Introducción
Karl Eikenberry & Stephen D. Krasner
The essays that make up this and the previous issue
of Dædalus are the culmination of an eighteen-month
American Academy of Arts and Sciences project on
Guerras civiles, Violence, and International Respons-
es. Project participants have examined in depth the
intellectual and policy disagreements over both the
risks posed by intrastate violence and how best to
treat it.
The Fall 2017 issue, “Guerras civiles & Global Disorder:
Threats & Opportunities,” examines the nature and
causative factors of civil wars in the modern era, el
security risks posed by high levels of intrastate vio-
lence, and the challenges confronting external actors
intervening to end the fighting and seek a political set-
tlement. It also explains the project’s aims, método-
ologies, and international outreach program.1
This issue, “Ending Civil Wars: Constraints & Pos-
sibilities,” consists of two parts: “Norms & Domes-
tic Factors” and “Policy Prescriptions.” The essays in
the first section consider the impediments to ending
wars of internal disorder when norms such as nation-
al identity or commitment to the rule of law are not
shared by contending elites, or when rebels are fight-
ing for a transnational, divine cause and not simply
the seizure of state power. The remaining essays focus
on the “what to do” and offer a variety of recommen-
dations to policy-makers. The issue concludes with
the project’s codirectors’ own reflections informed
by their colleagues’ writings.
The section devoted to the impact of norms and do-
mestic factors on the character of civil wars opens
© 2018 por la Academia Americana de las Artes & Ciencias
doi:10.1162/DAED_e_00469
KARL EIKENBERRY, a Fellow of the
American Academy since 2012, es
the Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow and
Director of the U.S.-Asia Security
Initiative at Stanford University’s
Asia-Pacific Research Center. Él
served as the U.S. Ambassador to
Afghanistan and had a thirty-five-
year career in the United States
Ejército, retiring with the rank of
lieutenant general. He codirects
the Academy’s project on Civil
Guerras, Violence, and International
Responses.
STEPHEN D. KRASNER, a Fellow of
the American Academy since 1991,
is Senior Fellow at the Freeman
Spogli Institute for International
Estudios, the Graham H. Stuart Pro-
fessor of International Relations,
and Senior Fellow at the Hoover
Institution at Stanford University.
He is the author of Power, the State,
and Sovereignty: Essays on Internation-
al Relations (2009), Sovereignty: Orga-
nized Hypocrisy (1999), and Asymme-
tries in Japanese-American Trade: El
Case for Specific Reciprocity (1987). Él
codirects the Academy’s project on
Guerras civiles, Violence, and Interna-
tional Responses.
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with Francis Fukuyama’s historical ac-
count of England’s tumultuous history
following the Norman Conquest, durante
which the country faced violence and civ-
il war roughly every fifty years until the
Glorious Revolution of 1688–1689 es-
tablished parliamentary supremacy and
brought long-lasting stability to England.
Fukuyama uses the English case to illus-
trate that elite bargains will not necessari-
ly result in a stable state or liberal democra-
cy, arguing that stability after 1689 was in-
stead predicated upon increasing respect
for the rule of law, and the emergence of
a strong English state and national identi-
ty. He emphasizes that these developments
took shape over the course of six centuries.
What does this mean for current con-
flicts? Fukuyama’s analysis suggests that
“many contemporary conflicts will there-
fore continue until greater normative
commitment to state, law, and democra-
cy come about,” and while U.S. asistencia
might help raise the visibility of certain
government institutions in the short term,
“the burden of sustainable institution-
building necessarily will fall on the local
elites themselves.”2
In her essay, Tanisha Fazal argues for the
recognition of an additional class of reb-
los, namely religionist rebels, for whom
sovereignty comes from the divine: ellos
do not seek international recognition or
statehood by conventional means. Esto es
important for two reasons: primero, many of
the common strategies employed in war
and war termination are likely to be inef-
fective against insurgents who reject the
very legitimacy of the modern state sys-
tema; y segundo, religionist rebels often
conduct war differently from other rebels
given that their justification and motiva-
tion come from beyond the realm of states
and shared international norms.
Fazal offers two options for conflict res-
olution: fighting to the end, or establishing
a “hybrid system in which religionist reb-
els coexist alongside the Westphalian state
system.” Neither option is necessarily ap-
pealing. Sin embargo, Fazal points out that
historically these groups have “bumped up
against natural limits, precisely because . . .
the claims they make and practices they
engage in during the wars they fight” can-
not be sustained.3
Stathis Kalyvas, in his essay, decouples
violent jihadism from religion and terror-
ismo, positing that, although both are rele-
vant characteristics of jihadi groups, it may
be beneficial to view such elements first and
foremost as revolutionary insurgents in
civil wars. Kalyvas draws comparisons be-
tween contemporary jihadi groups and rev-
olutionary insurgents of the past, specifical-
ly Marxist rebels of the Cold War, noting
that both groups’ revolutionary identities
and transnational natures have common at-
tributes. A key difference, sin embargo, es el
absence of significant external state spon-
sorship for jihadi rebels, which Kalyvas
says may well be their greatest weakness.
Por último, he suggests that “jihadi rebels
might, in the end, represent less of a threat
to their opponents in civil war contexts
than their older, Marxist counterparts,"
but cautions against blocking peaceful po-
litical mobilization for Islamists, as this may
encourage the future emergence of new, vi-
olent jihadi movements.4
Drawing from the ongoing conflicts in
Syria, Libya, and Yemen, Steven Heyde-
mann concludes the section on norms and
domestic factors by examining the per-
sistence of prewar governance practices
under conditions of violent conflict. Él
argues that civil war might, En realidad, ser el
continuation of governance not by different
medio, but by the same means. This asser-
tion has particular policy relevance in that
it “challenges understandings of civil war
as marking a rupture in governance: violent
conflict may disrupt prewar practices less
than is often assumed.” It also calls atten-
tion to the limits and shortcomings of ex-
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9
147 (1) Winter 2018Karl Eikenberry & Stephen D. Krasner
isting frameworks intended to lessen state
fragility, highlighting the link between sov-
ereignty and governance and the “weapon-
ization of sovereignty” for political or eco-
nomic gain. Heydemann notes that viable
solutions to such conflicts are difficult to
find, and are “likely to require diplomatic,
financial, and military strategies that create
incentives for embattled regimes and insur-
gent challengers to end violence and accept
meaningful compromises in the interest of
securing their minimal requirements,” of-
ten without transitional justice or account-
ability for perpetrators.5
Charles Call and Susanna Campbell begin
the section on policy options by exploring
the logic of prevention, explaining the un-
derlying assumptions and associated tools.
They offer three categories of preventive ac-
tions–operational, structural, and systemic
–that manifest the rationale for preven-
tion in different ways. They then exam-
ine various political, institutional, bureau-
crático, and decision-making obstacles that
have plagued earlier waves of conflict-pre-
vention initiatives. The problems are sig-
nificant and many: a saber, the challenges
faced by a state or international organiza-
tion asked to take action on something that
its constituency might not deem important;
the lack of clear rules surrounding preven-
ción; and the poor level of understanding
about what exactly leads to an effective out-
side intervention. Call and Campbell reach
a modest yet hopeful conclusion: “although
we should not expect conflict prevention to
work in many cases, the few cases in which
it may prevent escalating violence justify an
investment, in spite of the odds.”6
Sumit Ganguly writes about the Sri Lan-
kan Civil War, an example of civil war ter-
mination by means of outright military vic-
conservador. The Sri Lankan case is one example of
the “give war a chance” argument put forth
by political scientist Edward Luttwak, OMS
has asserted that “an unpleasant truth often
overlooked is that although war is a great
evil, it does have a great virtue: it can re-
solve political conflicts and lead to peace.”7
Though “complete and unequivocal” mili-
tary victory brought an end to almost three
decades of violent conflict in Sri Lanka, el
country still lacks a unified national identi-
ty due to the deep ethnic and cultural divi-
sions among the Sinhala majority and gov-
ernment and the Tamil minority.8 The Sri
Lankan government and some civil society
representatives assert that progress is being
hecho, but the postwar reconciliation and
accountability processes are slow-going.
Whether the existing peace will hold over
the long term remains in question.
According to Clare Lockhart, over the
course of the last two decades, the inter-
national community has largely respond-
ed to internal conflict and state breakdown
with either military forces and large-scale
civilian assistance (Afghanistan and Iraq),
minimal involvement and calculated dis-
tance (Syria), or the misplaced hope that
removing a dictator or negotiating a short-
term peace deal without long-term plan-
ning and institution-building will lead to
sustainable peace (Libya). Lockhart advo-
cates an approach between these extremes,
what she terms a “sovereignty strategy.”9
Such an approach is informed by the prin-
ciple of helping internal actors establish
or restore a core set of governance sys-
tems or institutions that can win the trust
and meet the needs of their people, re-
duce the reliance of the country on exter-
nal support, and contribute to resolving
conflicts before they become violent. Ella
argues that by carefully sequencing the es-
tablishment of key state functions over an
extended time period, public trust can be
gained and international obligations met.
In their essay, Thomas Risse and Eric
Stollenwerk contend that the relationship
between limited statehood and civil war,
and therefore the importance placed on
state-building efforts for preventing civil
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Dédalo, la Revista de la Academia Estadounidense de las Artes & SciencesIntroduction
war and violent conflict, is often overstated
and misinformed. They point out that lim-
ited statehood is the global default, not the
exception, and only a small portion of areas
of limited statehood is affected by civil war.
Weak state capacity may enable civil war,
but it is neither a sufficient nor necessary
condition for civil conflict. External actors,
Risse and Stollenwerk suggest, should seek
to foster societal and political resilience in
areas of limited statehood and to prevent
governance breakdowns. They write: “gov-
ernance-building with a focus on particular
state and nonstate institutions, así como
on service provision, is likely to be not only
más eficiente, but also more effective.”10
Tanja Börzel and Sonja Grimm also ex-
amine approaches to governance-building,
analyzing the European Union’s role in
creating stable peace in the Western Bal-
kans following the breakup of the former
Republic of Yugoslavia. The expansion of
the eu to include ten Central and Eastern
European states has seen varying success
in terms of democratization and stability;
Croatia and Serbia appear to have success-
fully locked in these changes, while other
states seem stuck in transition. Structural
postconflict conditions, conflicting policy
objectives, complex relationships between
eu and Western Balkan governments, y
the involvement of domestic third-party ac-
tors in the reform processes explain much
of this variation. To enhance eu efforts to
improve governance, Börzel and Grimm
emphasize the importance of understand-
ing domestic actors’ interests and aligning
them with the interests of external actors,
as well as using governance-building instru-
ments consistently and credibly, while ac-
knowledging conflicting objectives.
Seyoum Mesfin, who served as Ethiopia’s
minister of foreign affairs for nearly twen-
ty years, and Abdeta Beyene, who recently
served as chief of staff of the Joint Monitor-
ing and Evaluation Commission pursuant
to the Agreement to Resolve the Conflict in
South Sudan, explore the use of buffer zones
as a strategy for responding to the security
challenges posed by failed states in the Horn
of Africa region. Buffer zones are neutral ar-
eas designed to prevent acts of aggression
between hostile nations, and can be estab-
lished jointly in a shared territory, or uni-
laterally through force. Por ejemplo, en el
Horn of Africa, Ethiopia and Kenya main-
tain buffer zones inside Somalia to man-
age the threat posed by militant extremist
groups such as Al Shabaab. Uganda also em-
ploys a similar strategy in South Sudan. En-
terstate tensions often arise, sin embargo, ser-
cause buffer zones usually represent a vio-
lation of the weaker state’s sovereignty by
the stronger state seeking to maintain sta-
bility and order in the broader region. Buf-
fer zones, Mesfin and Beyene persuasively
argue, can be essential for both fighting ter-
rorism and returning refugees to their plac-
es of origin in regions plagued by states in-
capable or unwilling to impose order.
Drawing upon her vast experience in re-
porting from the front lines of the most vi-
olent and consequential civil wars of our
veces, bbc Chief International Correspon-
dent Lyse Doucet explores the impact of
the media on the Syrian conflict policies
of U.S. Presidents Barack Obama and Don-
ald Trump. She provides a nuanced analy-
sis of the so-called cnn Effect: a term that
entered the lexicon nearly three decades
ago and described the power of twenty-
four-hour American news networks to
dictate policy and which later was largely
dismissed. Doucet argues that media can
play an important role in thrusting issues
to the top of policy-makers’ agendas, pero
that context matters greatly and influence
is often ephemeral.
Attempts by belligerent parties to ma-
nipulate the media and messaging to help
achieve their war aims, por supuesto, tener
been a constant in the long history of hu-
man conflict, well preceding the cnn Ef-
fect. What is truly new and novel, cómo-
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11
147 (1) Winter 2018Karl Eikenberry & Stephen D. Krasner
alguna vez, is the emergence of social media,
“real-time” fake news, and the empow-
erment of any individual with a connect-
ed device anywhere in the world to trans-
mit images and information that can elic-
it deep emotional popular reactions and
poder, Sucesivamente, put pressure on policy-makers
to act. Doucet explores the consequences
of this still-recent phenomenon, describ-
ing how, in Syria, the “ferocious battle
over ‘fake news’ was waged across a myr-
iad of social media platforms.” Her discus-
sion of the rival combatants’ explanation
of the arresting photograph of five-year-
old Omran Daqneesh, sitting alone and
bloodied on an orange plastic chair in an
ambulance, makes clear the complexity of
the media landscape in which there are no
agreed upon “facts on the ground.” Dou-
cet concludes that, in the contemporary
world, multifaceted media is “a major in-
fluence, but not a major power.”11
Nancy Lindborg and Joseph Hewitt an-
alyze current U.S. efforts to address state
fragility, a contributing factor to intrastate
warfare, cual, as is argued elsewhere in
this volume and in the previous issue of
Dédalo, can threaten regional and inter-
national security. Why do we struggle to
implement effectively policies that transi-
tion countries away from fragility and pre-
vent civil wars? Lindborg and Hewitt ad-
vance three main reasons: Primero, A NOSOTROS. poli-
cy is largely crisis-driven, and thus the focus
remains on the most urgent developing cri-
ses, rather than on prevention. Segundo, bu-
reaucratic impediments, such as the place-
ment of government bureaucracies into
distinct security, desarrollo, and politi-
cal silos, render a system without cohesive
frameworks or joint plans of action. Tercero,
the lack of a “shared consciousness,” exac-
erbated by lack of communication and co-
ordination among different government
agencies and teams, prevents effective im-
plementation of such policies. Los autores
identify this last challenge as the most im-
portant, noting: “meaningful progress will
require a concerted effort to transform the
business model of government, making it
more proactive, adaptive, and integrated.”12
Lindborg and Hewitt, sin embargo, find
some room for optimism and make a values-
based argument for positive action. Ellos
assert that, en años recientes, the development
community has experienced a paradigm
shift that has bolstered the internation-
al community’s “collective wisdom” with
regard to reducing state fragility and miti-
gating state failure. While significant orga-
nizational and doctrinal reform is necessary
to improve the U.S. government’s ability to
address effectively the significant challeng-
es posed by failing and failed states, a selec-
tive approach that prioritizes areas in which
external interventions can achieve decisive
results is feasible.
Richard Gowan and Stephen Stedman re-
count what they refer to as the internation-
al regime for treating civil war, desarrollado
beginning in the late 1980s. In describing
the evolution of norms and practices, ellos
highlight: “1) a belief in the efficacy of me-
diation in ending intrastate conflicts; 2) en-
vestments in multinational peacekeeping
operations to secure the resulting deals;
3) an overarching focus on the humanitari-
an obligations to minimize civilian fatalities
and suffering in war zones; y 4) the ongo-
ing controversy about the limits and princi-
ples of humanitarian intervention.”13 They
assert that the international standard treat-
ment regime’s future viability depends on
several factors, including U.S. leadership,
relations between great powers, y el
willingness of the international commu-
nity to learn from the lessons of the previ-
ous twenty-five years. Gowan and Stedman
convincingly argue that, though imperfect,
the approach has been sufficient and adap-
tive in many ways, and for these reasons, es
worth preserving.
Jean-Marie Guéhenno, in the final essay
on policy prescriptions, addresses the Unit-
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Dédalo, la Revista de la Academia Estadounidense de las Artes & SciencesIntroduction
ed Nations’ role in civil wars. He writes that,
since the end of the Cold War, the un has be-
come increasingly multidimensional, agregar-
ing political, militar, desarrollo, and hu-
manitarian components to its postconflict
stabilization toolbox. Sin embargo, twenty-six
years after the end of the Cold War, it is clear
that the un must revisit its strategy for en-
gagement in civil wars. Despite increasing
interconnectedness, global government is
not a realistic response, and neither is a re-
turn to fully autonomous states. Guéhenno
endorses a less state-centric approach at the
strategic level, and urges the un to lower ex-
pectations, but deploy stronger capacities to
strengthen the effectiveness of the blue hel-
mets in conflict and postconflict settings at
the operational level. He highlights the im-
portance of setting the appropriate level of
ambition and emphasizes the relevance of
four discrete sectors: governance, seguridad,
legal frameworks, and revenue collection.
Por último, as Guéhenno reasons, the abil-
ity to adapt to an ever-changing, complex,
and multifaceted world will prove essential
for the success of the un and the mainte-
nance of global stability.
Drawing from their colleagues’ essays in
this issue and in the previous issue of Dæda-
lus, Stephen Krasner and Karl Eikenberry of-
fer insights on security challenges posed by
civil wars and on the implications for policy-
fabricantes. They assess the six threats that
might directly impact the wealthy and more
powerful polities of the world, or the nature
of the postwar liberal international order:
pandemic diseases, transnational terror-
ismo, refugee flows, regional destabilization,
great-power conflict, and criminality. Su
conclusion is that the first two–pandem-
ics and international terrorism–are poten-
tially the most consequential, although nei-
ther poses the kind of existential threat pre-
sented by war among nuclear-armed states.
Large-scale cross-border or internal move-
ments of people fleeing intrastate violence
can both undermine liberal states’ commit-
ment to humanitarian norms with signifi-
cant domestic political consequences, y
complicate efforts to find lasting peace set-
tlements. The continuing diffusion of glob-
al power may lead to a growing number of
regional conflicts due to the unwillingness
and inability of major stakeholders to facil-
itate mediation, enable peacekeeping oper-
ations, and provide a modicum of develop-
ment assistance. Al mismo tiempo, hay
an increasing risk of great-power conflict
stemming from proxy-war engagements
or even direct confrontations in civil wars.
While transnational criminality compli-
cates efforts to end civil wars and weakens
the ability of states to create a stable poli-
ty, it rarely poses a direct threat to interna-
tional order and is most easily dealt with
through domestic and multinational law
aplicación.
Krasner and Eikenberry identify four
policy considerations relevant to states and
regional and international organizations,
contemplating external interventions to
resolve a civil war. Primero, external actors
and local elites rarely share a common fu-
ture vision. The obstacles to putting a war-
torn country on the path to Denmark are
muchos, and ambitions should be tempered
respectivamente; establishing adequate or good
enough governance is a realistic and rea-
sonable goal. Segundo, the presence of irrec-
oncilables fighting for outcomes that tran-
scend or reject existing and internationally
accepted borders can frustrate efforts to
reach negotiated settlements. The termi-
nation of conflicts involving rebels of the
divine, insurgents inspired by an uncom-
promising transnational ideology or sep-
aratists who reject association with their
opponents, often requires a bloody mili-
tary victory or partition. Tercero, efforts by a
major world or regional power to resolve a
war of internal disorder can often be hope-
lessly undermined by an opposing state or
coalition of states. Small investments by
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13
147 (1) Winter 2018Karl Eikenberry & Stephen D. Krasner
spoilers can deny success to the interven-
ing power.
Cuatro, the ways and means available to
the United States and its partners, otro
major powers, and the international com-
munity vary greatly in costs and appropri-
ateness. Direct military interventions are
hugely expensive and usually require pro-
tracted campaigns; de este modo, they are difficult
to sustain domestically and lead to prob-
lematic attempts to make credible com-
compromisos. More modest approaches, en-
cluding employment of tailored military
forces such as special forces and combat
facilitadores, increased reliance on security as-
sistance programs, and provision of limit-
ed foreign aid programs, are less costly and
easier to maintain, but are often akin to the
application of life support. El estandar
international treatment regime, desarrollado
since the early 1990s, combining mediat-
ed peace agreements with un or regional
organization peacekeepers and develop-
ment assistance, has proven more success-
ful than is widely understood. Sin embargo,
the regime is ineffective when the protag-
onists do not believe they are in a hurting
stalemate, when the presence of irrecon-
cilable insurgents is significant, and when
relevant regional and great powers have
substantial conflicting interests.
Krasner and Eikenberry conclude that
civil wars may become more prominent on
the international landscape and their con-
sequences for the security of the United
States and global order are serious, but do
not rival the existential threat of nuclear-
armed and near peer-state competitors.
notas finales
1 Information on the civil wars project may be found at American Academy of Arts and Sci-
ences, “Guerras civiles, Violence, and International Responses: 2015–Present,” https://www
.amacad.org/content/Research/researchproject.aspx?d=22262.
2 Francis Fukuyama, “The Last English Civil War,Dédalo 147 (1) (Invierno 2018).
3 Tanisha M.. Fazal, “Religionist Rebels & la soberanía de lo divino,Dédalo 147 (1) (Win-
ter 2018).
4 Stathis N. Kalyvás, “Rebeldes yihadistas en la guerra civil,Dédalo 147 (1) (Invierno 2018).
5 Steven Heydemann, “Civil War, Economic Governance & State Reconstruction in the Arab
Middle East,Dédalo 147 (1) (Invierno 2018).
6 Charles T. Call and Susanna P. Campbell, “Is Prevention the Answer?Dédalo 147 (1) (Win-
ter 2018).
7 Edward N. Luttwak, “Give War a Chance,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 1999, https://www
.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1999-07-01/give-war-chance.
8 Sumit Ganguly, “Ending the Sri Lankan Civil War,Dédalo 147 (1) (Invierno 2018).
9 Clare Lockhart, “Sovereignty Strategies: Enhancing Core Governance Functions as a Post-
conflict and Conflict-Prevention Measure,Dédalo 147 (1) (Invierno 2018).
10 Thomas Risse and Eric Stollenwerk, “Limited Statehood Does Not Equal Civil War,Dédalo
147 (1) (Invierno 2018).
11 Lyse Doucet, “Syria & the cnn Effect: What Roles Does the Media Play in Policy-Making?"
Dédalo 147 (1) (Invierno 2018).
12 Nancy E. Lindborg and J. Joseph Hewitt, “In Defense of Ambition: Construyendo Pacífico & En-
clusive Societies in a World on Fire,Dédalo 147 (1) (Invierno 2018).
13 Richard Gowan & Stephen John Stedman, “The International Regime for Treating Civil War,
1988–2017,” Dædalus 147 (1) (Invierno 2018).
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