
demonstrates that the Bulgarians needed technical help in carrying out “sharp
measures.” Second, most scenarios later employed by Bulgarian assassins (per esempio.,
poisoning) were outlined in the document. Third and most important, IL
Bulgarians were never allowed to pass on their requests to the Stasi. IL
handwritten Russian word “NYET” (No), underlined and followed by two
exclamation marks, was inserted next to this passage of the document. IL

65. See the “Work plan of division XVI of the First Main Department [Purvo glavno upravlenie] del
DS for 1970/71,” in COMDOS Archive, F. 9, Op. 2, a.e. 522, pag. 1–11. For analogous records for
1971/1972, see COMDOS Archive, F. 9, Op. 2, a.e. 524, pag. 1–9.

66. “Report on some questions in the joint work of the intelligence organs 1972,” in COMDOS
Archive, F. 9, Op. 2, a.e. 539, pag. 131–136.

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KGB adviser was unwilling to let the Bulgarians ask the Stasi for such highly
sensitive information and materiel.

Invece, the KGB signed its first general agreement on cooperation with
the Bulgarian foreign intelligence service. Several top-secret amendments were
made to the agreement, one of which—No. 13—is titled “On the Necessary
Help to Be Granted by the PGU-KGB to the PGU-MVR with OM for the
Period 1972–1976.” The amendment states,

At the current moment, the necessity prevails to unveil the experience of
the PGU-KGB to the specialized department 16 concerning the following
questions:

1. The contingent for the recruitment of agents for the preparation and
execution of OM: UN) local citizens, B) foreign citizens, C) bandit groups
of foreign origin

2. The preparation of agents executing OM: . . . C) contact—radio, secret
writing, impersonal, personal, D) conditions of explosive, combustion,
technical, chemical and other materials to carry out OM . . .

3. The possibility to deliver the following special materials to the PGU-
MVR: UN) explosive and fire mines . . . , B) surprise mines, C) devices
for soundless, mechanical shooting of needles containing fast-acting
poisons, D) strong toxins

4. During the second trimester of 1973, the following will be delivered to
the PGU-MVR for use in current cases: UN) explosive, magnetic mines
to be activated by radio, B) camouflaged mines activated by radio,
C) camouflaged fire mines activated by radio, D) a device for the sound-
less shooting of needles . . .

5. To the extent necessary, meetings will be held regarding individual cases
between representatives of the PGU-MVR and the PGU-KGB at the
necessary level for providing assistance.67

By signing the agreement, the KGB secured complete control over almost any
act of physical violence the DS might carry out abroad, and Bulgarian foreign
intelligence again earned its reputation as a “regional branch of the KGB.”

Assumptions about and characterizations of the DS as “killers for the
KGB” who specialized in “sharp measures” gained currency both during and
after the Cold War.68 However, nothing could be further from the truth. IL

67. “Agreement on Cooperation between the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the PRB and the KGB
under the USSR Council of Ministers," 4 agosto 1972, pag. 476–493. In this document Bulgarian
foreign intelligence is referred to as “PGU-MVR,” meaning “First Main Directorate of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs.” See Amendment No. 13, in COMDOS Archive, F. 9, Op. 2 a.e. 815, pag. 105–106.

68. For these old interpretations, see John Barron, KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents (Nuovo
York: Reader’s Digest Press, 1974); Jennifer Sims, “Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, E

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Bulgarians relied almost completely on the KGB when carrying out their own,
limited “sharp measures.” Thus, allegations such as the “Bulgarian Connec-
tion” in the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II in 1981 seem, In
retrospect, unconvincing. The Bulgarians were incapable of executing such a
difficult and risky operation on their own. Even in the unlikely event that
the KGB would have enlisted someone else to assassinate he pope, the DS was
not an obvious candidate. Three years before, In 1978, the KGB had provided
the DS with equipment and training to carry out the murder of one of the
Bulgarian regime’s most hated dissidents abroad, Georgi Markov.69 But even
though the operation was successful, it was promptly traced back to the DS
and KGB. Hence, if the KGB wanted to maintain plausible deniability, the DS
did not seem the best “co-conspirator” in a plot to assassinate the pope. Offi-
cial investigators and academic researchers have not found ironclad evidence
of Bulgaria’s involvement (Italian prosecutors in the 1980s amassed only cir-
cumstantial evidence), and the well-known KGB defector Vasilii Mitrokhin
also did not bring out proof of Bulgarian involvement in the attempt to kill
the pope.

This is not to imply, Tuttavia, that the Bulgarian foreign intelligence ser-
vice and the KGB did not engage in a major intelligence operation with regard
to the attack on Pope John Paul II. Tuttavia, the available documents from
PGU-DS suggest that the attack became an issue for them only at the end
Di 1982, when a representative of the Bulgarian National Airline in Rome,
Sergei Antonov, was arrested as a co-conspirator of the accused Turkish citi-
zen Mehmet Ali A˘gca. The BKP Politburo immediately formed two commis-
sions to investigate the attempted assassination—one within the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and a second in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.70 The head of
Bulgarian foreign intelligence drafted an “action plan for massive countermea-
sures against the West’s anti-Bulgarian campaign.”71 Whereas a special task
force was set up by the Bulgarian authorities to investigate and gather informa-
tion on the attack, the DS’s countermeasures—that is, active measures—were
coordinated with the KGB and other “fraternal organs.”

Details,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2006), P. 201;
and Nigel West, The Third Secret: The CIA, Solidarity and the KGB’s Plot to Kill the Pope (London:
HarperCollins, 2001).

69. For an up-to-date overview of research into the killing of Georgi Markov, see Christopher Nehring,
“Umbrella or Pen? The Murder of Georgi Markov: New Facts and Old Questions,” Journal for Intelli-
gence History, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2017), pag. 47–58.

70. See Baev, KGB v Bulgariya, P. 210.

71. See the documents in COMDOS Archive, Sluchaya Antonov, a.e. 218, pag. 1–8.

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Nehring

Hungarian foreign intelligence, Per esempio, arranged for the publication
of press articles via their channels in the Vatican, and Polish foreign intelli-
gence was responsible for “unmasking” the alleged Bulgarian agent and union
leader Luigi Scricciolo as an agent of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). Conducted along with the East German HVA, the long-term Oper-
ation Papa (the Bulgarian word for “Pope”) was designed to “unmask Agca’s
connections with Turkish Neo-Fascists und their cooperation with right-wing
forces in the FRG.”72 As early as December 1982, Blagoy Plachkov, deputy
head of Department VIII of the PGU-DS, flew to East Berlin to meet with
the director of the HVA and Deputy Minister of State Security Markus Wolf,
along with the heads of the departments for counterespionage and active mea-
sures, Horst Jaenicke and Rolf Wagenbreth, rispettivamente. (From East Berlin,
Plachkov continued on to Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest for similar meet-
ings.)73 The main goal of their active measure was to make the world believe
that the CIA was behind the attack and had enlisted the Turkish extremist
organization known as the “Grey Wolves” (of which A˘gca was a member) A
shoot the pope.74 Wolf, for his part, was relatively certain that the CIA had
launched the “anti-Bulgarian campaign” to blame the Soviet bloc, although
his service possessed no hard evidence. Nevertheless, within a month the HVA
had composed two manuscripts about the shooting based on the Bulgarians’
requirements. One 35-page document was entitled “My God, why? Who had
an interest in the Death of John Paul II?” The second was a 56-page text on
A˘gca’s biography, travels, and political connections.75 Years later, the Bulgari-
ans still pointed to these texts as the greatest contribution made by their East
German colleagues.76

As early as January 1983, Bulgarian foreign intelligence embarked on its
own active measures. Per esempio, its rezidentura in West Germany began
to send out forged letters from an anonymous person in the West German

72. Ibid., P. 8.

73. “Report by Colonel B. Plachkov on Talks with the German Comrades in Berlin,” 21–23 Decem-
ber 1982, in COMDOS Archive, Sluchaya Antonov, a.e. 269 (Operatsij “PAPA” AM “VEZUVIJ”
Vol. II), pag. 14–16.

74. “Information on our ideas for Undertaking a Common Operation with the German Comrades
in Response to the Antisocialist Campaign in Connection with the Attack on the Pope," 20 Decem-
ber 1982, in COMDOS Archive, Sluchaya Antonov, a.e. 269 (Operatsiya “PAPA” AM “VEZUVIJ”
Vol. II), pag. 6–8.

75. “My god, why? Who had an interest in the death of John Paul II?” in COMDOS Archive, Sluchaya
Antonov, a.e. 269 (AM VEZUVIJ Vol. II), pag. 17–115.

76. The HVA labeled one brochure, which they fashioned, as one of their own active measures.See
“The Grey Wolves: Political Home of Assassin Mehmet Ali Agca,” in COMDOS Archive, Sluchaya
Antonov, a.e. 269 (AM “VEZUVIJ” Vol. II.), pag. 167–172, 176–193.

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Cooperation between the Soviet KGB and Bulgarian State Security

intelligence community claiming that an alleged conspiracy between the Turk-
ish nationalist Alparslan Türke¸s and Bavarian Prime Minister and conservative
CSU leader Strauss was behind the attack on the pope.77 For this operation,
the Bulgarians used an alleged record from a meeting of all NATO heads of
counterterrorism that the KGB had either acquired or skillfully forged.78 The
purported minutes of this meeting affirmed that none of the Western ser-
vices had found any proof of a connection between A˘gca and the KGB or
the Bulgarians. The KGB and the Bulgarians also managed to obtain copies
of the interrogations and hearings for all the major witnesses from Rome.79
Nevertheless, the Bulgarians’ active measures did not have much success in
persuading the world of Sofia’s innocence.

Only after Antonov was acquitted of all charges—no hard evidence could
be produced of his involvement with A˘gca, the assault, or a connection to
Bulgarian intelligence—did the accusations against the Bulgarians and the
KGB begin to abate. Time and again, the Communist countries had claimed
that Claire Sterling and her coauthor, Paul Henze, who were the first to write
about Antonov and the alleged “Bulgarian connection,” were influenced by
the CIA.80 Melvin Goodman, a former CIA section chief for the Soviet Union
who became disaffected with the agency, claimed in a recent documentary
that Sterling’s book drew on false information planted by the CIA, and the

77. See the draft for the forged letter, “Untitled, 1982,” in COMDOS Archive, Sluchaya Antonov,
a.e. 254 (AM “ETNA”), pag. 5–8. See also Bundesministerium des Innern, ed., Verfassungsschutzbericht
1983 (Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern, 1984), pag. 191–193.

78. “Proposal concerning the execution of AM ETNA," 22 Marzo 1983, in COMDOS Archive,
Sluchaya Antonov, a.e. 254, pag. 4–6, 9–12.

79. Information from the Security Organs of the PRB, 22 Dicembre 1982, in Bundesbeauftragter für
die Stasi-Unterlagen (Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Files, BStU), MfS Abt. X 235, pag. 15–17;
Telegram from Minister Solakov, 1 Febbraio 1983, in BStU, MfS Abt. X 235, pag. 29–30; Telegram
from Minister Solakov, 2 September1984, in BStU, MfS Abt. X 235, pag. 64–66; “Information from
the Security Organs of the UPR: Information on the Agca case, 3 Giugno 1983, in BStU, MfS Abt. X
235, pag. 99–109; Information from the Security Organs of the PRB on the Trial against the Bulgarian
Citizen Sergey Antonov, 29 Marzo 1985, in BStU, MfS Abt. X 235, P. 131; “Telegram from Minister
Solakov, 23 settembre 1985, in BStU, MfS Abt. X 235, pag. 142–143; “Information from the Security
Organs of the PRB on the Anti-Bulgarian Campaign in the West, 30 Luglio 1984, in BStU, MfS AS
19/87, pag. 2–3; “Information from the Security Organs of the PRB on the Anti-Bulgarian Campaign
in the First Trimester 1984,” in BStU, MfS Abt. X 235, pag. 82–90; “Information from the Security
Organs of the PRB on the Campaign against the PRB, Its Security Organs, and other Socialist Coun-
tries in Connection with the Assault on the Pope, January 1983,” in BStU, MfS HA XXII 17754,
P. 16; and Assessment of the Campaign against the Socialist Countries Raised by Western Media in
connection with the assault on the Pope, 21 December1982, in BStU, MfS HA 17752, pag. 46–48.

80. See the interview with Melvin Goodman in the German-Italian documentary film Schuesse auf
dem Petersplatz [Shots on St. Peter’s Square], dir. Moritz Enders and Werner Koehne (Berlin: Prounen
Film; Rome: SD Cinematografica, 2015).

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Nehring

book then persuaded CIA Director William Casey of the Bulgarian and KGB
connection.81

After the close of Antonov’s trial in 1985, Bulgarian foreign intelligence
complained bitterly to the KGB about the other “fraternal organs.”82 Only the
KGB had offered real help. The East Germans had provided some informa-
zione, but all the other Soviet-bloc intelligence services kept out of the matter
until they, pure, were accused of a role the assassination attempt. Decades after
the collapse of Communism, Tuttavia, Stankov, the former head of Depart-
ment VIII of the PGU-DS, admitted that the KGB had suspected Bulgar-
ian involvement in the assault and had conducted investigations along those
lines.83 The investigations ended after the KGB concluded that the DS was not
involved and that the “Bulgarian connection” was a “flagrant [U.S.] provoca-
tion” (provokatsiya na golo myasto).84

Another murder attempt, Tuttavia, can be unambiguously attributed to
the DS: Georgi Markov’s murder in London in 1978.85 The Bulgarian dis-
sident and émigré was poisoned by a small pellet that contained ricin, UN
quick-working, deadly poison that has no antidote. On his deathbed, Markov
recalled a man with an umbrella on Waterloo Bridge and stated that he had
felt a short sting in his right thigh, where the pellet was later found. One week
Dopo, another Bulgarian émigré in Paris, Vladimir Kostov, was attacked in a
similar fashion and survived only because the poison pellet did not open. It
proved easy to link both attacks to the DS, especially because Markov was
murdered on Zhivkov’s birthday.

As KGB General Kalugin revealed in the 1990s, Zhivkov had directed
Stoyanov to ask the KGB for help with “neutralizing” Markov.86 KGB chief
Andropov declined at first but later agreed to help in order not to insult
Zhivkov personally. Eventually, the KGB agreed to provide the Bulgarians
with the necessary technology and devices and to train Bulgarian operatives
in how to use them. The KGB did not want to use its own agents. Again,
a special relationship revealed itself: The Soviet Union could control the

81. Ibid.

82. “Protocol on the work meeting with the KGB delegation," 17 May 1983, in Kiryakova et al., eds.,
KGB i DS, Doc. 203, pag. 1296–1304.

83. See the online interview with Stankov,“Polk. Dimo Stankov, bivsh zam.-shef na PGU na DS: Pap-
ata znaeshe, che zad pokushenieto stoi ‘Svetata Troica’ – turskite, amerikanskite i italyanskite sluzhbi,"
14 ottobre 2010, https://www.blitz.bg/article/20948. Stankov was the longest-serving head of De-
partment VIII of Bulgarian foreign intelligence.

84. See Baev, KGB v Bulgariya, P. 214.

85. See Nehring, “Umbrella or Pen?"

86. See Kalugin, Spymaster, pag. 178–181.

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Cooperation between the Soviet KGB and Bulgarian State Security

Bulgarians and their “sharp measures,” in part because the KGB was the only
agency that had the resources to carry out such operations abroad. At the same
time, even someone as powerful as Andropov, who was also a member of the
Soviet Politburo and future leader of the Soviet Union, could hardly say no to
a personal request from Zhivkov. Being a “local branch of the KGB” and the
“16th Soviet republic” paid off for the Bulgarians in this case.

An analysis of the cooperation of the KGB and Bulgarian DS in the field
of “sharp measures” shows some interesting results. Primo, Cold War-era claims
that Bulgaria specialized in or was highly accomplished at carrying out mur-
ders or abductions abroad are unfounded. On the contrary, the DS lacked
necessary resources for such operations. Secondo, to make up for this lack of
resources, the DS cultivated almost uniquely close cooperation with the KGB,
which provided the Bulgarians with material and know-how, in turn ensur-
ing that Moscow could control and oversee DS “sharp measures.” The case of
Markov is a perfect example of what was feasible, but conversely it also shows
why the KGB probably would not have wanted the DS to be involved in an
assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II. Finalmente, the record of KGB-DS
cooperation shows that “sharp measures” were only a small part of Bulgaria’s
active measures and reinforces how heavily the Bulgarians in the departments
responsible for such measures depended on their Soviet comrades.

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The Effectiveness of Western Countermeasures
against Soviet-Bloc Active Measures

Active measures against the West were of considerable significance in the “in-
telligence war” between East and West in the 1960s and 1970s and involved
not only increased disinformation and propaganda attacks but also defectors.
Bittman and Šejna, Per esempio, both defectors from Czechoslovakia, spoke
at length about the KGB’s work in this field.87 Even though both men warned
about the West’s lack of interest and vulnerability to Soviet-bloc active mea-
sures, Western intelligence communities gave little indication of being con-
cerned. Despite the constant propaganda attacks of the GDR and the Stasi,
the West German counterintelligence service (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz,
or Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, BfV) did not men-
tion active measures in its annual public reports until the 1980s. Even major
events such as the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, a special target of

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87. Bittman, Geheimwaffe D., pag. 13–33; and Šejna, We Will Bury You.

29

Nehring

active measures by the Stasi, were not seen as being at any special risk from
information warfare.88

Not until the 1980s did active measures become a grave concern for West-
ern intelligence services. In the United States, special task forces of the CIA
and the State Department and annual congressional reports sought to list
and give detailed accounts of Soviet disinformation operations. Organizations
such as the United States Information Agency (USIA), the West Berlin–based
Radio in the American Sector (RIAS), Voice of America (VOA), and Radio
Free Europe (RFE) then used these accounts to publicize and counter the
East-bloc disinformation operations by launching their own information cam-
paigns.89 In the FRG, the BfV took on similar tasks and tried to inform the
public about Soviet disinformation attempts.90 Efforts to counter Communist
active measures followed a threefold model. Primo, measures of “classic” coun-
terespionage were implemented—that is, identifying Soviet spies, front orga-
nizations, and forgeries used by the KGB to spread disinformation.91 Second,
government agencies such as the State Department, the White House, IL
CIA, and the Department of Defense publicly addressed the issue at stake,
analyzed it, and revealed its untrue character. Third, Western news organi-
zations such as USIA, VOA, RFE, the BBC, and Deutsche Welle released a
steady flow of “serious” news and information into the Soviet bloc and the
“Third World.”92 Dennis Kux, a State Department employee who served on
one of the U.S. task forces that looked at Soviet disinformation, later described

88. On the 1972 Olympic games in Munich, see Justus Johannes Meyer, “Politische Spiele—Die
deutsch-deutschen Auseinandersetzungen auf dem Weg zu den XX. Olympischen Sommerspielen
1972 und bei den Spielen in München,” Ph.D. Diss., University of Hamburg, 2010, pag. 309–350.

89. See Alvin Snyder, Warriors of Disinformation: American Propaganda, Soviet Lies, and the Winning
of the Cold War—An Insider’s Account (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1995), pag. 93–125; Herbert
Romerstein, Soviet Agents of Influence (Alexandria, VA: Center for Intelligence Studies, 1991); Her-
bert Romerstein, Soviet Active Measures and Propaganda: New Thinking & Influence Activities in the
Gorbachev Era (Toronto: Mackenzie Institute for the Study of Terrorism, Revolution, and Propa-
ganda, 1989); Dennis Kux, “Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation,” Parameters, Vol. 15, No. 4
(1985), pag. 19–28; Christopher Lamb and Fletcher Schoen, Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic
Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference, Strategic Perspectives No. 11
(Washington, DC:National Defense University Press, Giugno 2012); NOI. Department of State, Bureau
of Public Affairs, Special Report No. 101: Soviet Active Measures. An Update” (Washington, DC: NOI.
Department of State, 1982); NOI. Congress, Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Euro-
pean Affairs, United States Policy toward East Europe, West Europe and the Soviet Union: Hearing, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1986); and U.S. Department of State, Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active
Measures and Propaganda, 1986–87” (Washington, DC: United States Department of State, 1987).

90. Vedere, Per esempio, Innere Sicherheit. Informationen des Bundesministeriums des Inneren Nr. 1
vom 20. 3. 1985; and Bundesministerium des Innern Verfassungsschutzbericht 1983, pag. 201–202.

91. See Kux, “Soviet Active Measures,” p. 26.

92. Snyder, Warriors, pag. 73–163.

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Cooperation between the Soviet KGB and Bulgarian State Security

the gravest problem of such countermeasures. On the one hand, giving too
much attention to forgeries, falsehoods, and propaganda could overstate their
importance; on the other hand, ignoring active measures would only spur
the KGB to undertake more of them.93 Western efforts to counter Cold War
disinformation campaigns are well worth remembering today, at a time of
heightened Western concern about the Russian government’s use of “hybrid
and information warfare.’

Conclusione

Bulgaria and the Soviet Union were united politically and by their special
intelligence relationship. Both facets of this union, Tuttavia, were asymmet-
rical and dominated by the USSR. Ancora, the Bulgarians skillfully managed to
employ tactics of extreme submissiveness to get as much out of their coop-
eration as they possibly could. For instance, by revealing agents, work plans,
and operations to the KGB, they succeeded in obtaining Soviet support for
their work even when Moscow had little interest in it. Even though the DS
was heavily dependent on the KGB, the Bulgarians gained materially from the
relationship.

Active measures, disinformation, and propaganda were specific fields of
work for Soviet-bloc intelligence services, especially because such activities
were closely connected to the foreign policy interests of the Soviet Union.
The Bulgarian (and other) departments for active measures were set up based
on the model of Service “A.” Because the Bulgarians never had the ambi-
tion to become globally engaged in active measures, they chose to affiliate
themselves with operations initiated by the KGB—but never without hint-
ing toward their limited resources. Agents were shared with or transferred
completely to the KGB. Materials the Bulgarians planned to use were almost
always produced in Moscow (or East Berlin). Frequently, the services would
“double-account” for their actions and operations in order to reconcile heir
limited resources with their Soviet-assigned global tasks. During times of fierce
international conflict, notably the propaganda war after the attempt to assassi-
nate Pope John Paul and Western speculation about a “Bulgarian connection,"
these tricks came back like a boomerang to the Bulgarian foreign intelligence
service.

93. Kux, “Soviet Active Measures,” p. 26.

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Nehring

The record of Bulgarian-Soviet intelligence cooperation during the Cold
War yields several lessons that can be applied to the current Russian campaigns
of “hybrid and information warfare.” First, Moscow’s use of active measures as
an instrument for exerting clandestine influence did not stop with the collapse
of Communism and the Soviet Union itself. Service “A” of the former PGU-
KGB was not dissolved, although it did suffer from layoffs and cutbacks when
the Russian state encountered severe financial problems in the 1990s. IL
intelligence service was simply renamed and integrated within the structures of
the new Russian SVR. Afterward, especially during the consolidation phase of
Putin’s rise to power, active measures, disinformation, and influence measures
were employed to stabilize domestic rule and to accompany internal conflicts,
as in Chechnya, the Caucasus, Ukraine, and Central Asia.94 After 1991, active
measures did not die out as an instrument of Russian foreign policy toward the
West, but the resources that could be directed in this direction were initially
limited.

Secondo, despite Moscow’s loss of its “fraternal states” and its outer empire,
close personal and structural ties continued to exist between individuals and
organizations active in the West during the Cold War years and the Soviet
state. Most likely, clandestine structures in the former states of the Soviet bloc
are still being used today to spread disinformation.

Third, the digital age is the real driving force behind the change in Rus-
sian disinformation policy. On the one hand, the Internet, blogs, Facebook,
and real-time communications around the globe have facilitated contacts with
foreign societies while helping, in some cases, to conceal such ties. On the
other hand, the shape of “hybrid and information warfare” has been adapted
to the digital age. Internet blogs, “trolls,” and “fake news” on Facebook can
spread disinformation much more rapidly and can reach a far broader audi-
ence than newspaper articles could during the Cold War. The use of digital
instruments also raises the question of penal codes concerning the spread of
“foreign disinformation,” which may cause a massive problem for Western law
enforcement authorities.

The examples analyzed in this article support proposals for a concen-
trated and coordinated set of steps to counter disinformation. The commis-
sions formed within the U.S. Dipartimento di Stato, the U.S. Congress, the CIA,
USIA, and the West German BfV caused great concern among the “warriors of

94. Irena Borogan and Andrei Soldatov, The New Nobility: The Restoration of Russia’s Security State and
the Enduring Legacy of the KGB (New York: Public Affairs, 2010); and Irena Borogan and Andrei Solda-
tov, The Red Web: The Struggle between Russia’s Digital Dictators and the New Online Revolutionaries
(New York: Public Affairs, 2015).

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Cooperation between the Soviet KGB and Bulgarian State Security

disinformation” in the KGB and its “fraternal organs” in the 1980s.95 Even
though the effectiveness of these efforts was not always clear at the time,
archival evidence indicates that he KGB, the HVA, and the Bulgarian foreign
intelligence all felt the pressure and rising costs.

Finalmente, disinformation policies and efforts to counter them carry strong
political implications. Countermeasures did not stop Soviet disinformation
during the Cold War—and will not stop Russian operations today. How-
ever, they will raise the costs of such operations and complicate the efforts
of the other side. In any case, Russian disinformation policy (which officials
in Moscow call “information policy”) claims to “counter” Western efforts to
spread disinformation and “propaganda.” This rhetoric creates an atmosphere
of insinuations and counter-insinuations, measures and countermeasures, UN
spiraling interaction that obscures what is true and what is not. Today, COME
during the Cold War, hostile states’ efforts to creating mistrust, disruptions,
and confusion are fairly successful when Western societies are internally di-
vided. D'altra parte, disinformation seldom has “positive” or “creative”
effects. Per esempio, Soviet propaganda did not succeed in creating a new
and attractive “master narrative” or even in persuading anyone of the superi-
ority of Communism. Hence, “hybrid and information warfare” should not
be overestimated, just as it should not be underestimated. The same is true of
countermeasures. The real challenge—and the level at which disinformation
must be tackled—is the political sphere. Western liberal democracy proved
more attractive and effective during the Cold War (E, one hopes, will do so
Ancora).

95. Vedere, Per esempio, the documents in COMDOS Archive, F. 9, Op. 2, a.e. 540; Nehring, Zusam-
menarbeit, pag. 239–265; and Christopher Nehring, “Russische (Des) Informationspolitik: Bruch oder
Kontinuität,” in Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, Vol. 10 (2017), pag. 441–451.

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