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Kenneth W. Abbott and Thomas Hale
Orchestrating Global Solutions Networks
A Guide for Organizational Entrepreneurs
From poverty to financial regulation, global health to climate change, national
governments and international organizations are finding it increasingly difficult
to address pressing transnational challenges. To help fill these governance gaps, a
host of global solution networks (GSNs) are emerging, enabling companies, cities,
civil society groups, individuos, and other actors to join traditional organizations
in addressing global problems.
We often think of GSNs as self-organizing, “bottom-up” arrangements. En
hecho, a significant number are products of orchestration, a strategy in which orga-
nizational entrepreneurs—including NGOs, business leaders, gobiernos, y
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)—consciously act to initiate, apoyo, y
shape GSNs.
Orchestration is a potentially powerful tool for entrepreneurs that seek to
effect beneficial changes in behavior but lack the formal authority to mandate such
cambiar. It is also an underused tool; del 223 GSNs we surveyed, Encontramos eso
solo 53 (fewer than a quarter) were at least in part a product of orchestration.
Además, most of these involved just six “super-orchestrators,” including the U.S.
and UK governments, the United Nations Environment Programme, the World
Bank, and WWF. The implication is that many more organizational entrepre-
neurs—including “traditional” actors like national governments and IGOs—can
use orchestration as a strategy to tackle global problems.
This memo introduces the strategy of orchestration and offers practitioners
guidance on how to employ it. To be successful, an orchestrator must (1) be seen
as legitimate by the organizations with which it aims to work; (2) occupy a central
Kenneth Abbott is the Jack E. Brown Professor of Law and Professor of Global
Estudios, School of Politics & Global Studies at Arizona State University.
Thomas Hale is an Associate Professor in Public Policy at the Blavatnik School of
Government at the University of Oxford.
The authors are grateful for the support of the Global Solution Networks project,
and for the skillful research assistance of Blavatnik School MPP candidates Luisa
Cadena, Aaron Maniam, Tatianna Mello Pereira da Silva, and Leonardo
Quattruci.
© 2014 Kenneth W. Abbott and Thomas Hale
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Kenneth W. Abbott and Thomas Hale
position in its issue area; (3) be able to offer collaborating organizations moral,
technical, financial, or other resources; y (4) nurture an organizational culture
that is conducive to innovation and collaboration. Orchestrators also must be able
to identify potential intermediaries that (1) pursue goals aligned with those of the
orchestrator and (2) possess the capabilities needed to bring about the desired
cambiar. When these conditions are met, orchestration offers numerous techniques
for promoting GSNs.
ORCHESTRATION:
A STRATEGY FOR ORGANIZATIONAL ENTREPRENEURS
The Global Solution Networks program highlights the emergence of transnation-
Alabama, multi-stakeholder, networked organizations to address global challenges, de
poverty to climate change, human rights to corruption. These innovative partici-
patory arrangements, known as global solution networks or GSNs, go beyond tra-
ditional state-based cooperation. Whether they focus on developing new knowl-
edge and ideas, proposing policies, setting standards, or advocating for change,
GSNs offer one of the most promising ways to strengthen global governance and
improve the human condition.
It is often said that networked institutions are self-organizing, and it is true
that networks are formed by participating stakeholders rather than by official
mandate. But this is only part of the story. The civil society organizations, negocio
grupos, city governments, and other stakeholders that make up GSNs face serious
information and collective action problems that can inhibit cooperation before
they can organize into a cooperative network. Por lo tanto, the actors must be per-
suaded of the network’s potential and informed about the participants and the
proceso. They also must build mutual confidence and find ways to overcome their
natural incentives to operate independently and pursue their own preferred solu-
ciones. Y, finalmente, they must construct communications and organizational links
that enable them to work together.
Organizational entrepreneurs are essential to this process. They take the lead
in providing information, encouraging cooperation, building links, providing
resources, and resolving conflicts. In most cases, sin embargo, entrepreneurs cannot
demand cooperation; they must catalyze, encourage, and support it. En breve, ellos
must “orchestrate” the actors that make up the network. As orchestrators, entre-
preneurs work with and through intermediaries—including networks and their
component actors—to achieve their governance goals more effectively.
Orchestration is the most workable and effective strategy for organizational entre-
preneurs in the polycentric, voluntary world of GSNs.
A few prominent examples illustrate the possibilities of orchestration for
GSNs.
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The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)
Two US-based nonprofit organizations, working with the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP), convened stakeholders to form GRI; they also
endorsed the organization and provided administrative support for its early activ-
ities.
GRI is now an independent, multi-stakeholder, network-based organization.
Its governing and advisory bodies include representatives of business, civil society,
investors, labor, and other sectors, as well as experts in reporting.
GRI is the source of the world’s leading social and environmental reporting
standard, which is used by over 1,800 companies worldwide.
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI):
The British Department for International Development (DFID) convened NGOs,
major oil companies, and government representatives from the North and South
to address corruption in the extractive sector.
EITI is now an independent multi-stakeholder organization.
The EITI Principles and associated criteria promote transparency in corporate
payments and national revenues for mining, oil, and other extractive projects.
Más que 40 countries now implement EITI standards.
The C40 Cities
When he was mayor of London, Ken Livingstone convened representatives from
18 megacities to address greenhouse gas emissions at the local level. The C40 net-
work has grown to include 40 major cities.
C40 works closely with the William J. Clinton Foundation’s Climate Initiative
(CCI) to manage on-the-ground emissions mitigation projects in developing and
developed countries.
C40 and CCI also provide a platform for cities to share best practices and
manage practical initiatives, such as carbon finance capacity-building.
The Global Sustainable Electricity Partnership (GSEP)
The chairmen of Electricité de France and Hydro-Québec invited their counter-
parts at other electric utilities in the G8 countries to meet in Canada to consider
collaborating on global issues.
The GSEP network is now organized as a nonprofit organization. Utilities
from major emerging markets, such as China, South Africa, Brasil, and Mexico,
have joined in recent years.
More than just an industry association, GSEP functions as a network of indus-
try leaders on sustainability. It provides technology and capacity-building for sus-
tainable energy and manages renewable energy demonstration projects in devel-
oping countries.
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Kenneth W. Abbott and Thomas Hale
Cifra 1. Orchestrators by sector
Cifra 2. Intermediaries by sector
MAPPING ORCHESTRATION
How widespread is orchestration? Who engages in it? For what purpose? To map
this phenomenon, we collected information about a large number of GSNs iden-
tified in the academic literature and by the Global Solution Networks project, a
total of 297. We were able to identify whether orchestration was at work for 223
de ellos, and found that 53 GSNs, o 23 por ciento, were at least in part the product
of orchestration (Apéndice 1 identifies the orchestrated GSNs). IGOs account for
half of all orchestrators, while national governments account for nearly a third and
NGOs just 16 por ciento. The intermediaries that make up GSNs, sin embargo, most fre-
quently come from the private sector (one-third of orchestrated GSNs include
firms), followed by national governments and NGOs (figures 1 y 2).
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Cifra 3. GSNs by issue area
Cifra 4. Orchestrated GSNs by issue area
The number of organizations engaging in orchestration is surprisingly small.
Two governments (the US and the UK), one NGO (WWF), and three IGOs
(UNEP, the World Bank, and the World Health Organization [WHO]) cuenta
for the bulk of orchestrated GSNs. At least one of these six actors was involved in
42 del 53 orchestrated initiatives we identified. Yet these are clearly not the only
organizations with the capacity to orchestrate (see section 5 abajo). Additional
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Kenneth W. Abbott and Thomas Hale
Cifra 5. The orchestration process
IGOs, ONG, gobiernos, and other organizational entrepreneurs should con-
sider orchestration as a strategy.
We find orchestration across a wide range of issue areas, but it is more preva-
lent in some spheres than in others. It is most common in the environmental
realm: orchestrated environmental GSNs constitute 44 percent of the observed
casos, although environmental networks make up only about a third of all GSNs.
Orchestrated human rights GSNs, in contrast, are uncommon, both absolutely
and as a share of the overall numbers (figures 3 y 4, prior page).
UNDERSTANDING ORCHESTRATION
We now can develop a fuller understanding of orchestration. In its scholarly defi-
nition, orchestration is an indirect mode of governance in which a lead organiza-
ción (the orchestrator) enlists intermediary actors and organizations (the interme-
diaries) to influence the behavior of other actors (the targets) in accordance with
the orchestrator’s goals (cifra 5). Some targets are largely passive, whereas others
take a more active role in governance, even participating directly in the interme-
diary organization. The orchestrator pursues this indirect strategy rather than (o
in addition to) attempting to influence the targets directly, often because it lacks
access to the targets or authority over them.
In the case of GRI, Por ejemplo, UNEP (a co-orchestrator) had interacted
directly with business firms (the targets) for several years, encouraging them to
publish corporate sustainability reports and working to develop standards to make
those reports informative and comparable to one another. After making only lim-
ited progress, UNEP decided it needed a different approach. It then joined with
the NGOs CERES and the Tellus Institute (co-orchestrators) to catalyze the for-
mation of a new multi-stakeholder network, organized as GRI (the intermediary).
GRI developed a social and environmental reporting standard, which it promotes
to businesses and other organizations (the targets) and regularly updates with
stakeholder and expert input. UNEP also supported GRI by providing administra-
tive assistance in its early years and publicly endorsing it, thereby increasing its
visibility and legitimacy.
As this example shows, orchestration relies on voluntary collaboration among
organizations that have similar goals. Aligned goals are always important between
the orchestrator and intermediaries, frequently important among intermediaries
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Orchestrating Global Solutions Networks
and among co-orchestrators, and sometimes important between targets and inter-
mediaries. All these forms of collaboration are very much in the spirit of net-
worked governance. Orchestration is valuable whenever an organization (como
UNEP in this example) seeks to bring about social change, but lacks both the
authority to require it and the capabilities essential to achieving it, such as expert-
ise or direct access to targets.
Once created or enlisted, intermediaries interact with targets in many ways.
Sometimes target actors play key roles in shaping the goals and activities of the
intermediary, as they do in EITI. It is important, sin embargo, that targets not domi-
nate the intermediary, lest it be unable to perform its independent governance
funciones.
Some intermediaries, such as the Investor Network on Climate Risk (INCR),
also orchestrated by CERES, engage in advocacy, lobbying, campaigning, or other
forms of persuasion, and provide platforms for sharing information and experi-
ences among targets.
Other intermediaries, including GRI and EITI, seek to “regulate” targets by
adopting voluntary standards, encouraging their adoption, monitoring their
implementación, and pressing for compliance.
En otros casos, intermediaries provide benefits to targets, such as expertise or
material resources, as C40 Cities and GSEP do. Another important example is the
Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), a network that includes
technical organizations and laboratories, humanitarian NGOs, the Red Cross, y
United Nations bodies and is orchestrated by the WHO. GOARN helps participat-
ing organizations share information and coordinate on-the-ground responses to
serious disease outbreaks.
Some intermediaries obtain information from and about targets to help the
orchestrator achieve its goals. Por ejemplo, the WHO supports the Global Public
Health Intelligence Network in obtaining real-time electronic information on dis-
ease outbreaks, while the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species relies on the NGO network TRAFFIC to monitor species trade.
Orchestration is beneficial whenever GSNs or other intermediaries can carry
out these activities more effectively than the orchestrator itself.
ORCHESTRATION AND GLOBAL SOLUTION NETWORKS
As these examples make clear, GSNs are frequently enlisted or established as inter-
mediaries as part of strategies of orchestration. The orchestrator is an organiza-
tional entrepreneur; it may be an NGO, an IGO, or some other organization. El
orchestrator catalyzes, mobilizes, supports, and/or enables a networked set of
actores (the GSN) as an intermediary, so that the GSN can take action on some
global problem in accordance with the orchestrator’s overall goals. The orchestra-
tor and intermediary are mutually supportive: the orchestrator can achieve its
goals more effectively by working through the GSN; the GSN, whose goals are
aligned with those of the orchestrator, can operate more legitimately and effective-
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Kenneth W. Abbott and Thomas Hale
ly with the support of the orchestrator. Together they can achieve governance out-
comes that neither could achieve alone.
Orchestrated GSNs take a variety of forms, which are tailored to the specific
circumstances they face and the activities in which they engage. En algunos casos, el
actors that make up the GSN may be loosely linked in a network structure: para
ejemplo, the Roll Back Malaria (RBM) partnership, orchestrated by the WHO,
includes more than 500 partners, including international organizations, donor
gobiernos, ONG, foundations, business groups, and researchers. Digital tech-
nologies enable many of their communications. En otros casos, the partners may
establish a formal organization, such as GRI. While we cannot yet draw firm con-
clusions as to why these variations exist, it seems likely that looser structures are
satisfactory (and less costly) for relatively modest activities, such as information-
sharing and coordination (RBM), while higher and more costly levels of organiza-
tion are necessary for more demanding joint activities, such as adopting and
implementing standards (GRI) or carrying out sophisticated projects (CCI).
In many of our examples, the orchestrator is an influential organization out-
side the GSN, or outside the group from which its members are drawn. Para examen-
por ejemplo, UNEP, an IGO, was outside the network of civil society groups and businesses
that formed GRI; the NGO CERES was outside the network of investment man-
agers that formed INCR. External orchestration may be necessary when potential
intermediary actors cannot overcome collective action problems on their own; un
external orchestrator also may have special influence or persuasive ability.
En otros casos, sin embargo, the orchestrator acts within its peer group: it is able to
convene and coordinate peer organizations, participates in the resulting GSN, y
provides support, coordination, and guidance. Por ejemplo, Mayor Livingston
orchestrated the creation of C40 Cities by convening other mayors (just as the
mayor of Kyoto convened the World Mayors’ Conference on Climate Change
after the Kyoto Protocol entered into force); the chairs of two electric utilities
orchestrated the creation of the GSEP network of utilities.
Por supuesto, not all GSNs emerge through orchestration, and not all orchestra-
tion creates or involves GSNs. Sin embargo, our research suggests that orchestration
is one of the major ways in which GSNs emerge and prosper.
Both conceptually and in practice, entonces, orchestration of GSNs is a feasible
and effective strategy, whether it comes from inside or outside the relevant net-
trabajar. Estados, government agencies, local governments, IGOs, ONG, negocio
grupos, and other organizational entrepreneurs can employ the strategy of orches-
tration to tackle global issues where traditional forms of governance are grid-
locked or ineffective.
ENABLING CONDITIONS AND OBSTACLES
What factors cause orchestrators to succeed or fail? A common set of enabling
conditions can be observed across most successful examples.
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Orchestrating Global Solutions Networks
Primero, the orchestrator must possess one or more of four specific characteris-
tics: legitimacy, focality, material or subjective resources that are of value to inter-
mediaries, and an organizational culture that supports engaging with sub- y
non-state actors. An orchestrator need not have all four of these characteristics to
be successful; Por ejemplo, some organizations are able to orchestrate with only
limited focality or modest resources. Sin embargo, orchestration is unlikely to succeed
where the orchestrator lacks legitimacy within the relevant community, y donde
it has no resources to offer intermediaries. Además, by definition the orches-
tration of GSNs is unlikely to succeed when the orchestrator is unwilling or unable
to interact with sub- and non-state actors. En general, the more of these character-
istics orchestrators have, the more likely they are to succeed, although the relative
importance of each attribute will vary across contexts.
Segundo, the orchestrator must operate within a favorable context, with inter-
mediaries that are willing and able to contribute to the solution. While orchestra-
tors and intermediaries need not have wholly equivalent goals and priorities, ellos
must have a sufficient commonality of interests to be able to collaborate.
Intermediaries must also possess capabilities that complement those of the orches-
trator, so that together they can provide effective governance. Además, alguno
targets may be more responsive to orchestrated governance than others; powerful
targets that adamantly resist the relatively soft techniques of orchestration may
defeat this and other modes of governance.
When these two conditions are present, organizations can reap substantial
benefits from orchestration. When they do not apply or when other barriers are
present, orchestration may not be a viable strategy.
Characteristics of successful orchestrators
Legitimacy
Because orchestration is a way of governing without legal authority or coercive
fuerza, it is crucial for orchestrators to be seen as legitimate by the intermediaries
and targets they wish to organize and influence. Legitimacy is especially important
when an orchestrator seeks to steer the activities of GSNs or other intermediaries.
For present purposes, we can understand legitimacy as the belief amongst inter-
mediaries and targets that an orchestrator is an appropriate organization to direct
policy on a given issue.
Legitimacy can derive from multiple sources; here we outline three of the most
important. Primero, legitimacy may stem from the moral authority of the orchestra-
colina. Multilateral IGOs often derive such legitimacy from their membership and
procedures. UN agencies, Por ejemplo, have near-universal state membership and
are widely seen as neutral, public-spirited organizations. Civil society groups may
obtain moral authority from consistent adherence to admirable principles such as
respect for human rights or the environment. Sin embargo, all actors do not necessar-
ily perceive an institution’s moral authority in the same way. Would-be orchestra-
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Kenneth W. Abbott and Thomas Hale
tors must be legitimate in the eyes of the intermediaries and targets whose behav-
ior they aim to shape.
Segundo, legitimacy may derive from the expertise of the orchestrator.
Individuals and organizations are often willing to be guided by the organizations
they believe have the best information or greatest technical proficiency on an
issue. Por ejemplo, the World Bank’s Oil, Gas, and Mining Unit was able to con-
vince oil companies to reduce gas flaring via the Global Gas Flaring Reduction
Initiative because it could provide technical expertise that helped the companies
commercialize the natural gas released by oil drilling instead of flaring it into the
atmosphere.
Tercero, legitimacy may be based on the orchestrator’s record of success. If an
organization can demonstrate that it has performed consistently well in address-
ing an issue, others with similar goals are more likely to view it as a proper author-
ity to guide their own actions. The WHO, Por ejemplo, has a proven record of suc-
cessful health interventions, which gives it credibility with the governmental,
NGO, and business partners it convened to form RBM.
Focality
Focality—an organization’s position as an acknowledged governance leader with-
in an issue area—helps determine an organization’s convening power and influ-
ence. Focal institutions can reach out to the full range of relevant actors with a rea-
sonable expectation that they will respond. Focality also allows an orchestrator to
bring together organizations that might otherwise find it difficult to work togeth-
es, such as companies and NGOs. While such groups may come together on their
own (NGOs and business have jointly created many private schemes), a focal
orchestrator can attract more diverse actors and can thus create broader, stronger
governance institutions.
Two interrelated characteristics determine an institution’s focality. Primero, focal
institutions are the hubs that actors look to and converge around in a particular
issue area or within a certain network. Some realms of global governance have a
relatively clear “anchor” institution that plays the central role in policymaking. Para
ejemplo, the World Trade Organization and ICANN currently have high focality
within the domains of international trade and Internet governance, respectivamente.
Other fields, such as environmental protection and financial regulation, are more
fragmented: multiple organizations overlap and even compete for influence.
Anchor institutions can also lose focality as other influential organizations enter
their domains; in the field of global health, Por ejemplo, the activities of the World
Bank and the Gates Foundation, among others, have undercut the focality of the
WHO.
Segundo, focal actors have strong connections with the many other organiza-
tions working in an issue area. In network analysis, “centrality” measures the rel-
ative importance of an organization based on the number of connections it has
with other organizations, its “distance” from other organizations, and the distri-
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bution of organizations around it. In practical terms, an organization’s centrality
can be measured in terms of the number of interactions or working relationships
between its staff and those of other organizations in the field, the number of peo-
ple who read its publications or attend its events, and similar tangible indicia.
En tono rimbombante, our examples show that a truly dominant position may not be
essential to successful orchestration. In appropriate circumstances, actors such as
CERES, Electricité de France, and the mayor of London have shown they possess
sufficient centrality, legitimacy, and other attributes to convene and steer signifi-
cant GSNs.
Recursos
Because orchestrators lack coercive power, they must enlist, encourage, and guide
intermediaries using softer methods. As we discuss below, providing positive
incentives is a central technique of orchestration. De este modo, orchestrators need to have
financial, technical, administrative, or subjective resources that they can offer as
support to potential intermediaries.
Money is an obvious way to motivate action, and governments and IGOs often
contract with private actors for services. Such relationships are distinct from
orchestration, sin embargo, as they follow a more traditional principal-agent model.
Many orchestrators (IGOs, ONG) lack financial resources, and most face con-
straints in transferring them to others. Como resultado, financial support is a minor fac-
tor in most cases of orchestration.
Technical support is more common. By offering information and advice that
show actors new ways to achieve their goals and enhance their capacity to do so,
orchestrators can induce actors to take on desired governance functions. El
Global Gas Flaring Initiative again provides a useful example. The World Bank’s
Oil, Gas, and Mining Unit had access to state-of-the-art knowledge on methods to
capture and commercialize natural gas byproducts. By sharing its technical
expertise with oil companies, the World Bank was able to draw them into commit-
ments to phase out gas flaring.
Orchestrators often provide administrative support during the startup phase
of a GSN or other intermediary. Por ejemplo, UNEP did this in the early years of
GRI; it also helped persuade the Dutch government to host GRI’s organizational
secretariat. Some orchestrators host the staffs of the intermediaries they support.
Finalmente, legitimate focal orchestrators frequently provide non-material
resources to collaborating actors and organizations. Particularly important is rep-
utational support. New GSNs and other intermediary organizations must rapidly
gain recognition and legitimacy in relevant communities if they are to be effective.
Endorsement and similar modes of support help launch startup organizations in
strong positions. The UN, Por ejemplo, endorsed GRI by hosting its launch event
at the General Assembly.
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Organizational culture
An equally intangible but important trait for orchestrators is an organizational
culture geared toward collaborative, indirect governance. Organizations that work
in a closed manner are unlikely to see how other organizations can help them
achieve their goals, or how they might motivate those organizations to collaborate.
A diferencia de, successful orchestrators habitually interact with actual and potential
partners outside the organization.
Bureaucratic organizations that perform well-defined functions through long-
standing procedures and processes are less likely to orchestrate—and to do so
effectively—than organizations that seek innovative strategies to confront existing
and emerging problems. It is often organizations that lack the capacity to address
problems in traditional bureaucratic ways (Por ejemplo, those without sufficient
legal authority or financial resources) that turn to innovative methods such as
orchestration and do what is necessary to make them work.
Finalmente, public organizations such as government agencies and IGOs must be
willing and able to engage with sub- and non-state actors. This often requires spe-
cific organizational policies, as well as appropriate staffing and training. En algunos
intergovernmental bodies, sin embargo, member states resist such engagement. Para
ejemplo, a number of developing countries have resisted efforts to recognize bot-
tom-up initiatives in the UN climate negotiations. Similarmente, in the International
Labor Organization (ILO), in which workers and employers (the “social partners”)
enjoy a privileged position, those groups have resisted ILO engagement with other
NGOs and private groups. Such barriers must be overcome if orchestration is to
be successful.
A conducive context: Willing and able intermediaries
If orchestration is governance through intermediaries, suitable intermediaries
must be available if orchestration is to succeed. Primero, GSNs and other intermedi-
aries must have the capabilities to address the issue at hand. Por ejemplo, multi-
stakeholder groups such as EITI are well-suited to adopting consensus standards,
although they often lack the capacity to monitor implementation; city networks
such as C40 have the administrative capacity to improve their own operations and
to influence others through demonstration projects; and on-the-ground opera-
tional GSNs such as GOARN are able to coordinate information-sharing and the
provision of benefits.
Segundo, orchestrators typically seek intermediaries whose capacities comple-
ment their own. Por ejemplo, UNEP and the UN Global Compact orchestrated
formation of the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), a network of social-
ly responsible and conventional investors that urges investment institutions to
incorporate social and environmental considerations into their investment deci-
siones. UNEP is legitimate, focal, and expert, but it lacks both effective access to
business targets and influence over them. PRI has both qualities in abundance,
and it in turn benefits from UNEP’s support and endorsement. In this and many
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When does orchestration fail?
Organizations that attempt to orchestrate without key attributes are likely to
fail. En 2009, the UK’s Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC)
became concerned about the proliferation of carbon-offsetting programs, cual
purported to allow consumers or businesses to compensate for their carbon
emissions by purchasing an equivalent amount of carbon mitigation in the form
of afforestation, energy efficiency, clean technology deployment, and the like.
While some of these programs offered real benefits, others were less scrupulous,
so DECC decided to adopt a standard to distinguish good offsets from bad. A
do so, it created an intermediary organization, the Carbon Offset Quality
Assurance Scheme (QAS), which reviewed different programs and awarded a
seal of quality to those that met its standards.
The UK government was no stranger to this strategy, having orchestrated a
number of successful climate GSNs, including the Carbon Disclosure Project
and the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership. It had an
amenable organizational culture and ample material resources. Sin embargo, en
2011, just two years after its launch, the QAS was forced to close, having failed
to shift carbon-offsetting programs toward its standards. Three missteps led to
this failure.
Primero, DECC adopted controversial standards for what constituted a “quali-
ty” offset program without having the normative legitimacy to do so. Para examen-
por ejemplo, QAS allowed only “compliance” standards, which excluded some dominant
private standards like the Voluntary Carbon Standard. DECC similarly refused
to incorporate sustainable development and other “side benefits” into its car-
bon-offset standards, as a number of existing schemes had done. El efecto fue
to exclude a large number of projects undertaken by offset providers, many of
which believed that their standards, not those of QAS, led to higher quality off-
conjuntos.
Segundo, DECC did not bring sufficient technical resources to bear. QAS’s
knowledge of the carbon markets was widely questioned by market participants.
Without sufficient expertise, QAS had little ability to influence its targets.
Tercero, despite its central governmental position, DECC lacked focality.
Industry bodies like the International Carbon Reduction and Offset Alliance
and the Carbon Markets and Investors Association argued that the government
had failed to keep up with positive developments in the sophistication and qual-
ity of self-regulation in the voluntary carbon market. These bodies had come to
be seen as the global leaders in offsetting issues, and they functioned as compet-
ing sources of expertise and legitimacy that undermined the formal focality of
DECC.
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Cifra 6. Distribution of orchestration strategies across GSNs
other cases, the orchestrator may create intermediaries where suitable ones do not
existir.
A diferencia de, in cases where the orchestrator is part of a network, all members
have similar capabilities. Por ejemplo, the mayor of Kyoto did not seek comple-
mentary capacities when he formed the World Mayors’ Council, nor did
Electricité de France do so when convening GSEP. These orchestrators focused on
building the scale and extending the reach of a GSN, rather than on adding miss-
ing capabilities.
Tercero, intermediaries’ goals must be aligned with those of the orchestrator.
Because an orchestrator cannot “control” intermediaries, it must seek out organi-
zations that will independently act in accordance with the orchestrator’s aims.
dicho eso, having perfectly harmonious goals is not essential; as long as there is a
sufficient commonality of interests between the orchestrator and intermediaries—
even if there are some differences in priorities and tactics—orchestration is worth-
mientras. It is unlikely that any multi-stakeholder organization such as GRI or EITI,
or indeed any multi-member organization such as C40 or GSEP, will have exactly
the same priorities as its orchestrator.
TECHNIQUES FOR ORCHESTRATION
Orchestrators can activate the governance abilities of sub-state, non-state, y
multi-stakeholder intermediaries in three basic ways: initiating, secundario, y
shaping. Some orchestrators will engage in all of these techniques over the course
of a project; others will apply only one or two of them. Initiating is by far the most
common strategy, followed by supporting and shaping (cifra 6).
Initiating
The first step for any orchestrator is to enlist appropriate intermediaries. Idealmente,
the orchestrator can identify existing organizations with aligned goals and the nec-
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Cifra 7. Techniques of orchestration
essary capabilities. The orchestrator then enlists those organizations to collaborate
through persuasion and the offer of support.
A menudo, sin embargo, appropriate intermediaries do not exist. In these situations,
the orchestrator may play a catalytic role in creating new ones. Lacking formal
authority and control, the orchestrator uses the “convening power” that its focality
and legitimacy provide to bring together the actors it hopes will participate,
encourage them to collaborate in an organized way, and guide their interactions.
The orchestrator frequently conceptualizes the overall project and even provides
its core design. Por ejemplo, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a unit
of the World Bank, convened major banks and guided them to adopt the Equator
Principles, which apply social and environmental safeguards parallel to those of
the IFC in private project lending; the IFC and Equator meet regularly to keep
their standards aligned. Many of the examples discussed above reflect a similar
proceso.
Secundario
Once appropriate intermediaries have been identified or created, the orchestrator
strengthens their governance impact by providing support. As discussed above, un
orchestrator may provide material support, such as financial contributions,
administrative assistance, or hosting staff; these strengthen intermediaries’ opera-
tional capacities. An orchestrator may also supply subjective support such as tech-
nical expertise, access to information, access to other influential actors, a clear
agenda, and political or legal endorsement. These enhance intermediaries’ visibil-
idad, legitimacy, and reputation, and also strengthen their capacities.
Shaping
An orchestrator may seek to shape or steer the goals, estructuras, and activities of
its intermediaries to keep them in line with its own goals and priorities. Shaping
and steering are especially significant for governmental orchestrators like UNEP
and DFID, which must ensure that publicly adopted mandates and norms are
observado. They can also be used to promote such goals as the inclusion of devel-
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oping country actors or other key stakeholders, or the adoption of more demo-
cratic or efficient internal procedures.
The attributes of the orchestrator and its relationships with intermediaries,
especially the forms and levels of support it offers, may give it a modest degree of
leverage to shape individual intermediaries and steer their activities. Several shap-
ing techniques are available. As part of catalyzing new intermediaries, orchestra-
tors can choose whom to include in an initiative and whom not to invite; para
ejemplo, only certain organizations were asked to participate in framing EITI.
Orchestrators also can provide information and guide deliberations on organiza-
tional forms, standards, and activities, as the IFC did with deliberations on the
Equator Principles.
If appropriate intermediaries exist—or once they are formed—orchestrators
can steer them by providing support. Orchestrators create positive incentives by
directing support to desired actions or making support conditional upon those
comportamiento; they provide negative incentives by implicitly or explicitly threatening to
terminate support if an intermediary strays from its commitments. Por ejemplo,
the World Bank provided technical assistance to oil companies only for gas con-
version projects.
Orchestrators can also single out certain organizations for support and
endorsement. This approach strengthens the selected organizations vis-à-vis less
representative, effective, or ambitious competitors in the same issue space. Para
ejemplo, the UN and the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development gave
such broad support to GRI that they established its reporting protocols as the de
facto global standard. Idealmente, especially when decisions are based on explicit cri-
teria, the possibility of receiving a valuable endorsement or other support will set
off a “race to the top,” with organizations competing for recognition.
Finalmente, orchestration is used to shape complexes of institutions. Por ejemplo,
while numerous cities, investment firms, and electric utilities have adopted envi-
ronmental programs, orchestrators still considered it worthwhile to structure and
coordinate their activities through C40, INCR, and GSEP, respectivamente. Broad
multi-stakeholder partnerships such as RBM have similar goals. Here the most
important tools of steering include setting agendas, sharing information, guid-
ance, and coordination, although the positive and negative incentives of support
are also relevant.
An area ripe for this kind of shaping is the world of voluntary transnational
governance initiatives. In many issue areas, multiple transnational organizations
compete with each other. Por ejemplo, multiple product-certification schemes
address sustainable forest management, worker rights, and other issues; multiple
schemes also compete to certify carbon-offset projects. Such fragmentation is
often less than optimal because it confuses consumers (who are unable to distin-
guish between competing schemes), burdens producers, and consumes excessive
organizational resources. By strategically supporting better governed and more
effective schemes, orchestrators could significantly enhance transnational gover-
maricón. Sustainable development governance has focused similarly in recent years
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on encouraging voluntary partnerships and commitments from non-state actors
y organizaciones; hundreds of these initiatives have been created. Orchestration
is sorely needed to encourage good internal governance and effective programs,
coordinate dispersed actions, and increase accountability.
IMPLICATIONS FOR NETWORK LEADERS
In a world of rising global challenges, orchestration represents a powerful strategy
for organizational entrepreneurs to unlock innovative governance solutions.
While some GSNs emerge organically from the bottom up, this memo demon-
strates that many have been brought to life in more intentional fashion by orches-
trators that catalyze their formation, shape their memberships and organizations,
support their programs, and steer their activities. While a handful of “super-
orchestrators” have been especially active, a wide range of organizations have
orchestrated successfully, including both “new” transnational actors, such as
NGOs and city officials, and “traditional” international actors, such as states and
IGOs.
To succeed, an orchestrator must possess a set of key characteristics: legiti-
macy, focality, material and intellectual resources, and an organizational culture
disposed to collaboration and experimentation. These qualities can be devel-
oped, but they can also be undermined by missteps and competition. There also
must be a sufficient number of willing and able intermediaries—that is, organiza-
tions that share a broad commonality of interests with the orchestrator and pos-
sess the essential complementary capacities to address the problem. If such inter-
mediaries do not exist, an orchestrator may be able to catalyze their formation, pero
collective action problems and the costs of active cooperation can block this
proceso.
While orchestration is not appropriate for every actor, problema, or context,
we believe it is undersupplied. Research does identify successful cases of orches-
tration in a variety of fields, from environment to financial regulation to human
rights. Sin embargo, too few organizations work in this way, even though they have
many of the requisite attributes and operate in facilitative contexts, with a growing
number of highly capable non-state actors available to serve as intermediaries. Como
a result, most GSNs have been formed bottom-up, without the catalyzing effects,
apoyo, and steering orchestrators can provide.
Organizational culture is likely a key factor in the undersupply of orchestra-
ción. Even within UNEP, one of the most active orchestrators, the Division of
Tecnología, Industria, and Economics and the entrepreneurial team at the UNEP
Finance Initiative have led most of the initiatives. Afortunadamente, organizational cul-
ture is something that policymakers and leaders can control, although not always
easily or quickly. By following the guidelines outlined here, organizations that
aspire to promote social change through entrepreneurship can determine if
orchestration makes sense for them, and can then apply strategies that have
worked elsewhere.
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