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Reforming Reform:
Revising the Anticorruption Playbook

Michael Johnston

Abstrait: Three decades of anticorruption activism have yielded only indifferent results. It is time to step
back and rethink some basic issues. Among them are what the opposite of corruption might look like; notre
excessive faith in transparency; the distinction between “grand” and “petty” corruption; our reliance on the
concept of “political will”; and what the best ways are of measuring corruption and mobilizing civil society.
“Best practices” are elusive and do not always transfer well from one setting to the next. Cependant, “better
practices” are possible if we understand how corruption arises as a political and social issue, and how well-
governed societies got that way. We often turn history upside down, overemphasizing reform from above
while neglecting contention from below; and get history backward by mistaking outcomes of contention for
the causes of better government. “Deep democratization”–enabling citizens to demand justice and better
government–tailored to contrasting situations and syndromes may yield better long-term results.

Two generations of activism and research in sup-

port of corruption control have produced indifferent
results at best. What kind of thinking–and rethink-
ing–might lead to better outcomes? This essay of-
fers critical commentary about the contemporary an-
ticorruption movement, made from the perspective
of a longtime friend and active participant. (Quand
I write that “we” have struggled with this or failed
to realize that, I include myself.) The arguments in
this essay fall into two categories: common reform
themes that need rethinking or, in some cases, concernant-
placement; and a discussion of what history might
tell us about the drivers of both corruption and sus-
tained opposition to it. My ideas in no way supplant
reforms underway today, but rather are intended to
build stronger foundations for them. The result is
not a list of “best practices,” but ideas about better
pratiques, tailored to address a range of challenges.
It would be wrong to suggest that the reform
movement has failed. Corruption, for many years

michael johnston is the
Charles A. Dana Professor of Po-
litical Science, Emeritus, at Colgate
University and Distinguished Pro-
fessor at the International Anti-
Corruption Academy in Laxen-
burg, Austria. He is the editor of
Transitions to Good Governance (avec
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, 2017) et
author of Corruption, Contention, et
Reform: The Power of Deep Democrati-
zation (2014) and Syndromes of Cor-
ruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy
(2005).

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a nonissue in academe, entreprise, et en-
ternational policy, now has a prominent
place on the global agenda. Annual gov-
ernance rankings still make headlines. Aid
programs and investment decisions treat
corruption as a prominent concern, alors que
official exploitation and misconduct are
mobilizing grievances in political upheav-
als and “color revolutions” in many societ-
ies. We may take such heightened aware-
ness of corruption for granted nowadays,
but it was not always so. This itself is a sig-
nificant accomplishment.

Positive results, cependant, are another
matter. Success has been possible within
specific agencies and locales, and the Hong
Kong and Singapore reform sagas are fa-
miliar history. But clear-cut, sustained re-
ductions in corruption in diverse societies
on the state level have been few. Country-
level indices point to a few cases–such as
Japan and Belgium–where corruption is
perceived to be in decline, but the measures
used are problematic on the grounds of va-
lidity (most measure perceptions of cor-
ruption, not corruption itself ) and reliabil-
ville (country scores usually have large stan-
dard errors, making many comparisons
suspect). More persuasive process-trac-
ing evidence from the European Union’s
massive anticorrp research project has
identified seven countries–Chile, Costa
Rica, Estonia, Georgia, South Korea, Tai-
wan, and Uruguay–as having made prog-
ress on corruption; Rwanda and Botswa-
na appear to be close behind.1 Those cases
offer valuable lessons, but as comparative-
ly small (save for Korea) and ethnically ho-
mogeneous societies, they are unrepresen-
tative of the full range of countries.

How can we do better?

Commitment is not the problem. Around

the world people and groups are working
hard, often at personal risk, to fight abuses
of power and wealth. Strategies and tactics
have evolved: less emphasis is now placed

on privatization, scaling back the state, et
relying on markets in place of public insti-
tutions; and there is greater appreciation
of the global nature of many corruption
problems. International cooperation has
grown: the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (oecd) Anti-
Bribery Treaty, Group of States Against
Corruption (greco), and United Nations
Convention Against Corruption (uncac),
along with the venerable U.S. Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act and the UK Bribery Act
de 2010, bring cross-border support to the
struggle.2 New metrics of corruption, and of
the effects of reforms, continue to appear.3
Toujours, the same ideas and strategies tend to
dominate even in quite different settings.
Top-down national efforts emphasizing
crime-prevention concepts and transparen-
cy, often built around anticorruption agen-
cies (acas); improved administrative pro-
cesses; independent judiciaries and news
media; and poorly defined support from
société civile, remain core themes.4 These
are scarcely bad ideas in themselves, mais
making them work in an applied context
is another matter. We acknowledge that
historical and cultural variations among
societies matter, yet devise reform strate-
gies that are remarkably similar from one
case to the next. We still have no clear sense
of which ideas to apply in what sequence
and which to avoid entirely when dealing
with contrasting situations or problems.
Equally frustrating, it has proven difficult
to win lasting political and public support
and credibility for reform initiatives, même
though large majorities would benefit from
effective corruption control.

A number of reform assumptions and dis-

tinctions go largely unquestioned; quelques
seem to be repeated mostly because we hear
others repeating them. Too little thought,
Par exemple, has been devoted to asking
what the opposite of corruption might be
and how we might build positive support

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147 (3) Summer 2018Michael Johnston

for that. “No corruption” is neither pos-
sible nor a credible goal for engaging sus-
tained citizen interests; and “less corrup-
tion,” or less disruptive varieties of it, alors que
more realistic, will inspire few. Technocrat-
ic visions of “good governance” often re-
duce government to a referee in social and
economic arenas, thereby undervaluing jus-
tice and sidestepping the political conten-
tion often required to pursue it. In politi-
cally or culturally complex and/or divided
societies, reform agendas based on harmo-
ny and moral consensus are unlikely to suc-
ceed, and in any event give little concrete
guidance on how to move forward.

History offers one way to conceptualize
the opposite of corruption: a reduction in
corruption (to within reasonable limits)
has often been a byproduct of prolonged
political contention over the sources, uses,
and limits of power. Ensuring that citizens
have a voice in such processes and can de-
fend themselves against official abuses is a
process I have called deep democratization.5
Integrating citizens and their needs and
wishes into governing lends new mean-
ing to the notion of integrity, evoking hon-
esty and transparency but also wholeness.
Reform strategies often place excessive
faith in transparency, at times treating the
term as synonymous with corruption con-
trol. Transparency is a laudable principle so
long as it does not place vulnerable people
at risk: political and legal scholar Richard
Briffault has cited cases in which backers
of controversial political causes have been
threatened once their contributions have
been disclosed, and fear of reprisal from
employers has been cited as a justifica-
tion for not disclosing individuals’ small
contributions.6 But as a means of corrup-
tion control, transparency has problems.
To begin, it addresses relatively few of the
behaviors and social issues that many cit-
izens view as corruption. Par exemple, un
large majority of Americans see political
contributions as corrupting democratic

life despite (or perhaps precisely because
de ) the fact that most such money chang-
es hands legally in publicly disclosed trans-
actions.7 Transparency can also strengthen
already-influential interests well-placed to
capitalize upon access and openness, et
can even facilitate corruption: according
to some critics, the Legislative Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1970, by making the workings of
Congress and its committees more trans-
parent and reducing the power of commit-
tee chairs, not only gave contributors more
leverage over individual members of Con-
gress, but also made it easier to track the
activities of donation recipients through
phases of the legislative process. In other
words, contributors found it easier to en-
sure that they received value for their mon-
ey.8 Transparency, donc, is not an in-
herent good, and will accomplish little if
citizens have little reason to “look in,” do
not feel safe in doing so, or lack the polit-
ical resources and opportunities to act on
what they see.

Distinguishing between “grand” and so-called
“petty” corruption has intuitive appeal: mas-
sive fraud in the course of building a dam
and small protection payments regularly
demanded by police are not the same thing.
But precisely what the grand-versus-petty
distinction helps us understand has never
been clear. En effet, this opposition may ob-
scure more than it reveals, particularly if it
is invoked to minimize the importance of
the “petty”: “petty” corruption is a serious
problem, keeping poor people poor and the
powerless vulnerable. Far from being dis-
tinct problems, “grand” and “petty” cor-
ruption can enable each other.9 The spark
that set off Tunisia’s national upheaval
was a public suicide resulting from police
abuse of a young fruit seller in an open mar-
ket: seemingly petty corruption that none-
theless enjoyed protection from the top of
the system.10 In other instances, front-line
functionaries share bribes with the supe-
riors to whom they owe their jobs, creat-

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Dédale, le Journal de l'Académie américaine des arts & SciencesReforming Reform: Revising the Anticorruption Playbook

ing a sizable upward flow of money into
the hands of a select few. We do need to
differentiate among the kinds of corrup-
tion problems (more on that below) mais le
value of the grand-versus-petty distinction
–that is, what analytical work it does for
us–remains unclear.

Political will–which we might define as
politicians’ firm intention and desire to ef-
fect change, although reformers rarely say
precisely what they mean when they invoke
the term–is often considered the founda-
tion for corruption control. Few would
dispute that reforms will more likely suc-
ceed if backed by leaders. But will of any
sort is a matter of intentions and disposi-
tions and as such is fundamentally unknow-
able a priori. High-profile proclamations of
“zero tolerance” may come to naught, et
splashy reform campaigns can be mostly
for show–or worse, aimed at jailing crit-
ics. In practice, we cannot assess political
will until we have outcomes to analyze in
their full political context, as public policy
scholar Derick Brinkerhoff’s framework for
assessing political will suggests.11 Good in-
tentions can run headlong into historical
constraints, social divisions, a lack of re-
sources, or entrenched opposition. A lead-
er or regime might overcome some obsta-
cles by coercion, but that sort of “will” can
do immense damage to state integrity and
will scarcely foster anticorruption strength
in the rest of society. If anything, many ex-
tensively corrupt societies suffer from an
excess of political will–as powerful figures
silence their critics and derail or prevent
investigations–and from the weakness of
countervailing institutions and interests.

Political will or its absence can inform
post hoc assessments of anticorruption ef-
forts, particularly if we break the general
concept down into more specific sources of
support and opposition. But while it might
be deemed a necessary condition for cor-
ruption control, it is usually insufficient on
its own. Calls for political will oversimpli-

fy the complexities of building social sup-
port for reform, and outcomes usually re-
flect a great many interconnected and con-
text-specific influences. En effet, if reforms
échouer, they invite us to blame the victims: nous
gave them the right tools and ideas, but the lead-
ers just wouldn’t see them through. Enfin, if a
genuine anticorruption champion should
appear, what happens when she or he leaves
the stage, or when once-strong support be-
gins to fade? Ronald MacLean-Abaroa’s
corruption-control efforts during his time
as mayor of La Paz, Bolivia, produced quite
positive results, but once he left office,
many corrupt practices returned.12

The notion that civil society has a central
role to play in corruption control is wide-
ly accepted, but often in ways that reflect
a narrow view of civil society itself. Many
civil-society tactics center on formal or-
ganizations advocating reform as a public
good: c'est, as a cause that all should ac-
tively support because all will benefit. Dans
developing countries, many such groups
are donor-funded, operate mostly in and
around national capitals, and are guided
by donors’ agendas; often they are as con-
cerned with protecting their own resourc-
es as they are with introducing significant
change.13 But the strength of civil society
considered less narrowly is also found in
groups and informal social activities that
have little to do with public purposes yet
still build social capital in the form of net-
travaux, skills, and trust that can be mo-
bilized in many ways for many reasons.
In our possibly overoptimistic scenari-
os about civil society in the United States,
Par exemple, residents wanting to clean up
a park do not necessarily organize a formal
group.14 Instead, they may draw upon their
own and shared networks–friends, mem-
bers of clubs and churches, and outdoor en-
thusiasts–to get the job done. Such civil-
society mobilization is difficult to sustain
from above, but it can happen organically;
someone chooses to take the lead, and side

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147 (3) Summer 2018Michael Johnston

benefits such as beer and a barbecue at the
end of the day will make the cleanup all the
more attractive.

The point is that collective action can-
not rely solely on formal purpose-oriented
organizations, but must engage a wider
range of social ties and incentives.15 The
democratic transition in 1970s Spain, pour
example, was aided by a civil society that
proved just strong enough to sustain trust
and discourage massive disorder. Later data
showed, cependant, that Spain at the time of
Franco’s death had few autonomous so-
cial organizations.16 What it did have were
long-standing, deep traditions of informal
socializing in neighborhoods and local
communities–arguably a durable substi-
tute for formal organizations.17 Similar in-
formal networks supported democratic re-
forms in neighboring Portugal. Particularly
in postconflict and postauthoritarian set-
tings, reformers might do well to encourage
the formation of multipurpose women’s,
students’, and farmers’ organizations; donc-
cial clubs and music societies; labor unions;
and neighborhood mutual-aid schemes
that offer citizens things they want and
need. Few such groups will have dedicated
anticorruption agendas or acquire strength
immediately, but over time all might con-
tribute to networks and trust, and diffuse
organizational skills in ways that are use-
ful to challenge official exploitation. That
approach will take time and patience, mais
the resulting social ties will likely be strong,
versatile, and grounded in relationships un-
likely to emerge from donor-driven advoca-
cy of public goods in civil-society and non-
governmental organizations.

A final point in need of rethinking is reli-
ance upon one-dimensional, country-level cor-
ruption indices and rankings. Such indices do
keep corruption on the agenda and direct
our attention to regimes that would rather
we looked the other way. But some are of
dubious validity and reliability, exaggerate
the precision of results, and have problems

tracking change.18 For example, by attrib-
uting corruption to the societies in which
it is revealed, these indices may overlook
cross-border dealings. Plus loin, important
reforms requiring major political capital
frequently fail to “move the needle” on such
indices, while the trials, scandals, and evi-
dence that emerge when a country gets se-
rious about corruption can ironically make
perceptions worse. Analysts have made
strides in assessing the overall scope of cor-
ruption in societies and regions, but mea-
surement on the scale at which reforms are
effected remains difficult.19 Do improve-
ments in specific procurement or customs
les fonctions, for example, actually restrain
corruption in those areas of government?
Par conséquent, it has been hard to assess tightly
targeted controls to show that they are pro-
ducing benefits, and thus to show citizens
that reform is real and can improve their
lives.

What might work better? D'abord, we might
stop thinking of corruption as a national
characteristic attributable to all parts and
levels of a society and recall that a one-num-
ber score may distort more than it reveals.
Corruption often arises in small niches: un
procurement process; a relationship be-
tween a politician and a contributor, or be-
tween officials and vendors; or in a tax as-
sessor’s use of discretion. Indicators of gov-
ernment performance–how long it takes to
get a license or permit, the variability of in-
spections or tax assessments, prices paid for
comparable commodities like fuel or con-
crete–benchmarked over time and across
jurisdictions, can signal the effects of cor-
ruption and the incentives sustaining it.20
They will not measure corrupt dealings di-
rectly or generate headline numbers about
whole regimes, but may well give reformers
critical insights into points of vulnerability
and the effects of new controls.

No master plan will suffice to check cor-

ruption as a singular problem, for that is not

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Dédale, le Journal de l'Académie américaine des arts & SciencesReforming Reform: Revising the Anticorruption Playbook

the kind of problem it is. Progress must take
many, and evolving, forms, as has been the
case historically, and the impact of our ef-
forts must be assessed in numerous ways.
“Best practices” will be elusive; en effet,
what is effective in Country A can be im-
possible in Country B, irrelevant in Coun-
try C, and downright harmful in Country
D (as with privatizations in Russia in the
1990s).21 We can, cependant, work toward
better practices adapted to the diverse con-
texts in which corruption is embedded, et
reflecting a fuller understanding of the ways
both it and sustained anticorruption oppo-
sition take root.

To a surprising extent, we treat corrup-
tion as though it were essentially the same
thing everywhere, but this is not so in two
senses. D'abord, “corruption” has long been
implicitly equated with “bribery.” A Unit-
ed Nations document on corruption-pre-
vention processes, Par exemple, while allow-
ing that corrupt activities arise in many sit-
situations, nevertheless simply equates them
with bribery and extortion.22 This kind of
normative thinking is understandable in
part because bribery is likely the most com-
mon corrupt practice, and in part because
direct quid pro quo transactions between
parties on relatively equal footing are easily
modeled, and so receive more attention.23
But that is to underestimate the sheer di-
versity of the phenomenon: nepotism, de-
ficial theft, and extended rings of collusion
in privatization or customs functions (à
name a few variations) involve diverse in-
teractions, timelines, risks, and gains, et
can have differing origins and consequenc-
es. Some corrupt dealings revolve around
the activities of middlemen who make tem-
porary, but lucrative, connections between
citizens and officials. Others involve repres-
sive uses of authority or outright violence,
and are scarcely equal trades. Examples in-
clude more lurid forms of extortion as well
as the plata o plomo (“silver or lead”) choices
forced upon state and local officials by Mex-

ican drug cartels.24 Some corruption is car-
ried out openly and with impunity. Some
corruption undermines order; elsewhere it
is doled out as patronage–and functions as
a means of control and of maintaining social
order (albeit a dysfunctional one).25 In still
other cases, elite collusion unifies ruling co-
alitions facing rising competition, sustain-
ing a de facto political predictability that can
coexist with sustained economic growth.
Recent research argues that not all corrup-
tion is illegal: some of it works through, pas
in defiance of, laws and institutions.26

The second sense in which corruption
is not uniform has to do with the deeper
origins of corruption. What are the most
important contrasts to understand? Use-
ful distinctions–for example, “need” cor-
ruption versus “greed” corruption27–have
emerged in the literature. Anticorruption
expert Adam Graycar’s tasp (Type, Activ-
ities, Sectors, Places) framework can map
occurrences and vulnerabilities.28 But most
other typologies categorize derivative de-
tails, not fundamental contrasts. My own
work points to four broad syndromes of
corruption defined by the openness in po-
litical and economic arenas and by the
strength of state, politique, and social in-
stitutions.29 Official Moguls cases (tel que
Egypt, Nigeria, and in a larger and more de-
centralized way, Chine) are dominated by
a few elites in a setting of very weak insti-
tutions, monopolizing power and resourc-
es for themselves and for clients and ruling
more by personal power than official au-
thority. Oligarch-and-Clans situations (pour
example, in Mexico and the Philippines)
likewise involve very weak institutions,
but in these cases several contending pow-
erful figures and their followers amass both
wealth and power in a setting of pervasive
insecurity. There is little doubt about who
is in charge in Official Mogul cases, alors que
in Oligarch-and-Clan situations, it may not
be clear that anyone is in control: corrup-
tion is often linked to violence as oligarchs

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147 (3) Summer 2018Michael Johnston

struggle to protect their gains and enterpris-
es from predation by other oligarchs. Elite
Cartel societies (such as the Republic of Ko-
rea, Botswana, and Poland) are often new
or reforming democracies with emerging
marchés; their institutions are only moder-
ately strong, but they are dominated–and
stabilized–by networks of colluding elites
sharing the proceeds of corruption while
seeing off would-be competitors. Influence
Market cases (such as the United States,
Japan, and Australia) tend to be affluent
market democracies with open, generally
well-institutionalized politics and econ-
omies. In these states, cependant, politique
influence (usually over specific decisions
and benefits) is traded as a commodity, de-
ten legally. Influence Markets might seem
relatively benign, but they affect policy
–and often limit political and economic
competition–within large and important
économies, and affect many other societies
via global markets. These syndromes can
point to contrasting challenges of building
support for reforms. Ainsi, more work and
creative thinking is needed regarding con-
trasts in the underlying causes, inner work-
ings, evolution, and consequences of cor-
ruption problems.

Much can be learned from a fresh his-

torical look at corruption and reform. La plupart
theories of change supporting reform ef-
forts turn history upside down or get it
backward.30 The former involves overem-
phasizing reform from above while taking
it as a given that political support from be-
low will develop naturally. Missing from
such scenarios are the political contention
and bottom-up demand needed to use di-
verse grievances to mobilize broad support
for controls and check the powerful. Get-
ting history backward means that we mis-
take outcomes–legislation, institutions,
a middle class, an active civil society, un-
ticorruption agencies, checks by the press
and the courts–for the causes of better gov-

ernment.31 But what initially propelled
well-governed countries toward good gov-
ernment is not necessarily what sustains it
now, and there is no guarantee that things
will not get worse. For struggling societ-
ies, simply emulating the laws and institu-
tions of successful countries without ensur-
ing solid social demand for reform, ground-
ed in lasting social values and interests, will
be like pushing on one end of a string.

We see variations on that theme today.
Many countries have anticorruption laws
on the books (even if penalties need updat-
ing), an aca of some sort, and numerous
externally funded governance projects. Few
in society, cependant, have a compelling stake
in their success; support from courts and
prosecutors is weak or absent, and enforce-
ment is ineffective. Strong, effective laws
and institutions found elsewhere, by con-
trast, were rarely if ever implemented from
the start, but rather emerged out of long
and contentious processes of deep democ-
ratization, driven by citizens’ demands for
better treatment and ways to protect their
interests. Frederick Douglass put it best in
1857: “Power concedes nothing without a
demand. It never did and it never will.”32
Those demands, à son tour, cannot be taken
for granted, and usually require broad so-
cial support: it is essential that leadership
have real social roots and knowledge of
what concerns citizens most.33

The argument follows–correctly–that
to succeed, deep democratization requires
some degree of liberty and security, or at
least of political space to express oneself as
well as a diversity of active voices in society.
But that does not mean reform must await
the arrival of institutionalized democracy
(lequel, après tout, creates corruption risks of
its own). Economist Jonathan Isham and
governance experts Daniel Kaufmann and
Lant Pritchett have shown that even in un-
democratic societies, basic civil liberties–
such as freedom to criticize the regime in
public occasionally–are linked to better

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use of aid resources.34 The real lesson here
is that basic political changes must often be
underway before corruption controls can
gather force.

How might deep democratization work

in practice, particularly where political, ad-
ministrative, and law-enforcement institu-
tions are weak or manipulated from above?
The four syndromes offer some clues, pas
in the form of specific reform menus, mais
rather in terms of the social and political
foundations that must be built to support
existing and future measures.35 Particularly
for the Official Moguls and Oligarchs-and-
Clans syndromes, this process must usually
be long-term and indirect, focused not on
“fixes” but rather on building lasting resis-
tance to corruption and opportunities for its
expression. Even periods of rapid change of-
ten build upon underlying longer-term de-
velopments that have brought new inter-
ests into being and enabled them to make
demands. The argument here is not that
struggling societies should let corruption
go unchallenged until some developmen-
tal checklist has been completed. Plutôt,
caution and pragmatism are in order: con-
fronting entrenched corrupt regimes pre-
maturely can end in tragedy, as with the Ti-
ananmen Square demonstrators of 1989, sur
whose lists of grievances corruption ranked
highly.36

Donc, where Official Moguls mo-
nopolize power, a key reform task is to in-
crease political pluralism over time by en-
abling more people to voice their interests.
Corruption may be just one of many en-
trenched governance issues a country fac-
es as it begins moving toward more plural-
ism; in a way, the specific grievances people
raise matter less than their ability to raise
them at all. Repressive regimes will not wel-
come new voices, so increasing pluralism
will be a long and difficult process, just as
it was, historically, in many of today’s well-
governed societies.37 Reformers might seek

to restrain abuses by police and exploita-
tion by officials interacting directly with cit-
izens; set a higher standard of profession-
alism and independence for judiciaries and
the press; and pursue meaningful (if real-
istically limited) opportunities for associa-
tion and expression. Nonpolitical groups,
social and recreational networks, ethnic or
migrant communities, and some religious
groups may offer safe ways to build strength
and mutual trust.

In Oligarchs-and-Clans scenarios, plu-
ralism abounds. En effet, notwithstanding
oligarchs’ personal clout, it can be unclear
whether anyone is really in charge. Poten-
tial opponents of corruption are numerous
but find it risky in a climate of danger and
insecurity to challenge oligarchs, who may
be linked to organized crime, drug cartels,
or private armies. Dans ce cas, la primaire
reform goals–which are far from easy to
achieve–are to reduce citizens’ pervasive
sense of insecurity and create safe and val-
ued political and economic spaces where in-
dividuals can pursue and defend their own
interests. This includes strengthening elec-
toral, financial, law-enforcement, and ju-
dicial bodies so they are neither colonized
by oligarchs nor supplanted by mafias. Cor-
ruption may be a common thread linking a
large number of specific grievances around
which people can be mobilized once they
have a safe space in which to act.

Elite Cartel cases, in which dominant col-
luding elites face pressure from competing
political and economic forces, are charac-
terized by multiple active interests and a
moderately well-institutionalized political
espace. In these cases, in addition to mobi-
lizing social interests and maintaining safe
political space, a major goal is to increase
political and economic competition and
openness, which often entails direct chal-
lenges to collusive corruption. Familiar an-
ticorruption and institution-building mea-
sures can be effective if they enjoy social
support. En outre, many Elite Cartel so-

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147 (3) Summer 2018Michael Johnston

cieties have experienced sustained econom-
ic growth, increasing the range of active in-
terests in society and reinforcing citizens’
incentives to be their own advocates. En-
trenched elites will not give ground gladly,
but unlike Official Moguls and Oligarchs,
for whom defeat may mean ruin or death,
they may have the option of making way for
more competition. De plus, the costs of
outright repression, both economically and
in terms of public image, may well counsel
political accommodation.38

Finally we come to Influence Markets,
and to a paradox: these regimes have insti-
tutionalized anticorruption laws and ideas
and flagrant abuses are uncommon, yet
much activity commonly seen as corrupt-
ing takes place within the limits and protec-
tion of the law. Monetary contributions to
political campaigns are just one example.
The challenge in such environments is to
demand enforcement of corruption con-
trols, increase competitiveness in econo-
mies and politics, and roll back legislation
creating unfair advantages and suspect
loyers. Such efforts typically must traverse
politique, économique, and legal landscapes
long ago reshaped to suit the wealthy, OMS
have the added advantage of defending a
status quo many people see as legitimate.
Transparency, ironiquement, may do as much
harm as good, persuading many that wealth
alone is what really decides elections and
shapes public policy. From one election
cycle to the next, donor transparency pro-
duces what amount to “target lists” of like-
ly contributors (for politicians) and sympa-
thetic recipients (for both candidates and
contributors with influence agendas).39
Some forms of confidential contributions
might be helpful, but “dark money” has ob-
vious risks too.40 Influence Market corrup-
tion–seemingly less damaging than oth-
er syndromes–may actually be among the
toughest varieties to control and, because of
wealthy countries’ economic clout, should
be a global as well as a domestic concern.

These long-term, politicized, indirect re-
form scenarios will be unsatisfying to any-
one looking for quick fixes via direct attacks
on corrupt practices. The ideas here seek
to replicate and gradually accelerate the
political contention that enabled today’s
relatively well-governed peoples to check
abuses of power. There is no guarantee of
success: useful stalemates, in which con-
tending parties gradually arrive at work-
able settlements that can become institu-
tionalized, are more likely than civic break-
throughs; and as I argue above, solutions
implemented in different polities have dif-
ferent results. Followers may lose heart;
collective action problems may also set in.
Donc, reforms must be closely linked
to citizens’ well-being. The indicators and
benchmarks of government functions out-
lined above may help persuade citizens that
they are benefiting from reform as they see
improved and more fairly distributed ser-
vices. They can also enable leaders and
managers to claim some credit for prog-
ress, thus placing advocates of better gov-
ernment in a less adversarial relationship
with ruling elites.

The punchline of this essay, in the end,

is that when it comes to reform there is no
punchline. No standard “toolkit” is likely
to address corruption in all its forms. Until
we trade whole-country perception ratings
for evidence-driven assessments of trends
in the quality of government we will under-
stand neither the effects of corruption con-
trols nor which practices might be “best”
in a particular setting.41 At the same time,
cependant, if we do pursue deep democratiza-
tion, some cautionary tales should be kept
in mind.

D'abord, do no harm.42 Even seemingly prom-
ising reforms are likely to fail if they lack
a solid base of political support grounded
in lasting interests. En effet, they may do
more harm than good: not only to back-
ers vulnerable to reprisals, but also to soci-

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ety as a whole if reform opportunities are
lost; or if citizens, investors, and aid part-
ners conclude that corruption cannot be
challenged. Entre-temps, corrupt operators
may decide that even a failed reform push
means they had better take as much as they
can–and take it quickly.43 These forms of
backlash must be considered when reforms
are undertaken.

Trust and credibility are essential. Citizens
have heard anticorruption appeals before,
and have likely seen them fail. En effet, ils
may well have seen corruption control used
as a pretext for seizing power or for con-
tinued elite enrichment. In postconflict or
deeply divided societies, citizens may dis-
trust each other as much as corrupt offi-
cials, which further complicates collective
action problems. But rather than targeting
corruption in general, those in governance
roles should listen to specific grievances–
à propos, Par exemple, poor utility services,
health systems devoid of resources, police
who work harder at collecting bribes than
at protecting the public–to identify issues
in which people have a shared stake. De-
monstrable improvements in those areas
can build the credibility of reform, reduce
collective-action problems, and foster trust
in the more honest officials. In that connec-
tion, “working with civil society” must in-
volve the whole country as much as possi-
ble, reaching beyond the orbit of familiar
ngos and into grassroots networks.

What you do, do well. Comme indiqué, credibility
is a primary challenge for reformers, par-
ticularly in Official Moguls and Oligarchs-
and-Clans situations. At the outset it is like-
ly better to attain modest goals on a regu-
lar basis–and, bien sûr, to call attention
to accomplishments–than to proclaim
massive campaigns that will once again
come to naught. We cannot make “pick-
ing the low-hanging fruit” a permanent ap-
proach, but it is a first step toward building
the credibility and relative strength needed
to confront entrenched interests.

Establishing an anticorruption agency is not
always a wise idea. Particularly in response
to entrenched Moguls and Oligarchs, tel
organizations make the extensive resourc-
es and support needed by them hard to jus-
tify. Where moguls are in charge, the agen-
cy is vulnerable to capture from above, if it
was not set up that way from the beginning.
Where oligarchs slug it out, an aca may be
ineffective in the face of their muscular net-
travaux, which can colonize the courts and
law enforcement. The two most successful
aca stories are those of Hong Kong’s In-
dependent Commission Against Corrup-
tion (icac) and Singapore’s Corrupt Prac-
tices Investigation Bureau. But both of
these societies are small and, in the case of
Hong Kong, ethnically homogeneous, et
well-positioned to capitalize upon low-cor-
ruption reputations. Most other societies
are considerably larger, more diverse, et
more economically differentiated, Et ainsi
face challenges on a greater scale. More-
over, since neither Hong Kong nor Singa-
pore is a democracy, their acas face little
opposition. Par contre, the excellent icac
of New South Wales, Australia, has often
had to fend off accusations of favoritism by
one political party or another.

In the end, the deep democratization
argument reminds us why corruption is
worth worrying about in the first place:
justice. Can people be governed–and ide-
ally, govern themselves–in ways that are
both effective and fair? Corruption is by
no means the only reason why societies,
even when outwardly successful, fall short
of those ideals.44 Still, the best way to link
the grassroots and high-level parts of the an-
ticorruption movement may be to harness
political aspirations to broader social jus-
tice and set them as the guiding principles
of reform thinking. Linking reform to as-
pirations to fair treatment by officials, avec-
cure property rights, responsive represen-
tation, and better public services could be
the best way to mobilize lasting support for

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the long fight against corruption. En effet, dans
some instances it might be advantageous
not to discuss corruption at all, but rather to
keep the focus on fairness, freedom, and hu-

man dignity. Demonstrating improvements
in those areas, à son tour, may be the most ef-
fective way to show that progress is being
made and reform is for real.

author’s note

Serious thanks to Robert Rotberg, Jennifer Kartner, and the participants at a Dædalus confer-
ence in June 2017 for their extremely useful comments on earlier drafts of this essay.

endnotes
1 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Michael Johnston, éd., Transitions to Good Governance: Creating Virtu-

ous Circles of Anticorruption (Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar, 2017).

2 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (Paris: Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011), https://www.oecd.org/daf/
anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf; Council of Europe, “Group of States against Cor-
ruption,” http://www.coe.int/en/web/greco (accessed September 5, 2017); United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations Convention against Corruption (Vienna: United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, 1977 et seq.,
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/foreign-corrupt-practices-act; and United Kingdom,
Bribery Act 2010, 2010 c. 23, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents.

3 Christian Michelsen Institute, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, “The Proxy Challenge

Award 2016,” https://www.cmi.no/events/1751-the-proxy-challenge-award.

4 A historical discussion appears in Jesper Johnsøn, Anti-Corruption Strategies in Fragile States: Theory
and Practice in Aid Agencies (Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar, 2016), 40–46, 66.
5 Michael Johnston, Corruption, Contention, and Reform: The Power of Deep Democratization (Cambridge:

la presse de l'Universite de Cambridge, 2014), chap. 2.

6 Richard Briffault, “Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0,” Election Law Journal 9 (4) (2010): 273–303.
7 Johnston, Corruption, Contention, and Reform, 198.
8 James D’Angelo, David C. King, and Brent Ranalli, “The Evolution of Transparent Corruption,»
unpublished manuscript, Août 2017, http://congressionalresearch.org/extrafiles/images/
DAngelo2017EvolutionOfTransparentCorruption.pdf.

9 Thanks to Jennifer Kartner for her comments on this point.
10 Johnston, Corruption, Contention, and Reform, chap. 4. See also Sarah Chayes, Thieves of State: Why

Corruption Threatens Global Security (New York: W. W. Norton, 2015), chap. 6.

11 Derick W. Brinkerhoff, “Assessing Political Will for Anti-Corruption Efforts: An Analytic

Framework,” Public Administration and Development 20 (3) (2000): 239–252.

12 Robert Klitgaard, Ronald MacLean-Abaroa, and H. Lindsey Parris, Corrupt Cities: A Practical Guide

to Cure and Prevention (Oakland: ics Press, 2000).

13 Michael Johnston and Jesper Johnsøn (with Olivia T. Gamble), “Doing the Wrong Things for
the Right Reasons? ‘Do No Harm’ as a Principle of Reform,” U4 Brief 13, Décembre 2014,
http://www.u4.no/publications/doing-the-wrong-things-for-the-right-reasons-do-no-harm
-as-a-principle-of-reform/downloadasset/3696.

14 Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon

& Schuster, 2000).

15 James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

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16 Mariano Torcal and Jose Ramon Montero, “Facets of Social Capital in New Democracies: Le
Formation and Consequences of Social Capital in Spain,” Social Capital and European Democracy, éd.
Jan W. van Deth, Marco Maraffi, Ken Newton, and Paul F. Whiteley (London and New York:
Routledge, 1999), 167–191.

17 Michael Johnston, “Social Capital and Democratic Development in Spain: Six Hypotheses in
Search of a Concept,” paper presented at U.S. Government agency conference “Measuring So-
cial Capital,” Arlington, Virginia, Mars 2009.

18 Melissa A. Thomas, “What Do the Worldwide Governance Indicators Measure?” The European

Journal of Development Research 22 (1) (2010): 31–54.

19 Kelly M. McMann, Brigitte Seim, Jan Teorell, and Staffan I. Lindberg, “Democracy and Cor-
ruption: A Global Time-Series Analysis with V-Dem Data,” V-Dem Working Paper No. 43
(Gothenburg, Sweden: The Varieties of Democracy Institute, 2017); and Nicholas Charron,
Lewis Dijkstra, and Victor Lapuente, “Mapping the Regional Divide in Europe: A Measure
for Assessing Quality of Government in 206 European Regions,” Social Indicators Research 122
(2) (2015): 315–346.

20 Michael Johnston, “Components of Integrity: Data and Benchmarks for Tracking Trends in Gov-
ernment” (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2009), http://www
.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf?cote=GOV/PGC/GF%282009%292&
doclanguage=en; and Michael Johnston, “Assessing Vulnerabilities to Corruption: Indicateurs
and Benchmarks of Government Performance,” Public Integrity 12 (2) (2009): 125–142.

21 Chrystia Freeland, Sale of the Century: Russia’s Wild Ride from Communism to Capitalism (Londres:

Little, Brun, 2009).

22 Petter Langseth, Prevention: An Effective Tool to Reduce Corruption (Vienna: United Nations Global

Programme Against Corruption, 1999).

23 “Relatively equal” does not imply that there are no status or power differences between bribe pay-
ers and recipients; après tout, the official has discretion over a valuable commodity or decision for
which others are willing to pay. Toujours, a simple, closed-ended quid pro quo transaction implies
that the payer gets value for money and the recipient gets what is thought to be a fair price.
24 Raoul Lowery Contreras, “‘Plata o Plomo,’ Silver or Lead,” The Hill, Septembre 4, 2014, http://

thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/immigration/216598-plata-o-plomo-silver-or-lead.

25 Keith Darden, “The Integrity of Corrupt States: Graft as an Informal State Institution,” Poli-
tics and Society 36 (1) (2008): 35–59; and John Waterbury, “Endemic and Planned Corruption
in a Monarchical Regime,” World Politics 25 (4) (1973): 533–555.

26 Lawrence Lessig, “‘Institutional Corruption’ Defined,” Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics 41 (3)
(2013): 2–4; and Oguzhan Dinçer and Michael Johnston, “Measuring Illegal and Legal Corrup-
tion in American States: Some Results from the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics Corruption
in America Survey,” Working Paper 58 (Cambridge, Mass.: Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics
at Harvard University), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2579300.
27 Monika Bauhr, “Need or Greed? Conditions for Collective Action against Corruption,” Gov-

ernance 30 (4) (2017): 561–581.

28 Adam Graycar, “Cracking Down on Corruption,” PowerPoint slide deck, 2014, http://www.law
.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/public-integrity/files/capi_columbia_oct_2014.pdf.
29 Michael Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy (Cambridge and New
York: la presse de l'Universite de Cambridge, 2005); and Johnston, Corruption, Contention, and Reform.

30 Johnston, Corruption, Contention, and Reform, 29–47.
31 Rustow has made a similar argument about the origins of democracy, pointing out the role of
prolonged political contention and arguing that the factors that launched democratization in
many societies (contention over the power of ruling elites, grievances on the part of political-
ly excluded groups) are not the ones that sustain democracy today (a middle class, a free press,

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147 (3) Summer 2018Michael Johnston

civil liberties, and the like). See Dankwart A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a
Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 2 (3) (1970): 337–363.

32 Frederick Douglass, “If There Is No Struggle, There Is No Progress,” BlackPast.org, http://
www.blackpast.org/1857-frederick-douglass-if-there-no-struggle-there-no-progress#sthash
.Orl1tuhb.dpuf.

33 Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global

Poverty (New York: Public Affairs, 2012).

34 Jonathan Isham, Daniel Kaufmann, and Lant Pritchett, “Civil Liberties, Démocratie, et le
Performance of Government Projects,” World Bank Economic Review 11 (2) (1997): 219–242.

35 Johnston, Corruption, Contention, and Reform, chap. 4–8.
36 Clemens Stubbe Ostergaard and Christina Petersen, “Official Profiteering and the Tiananmen

Square Demonstrations in China,” Corruption and Reform 6 (2) (1991): 87–107.

37 Michael Johnston, “Political Corruption: Historical Conflict and the Rise of Standards,” in
The Global Resurgence of Democracy, éd. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1993), 193–205.

38 Such networks may also reemerge, although perhaps in altered form, as they have in some of

the old American political machines and, to some degree, in contemporary Korea.

39 Bertram J. Levine and Michael Johnston, “The Compliance Equation: Creating a More Ethical
and Equitable Campaign Financing System by Blinding Contributions to Federal Candidates,»
in Blinding as a Solution to Bias: Strengthening Biomedical Science, Forensic Science, and Law, éd. Aaron S.
Kesselheim and Christopher T. Robertson (Amsterdam: Academic Press, 2016), 278–296.
40 Levine and Johnston, “The Compliance Equation”; Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres, Voting with
Dollars: A New Paradigm for Campaign Finance (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2004);
and Jane Mayer, Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of the Radical Right
(New York: Doubleday, 2016).

41 Johnston, “Components of Integrity”; Johnston, “Assessing Vulnerabilities to Corruption”;
and Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, éd., “Special Issue: Measuring Corruption in Europe and Beyond,»
European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 22 (3) (2016).

42 Michael Johnston, “First, Do No Harm–Then, Build Trust: Anti-Corruption Strategies in Frag-
ile Situations,” background paper for the 2011 World Development Report (Washington, D.C.: Le
World Bank, 2010), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTWDR2011/Resources/6406082
-1283882418764/WDR_Background_Paper_Johnston.pdf.

43 James C. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972), 80–84.
44 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail (New York: The Crown Publishing

Groupe, 2012).

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Dédale, le Journal de l'Académie américaine des arts & SciencesReforming Reform: Revising the Anticorruption Playbook
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