Iran-Iraq War and the Nuclear Deal

What the Iran-Iraq War
Tells Us about the
Future of the Iran
Nuclear Deal

Ariane M. Tabatabai
y
Annie Tracy Samuel

It is a truism that the
1979 Islamic Revolution transformed Iran and its place in the world. Para
the United States, the revolution swept away a reliable partner and replaced it
with a regime long considered a “mystery” and a “puzzle.”1 Although schol-
ars and analysts have devoted many pages to deciphering the Iranian enigma,
most have failed to adequately examine the event in modern Iranian history
whose signiªcance and impact rival that of the revolution itself: the 1980–88
Iran-Iraq War.

Neglect of such a momentous event reveals a major shortcoming in the
scholarship on Iran. Although that is signiªcant in itself, Iran is not a country
of interest only to scholars. Since the revolution, Washington has viewed
Tehran with fear and enmity, especially after the 2002 exposure of the Natanz
uranium enrichment facility, which the Iranian government had not declared
to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Since then, one of the most
pressing national security issues for the United States and its allies has been to
prevent such an apparently enigmatic and threatening regime from weapon-
izing its nuclear program. Para tal fin, the P5(cid:2)1 (the ªve permanent members
of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany) and Iran concluded the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on July 14, 2015, which places
limits on Tehran’s sensitive nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief.
It is precisely on this issue of the JCPOA’s implementation that the lessons
of the Iran-Iraq War have immense and immediate bearing.

While most of the discussion surrounding the nuclear negotiations and
deal has focused on the untrustworthiness of the Islamic Republic, little atten-
tion has been paid to how Iranians view that process, its outcome, and its
broader impact on Iran’s security outlook. Responding to domestic opposition
to the deal, A NOSOTROS. ofªcials have stated that it is built not on trust but on veriªca-

Ariane M. Tabatabai is an Assistant Teaching Professor and Director of Curriculum in the Walsh School of
Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Annie Tracy Samuel is Assistant Professor of History at the
University of Tennessee at Chattanooga.

The authors’ names are listed in alphabetical order. Each author contributed equally to this article.
They would like to thank Robert Reardon, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and the anonymous peer re-
viewers for their helpful feedback.

1. Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conºict between Iran and America (Nueva York: Ran-
dom House, 2005).

Seguridad Internacional, volumen. 42, No. 1 (Verano 2017), páginas. 152–185, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00286
© 2017 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

152

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Iran-Iraq War and the Nuclear Deal 153

tion.2 Iranian ofªcials, especially Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
and some leaders of the powerful paramilitary conglomerate, the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), have indicated a similar reluctance to
trust the United States.3 Despite declaring their support for the process,
Khamenei and others have warned Iranians that the United States cannot be
trusted, contending that Washington would not remove the sanctions against
the country and would ªnd other excuses to stymie Iran’s progress.4 Elite and
popular support for the deal in Iran ebbed following the JCPOA’s ofªcial
Implementation Day on January 16, 2016, as economic recovery was slow to
materialize and Khamenei distanced himself from the deal and from the mod-
erate president, Hassan Rouhani, who delivered it.5 Iranians’ concerns were
further exacerbated by the election of Donald Trump as president of the
United States in November 2016. Trump’s denigration of the JCPOA and hos-
tility toward Iran appeared to conªrm the Iranian belief that the United States’
ultimate objective is to isolate Iran and undermine its ability to protect itself.6

This article examines how Iran’s experience in the Iran-Iraq War affects its
nuclear policy. We argue that the inºuence of that war has been greatly under-
estimated and misinterpreted outside Iran. We demonstrate that the conven-
tional wisdom, which views Iran through the lens of the Islamic Revolution
without considering the impact of the Iran-Iraq War, is incorrect and mislead-
ing for those seeking to understand Iran and prevent it from acquiring nuclear
armas. We further demonstrate how Iran’s interpretation of the war has di-

2. Bernie Becker, “Kerry: Iran Deal Not about Trust,” The Hill, Noviembre 24, 2013, http://thehill
.com/policy/international/191272-kerry-iran-deal-not-about-trust.
3. Ariane Tabatabai, “Don’t Fear the Hard-Liners,” Foreign Policy, Abril 4, 2015, http://
foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/04/dont-fear-the-hardliners-iran-nuke-deal-zarif-khamenei/.
4. “Bayanat dar didar-i farmandihan va karkunan-i Niru-yi Havayi-i Artish” [Remarks in a meet-
ing with air force commanders and staff], Khamenei.ir, Febrero 8, 2015, http://farsi.khamenei.ir/
speech-content?id(cid:3)25260; and Annie Tracy Samuel, “Revolutionary Guard Is Cautiously Open to
Nuclear Deal,” Iran Matters blog, December 20, 2013, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/
revolutionary-guard-cautiously-open-nuclear-deal-1.
5. “Bayanat dar didar-i aqshar-i mukhtalif-i mardum” [Remarks in a meeting with various groups
de personas], Khamenei.ir, Agosto 1, 2016, http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id(cid:3)34429.
6. Carol Morello, “Iran Nuclear Deal Could Collapse under Trump,El Correo de Washington, Novem-
ber 9, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/iran-nuclear-deal-could-
collapse-under-trump/2016/11/09/f2d2bd02-a68c-11e6-ba59-a7d93165c6d4_story.html; “Netan-
yahu Hopes to Work with Trump to Undo Iran Nuclear Deal,” Associated Press, December 12,
2016, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/12/12/netanyahu-hopes-to-work-with-trump-to-
undo-iran-nuclear-deal.html; Karen DeYoung, “Trump Administration Says It’s Putting Iran ‘On
Notice’ Following Missile Test,El Correo de Washington, Febrero 1, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost
.com/world/national-security/2017/02/01/fc5ce3d2-e8b0-11e6-80c2-30e57e57e05d_story.html
?utm_term(cid:3).fe4d83f4d557; and Yeganeh Torbati, “Trump Administration Tightens Iran Sanctions,
Tehran Hits Back,” Reuters, Febrero 3, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-usa-
idUSKBN15H253.

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Seguridad Internacional 42:1 154

rect bearing on its approach to international relations, its security outlook, y
its decisions regarding its nuclear program.

One of the clearest indications of the Iran-Iraq War’s importance is found in
the vast amount of research that has been published on the conºict by a variety
of ofªcial and unofªcial institutions and individuals. Foremost among these is
the IRGC, whose research and publications on the war constitute an impres-
sive and substantial project, including a multivolume analytical chronology of
the war (lo sucesivo: War Chronology). The IRGC publications are particularly
signiªcant because they shed light on the incompletion and inaccuracy of
Western analyses of the organization and of the lasting impact of the war on
Iran’s strategic culture. As highlighted by an IRGC volume published in 2001,
“The Iran-Iraq War, . . . because of its vast impact and outcomes, will affect
every issue of internal and foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran for at
least the next several decades.”7

Western scholars and analysts, sin embargo, have failed both to examine such
Iranian sources and to understand the full
impact of the Iran-Iraq War
on Iranian decisionmaking, en general, and on nuclear policy, En particular.
There are surprisingly few English-language monographs on the Iran-Iraq
Guerra, and those that do exist are limited by a number of temporal, thematic,
and methodological shortcomings.8 In contrast to the existing scholarship,
this article relies heavily on Iranian sources available only in Persian, en-
cluding ofªcial statements; the IRGC publications mentioned above; publica-
tions on Iran’s nuclear program, such as Rouhani’s memoir describing the
2003–05 round of nuclear talks;9 and interviews with key Iranian decision-
fabricantes, including Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, Deputy Foreign Minister
Majid Takht-e Ravanchi, former Iranian representative to the IAEA Ali Asghar
Soltanieh, and the father of Iran’s nuclear program, Akbar Etemad.

7. Tajziyah va tahlil-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq [Analysis of the Iran-Iraq War], volumen. 1, 2y ed.. (Tehran: Cen-
ter for War Studies and Research, 2001/02), pag. 15.
8. Shirin Tahir-Kheli and Shaheen Ayubi, editores., The Iran-Iraq War: New Weapons, Old Conºicts (Nuevo
york: Preger, 1983); J.M. Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran: The Years of Crisis (baltimore, Maryland.: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1984); Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War (Lon-
don: I.B. Tauris, 1988); Edgar O’Ballance, The Gulf War (Londres: Brassey’s Defence, 1988); John
Bulloch and Harvey Morris, The Gulf War: Its Origins, Historia, y consecuencias (Londres: Methuen,
1989); Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conºict (Londres: Grafton, 1989); Efraim
Karsh, ed. The Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications (Houndmills, REINO UNIDO.: Macmillan, 1989); esteban
C. Pelletiere and Douglas V. Johnson II, Lessons Learned: The Iran-Iraq War (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.:
Strategic Studies Institute, A NOSOTROS. Army War College, 1991); and Stephen C. Pelletiere, The Iran-Iraq
Guerra: Chaos in a Vacuum (Nueva York: Preger, 1992). A notable exception is Farideh Farhi, "El
Antinomies of Iran’s War Generation,” in Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick, editores., Iran, Iraq, y
the Legacies of War (Nueva York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), páginas. 101–120.
9. Hassan Rouhani, Amniyat-i milli va diplumasi-i hastih-‘i [National security and nuclear diplo-
macy] (Tehran: Center for Strategic Research, 2011).

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Iran-Iraq War and the Nuclear Deal 155

While ofªcial Iranian sources and statements, like those of other countries,
should not be read uncritically or be taken at face value, they should also not
be disregarded because of the particular perspectives they present. Bastante, nosotros
posit that analyzing Iranian perspectives is vital to understanding Iran’s deci-
sionmaking process and policy outputs, even if those perspectives are not al-
ways accurate. That is because they shed signiªcant light on the Islamic
Republic’s views of itself and of international affairs, and bridge key gaps
in analysts’ understanding of Tehran’s interests, ambitions, and actions. En-
deed, although scholars and analysts have long dismissed Iranian accounts as
either the manifestation of its revolutionary ideology or as part of a face-
saving strategy, we argue that there is much more to the narrative and that
having a systematic appreciation of post-revolutionary Iran’s self-image is vi-
tal to interpreting its policies and conduct.

This article demonstrates that point by emphasizing the necessity of under-
standing the Iran-Iraq War in order to move forward with the implementation
of the JCPOA and to ensure that the deal’s achievements are sustained past its
implementation time frame. After outlining the relevant theoretical and histor-
ical background, we present our argument in two main sections. In the ªrst,
we analyze Iran’s view of its experience in the war and draw out the main
ways in which the war has shaped the Islamic Republic’s security outlook,
strategic culture, and policies since. In the second, we examine the two major
implications of that outlook for resolving the nuclear standoff and implement-
ing the JCPOA: (1) Iran’s distrust of what it views as an unjust international
sistema; y (2) its resultant determination to be self-reliantly secure.

Iran’s Strategic Defensive Realism

Although our assessment of Iran’s nuclear decisionmaking is based primarily
on a critical and source-driven analysis of Iranian perspectives and actions,
our arguments are also framed by a number of theoretical considerations.
Primero, we borrow from the scholarship on the Cold War and the theoretical
framework on Soviet attitudes and strategic culture—in particular, Jacobo
Snyder’s The Soviet Strategic Culture—to present the Iran-Iraq War as a catalyst
event shaping Iranian attitudes toward the nuclear crisis, negotiations, and re-
sulting deal, placing them within Iran’s strategic culture.10 Drawing on Snyder,
we posit that the particular rationale observed in Iranian decisionmaking does
not stem from or indicate irrationality, as the conventional wisdom of “mad

10. Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations (Santa
Monica, California: Corporación RAND, 1977).

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Seguridad Internacional 42:1 156

mullahs” holds. Bastante, as Snyder argued in the case of the Soviet Union,
Iran’s rationale and decisionmaking “reºect[] real differences in strategic
thinking,”11 which have their roots in the Iran-Iraq War.

Segundo, we posit that Iran’s security policy and strategic culture are deeply
rooted in defensive realism, which contends that in the “self-help system” that
characterizes a fundamentally anarchic world, “units worry about their sur-
vival, and the worry conditions their behavior.”12 Iran’s position in a perenni-
ally volatile region, surrounded by U.S.-backed adversaries stocked with
advanced weapons, and its belief that the United States’ ultimate objective is
to weaken and isolate the country heighten its sense of vulnerability. This in
turn fuels Iran’s security dilemma, which Tehran tries to address by building
up its own capabilities, often rooted in asymmetric warfare, to compensate for
its conventional inferiority.

Respectivamente, Iran’s main objective lies in the key tenet of defensive realism:
survival. As Kenneth Waltz argues, “In a self-help system each of the units
spends a portion of its efforts, not in forwarding its own good, but in pro-
viding the means of protecting itself against others.”13 Indeed, much of the
Islamic Republic’s foreign activities—its support for nonstate actors and its in-
volvement in regional conºicts—have been driven by self-protection, incluso
though they are generally portrayed as expansionist. This misconception ex-
empliªes the necessity of understanding such issues from all the relevant per-
spectives. What Gulf Arab ofªcials term “Iran meddling in Arab affairs” is to
Iran an essential part of an “aggressive defense” of its national security.14 And,
as Snyder argued in the case of the Soviet Union, Iranian policies, si
aligned with U.S. interests and values or not, should not be dismissed as irra-
tional or branded fundamentally expansionist.15 Rather, they must be exam-
ined within the framework of defensive realism and its emphasis on states’
primary goal of ensuring their own survival in an anarchic world. This is not
to say that U.S. and Persian Gulf states’ concerns surrounding Iran’s activities
are ill-founded. To be sure, Tehran’s policies in certain areas (p.ej., the Syrian
civil war) are disruptive if not destructive and should be countered. What our

11. Ibídem., pag. 22.
12. Kenneth N.. Vals, Teoría de la política internacional (Long Grove, Ill.: Waveland, 1979), pag. 105.
13. Ibídem.
14. Author interviews with Gulf Cooperation Council ofªcials, Doha, Muscat, Kuwait City, y
Abu Dhabi, May and November 2016; and Annie Tracy Samuel, “Perceptions and Narratives of
Security: The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and the Iran-Iraq War,” Seguridad Internacional
Program Discussion Paper 2012-06 (Cambridge, Masa.: Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2012), páginas. 17–18.
15. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” Interna-
tional Security, volumen. 25, No. 3 (Invierno 2000/01), pag. 128, doi:10.1162/016228800560543.

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Iran-Iraq War and the Nuclear Deal 157

research indicates, sin embargo, is that Iran’s activities have as their primary aim
not destabilization but the country’s survival.

Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear capability must accordingly be understood in
those terms as well. As we discuss further below, Tehran’s policy of hedging—
of developing a nuclear energy program that could also serve as the infrastruc-
ture for a weapons program—is as old as its nuclear ambitions, going back to
the 1950s. En el momento, Iran did not make a decision to weaponize its nuclear
program because its conventional superiority and alliance with the United
States made doing so unnecessary. After the revolution and the outbreak of the
Iran-Iraq War, sin embargo, Iran’s vulnerability and isolation in a self-help system
led Tehran to pursue weaponization. Por 2003, Iran had built a basic nuclear in-
frastructure and was developing the technical know-how and capability to
weaponize its program. Todavía, when it became clear that the nuclear program
was making Iran less rather than more secure, with crippling sanctions im-
posed on the country and the looming threat of another war, Tehran came to
the negotiating table prepared to discuss halting some of its nuclear activities.

Despite this record of pragmatic decisionmaking, the conventional wisdom
that has dominated the international security scholarship on Iran’s nuclear
policy suffers from several of the shortcomings introduced above. Para examen-
por ejemplo, James Sebenius and Michael Singh have argued that Iran’s “overriding in-
terests” concern the “persistence of [es] current . . . system of government,"
and that the “development of a nuclear weapon would serve these interests by
acting as a deterrent,” but they fail to explain how or why that could be
true. Sebenius and Singh also assert that Iranian leaders “acknowledged” this
“fact” in the late 1980s, “when they cited the need for such weapons in light of
Iran’s concerns about perceived threats from Iraq and Israel.”16

This statement is a mischaracterization of both historical events and Iran’s
interests. Primero, what Sebenius and Singh describe as a “perceived threat”
from Iraq was neither “perceived” nor a “threat” but an actual war, one in
which Iran was invaded and attacked with chemical weapons. Segundo, por
viewing Iran exclusively in terms of the Islamic Revolution and ignoring the
Iran-Iraq War, Sebenius and Singh incorrectly assert that Iran’s overriding in-
terest is the survival of its regime rather than national security and the defense
of its territory. In part, this and other ºaws in their argument stem from the
neglect of Iranian sources and perspectives and their reliance instead on

16. James Sebenius and Michael Singh, “Is a Nuclear Deal with Iran Possible? An Analytical
Framework for the Iran Nuclear Negotiations,” Seguridad Internacional, volumen. 37, No. 3 (Invierno 2012/
13), páginas. 52–91, at p. 60, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00108.

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Seguridad Internacional 42:1 158

“infer[ences]” based on Iran’s “actions, comportamiento,” and “studies on the re-
gime’s ideology.”17

The failure of scholars such as Sebenius and Singh to examine Iranian
sources and appreciate the impact of the Iran-Iraq War is one of the primary
reasons why the Islamic Republic has remained a seemingly impenetrable
puzzle, especially with regard to its nuclear ambitions, and why the conven-
tional wisdom on Iran has shed little light on that subject. Más, the scholar-
ship on Iran’s nuclear program has focused overwhelmingly on subjects such
as the dangers that a nuclear-armed Iran would present to its neighbors and
el mundo,18 the speciªc methods that should be used to prevent Iran from
weaponizing,19 and whether Iran actually wants nuclear weapons.20 What is
missing from much of this scholarship is consideration of the history, sources,
and subjects that shed the most light on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear policy.21
These form the basis of the present article.

En efecto, in analyses of Tehran’s nuclear ªle, the Iran-Iraq War has come to
serve merely as a metaphor. When commentators mention the war, they do so
almost exclusively with superªcial references to the founder and ªrst supreme
leader of the Islamic Republic Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s likening his de-
cision to end the war to drinking a chalice of poison.22 Will Iran’s current su-
preme leader drink from a poisoned chalice like his predecessor and move
forward with a nuclear deal?, observers have asked. Will he give up his re-

17. Ibídem., páginas. 59, 60.
18. Dalia Dassa Kaye and Frederic M. Wehrey, “A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of Neighbours,"
Survival, volumen. 49, No. 2 (Verano 2007), páginas. 111–128, doi:10.1080/00396330701437777; and Eric S.
Edelman, Andrew F. Krepinevich, and Evan Braden Montgomery, “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran:
The Limits of Containment,” Foreign Affairs, volumen. 90, No. 1 (January/February 2011), https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/persian-gulf/2011-01-01/dangers-nuclear-iran.
19. Dina Esfandiary and Mark Fitzpatrick, “Sanctions on Iran: Deªning and Enabling ‘Success,’”
Survival, volumen. 53, No. 5 (October/November 2011), páginas. 143–156, doi:10.1080/00396338.2011.621639;
Ray Takeyh, “Iran’s Nuclear Calculations,” World Policy Journal, volumen. 20, No. 2 (Verano 2003),
páginas. 21–28, doi:10.1215/07402775-2003-3006; Andrew Parasiliti, “Iran: Diplomacy and Deterrence,"
Survival, volumen. 51, No. 5 (October/November 2009), páginas. 5–13, doi:10.1080/00396330903309824; y
Scott D.. sagan, “How to Keep the Bomb from Iran,” Foreign Affairs, volumen. 84, No. 5 (September/
Octubre 2006), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2006-09-01/how-keep-bomb-iran.
20. Shahram Chubin, “Does Iran Want Nuclear Weapons?” Survival, volumen. 37, No. 1 (Primavera 1995),
páginas. 86–104, doi:10.1080/00396339508442778; and Shahram Chubin and Robert S. Litwak, “De-
bating Iran’s Nuclear Aspirations,” Washington Quarterly, volumen. 26, No. 4 (Otoño 2003), páginas. 99–
114, doi:10.1162/016366003322387136.
21. Edelman, Krepinevich, and Montgomery, “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran”; Daniel Brumberg,
“Internal Politics and Iranian Foreign Policy” (Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: Working Group on Internal Poli-
tics and Iranian Foreign Policy, Stimson Center, undated); and Matthew Levitt, “The Iranian Secu-
rity Threat in the Western Hemisphere: Learning from Past Experience,” SAIS Review, volumen. 32,
No. 1 (Winter/Spring 2012), doi: 10.1353/sais.2012.0018.
22. Robert Pear, “Khomeini Accepts ‘Poison’ of Ending the War with Iraq; U.N. Sending Mission,"
New York Times, Julio 21, 1988, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/21/us/khomeini-accepts-
poison-of-ending-the-war-with-iraq-un-sending-mission.html.

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Iran-Iraq War and the Nuclear Deal 159

gime’s decades-long struggle with the United States to save his country and its
faltering economy?23 As with so much of the sound-bite-driven analysis of
Iran, the allusion to the poisoned chalice greatly oversimpliªes a critical and
complex issue and reveals little about Iran’s nuclear program (or the Iran-Iraq
Guerra). It is also representative of how scholars and policymakers have failed to
appreciate the depth and breadth of the Iran-Iraq War’s signiªcance, thus pre-
venting them from accurately understanding and applying the lessons of the
war to the nuclear issue.

The Islamic Republic of Iran: Revolution and War

The Islamic Revolution of 1978–79 was a movement of several different
groups that were united most strongly in their opposition to the Pahlavi dy-
nasty and the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah.24 The shah faced opposition to
his efforts to rapidly transform the country through social reforms, the costly
modernization of infrastructure, and the military and the diversiªcation of its
energy sources, which included the establishment of a nuclear program with
the help of the United States.25 By the mid-1970s, when domestic opposition
was becoming more organized and galvanizing around Ayatollah Khomeini,

23. Dore Gold, The Rise of Nuclear Iran—How Tehran Deªes the West (Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: Regnery,
2009); Amir Taheri, “Opinion: When Mullahs and Generals Forget Their Duties,” Asharq al-Awsat,
Puede 22, 2015, http://english.aawsat.com/amir-taheri/opinion/opinion-when-mullahs-and-gen-
erals-forget-their-duties; Arash Karami, “Rouhani: Khomeini Chose Peace When Necessary,” Al-
Monitor, Enero 29, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/pt/contents/articles/originals/
2015/01/rouhani-says-khomeini-chose-peace.html; Barbara Slavin, “Result Trumps Deadline in
Marathon Iran Nuclear Talks,” Al Jazeera, Marzo 31, 2015, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/
2015/3/31/Marathon-Iran-nuclear-talks-extend-past-deadline.html; Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, “How
Iran Can Escape Its Nuclear Deadlock with the U.S.,” Hufªngton Post, Enero 5, 2015, http://
www.hufªngtonpost.com/abolhassan-banisadr/iran-us-nuclear-deadlock_b_6419612.html; y
Michael Rubin, “The Danger of Negotiating with Iran,” Washington Free Beacon, Marzo 9, 2015,
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/the-danger-of-negotiating-with-iran/.
24. For more on the Iranian Revolution, see David Menashri, Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution
(Nueva York: Holmes and Meier, 1990); Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic
Revolution in Iran (Nueva York: prensa de la Universidad de Oxford, 1988); Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism:
Essays on the Islamic Republic (berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); and Mohsen M.
Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic, 2y ed.. (1988;
repr. Roca, Colo.: Westview, 1994).
25. “Naguftih’ha-yi mas’ul zidd-i ittila’at Parchin” [Untolds from the head of counter-intelligence
at Parchin], Farda News (news agency), Enero 23, 2013, http://www.fardanews.com/fa/news/
243470; Stephen McGlinchey, “How the Shah Entangled America,” National Interest, Agosto 2,
2013, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/how-the-shah-entangled-america-8821; and author
telephone interview with Akbar Etemad, Tehran, Octubre 2014. As part of President Dwight D. Ei-
senhower’s Atoms for Peace initiative, Iran signed an agreement with the United States in 1957 a
start a nuclear program and then purchased the Tehran Research Reactor and highly enriched ura-
nium to fuel the reactor from the United States. “Tehran Research Reactor,” Nuclear Iran, undated,
http://www.isisnucleariran.org/sites/facilities/tehran-research-reactor-trr/.

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Seguridad Internacional 42:1 160

Iran’s nuclear program was well under way, and what became the Middle
East’s ªrst nuclear power plant in the Iranian city of Bushehr was under con-
estructura. Khomeini strongly objected to a number of the shah’s domestic
and foreign policies, and denounced nuclear technology as a waste of the
country’s resources.26 After the revolutionaries succeeded in ousting the shah
in February 1979, they abandoned many of his projects, including the nuclear
programa. Shortly after they established the new Islamic Republic, Iraq at-
tacked Iran.

The Iran-Iraq War is part of a long history of conºict between the rulers and
peoples of those lands. Por último, sin embargo, the causes of the war were politi-
cal and proximate, and it was the Iranian Revolution that formed its most
signiªcant catalyst. Iran’s post-revolutionary government was based on the
centrality of Islam in public life, and Khomeini vowed to ªght for the revival
of Shi’i Islam and for the freedom of the “oppressed” throughout the world. A
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, who presided over a Sunni-dominated, secu-
lar government ruling a Shi’i majority,27 these policies presented a threat to
his power.

Al mismo tiempo, Iran appeared to be in a vulnerable position, as violent
disputes over the post-revolutionary order persisted into its second year.
Saddam decided to take the opportunity to launch what he intended to be a
quick military operation to defeat the revolution and safeguard his rule and,
while he was at it, to seize the oil-rich territory in southwestern Iran and assert
his leadership of the Arab world. After a year of steadily worsening rela-
tions and several months of border clashes, Iraqi forces invaded Iran on
Septiembre 22, 1980, marking the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War.

What Saddam thought would be a swift and easy strike to check the revolu-
tionary regime quickly transformed into a brutal and drawn-out conºict that
instead revitalized the ºagging revolution. After a series of victories that al-
lowed Iraqi forces to advance into Iran through early 1981, Iranian forces
halted the Iraqis’ march and retook most of their territory over the course of
the next year. Iran then pursued the retreating forces into Iraq in the summer

26. Rouhani, Amniyat-i milli va diplumasi-i hastih-‘i, pag. 27; and author interview with Ali Asghar
Soltanieh, Tehran, Junio 2014.
27. For the period under question, the demographic breakdown between Sunnis and Shi’is in Iraq
is unclear and has been the subject of debate, because censuses either were not taken or are unreli-
capaz. En 1980 Shi’is made up between 55 y 65 percent of the Iraqi population. See Helen Chapin
Metz, ed., Iraq: A Country Study (Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: Government Printing Ofªce for the Library of
Congreso, 1988), páginas. 87–93; Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of
Iraq (Princeton, NUEVA JERSEY.: Prensa de la Universidad de Princeton, 1978), páginas. 13–50; and Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi’is
of Iraq (Princeton, NUEVA JERSEY.: Prensa de la Universidad de Princeton, 1994), páginas. 13–47.

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Iran-Iraq War and the Nuclear Deal 161

de 1982, but was unable to gain or hold much ground. The war broadened as it
stalled, entangling the rest of the Middle East and both superpowers and
spreading from the land to the Tanker War in the Persian Gulf and several se-
ries of aerial attacks on civilian areas, known as the War of the Cities. The con-
ºict continued largely as a bloody stalemate until August 20, 1988, cuando el
cease-ªre terms of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 598
came into force.28 The end of the war restored the status quo ante, with both re-
gimes still in power and without territorial adjustments.

Although neither side emerged as the clear victor, the war had a profound
impact on both countries. The war’s eight years amount to about one-ªfth of
the life of the Islamic Republic. Casualty ªgures remain highly uncertain, pero
estimates of Iranian deaths range from 170,000 a 750,000.29 The conºict was
brutal, with the use of trench warfare; extensive attacks on civilian areas; y
Iraq’s widespread use of chemical weapons, the effects from which Iranians
continue to suffer.30 The horrors of the war persist in other ways as well: land
mines left over from the conºict still explode along Iran’s western border,
sometimes inºicting additional casualties,31 and soldiers’ remains continue
to be unearthed and passed on to their proper resting places in either Iran
or Iraq.32

Finalmente, the Iran-Iraq War remains a central component of Iran’s national
identity. Although it was a disaster for the country, the leaders of the Islamic
Republic emerged from the war smarter and stronger. Many of its war veter-
ans now hold key positions in the government and military. For the revolution
and the regime it brought to power, the Iran-Iraq War was a test, one that pro-
vided Iran with important lessons that have driven its policies since.

28. United Nations Security Council Resolution 598, Julio 20, 1987.
29. Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New
Dataset of Battle Deaths,” European Journal of Population, volumen. 21, No. 2 (Junio 2005), páginas. 145–166,
doi:10.1007/s10680-005-6851-6.
30. Ramin Mostaghim and Patrick J. McDonnell, “Iran’s Nuclear Resolve Fueled by Iraq’s Chemi-
cal Assault in War,” Los Angeles Times, Octubre 17, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/oct/17/
world/la-fg-iran-chemical-20131017; and Narges Bajoghli, “Iran’s Chemical Weapon Survivors
Show Twin Horrors of WMD and Sanctions,” Tehran Bureau (online newspaper), Septiembre 2,
2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2013/sep/02/iran-chemical-weapons-
wmd-sanctions.
31. “Landmine from Wartime Kills 6 in Western Iran,” Tehran Times, Noviembre 4, 2012.
32. International Committee of the Red Cross, “Iran/Iraq: Efforts Continue to Clarify Fate of
Missing from 1980–1988 War” (Geneva, Suiza: International Committee of the Red Cross,
Junio 5, 2013), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2013/05-06-iran-
iraq-missings.htm; and Saman Kojouri, “Iran Holds Funeral Procession for 92 Soldiers Killed in
Iran-Iraq War,” Press TV, Septiembre 2, 2013.

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Seguridad Internacional 42:1 162

Unªnished History: The Iran-Iraq War in the Iranian Perspective

In their writings and declarations, Iranian leaders provide several reasons for
why the war will “affect every issue of internal and foreign policy” in Iran for
decades to come.33 First, the war’s length, intensidad, and human and material
costs make the war extremely signiªcant, as discussed above.34 Second, el
war and the revolution that immediately preceded it are “linked closely” to
each other and can only be understood together.35 But whereas the impact of
the Islamic Revolution (and other historical events, especially the 1953 coup
that overthrew Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh) on Iranian positions
and policies is taken as fact and has been examined closely by scholars, the im-
pact of the war has not been fully acknowledged or properly analyzed. Este
failure has contributed materially to skewed representations of the Islamic
República. Finalmente, the war’s signiªcance stems from the way Iranian leaders
view the role of history, en general, and the history of the Iran-Iraq War, en par-
particular, in shaping Iran’s national identity and foreign policy outlook in the
present day. Este, también, is an issue that has often confounded Western policy-
fabricantes, who have been unsure what to make of Iranians’ meandering refer-
ences to the ancient or recent past, especially during formal negotiations over
Iran’s nuclear program. Todavía, for many Iranians, history and, de nuevo, that of the
war in particular, is inextricable from the present. In the words of a 2003 IRGC
volumen, “[t]he war is part of the reality of Iran’s history whose place and in-
ºuential role leave[] no doubt that for a minimum of the next several decades
the results and consequences of the war will be clear in . . . the political, social,
cultural, and military life of Iran.”36

Por eso, the Iran-Iraq War has great bearing on every aspect of Iranian deci-
sionmaking, including the nuclear ªle. Por último, the war is the chief develop-
ment that has shaped the strategic thinking that is so “unique to the [Iranian]
experience.”37 The remainder of this section examines two signiªcant aspects
of Iran’s understanding of the war that stand out as central to Iran’s view of in-
ternational affairs and as having the broadest and most direct implications for
the Iranian nuclear program and the JCPOA’s viability: (1) Iran’s experience of

33. Tajziyah va tahlil-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 1, pag. 15.
34. Ibídem., páginas. 13, 15; Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq [Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War], volumen. 1 (Teh-
ran: Center for War Studies and Research, 1997), pag. 15; Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq [Chronology
of the Iran-Iraq War], volumen. 4 (Tehran: Center for War Studies and Research, 1993/94), pag. 30; Mu-
hammad Durudiyan, Naqd va barrasi-i Jang-i Iran va Iraq [Critique and review of the Iran-Iraq War],
volumen. 1, 2y ed.. (Tehran: Center for War Studies and Research, 2003/04), pag. 15.
35. Tajziyah va tahlil-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 1, pag. 15.
36. Naqd va barrasi-i Jang-i Iran va Iraq, volumen. 1, pag. 15.
37. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture, pag. 22.

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Iran-Iraq War and the Nuclear Deal 163

being attacked and its belief that the country is on the defensive, y (2) Iran’s
international isolation during the conºict.

on the defensive: ªghting for survival

One of the West’s key beliefs about the Islamic Republic is that the regime
pursues aggressive policies that threaten Iran’s neighbors and international se-
curity. That outlook had an immense impact both on U.S. policy regarding the
Iran-Iraq War and on the way American analysts have understood the conºict.
During the war, Saddam Hussein played on Western fears that the Islamic
Republic would damage U.S. interests in the region in order to secure weapons
and support from Washington. He also appealed to the conservative Gulf
monarchs, whose fear of the Iranian Revolution prompted them to create the
Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981 and to provide substantial support to Iraq
during the war.38 States such as Saudi Arabia and Israel have recently pursued
a similar policy by building their security discourse around the threat of
Iran as a regional hegemon and aggressor, allowing them to receive security
guarantees and weapons from the United States. In a March 2015 speech be-
fore the U.S. Congreso, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu asserted
that Iran “dominate[d] four Arab capitals” and that, “if Iran’s aggression is left
unchecked, more will surely follow.” The prime minister’s remarks were de-
signed to derail the then-ongoing nuclear negotiations with Tehran.39 This
belief that Iran is an aggressive actor has pervaded discussions of the coun-
try’s nuclear program, and Netanyahu has frequently used the image of a mili-
tant and fanatical Iranian establishment as the centerpiece of his campaign
against negotiations.40

Iran’s view of its actions in the Iran-Iraq War (and thereafter) is diametri-
cally opposed to the understanding outlined above. The most fundamental
feature of the Iranian narrative ªts the defensive realist model and holds that
Iran faces numerous threats to its national security and territorial integrity and
has persistently fought to defend itself from those threats. En efecto, that same
vista, more than any other factor, deªned Iran’s prosecution of and policies
during the war. Por ejemplo, a publication overseen by Mohsen Rezaee, el
IRGC commander during the war, emphasizes the security threats that charac-

38. R.K. Ramazani, The Gulf Cooperation Council: Record and Analysis (Charlottesville: Universidad
Press of Virginia, 1988).
to Congress,El Correo de Washington,
39. “The Complete Transcript of Netanyahu’s Address
Marzo 3, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/03/03/full-text-
netanyahus- address-to-congress/?utm_term(cid:3).37904bb76ce0.
40. Aviad Glickman, “Netanyahu Links Holocaust to Iranian Threat,” Y-Net News, Abril 18, 2012,
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4217989,00.html.

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Seguridad Internacional 42:1 164

terize a country at war and the lessons the war holds for Iranian security:
“Considering the substantial impact Iraq’s war against Iran had on . . . el
country, it is necessary to [examine] this war . . . in order to adopt appropriate
measures . . . to prevent or lessen the damages that competitors of the Islamic
Republic of Iran might impose on the country. Among these experiences, el
outcomes were that in this period national security and the preservation of ter-
ritorial integrity were in such a difªcult position that the regime’s decision-
makers and people have become determined to deter neighbors and great
powers from invading Iran’s territory [de nuevo].”41

In their publications, the Revolutionary Guards emphasize that restoring
Iran’s security and territorial integrity was the goal of Iran’s strategy through-
out the war, and Iran’s actions in the war support that claim. A pesar de
Tehran’s decision to continue the war in 1982 by invading Iraq is often given as
evidence of the regime’s aggression, in Iran the invasion is depicted in defen-
sive terms, as essential to securing its territory and borders.42 According to
contemporary reports included in the IRGC sources, Khomeini sanctioned
the assault only after being persuaded that it was necessary to “completely se-
cure the country” and only on the condition that it be limited to those defen-
sive aims.43

The centrality of the defensive realist notions of survival and national
defense to Iran’s prosecution of the war is also evident in how Iranian sources
characterize the conºict’s outcome. In their publications, the Revolutionary
Guards portray the war as a victory for Iran because Iran successfully de-
fended its territory and because Iraq failed to achieve its goals of gaining sov-
ereignty over the Shatt al-Arab (the river that runs along part of the Iran-Iraq
border) and occupying pieces of Iranian land.44 Although this argument cer-
tainly helps Iranian leaders compensate for their failure to achieve their own,
more expansive, war aims, the weight they put on defense and territorial in-
tegrity reºects core tenets of Iran’s security outlook.

Hoy, Iranian leaders often directly connect their “aggressive defensive”
policies to their experiences in the Iran-Iraq War. In their view, the aggression
against Iran that the war embodied has continued, as the country exists in
an anarchical system without security guarantees and a region in which the

41. Tajziyah va tahlil-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 1, pag. 12.
42. Iraqi forces still occupied pieces of Iran’s territory at the time of the invasion. See Atlas-i
rahnami [Guide atlas], volumen. 2 (Tehran: Center for War Studies and Research, 2001/02), pag. 96; Atlas-i
rahnami [Guide atlas], volumen. 1, 5ª edición. (Tehran: Center for War Studies and Research, 2002/03), pag. 48;
Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq [Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War], volumen. 20 (Tehran: Center for War
Studies and Research, 2002/03), páginas. 17, 24; and “Iraqis Vow to Be Out of Iran within 10 Days,” Los
Angeles Times, Junio 21, 1982.
43. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 20, páginas. 18–19.
44. Atlas-i rahnami, volumen. 1, pag. 64, back cover.

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Iran-Iraq War and the Nuclear Deal 165

inability to meet one’s basic security needs can lead to the loss of sovereignty.
Por lo tanto, the effort to derive strategic lessons from the war stems also from
the view of the conºict as ongoing. During a May 2011 conference for Iranian
veterans of the war, Por ejemplo, IRGC deputy Husayn Daqiqi declared that
even though it is being fought in a different manner, "el [Iran-Iraq] war has
still not ended.”45 A year earlier, former IRGC Commander Yahya Rahim
Safavi asserted, “[C]ertain countries, with the United States in the lead, cual
could not realize their hostile plot against Iran during the 1980–1988 war with
Iraq, are making efforts to create problems for the Islamic Republic” today.46
Similar language is also used to characterize the conºict over Iran’s nuclear
ªle. En 2012, a Tehran Friday prayer leader described U.S. sanctions against
Iran as an “imposed economic war” and stressed that Iranians would defend
themselves as they did in the imposed (Iran-Iraq) war.47 In the Islamic
Republic’s narrative, the nuclear crisis is thus a continuation of the war being
waged to defeat Iran. Just as Iran’s political and security establishments saw
and portrayed the nuclear crisis through the lens of the war, Presidente
Rouhani’s government has also tried to frame the nuclear negotiations and re-
sulting deal within the framework of the war. para hacerlo, Rouhani and his team
have explained the talks and the JCPOA as defensive measures to put an end
to the “unjust” and “illegal” international sanctions against Iran, removing the
threat of another war and allowing Tehran to maintain and build up its de-
fense capabilities to deter its adversaries. Además, Rouhani put the JCPOA’s
importance on par with that of the Iran-Iraq War and the Islamic Revolution
when he described his chief foreign policy achievement as the “third great vic-
tory of the Iranian nation in the international arena.”48

outcast: iran’s wartime isolation

Iranian leaders deªne the Iran-Iraq War as a conºict between Iran and a pow-
erful group of states.49 Iranian sources emphasize the “terrible inequality of
the two belligerent camps,”50 and state that “Iran’s military power, económico

45. “Gharbi’ha ªkr fath-i Khurramshahr ra ham nimikardand” [Westerners also thought
Khurramshahr could not be conquered], Fars News (news agency), Puede 27, 2011, http://
www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn(cid:3)9003067301.
46. “Iran Should Be Prepared for Every Imaginable Scenario: General,” Mehr News (news agency)
via Tabnak (news agency), Agosto 30, 2010, http://en.mehrnews.com/news/41629/Iran-should-
be-prepared-for-every-imaginable-scenario-general.
47. “Mushkilat-i iqtisadi az su’-i tadbir ast” [Economic problems are the result of mismanage-
mento], Jahan News (news agency), Octubre 5, 2012, http://www.jahannews.com/analysis/248182.
48. “Rouhani: Muzakirat-i hastih-’i sivumin piruziy-i buzurg-i millat-i
Iran dar sahnih-’i
baynulmillal ast” [Rouhani: The nuclear negotiations are the third great victory of the Iranian na-
tion in the international arena], Young Journalists’ Club (news agency), Agosto 6, 2015, http://
www.yjc.ir/fa/news/5283307.
49. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 1, pag. 14.
50. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 4, pag. 608.

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Seguridad Internacional 42:1 166

situation, and international position were in no way comparable to Iraq[‘s].”51
The IRGC’s War Chronology asserts that the numerous supporters Iraq drew to
its side came not because of any particular afªnity for the Iraqi regime, but be-
cause of Iraq’s “vindictive opposition to Iran.”52 As the war dragged on, el
common animosity toward the Islamic Republic proved powerful enough to
unite otherwise unlikely partners even more closely.53

In many cases, the IRGC asserts that increased international involvement in
the conºict came as a result of Iranian advances and with the intention of en-
suring that Iraq did not lose the war. Such was the case after Iran’s invasion of
Iraq in July 1982. Despite its mixed results, the invasion demonstrated Iran’s
tenacity and ability to challenge Iraq militarily. According to IRGC sources,
that challenge was deemed unacceptable by those who feared an Iranian vic-
conservador, something that then seemed possible. Por lo tanto, Baghdad’s supporters
“were persuaded to restore the military and political advantage in the war
to Iraq.”54

The same pattern was repeated in the aftermath of Iran’s occupation of
Iraq’s Faw Peninsula and its drive toward Basra in January 1987,55 cual estafa-
vinced Iraq and its allies that more was needed to “prevent the victory of the
Islamic Republic of Iran and to end the war.”56 To accomplish those goals, Iraqi
leaders sought to broaden the scope of the war in order to “increase the pres-
sure on the Islamic Republic to capitulate.”57 The most signiªcant expansion of
the war took place in the Persian Gulf, where Iraq very effectively carried out
its strategy of drawing in additional supporters while hurting Iran economi-
cally by attacking its energy infrastructure.58 The intensiªcation of attacks and
the initiation of the Tanker War internationalized the conºict, given the interest
of third parties in ensuring the export of oil.59 U.S. naval forces increased their
presence in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean over the course of the war, pero

51. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq [Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War], volumen. 51 (Tehran: Center for
War Studies and Research, 2008/09), pag. 36.
52. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq [Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War], volumen. 33 (Tehran: Center for
War Studies and Research, 2000), pag. 23.
53. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 51, páginas. 35–36.
54. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 20, páginas. 28–31.
55. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq [Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War], volumen. 47 (Tehran: Center for
War Studies and Research, 2002/03) páginas. 18–19, 21, 82, 122–123, 195–196, 502–503.
56. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq [Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War], volumen. 50 (Tehran: Center for
War Studies and Research, 1999/2000), pag. 3.
57. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 51, pag. 39.
58. Sayri dar Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq [Survey of the Iran-Iraq War], volumen. 1 (Tehran: Center for War
Studies and Research, 1998/99), páginas. 89, 163, 170–177; Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 20,
páginas. 17, 33; and Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq [Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War], volumen. 43 (Tehran:
Center for War Studies and Research, 1999/2000), pag. 29.
59. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 50, pag. 3.

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Iran-Iraq War and the Nuclear Deal 167

did so dramatically in the spring of 1987 when the Ronald Reagan administra-
tion agreed to escort Kuwaiti oil tankers with the aim of shielding them from
Iranian retaliatory strikes.60 But despite the importance of oil to outside pow-
ers, the Revolutionary Guards again assert that the underlying reason for
the United States’ more direct participation in the war was its fear of an
Iranian victory.61

The support that key players gave to Iraq continues to shape Tehran’s out-
look today, with many Iranian leaders viewing the United States and its re-
gional allies (p.ej., Israel and Saudi Arabia) as adamantly opposed to the
Islamic Republic and resolute in their efforts to isolate it. Shortly after
the JCPOA was concluded in 2015, Por ejemplo, President Rouhani con-
veyed the Iranian belief that the Saudis want to eliminate Tehran’s inºuence in
the region. He recounted his discussion with a Saudi ofªcial some twenty
years prior, during which Rouhani raised the issue of the kingdom’s aid to Iraq
during the war, enumerating the many ways Saudi Arabia had contributed to
Iraq’s efforts. According to Rouhani, the Saudi ofªcial boasted that there were
in fact many other contributions, which he then proceeded to list.62 To Iranian
líderes, this experience demonstrates their neighbors’ commitment to isolat-
ing Iran. These leaders tend to remain similarly dubious about reconciliation
with the United States because they assert, while referring to the Iran-Iraq War
as a case in point, that Washington has shown itself unwilling to “come to
terms” with the Islamic Republic and its position in the Middle East.

Dealing with History: The Iran-Iraq War and the JCPOA

The two key features of Iran’s understanding of the Iran-Iraq War outlined
above have direct and substantial bearing on Iran’s nuclear policies and on
the continuing efforts to implement the JCPOA. Juntos, Iran’s experience of
being attacked and its isolation during the conºict gave rise to a security doc-
trine built on the conviction that, in an inequitable international order, Iran

60. Ibídem.; and Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 47, páginas. 465–466.
61. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 43, pag. 19; Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 50, páginas. 3, 6,
15; and Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 51, páginas. 26, 37. A May 1987 news report makes the same
punto. See Jim Muir, “Gulf Attack Could Spur New Efforts to Resolve Iran-Iraq War,” Christian Sci-
ence Monitor, Puede 20, 1987. See also Julian Borger, “Rumsfeld ‘Offered Help to Saddam,’” Guardian,
December 31, 2002, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/dec/31/iraq.politics; Malcolm
Downing and Sara Beck, The Battle for Iraq: BBC News Correspondents on the War against Saddam
(Londres: BBC Worldwide, 2003), pag. 141; and Robin Wright, “The War That Haunts Iran’s Negotia-
tores,” New Yorker, Junio 28, 2015, http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-war-that-
haunts-irans-negotiators.
62. Hassan Rouhani, remarks at United Nations General Assembly sideline meeting, Nueva York,
Octubre 27, 2015.

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Seguridad Internacional 42:1 168

cannot rely on anyone for its security and that it therefore must maintain the
ability to independently defend its national security and interests. As this sec-
tion demonstrates, that security doctrine has two major implications for Iran’s
nuclear ªle that must be recognized and addressed in order for the JCPOA to
be effectively implemented and sustained: (1) Iranian leaders’ fundamental
distrust of international law and institutions, which they believe serve the in-
terests of certain powers to the detriment of the others; y (2) their pursuit of
self-sufªciency in matters of security and technology.

distrust of an unjust international order

Iran’s distrust of

The ªrst important strategic implication of the Iran-Iraq War for Tehran’s nu-
clear dossier is the profound distrust that the war instilled in Iran of its neigh-
bors, the international community, y los estados unidos. It reinforced Iran’s
feeling of isolation and its determination to “go it alone,” or at least to main-
tain its ability to do so. It also led Iran to the conclusion that the international
system is inherently unjust, as it beneªts (por diseño) the great powers (especialmente-
cially the permanent members of the UN Security Council) and their allies at
the expense of the rest. Tehran continues to see the international order through
that lens, one shaped by the defensive realist notions of anarchy and self-help.
law, e instituciones
the international community,
stems from the failure of other states and international organizations—the
United Nations, in particular—to condemn Iraq’s wartime breaches of jus ad
bellum and jus in bello. Primero, the international community failed to condemn
Baghdad’s breach of jus ad bellum by not recognizing Iraq as the instigator of
the war and not punishing Iraqi aggression accordingly. Este, Iranians argue,
had a substantial impact on Iran’s prosecution of the war, beginning with its
rejection of the ªrst UN Security Council resolution on the conºict. Adopted
on September 28, 1980, a week after the war began and when Iraq’s advance
had stalled, UNSCR 479 called for an end to the hostilities and was quickly ac-
cepted by Iraq.63 Iran rejected the resolution, sin embargo, because it “did not
mention Iraq’s aggression and/or its violation of Iran’s territorial integrity”
and did not “request Iraq’s . . . forces to withdraw from the occupied territo-
ries.” Instead, says the War Chronology, “This Resolution only requested that
Iran and Iraq avoid further use of force, and indeed the implication was
that Iraq’s aggressor army could thus hold the occupied areas and Iranian
forces could not carry out operations to recover [su] own occupied terri-
conservador!”64 The indignation apparent in this passage exempliªes the way Iranian
ofªcials portray such international pressure for peace, especially from the UN

63. United Nations Security Council Resolution 479, Septiembre 28, 1980.
64. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 20, pag. 21.

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Iran-Iraq War and the Nuclear Deal 169

Security Council, which they argue was consistently applied to Iran but failed
to deal justly with the realities of the war and its initiation by Iraq. Accord-
ing to Iranian ofªcials, the Security Council’s position in the beginning of the
war generated a profound distrust of the organization that made them wary of
entrusting it with their country’s national security.

Iran’s rejections of subsequent UN Security Council resolutions were in part
the result of that distrust. UNSCR 514, the next major resolution that Iraq also
declared its willingness to accept, came on July 12, 1982, after Iran had recap-
tured most of its territory and appeared poised to carry the war into Iraq, y
called for an immediate cease-ªre and withdrawal to international borders.65
Iran viewed this resolution as an improvement on UNSCR 479 porque
“spoke of establishing a cease-ªre and the withdrawal” of forces. But given the
fact that the Security Council had remained reticent for nearly two years, y
given Iran’s existing distrust of the Council based on its actions in the war’s
ªrst weeks, Iranian leaders concluded that “the main goal of the Security
Council in adopting Resolution 514 was preventing Iranian forces from enter-
ing Iraqi territory,” rather than reaching a just conclusion to the war. Ellos
therefore remained intransigent, rejected the proposal, and took the war into
Iraq.66 One of the primary considerations leading to the invasion, states one
IRGC volume, “was the international system’s lack of cooperation in con-
demning Iraq’s aggression and its disregard of Iran’s requests to bring the war
to an end.”67

Further contributing to Iran’s distrust of international involvement was the
perception that Iraq was effectively using international pressure to isolate Iran
and to secure military and political advantages, which aligned with Iran’s
view of the biased nature of the international order. Baghdad was not, Tehran
argues, truly interested in peace or even in a cease-ªre. It was only interested
in using a cease-ªre to maintain its advantage so that it could attack Iran again
if it chose and continue the war from an improved position.68 Just as it had im-
posed the war on Iran, Iraq was now using diplomacy to “impose new politi-
cal conditions” on the country.69 Iranian leaders were accordingly resistant to
ending the war because they believed that cease-ªres and negotiations would

65. United Nations Security Council Resolution 514, Julio 12, 1982.
66. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 20, pag. 23; Amir Taheri, “Iran Softens Demands on Iraq,"
Times of India, Junio 3, 1982; “Iran Rejects Cease-Fire Call, Builds Up Troops,” Los Angeles Times, Julio
13, 1982; “Iran Says New Offensive against Iraq Under Way,El Correo de Washington, Julio 14, 1982; Roberto
C. Toth, “U.S. Offers Support to Nations Threatened by Invasion of Iraq,” Boston Globe, Julio 15,
1982; and Geoffrey Godsell, “Resurgent Iran Worries Arabs More Than Lebanon War,” Christian
Science Monitor, Julio 15, 1982, pag. 1.
67. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 20, pag. 17.
68. Ibídem., páginas. 19–20, 24–25, 26–27.
69. Ibídem., páginas. 25, 27, 31.

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Seguridad Internacional 42:1 170

place Iran in a dangerous position. This distrust of international political in-
volvement in the war grew deeper as the conºict continued, and reinforced
Tehran’s thinking that its isolation made it necessary to look out for its own in-
terests. That position and sense of insecurity are summed up well in a pre-
scient publication produced during the war by the Islamic Republic’s Supreme
Defense Council: "Cuando [Iraqi] líderes . . . are explicitly opting out of observ-
ing international principles, how can one trust [a ellos] . . . to ensure the imple-
mentation of . . . a peace agreement? . . . [t]he Iranian people have no other
alternative but the continuation of [the war] until the aggressor is punished.
Has the time not yet arrived for international organizations to cease in their
dereliction of duty and unequivocally condemn the aggressor. . . ? No hay duda,
today’s silence . . . will merely embolden [Iraq] to commit another [act of] ag-
gression in the future.70

Por eso, for Iran the most important issue of the war was the failure of inter-
national assemblies and cease-ªre proposals to recognize and punish Iraq as
the aggressor in the war.71 Bringing about a change in that situation was the
goal of continuing the ªght, and eventually Iran’s military and diplomatic ef-
forts produced a shift in its favor in the form of UNSCR 598 of July 20, 1987.72
Speciªcally, 598 was “the ªrst resolution that set forth the responsibility
and determination of the aggressor.”73 Although Iranian leaders regarded
this resolution as a step toward resolving the conºict, they asserted that it
did not do enough to satisfy Iran’s requests. Como resultado, while Iraq accepted
Resolution 598, Iran neither accepted nor rejected it, which reºected its mixed
feelings but represented a break from Iran’s past policy of rejecting UN
Security Council cease-ªre proposals outright.74 According to a contemporary
press report, “Iran’s chief delegate to the United Nations criticized [este] reso-
lution as . . . ‘inherently incapable of addressing the Iran-Iraq conºict,’ but he
stopped short of rejecting [él].”75 The goal of Iran’s new, equivocal position was
to demonstrate its willingness to work with the United Nations to end the war

70. The Imposed War: Defence vs. Aggression (Tehran: Supreme Defence Council of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, 1983/87); and Mohammad-Ali Tashkiri, Islamic View on Imposed Peace (Tehran:
Islamic Propagation Organization, 1986), pag. 16.
71. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 43, páginas. 23–24.
72. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 47, pag. 18.
73. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 50, pag. 4; United Nations Security Council Resolution 598;
Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 47, pag. 18; Atlas-i rahnami, volumen. 1, páginas. 54, 60; and Atlas-i rahnami,
volumen. 2, pag. 107.
74. Atlas-i rahnami, volumen. 1, pag. 54; Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 50, páginas. 5–6; and Ruzshumar-i
Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 51, páginas. 45–46.
75. “Iranian Assails Demand,” New York Times, Julio 21, 1987; and Marianne Houk, “Iranians Hint
at Cooperation with UN on Cease-Fire,” Christian Science Monitor, Julio 24, 1987, pag. 7.

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Iran-Iraq War and the Nuclear Deal 171

and to prevent Iraq from appearing as the only party interested in peace, mientras
still indicating its dissatisfaction with certain parts of the resolution.76

Iran also withheld its full approval to ensure the adoption of a particular
method for the resolution’s implementation. Iranian ofªcials insisted, as they
had throughout the war, that they would not agree to a cease-ªre without the
granting of their demands. In the case of UNSCR 598, this meant that the es-
tablishment of the “immediate cease-ªre” called for in the ªrst paragraph not
be implemented before the formation of a commission to identify the aggres-
sor called for in the sixth.77 Indeed, “Iran did not have very much conªdence
in international organizations,” particularly as a result of “the functioning of
the Security Council in the beginning of Iraq’s aggression against the Islamic
Republic.”78 Iran’s insistence during the nuclear negotiations that the sanc-
tions against the country be removed upon the signing of the agreement limit-
ing its nuclear program mirrors its approach to Resolution 598 and is a product
of its experience in the Iran-Iraq War.79

In addition to the failure to condemn Iraq for initiating the war, Iran’s dis-
trust of the international community stems from the failure to denounce Iraq’s
breach of jus in bello in using indiscriminate means and methods of warfare.
The West, led by the United States, and the United Nations were reluctant to
censure or take action to prevent Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, cual,
Tehran argues, gave Baghdad the freedom to continue its deployment of such
armaments.80 As noted by the IRGC, “[W.]hile Iraq had complete freedom to
aggressively use this kind of weapon, Iran was prohibited from procuring
tools to defend [sí mismo] against such weapons!”81

Iran is also critical of the international community for its unwillingness to

76. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 50, páginas. 5–6; and Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 51,
páginas. 45–46.
77. Atlas-i rahnami, volumen. 1, pag. 60; Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 50, pag. 5; and Ruzshumar-i Jang-i
Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 51, páginas. 45–47.
78. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 51, pag. 47; Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 50, páginas. 5–6;
and Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq [Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War], volumen. 52 (Tehran: Center for
War Studies and Research, 2003/04), pag. 29.
79. Parisa Hafezi, “Iran’s Khamenei Demands All Sanctions End When Nuclear Deal Signed,"
Reuters, Abril 9, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-rouhani-idUSKBN0N00E
Q20150409.
80. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq [Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War], volumen. 37 (Tehran: Center for
War Studies and Research, 2004/05), pag. 91. En cambio, the UN suggested that both sides had used
chemical weapons, a position articulated in United Nations Security Council Resolution 582 (Feb-
ruary 24, 1986), which “deplored” their use but did not single out Iraq.
81. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 37, pag. 92; and Shane Harris and Matthew M. Aid, “Exclu-
sive: CIA Files Prove America Helped Saddam as He Gassed Iran,” Foreign Policy, Agosto 26, 2013,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/26/exclusive-cia-ªles-prove-america-helped-saddam-as-he-
gassed-iran/.

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Seguridad Internacional 42:1 172

reproach Iraq’s strikes on civilian areas during the war.82 Iranian leaders’ ef-
forts to urge the United Nations to “take action to prevent the violation of in-
ternational laws and commitments” eventually bore fruit in the summer of
1985, when the secretary-general expressed concern regarding Iraq’s an-
nouncement that the country would resume attacks on Iranian residential ar-
eas and called for both sides to cooperate to end the war.83 Such statements,
sin embargo, did little to deter Baghdad. According to Iranian sources, the interna-
tional support for Iraq and the ineffectiveness of international organizations
provided incentives for Saddam Hussein to continue such actions.84

These wartime experiences led Iran to see international law and institutions
as products of a biased international order and strengthened the country’s
feeling of isolation in a world of hostile powers. As Ali Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani, then speaker of the Majlis (Iran’s parliament), stated in October
1988: “[t]él [Iran-Iraq W]ar taught us that international laws are only scraps
of paper.”85 Likewise, the IRGC’s Safavi questioned the role and effective-
ness of the nonproliferation regime in enhancing Iran’s security, arguing that
international treaties and conventions would not protect the country.86 As a re-
sultado, Tehran remains dubious about the viability of the positive and negative
assurances that enjoin nuclear weapon states that have signed the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) from using or threatening to use nuclear weap-
ons against nonnuclear weapon states and to come to their aid if they are
subjected to their use, encapsulated in UNSCRs 984 (1995) y 225 (1968), re-
spectively.87 Instead, Tehran maintains a fundamentally realist view of its own
security in a world of bellum omnium contra omnes,88 in which a country’s
power and security are tied to its material capabilities.

This narrative of distrust and self-reliance was further reinforced by the
sanctions imposed on Iran as part of efforts to curb its nuclear program. Como
some of these sanctions were put in place by the Security Council—the same
entity that neglected the Iranian people during the war—the Islamic Republic
views them as another instance of its unfair treatment by the international

82. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 37, pag. 26; Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 47, pag. 25; y
Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 51, páginas. 40–41.
83. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 37, pag. 25.
84. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 51, pag. 39.
85. Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz, Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Birth of a
Regional Nuclear Arms Race? (Santa Bárbara, California: Praeger Security International, 2009), pag. 420.
86. Ray Takeyh, “Nuclear Iran: Has the Train Left the Station?” in James A. Russell, ed., Prolifera-
tion of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Directions and Policy Options in the New Cen-
tury (Londres: Palgrave Macmillan 2006), pag. 58.
87. United Nations Security Council Resolution 984, Abril 11, 1995; and United Nations Security
Council Resolution 225, Octubre 14, 1966.
88. Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen (Cambridge: Prensa de la Universidad de Cambridge, 1998), páginas. 29–30.

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Iran-Iraq War and the Nuclear Deal 173

community and as another sign that the world order the Council epitomizes is
unjust and untrustworthy.

Por lo tanto, Tehran’s nuclear policies are based on the conviction that inter-
national laws and institutions such as the UN, IAEA, and NPT are designed
not to promote international peace and security but to serve the interests of the
great powers at the expense of the rest of the world. Como resultado, they are inher-
ently biased and unjust. A statement read on behalf of Khamenei at the 2012
Nonaligned Movement summit, held in Tehran, encapsulates these views:
“The UN Security Council has an illogical, unjust and completely undemo-
cratic structure and mechanism. This is a ºagrant form of dictatorship, cual
is antiquated and obsolete and whose expiry date has passed. It is through
abusing this improper mechanism that America and its accomplices have
managed to disguise their bullying as noble concepts and impose it on the
world.”89 In other words, Khamenei asserts that Iran cannot and should not
put its faith in an unjust world order, and should focus instead on standing on
its own feet.

Manouchehr Mottaki, then the Iranian foreign minister, expressed similar
positions in an address to the UN Security Council several years prior, draw-
ing on Iran’s experience during the Iran-Iraq War to explain his objection to the
Council’s resolution calling on Iran to limit its nuclear program by halting its
enrichment activities: “This is not the ªrst time the Security Council is asking
Iran to abandon its rights. When Saddam Hussein invaded Iran 27 years ago,
this Council waited [Siete] days so that Iraq could occupy 30,000 square kilo-
meters of Iranian territory. Then it . . . asked the two sides to stop the hostili-
corbatas, without asking the aggressor to withdraw. Eso es, the Council—then
too—effectively asked Iran to suspend . . . its rights . . . [a] its territory. . . , pero
. . . we did not [agree].”90

As the above quotations demonstrate, for Iran, the injustice of the interna-
tional order is just as apparent in its policing of nuclear issues as it was in its
handling of the Iran-Iraq War. Iranian leaders argue that Western powers are
using the proliferation concerns surrounding Iran’s nuclear program as an ex-
cuse to maintain their monopoly on nuclear technology. Este, Iranian ofªcials
assert, is not surprising given that the West is the untrustworthy protector of
an international system that beneªts itself exclusively, as was illustrated

89. “Bayanat dar shanzdahumin ijlas-i saran-i Junbish-i ‘Adam-i Ta’ahud” [Remarks in the six-
teenth nonaligned movement summit], Khamenei.ir, Septiembre 30, 2012, http://farsi.khamenei
.ir/speech-content?id(cid:3)20840.
90. “Security Council Toughens Sanctions against Iran, Adds Arms Embargo, with Unanimous
Adoption of Resolution 1747 (2007)" (Nueva York: United Nations, Marzo 24, 2007), http://www
.un.org/press/en/2007/sc8980.doc.htm.

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Seguridad Internacional 42:1 174

clearly by its stance during the war. According to Khamenei’s statement to the
members of the 2012 Nonaligned Movement summit:

The bitter irony of our time is that the American government, which possesses
the deadliest and greatest number of nuclear weapons and other WMD [weap-
ons of mass destruction] and the only perpetrator of their use, today wants to
be the ºag bearer of opposition to nuclear proliferation! El [United States]
and its Western allies have provided the Zionist regime [Israel] with nuclear
armas, creating a great threat for this sensitive region; pero [ellos] . . . do not
accept the peaceful use of nuclear energy [por] independent countries and even
oppose the production of nuclear fuel for radiomedication and other peaceful,
humane purposes with all their might. . . .

I insist that the Islamic Republic is not pursuing nuclear weapons, and will
never give up its right to peacefully use nuclear energy. Our people’s slogan is
“nuclear energy for all, nuclear weapons for no one.” We will stand by these
statements and we know that breaking the monopoly [held by] a few Western
states on the production of nuclear energy, in the context of the NPT, is in the
interest of all independent states.91

This assertion that world powers profess to be concerned about the prolifer-
ation and use of WMD while possessing nuclear arsenals themselves is a key
element of Iran’s nuclear narrative and is often discussed in parallel with the
country’s experience during the war.92 That position became particularly ap-
parent during the nuclear negotiations, when Iranian ofªcials placed a number
of issues in the context of the Iran-Iraq War’s legacy, including the similarity
between the imposition of sanctions and Iraq’s 1980 invasion; the use of inter-
national law and institutions to pursue the interests and wishes of the major
powers, predominantly the United States and its allies, at the expense of the
Iranian people; the efforts to collect information and intelligence on Iran’s mili-
tary to use against the country; and the efforts to isolate Iran politically and
economically.93 Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister and chief negotiator in the
2013–15 nuclear talks, echoed many of the same motifs in a YouTube video just
a few days before the JCPOA was concluded. In the video, he criticized inter-
national powers for what he described as their misplaced focus on maintain-
ing the sanctions on Iran: “[My negotiating partners] have seen that eight
years of aggression by Saddam Hussein and all his patrons did not bring the
Iranian nation—that stood all alone—to its knees. And now, they realize that

91. “Bayanat dar shanzdahumin ijlas-i saran-i Junbish-i ‘Adam-i Ta’ahud.”
92. Ibídem.
93. Mohammad Javad Zarif, “Mohammad Javad Zarif: A Message from Iran,” New York Times,
Abril 20, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/20/opinion/mohammad-javad-zarif-a-mes-
sage-from-iran.html; and Steve Inskeep, “Iran’s Parliament Chief: Nuclear Deal Is ‘Acceptable,'
A NOSOTROS. Interpretation Is Not,” NPR, Septiembre 8, 2015, http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/
2015/09/08/437519714/iran-parliament-chief-nuclear-deal-is-acceptable-u-s-interpretation-is-not.

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Iran-Iraq War and the Nuclear Deal 175

the most indiscriminate and unjust economic sanctions against my country
have achieved absolutely none of their declared objectives; but instead have
harmed innocents.”94

De este modo, UNSCR 2231,95 endorsing the comprehensive nuclear deal, was of crit-
ical importance to Iran because of the ways in which the resolution, desde el
Iranian perspective, altered the approach to Iran that the Security Council had
adopted during and since the Iran-Iraq War.96Accordingly, this resolution
could become instrumental in enabling Tehran to overcome the distrust of the
Security Council that Iran developed during and as a result of the war. Lo hace
so by validating the JCPOA, which includes several provisions that Iran views
as ªnally recognizing its legitimate rights and allowing Iran to become a “nor-
mal” member of the international community.

Primero, the JCPOA acknowledges that Iran undertakes its commitments “vol-
untarily.” Second, while the JCPOA includes “certain restrictions” on and the
scaling back of sensitive nuclear activities such as uranium enrichment and re-
search and development, it also recognizes that Iran will continue those activi-
ties.97 This provision allowed Iranian negotiators to sell the deal at home by
highlighting Iran’s ability not only to continue scientiªc research in nuclear
medicine and other areas, but also to work with international institutions in
those efforts. Tercero, though the JCPOA requires Iran to redesign the Arak
Heavy Water Reactor, here again the deal’s language allowed the negotiators
to frame this stipulation in positive terms as contributing to the modernization
of the nuclear program and allowing Iran to work with countries such as the
United States and China to build a more advanced reactor.98

Finalmente, the JCPOA provides for a Security Council endorsement of its
terms (UNSCR 2231) and for the “terminat[ion of] all provisions of previous
UN Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue . . . simulta-
neously with the IAEA-veriªed implementation of agreed nuclear-related
measures.”99 This last provision was vital to Iran, as its leaders believed that
the language in those resolutions made the country “abnormal” within the in-
ternational community, especially given the use of language stronger than that

94. Mohammad Javad Zarif, “Iran’s Message: Our Counterparts Must Choose between Agree-
ment and Coercion,” YouTube (video), Julio 3, 2015, https://www.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv
%3Dcw71HMKDpco&usg(cid:3)AFQjCNG5h59JGkvHH4a0H2QknUypURl3FQ&sig2(cid:3)350jtZPLMLQf
BzPAKºu4g.
95. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, Julio 20, 2015.
96. Author interview with Mohammad Javad Zarif, Nueva York, Septiembre 2014.
97. “The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (Bruselas: European Union External Action Service,
Julio 14, 2015), A(1), http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/
iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf.
98. “The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” B(8).
99. “The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” C(18).

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Seguridad Internacional 42:1 176

of similar resolutions targeting Iraq before 2003.100 The signiªcance of these
changes was encapsulated in Zarif’s tweet accompanying the Council’s adop-
ción de 2231 on July 20, 2015: “Iran never got a fair treatment from #UNSC in
el ultimo 35 años. Expect to see evidence of ‘fundamental shift’ promised in to-
day’s resolution.”101

Although the JCPOA and UNSCR 2231 have done much to ameliorate Iran’s
distrust of the United Nations, there is still trust-building to be done, efforts on
which the successful implementation of the nuclear deal depend. Of particular
concern for Tehran is that some of the steps it pledged to take as part of the nu-
clear deal, such as the removal of a critical part of the Arak Heavy Water
Reactor and the shipment out of the country of most of Iran’s stockpile of low-
enriched uranium, are essentially irreversible.102 This irreversibility is crucial
for the P5(cid:2)1, but the snapback option, which provides the P5(cid:2)1 with leverage
over the process by allowing for the reimposition of sanctions, prevented
Tehran from enjoying the same degree of irrevocability. Además, los unidos
States holds the key to Iran’s ability to do business with international entities
and to access the international ªnancial system. And given the historic distrust
between the two key parties, fueled by the Iran-Iraq War, Tehran did not have
conªdence that Washington would deliver on its promises to grant Iran sanc-
tions relief. Hoy, the regime’s argument that the United States is the main
reason why Iranians are not seeing the tangible beneªts of the deal is gaining
traction among the population (though Iran’s own domestic challenges—its
opaque political and economic systems, lack of regulations, corruption, y
mismanagement—certainly play a signiªcant role in deterring foreign busi-
nesses and investors).

Matters are made more complex by the fact that Tehran complied quickly
with many of the agreement’s obligations,103 because it was anxious to begin
receiving sanctions relief. But even with the sanctions lifted, economic recov-
ery takes longer to materialize. Más, A NOSOTROS. domestic politics leading up to
el 2016 presidential election and the policies of the Trump administration
only exacerbated foreign businesses’ reluctance to reenter the Iranian market.
Después de todo, if the deal is not set in stone and can be “dismantle[d]” every four
años, why should risk-averse businesses bother bearing the costs of investing
in a market that can close off as quickly as it re-opened?104

tweet,

100. Author interviews with senior Iranian ofªcials, Lausanne, Suiza, Marzo 2015.
Julio
101. Mohammad Javad Zarif
623164220536979456.
102. Author interviews with senior Iranian ofªcials, Viena, Junio 2015.
103. “Veriªcation and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of the United Nations
Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015); (GOV/2016/46)" (Viena: International Atomic Energy
Agencia, Septiembre 21, 2016), https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/ªles/16/09/gov2016-46.pdf.
104. Morello, “Iran Nuclear Deal Could Collapse under Trump”; Ariane Tabatabai, “Trump Said

2015, https://twitter.com/jzarif/status/

20,

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Iran-Iraq War and the Nuclear Deal 177

The domestic debate surrounding the deal in Washington and the uncer-
tainty it has created further reinforce the lessons of the war: the United States
cannot be trusted. To mitigate the negative impact of U.S. politics on the deal’s
reception in Iran, the Rouhani government has tried to highlight its positive
aspectos. Iranian leaders argue that the deal allows their country to “blossom”
by gaining its rightful place within the community of nations and recovering
economically, while also trying to explain the intricacies and slow pace of the
process to the Iranian people.105 But conservatives, including some members
of the Revolutionary Guards and Khamenei, have been quick to point out U.S.
efforts to damage the deal, including the passage of new congressional legisla-
tion to impose additional sanctions on Iran for its other activities—such as its
ballistic missile program—or the extension of existing ones—such as the Iran
Sanctions Act in late 2016.106 They also argue that their country has seen “no
concrete or distinct impact” from the deal and that the JCPOA was supposed
to remove such “unjust sanctions.”107

Although these sanctions are not a violation of the JCPOA, as Tehran
claims, they could impair the deal’s implementation by further exacerbating
Iran’s distrust of international diplomatic processes, especially those involving
the United States, and weakening the pro-engagement moderates within the
regime. En efecto, if the implementation process remains uncertain and if Tehran
does not see the tangible beneªts of the deal, it is unlikely to agree to come to
the table on other issues in the future. Instead of helping Iran regain a measure
of trust in the international system, which the implementation of the deal has
provided the ªrst real opportunity to do, the process would then further re-
inforce the lesson Iranians learned from the Iran-Iraq War that the U.S.-
dominated international system cannot assure Iran’s security. For the deal to

He’d Tear Up the Iran Nuclear Deal. Now What?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Noviembre 10,
2016, http://thebulletin.org/trump-said-hed-tear-iran-nuclear-deal-now-what10148; and Dan
Bilefsky, “C.I.A. Chief Warns Donald Trump against Tearing Up Iran Nuclear Deal,” New York
Times, Noviembre 30, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/world/americas/cia-trump-
iran-nuclear-deal.html?_r(cid:3)0.
105. “President Hassan Rouhani’s 1395 Norouz Message,” Rouhani.ir, Marzo, 20, 2016, https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v(cid:3)UhNtY8v5vQU.
106. “Bayanat dar ijtima’-i za’iran va mujaviran-i Haram-i Razavi” [Remarks to an assembly of
pilgrims and neighbors at Imam Reza’s Shrine], Khamenei.ir, Marzo 20, 2016, http://farsi
.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id(cid:3)32695; Dan Roberts, “U.S. Imposes New Sanctions on Iranian
Firms over Ballistic Missile Test,” Guardian, Marzo 24, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2016/mar/24/us-treasury-new-sanctions-iran-ballistic-missile-test; and Harry Neidig,
“Iran Sanctions Bill Goes into Effect without Obama’s Signature,” The Hill, December 15, 2016,
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/310508-iran-sanctions-bill-goes-into-law-without-
obamas-signature.
107. “Bayanat dar didar-i aqshar-i mukhtalif-i mardum” [Remarks in meeting with various
groups of people], Khamenei.ir, Marzo, 1, 2016, http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id(cid:3)
33886.

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Seguridad Internacional 42:1 178

be effectively implemented, por lo tanto, the West must recognize and allay Iran’s
national security concerns stemming from the Iran-Iraq War.

going it alone: iran’s quest for security and self-reliance

The second implication of the Iran-Iraq War for the implementation of the nu-
clear deal is Tehran’s determination to be as self-reliant as possible in matters
of security. This aim developed in large part from Iran’s view of the inter-
national community as unjust and untrustworthy and from its isolation during
the war. According to Iranian leaders and sources, one of the most conse-
quential aspects of the war for Iran’s national security strategy was the dif-
ªculty that Iran had accessing weapons during the conºict. In stark contrast to
Iran, Iraq had easy access to weapons and a wealth of ªnancial and logistical
aid.108 This discrepancy had a signiªcant impact on Iran’s prosecution of the
guerra, affecting tactical and strategic capabilities and choices and even the war’s
outcome.109 The Revolutionary Guards often assert that the inºuxes of weap-
ons to Iraq came in response to Iranian advances and effectively saved that
country from defeat.110

In more recent years, Iranian leaders have often described how, con el
help of the United States, Saddam Hussein was “armed to the teeth.”111 They
also argue that the development of their conventional weapons programs—
and their desire to protect themselves from outside domination—developed
from the unfavorable position in which they found themselves during the
Iran-Iraq War. Almost every article on Iran’s military achievements that ap-
pears on Fars News, a website afªliated with the IRGC, notes that Iran
“launched an arms development program during the 1980–88 Iraqi-imposed
war on Iran to compensate for a US weapons embargo.” The articles also stress
that Iran’s efforts to expand its defensive capabilities should not be viewed as
a threat to other countries, but are the product of the lessons learned during
the war and are intended to prevent another such conºict.112

Iran’s isolation and inability to defend itself during the war have also

108. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 4, pag. 19; Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 33, páginas. 27, 37;
Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 47, páginas. 31–33, 37; and Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 51,
páginas. 40, 49–51.
109. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 4, pag. 609; Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 33, pag. 21;
Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 37, pag. 26; Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 43, pag. 29;
Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 51, pag. 42; and Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 52, páginas. 18, 23.
110. Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 1, pag. 17; Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 20, pag. 33; y
Ruzshumar-i Jang-i Iran va ‘Iraq, volumen. 4, pag. 608.
111. “Niru’ha-yi musallah pasdar-i marz’ha-yi hastand” [The armed forces are the guardian of the
fronteras], Fars News, Puede 24, 2011, http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn(cid:3)9003030720.
112. “IRGC Navy Commander: A NOSOTROS. Warships Fearful of Iran’s Speed Boats,” Fars News, Decem-
ber 27, 2015, http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn(cid:3)13941006001076.

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Iran-Iraq War and the Nuclear Deal 179

driven its nuclear policies and view of its nuclear program as an important
tool in making Iran self-sufªcient. In the midst of the Iran-Iraq War, Iranian
leaders decided to reverse the decision to abandon the nuclear program made
during the revolution. Some ofªcials, including Rafsanjani, argued that the
country should become self-reliant in defense and that possessing WMD capa-
bilities would further that goal. Although self-reliance had been part of the
early revolutionary discourse, it became increasingly important when the Iran-
Iraq War reinforced the view that Iran could not rely on anyone to safeguard
its security.

Although Tehran’s stance on the need to be self-reliant has been clear
throughout the Islamic Republic’s history, its statements on weapons of mass
destruction have been inconsistent. Por un lado, many Iranian leaders
have applied the idea of self-reliance broadly to all aspects of defense and tech-
nología, arguing during the 1980s that Iran should be able to defend itself with-
out having to rely on other parties, with the ongoing experiences of the war
and isolation informing their stance. Some asserted that the country should go
as far as developing chemical and nuclear weapons. In their view, Iraq’s use of
chemical weapons against Iran and Baghdad’s progress toward a nuclear ca-
pability added to the pressing need to develop a deterrent.113 In 1988, shortly
after the war ended, Rafsanjani stated that “chemical bombs and biological
weapons are the poor man’s atomic bombs and can easily be produced. Nosotros
should at least consider them for our defense.”114 He later changed his posi-
ción, albeit without ever acknowledging that he had made the earlier state-
mento. En 1997,
in response to the question “Are you after the bomb,"
Rafsanjani claimed, “Deªnitely not. We despise these weapons,” and added,
“We are not going after the atomic bomb, we are not after biological weap-
ons, we will not pursue chemical weapons.”115 Likewise, en 2010, he declared
that “the need for defense and deterrence” had prompted Iran’s “unfortunate”
decision to consider acquiring WMD, which would have only been harmful to
the nation.116

Similar ambivalence stemming from the need for security, on the one
mano, and the aversion to employing such destructive tactics, en el otro, en-
formed Iran’s decision during the war to develop but not use chemical weap-

113. Dan Reiter, “Preventive Attacks against Nuclear Programs and the ‘Success’ at Osirak,” Non-
proliferation Review, volumen. 12, No. 2 (Julio 2005), páginas. 355–371, doi:10.1080/10736700500379008.
114. W.. Seth Carus, “The Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb? Biological Weapons in the Middle East,"
Policy Papers No. 23 (Washington, CORRIENTE CONTINUA.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1991), pag. 68.
115. Mike Wallace, interview with Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, 60 Minutes, CBS, Marzo 8, 1997.
116. “Hashemi Rafsanjani: Mubarizih ba silah’ha-yi shimiyayi va mikrubi, bih ‘amal ast va nah
bih sukhanrani” [Hashemi Rafsanjani: Combat chemical and biological weapons with action, no
speeches], JARAS (news agency), Junio 28, 2010, http://www.rahesabz.net/story/18356/.

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Seguridad Internacional 42:1 180

ons.117 As noted by Iranian Foreign Ministry Director General Mohammad
Alborzi at the 1997 Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC):

Faced at the time [of the Iran-Iraq War] with continued and expanding use of
chemical weapons against our soldiers and civilians alike, and persistent
muteness and inaction on the part of the United Nations Security Council, Iran
was left with no alternative but to seek an effective means of deterrence in the
hope that it could halt or at least limit the barrage of these barbarous weapons
on its people. This particularly became an absolute necessity when threats
were made of chemical bombardment of the cities in the ªnal stages of the
conºict, and some indeed were carried out against civilian centers as reported
by United Nations investigating missions.

In this context, the decision was made that, on a strictly limited scale, capa-
bility should be developed to challenge the imminent threat particularly
against the civilian populated centers. We declared, at the time, that Iran had
chemical weapons capability, while maintaining the policy not to resort to
these weapons and [a] rely on diplomacy as the sole mechanism to stop their
use by its adversary.

The war ended soon after. Following the establishment of [el] ceaseªre, el
decision to develop chemical weapons capabilities was reversed and the pro-
cess was terminated. It was reiterated consequently that Iran would not seek
or produce chemical weapons and would accelerate its efforts to ensure [el]
early conclusion of a comprehensive and total ban under the CWC. This has
continued to be my government’s policy ever since.118

According to Iran’s leaders, its proven restraint vis-à-vis chemical weapons
serves as a precedent for nuclear weapons, también: it shows its commitment to the
Shi’i ethical and legal principles prohibiting the use of weapons of mass de-
estructura; it also demonstrates that if Iran refrained from using such weapons
when it was being attacked by them, it would certainly refrain from using
them in other situations.

Todavía, according to the founder of Iran’s nuclear program, Akbar Etemad,
Tehran’s policies were long shaped by a strategy of hedging after “Rafsanjani
made the decision to resume the [nuclear] program” during the Iran-Iraq
War.119 Etemad, whom the Islamic Republic asked to return to Iran and resume
work on the nuclear program in the 1980s but who declined, noted that, después

117. Author telephone interview with Mohsen Kadivar, Febrero 2014; and “Report of the Organi-
sation on the Implementation of the Convention (January 1–December 31, 1998), C-IV/5,” Organi-
sation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Conference of the States Parties, Fourth Session,
June 28–July 2, 1999, para. 6, https://www.opcw.org/?id(cid:3)715.
118. “The CBW Conventions Bulletin—A Draft Convention to Prohibit Biological and Chemical
Weapons under International Criminal Law,” Quarterly Journal of the Harvard Sussex Program on
CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, December 1998, pag. 43.
119. Author interview with Etemad.

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Iran-Iraq War and the Nuclear Deal 181

deciding to resume the program, Tehran focused on one particular component
of nuclear technology—the front end of the fuel cycle, or enrichment. Iran has
since argued that its enrichment program is geared toward meeting its “practi-
cal needs” to fuel the Bushehr reactor, part of a commercial nuclear power
plant. Although Russia agreed to provide the fuel for Bushehr until 2021,
Tehran argues that Moscow is not a reliable partner and has been known to
manipulate energy supplies for political reasons. As is the case with its na-
tional security more generally, Iran asserts that it cannot rely on Russia or any
other country to provide for the country’s needs and that it should instead be
self-reliant.120 It was for that reason, according to Etemad, that Iran “went and
bought centrifuges from Pakistan, and tried to enrich uranium. From the be-
ginning, [Iran’s ofªcials] wanted to have all the options.”121

De este modo, in resuming the nuclear program, the Iranian leadership sought to
build an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle before developing a functioning nuclear
infrastructure. According to Iranian ofªcials, and as discussed previously, este
emphasis on an indigenous enrichment program is a response to the country’s
quest for self-reliance in technology. Sin embargo, the fact that Tehran worked on
an enrichment capacity, which would allow it to develop a nuclear weapon, en-
dicates that it was indeed pursuing self-reliance in defense, también. The IAEA has
conªrmed U.S. intelligence reports’ ªndings that Tehran’s nuclear program
since the 1990s can be divided into three stages: a “coordinated” nuclear weap-
ons program, which ended in 2003; “feasibility and scientiªc studies, y el
acquisition of certain relevant technical competences and capabilities,” be-
entre 2003 y 2009; and the period starting in 2009, in which there have been
no “credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a
nuclear explosive device.”122

Domestic uranium enrichment has subsequently become a highly politi-
cized issue in Iran. In the negotiations over its nuclear program, Tehran ac-
cepted limitations on its activities, but presented the halting of all enrichment
as a red line. This contentious issue was at the heart of the failure of the pro-
cess undertaken by world powers and Iran in 2003–05, when the U.S. require-

120. Author interview with Soltanieh; and author interview with Zarif.
121. Author interview with Etemad.
122. IAEA Board of Governors, “Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regard-
ing Iran’s Nuclear Programme,” GOV/2015/68 (Viena: IAEA, December 2, 2015), https://
www.iaea.org/sites/default/ªles/gov-2015-68.pdf; Bruno Tertrais, The Black Market for the Bomb:
Investigation on Nuclear Proliferation (París: Buchet/Chastel, 2009), páginas. 14, 67; David Albright and
Corey Hinderstein, “Unraveling A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks,” Washington Quar-
terly, volumen. 28, No. 2 (Primavera 2005), pag. 5; and David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “The A.Q. Kan
Illicit Nuclear Trade Network and Implications for Non-Proliferation Efforts,” in James A. Russell
and James J. Wirtz, editores., Globalization and WMD Proliferation: Terrorism, Transnational Networks, y
Seguridad Internacional (Londres: Routledge, 2008), pag. 50.

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Seguridad Internacional 42:1 182

ment for zero enrichment drove Iran away from the table.123 When the
negotiations resumed a few years later and became public in 2013, it was with
the recognition that zero enrichment would not be a possibility. This change
reºects an understanding that enrichment in Iran is viewed not purely as a
technical issue but as one of sovereignty and independence.

The indigenous fuel cycle remains the ºagship element of Iran’s narrative of
scientiªc and technological self-reliance. This fact is often reiterated by Iranian
ofªcials, who use it to rally the nation around the ºag, especially under the
pressure of backbreaking sanctions. They argue that while the West has tried
to isolate Iranians politically and economically and to stop their scientiªc and
technological progress, the nation has nonetheless succeeded in pushing for-
ward. This position is illustrated in the following statement made by Ayatollah
Khamenei in 2012: “In the ªeld of technology—petro-chemistry, petroleum,
steel, defense production and industry—the progress is amazing. . . . In high
tech, which is talked about in the world with pride, [the West] has been forced,
despite all the animosity, to say that Iran is one of [a few] countries that has
mastered the nuclear fuel cycle. This is not a small thing.”124 Tehran insists that
the Iranian people remain undefeated by “illegal” and “unethical” sanctions,
just as they were undefeated by Iraq and its allies during the “imposed war.”
As noted by Khamenei, Iran has refused to let such obstacles impede its tech-
nological and nuclear advancement:

From the womb of all sorts of sanctions, which have been forced upon the
country for many years, . . . [F]rom the womb of all the concentrated efforts
[Iran’s enemies] have made, all of a sudden the ability to enrich uranium—
cual es [kept as a] monopoly [para] the great powers and which [they believe]
should not go anywhere without their authorization—happens in this country.
This is proof that the enemy has not succeeded, its sanctions are not effective,
[y eso] its threat is also ineffective. Por qué? Because this nation has kept its
ªrm determination, which is based on its deep faith, and moves on and goes
forward and they cannot [stop it].125

The idea of self-reliance, one of the key lessons of the Iran-Iraq War, has thus
become the cornerstone of Tehran’s nuclear narrative and has guided speciªc
nuclear policies. Por ejemplo, when asked why Iran would not convert the
heavy water reactor in Arak to a light water reactor, thus eliminating it as a

123. Author interview with Zarif.
124. Majlis Research Center, “Muz‘i-i Rahbar-i Mu‘azzam-i Inqilab dar barih-‘i tahrim‘ha va
diplumisi-i hastih‘i Jumhuri-i Islami-i Iran” [The stance of the Supreme Leader of the Revolution
on sanctions and the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear diplomacy] (Tehran: Majlis Research Cen-
ter, 2012), pag. 8.
125. Ibídem., páginas. 10–11.

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Iran-Iraq War and the Nuclear Deal 183

proliferation concern, Foreign Minister Zarif invoked self-reliance, noting that
Iran does not have indigenous light-water technology. Conversion, he argued,
would make Iran dependent on other powers, and “we can’t depend on oth-
ers.” As a result, it was agreed that as part of the JCPOA Iran would redesign
the reactor instead of converting it.126 This stance was popular in Iran, dónde
many believe that their country needs and deserves to be able to become self-
reliant in areas relating to technology and energy.127 The experience of the war
is often invoked to explain this perceived need to develop indigenous technol-
ogy.128 As a result, being able to frame the JCPOA and its implementation in
the context of Iran’s quest for self-reliance is key to its success.

As noted, since the JCPOA was concluded, some in the political and security
establishments and broader population in Iran have expressed their discontent
with the implementation of the deal. Nuclear-related sanctions have been
lifted but economic recovery has yet to materialize. The lack of tangible
beneªts, Iranian leaders argue, further proves that the United States cannot
be trusted and that Iran must stand on its own two feet, as it did during the
Iran-Iraq War. The slow pace of economic recovery is also likely to make Iran’s
“resistance economy” of continued relevance in the post-JCPOA era. En
Khamenei’s words, a resistance economy is “an economy that is resilient,” that
is invulnerable to sanctions and ºuctuations in international markets, y eso
can withstand U.S. “provocations.”129 Although it is built speciªcally around
sanctions resulting from the nuclear crisis, the resistance-economy narrative
borrows language and themes from the lessons learned in the Iran-Iraq War.
Iran thus remains determined to maintain as much independence and self-
sufªciency as possible, so that it can safeguard its own security regardless of
where world powers align politically or in the event of another conºict. Este
does not mean that Iran would not welcome assistance in maintaining and
growing a civilian nuclear program, but that its narrative of self-reliance can-
not be disregarded. Por eso, for the JCPOA to be successful and sustainable
over the course of its implementation, and its results viable beyond the deal it-
self, the P5(cid:2)1 and Iran need to reconcile the country’s practical needs and its
insistence upon self-reliance. If the international community can effectively
guarantee that Iran’s practical needs will be met and not be employed as a

126. Author interview with Zarif.
127. Author interviews with several dozen Iranian private citizens in Tehran and the provinces of
Kurdistan, Eastern Azerbaijan, and Khorasan Razavi, 2008–10, 2014.
128. Ibídem.; and author interviews with Iranian ofªcials, Viena, Geneva, and New York, 2013-15.
129. “Bayanat dar didar-i jama’i az karafarinan-i sarasar-i kishvar” [Remarks in meeting with a
group of entrepreneurs from across the country], Khamenei.ir, Septiembre 10, 2010, http://
farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id(cid:3)10077.

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Seguridad Internacional 42:1 184

bargaining chip, Iranian leaders can decrease the rationale behind the coun-
try’s insistence upon self-reliance.

Conclusión

Scholars assessing Iran’s nuclear ambitions have long argued that the ideology
and rhetoric of the Islamic Revolution illustrate that Iran is an irrational actor,
driven by a revolutionary Islamic ideology, that would use nuclear weapons to
annihilate Israel and plunge the Middle East into a cycle of death and destruc-
tion if given the chance. Todavía, in assessing Tehran’s intent and interests, analysts
have failed to critically consider the crucial impact of the Iran-Iraq War on
Iranian nuclear and security decisionmaking, which cannot be underesti-
acoplado. The war has forged the Islamic Republic’s image of the international
community and reinforced the idea that the country must be self-reliant in all
spheres, especially in matters of defense. De hecho, a key driver behind Iran’s re-
turn to the negotiating table was to avoid the looming threat of another inter-
state war. When the negotiations resumed in 2012, observers argued that it
was a matter of “when” not “if” Israel would attack Iran’s nuclear facilities,
with the United States being inevitably dragged into the conºict. The last time
Iran was at war with another state was the Iran-Iraq War. The prospect of an-
other such war, this time with much more powerful adversaries, led Iran to
choose negotiations over escalation.

The Islamic Republic has framed the nuclear crisis as the continuation of ef-
forts by the West to undermine and weaken Iran, efforts that began with the
Iran-Iraq War. The war failed to stop Iran’s progress, Iranian leaders argue,
and was perpetuated by Western powers as the nuclear crisis in the form of
the sanctions regime, and threats of war, sabotage, and assassinations. Por eso,
Iran presents international efforts to limit its nuclear program as another form
of warfare, intended to undermine the Islamic Republic. In the words of
President Rouhani: “The enemy could not achieve its goals in the eight-year
Imposed [Iran-Iraq] Guerra. . . . [But after the war], under the pretext of the nu-
clear issue, it imposed a new economic war and sanctions against our nation.
Our people have persisted and declare to the world that we are not consider-
ing producing weapons of mass destruction, that we only [pursue] develop-
ment and scientiªc progress and the realization of our rights, and that we will
not bow down to the pressure of the West and the superpowers.”130

130. “Ra’is-i jumhuri dar marasim-i rizhih-’i niru’ha-yi mussalah bih munasibat-i aghaz-i Haftih-’i
Difa’i Muqaddas” [The president in the armed forces’ march on the occasion of the beginning of
the Sacred Defense Week], Rouhani.ir, Septiembre 22, 2014, http://president.ir/fa/81065.

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Iran-Iraq War and the Nuclear Deal 185

For the nuclear deal to be sustainable and its implementation to proceed
successfully, the West must understand Iran’s security concerns and threat per-
ceptions stemming from the Iran-Iraq War. Iran’s view of its security is encap-
sulated in defensive realist international relations theory, which sees states as
striving for survival and their national security thinking as plagued by the
security dilemma. The war’s legacy drives Iranian decisionmakers and the
public alike, and a failure to understand and appreciate this fact can lead to
missteps with the potential to derail the implementation process.

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