Water Security in a Changing World

John Briscoe

Abstrait: This essay de½nes the concept of water security and explores the implications of the eternal pur-
suit of it. I will describe how water security is perceived by wealthy and by poorer nations, the tensions that
arise from these differing views, and how these tensions are being resolved in a world in which the geography
of economics and power is changing rapidly. I outline a few iconic cases of how societies have built institu –
tions and infrastructure to deal with both floods and droughts. The essay assesses the effects of changes in
climate and land use systems, and the differing reactions to the new perception of “nonstationarity”: le
idea that these systems are less predictable than they have historically been. The essay concludes with some
reflections on the challenges of educating young people seized with passion for the issues of their generation
but who may have dif½culty taking a long view of water security. Many have been taught about the envi-
ronmental ravages wrought by water infrastructure, but few understand how these same infrastructure and
institutions underpin the water security that the United States has achieved.1 Similarly, we teach the next
generation too little about the remarkable contributions of “thinking practitioners”: experts who are also
involved in policy-making and planning–whose work underpins the food, eau, and energy security of
their societies.

JOHN BRISCOE was the Gordon
McKay Professor of the Practice of
Environmental Engineering and
Environmental Health at Harvard
University and Director of the Har –
vard Water Security Initiative. Pre –
vicieusement, he worked as an engineer in
the state water agencies of South
Africa and Mozambique and at the
World Bank for twenty years as the
Senior Water Adviser and as Direc –
tor for the World Bank in Brazil. Il
was the 2014 Stockholm Water Prize
Laureate. His books and publica-
tions include Pakistan’s Water Econo-
mon: Running Dry (with Usman Qa –
mar, 2005), India’s Water Economy:
Bracing for a Turbulent Future (2005),
and Water Resources Sector Strategy
(2004). He passed away on Novem-
ber 18, 2014.

The relationship of people to water is and has al –

ways been complex and contradictory. Ancient civ-
ilizations developed alongside rivers because of the
services abundant and easily accessible water pro-
vided (such as irrigation, potable water, and trans-
portation). Yet proximity to ½ckle rivers also meant
that these civilizations were vulnerable to floods,
droughts, and changing river courses. The challenge
for civilizations both ancient and contemporary has
been to confront this Faustian bargain and ½nd bal-
ance–between too little and too much water on the
one hand and between the ½nancial and environ-
mental costs and bene½ts of manipulating rivers,
lakes, and aquifers on the other.

This essay addresses three contemporary aspects of
this age-old quest. D'abord, it describes what is meant
by water security and outlines which aspects of wa –
ter security keep forward-looking leaders awake at
night. Deuxième, the essay describes some successful
efforts to manage the two ends of the water-security

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Water
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a Changing
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spectrum: droughts and floods. The essay
concludes with some observations on the
challenges that face policy-makers, scien –
tists, and citizens in moving forward.

There are a few major concepts implicit

in the idea of water security and its im –
plementation challenges. D'abord, water secu –
rity is rooted in water’s contribution to
the “good life.” An adequate sup ply of wa –
ter of reasonable reliability and quality–
for people, industry, agriculture, and ener-
gy–is essential for the well-being of soci-
eties. Second is the “Goldilocks” concept:
c'est, societies need just the right amount
of water–not too little (few periods of
scarcity) or too much (few pe riods of in –
undation). Third is the concept that build –
ing the institutions and infrastructure to
provide water security in volves ½nancial
and environmental trade offs. Fourth and
½nally is the idea that con text matters:
peo ple and governments choose to situ-
ate themselves at different points on the
“risk/cost curve” depending on levels of
development and social values.

According to the vast outpourings of the
catastrophe-prediction industry, there is
no end to the list of risks that threaten civi –
lization and society today. Cependant, issues
of water security have moved up the prior –
ity lists for even the most sober prognos-
ticators; three examples are worth men-
tioning.

The ½rst is the national security estab-
lishment. One decade ago, the cogitations
of national security bodies were largely
con cerned with two issues: nuclear pro-
liferation and terrorism. Aujourd'hui, there is
broad agreement that a range of environ-
mental issues constitutes a third strand and
that water looms large in these concerns.
Par exemple, dans 2012, the U.S. National In –
telligence Council produced a major report
on the global trends that would frame “the
alternative worlds of 2030.”2 One of these
four dominant global trends was the water-

energy-food nexus, and the Council sug-
gested that “water may become a more sig –
ni½cant source of contention than energy
or minerals . . . at both the intrastate and
interstate levels.”

The business community also expresses
growing concern about water-related is –
sues. Encore, a decade ago, water would
have been barely mentioned in the halls of
Davos, the home of the World Economic
Forum (wef). The most recent wef sur-
vey of global business leaders, cependant,
shows that of the hundreds of identi½ed
risks to the global economy, not one has a
higher combination of “likelihood” and
“im pact” than water.3

The third group expressing concern is
citi zens, as revealed in Globescan’s annual
surveys of citizens in Brazil, Canada, Chi –
na, France, Allemagne, India, Indonésie,
Mex ico, Nigeria, Turkey, the United King-
dom, and the United States. For every year
depuis 2008, “shortages of freshwater” have
been the highest-ranked environmental
con cern, above water pollution, depletion
of natural resources, air pollution, loss of
biodiversity, climate change, and automo-
bile emissions (in descending order ac –
cord ing to the most recent poll).4
Perceptions about challenges are strik-

ingly different among different groups of
experts. As a former World Bank employee
and as a university professor, I have been
exposed to the perspective of elites in the
most prosperous countries in the world (un
group that economist Thomas Sowell has
tellingly called “the anointed”).5 As part of
the many talks I am privileged to give on
eau, I often give the (mostly highly edu –
cated and rich) audience members “click-
ers” to gauge their views on water-related
problems and their solutions. These polls
produce some telling results. People in rich
countries believe that about 70 percent of
people in the world do not have access to
an adequate supply of drinking water, mais

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in fact the proportion (as shown in the
latest global survey conducted by unicef
and the World Health Organization) is on –
ly 11 percent.6 In terms of solutions, le
vast majority of aid money going to water-
related causes (from philanthropies in –
cluding the Gates Foundation and thou-
sands of smaller charities, and from aid
agen cies such as the World Bank and
usaid) is used to “provide water to the un –
served.”7

While leaders in the developed world
tend to view water as a matter of charity
and an issue to be addressed only when it
reaches the status of an emergency, leaders
in the developing world have a sharply dif –
fering perspective. It is these leaders of the
major “emerging markets” (such as China,
Indonésie, India, Mexico, and Brazil) OMS
have been responsible for the remarkable
decline in poverty over the past twenty
années (from global levels of over 50 pour cent
to under 20 pour cent). As part of this broad-
based progress, water services to the poor
have improved dramatically. According
to unicef/who ½gures, every day for the
past twenty years over 280,000 people
on average moved from “unserved” to
“served.”8 While the leaders of the rapidly
growing emerging-market countries are
re sponsible for most of the global success
in improved access to water, they see “wa –
ter supply for the poor” as one element of a
broad-based economic advancement pro –
g ram. They do not treat the social problem
(as do “the anointed” in rich countries);
they search for underlying economic so –
lutions.

What challenges do developing coun-
tries face in providing reasonable levels of
water security to their populations? D'abord
is the simple fact of the hydrological start-
ing point. In the United States, for exam-
ple, development started in the Northeast,
where hydrology was favorable: not too
much or too little rain; and abundant water
for supply to factories and people, to di –

lute wastes, to generate cheap hydropow-
er, and to transport goods to market cheap-
ly via shipment on boats. Under such cir-
cumstances it was easy and cheap to build
a water platform for economic and social
growth. The ½nancial capital accrued
through this “easy hydrology” was subse-
quently used to ½nance the major works
(such as the Hoover Dam) necessary to
serve the parts of the country where hy –
drology was much less favorable. Similar
processes drove the developmental history
of most wealthy nations; a few ½gures give
the general picture. Wealthy countries have
developed over 80 percent of their eco nom –
ically viable hydroelectric potential; in arid
domaines (such as the Colorado Riv er ba sin in
the United States or Murray-Darling Basin
in Australia) they have built reservoirs that
can store about a thousand days of aver-
age flow to generate electricity and act as
buffers against floods and droughts.9

The situation in developing countries is
quite different. As a group, they often face
far more challenging hydrological condi-
tions than do now-wealthy countries:
great er intra- and interannual variability
and either too much or too little water.10
And developing countries have invested far
less in the water platform for growth. Com –
pared to the 80-percent level of rich coun-
tries, Asia and Latin America have devel-
oped 30 percent of their viable hydropower
respectivement, and Africa has developed 10
pour cent. And compared to the thousand
days’ worth of water stored on the Colo –
rado or Murray-Darling rivers, the reserves
of water available in developing countries
are much more paltry; Par exemple, là
is only a thirty-day supply of water stored
on the Indus River in arid Pakistan.11

Fifty years ago, the primary mission of
multilateral and bilateral aid agencies was
to help poor countries build the water (et
other) infrastructure deemed essential for
growth. The rise of the environmental
move ment in rich countries, cependant, était

John
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Water
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accompanied by a rise in activism against
the sorts of investments that had made
rich countries rich. This was due in part to
legitimate and important concerns with
social and environmental impacts of large
infrastructure projects. But it was also
fueled by an ahistorical paradigm that
scorned the same types of investments that
had been necessary to bring about the priv –
ilege those critics enjoyed. Activist ngos
in the Northern hemisphere focused heavi –
ly and productively on the otherwise large –
ly ignored business of aid. By the late 1990s,
cependant, most of the agencies that had
once funded water and other infrastruc-
ture in developing countries (including the
World Bank and the bilateral agencies of
the Unites States, Canada, and Europe) had
withdrawn from this business.

This change created much tension on the
boards of institutions like the World Bank,
where emerging and poor countries pro –
tested about the hypocrisy of those who
came to have water, food, and energy se –
curity in part because of major infrastruc –
ture and yet deny similar opportunities to
countries in need. But as global econom-
ic geography has changed, so too have the
politics of multilateral agencies and the
suite of countries offering ½nancial assis-
tance. Dans 2003, the politics of withdrawal
at the World Bank came to a head: a con-
certed effort led by China, Brazil, and India
led to a turnaround in the form of a new
World Bank water policy recognizing the
strongly expressed needs of developing
coun tries and committing itself to reen-
gagement with “high-risk/high-reward”
in frastructure.12 Simultaneously, middle-
income countries not only continued to in –
vest heavily in their own major infrastruc –
ture, but became major funders of such in –
frastructure in the poorer parts of the de –
veloping world. The World Bank–even
with the new policy and with increasing
lending for infrastructure–½nances just a
handful of large dams around the world,

whereas China ½nances hundreds outside
its borders.

There is, alors, a yawning gap between
the understanding of the anointed in
wealthy countries (who prescribe what
others should do) and leaders in develop-
ing countries (who have to live with the
con sequences). While the former worry
about the (rapidly declining) problem of
the unserved poor and shy away from high-
risk infrastructure projects, the latter focus
on longer-term solutions: namely, build-
ing infrastructure and institutions for deal-
ing with their (generally) dif½cult hydrol-
ogy and the still-unconquered problem of
national water security. Wen Jiabao, pour-
mer Premier of China, worried that “water
shortages . . . threaten the very survival of
the Chinese nation,” and Montek Ahlu –
walia, Minister of Planning for India, sug –
gested that “India can envisage a solution
to the energy problem, but we do not know
how to solve the problem of provi ding the
water we need for people, industry, and ag –
riculture.”

All successful efforts to enhance water

security involve the simultaneous and in –
tegrated development of infrastructure
and institutions, as the following two ex –
amples illustrate. The iconic contempo-
rary case for addressing water scarcity is
that of the Murray-Darling Basin in South –
east Australia. The core infrastructural
foun dation was built throughout the twen –
dixième siècle, the end result being a system
that used almost all of the available hydro –
power potential, and whose reservoirs
could hold several years of water in stor-
âge. The core institutional foundation was
laid in the 1980s as part of a more general
push to restructure the Australian econo-
my around the principle of competition. UN
core element of this restructuring was the
separation of water rights from land rights,
the conversion of existing water licenses
into tradable rights, and the creation of a

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strong set of incentives to facilitate trade
both within and between states. This sys-
tem was put through a severe stress test by
an unprecedented eight-year drought at
the beginning of the new millennium, et
it performed extraordinarily well. The core
driver of this success was that water had
quite different value in different end uses
(low for rice, high for grapes and fruits, et
high for cities and industry). As the supply
of water fell, prices rose. For a rice farmer,
it was now far more pro½table to lease his
water for a year to a high-water-value proj –
ect than it was to grow rice in a drought.
There were therefore massive, voluntary
transfers between low-value and high-
value agriculture and from the country to
the city. Remarquablement, the bottom line was
that there was very little impact of gross
value added in agriculture (let alone the
economy as a whole) from a 70-percent re –
duction in water availability.13 Several
other promising examples of the use of
mar kets in the Western United States are
discussed in Terry Anderson’s essay in this
issue.14

An iconic case of addressing flooding
comes from the lower Mississippi, où
water collected over almost half of the land
area of the United States is funneled down
into the Gulf of Mexico through Missis-
sippi and Louisiana. Following the found –
ing of the Mississippi River Commission
dans 1879, there was a vigorous debate about
how to avoid catastrophic flooding in the
delta. Nature spoke in 1927 in the form of
a huge flood. Once it became apparent
that water could not be contained within
the extensive levee system, dikes were
breached to protect New Orleans (et
other areas where privileged and influen-
tial people lived). The result was anarchy
and widespread destruction, wreaked par –
ticularly on disenfranchised black commu –
nities.15 This taught the United States
some hard-learned lessons. Most funda –
men tal, it was evident that in “the big

flood” the Mississippi could not be con-
tained within the levees, and so the phi-
losophy of “making room for the river”
was born. In a remarkable process of com –
munity consultation, fiançailles, et
con sensual decision-making, two special
types of land areas were identi½ed. Flood-
ways function as alternative exits to the
Gulf of Mexico when water volumes ex –
ceed the carrying capacity of the main stem
of the river; and backwaters along the river
can store water when the river is at a high
stage, both replenishing aquifers and wet –
lands and catching and holding floodwa-
ters, which are then released slowly after
the flood crest has passed. Central to this
process was 1) identifying areas that could
occasionally be submerged without lasting
economic or social impact (such as limiting
development of infrastructure and hous-
ing in these areas); et 2) awarding ex-ante
com pensation to the owners of this land.
The resulting Mississippi Rivers and Trib-
utaries Project, ½nanced by the federal gov –
ern ment and managed by the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, was built in an inte-
grated fashion and largely completed over
the sub sequent eighty years. The great
stress test came in 2011, when the valley
experienced a flood of even greater mag-
nitude than that of 1927. The outcome was
an ex traordinary triumph (all but ignored
by the disaster-hungry media). All excess
water went only to designated floodways
and backwaters; the area flooded was 60
percent less than that of the flood of 1927;
no major infrastructure was affected; et
the implementation process was–with
some exceptions–planned and consen-
sual, thanks to often-brilliant consensus-
build ing by the leadership of the Corps of
Engi neers.16

The broad lessons from these cases of
drought and flood are similar: the need to
walk on two legs (drawing on the support
of both infrastructure and institutions);
the importance of having a way to reveal

John
Briscoe

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144 (3) Été 2015

Water
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the opportunity cost of a shortage or ex –
cess of water; the reliance on voluntary
processes for reallocation of water; et le
emphasis on avoiding government con –
½scation of land.

Enfin, to those who live in the Murray-
Darling or Mississippi basins, the above
de scriptions will appear to be Panglossian
or naive despite these systems’ success
over all. In his study on the history of water
and the state in Germany over four cen-
turies, historian David Blackbourn shows
how “½nal solutions” to the water problem
are illusory: solutions are merely “provi-
sional.”17 So it is, aussi, in the Murray-Dar-
ling and Mississippi, where major chal-
lenges continue to arise, either because
they are actually new or because changed
social values have given them new visibil-
ville. Australia is now negotiating a complex
and much-contested process for determin –
ing an optimal balance between human
bene½t and environmental impact; et le
Mississippi basin faces great challenges in
maintaining an aging infrastructure while
simultaneously addressing the challenges
of coastal degradation (to which the dams
and dikes contribute) and of the transport
of phosphorus and other agrochemicals
from the agricultural heartland into a large
dead zone in the Gulf of Mexico.

The primary challenge of water security

is and always has been dealing with the
tails of the hydrograph (droughts and
floods). What of the bold claim of a group
of hydrologists that climate change means
“the end of stationarity,” or the end of our
ability to accurately anticipate water-relat-
ed events?18

D'abord, it is true that hydrologists have
long used often quite short “historic rec –
ords” as substitutes for longer-term rec –
ords on which they would prefer to base
their planning. But hydrologists have also
been clear that short records are still the
best basis for long-term projections, concernant –

gardless of their limitations. From the few
existing long-term records and from re –
constructed records (often based on mea –
surements of tree rings), cependant, it has
long been clear that climate has never
been stationary, but subject to short- et
long-term variability. The Colorado River
is one interesting study. In the early twen –
dixième siècle, the Colorado Compact based
its allocations on one half-century of rec –
ords of river flows, which suggested that
there were about seventeen million acre
feet of water to allocate. Flows in recent
dec ades have been only about thirteen mil-
lion acre feet. Paleontological reconstruc-
tion of seven hundred years of records
shows that there have been many shifts in
runoff patterns, et ça, in fact, the un –
usual period is not the last hundred years,
but the unusually wet half-century before
the signing of the Compact.

Deuxième, it is important to recognize that
climate models are just that–models–and
not reality, despite the seemingly precise
maps and graphs they produce. My own
en gagement with detailed climate models
of the Amazon shows that even the most
credible models seldom produce credible
data on critical variables (including basic
realities such as the timing and distribution
of rainfall).

Troisième, many changes beyond the climate
are affecting the stationarity of water. Pour
example, work I was involved in in the Pa –
raná River in Brazil showed that land-use
changes in recent decades not only have a
much bigger effect than climate change,
but also induce changes in the opposite di –
rection from precipitation changes.19

Fourth, a single-minded focus on cli-
mate becomes counterproductive when it
crowds out attention to both known vari-
ability and other sources of nonstationar-
ville. Par exemple, I have in recent years
worked extensively in Pakistan, where dev –
astating floods have always alternated with
devastating droughts.20 There is much

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John
Briscoe

un certainty about the effects of climate
change on the Himalayas, with recent data
(from the Gravity Recovery and Climate
Experiment satellites, for instance21)
show ing a far more nuanced view than the
ipcc’s claim in 2007 that “the glaciers will
be gone by 2035”–an error that the orga –
nization corrected soon after it was made,
but which nonetheless continues to circu –
late in the media and in public discourse in
South Asia.22 Pakistan is swamped with
foreign experts pushing their own climate
models, but the obvious need is to walk
be fore trying to run: Pakistan must build
the infrastructure and institutions neces-
sary to deal with variability, starting with
known variability and eventually expand –
ing to plan for new sources of natural and
human-induced changes. If Pakistan and
its development partners were to follow
this course while keeping a watching brief
on climate science, it might more quickly
remedy its tragic water insecurity.

The water glass, alors, is both half-full and

half-empty. As one privileged to be educat –
ing the next generation, I see reasons for
both pessimism and hope. On the down-
side, young people who have grown up in
a society with established water security
(and the associated health, energy, and food
security) are inundated with the politically
correct but, in my opinion, mostly erro-
neous view that all water management in

the United States has been a disaster. Quand
they are exposed both to the reasoning be –
hind water management decisions (for ex –
ample, on the Mississippi) and to the chal –
lenges the future poses to water manage-
ment, their response is rarely to reject that
view but rather to ask, “How come no one
shared that perspective with us before?”23
En effet, when I am able to engage students
with thinking practitioners–experts in –
volved in water-management policy–the
students are surprised that hands-on man-
agers are often doing quite well in much
more complex environments than those
addressed by academics and advocacy
groupes! Pleased as I am with this, I still
encounter large numbers of students who
want to work on water and climate change
but show little interest in the maintenance
of the crumbling infrastructure that under –
pins their own water security.

In the meantime, as though on another
planet, the emerging economies of the
world are working on creating the knowl-
bord, institutions, and infrastructure to en –
hance their still-precarious water security.
Since they live in societies in which the
con sequences of insecurity of water, ener-
gy, and food reflect recent national expe-
rience, theirs is a more pragmatic and clear-
eyed view. Peut-être, in this changing world,
it will be they who are able to de½ne a new,
more balanced engagement with the great
challenge of building a water-secure world.

endnotes
1 John Briscoe, “The Practice and Teaching of American Water Management in a Changing
Monde,” Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management 136 (4) (2010): 409–411.

2 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (Washington D.C.:
National Intelligence Council, 2012), http://www.dni.gov/½les/documents/GlobalTrends
_2030.pdf.

3 World Economic Forum, Global Risks, 8th ed. (Davos, Suisse: World Economic Forum,

2013), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalRisks_Report_2013.pdf.

4 Globescan, “Environmental Concerns at Record Low,” Globescan Radar Survey 2013, http://
www.globescan.com/images/images/pressreleases/2013-Enviro-Radar/globescan_press_
release_enviroconcern_03-25-2013.pdf.

144 (3) Été 2015

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Water
Security in
a Changing
Monde

5 Thomas Sowell, The Vision of the Anointed: Self-Congratulation as a Basis for Social Policy (Nouveau

York: Basic Books, 1996).

6 unicef/who, Progress on Drinking Water and Sanitation, 2012 Update (New York: unicef,

2012), http://www.unicef.org/media/½les/JMPreport2012.pdf.

7 Ibid..
8 Ibid..
9 World Bank, Water Resources Sector Strategy: Strategic Directions for World Bank Engagement
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2003), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/03/10/000090341_20040310154948/Rendered/PDF/281
140PAPER0Water0Resources.pdf.

10 Casey Brown and Upmanu Lall, “Water and Economic Development: The Role of Variability

and a Framework for Resilience,” Natural Resources Forum 30 (2006): 306–317.

11 World Bank, Water Resources Sector Strategy.
12 Sebastian Mallaby, The World’s Banker (New York: Manchot, 2006).
13 John Langford and John Briscoe, The Australian Water Project: Crisis and Reform (Melbourne:
Committee for the Economic Development of Australia, 2011), http://www.ceda.com.au/
media/154748/waterprojectdigital.pdf.

14 See Terry L. Anderson, “Dynamic Markets for Dynamic Environments: The Case for Water

Marketing” in this volume.

15 John Barry, Rising Tide: The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 and How it Changed America (Nouveau

York: Simon and Schuster, 1998).

16 Charles Camillo, Divine Providence: Le 2011 Flood in the Mississippi River and Tributaries Proj-

ect (Berkshire, United Kingdom: Books Express Publishing, 2012).

17 David Blackbourn, The Conquest of Nature: Water, Landscape, and the Making of Modern Germany

(New York: Norton, 2007).

18 P.. C. D. Milly, Julio Betancourt, Malin Falkenmark, Robert M. Hirsch, Zbigniew W. Kund –
zewicz, Dennis P. Lettenmaier, and Ronald J. Stouffer, “Stationarity is Dead: Whither Water
Management?” Science 319 (1) (2008): 573–574.

19 Angela Livino, John Briscoe, Eunjee Lee, Paul Moorcroft, and Jerson Kelman, “Climate Change
as a Challenge to Decision-Makers in Brazilian Hydropower Systems Management,” Interna-
tional Journal of Hydropower and Dams 4 (2014).

20John Briscoe and Usman Qamar, Pakistan’s Water Economy: Running Dry (Karachi: Oxford Uni –

versity Press, 2005).

21 Jonathan Bamber, “Climate Change: Shrinking Glaciers under Scrutiny,” Nature 23 (2012):

482–483.

22 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and
Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change, éd. Martin Parry, Osvaldo Canziani, Jean Palutikov, Paul van
der Linden, and Clair Hanson (Cambridge: la presse de l'Universite de Cambridge, 2007), http://www
.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter10.pdf.

23 John Briscoe, éd., “The Harvard Water Federalism Project: Pedagogy and Substance,” Water

Policy 16 (Supplement 1) (2014): 1-dix.

Dédale, le Journal de l'Académie américaine des arts & les sciences

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