Implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements: An Analysis of EU Directives
Richard Perkins and Eric Neumayer
Artículos de investigación
Implementing Multilateral
Environmental Agreements: An Analysis
of EU Directives
•
Richard Perkins and Eric Neumayer
Introducción
The past three decades have witnessed the rapid proliferation of multilateral en-
vironmental agreements (MEAs). En efecto, judged by the number of MEAs, el
period since the Second World War has been a spectacular success for propo-
nents of multilateralism.1 Less successful, sin embargo, has been the implementa-
tion of these agreements. While many governments have been willing to join
MEAs, evidence suggests that they have not always fully honored their legal obli-
gations to put supranational commitments into practice, es decir., by incorporating
treaties into domestic law, promulgating regulations, and establishing an ade-
quate monitoring and enforcement infrastructure.2 The result has been a com-
plex geography of legal compliance,3 characterized by spatial and temporal vari-
ations in the implementation of multilateral environmental policies.
Such variations have not escaped the attention of academics who have ad-
vanced a number of theoretical models to explain why states comply or fail to
comply with their legal obligations to implement MEAs. Most relevant in the
present context are what are broadly termed the domestic adjustment, reputa-
tional, constructivist and managerial models. Within the literature, each of
these theoretical models (or approaches) is advanced as providing a distinctive
account of variations in states’ (non-)compliance with multilateral legal obliga-
ciones. En realidad, sin embargo, many scholars accept that these models are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive.4 Rather, as Underdal suggests, different models focus
1. mitchell 2003.
2. Faure and Lefevre 2005; Hønneland and Jørgensen 2003; Raustiala 2001; Sands 2003; y
Weiss and Jacobson 1998.
3. In this article we use the terms legal compliance and implementation interchangeably.
4. Beach 2005; Cardenas 2004; matar 2001; Raustiala and Slaughter 2002; and Simmons 1998.
Global Environmental Politics 7:3, Agosto 2007
© 2007 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
13
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14 •
Implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements: An Analysis of EU Directives
on different aspects of non-compliant behavior, and therefore should be seen as
potentially complimentary.5
Todavía, despite no shortage of theoretical debate,6 very little empirical work
has been undertaken to evaluate whether all four models contribute sig-
niªcantly to explaining variations in the implementation of MEAs.7 To be sure,
existing research has found evidence compatible with elements of each model.
Consistent with the domestic adjustment model, empirical studies have identi-
ªed high economic compliance costs as a major factor impeding states’ imple-
mentation of MEAs.8 Similarly, past work has found that reputational concerns
have underpinned countries’ efforts to faithfully implement multilateral envi-
ronmental commitments.9 Empirical support for the constructivist perspective,
which emphasizes the role of socialization, learning and norms in fostering im-
plementation of MEAs, has proved more elusive. Yet the inºuence of normative
factors has been documented in other contexts.10 Finally, conªrming managerial
expectations, past work has identiªed an important role for administrative ca-
pacity and/or quality in determining states’ ability to comply with MEAs.11
Because these studies are based on different policies, methodologies and
muestras, it is difªcult to draw comparable conclusions from them. Finding evi-
dence for one or the other model hardly constitutes conclusive evidence that all
four models are important determinants. En efecto, without controlling for the
inºuence of other determinants, simply focusing on the relationship between
implementation and individual explanatory models runs the risk of generating
spurious results.12
We seek to overcome these shortcomings by including several variables—
representing different theoretical approaches to explaining (non-)compliance
with legal obligations—within a single econometric model. Our multivariate re-
search design allows us to determine whether all four models are statistically ro-
bust predictors of implementation of MEAs. Por ejemplo, it is quite possible
that variables capturing predictions from managerial models might lose their
explanatory power once variables associated with domestic adjustment, reputa-
tional or constructivist approaches are taken into account. En tono rimbombante, nuestro
multivariate, statistical approach allows us to evaluate whether each explanatory
approach adds in a statistically signiªcant way to the overall explanatory power
of the model.
Our empirical focus is the implementation of European Union (EU) envi-
ronmental directives. Although originally a predominantly economic agree-
5. See Underdal 1998.
6. Downs and Jones 2002; Neumayer 2001a; and Underdal 1998.
7. Weiss and Jacobson 1998.
8. Economy 2004; and Gupta 2001.
9. Comisso et al. 1998; and Zhao 2005.
10. Beach 2005; Checkel 2001; Gulbrandsen 2003; and Solomon 2006.
11. Aguilar-Støen and Dhillon 2003; Economy 2004; Hønneland and Jørgensen 2003; jacobson
and Weiss 1998; and Vogel and Kessler 1998.
12. mitchell 2002.
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Richard Perkins and Eric Neumayer
• 15
mento, the EU has gone on to develop a large number of environmental laws.
We use quantitative techniques to evaluate the inºuence of ten hypothesized
variables—chosen to examine models of legal compliance—on the number
of legal infringement cases raised against 15 individual EU states13 for non-
implementation of environmental directives. Testing theoretical models
through the development and statistical analysis of hypotheses is a widely de-
ployed approach in the social sciences. In the present context, it involves speci-
fying independent variables believed to explain variations in state behavior (el
dependent variable), derived from different causal models.14 The explanatory
power of the independent variables can subsequently be examined using vari-
ous econometric estimation techniques.
Quantitative approaches have been used in past studies to investigate
the determinants of policy implementation within the EU, although none of
these works has speciªcally examined environmental directives.15 Outside
the EU, only a handful of studies have applied statistical techniques to under-
stand the conditions facilitating and/or impeding the domestic implementa-
tion of MEAs.16 Instead, the majority of studies—whether focused on EU envi-
ronmental directives or other regional and/or international environmental
agreements—have taken the form of qualitative case-studies, typically involving
a small number of countries, policies and/or regimes.17
Yet a large-N quantitative approach offers considerable advantages in the
present context. Econometric estimation techniques allow us to investigate large
numbers of cases, comprising multiple years, states and environmental policies.
They therefore yield insights that are potentially more generalizable than small-
N qualitative studies.18 This is of particular advantage in testing theoretical mod-
els of compliance where we are interested in clarifying whether speciªc causal
relationships hold across a range of contexts.19 Inevitably, there are trade-offs in
our approach, not least because of the limited availability of data. We cannot
measure several institutional variables identiªed in the literature as potential
correlates of MEA implementation and, furthermore, are forced to rely on sev-
eral proxies which provide an imperfect measure of underlying mechanisms.20
Inevitably, these factors restrict our analysis, meaning that our results should
only be read as indicative. Still, we believe that our approach makes a useful
contribution to current understanding. En efecto, a nuestro conocimiento, nuestro estudio
is the ªrst to use econometric techniques to explicitly investigate all four
13. El 15 members of the EU prior to the accession of 10 new states in May 2004.
14. Joven 2004.
15. Guiliani 2003; Lampinen and Uusikylä 1998; Mbaye 2001; Perkins and Neumayer 2007; y
Zürn and Joerges 2005.
16. Miles et al. (1998) undertake cross-national statistical analyses of MEAs, although their focus is
largely on effectiveness, rather than legal implementation.
17. Börzel 2003; Bursens 2002; matar 2001; and Wilson et al. 1999.
18. Haas 2000; and Sprinz 2004.
19. mitchell 2006.
20. mitchell 2002.
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16 •
Implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements: An Analysis of EU Directives
compliance theories—domestic adjustment, reputational, constructivist and
managerial—within a single estimation model.
The rest of our article is structured as follows. The nature, enforcement and
scale of member state implementation are outlined in Section 2. Sección 3
brieºy describes four widely discussed theoretical explanations for variations in
(non-)compliance with supranational legal commitments and advances a num-
ber of variables used to capture each of these approaches. Sección 4 outlines our
variables and estimation model. Results are presented in Section 5. Brieºy, nosotros
ªnd that all four models contribute statistically signiªcantly to explaining
spatio-temporal differences in legal implementation. Eso es, our estimations
suggest that the implementation of EU directives is shaped by a combination
of the rational calculations of domestic compliance costs and reputational
damage, domestically institutionalized normative obligations, and legal and
political constraints. Finalmente, conclusions and discussion are provided in
Sección 6.
Implementing EU Environmental Law
According to Mitchell, an MEA is an “intergovernmental document intended as
legally binding with a primary stated purpose of preventing or managing hu-
man impacts on natural resources.”21 MEAs vary considerably, both in terms of
their number of participants, geographical scale, target issues and policy re-
quirements. Yet common to the majority of agreements are a set of obligations,
actions and constraints, which states consent to follow.22
En el presente estudio, we focus on one particular intergovernmental agree-
mento, or rather, set of agreements. Speciªcally, we investigate spatio-temporal
variations in the implementation of a body of European law, collectively termed
EU environmental policy.23 Although not entirely comparable with truly inter-
national environmental policy, EU environmental policy makes a useful test
case for scrutinizing models of supranational legal compliance, for three rea-
hijos. Primero, the EU has a well-developed and diverse set of environmental poli-
cíes, straddling a range of issues, sectors and regulatory approaches.24 Therefore,
the EU case has the potential to provide generalizable insights for a range of en-
vironmental regulations, capturing some of the diversity of MEAs currently in
el sistema internacional. Segundo, unlike the majority of MEAs,25 data exist on
the implementation of EU policy. Although not a precise measure, these data
nevertheless provide an indication of the relative extent of legal implementa-
tion by member states, as given by the number of infringement cases launched
by the European Commission for suspected non-implementation of directives.
21. mitchell 2003, 423.
22. Sands 2003.
23. McCormick 2001; and Weale et al. 2000.
24. Axelrod and Vig 1999.
25. Sprinz 2004.
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Richard Perkins and Eric Neumayer
• 17
Tercero, the EU is a natural laboratory for comparative social science research. Como
a collection of countries with important shared characteristics, but which differ
along a number of recognizable and well-documented dimensions, the EU pro-
vides researchers with an excellent opportunity to identify the determinants of
cross-national variations in state behavior. En efecto, differences in member state
implementation of EU environmental policy have previously been used to de-
rive wider lessons about the determinants of MEA implementation.26
Our speciªc focus in the present article is the most important instrument
of European environmental policy, a saber, the directive. In common with
many “hard law” MEAs, European environmental directives do not automati-
cally become part of a state’s legal system.27 Rather, in order to become opera-
tional, they must ªrst be transposed into domestic law by competent national
and/or subnational authorities. Asimismo, directives only specify the broader
goals and objectives of environmental action, a characteristic shared with many
MEAs. The precise ways and means to achieve these obligations are left to com-
petent domestic authorities.28
While granting states considerable discretion, such ºexibility also in-
creases the opportunities for non-compliance with treaty obligations.29 In ex-
treme cases, governments can ignore directives altogether, although this is rare.30
More commonly, non-compliance arises from the late, incomplete or incorrect
transposition of directives into national law; or the failure of competent author-
ities to establish adequate implementation and enforcement mechanisms.31
Under Article 211 of the Treaty of Rome, legal responsibility for ensuring
compliance with directives falls to the European Commission.32 The commis-
sion monitors the implementation of EU law by individual member states. En
cases of suspected non-implementation, it also initiates infringement proceed-
ings. Invariably, these proceedings begin informally, with a series of bilateral ne-
gotiations between the commission and the concerned state. Typically, this is
sufªcient to settle legal disputes, with the majority of suspected breaches of EU
law resolved without formal recourse.33
Where dialogue and mediation fail to produce a satisfactory conclusion,
proceedings may move to a formal stage, comprising three sequential steps. En
the ªrst (the “formal letter” stage), the commission sends a “formal letter of no-
tice,” detailing the grounds of the suspected infringement and inviting feedback
from the concerned member state. If a satisfactory response is not forthcoming,
the commission may deliver a “reasoned opinion,” laying out its view of how
member state action remains inadequate, and establishing a deadline to rectify
26. Vogel and Kessler 1998; and Raustiala and Slaughter 2002.
27. Jacobson and Weiss 1998.
28. McCormick 2001.
29. Bursens 2002.
30. Dimitrakopoulos 2001.
31. Grant et al. 2000.
32. Hattan 2003.
33. Davies 2001.
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18 •
Implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements: An Analysis of EU Directives
the infringement (the “reasoned opinion” stage). Failure to comply with the
reasoned opinion may result in a third stage (“referral to the ECJ”) wherein the
case is referred to the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
En realidad, only a small proportion of actual legal breaches result in in-
fringement proceedings. De hecho, anecdotal evidence suggests that member states
frequently implement directives late, without evoking a formal investigation by
the commission.34 However, because there is little concrete evidence to suggest
that the detection and/or prosecution of non-compliance is systematically bi-
ased against particular member states,35 it is possible to use the number of in-
fringement cases as a relative measure of legal implementation between mem-
ber states.36 Indeed, national infringement counts have been adopted as the
dependent variable in several recent statistical studies of member state compli-
ance with European law,37 although none of these studies speciªcally investi-
gates environmental directives.
In the present article, we similarly make use of infringement statistics, spe-
ciªcally, the annual number of reasoned opinions against individual member
states for non-implementation of environmental directives. We opt for reasoned
opinions because, of the three possible stages, they best capture differences in
genuine breaches of EU law related to member states’ willingness and/or ability
to comply. De este modo, reasoned opinions largely exclude ambiguous infringements
arising from misunderstandings between the member state and the commis-
sión, but equally, do not simply count the most persistent and intransigent
cases of non-implementation that end up in the hands of the ECJ. Mesa 1 re-
ports the number of reasoned opinions related to environmental directives is-
sued to individual member states—aggregated into three-year averages to
smooth over yearly variations—for the period 1979–2000. The table shows that
all states have been the subject of proceedings. Yet it also reveals considerable
variation in the number of breaches of EU environmental law, both within and
between different member states over time.
While we use these variations in infringement proceedings in the present
article to further understanding of the conditions under which states implement
MEAs, it is important to note that the EU case is unique in several respects. Mayoría
notably, environmental directives are legally enforceable by courts at the na-
tional and European level,38 although as with other MEAs, legal disputes within
the EU are often resolved through mediation.39 Additionally, the states compris-
ing the EU are arguably less diverse—in terms of characteristics such as their ad-
ministrative capacity and cognitive setting—than is the case for truly interna-
34. Pagh 1999.
35. Börzel 2001.
36. Bursens 2002; and Sverdrup 2004.
37. Guiliani 2003; Mbaye 2001; and Perkins and Neumayer 2007.
38. Readers should note that the assumed superiority of binding vis-à-vis non-binding forms of su-
pranational environmental law remains a subject of ongoing debate; see Victor (2006) y
Skjærseth et al. (2006) for relevant insights.
39. Faure and Lefevre 2005.
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Richard Perkins and Eric Neumayer
• 19
Mesa 1
Number of Reasoned Opinions Issued (Aggregated over Three-Year Periods)
Año
Austria
Bélgica
Dinamarca
Finland
Francia
Alemania
Greece
Irlanda
Italia
Luxembourg
Países Bajos
Portugal
España
Suecia
Reino Unido
1979–
1982
1983–
1985
1986–
1988
1989–
1991
1992–
1994
1995–
1997
1998–
2000
—
4
0
—
1
0
0
1
8
5
3
—
—
—
2
—
12
0
—
8
5
14
5
8
4
3
—
—
—
3
—
15
5
—
13
22
21
17
33
15
5
0
4
—
12
—
17
2
—
7
10
37
13
34
11
11
10
25
—
6
—
8
2
—
11
25
15
21
29
12
14
17
18
—
15
3
41
0
3
19
16
15
10
21
11
5
40
33
2
10
19
40
5
11
32
22
26
36
42
16
8
46
28
8
28
Fuente: Centre for European Integration, Free University Berlin.
tional MEAs. Todavía, in many other respects, EU environmental policy and non-
European MEAs share important similarities. Both are characterized by spatio-
temporal variations in implementation;40 both require participants to make po-
tentially costly domestic adjustments; both make demands on states’ legal, después-
litical and bureaucratic apparatus; y, to a greater or lesser extent, both appeal
to states’ normative obligations to ensure compliance. Por eso, we believe that
the EU case contains important, generalizable lessons for MEAs both at the re-
gional and international level.
Deriving Theoretical Predictions
What explains variation in the implementation of MEAs? Why do certain states
fully implement environmental agreements, while others do so incompletely or
not at all? At a theoretical level, a number of models (or approaches) ha sido
advanced to answer such questions. We focus on four widely discussed ap-
proaches in the present article, a saber, domestic adjustment, reputational, estafa-
structivist and managerial. En realidad, considerable diversity exists within each of
these explanatory schools, as well as a degree of overlap between them.41 Still, él
40. Todavía, as in the EU case, it is important not to overstate the scale of implementation failure. Ver
Chayes and Chayes 1993; and Neyer 2004.
41. See Checkel 2001; Raustiala and Slaughter 2002; and Sterling-Folker 2000.
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20 •
Implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements: An Analysis of EU Directives
is possible to identify a number of distinctive assumptions underpinning each
acercarse, although we readily admit that not everyone would agree with our
deªnitions.
In the rest of this section, we detail each of these models and formulate
hypotheses designed to capture the dynamics of each model. The text is struc-
tured into four parts, corresponding to individual theoretical explanations. Nosotros
begin with domestic adjustment approaches.
Domestic Adjustment Model
The domestic adjustment model42 takes its cue from theories of rational choice.
De este modo, explanations rooted in domestic adjustment conceptualize states as ratio-
nal, calculative and self-interested actors who make implementation decisions
by weighing-up the material costs and beneªts associated with compliance. A
central prediction is that adjustment costs imposed on domestic stakeholders
are a key factor inºuencing the implementation of legal commitments.43 As the
costs of implementing policy rise, so it is suggested that actors face growing in-
centives to delay, dilute or even ignore their legal obligations.44 These dynamics
are potentially signiªcant in the present context to the extent that the costs of
implementing multilateral environmental commitments are likely to vary spa-
tially and temporally.45 We expect two such factors to inºuence the costs of im-
plementing EU environmental directives.
The ªrst is the level of ambient environmental quality, with overall com-
pliance costs likely to be higher in states with a higher pollution load, not least
because of the need for larger investments in abatement equipment.46 Of
curso, EU environmental policy is extensive, covering a range of media, re-
sources and discharges. Sin embargo, directives governing pollution emissions and/
or ambient standards are likely to be especially susceptible to domestic resis-
tance, owing to the fact that they have historically impacted politically inºu-
ential groups comprising citizens (es decir., voters) and industry.47 A second—and
closely related—factor inºuencing compliance costs is manufacturing intensity.
Manufacturers have been the targets of a large number of EU environmental
políticas, many of which have potentially signiªcant cost implications.48 While
agricultural producers have also been subject to environmental directives, semejante
policies have often been accompanied by offsetting payments. We therefore ex-
pect, all else equal, manufacturing-intensive states to encounter higher overall
compliance costs in seeking to implement environmental directives.
42. For examples of this reasoning, see Börzel 2003; Underdal 1998; and Vogel and Kessler 1998.
43. Beach 2005; Jacobson and Weiss 1998; Tallberg 2002; and Underdal 1998.
44. Börzel 2003.
45. Downie 2005.
46. Zito 2000.
47. The importance of business opposition in undermining the effective implementation of supra-
national environmental policy obligations is well documented in the literature, p.ej., Weinthal
and Parag 2003.
48. Grant et al. 2000.
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Richard Perkins and Eric Neumayer
• 21
Juntos, the above suggests that regulated parties in heavily polluted and/
or manufacturing-intensive states will be more likely to mobilize against the in-
troduction of new environmental policies. Este, Sucesivamente, increases the risk of le-
gal infringements as politicians and regulators respond to pressures from
nonstate actors to defy, delay and/or dilute environmental directives. Manufac-
turers are likely to be especially inºuential in this respect49 since they have re-
ceived comparatively few side-payments from the EU and are typically repre-
sented by strong and well-organized lobby groups.50
Por eso:
Hipótesis 1. The higher the pollution load, the lower the implementation of envi-
ronmental directives.
Hipótesis 2. Implementation will be lower where manufacturing intensity is
más alto.
Reputational Model
A second broad approach, which we label reputational, is most often associated
with theories of neoliberal institutionalism.51 In common with domestic adjust-
ment approaches, reputational ones assume rational, calculative and egoistic
comportamiento. Sin embargo, the latter widen the scope of self-interest, focusing on exter-
nal reciprocity, strategic legitimacy and reputational calculus. De este modo, states com-
ply with their legal obligations anticipating that the long-term costs from non-
compliance in terms of reputational damage outweigh any short-term gains.52
More positively, it is suggested that compliance offers states an opportunity
to prove their credentials as reliable and legitimate partners in cooperative
ventures, with potentially positive payoffs for economic, political and military
security.53
Within the EU context, we argue that such concerns are likely to be espe-
cially important for recent entrants. Keen to prove their credentials as good Eu-
ropean citizens, and therefore dependable collaborators in EU affairs, newcom-
ers will make greater efforts to faithfully implement environmental directives.54
Además, recent entrants are likely to anticipate higher losses from reneging on
their treaty commitments. De este modo, against a backdrop of limited reputational cap-
ital, newcomers will be concerned about the negative ramiªcations—for exam-
por ejemplo, in terms of reduced political inºuence within EU decision-making institu-
tions—arising from a widely publicized record of non-compliance with
European law.
49. Por supuesto, manufacturers do not always oppose new environmental policies (p.ej., see Wurzel
2002). Todavía, across the majority of environmental directives, we expect the predominant pattern
to be one of resistance.
50. Grant et al. 2000.
51. Downs and Jones 2002; and Keohane 1984.
52. Simmons 1998.
53. Chayes and Chayes 1993.
54. Guiliani 2003.
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22 •
Implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements: An Analysis of EU Directives
Long-established member states, por otro lado, are unlikely to rely so
heavily on compliance for their legitimacy, standing and reputation. Their posi-
tion as legitimate members of the EU is frequently taken for granted, owing to
their founding status and/or long history of political engagement. En efecto,
conªdent of their standing and with an accumulated stock of reputational capi-
tal, long-term members may be tempted to prioritize the protection of domestic
economic interests over the legal goals of EU integration.55
These predictions are consistent with theoretical expectations that empha-
size the importance of faithful compliance amongst new states for signaling
their reputation as reliable partners in future cooperative ventures.56 They are
also in line with the literature on Europeanization, which emphasizes the strate-
gic intent of new accession states to gain legitimacy.57 Additionally, our expecta-
tions are supported by empirical evidence. Several qualitative studies therefore
document how concerns to nurture international legitimacy and a reputation as
cooperative and responsible actors have led several developing and transition
countries to make concerted efforts to fully implement MEAs.58 More spe-
ciªcally, the idea that more recent entrants to the EU should have a better record
of implementing directives is supported by past quantitative work, which has
found a positive relationship between membership length and number of legal
infringements.59
Another claim made in the literature is that the signiªcance of reputa-
tional capital is inºuenced by power status. Underlying this argument is the
idea that more powerful states command international legitimacy and inºuence
on account of their political, economic and/or military size, lessening the strate-
gic importance of reputation for cooperative ventures. Along similar lines, es
claimed that powerful countries are more autonomous, in that they are better
able to resist international pressures to comply from supranational organiza-
ciones, nongovernmental organizations and other sovereign states.60
Applied to the EU context, these insights suggest that more powerful
members will be better positioned to defy costly and/or disruptive EU environ-
mental laws.61 Their economic, political and environmental weight means that
inºuence in EU affairs is unlikely to depend greatly on their reputation as faith-
ful implementers. They can, en otras palabras, afford to defect. Al mismo tiempo,
powerful states are less likely to face hostile responses from fellow member
estados, particularly weak ones. Fearing negative economic and/or political conse-
quences, weak states might be expected to avoid threatening their self-interests
by mobilizing shame against their larger, more powerful counterparts.
En cambio, unable to rely on economic and/or political power for inºu-
55. Olsen 2002.
56. Downs and Jones 2002.
57. Lægreid et al. 2004.
58. Comisso et al. 1998; and Zhao 2005.
59. Guiliani 2003; and Mbaye 2001.
60. Cardenas 2004.
61. Sverdrup 2004.
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Richard Perkins and Eric Neumayer
• 23
ence, weaker states are likely to depend to a far greater extent on their reputation
as cooperative, reliable and committed member states. En efecto, their ability to
wield political inºuence may crucially depend on maintaining such a reputa-
ción. An important corollary is that less powerful states face greater incentives to
establish and maintain a reputation as good European partners through the
timely and/or proper implementation of EU law.
A similar argument has been applied to explain the greater propensity of
más grande, more powerful member states to breach the Stability and Growth Pact
rules of European Monetary Union.62 Speciªcally, it is claimed that smaller
states are less able to afford the loss of reputational capital arising from non-
compliant behavior compared to their larger counterparts. Asimismo, the ability
of the United States to defy international environmental law has been attrib-
uted to its hegemonic status, which has allowed domestic elites to resist external
pressure for compliance.63 Hence, we expect more powerful states to violate EU
environmental laws more frequently, an expectation consistent with past quan-
titative studies into the implementation of all directives.64
To summarize:
Hipótesis 3. More recent entrants to the EU will have a better record of implemen-
tation of environmental directives.
Hipótesis 4. More powerful member states are likely to have a worse record of im-
plementation.
Constructivist Model
A third approach used to explain (non-)compliance with legal obligations,
constructivism, emphasizes the normative basis of compliance.65 According to
implementation are fundamentally
constructivists, choices governing legal
guided by norms, beliefs and rules, which collectively provide the foundation
for individuals’ interests.66 Constructivist accounts adopt a process-based ontol-
ogy.67 Hence, it is suggested that normative commitments are not preªgured,
but are frequently learned, internalized and embedded through a process of
transnational engagement.68 Accordingly, constructivists predict that compli-
ance happens where legalized norms are internalized, meaning that they “reso-
nate and are considered legitimate locally” and therefore become institutional-
ized into accepted practice.69
Within the recent literature, considerable importance has been attached to
62. Buti and Pench 2004.
63. Falkner 2005.
64. Mbaye 2001; and Sverdrup 2004.
65. Sterling-Folker 2000.
66. Beach 2005; Chayes and Handler Chayes 1993; and Faure and Lefevre 2005.
67. Palan 2004.
68. Kostakopoulou 2005; and Underdal 1998.
69. Cardenas 2004, 215.
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24 •
Implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements: An Analysis of EU Directives
the normative identities, preferences and beliefs of civil society.70 Thus, it is sug-
gested that civil society plays a pivotal role in embedding, mobilizing and sanc-
tioning normative obligations at the domestic level. Constructivist scholars
within the European context have similarly emphasized the importance of na-
tional publics in determining the normative “pull” of European law.71 One
claim is that positive citizen values, attitudes and beliefs towards Europe en-
hance the domestic legitimacy of EU forms of polity and governance.72 In doing
entonces, they increase political actors’ acceptance of EU legal norms “as being legiti-
mate and part of the ‘law of the land’”73, and working from a “logic of appropri-
ateness,”74 their implementation of directives as a matter of normative obliga-
tion.75 Indeed, these ideas are consistent with notions of Europeanization that
emphasize the cognitive basis of institutional change.76 Hence, we expect that
countries in which the public are more supportive of the EU, in the sense of
more approving of its existence, modalities and actions, will be the subject of
fewer infringements for non-implementation of environmental directives.
Yet it is not only civil society that is widely implicated in the domestic
incorporation of compliance norms. For constructivists working within an In-
ternational Relations tradition, national political elites internalize new and/
or strengthened normative commitments through “participation in a norm-
governed process.”77 Involvement in international polity, politics and policy, en
particular, is believed to support social communication, learning and the devel-
opment of new normative understandings. What this suggests is that countries’
involvement in international and/or regional environmental agreements might
plausibly shape compliance. With a history of international engagement, signa-
tories to multiple MEAs might be expected to have reconªgured their prefer-
ences further from unilateralism, recognizing that they hold common interests
and stand to gain from common solutions. Como resultado, they are more likely to
be accepting of the normative force and legitimacy of multilateral governance,
and therefore comply with resulting obligations.78 Indeed, it seems improbable
that signatories to multiple MEAs would be peculiarly adverse to EU directives
on the grounds that they represent an unacceptable challenge to national sover-
eignty.79 More speciªcally, domestic political actors in states that are party to
larger numbers of MEAs are more likely to have internalized norms regarding
environmental policy as a legitimate and worthwhile focus for multilateral pol-
icy intervention, fostering institutionalized compliance behavior. We therefore
70. Cardenas 2004; and O’Neill et al. 2004.
71. Checkel 2001; and Laffan 2001.
72. Mbaye 2001.
73. Beach 2005, 124.
74. March and Olsen 1979.
75. Dyson 2000; and Laffan 2001.
76. Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002.
77. Raustiala and Slaughter 2002, 546.
78. Lægreid et al. 2004.
79. Brunnée 2004.
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Richard Perkins and Eric Neumayer
• 25
anticipate that the implementation of environmental directives and states’ cu-
mulative experience of MEAs will be closely linked. Por eso:
Hipótesis 5. Implementation of environmental directives will be better the higher
the approval rate of the EU in a member state’s population.
Hipótesis 6. Signatories to a larger number of MEAs are likely to have a better re-
cord of implementation.
Managerial Model
Even where states are compelled, coerced and/or obligated to implement inter-
national law, there is no guarantee that they will be able to do so.80 A funda-
mental claim of the fourth and ªnal approach considered here, the so-called
managerial perspective, is that compliance problems may continue to arise on
account of various constraints.81 In reality, managerialist accounts capture a
broad set of dynamics, several of which are potentially compatible with domes-
tic adjustment, reputational and constructivist models. We restrict our focus
here to three constraints widely discussed in the literature on supranational le-
gal implementation and compliance. The ªrst is the domestic political structure.
A popular argument is that the number of political veto points has an important
inºuence on the implementation of multilateral agreements. Underlying this
belief is the observation that veto players may oppose the introduction of new
supranational policy requirements and, por lo tanto, their incorporation into na-
tional law.82 Since the likelihood of delays is expected to rise with the number of
veto players in government, we expect political executives in states that are more
constrained by the existence of veto players to ªnd it more difªcult to imple-
ment multilateral policy requirements. This prediction is supported by case-
study evidence,83 together with recent statistical analyses of EU directives, cual
have found that states with more veto players have been subject to more formal
infringement proceedings.84
Another constraint hypothesized to impede compliance with suprana-
tional legal commitments is a country’s domestic legal system, traditions and
culture.85 According to several scholars, implementation is likely to run into op-
position and/or delays where legal systems are more litigious, complex or toler-
ant of non-compliance.86 Conversely, where a country’s legal system settles dis-
putes quickly, is respectful of international law and/or is compliance-oriented,
implementation will proceed more smoothly.87 Within the EU, it is the Nordic
80. Chayes and Chayes 1993; Faure and Lefevre 2005; and Haas 2000.
81. Dimitrakopoulos 2001.
82. Haverland 2000; A 2002; and Scruggs 2003.
83. Falkner 2005; and Weale et al. 2000.
84. Guiliani 2003.
85. A 2002; and Simmons 2000.
86. Alter 2000.
87. c.f. Scruggs 2003, 143.
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26 •
Implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements: An Analysis of EU Directives
states whose (Scandinavian) legal systems, traditions and culture embody these
characteristics most closely.88 Indeed, their peculiar approach to conºict man-
agement and norms of faithful compliance with international law have previ-
ously been identiªed as factors underlying the comparatively low number of in-
fringement proceedings raised against them, particularly beyond the ªrst formal
stage of proceedings known as the formal letter stage.89
A third set of constraints is administrative in nature. A common sugges-
tion is that making the adjustments required to implement multilateral envi-
ronmental policy commitments depends on administrative capacity, incluido
an adequate supply of lawyers, bureaucrats and scientists.90 Along similar lines,
it is suggested that the quality of the administrative resources is also impor-
tant.91 Of particular relevance in this respect is the ability of government depart-
mentos, agencies and personnel to facilitate and/or enact the steps—e.g., legal
transportation, promulgation of regulations, creation of enforcement agen-
cies—required to implement treaty obligations. En efecto, these claims are largely
consistent with past empirical studies, which have identiªed administrative ca-
pacity and/or quality as a constraint on the correct and/or timely implementa-
tion of both international MEAs92 and EU environmental directives.93 We there-
fore expect states with weak or inefªcient bureaucratic capacity to encounter
more difªculties in implementing EU environmental law.
To summarize:
Hipótesis 7. Countries in which national governments are more constrained by
veto players are likely to have a worse record of implementing environmental direc-
tives.
Hipótesis 8. States with a Scandinavian legal system are likely to have a better re-
cord of implementation.
Hipótesis 9. Greater administrative capacity renders implementation more likely.
Hipótesis 10. Bureaucratic quality will be positively correlated with imple-
mentation.
Empirical Research Design
Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable—that is, measure of the extent to which states imple-
ment environmental directives—is the annual number of environment-related
88. Bengtsson et al. 2004; and Goldsmith and Larsen 2004.
89. Bursens 2002; Sverdrup 2004.
90. Carretero 2001; Downie 2005; Jacobson and Weiss 1998; and Raustiala and Slaughter 2002.
91. Vogel and Kessler 1998.
92. Comisso et al. 1998; Hønneland and Jørgensen 2003; and Weiss and Jacobson 1998.
93. Bursens 2002; Falkner et al. 2004; Lampinen and Uusikylä 1998; and Weale et al. 2000; ver
Perkins and Neumayer 2007 for all directives.
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Richard Perkins and Eric Neumayer
• 27
infringement proceedings taken against individual member states over the pe-
riod 1979–2000. It is important to note that infringement data do not provide a
true measure of the actual number of legal breaches committed by member
states in any one year. En cambio, infringements only record cases of non-imple-
mentation detected by the commission and currently under investigation,
whether or not the breach was committed during that year. En realidad, these com-
prise a fraction of the overall number of legal breaches by member states.94
Providing that “unrevealed” cases are randomly distributed across the
sample, sin embargo, they should not invalidate the use of infringement data as a
measure of legal implementation. Börzel investigates this assumption and ªnds
little evidence for the existence of systematic bias.95 Thus, neither societal activ-
ism nor state monitoring capacity—two factors that could plausibly bias the de-
tection and reporting of non-implementation between countries—are corre-
lated with the number of national
infringements received by individual
member states. Similarmente, she ªnds no consistent relationship between country
rankings by total infringements to any of the factors—such as state power or
level of Euro-skepticism—previously hypothesized to inºuence the commis-
sion’s willingness to pursue formal proceedings. These observations do not rule
out the possibility of systematic bias, but do suggest that several of the potential
biases posited in the literature96 may be relatively unimportant.
As explained earlier (see “Implementing EU Environmental Law”), en-
fringement proceedings take place over three sequential stages: formal letter,
reasoned opinion and referral to the ECJ. Of these three stages, we opt for the
number of infringement cases at the reasoned opinion stage. Our choice was
guided by a number of considerations. Primero, unlike formal letters, reasoned
opinions exclude a substantial share of infringement cases arising from ambigu-
ities and misunderstandings between the member state and the commission,97
neither of which are relevant in the context of our four explanatory models. En
al mismo tiempo, reasoned opinions do not exclude potentially instructive cases of
non-compliance, as is the case with ECJ referrals. Only the most intransigent
cases of non-implementation end-up being referred to the ECJ, meaning that
they fail to capture a large number of genuine breaches settled earlier on.98 In-
deed, precisely because there are very few ECJ referrals, and therefore limited
variability in the data, they are poorly suited to econometric analysis.
Independent Variables
Beginning with domestic adjustment costs, our measure of a country’s pollution
actuación (H1) is the average per capita pollution load index (PLI) for car-
94. Börzel 2001; Bursens 2002; and Davies 2001.
95. Börzel 2001.
96. See Hattan 2003; and Mastenbroek 2003.
97. Davies 2001.
98. Börzel 2001.
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28 •
Implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements: An Analysis of EU Directives
bon dioxide, nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide emissions.99 The PLI index mea-
sures the average emission load per capita relative to the EU average, expressed
in percentage terms. Values above (abajo) zero mean higher (más bajo) than aver-
age EU pollution load.100 For example, a value of 80 means that the country’s
per capita pollution load was 80 per cent above the EU average, whereas a value
of –20 means that it was 20 per cent below the EU average. Idealmente, we would
have liked to use a more comprehensive measure of pollution load, going be-
yond air pollution. Sin embargo, such data are unavailable for our period of study,
with comparable indicators for water only available from 1990 onwards. Still, él
is plausible to assume that a country’s per capita air emissions will be closely
correlated with other forms of pollution. As our measure of the manufacturing-
intensity of a country’s economy (H2), we take the manufacturing value-added
share of GDP.101
With regard to reputational variables, our measure of membership length
(H3) is the number of years the country has been a member of the European
Union or its predecessors. We take the natural log of this variable since we be-
lieve that the impact of reputation on a country’s non-compliant behavior will
decrease with the passage of time. In order to measure a country’s power status
(H4), we use population size.102 Because it is unlikely that a country’s power
status will have a linearly increasing inºuence on its ability to shirk treaty obli-
gations to implement EU environmental directives, we use the natural log of
this variable.
Moving on to our variables capturing expectations derived from
constructivist theories, we measure public approval for the EU (H5) using the
percentage of the population stating that membership of their country in the
European Union is “a good thing.” Data are taken from the Mannheim
Eurobarometer Trend File 1970–2002.103 For our measure of engagement with
MEAs (H6), we use the percentage share of multilateral environmental agree-
mentos (MEAs) a country has ratiªed.104
In order to measure managerial restrictions imposed on executive author-
ity by the domestic political structure (H7), we use an index of political con-
straints developed by Henisz.105 Building on a simple spatial model of political
interacción, the index captures the structure of government in a given country,
together with the political views represented by different levels of government.
It measures the extent to which political actors are constrained in their future
policy choices by the existence of other political actors with veto power. A
dummy variable captures the effect of the prevailing Scandinavian civil law sys-
99. As calculated by Klein 2005.
100. There is substantial variation across EU countries—see Neumayer 2001b.
101. Data from World Bank 2003.
102. Data from World Bank 2003.
103. Schmitt et al. 2005.
104. CIESIN 2004. Due to lack of data, values for 1998 onwards are as 1997.
105. Henisz 2000.
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Richard Perkins and Eric Neumayer
• 29
tem in Denmark, Finland and Sweden (H8). Rather than lumping the remain-
ing countries together, we allow for more ºexibility in the estimations by further
distinguishing between French civil law (Bélgica, Francia, Greece, Italia, Luxem-
bourg, Países Bajos, Portugal and Spain), German civil law (Austria and Ger-
muchos) and common law (Ireland and United Kingdom) countries. With a set of
exclusive and complete dummy variables, one dummy must be omitted from
the estimations to serve as the reference category. In our case, this is the Scandi-
navian civil law dummy.106
We measure administrative capacity (H9) using per capita income ex-
pressed as gross domestic product in purchasing power parity and constant US
dollars.107 Although an indirect measure, it makes sense that states with greater
wealth should command (all else equal) more administrative resources to im-
plement environmental directives, an assumption conªrmed in past empirical
studies.108 Our fourth managerial variable, bureaucratic efªciency (H10), is mea-
sured using a score provided by the International Country Risk Guide,109 cual
runs from 1 (worst) a 4 (best). These data are only available from 1984 en-
wards, meaning that we use the 1984 value for prior years. Sin embargo, porque
there is little variation in expert assessments of bureaucratic quality over time,
this should not represent a major problem.
Además, we include a control variable to account for the so-called
“newcomer” effect, whereby new entrants have historically been exempted from
infringement proceedings for a period of approximately two years.110 Granted by
the commission in recognition of the difªculties faced by new member states in
adjusting to a large number of directives, we expect the newcomer effect to have
a negative inºuence on the number of infringement cases. Our dummy variable
is set to one for the ªrst two years of EU membership. Mesa 2 provides sum-
mary descriptive variable information.
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Estimation Model
We estimate the following model:
yit (cid:2) (cid:3) (cid:4) (cid:5)1xit (cid:4) (cid:6)tTt (cid:4) uit
The subscript i represents each member state of the EU in year t; y is the
number of reasoned opinions; and x is the vector of explanatory variables. El
year-speciªc dummy variables T are of particular importance in the context of
the present study, capturing general developments common to all member
estados, but changing over time. They include annual increases in the number of
environmental directives and other regulations, both of which might plausibly
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106. Data from La Porta et al. 1999.
107. Data from World Bank 2003.
108.
109. PRS Group 2004.
110. Sverdrup 2004.
Jacobson and Weiss 1998.
30 •
Implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements: An Analysis of EU Directives
Mesa 2
Descriptive Statistical Variable Information
Variable
Number of reasoned opinions
Air pollution load
% Manufacturing
EU membership length (logged)
Population (logged)
EU approval rates
% MEAs
Index of political constraints
Common law
French civil law
German civil law
Bureaucratic efªciency
GDP per capita
Period of grace
Obs
262
262
262
262
262
262
262
262
262
262
262
262
262
262
Significar
estándar. desarrollador.
mín.
4.62
22.85
22.95
2.97
16.40
0.63
0.75
0.47
0.17
0.60
0.11
3.68
18633
0.06
5.42
58.41
6.12
0.87
1.48
0.16
0.16
0.10
0.37
0.49
0.31
0.54
5174
0.23
(cid:7) 0
(cid:7)52
(cid:7)11.47
(cid:7) 0
(cid:7)12.80
(cid:7) 0.25
(cid:7) 0.45
(cid:7) 0.23
(cid:7) 0
(cid:7) 0
(cid:7) 0
(cid:7) 2
9839
(cid:7) 0
máx.
30
236
43
3.89
18.22
0.90
1
0.72
1
1
1
4
43844
1
impact member state compliance.111 They also include changes in the commis-
sion’s willingness to pursue infringement proceedings against member states,112
developments in the European legal regime for enforcing and sanctioning non-
compliance113, and institutional developments such as treaty revisions and en-
largement. As long as these developments affect all member states approxi-
mately equally, they can be captured with year-speciªc time dummies, sin
the need to model each factor independently. The uit is a stochastic error term.
Because the dependent variable is a discrete, strictly positive count vari-
capaz, ordinary least squares (OLS) is not well-suited as an estimator as its under-
lying distributional assumption is that of a normally distributed continuous
variable. A common technique for count data is an estimator based on the as-
sumption that the underlying data is Poisson distributed. Sin embargo, it implicitly
assumes that the conditional mean and the variance functions of the dependent
variable are equal. If this assumption does not hold, then Poisson regression is
insufªciently conservative and hugely overestimates the statistical signiªcance
of variables.114 We therefore use negative binomial regression, Cual es más
ºexible than Poisson, with standard errors that are fully robust toward arbitrary
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (clustered on countries). To deal with
potential autocorrelation more directly, we also include the lagged dependent
variable; sin embargo, since it sometimes absorbs a large amount of variation of the
111. Börzel 2001; and Neyer 2004.
112. Hattan 2003.
113. Alter 2000.
114. Cameron and Trivedi 2005.
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Richard Perkins and Eric Neumayer
• 31
datos, we report two regression results: one with and one without the lagged de-
variable pendiente.
Resultados
Mesa 3 shows our estimation results. With regards to our hypotheses, nuestro
ªndings are largely consistent with expectations. De este modo, we estimate a positive,
statistically signiªcant relationship between manufacturing-intensity and num-
ber of legal infringements (es decir., reasoned opinions). Similarmente, our estimated
coefªcient for air pollution is positive and statistically signiªcant. Eso es, ac-
cording to our estimations, states with a higher pollution load appear to have a
worse record of implementing environmental directives.
With regard to variables measuring reputational motives, the estimations
are consistent with expectations. De este modo, we estimate a positive and statistically
signiªcant relationship between length of membership and the number of legal
infringements. Similarmente, we ªnd that population is positively and statistically
signiªcantly correlated with legal infringements, indicating that more powerful
member states are more likely to ignore and/or defy environmental treaty obli-
gaciones.
Moving to constructivist variables, we ªnd that public support for Euro-
pean integration is negatively and signiªcantly correlated with the number of
reasoned opinions, suggesting that governments of countries whose citizens
hold favorable opinions of the EU are more likely to implement its envi-
ronmental policies. We also ªnd that states that are signatories to a larger num-
ber of MEAs have fewer infringements. De nuevo, both results are theoretically
consistent.
Finalmente, with respect to managerial expectations, we estimate a positive
and statistically signiªcant relationship between political constraints and the
number of infringement cases. Asimismo, as expected, all the non-Scandinavian
legal systems (common law, French civil law and German civil law) have statisti-
cally signiªcantly more infringements than the countries with Scandinavian
civil law traditions, the omitted reference category. Our other two measures of
administrative constraints—namely, bureaucratic efªciency and administrative
capacity—fail to attain statistical signiªcance. It is worth noting that, mientras que la
two variables are correlated with each other, multicollinearity is not responsible
leaves the other variable statistically
for this result. Taking out one still
insigniªcant.115 The results thus fail to conªrm part of the expectations derived
from managerial theories of compliance, as well as several recent case studies.116
It may of course be that our highly generalized measures of administrative re-
sources are a poor measure of the capacity/efªcacy of a state’s institutions in-
volved in implementing environmental directives. Desafortunadamente, more sector-
speciªc measures of administrative resources—for example, the number of em-
115. Using the log of per capita income makes no difference either.
116. Bursens 2002; and Falkner et al. 2004.
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32 •
Implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements: An Analysis of EU Directives
Mesa 3
Estimation Results
Lagged dependent variable
Air pollution load
% Manufacturing
EU membership length (logged)
Population (logged)
EU approval rates
% MEAs
Index of political constraints
Common law
French civil law
German civil law
Bureaucratic efªciency
GDP per capita
Period of grace
Observaciones
Countries
0.003
(1.95)*
0.039
(3.45)***
0.234
(1.89)*
0.415
(3.73)***
(cid:7)1.751
(2.94)***
(cid:7)3.521
(3.36)***
1.185
(1.90)*
0.710
(2.45)**
1.434
(5.85)***
0.729
(2.57)**
0.167
(0.75)
0.000
(1.39)
(cid:7)0.729
(1.78)*
262
15
0.000
(0.04)
0.003
(1.96)**
0.042
(3.74)***
0.208
(1.68)*
0.416
(3.75)***
(cid:7)1.809
(3.06)***
(cid:7)3.477
(3.35)***
1.086
(1.76)*
0.717
(2.49)**
1.446
(5.87)***
0.737
(2.62)***
0.162
(0.73)
0.000
(1.54)
(cid:7)0.615
(1.56)
250
15
Nota: Estimation is by negative binomial regression with clustered standard errors. Constant and
year-speciªc time dummies included, but coefªcients not reported.
* signiªcant at .1 nivel
** signiªcant at .05 nivel
*** signiªcant at .01 nivel
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Richard Perkins and Eric Neumayer
• 33
ployees working in environmental protection agencies—are unavailable for our
sample countries and years.
Our dummy control variable for newcomer status is statistically signiªcant
with the anticipated positive sign. This is the only variable that becomes mar-
ginally insigniªcant when the lagged dependent variable is included in the esti-
mations. De lo contrario, results are robust toward inclusion of the lagged dependent
variable, which itself is statistically insigniªcant.
What can we say about the relative explanatory power of each theory? Ser-
cause the negative binomial is not a linear regression, one cannot use a measure
of ªt such as adjusted R-squared. En cambio, one needs to employ statistical infor-
mation criteria such as the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian
information criterion (BIC). Similar to adjusted R-squared, these information
criteria assess the goodness of ªt by assessing the explanatory power of non-
linear models with reference to their log-likelihood, adjusting for the fact that
models with more explanatory variables will usually ªt the data better. The crite-
ria differ in the extent to which they penalize model complexity (more variables
typically explain more variation in the data117). If only the variables of each the-
ory are entered into a regression on their own, then the managerial model has
the lowest AIC and BIC, followed by the domestic adjustment, constructivist
and reputational models.118 Since lower AIC and BIC values are preferred, este
would suggest that the managerial model
is the most preferred and the
reputational model, the least. Sin embargo, such a comparison assumes that the ex-
planatory models are mutually exclusive, which is not necessarily true either in
theory or in reality. A more pertinent question might therefore be whether each
theory adds to the overall explanatory power of the model. One can test with
the same criteria whether dropping the variables from any single model from
the regression that includes all variables leads to a more preferred model. El
test results suggest that dropping the variables of any one of the theories would
lead to a less preferred model according to both AIC and BIC.119 The conclusion
is therefore that all theories add signiªcantly to the model and should be in-
cluded together in estimation.
Discussion and Conclusions
While scholarship has gone a long way in resolving the question of why states
join MEAs, far less is known about the reasons for differences in the implemen-
117. Cameron and Trivedi 2005.
118. Managerial (AIC: 1191.2; BIC: 1300 .0); domestic adjustment (AIC: 1243.3; BIC: 1336.1);
constructivist (AIC: 1246.9: BIC: 1339.6); reputational (AIC: 1247.6; BIC: 1340.3).
119. The full model has an AIC of 1176.0 and a BIC of 1304.4. Dropping the domestic adjustment
model variables increases the AIC to 1184.6 and the BIC to 1305.9. Dropping the reputational
model variables raises the AIC to 1189.9 and the BIC to 1311.2. Excluding the managerial
model variables increases the AIC to 1211.5 and the BIC to 1318.5. Finalmente, dropping the
constructivist model variables raises the AIC to 1187.5 and the BIC to 1308.8. En todos los casos, el
nested, more parsimonious models have higher AIC and BIC than the complete model, cual
renders the complete model the preferred one.
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34 •
Implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements: An Analysis of EU Directives
tation of these agreements.120 Indeed, when it comes to understanding why
states do—or indeed, do not—comply with their treaty obligations to imple-
ment MEAs, it would be fair to say that theorization has run ahead of empirical
pruebas. Although scholars have advanced a number of theoretical models to ex-
plain differences in legal compliance, comparatively little research has been un-
dertaken to validate empirically their respective predications.121
In this article, we seek to reduce this gap between theoretical and empirical
comprensión. Para tal fin, we use econometric techniques to test statistically
the value of four distinct theoretical approaches—domestic adjustment, reputa-
tional, constructivist and managerial—in explaining differences in the imple-
mentation of EU environmental directives. Our study makes a number of im-
portant contributions to current understanding of the conditions under which
MEAs are (no) implemented. Primero, we provide systematic empirical support for
the predictive power of two dominant rationalist explanations, notably, domes-
tic adjustment and reputational models. While several authors have cast doubt
over the idea that compliance decisions are subject to rational, calculative
logic,122 our study suggests otherwise. De este modo, we ªnd that states with a higher
share of manufacturing industry and/or air pollution load—characteristics that
might plausibly increase the economic costs of implementing EU environmen-
tal policy requirements, and therefore opposition from governmental and
nongovernmental actors—have a worse record of implementing environmental
directives.
Similarmente, our statistical estimations validate predictions derived from
reputational models.123 Recent entrants to the EU club, who presumably face
strong self-help motives to establish and maintain a reputation as “good” Euro-
pean partners, are more likely to implement environmental directives. Estafa-
versely, we ªnd that more populous states have a worse record of compliance, a
ªnding consistent with theoretical predications regarding the lower reputa-
tional penalty faced by more powerful states in defecting from treaty obliga-
ciones.
Compared with the preceding two explanations, constructivist accounts
have largely been ignored in the empirical literature.124 Our ªndings, sin embargo,
suggest that constructivist explanations are potentially instructive in under-
standing cross-national variations in the implementation of MEAs. According to
constructivists, por lo tanto, we should expect political actors to internalize wider
societal norms in making implementation decisions. Presumiblemente, this explains
our ªnding that member states whose citizens hold more positive sentiments
towards EU integration have fewer infringements. According to the same per-
perspectiva, we should expect norms regarding the role of supranational gover-
120. Carretero 2001; Raustiala and Slaughter 2002; and Simmons 1998.
121. Raustiala and Slaughter 2002.
122. Weiss and Jacobson 1998 Chayes and Chayes 1993; and Hønneland and Jørgensen 2003.
123. Downs and Jones 2002.
124. See Börzel 2003; and Weiss and Jacobson 1998.
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Richard Perkins and Eric Neumayer
• 35
nance and environmental protection to inºuence compliance activity. De nuevo,
this is consistent with our ªnding that member states that have joined a larger
number of MEAs have fewer infringements.
Finalmente, our ªndings lend systematic empirical support to managerial
models of compliance, which emphasize various implementation constraints.
Consistent with previous empirical work,125 we ªnd that countries where politi-
cal actors are impeded by the presence of veto players in national government
are less likely to implement environmental policy successfully. Similarmente, nosotros
ªnd that countries with a Scandinavian legal system have fewer infringements
for non-compliance, presumably because of their compliance-oriented and less
adversarial legal culture.
Todavía, while our estimation results corroborate past ªndings highlighting the
importance of political and legal constraints,126 we ªnd no support for the oft-
made claim that administrative capacity and/or efªciency explains variations in
the implementation of MEAs. Por supuesto, it may be that our result is simply a
product of our generalized measure of administrative resources or, alternatively,
that our sample does not contain countries with very limited and/or inefªcient
bureaucratic capacity.127 Still, our results should caution against the widely held
assumption that implementation failures should be automatically blamed on
administrative shortcomings. Börzel reached a similar conclusion in her study
of alleged non-compliance in Southern Europe.128
Tomados juntos, our ªndings lead us to three key conclusions. Primero, the rea-
sons for states’ implementation—or, en efecto, non-implementation—of MEAs
are multiple and complex.129 Accepting our premise that insights from the EU
case are generalizable, it is clear that variations in implementation cannot be re-
duced to a single variable, suggesting a need for multivariate explanations. En-
deed, given that the number of quantiªable variables for which data are avail-
able limits our study, we expect the underlying determinants to be even more
complex than portrayed here. En particular, we expect governance-related factors
such as national bureaucratic traditions or policy styles to account for some of
the unexplained variations in compliance with environmental directives.130 A
challenge for future research is to investigate the role of these contextual and in-
stitutional determinants using a large-N approach.
A second important conclusion is theoretical and follows closely from the
ªrst. While different conceptual models—rational choice, reputational, estafa-
structivist and managerial—offer important insights into (non-)compliance
with treaty obligations to implement environmental policy, they need not, y
125. Guiliani 2003; and Haverland 2000.
126. Haverland 2000; Lampinen and Uusikylä 1998; and Weale et al. 2000.
127. We note that past research documenting the constraining role of administrative resources on
MEA implementation is largely based on case-study evidence from low-income developing
countries. See for example Blaikie and Simo 1998.
128. Börzel 2003.
129. Mbaye 2001; and Raustiala and Slaughter 2002.
130. matar 2001.
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36 •
Implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements: An Analysis of EU Directives
should not, be seen as mutually exclusive. By themselves, none of the models
offers a satisfactory explanation for the observed variations in the implementa-
tion of EU environmental directives. Juntos, sin embargo, they provide a more
complete account of variations in implementation. We are not the ªrst to recog-
nize this point.131 Yet our study is unique in providing statistical support for the
value of four leading models of compliance in explaining cross-national varia-
tions in the implementation of supranational treaty obligations designed to
protect the environment. Por supuesto, this does not mean that different states
comply for the same set of reasons, and that the above models will be relevant
in understanding (non-)compliance in all instances. Bastante, our study suggests
that domestic adjustment, reputational, constructivist and managerial models
offer important insights in understanding variations between countries in the
degree of compliance with supranational policy commitments.
A third conclusion centers on data. Our study examines a single example
of supranational environmental policy implementation, and moreover, uno
with very speciªc characteristics. Yet recognizing the variety of multilateral envi-
ronmental agreements and associated governance structures, it would seem im-
perative to examine compliance models in a broader range of settings. Unfortu-
nately, statistical work in this direction is restricted by a basic lack of data. Nosotros
therefore ªnish by pointing to the urgent need to assemble new implementa-
tion datasets that cover a wide range of MEAs and include a number of different
measures of compliance.
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