Introducción
A Global Turn to Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Trading? experimentos,
Actors, y Difusión
(cid:129)
Katja Biedenkopf, Patrick Müller, Peter Slominski,
and Jørgen Wettestad*
The policy instrument of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading has gained
prominence since the early 2000s. At the end of 2016, twenty-one distinct
GHG emissions trading systems (ETSs) covering thirty-five countries were oper-
ating worldwide (ICAP 2017). China has announced the launch of a national
ETS for the second half of 2017, which is expected to become the world’s largest
carbon market. A number of other countries and subnational jurisdictions,
including Thailand, México, and Oregon, are considering the adoption of a
GHG ETS. Por eso, it is increasingly important to improve our knowledge about
the forces that shape the initiation, diseño, and functioning of such systems,
whether internal or external to the jurisdictions. This includes the interactions
among individual systems and the precise ways in which ETS policy diffuses.
With the increasing spread of GHG ETSs around the world over the past decade,
sufficient empirical cases and variation are now available to provide a good
base de conocimientos, and these warrant a thorough analysis.
This special issue of Global Environmental Politics contributes to our
knowledge and understanding of the expanding turn to GHG emissions trad-
En g. En particular, we aim to investigate the role and detailed unfolding of dif-
fusion processes in the emergence of various GHG ETSs globally, con un
particular focus on the interaction between external influences and domestic
* All articles in this special issue were presented at a workshop at KU Leuven entitled “Global
Experimentalism and Policy Innovation in Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading” in February
2016, which was generously funded by the INOGOV network (COST Action IS1309). We thank
all workshop participants, and particularly Sebastian Oberthür, Jos Delbeke, y andres
Jordán, for their valuable contributions and the insightful discussions. We also would like to
thank Susan Altman of GEP for her professionalism and patience in making this special issue
happen.
Global Environmental Politics 17:3, Agosto 2017, doi:10.1162/GLEP_e_00412
© 2017 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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2 (cid:129) A Global Turn to Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading? experimentos, Actors, y Difusión
dynamics within jurisdictions that newly design and adopt a GHG ETS. Desde
all GHG ETSs that have emerged so far have their own particular design, el
global turn to emissions trading seems more complex than a simple policy
diffusion account can explain. Domestic factors seem to be of great impor-
tance for understanding the growing adoption of ETSs in widely different
jurisdictions.
Establishing a market is accompanied by uncertainty, and its functioning
cannot be fully predicted. To deal with the uncertainty associated with such
complex policy instruments as emissions trading, the initial phase of these
schemes is frequently characterized by experimentation and learning through
“pilot schemes” and “test phases.” An ETS may need to be adjusted in response
to new experiences and unanticipated events, such as an economic downturn
or a low degree of trading activity. Por esta razón, one way to analyze ETSs is
to conceive of them as experiments that produce information about successes
and failures. En efecto, we have witnessed a remarkable level of testing and
experimentation with GHG ETSs over recent years. One example of explicit ex-
perimentation is the seven pilot schemes that China launched in 2010. Otro
is the European Union’s first trading period (2005–2007). These domestic
experiments generated lessons tailored to a specific jurisdiction, since individ-
ual systems are developed in a particular context, which we could label islands
of experimentation.
En cambio, policy-makers may also turn to the experiences of other
jurisdictions, which suggests diffusion and interdependent policy-making.
En efecto, previous and emerging research points to the importance of diffusion
dynamics in developing specific ETSs (Biedenkopf 2012; Müller and Slominski
2016; Wettestad and Gulbrandsen 2017). From a global perspective, este
raises the question of how experiments and experiences in different jurisdic-
tions may inform and interact with each other, potentially contributing to
the creation of a future international carbon market through a bottom-up
proceso. This connects to the rich discussion in political science on policy dif-
fusion (for an overview, see Gilardi 2012). Underdal, Victor, and Wettestad
(2015) distinguish the main mechanisms that underpin diffusion processes:
competition (ratcheting up or lowering standards in response to economic
interdependencies), aprendiendo (from the perceived policy successes and fail-
ures of others), and emulation (decisions based on norms and the logic of
appropriateness).
Creating a market for GHG emission allowances requires a number of
measures that are likely to be shaped by the features of the economy and
the political preferences of the jurisdiction in which they are applied. Para esto
reason, a carbon market is not a policy instrument that can be transferred
easily and unchanged from one jurisdiction to another (Knox-Hayes 2016).
Political controversies remain about the ways in which carbon markets
should be organized, the role that they should play, and the objectives that they
should achieve.
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k. Biedenkopf, PAG. Müller, PAG. Slominski, y j. Wettestad
(cid:129) 3
The bottom-up proliferation of GHG ETSs has led to a fragmented global
sistema. Actualmente, these different systems are not operationally linked, apart
from a few exceptions such as the EU-Norway and California-Quebec links.
There are other types of linkages, sin embargo, most notably in the form of sharing
experiences and lessons, and capacity building. Por ejemplo, the EU, Norway,
and California all support China in various aspects of its subnational ETS pilot
projects and in its development of a national system (see Biedenkopf et al.
artículo, this issue). Oftentimes, the processes seem to be driven by a clear
demand from the jurisdiction wishing to design an ETS (see Gulbrandsen
et al. artículo, this issue).
This introduction to the 2017 special issue of Global Environmental Politics
first charts some of the key insights and findings pertaining to the experimen-
tation and diffusion of GHG emissions trading. The second part introduces the
individual contributions to this special issue. We then conclude with some
reflections on future research needs.
What Have We Learned?
Mirroring the growing relevance of emissions trading, a number of insightful
studies have been conducted on the evolution, diseño, and functioning of spe-
cific ETSs, including the EU’s ETS (p.ej., Ellerman and Buchner 2007; Ellerman
et al. 2016; Skjærseth and Wettestad 2008; Wettestad and Jevnaker 2016), US
subnational ETSs (p.ej., Ellerman and Harrison 2003; Ruth et al. 2008), y
the Chinese pilot schemes (p.ej., Han et al. 2012; Lo 2013; Lo and Howes
2013). Few studies have looked at diffusion (p.ej., Biedenkopf 2012), direct link-
ing of individual ETSs (p.ej., Müller and Slominski 2016), and indirect linking
through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (p.ej., Belis and Kerremans
2016).
The role of experimentation and learning from one’s own and others’ ex-
periments as part of the design process of a GHG ETS has not received much
academic attention so far. Addressing this gap in existing research, the contribu-
tions to this special issue cover diverse variants of emissions trading in seven
different jurisdictions—Australia, California, Porcelana, Kazakhstan, New Zealand,
Tailandia, and Vietnam. Some of these cases are mature systems while others are
early in development, which provides for empirical richness and variation. El
case studies provide valuable new knowledge, including on under-researched
ETSs such as those in New Zealand, Kazakhstan, Tailandia, and Vietnam. Qué
is more, by considering the ways in which these different ETS experiments inter-
act with each other, this special issue also provides a “macro-picture” of the
interconnections among the different systems and jurisdictions. Mapping these
links sheds light on their role in facilitating a globally linked carbon market
through bottom-up processes and networks. For each of the ETSs studied in this
special issue, the authors consider the main external reference points that played
a role in their development.
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4 (cid:129) A Global Turn to Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading? experimentos, Actors, y Difusión
A number of important observations can be made from analyzing the
links established by GHG emissions trading in different jurisdictions. Primero, él
becomes apparent that as the number of jurisdictions experimenting with
GHG emissions trading increases, we also witness an increase in the number
of actors that promote this policy externally by supplying expertise, capacity
building, and policy solutions to other jurisdictions. Promoting the proliferation
of carbon markets can generate benefits for those who already have an ETS, desde
it increases the possibilities for different kinds of linkages and the legitimacy of
emissions trading as a suitable climate policy. Respectivamente, we are increasingly
facing a situation in which multiple jurisdictions seek to exert influence on
other jurisdictions and to promote their own distinct variants of a GHG ETS.
Por ejemplo, the capacity-building projects identified in the case study on China
involve twelve different external financiers (Biedenkopf et al. artículo, this issue).
The majority of these external financiers are national and subnational govern-
ments that have their own ETSs in place, but they also include international
organizations such as the World Bank and research institutes. A similar complex-
ity can be observed in the case of Thailand, which has been experimenting with
a number of different bilateral, regional, and international market mechanisms
that involve a broad range of external actors (Smits article, this issue).
The research articles in this special issue show that we are certainly not
faced with a situation of isolated experiments or knowledge silos. On the con-
trary, we are witnessing a growing range of actors becoming involved in the pro-
cess of building capacity and sharing of expertise information, conocimiento, y
lessons across borders. This interaction among a growing number of jurisdic-
tions and types of actors appears to facilitate bottom-up dynamics that may
benefit the building of a global carbon market as part of the Paris Agreement
on climate change (cristóbal 2016). Still, the availability of multiple suppliers
of policy advice, conocimiento, and technology does not necessarily translate into
a collective and coherent effort that will lead to synergies and complementarity.
It might also result in greater complexity and involve duplication and compe-
tition, since jurisdictions that provide policy advice and capacity building on
emissions trading abroad frequently seek to promote their own variants of that
política (Biedenkopf et al. artículo, this issue).
Segundo, the contributions to this special issue show that even though
there is considerable communication between different jurisdictions experi-
menting with emissions trading, such linkages do not necessarily facilitate
greater policy convergence. While previous studies have convincingly demon-
strated that international diffusion processes can lead to an increase in policy
convergence, these studies have generally considered rather general factors,
such as the portfolio of environmental policy measures adopted by a country
and the stringency of the policies adopted (Holzinger et al. 2011). Además,
diffusion studies have a tendency to focus on the decision to adopt a policy,
while significantly less attention is often paid to questions of policy develop-
mento, the choice of specific design elements, and policy implementation.
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k. Biedenkopf, PAG. Müller, PAG. Slominski, y j. Wettestad
(cid:129) 5
Sin embargo, policy diffusion is not limited to the decision to adopt a certain policy;
the narrowness of this focus fails to capture the dynamic nature of policy devel-
opment and the evolution of the particular design features that determine the
effectiveness and efficiency of complex policies like GHG emissions trading
(Inderberg et al. artículo, this issue).1
The question of convergence and divergence with respect to policy devel-
opment in different jurisdictions is also acutely relevant for GHG ETSs. En tono rimbombante,
it has clear relevance for the ways in which different ETSs can be linked or inte-
grated in the future. Aquí, divergences across jurisdictions can make it very com-
plex and challenging to attain deep linkages, entailing the risk of a “balkanized”
global trading system that could erase many of the economic and environmental
advantages of flexible, market-based approaches to pollution control (Bang et al.
artículo, this issue).
It is certainly fair to say that the idea of emissions trading has spread
around the globe. The establishment of ETSs by pioneering jurisdictions, mayoría
notably the EU, has facilitated the decision to adopt GHG emissions trading
elsewhere, reducing uncertainty and enhancing the argumentative power of
proponents of emissions trading. Similarmente, the Kyoto Protocol has been iden-
tified as an important driver of the diffusion of emissions trading around the
globe by means of the CDM. Respectivamente, the international trend toward emis-
sions trading over recent years can easily appear to be a convergence process
driven by international dynamics.
Sin embargo, if we move beyond the principled decision to adopt an ETS and
look at specific design features and policy implementations, policy convergence
becomes more elusive. In part, this can be explained as the result of policy-
makers trying to learn from the shortcomings and mistakes of others, En particular
when a receiving jurisdiction seeks to avoid problems experienced with emissions
trading elsewhere. Por ejemplo, policy-makers in Australia and New Zealand
deliberately sought to avoid the problems experienced in the EU ETS, cual
played an influential role in the development of their own domestic schemes
(Inderberg et al. artículo, this issue; Müller and Slominski article, this issue). En
certain cases, sin embargo, the impact of negative lessons might be just temporary,
since over time, suppliers of policy solutions such as the EU also seek to advance
their own systems and correct past mistakes. This could lead to an international
dynamic of mutual ratcheting up and improving other (sub)national GHG ETSs.
An even greater challenge for achieving similarity of policies on emissions
trading across jurisdictions is the fact that international processes interact
substantively with domestic political and economic systems in the receiving
1. The literature on policy transfer, por el contrario, has been more attentive to the different stages of
the policy cycle in a receiving jurisdiction. Sin embargo, this literature’s focus on the transfer of a
policy from one jurisdiction to another has resulted in a situation in which scholars have pre-
dominantly relied on the detailed qualitative analysis of one or very few cases (see Marsh and
Sharman 2009). Although the policy transfer literature has facilitated more nuanced analysis,
it faces difficulties with generalizing its findings.
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6 (cid:129) A Global Turn to Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading? experimentos, Actors, y Difusión
jurisdictions. These interaction dynamics can reach considerably beyond what
has been suggested by conventional wisdom in diffusion studies—that is, eso
a new policy inspired by policy solutions from abroad must be adjusted to the
particular historic, cultural, and institutional context prevailing in the receiving
jurisdiction (the “goodness-of-fit” argument; ver, p.ej., Marsh and Sharman
2009). As Müller and Slominski (this issue) and Wettestad and Gulbrandsen
(2017) remind us, policy diffusion is much more than a technical function of
gobierno; it involves not only learning from abroad, but also negotiations
and bargaining among political actors and the accommodation of many differ-
ent interests.
Por eso, decisions pertaining to specific policy design elements cannot be
reduced to considerations of policy effectiveness and inspiration by successful
policies abroad. Bastante, the case studies presented in this special issue show that
policy development is frequently shaped by the interests of powerful domestic
stakeholders and the ideological and political preferences of leading policy-
fabricantes. Aquí, learning easily becomes politically motivated, with political actors
cherry-picking the features of a foreign program or of programs from different
places that they consider politically opportune (Müller and Slominski, this issue).
Tercero, we observe that the EU ETS has served as a particularly important
reference point for other jurisdictions experimenting with GHG emissions trad-
En g. As the world’s first and biggest GHG emissions trading system, the EU ETS
has played an influential role in the development of ETSs in all seven juris-
dictions studied in this special issue. The EU ETS was the main external source
of inspiration for developing emissions trading in Australia and Kazakhstan,
and it was a key external reference point in developing the ETSs in California (a-
gether with RGGI) and New Zealand (together with the Australian Carbon
Pollution Reduction Scheme). The EU and its member states are also principal
sponsors of the capacity-building projects studied in China, as well as important
contributors to multilateral initiatives such as the World Bank’s Partnership for
Market Readiness (PMR). The PMR provides a platform for sharing knowledge
and experiences with market-based mitigation instruments and has played an
important role for such countries as Thailand, Vietnam, and China.
Even though the EU ETS has been an important reference point, the ways
in which the recipient jurisdictions have engaged with the expertise and experi-
ence provided have often caused them to depart from the EU template with
regard to key design elements. The EU may have experienced its biggest success
in achieving approximation of its own ETS design in Kazakhstan, which bor-
rowed key elements from the EU ETS even without the EU actively promoting
a ellos (see Gulbrandsen et al., this issue).
The Global Diffusion of Emissions Trading
The individual contributions to this special issue build on the literatures of
policy diffusion and policy transfer to explore how international dynamics have
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k. Biedenkopf, PAG. Müller, PAG. Slominski, y j. Wettestad
(cid:129) 7
impacted the evolution of GHG ETSs in the selected jurisdictions. Moving
beyond policy adoption, which has been the main focus of much previous
research of international policy diffusion, to a detailed analysis of policy
development over time, the authors find themselves confronted with growing
complejidad. Por un lado, they face a growing range of actors supplying
emissions-trading-related expertise, capacity building, and policy solutions.
En el otro, they confront a situation in which international dynamics interact
considerably with domestic factors in the recipient jurisdictions. While an inte-
grated analysis of the international diffusion dynamics and domestic factors
affecting the development of emissions trading certainly increases the com-
plexity of researchers’ work, it also promises a more profound understanding
of the international and domestic influences. Al mismo tiempo, it mitigates
the risk of overstating the impact of international influences, which must work
their way through domestic politics in the recipient jurisdictions to have an
impact on policy development.
The contributions to this special issue focus on different aspects of the
interactions between international and domestic dynamics in the diffusion of
GHG emissions trading policies, which have not received sufficient attention
in previous research (ver, p.ej., Müller and Slominski 2016). The article by Bang
et al. examines the origins and operation of California’s cap-and-trade system
from two broad sets of theoretical frames: research on international policy
diffusion and on the local political economy. It investigates the process of dif-
fusion and active learning as policy agents and organized interest groups sought
to identify and apply lessons from other trading systems when designing and
adjusting the California emissions trading program. Al mismo tiempo, Bang
et al. acknowledge that such processes are intrinsically complex and responsive
to many different actors, interests, administrative arrangements, institutions, y
ideas. They argue that California “learned” a few lessons from early actors—
mainly about dangers to avoid, such as overallocation of permits and the risks
of generous offset rules—but then proceeded largely into uncharted territory.
Simultáneamente, local political concerns were important mediating factors in
the diffusion process. Local concerns have shaped the design of the cap-and-trade
programa. Por ejemplo, overcoming the opposition of the state’s politically well-
organized oil industry was crucial to expansion of coverage to include the
transport sector in the second compliance period (2015–2017), and strategies
to overcome and redirect organized environmental and community interests
were crucial to creating a cap-and-trade system in the first place.
The article by Inderberg et al. explores how diffusion and learning from
other ETSs can explain the adoption, diseño, and revision of climate policy in
New Zealand. The article specifically distinguishes how diffusion dynamics inter-
act with two types of domestic factors: Por un lado, interaction motivated
by learning between jurisdictions, and on the other, scrutiny aimed at avoiding
material disadvantages that could result from miscalculations in climate policy
diseño. The article also pays attention to the temporal dimensions of climate
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8 (cid:129) A Global Turn to Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading? experimentos, Actors, y Difusión
policy development to account for how diffusion and domestic influences may
change during policy adoption, diseño, and revision. It also shows the relevance
of domestic lenses—shaped by experiences with related policy problems—for the
evaluation of different approaches to climate policy. Específicamente, it shows that
the key actors involved in developing the New Zealand ETS already had expe-
rience with designing both regulated and deregulated markets, and considered a
carbon market as merely another, not particularly complex, extension of
this process.
The contribution by Müller and Slominski discusses the development of
an ETS in Australia. As a starting point, the article criticizes the literature for
often treating learning from abroad as a way to improve the effectiveness and
problem-solving capacity of public policy at home. En cambio, little attention
has been paid to how policy-makers strategically employ learning from abroad
to advance their domestic policy preferences. Building on the notion of political
aprendiendo, the article refines this concept by distinguishing between “learning as
an argumentative resource,” “selective learning,” and “learning about policy
design.” Even though—at least for the time being—the Australian ETS has failed,
it provides an illustrative case of how government policy-makers have used polit-
ical learning from abroad to promote emissions trading in a polarized domestic
climate of adversarial ideas and competing interests. More generally, it high-
lights the fruitfulness of an integrative analytical approach that studies the inter-
action of international diffusion dynamics with domestic politics in the receiving
jurisdiction.
The article by Smits analyzes past and emerging experiments with carbon
market mechanisms in Thailand and Vietnam in the context of their domestic
political economies and the shifting dynamics of the global climate governance
regime. It shows the changing roles of government, the private sector, civil
sociedad, and donors and multilateral actors in these countries. Además, el
article identifies key factors that play a role in the further development of carbon
market mechanisms: the generation of domestic demand for carbon credits;
building and keeping human capacity and adequate data; creating space for civil
sociedad; ensuring coordination within the government and between sectors,
notably the energy sector; and establishing further linkages with regional (es decir.,
asiático) and global carbon market mechanisms, such as those in China, Japón, y
South Korea. While Thailand and Vietnam can be regarded as cases of dynamic
carbon market experiments, the article also points to domestic and international
challenges that have inhibited the development of significant carbon market
schemes in those countries, such as uncertainty about the climate governance
regime, the marginal role of civil society, and limited domestic demand.
Biedenkopf, Van Eynde, and Walker analyze the ways in which capacity-
building projects can be a vehicle for fostering policy diffusion. They demon-
strate that capacity-building projects should, sin embargo, not be considered as
exclusively externally driven. The receiving jurisdiction’s receptiveness and
leverage to adapt the designs of those projects can be crucial to infusing different
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k. Biedenkopf, PAG. Müller, PAG. Slominski, y j. Wettestad
(cid:129) 9
external policy experiences into a domestic policy design and implementation
proceso. Biedenkopf et al.’s article shows that, in the case of GHG emissions
trading, the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission plays a
gatekeeping role in steering capacity-building efforts by external financiers. Este
contribution analyzes both the interaction among capacity-building projects
financed by different external financiers and the role that gatekeeping actors
and brokers can play in the complex structure of interacting projects.
The Gulbrandsen, Sammut, and Wettestad article, on the ETS in Kazakhstan,
examines the role of international policy diffusion in the adoption and design
of emissions trading in Kazakhstan. They find that the overall framework for
the ETS in Kazakhstan was inspired by the EU ETS, with many of its design ele-
ments based on the EU system. Two closely related diffusion mechanisms—
emulation and learning—explain particular design similarities, como el
systems’ allocation mechanisms, coverage, and monitoring, reporting, and verifi-
cation procedures. Gulbrandsen et al. also find that domestic political concerns
were central mediating factors in the diffusion process that helped shape the
design of the Kazakh ETS. These concerns led the Kazakh authorities to go for
some design choices quite different from those of the EU ETS, regarding the time
periods/phases, fundamental ambition level, and offset rules. While conventional
wisdom holds that the outcome of diffusion processes is policy convergence, este
case shows that diffusion processes may result in both policy convergence and,
more indirectly, divergencia.
Lederer’s forum piece highlights four questions to which all articles pre-
sented in this special issue speak. These questions are: Why have carbon markets
been set up in the first place? What are the current regulatory trends that we can
observe on the national level? What are the global aspects of emission trading?
Who benefits from carbon trading? Lederer argues that carbon trading is a highly
political multiactor and multilevel process.
Given the growing relevance and diffusion of GHG ETSs, we expect to
witness a significant increase in scholarly research dealing with the issues out-
lined above in the years to come. This special issue can serve as a source of
reference for other scholars who wish to investigate the remaining research gaps.
The missing pieces that deserve more attention in the future include a number
of questions. Primero, the operation of bottom-up dynamics in a post–Paris Agree-
ment world will raise broader comparative questions about whether we can
identify certain patterns among various domestic schemes in terms of their inter-
actions and policy designs. Por ejemplo, what are the relevant similarities and
differences in the ways in which individual ETSs are introduced? Why do differ-
ent ETSs have similar or different design elements? The latter point is of particular
relevance to questions about how individual ETSs can or should be linked to
form a multijurisdictional, or even global, carbon market (Verde 2017).
Segundo, there has been a clear lack of research on those countries that have
only recently begun to experiment with GHG ETSs. While this special issue dis-
cusses new ETS experiments in Kazakhstan, Tailandia, and Vietnam, we will
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10 (cid:129) A Global Turn to Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading? experimentos, Actors, y Difusión
need more research before we can understand the various dynamics that under-
pin the global turn to GHG emissions trading in countries not just from the
Global North, but also from the Global South. This research should not limit
itself to cases of successful ETS implementation, but should also include cases in
which the establishment of an ETS has encountered considerable domestic
opposition or has not been feasible at all.
Tercero, the roles of both international organizations and private actors in
polycentric climate governance and ETS diffusion remain under-researched.
Given the interplay between top-down and bottom-up approaches in climate
change politics, it will be interesting to know what role international organi-
zations can and should play in the ever-denser web of GHG ETS experiments.
Similarmente, understanding the ways in which nongovernmental actors facilitate or
inhibit the establishment and working of domestic ETSs is a recent but highly
important research area. We hope that this special issue will inspire new research
in this vital and dynamic area of international climate governance.
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